

reaction to his timidity. The removal of troops from Moultrie to Sumter, the firing on the "Star of the West," and the formation of the Confederacy all, according to the author, increased Northern unity. The conflicts in Congress and the failures to make any progress toward compromise increased this unanimity of sentiment. But even more effective, according to Mr. Stamp, were the cogent arguments presented to convince the people that disunion would bring permanent injury to them. The danger of cutting off the Northern navigation of the Mississippi, the loss of the Southern markets, the difficulty of enforcing the tariff because of the long Southern free trade border, and the danger of repudiation of Northern debts in the South were emphasized. Added to these economic arguments, he reveals, many insisted that secession would destroy the subsequent effectiveness of the Union of Northern states, destroy the growing nationalism, and admit to the rest of the world that the American experiment in democracy was a failure. Some hoped to win and remake the South so that it would be more like the North. In short, they had become crusaders who in fighting a holy cause for the North, the South, and the world were also helping themselves materially.

Mr. Stamp shows that compromise was never a real possibility because the North, including Democrats, was never willing to make any significant concessions; and the South was unwilling to remain in the Union unless the North acquiesced in slavery expansion and in the elimination of economic inequalities.

This is a revealing study of this controversial period which in recent years has been treated by many scholars. Although he covers familiar ground and adds little that is entirely new (most of the last two chapters were previously published in the *Journal of Southern History*), he makes clearer through his exhaustive study of Northern public opinion why secession was resisted. His is a sound and objective study which is based on exhaustive and careful research.

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Cracker Parties. By Horace Montgomery. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950, pp. x, 278. Bibliography and index. \$4.00.)

State party battles in the South during the late antebellum period were never dull affairs. Purposeful or scheming politicians, of national prominence or only local fame, zealous or notoriety-hungry editors, champions of national sovereignty, defenders of state and local rights—all were fierce antagonists for their several causes and some descended to cheap sensationalism in their ungraceful attempts to attract the public eye. And Georgia, during the whole of the period, through the intensity and vehemence of its factional and party battles occupied the center of the Southern arena.

The central theme of Georgia politics during this somewhat fantastic political era was the growing influence and power of the Democratic party, but the Jacksonian democratic dogmas of the 1840's slowly merged, by the end of the 1850's, with the credos of John C. Calhoun. During this period of change many of the old leaders of Democracy suffered the agonies of the cross and had it not been for the pressing issue of slavery it is quite possible that numbers of them would have attended the Chicago Convention of 1860 rather than the convention which met in Charleston. As it was, frustrated, uncertain of what their course of action should be, and despairing of saving the old Union, they became the secessionists of 1861 and appealed to the sword.

But during the whole period the spirit and interests of localism and local politics guided the steps of many Georgia leaders. When the editor of the Milledgeville (Ga.) *Federal Union* wrote on October 31, 1854, "while the North is rallying for the battle, we are up to our ears in a petty dispute as to whether some minor Post Office at the North . . . is filled by a man who has not, some time in his past life, advocated Free Soil sentiments," he had hit upon the touchstone of Southern political life during the 1850's. But he should have included the statement that the South, at the same time, was just as much concerned over the postmastership in Milledgeville or Natchez or Fredericksburg. The average Southerner, during the entire decade, was more interested in local matters than he was in the more fundamental and important differences between the North and South. The campaigns for Southern political unity never attained their goal, even during the critical days of 1863 and 1864.

Professor Montgomery's work admirably and succinctly summarizes the factional and party battles in Georgia during

the last decade when the finality of secession was slowly maturing. Drawn from a great variety of sources (though the student of political history would have wished for the availability of more private unpublished or published sources), the author traces his chronological way without getting lost in the vast maze of trivia which could easily have engulfed and trapped him. His work for Georgia should be duplicated for each of the Southern states.

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Edwin Adams Davis

South Carolina Goes to War, 1860-1865. By Charles Edward Cauthen. Volume 32 in the James Sprunt *Studies in History and Political Science*. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1950, vii, 256. Bibliography and index. \$1.25.)

South Carolina Goes to War, 1860-1865 is a political history of the state that contributed more than any other to the disunion movement. The weight of this responsibility rested heavily upon the South Carolina leaders. Men whose temperament and background fitted them for the role of critical opposition or factious dissent were constrained to urge co-operation with the other states in the Confederacy to defeat the common enemy. The spirit of localism, support of state at the expense of Confederate measures, and indifference or resistance to the war regardless of the authorities conducting it appeared in South Carolina later and to a less degree than in some of the other states.

The bombardment of Fort Sumter comes midway in this book. The first half, an account of how South Carolina became involved in war, stresses conflicting issues and leaders. The second half, a story of what the state did after the war arrived, is primarily about governmental organization and operations, although politics during the war period is not ignored. One of the best chapters is on the relationship of various leaders and factions to the Davis government.

Mr. Cauthen's competent and thorough scholarship may be accepted as authoritative on the various topics he treats, except perhaps for the introductory summary of the historical origins of the secession movement. His chapters on the presidential election of 1860, the decision of South Carolina