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The Tennessee River Campaign and Anna Ella Carroll

*Kenneth P. Williams**

It was not Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses Grant, or any other general who devised some of the most important Federal strategy in the Civil War. It was Anna Ella Carroll. Such is the startling claim that has been circulated of late. Nothing that has been done to make Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, James E. B. Stuart, and others great heroes for the South, compares with this effort to give the North a heroine to bow before. Though Miss Carroll's promoters cannot portray a young girl who donned armor, mounted a horse, and with upraised sword led armies in battle in the fashion of Joan of Arc, they give her very intriguing qualities—mystery and anonymity.

While Joan received her inspiration from unembodied voices, Anna—so the story goes—was launched on her career by voices in the Senate. Though the seats of the seceding states were vacant during the crucial special session of July, 1861, John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, recently vice-president and the candidate for the presidency favored in the South in the last election, returned to the floor to denounce the other native of Kentucky, who had defeated him at the polls.¹ Seated in the balcony, Anna Carroll heard Lincoln severely criticized, and believing the President should be defended, wrote a reply to Breckinridge. She took it to Assistant Secretary of War Thomas Scott, who thought it would do the Union cause much good. If Miss Carroll would have

* Kenneth P. Williams is professor of mathematics at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. The paper was read at the dinner of the Society for the Libraries of New York University on April 28, 1950, on the occasion of the presentation of the society's gold medal.

¹ Though Breckinridge carried ten Southern States, including Delaware and Maryland, he did not carry Kentucky, Tennessee, or Virginia, all of which went to Bell.

her paper printed and distributed, the government would surely reward her properly, said Thomas Scott.² So Miss Carroll—daughter of a governor of Maryland—became a pamphleteer.

Since Lincoln was now provided with answers to the forays of his fellow Kentuckian, and since there was great turmoil in Missouri, Miss Carroll went to St. Louis in October in order to gain firsthand knowledge of the situation. She talked with a river pilot about what she believed was the contemplated Federal thrust down the Mississippi, and learned of objections to that great stream. The Tennessee River offered a far better way to enter the Confederacy. It flowed North and it would be better for gunboats to fight against the current than with it; then if they were damaged, they would float back to their friends. Naval men would not think of this, for oceans, not rivers, were their habitat, and generals could just be dismissed. Hastening back to Washington, Miss Carroll was on November 30 once more in the presence of Thomas Scott, this time as a high military strategist.³ "The President must see this," is what Scott in effect is claimed to have said after he had read the paper Miss Carroll gave him.

Lincoln at once liked the plan to use the Tennessee—the story continues—but there was a grave objection. The generals would never approve it, and it would not do to let it be known that a woman was devising military moves. Then vigorous Senator Benjamin F. Wade, presently chairman of the new Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, came to the aid of the baffled President. "That's no problem!" he remarked. "We will swear Miss Carroll to secrecy." Lincoln was delighted, and a magazine with a circulation near three million stated: "Anne Carroll agreed, and thus a great decision was made. Lincoln changed the plan of campaign to the Tennessee, and Scott was sent to assemble troops in the West. Soon the battles began. The Confederates were taken by surprise. Fort Henry fell to the Union onslaught, then Fort Donelson."⁴

² The Carroll claim in the matter was admitted by Scott, as will appear later.

³ This claim was also admitted by Scott.

⁴ Harry E. Neal, "Secret Heroine of the Civil War," *Coronet* (Chicago, 1936-), XXVI (May, 1949), 148-152. Quotation from pages 150-151 reprinted with permission from *Coronet*, Copyright, 1949, by Esquire, Inc.

Heroically with sealed lips Anna Carroll sat again in the balcony of Congress, but this time to hear unenlightened politicians praise Generals Grant and Henry W. Halleck, and Commodore Andrew H. Foote. Joan of Arc has something of a rival in Boadicea. But where is there a rival for the mute figure in the gallery of the capitol on that February day of 1862—if the Carroll story is indeed true?

The Carroll claim is not new. The lady herself began to push it soon after the war, and for twenty years she had memorials before Congress asking recognition and remuneration for her services. Some committees accepted her claim completely; one reported a bill giving her the pay of a major general with arrearage from November, 1861. But she nevertheless lost her case both before Congress and historians.⁵

How did it happen that a case seemingly settled should be vigorously brought to life?

In the preface to her biography of Miss Carroll, Mrs. Marjorie B. Greenbie stated that it was by chance that her eye fell on a card in the Library of Congress that bore Miss Carroll's name followed by the description, "The great, unrecognized member of Lincoln's cabinet."⁶ Her curiosity aroused by the appealing thought, Mrs. Greenbie began an investigation, believing, she said, at first, that Miss Carroll was a "pretender" with "delusions of grandeur." But her scepticism vanished, and Mrs. Greenbie became a hundred per cent believer, and on the title page of her book she gave Miss Carroll the description found on the library card, the legacy of an earlier biographer.

⁵ In the Index volume (1945) of *The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography* (34 vols., New York, 1898-1948), Miss Carroll is listed as a "strategist," and in the biographical sketch, V (1907), 193, her claim is fully recognized. Miss Carroll is not mentioned in Nicolay and Hay's ten-volume work on Lincoln, though they had full use of Lincoln's private papers, and wrote at a time when she was pressing her claim before Congress. These papers, which have been open to other people since 1947, contain nothing that supports Miss Carroll, but preserve a letter from her with which Nicolay and Hay must have been familiar, and which, as will be seen later, is extremely damaging to her claim. In *Lincoln's Secretary: A Biography of John G. Nicolay* (New York, 1949), Helen Nicolay gave (p. 312) a list of fifteen items that her father one day "scribbled" on a scrap of paper and which he deemed "questionable." In the list one finds the name Anna Ella Carroll.

⁶ *The Story of Anna Ella Carroll, the "Great Unrecognized Member of Lincoln's Cabinet"* (New York, 1940).

More recently Hollister Noble has rallied to the Carroll banner, using the novel as a vehicle that can go places inaccessible to even uninhibited and unannotated biography. His book *Woman with a Sword* reached a large circulation through The Peoples Book Club, and *Life* magazine carried its main thesis to millions.⁷ Seldom have end papers been used more effectively, and one can dwell pleasantly over the picture of Lincoln, with his tired and disturbed expression, a sheaf of papers in his hand, his tall hat on a sofa behind him, a dejected frustrated officer with head bowed in failure standing nearby, the raised face of a handsome young woman with steady gaze on the President, a shawl upon her arm, the graceful curling fingers of her raised hand inviting the troubled Lincoln to turn his problems over to her. To put romance into the story and the picture, a little subtracting was necessary in Miss Carroll's age for the outbreak of the war found her forty-six.

Woman with a Sword could be dismissed as mere fiction if its author had not insisted that it is based substantially on fact and that except for minor storytelling licenses it is true. In the book club edition he added a documentary of a dozen pages in which he described not only his investigations but put down what he claimed is an indisputable basis for his novel. A review of Noble's book in a scholarly publication spoke of his "irrefutable and documented authority," and said the book will hereafter be required reading in the Civil War period.⁸ Only to what appeared in Noble's documentary will any attention be given here.

A study of the Tennessee campaign should of course start with a careful consideration of the *Official Records*. If Miss Carroll had anything to do with the operation there should be something in the records, or some gap for her to fill. Though her recent champions traveled far and searched diligently for new information about her, they shunned the records.

The very foundation on which Miss Carroll built her case falls quickly. She claimed that until she gave her paper

⁷ The book was originally published by Doubleday & Company, New York, in 1948, and in the same year a special edition was published exclusively for members of the Peoples Book Club, Chicago, which contained a documentary of a dozen pages. "Lincoln's Lady Strategist," *Life* (Chicago, 1936-), XXV (July 26, 1948), 101-105.

⁸ Review by Carl Haverlin in *Lincoln Herald* (Harrogate, Tennessee, 1917-), L (1948), 46.

to Scott on November 30, 1861, it was intended without question to conduct an operation down the Mississippi. That such was the purpose was indeed probably believed by most persons, and it had its origin in General Winfield Scott's "Anaconda Plan." But before the end of May, 1861, the old Mexican War hero had himself given up the idea, as shown by a letter he wrote to General George B. McClellan, then commanding the Department of the Ohio.⁹ He now intended to have only a small force follow the river; the main expedition of eighty thousand men would move not far away but by land, taking fortified places on the river from the land side, the river being used chiefly to support the marching column. Busy with many cares and afflicted with years and illness, Scott evidently had not reviewed his geography, and did not see the advantage of the Tennessee River. But he had given up the Mississippi, and certainly McClellan, who eight months later—but before any move had been started—wrote that he never had favored the great river,¹⁰ had been influenced by Scott's letter.

Fortunately Lincoln's views about operations are fully set down in a remarkable memorandum, undated, but shown by its contents to have been written in the last part of September, 1861.¹¹ He outlined an operation into East Tennessee, to seize the great strategic railroad that connected Richmond with Chattanooga and Memphis, and to liberate the Tennessee Unionists. Aware of the difficulty of forcing mountain gaps and of the long and poor roads involved in his proposal, the President said its practicability would have to be decided by military men. In order that it should succeed, Lincoln saw that the East Tennessee thrust should be co-ordinated with other operations. One on the Atlantic was to tie down the enemy in that region, while General John Frémont, commanding in Missouri, and McClellan, now at the head of the Army of the Potomac about Washington, were to take advantage of

⁹ Scott to McClellan, May 21, 1861, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (70 vols., Washington, 1880-1901), Series 1, LI, part 1 (1897), 386-387. Scott's original plan is given in a letter to McClellan dated May 3, *ibid.*, 369-370. Hereafter *Official Records* will be used to refer to this work.

¹⁰ McClellan to Halleck, January 29, 1862, *ibid.*, Series 1, VII (1882), 930-931.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Series 1, LII (1898), part 1, pp. 191-192.

the diversion in any ways they could. But nothing was said about a move down the Mississippi.

On November 1, Scott retired and McClellan became General in Chief. Henry W. Halleck, back in uniform after a successful civilian career in California, was sent to Missouri, Frémont having been removed early in the month. The letter of November 11 that Halleck received from McClellan directed him to straighten out "a system of reckless expenditure and fraud, perhaps unheard of before in the history of the world," as well as correct other glaring faults of Frémont's administration.¹² Very little was said about military operations, McClellan directing only that certain places be held securely, with excess troops concentrated "on or near the Mississippi, prepared for such ulterior operations as the public interest may demand." Though this vague statement does not indicate that a movement down the great river was not intended, it certainly gives no support to the contention that one was definitely planned. And as indicated previously, McClellan would later write to Halleck that his "ideas from the beginning" had "ever been against a movement in force down the Mississippi itself."

When Halleck reached St. Louis on the eighteenth, Missouri was seemingly quiet; but almost immediately former governor Sterling Price, whose state force had been operating with Confederate troops in the southwestern part of the state, marched northward, calling the people to his standard with a rhetorical proclamation.¹³ Sabotage on a large scale soon broke out and Halleck found himself virtually occupying enemy territory.

But Halleck's thoughts about Price were broken into dramatically by a letter from Cincinnati. On November 20, Colonel Charles Whittlesley, an engineer officer, wrote: "SIR: Will you allow me to suggest the consideration of a great movement by land and water up the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers?"¹⁴ Then Whittlesley set down four specific merits of the operation. Thus ten days before Miss Carroll

¹² *Ibid.*, Series 1, III (1881), 568-569.

¹³ On November 23, Colonel Frederick Steele telegraphed Halleck from Sedalia saying he had reliable information that Sterling Price was marching north at the rate of 30 miles a day with a force estimated at from 33,000 to 50,000 men, his objective being said to be Sedalia. *Ibid.*, Series 1, VIII (1883), 374. Price's proclamation was issued at Marshall, Missouri, on November 26. *Ibid.*, 695-697.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Series 1, VII, 440.

gave her paper to Scott the Tennessee plan was communicated to Halleck. One cannot give Miss Carroll credit for even being the first to put it on paper.

As a matter of fact the first step for a move up the Tennessee had already been taken before Miss Carroll went west. During the spring and summer, Kentucky had been preserving a strange neutrality, with regiments forming both for North and South, but with no troops from outside states upon her soil. On September 4, Brigadier General U.S. Grant took over command at Cairo, sent there by Frémont. The very next day Grant learned that Confederate troops from Tennessee had seized Hickman and Columbus, important Kentucky towns on the Mississippi. He notified Frémont, saying that if not prevented by orders he would seize Paducah, which he did early the next morning.¹⁵ Why did Grant want Paducah and act so swiftly? The answer is obvious. Paducah is at the mouth of the Tennessee River. Within a few days General Charles F. Smith, Grant's old West Point idol, was sent to command at the new position, and soon the little wooden gunboat "Conestoga" began to make trips up the river to inspect Fort Henry, which the Confederates were building just over the Tennessee line to block the stream whose importance was obvious to everyone in the region.

Mrs. Greenbie ignored a telegram in the records that is well known to everyone who has given any serious study to western operations in the Civil War, and made the statement that Grant knew nothing of a move up the Tennessee until ordered to make it by Halleck.¹⁶ Smith, presently put under Grant's command, wrote to the latter's adjutant about the

¹⁵ Grant's telegram notifying Frémont of the Confederate move into western Kentucky and stating his intention of seizing Paducah does not seem to be in the records, but a message later in the day contained the sentence, "I am now nearly ready for Paducah, should not telegram arrive preventing the movement on the strength of the information telegraphed." *Ibid.*, Series 1, III, 150. Grant's reports (probably a telegram and a letter) on the seizure of Paducah, sent from Cairo on September 6 are given in *ibid.*, Series 1, IV (1882), 196-197. He stated that Confederate flags had been flying above the city, that a company of Confederate troops left by train, and that he had seized a large quantity of rations and leather intended for the Southern army. The report that a Confederate column of 3,800 was 16 miles away he apparently believed, but he said he did "not credit" the report that a large force was coming down the Tennessee. He took possession of the telegraph office and immediately sent additional troops to assure his hold on the town.

¹⁶ *My Dear Lady*, 156.

sketch of Fort Henry that Grant had seen in his quarters.¹⁷ What, one wonders, would Anna's biographer have us believe those two competent generals talked about when that sketch was before them?

At the same time that Halleck went to Missouri, Brigadier General Don C. Buell came to Louisville to command the Department of the Ohio, which included the portion of Kentucky east of the Cumberland River. The instructions that Buell's good friend McClellan gave him were in accordance with Lincoln's memorandum and spoke of "the necessity of entering Eastern Tennessee as soon as it can be done with reasonable chances of success."¹⁸ But Buell almost at once began to think of an operation against the Confederates who were blocking the road to Nashville by a strong position at Bowling Green.¹⁹ In reply to a telegram that McClellan sent him on the twenty-seventh, he described his proposal, saying that as he advanced on Nashville there should be "two flotilla columns up the Tennessee and Cumberland."²⁰ On the twenty-ninth, McClellan telegraphed enthusiastically, "Your letter received.

¹⁷ *Official Records*, Series 1, VII, 561.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Series 1, IV, 355-356.

¹⁹ The letter of instructions actually given Buell, bearing the date November 12, apparently replaced a letter dated the seventh, which did not receive McClellan's signature, though the editors indicated that it was written by him. *Ibid.*, 342. This letter said that if it were not for political considerations, Buell's first and principal objective point should probably be Nashville. After indicating that there should be a defensive attitude on the Louisville-Nashville line, the letter directed Buell to "throw the mass of your forces by rapid marches, by Cumberland Gap or Walker's Gap, on Knoxville, in order to occupy the railroad at that point, and thus enable the loyal citizens of Eastern Tennessee to rise . . ." The letter of the twelfth made no reference whatever to Nashville but spoke of the full conversations on the subject of military operations that McClellan and Buell had had, so it seems certain that an operation toward Nashville had been talked about. As a directive the letter of the twelfth was weakened by the ending: "If the military suggestions I have made in this letter prove to have been founded on erroneous data, you are, of course, perfectly free to change the plans of operation." *Ibid.*, 355. Buell may not have taken the move on eastern Tennessee very seriously, and in a dispatch to McClellan on November 23, he said, "I have a letter from the Adjutant-General. Have you seen cause to curtail my discretion?" *Ibid.*, Series 1, VII, 445. He seemed to be stretching the concluding sentence McClellan wrote.

²⁰ Observing Buell's shifting of troops, McClellan sent him on November 27 the tart telegram: "GENERAL: What is the reason for concentration of troops at Louisville? I urge movement at once on Eastern Tennessee, unless it is impossible. No letter from you for several days. Reply. I still trust your judgment, though urging my own views." *Ibid.*, 450, Buell replied at length the same day. *Ibid.*, 450-452.

I fully approve of your course and agree in your views."²¹ In a letter written the same night the General in Chief said that the East Tennessee move still had precedence, but he thought the two operations could perhaps go forward simultaneously.²² Thus the day before Miss Carroll gave her paper to Scott the Army High Command spoke approvingly of a move up the rivers. McClellan sounded out Halleck upon the subject,²³ and the day after Christmas the St. Louis general, though busy with saboteurs, ended a long letter, "If I receive arms in time to carry out my present plans in Missouri I think I shall be able to strongly re-enforce Cairo and Paducah for ulterior operations by the early part of February."²⁴

Grant now came back into the story. A report that he sent to St. Louis on January 6 ended, "If it meets the approval of the general commanding the department, I would be pleased to visit headquarters on business connected with this command."²⁵ In his *Memoirs*, Grant said he wished to discuss a move up the Tennessee,²⁶ and no one knowing much about him will doubt the statement. January 8 brought a letter from Halleck,²⁷ but instead of giving him permission to come to St. Louis, it directed Grant to make a demonstration in western Kentucky. The story back of this demonstration is somewhat intricate, but is fully set forth in the records,²⁸

²¹ *Ibid.*, 457.

²² *Ibid.*, 457-458. McClellan said, ". . . I now feel sure that I have a 'lieutenant' in whom I can fully rely. Your views are right. You have seized the true strategic base, and from Lebanon can move where you will. Keep up the hearts of the Tennesseans. Make them feel that, far from any intention of deserting them, all will be done to sustain them . . ." After indicating a move into eastern Tennessee with 15,000 men, and a strong attack—as Buell had proposed—on Nashville, with perhaps 50,000 men, McClellan said, "I think we owe it to our Union friends in Eastern Tennessee to protect them at all hazards. First, secure that; then, if you possess the means, carry Nashville."

²³ McClellan said in his letter to Buell, "I have telegraphed to-day to Halleck for information as to his gunboats. You shall have a sufficient number of them to perform the operations you suggest. I will place C. F. Smith under your orders and replace his command by other troops." *Ibid.*, 458.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Series 1, VIII, 463.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Series 1, VII, 534.

²⁶ *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant* (2 vols., New York, 1885), I, 287.

²⁷ *Official Records*, Series 1, VII, 533-534. The letter is dated the sixth. Grant answered on the eighth that he had received it that morning. *Ibid.*, 537-538.

²⁸ Lincoln was forced to take an active part in plans when McClellan became sick near the end of December, 1861. His chief of staff, who was also his father-in-law, was ill at the same time. On December

and Mrs. Greenbie got a distorted idea about it because she consulted newspapers instead of the official documents.²⁹

The twentieth saw Grant back from the demonstration, after his troops had done a good deal of marching through mud and rain. In the letter in which he reported his return he again asked for permission to visit headquarters, adding "as I have before desired."³⁰ The twenty-second brought per-

31, Lincoln wired Halleck: "General McClellan is sick. Are General Buell and yourself in concert? When he moves on Bowling Green, what hinders it being reenforced from Columbus? A simultaneous movement by you on Columbus might prevent it." *Ibid.*, 524. A similar dispatch went to Buell. Clearly Lincoln knew that a movement on Nashville by Buell was intended as well as one on Knoxville, and he also was well informed about the railroad from Columbus to Bowling Green, which gave the Confederates excellent means of concentrating rapidly at a threatened point. Telegrams the next day from Buell and Halleck indicated that they were not "in concert" but were working through McClellan. *Ibid.*, 526. Buell stated there was nothing to prevent Bowling Green being re-enforced from Columbus unless that place were threatened. Halleck said he was not ready for co-operation but hoped to be in a few weeks, ending, "Too much haste will ruin everything." Lincoln immediately suggested that the generals get in touch with each other and Buell wired—still on January 1—that he had telegraphed Halleck.

On January 4, Lincoln wired Buell "Have arms gone forward for East Tennessee? Please tell me the progress and condition of the movement in that direction. Answer." *Ibid.*, 530. In his telegraphic reply Buell virtually admitted that he had never thought much of the East Tennessee movement. *Ibid.*, 530-531. This statement brought letters from both Lincoln and McClellan expressing great disappointment. *Ibid.*, 927-928, 531. On the twelfth, Buell telegraphed McClellan, "I have received your letter, and will at once devote all my efforts to your views. Will write to-night." *Ibid.*, 547. In his letter, he said he would stop active operations toward Bowling Green. *Ibid.*, 548-549.

When Halleck ordered Grant to make the demonstration, he believed Buell would start an advance on Bowling Green any day. There was a delay, and on the tenth Halleck said in a telegram to Buell, "Fix a day when you wish the demonstration, but put it off as long as possible, in order that I may increase the strength of the force." *Ibid.*, 543. The next day he wired Grant, "I can hear nothing from Buell, so fix your own time for the advance . . ." *Ibid.*, 544. Presumably Buell thought Halleck would do nothing if he did not "fix a day."

²⁹ In his instructions to Grant, Halleck fully explained the purpose of the demonstration and told him to "make a great fuss about moving all your forces towards Nashville, and let it be so reported by the newspapers." He also instructed him to deceive his own men and not even let members of his staff be correctly informed. The entire operation was naturally completely misunderstood by correspondents, and Mrs. Greenbie's account, *My Dear Lady*, 172-174, is built on what was written by Galway, a reporter for the *New York Times*, January 23, 1862, who said in one dispatch, "The whole expedition [in the West] seems to be about as incomprehensible as to its objects and results as anything well can be." Mrs. Greenbie left the impression that the demonstration was somehow intended as a blind for the movement up the Tennessee.

³⁰ *Official Records*, Series 1, VII, 565-566. The letter is dated January 25, but the date should be January 20, as other dispatches Grant sent that day indicate. A report from Cairo on the twenty-first

mission and presently the Cairo general was face to face with Halleck,³¹ whom he had known slightly in the "old army." The meeting was a dismal and historic failure, Grant writing in his *Memoirs* that he was received with so little cordiality that he perhaps presented his case badly, and was quickly made to feel that his plan was "preposterous."³² It is a hard thing to understand, for several days before—just after he had returned to duty from a week's absence with the measles—Halleck had written to McClellan that the Tennessee and Cumberland gave the true line of operations in the West.³³ He had said in addition that by the middle or last of February he might be able—if he received arms—to double his force at Cairo and Paducah; then if he could get some thirty to forty thousand men from elsewhere, he would have the number of effectives he believed necessary to hold his bases and advance.

Upon his return to Cairo, Grant found—if he had not received it before he went to St. Louis—a report from Smith about a personal reconnaissance of Fort Henry.³⁴ He thought, said Smith, that the place could be reduced by two of the new gunboats recently finished at Cairo. On the twenty-eighth, Grant sent Halleck the historic telegram that Mrs. Greenbie missed, but which is given in many places: "With permission, I will take Fort Henry, on the Tennessee, and establish and

which was carried by the New York *Tribune* on the twenty-second stated that the last of the troops had returned. Grant's message indicated the last units would be back "tomorrow."

³¹ Halleck to Grant, January 22, *Official Records*, Series 1, VII, 561-562. In a letter written to his sister Mary on the twenty-third, Grant said, "I go tonight to St. Louis to see General Halleck; will be back on Sunday morning [the twenty-sixth]." Jesse Grant Cramer (ed.), *Letters of Ulysses S. Grant to his Father and his Youngest Sister, 1857-78* (New York, 1912), 77-79. That Grant was anticipating activity as the result of his visit was shown by the sentence, "I expect but little quiet from this on and if you receive but short, unsatisfactory letters hereafter you need not be surprised."

³² *Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant*, I, 287.

³³ *Official Records*, Series 1, VIII, 508-511. In this very important document, in which Halleck discussed operations both east and west of the Mississippi, he said, "The idea of moving down the Mississippi by steam is, in my opinion, impracticable, or at least premature. It is not a proper line of operations, at least now." In his reply of January 29, McClellan said, "I like your views as to the future. They fully agree with my own ideas from the beginning, which has ever been against a movement in force down the Mississippi itself." *Ibid.*, Series 1, VII, 930-931.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 561. The dispatch was written on January 22 at Callaway, Kentucky, a small place on the Tennessee, fifteen miles below Fort Henry. Smith said a steamer would start for Paducah with some sick men and the mail at eight o'clock the next morning.

hold a large camp there."³⁵ Commodore Foote sent a telegram, indorsing Grant's idea and cornered Halleck by concluding his message, "Have we your authority to move . . . when ready?"³⁶

Halleck now faced one of the greatest decisions of his career. Could he advance the Tennessee operation by at least two weeks? Could he get re-enforcements to Grant in time to insure success? How would the Confederates at Columbus, only fifteen miles below Cairo, react when most of the Federal troops there and at Paducah went up the Tennessee? The St. Louis general decided boldly and the next day he wired Foote that he was waiting to hear from Smith about the condition of the road from Paducah to Fort Henry, adding, "As soon as that is received will give order. Meantime, have everything ready." Foote replied the same day that four gunboats would be ready by February 1, saying also that both he and Grant thought it would be well to start not later than the third, and adding that the road in question was reported good.³⁷

Then a new person abruptly entered the picture—but it was not Anna Carroll. It was a Confederate deserter, and strange as it may seem, a deserter from Centerville, in far off Virginia. To both Halleck and Buell, McClellan telegraphed on the thirtieth that a deserter just in reported that General Pierre G. T. Beauregard—of Sumter and Bull Run fame—had been in Centerville four days before. But the deserter had added that as he went on picket he heard some officers say that Beauregard was under orders to go to Kentucky with fifteen regiments. The learned but busy Halleck misread the message, and thinking that the famous Beauregard had started west with re-enforcements four days before, he wired McClellan, "General Grant, and Commodore Foote will be ordered to immediately advance, and to reduce and hold Fort Henry . . ."³⁸ Since nothing was said about

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 121. Grant virtually quoted the dispatch in his *Personal Memoirs*, I, 287. Any study of the Tennessee campaign should certainly include what the officer who led it had to say about it. Though Mrs. Greenbie showed familiarity with Grant's *Personal Memoirs*, she asserted that Grant "knew nothing of it [the Tennessee movement] till he was ordered up that river by Halleck." *My Dear Lady*, 156.

³⁶ *Official Records*, Series 1, VII, 120.

³⁷ *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion* (27 vols., Washington, 1894-1917), Series 1, XXII (1908), 525-526.

³⁸ *Official Records*, Series 1, VII, 571, 572.

the messages from Grant and Foote asking permission to make the move and underwriting it, the telegram from St. Louis must have given McClellan considerable surprise.

Halleck alerted Grant with the order: "Make your preparations to take and hold Fort Henry. I will send you written instructions by mail." The letter that followed said that Beauregard had left Manassas four days before with fifteen regiments for the Columbus-Bowling Green line, and directed, "You will move with the least delay possible."³⁹

Buell was not forgotten, but was startled with the message, "I have ordered an advance of our troops on Fort Henry and Dover. It will be made immediately." The Louisville general replied, "Please let me know your plan and force and the time, &c." but to McClellan, Buell wrote, "I protest against such prompt proceedings, as though I had nothing to do but command 'Commence firing' when he starts off."⁴⁰

Quietly, efficiently, and with speed Grant went about assembling his task force from at least five different places, gathering up his sick, providing for defense of the positions he left, and perfecting plans with Foote. On February 3, he telegraphed Halleck from Paducah, "Will be off up the Tennessee at 6 o'clock. Command, twenty-three regiments in all."⁴¹

Such is the story as given in the *Official Records*. Coherent and complete, it simply does not leave any place for the Carroll claim.

Noble asserted that Lincoln ordered Smith to reconnoiter Fort Henry.⁴² Where is the order? Where is the early January report—presumably to Lincoln—of which he spoke? In the records there is a report concerning Fort Henry dated October 16, that Smith sent to St. Louis, and one dated November 8 to Washington,⁴³ not only about Henry but about

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 121-122.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 574, 933.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 581.

⁴² Noble, *Woman with a Sword*, 400. After incorrectly stating that the replies of Halleck and Buell to Lincoln's telegram of December 21, 1861, indicated that they had no plans to move until May 1 at the earliest, Noble stated the President at once decided on his own course of action and directed Smith to reconnoiter Fort Henry. What Lincoln actually did, as shown in the records, was described in note 28.

⁴³ *Official Records*, Series 1, IV, 308-309, 345-346. Smith said the work on the Cumberland was "usually called Fort Gavock." Lieutenant Colonel R. W. MacGavock was in command, but referred to the fort as Fort Donelson. *Ibid.*, 519.

Fort Donelson, a work twelve miles east of Henry, located on the Cumberland, to block the direct water route to Nashville. But Smith's statement that he thought Fort Henry could be easily reduced was sent to Grant on January 23, and it was the result of the demonstration that Halleck had ordered.

Secret orders from Lincoln in late January to Buell and Halleck were, Noble stated, the cause of Grant's thrust up the Tennessee. Finding no trace of them in the records he reasoned them into existence, and in a strange way indeed. He observed⁴⁴ that the first draft of the letter written by the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, to Horace Greeley, editor of the New York *Tribune*, soon after the capture of Fort Donelson, contained the statement, "The movement and concert of action between Generals Halleck and Buell was directed by the President."⁴⁵ This, Noble contended, revealed too much, so the Secretary struck it out. But Noble omitted from Stanton's deletion, for after the words quoted followed, "—as I am informed." This shows that Stanton had no personal knowledge of any order from Lincoln to Buell and Halleck. That he in fact knew there had been no such order is proved by a letter he wrote to Buell on February 9.

McClellan had turned over to the Secretary of War a long letter from Buell written on February 1, but not mailed until the sixth, the very day that Fort Henry was captured.⁴⁶ Buell asked for authority to abandon the move on Knoxville which both Lincoln and McClellan had strongly urged upon him early in January, saying that he had been "forced reluctantly to the conviction that an advance into East Tennessee is impracticable at this time on any scale that will be sufficient." As an alternative he suggested a determined and persistent attack up the Cumberland and Tennessee, saying that the enemy's "center is now the most vulnerable point, and it is also the most decisive." Stanton answered: "The President directs me to say that he has read your communication to Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellan dated the 1st and mailed the 6th of this month, and he approves the operations you propose therein, and believes, if vigorously prosecuted they cannot fail.

⁴⁴ Noble, *Woman with a Sword*, 400.

⁴⁵ Stanton Papers, IV, 50812. These papers are in the Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.

⁴⁶ *Official Records*, Series 1, VII, 931-933. The original of this very important letter is in the Stanton Papers, III, 50553-50556, the envelope bearing the postmark of February 6.

He desires you and Major-General Halleck to co-operate as far as possible, and says that your two heads together will succeed."⁴⁷

Thus it was three days after the capture of Fort Henry that Lincoln approved the operation up the rivers. With such a letter in the *Official Records*, it is mere nonsense to talk about some secret order from Lincoln to Buell and Halleck in late January being responsible for the movement.

If the records destroy Miss Carroll's claim, how is one to dispose of the supporting material she presented to Congress? Most of it can be eliminated at once as the testimony or opinion of uninformed persons. Only Ben Wade and Thomas Scott have to be considered,⁴⁸ and both Mrs. Greenbie and Noble built much of their claims on what those men said. Wade goes out rather easily. The congressional committee of which he was chairman apparently never investigated the Tennessee River campaign, so he had no special knowledge about it, while the very intimate friendship that existed between Miss Carroll and his wife made him a biased advocate. That he was an extremely partisan person was proved by the fact that near the beginning of the election campaign of 1864, he joined with Senator Henry Winter Davis in a bitter newspaper denunciation of Lincoln because the President gave a pocket veto to the reconstruction bill they favored. A man with such vindictiveness is hardly to be trusted when he later wrote of Lincoln, unless there is corroborative evidence. Nor was Wade's reputation enhanced in the minds of many when he voted for conviction in the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson, for the next man in line for the office was Ben Wade. Miss Carroll's champions do not refer to the cautious regard that historians of the period have for Wade's statements, and accept as a cornerstone of their thesis a letter he wrote to Miss Carroll in 1876, two years before his death at the age of eighty-two. Part of it is easily refuted and part is an alleged statement that Stan-

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 937-938.

⁴⁸ In his article "Anna Ella Carroll and her 'Modest' Claim," *Lincoln Herald*, L, 2-10, F. Lauriston Bullard said (pp. 9-10), "Of the many men whose endorsements fill scores of pages in Miss Carroll's Petitions and Memorials only two can be regarded as contributing primary evidence; these men were Assistant Secretary of War, Thomas A. Scott, and Benjamin F. Wade, chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War."

ton made on his deathbed nine years before, for which corroboration is lacking.

The only person with firsthand knowledge of military matters who supported Miss Carroll was Thomas Scott, and he was in an embarrassed position because he went back to the Pennsylvania Railroad in the summer of 1862 before Miss Carroll's pamphleteering bill had been fully paid. Though he wrote his successor that he thought she should receive the \$6,750 asked for and added he would sign any voucher necessary, the successor evidently viewed the matter differently, and Miss Carroll appears to have received only \$1,250 in all.⁴⁹ In 1870 and again in 1872, Scott wrote a letter to the chairman of the Senate Military Committee supporting Miss Carroll's Tennessee River case. According to two versions of the first letter in congressional documents, Scott gave Miss Carroll's plan only to the Secretary of War, who at the time was Simon Cameron, while two versions stated he also gave it to the President. All versions of the 1872 letter agreed in saying he gave the plan not only to the Secretary but to Lincoln.⁵⁰

In the second letter, Scott stated that after Stanton was appointed secretary he "was directed to go to the western armies and arrange to increase their effective force as rapidly as possible," for the purpose of carrying through the Tennessee River campaign, "then inaugurated." This looks like a complete and authoritative indorsement of the Carroll case. But Scott's letter falls completely to pieces when put against documents written in the last of January and the first of February, 1862—some by Thomas Scott himself.

Much depends upon when Scott made his trip. His own statement seems to imply it was promptly after Stanton succeeded Cameron, which was January 15. Miss Carroll inti-

⁴⁹ Scott to Tucker, January 16, 1863, *House Miscellaneous Documents*, 44 Cong., 1 Sess. no. 179 (serial no. 1706), 7, 82. Bullard, "Anna Ella Carroll and her 'Modest' Claim," *Lincoln Herald*, I, 5, placed the total Carroll claim at \$6,250, breaking it down into parts for the three different pamphlets she had written, and stated that the \$1,250 which she received on October, 1861, might have been paid by Scott himself.

⁵⁰ *House Miscellaneous Documents*, 44 Cong., 1 Sess., no. 179. The letter is given on page 41, and contains the words "which I submitted to the Secretary of War and President Lincoln." As given in the *Senate Miscellaneous Documents*, 45 Cong., 1 Sess., no. 5 (serial no. 1785), 2, the words "and President Lincoln are wanting. The later version differs from the earlier also in the position of the address and in the signature, as well as slightly in punctuation.

mated this more strongly, and Wade wrote to Miss Carroll in 1876, "It was determined that, as soon as Mr. Stanton came into the department, Colonel Scott should go" ⁵¹ Noble, perhaps taking his cue from Mrs. Greenbie, asserted that there is evidence that even before Stanton's confirmation, "Colonel Scott was rushed West with a letter of secret instructions from Stanton to prepare a huge striking force to ascend the Tennessee." ⁵² Though the letter of instructions that Stanton gave to Scott was published in 1875, ⁵³ neither the biographer nor the novelist apparently ever saw it. Not only was it dated January 29, two weeks after Stanton took over, but it shows Scott was sent west for a very different reason than he later alleged.

What lay behind Scott's trip is easy to discover. On January 27, Lincoln signed the President's War Order No. 1, ⁵⁴ a document which has received considerable criticism. Since the original is in the Stanton Papers, it came to Noble's attention, and without any authority, he said Miss Carroll's proposal was responsible for it, ⁵⁵ though students of the Civil War know that the inactivity of the great Army of the Potomac at Washington was becoming a matter of country-wide ridicule which was goading Lincoln to take a hand. But what really counts is what the order said, and this Noble withheld from his readers.

In the order Lincoln set February 22 as "the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces." Immediately after receiving the President's order Stanton wrote Wade a letter, marked "most confidential," ⁵⁶ which began: "An order has this day been made by the President requiring *all the armies* in the field to place themselves in fighting order immediately, and to commence operations by a specific date." Even the senator was not intrusted with the President's D-day, and

⁵¹ Greenbie, *My Dear Lady*, 297.

⁵² Noble, *Woman with a Sword*, 400.

⁵³ William B. Sipes, *The Pennsylvania Railroad: its Origin, Construction, Conditions, and Connections* (Philadelphia, 1875), 15-16. The letter begins, "For the purpose of efficient organization of this department, ascertaining and organizing the requisite forces and means for combined active operation, you are requested to proceed from this city"

⁵⁴ *Official Records*, Series 1, V (1881), 41.

⁵⁵ Noble, *Woman with a Sword*, 400.

⁵⁶ Stanton Papers, II, 50276.

in later years, indeed if not at the time, Wade may have confused the movement that Grant made up the Tennessee with the operations that Stanton said Lincoln had ordered. Likewise it seems certain that Scott's trip looked forward to the very indefinite moves that Lincoln had in mind for Washington's birthday, and not the movement that Grant and Foote started on February 3.

Both Mrs. Greenbie and Noble referred to the letters⁵⁷ that Scott wrote to Stanton while on his trip, but neither told what was in them. For the most part they gave a painstaking enumeration of equipment, and discussed supply departments—in accordance with the major points in his instructions—with some mention of new regiments, until Scott reached Indianapolis early on February 5. There the momentous news of the day burst upon him when he saw a telegram that Governor Oliver P. Morton had received from Halleck, asking if Indiana could give him some regiments. Learning that Scott was in Indianapolis, Halleck telegraphed directly to him: "I want all the infantry regiments at Cairo you can possibly send me there, in order to re-enforce the column now moving up the Tennessee River Send me all the re-enforcements you can, as I wish to cut the enemy's line before Beauregard arrives."⁵⁸ Scott wired Washington for instructions, and though he received none that day, he completely changed his itinerary,⁵⁹ and thereafter his trip took on a totally new character. Presently the Assistant Secretary was sending a special messenger to Washington with a description of the ambitious plan that Halleck had developed, accompanying it with an impressive map.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, *passim*.

⁵⁸ *Official Records*, Series 1, VII, 585.

⁵⁹ According to his letter of instructions, Scott was to go to Springfield, Illinois, from Indianapolis. Instead he went to Louisville, which he had been directed to visit on his return trip, after he had been at St. Louis, Cairo, and Paducah. On February 6, he wrote from Louisville, "After closing my report from Indianapolis last night—not having received a response to messages sent you—I concluded to remain until morning and then proceed to Louisville to lay before General Buell all the data in relation to military organizations in Ohio, Indiana and Michigan, in order to enable him the more effectually to aid General Halleck in the Tennessee river movement." Stanton Papers, III, 50757.

⁶⁰ On February 9, Scott wrote Stanton from St. Louis saying he had arrived the day before, but had not been able to see Halleck or his staff. *Ibid.*, III, 50668-50669. Halleck was very busy trying to get re-enforcements for Grant as well as supervise and plan for Curtis's operation toward Springfield, Missouri. Scott stated that the longer he

Scott's letters thus show that he did nothing to initiate the movement up the Tennessee; he found it already started and sought to persuade Washington to support Halleck's mature and extensive plan. Apparently McClellan had not even informed Stanton of Halleck's telegram saying he was ordering Grant and Foote to take Fort Henry.⁶¹ That Scott

was in the West the more convinced he was of the views expressed in his "second report from Louisville (in regard to the movement of our forces into the centre of the enemy's line at points on the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers near the scene of the late action [Fort Henry]—and beyond that point of Clarksville, and subsequently Nashville & Memphis—as centers for great action)" He stated he thought it would be necessary to bring men from the Army of the Potomac to get the needed force.

Scott went to Cairo on the tenth, and there received a letter from Halleck written on the twelfth in which the general said, "I was very much disappointed in not meeting you again before you left. Can't you touch here on your way to Springfield? There are several things I wished to talk with you about. First of all the proposed movement up the Tennessee and Cumberland. I put my views in the form of a letter for you to Sec'y Stanton. I send the draft as then written. If you approve the project I hope you will urge it, both by telegraph and letter. McClellan approves if Buell is willing. Buell is 'willing,' but hesitates and asks questions. If we are to act we must do so promptly. I have not the slightest doubt of the policy of the plan and will stake my military reputation on its complete success, *if they will give me the forces which are now useless elsewhere.*" *Ibid.*, III, 50757.

The letter Halleck had prepared for Scott to send Stanton began, "I have conversed with Gen'l Halleck and agree with him that the Tennessee and Cumberland constitute the proper line for an early spring campaign." *Ibid.*, III, 50646-50647. Scott forwarded both Halleck's letter of the ninth and the twelfth to Stanton, and said in his accompanying letter of the fourteenth from Cairo ". . . there is a little desire on the part of General H. to outgeneral General B., who is a very careful, prudent, and will prove himself an eminently successful general if well supported." *Ibid.*, III, 50765-50766.

On February 16—the day Fort Donelson fell—Scott was back in St. Louis and wrote to Stanton, "After a full discussion [with Halleck] I am now satisfied that his views and aims are thoroughly patriotic and honorable." *Ibid.*, III, 50795-50799. The map that Scott sent to Washington showed objectives as far south as northern Mississippi. He said Halleck wanted 50,000 men from the East, a proposal in which Buell concurred. On February 21, Stanton wrote to Scott praising Halleck's activity, and saying he would direct his attention to sending troops to Halleck and Buell, but that he did not know whether McClellan would agree—the future would have to show. *Ibid.*, IV, 50821-50827.

⁶¹ If Stanton had known what was impending in the West, he would probably have passed the word to Scott. In his letter of February 21 to Scott, the Secretary complained that Halleck and Buell were addressing communications to McClellan and not to the Adjutant General. Thus the War Department had to get its information from the newspapers and from what McClellan saw fit to pass on. Since Grant's move against Henry made Lincoln's order of January 27 a dead letter so far as the West was concerned, the question arises whether it was ever known about in that region. The only allusion to it that seems to have reached Halleck—at least as far as the records show—was the enigmatical sentence with which McClellan closed his letter of

did practically nothing in the way of getting re-enforcements to Grant is shown by studying the roster of Grant's regiments; it was Major General David Hunter, commanding the Department of Kansas, to whom Halleck gave very effusive thanks for responding to his direct call for aid.⁶² The huge "striking force" that Noble inferred Scott prepared has no foundation in fact.

On the eleventh of March, McClellan, who had been given permission to move the Army of the Potomac to Fort Monroe to start his campaign against Richmond, was removed from the position of General in Chief.⁶³ No successor was appointed until Halleck was summoned to Washington in July. Lincoln and Stanton carried on general direction, with assistance from Major General Ethan Allen Hitchcock, a veteran of the Mexican War who had recently returned to service. The order removing McClellan also put into effect the proposal for a unified command in the West which Halleck had made to McClellan on February 8, and which Scott had sent to Washington by courier.⁶⁴ The Secretary of War had telegraphed Halleck on the twenty-second that the President did not think a change was "at present advisable,"⁶⁵ but with McClellan out of the way, Hunter's and Halleck's old departments, and a part of Buell's were made into the new Department of the Mississippi with Halleck in command.

Although Miss Carroll's supporters do not seem to have claimed that Lincoln sought to get along without a General in Chief because he had the lady strategist near at hand, Mrs. Greenbie stated that it was due to her heroine that Buell was

January 29, "It is very desirable to move all along the line by the 22d of February, if possible." *Official Records*, Series 1, VII, 930-931. Foote was given an intimation that something was planned for Washington's birthday by H. A. Wise, Assistant Inspector of Ordnance, who wired on January 28, "The President authorizes you to make the change you require on the *Benton* on the terms you have submitted to General Meigs, if the work can positively be executed by the 22d of February next." *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion*, Series 1, XXII, 523.

⁶² *Official Records*, Series 1, VII, 636.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, Series 1, X, part 2, (1884), pp. 28-29.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, Series 1, VII, 595.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 652. On the twenty-first, Stanton telegraphed that he was struck "very favorably" with the plan, "but on account of the domestic affliction of the President" (Lincoln's oldest son had died the day before), had been unable to present it to him. *Ibid.*, 648. The same day Halleck wired Stanton saying that a week had been lost on account of hesitation and delay, and he urged immediate action on his proposal. *Ibid.*, 655.

able to aid Grant in the battle of Shiloh (April 6-7).⁶⁶ Grant, she asserted, was in command of the Federal forces near Corinth, and in response to Anna's urgings Buell was started from Nashville with an army to strengthen him. Of course any suggestion that Miss Carroll may have made to the War Department was offered without any knowledge of instructions that Halleck had given; but Mrs. Greenbie could in a few minutes have found in the *Official Records* the correct story about Buell's move. On March 14, while Grant was still at Fort Henry, with only Smith's division thrust forward to the vicinity of Savannah, Halleck wrote Buell saying he thought all his force not required to defend Nashville should be sent up the Tennessee, adding, "This seems to be the best line of operations, as it leads directly to the enemy's center, and is easily supplied. Give me your views."⁶⁷ The next day Buell replied: "... Undoubtedly we should use the river to get supplies, but I am decidedly of opinion that my force should strike it by marching. It can move in less time . . . I had designed to commence moving to-morrow . . ."⁶⁸ With such messages in the records it was as absurd for Mrs. Greenbie to make her claim for Miss Carroll as it was for Noble to assert that secret orders were sent by Lincoln to Buell and Halleck the latter part of January.

Miss Carroll's promoters also of course give her credit for suggesting the move by which John Pope captured Island No. 10, and the operation by which Grant finally succeeded at Vicksburg; as one would expect they used Wade as their authority and neglected the records. Though Mrs. Greenbie withheld from her reader the contents of Scott's letters to Stanton, which blast so completely the Carroll Tennessee myth, she described two documents in the Stanton Papers

⁶⁶ *My Dear Lady*, 210.

⁶⁷ *Official Records*, Series 1, X, part 2, p. 38. At the same time that Halleck was seeking to build up Grant he was having to provide for General Curtis's operations in the Southwest. On March 10, he informed Grant that Curtis's recent victory would release to the Tennessee expedition reserves held for the other operation. *Ibid.*, 27. That there was a desire to push things in the West was shown by a telegram Scott sent Stanton from Nashville (occupied by the Federals February 25) on March 3, asking if McClellan could come to Louisville to meet Halleck and Buell "for consultation, to determine movements for Western forces." He added, "I believe this to be important." *Ibid.*, Series 1, VII, 680. With the change in command in the West that was made in a few days, such a meeting would be unnecessary, for Halleck's plans were known to both Scott and Stanton.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Series 1, X, part 2, pp. 38-39.

that charge Grant with drunkenness and immorality.⁶⁹ One was made out by an officer Grant had put in arrest and whose transfer he had requested, and who had previously been cautioned by the Quartermaster General about his inability to get along with officers.⁷⁰ The other was a scurrilous sheet,

⁶⁹ *My Dear Lady*, 175, 178-179.

⁷⁰ On January 14, Grant wrote in a letter to department headquarters, "Captain Kountz, who was recently sent here as master of transportation, from his great unpopularity with river men and his wholesale denunciation of everybody connected with the Government here as thieves and cheats, was entirely unable to get crews for the necessary boats." After giving more particulars, Grant said, "I have been compelled to order his arrest. I would respectfully ask that he be ordered to another field of duty." *Official Records*, Series 1, VII, 551-552.

A study of Kountz has been made by Theodore R. Parker, "William J. Kountz, Superintendent of River Transportation under McClellan, 1861-1862," *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine* (Pittsburgh, 1918-), XXI (1938), 237-254. Parker stated that Kountz interfered with movements of troops and supplies soon after January 10—which was when Grant was preparing for his demonstration—and adds that Grant acted in the public interest when he overruled Kountz. He also indicated that before Kountz came West he had been cautioned by Quartermaster General Meigs. Kountz, described by Parker as an uncompromising teetotaler, preferred charges against Grant for drunkenness. He sent them directly to St. Louis, and Halleck returned them to Grant with instructions that they come properly through his headquarters. Grant added an indorsement directing Kountz to furnish him a duplicate copy. There the matter might have rested had not Scott arrived and found Kountz in arrest (restricted to Cairo). The two men were acquainted, Scott in fact having gone on Kountz's bond. With Grant away, Scott heard only one side of the story. He wrote at some length on the case to Stanton and forwarded the charges, which was in a way by-passing Halleck.

One of the specifications in Kountz's charges was that Grant drank to the point of intoxication on December 6, 1861, with Confederate officers, while on a flag of truce boat to Columbus. There evidently was a flag of truce boat on that date, but a note Grant wrote on the fifth to General Leonidas Polk, Confederate commander at Columbus, suggested that he did not intend to go personally on the boat. *Official Records*, Series 2, I (1894), 528-529. Polk made a written reply on the sixth. *Ibid.*, 529. On November 15, Polk—a bishop in the Episcopal church—wrote to his wife about having met Grant on flag of truce boats. He reported the Union general as "grave" and seemingly not at ease at first, adding, "I was favorably impressed with him; he is undoubtedly a man of much force. We have now exchanged five or six flags, and he grows more civil and respectful every time." William M. Polk, "General Polk and the Battle of Belmont," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (4 vols., New York, 1887), I, 348-357. What actually took place December 6 on the flag of truce boat cannot be said with certainty; nor can one be certain that the six witnesses Kountz listed—three civilians, three absent captains—ever saw his charges. Mrs. Greenbie made no reference to the fact that Grant had put Kountz in arrest, and inaccurately said that the charges were made by him "and six witnesses," and that they asked "for a court-martial." No one asked that Grant be court-martialed. Samuel R. Kamm, *The Civil War Career of Thomas A. Scott* (Philadelphia, 1940), spoke of Kountz as a "stormy petrel."

which Mrs. Greenbie said was "sent" to the War Department by twenty-three officers. It was probably sent by Scott, and though it gave the names of twenty-three persons as witnesses, it was in fact anonymous since no one had written his signature below the charges.⁷¹

In a letter to Grant in January, 1867,⁷² Miss Carroll virtually admitted that his Tennessee operation may have been entirely independent of her suggestion, and the general having previously told her that the idea should have occurred to any military person, she was driven to seek priority in recording it. She told Grant he should write down whether he knew anyone had thought of it, and that he should give "the date when the Tennessee became in your mind the plan of conducting the campaign in the Southwest, and to whom you communicated it, verbally, or otherwise." Naturally Grant did not comply. But his statement that the operation was obvious was not just a soldier's unkind way of keeping credit from Miss Carroll. Immediately after the capture of Fort Donelson the papers had debated whether credit should go to Halleck, Buell, Foote, or Grant, and on March 22, Grant wrote to his good friend, Congressman Elihu B. Washburne, "I see the credit of attacking the enemy by the way of the Tennessee and Cumberland is variously attributed. It is little to talk about it being the great wisdom of any general that first brought forth this plan of attack. Our gunboats

⁷¹ This paper was as incorrectly drawn up as it was grotesque in character. In reality there was no charge, the various so-called "charges" being in the nature of specifications. The paper was dated February 8, and though Scott did not mention it in his letters to Stanton from Cairo, Kamm would seem to be correct in saying that Scott sent it in. *The Civil War Career of Thomas A. Scott*, 105, n. 87. Mrs. Greenbie said that on February 10, while paeans of victory were still sounding for Fort Henry, the War Department was contemplating sourly an enlargement of the charges against Grant which had been suspended just before he went up the Tennessee River. *My Dear Lady*, 178. There being no air mail at the time, it is hard to see how a paper dated February 8 could have been in Washington on the tenth. Of course no charges had been suspended. Grant returned the charge sheet to Kountz on January 29; and Scott sent it to Stanton on February 12, nine days after Grant went up the Tennessee. Mrs. Greenbie stated that Miss Carroll heard while in St. Louis about Grant's drinking, that he did not drink like a gentleman, and that ugly and disgusting stories were circulating freely among officers and enlisted men about his behavior when drunk. Is it too much to assume that this statement was made without any basis whatsoever and was only a guess or inference from the paper written at Cairo on February 8 by an *unknown person*?

⁷² *House Miscellaneous Documents*, 44 Cong., 1 Sess., no. 179, pp. 120-121.

were running up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers all fall and winter watching the progress of the rebels on these works [Forts Henry and Donelson]. General Halleck no doubt thought of this route long ago, and I am sure I did."⁷³ Thus the perfect answer to the whole question was early put on paper, though not on public record.

One must face the question whether Miss Carroll definitely distorted things. In 1886, a year after Grant's death, she wrote a magazine article to explain the origin of the Tennessee campaign.⁷⁴ In connection with her St. Louis visit she said: "I went to General Fremont's. He was absent on one of his expeditions. His wife was in command at St. Louis." The slap at the prominent and aggressive Jessie Benton Frémont was not just jealousy; it was a misrepresentation. In the article Miss Carroll also boasted of telling Grant that she knew no military person who would think of asking a river pilot about the navigability of a river. Did she actually believe that?

There is something worse, however, than merely suspicious manifestations. Though in the paper referred to Miss Carroll maligned the Seventh Iowa Regiment by speaking of seeing it "fleeing" to Benton Barracks when it returned to St. Louis a few days after the battle of Belmont, she did not

⁷³ *General Grant's Letters to a Friend, 1861-1880* (New York, 1897, 6-8. Through the *Letters from Lloyd Lewis* (Boston, 1950), the author became acquainted with John W. Emerson's "Grant's Life in the West and his Mississippi Valley Campaigns," that ran through volumes 6-11 (July, 1896-June, 1898), of the *Midland Monthly* (11 vols., Des Moines, Iowa, 1894-1899), see particularly IX (February, 1898), 115-119. In this rather extended history it is claimed upon the personal recollections of Colonel Emerson and General John M. Thayer (later governor of Nebraska and United States senator) that Grant devised the Tennessee campaign while he was on duty at Ironton, Missouri, August 8-19, 1861, and that he wrote it out and sent it to Congressman Washburne for delivery to the President. It is also said that he secured leave ostensibly to visit his family in Galena, Illinois, before going to his next assignment at Jefferson City, but really to get Washburne's influence to have him sent to Cairo, and that he was sent there as the result of a direct order to Frémont from Lincoln after the latter had read Grant's plan. There seems no support whatever for the claim in the records, which do, however, show that Grant was in Ironton on August 18, and in Jefferson City on the twenty-first. Grant made no such claim in his *Memoirs*, and it would have been completely out of character for him to prepare an unsolicited paper for the President. Furthermore, it seems impossible to reconcile the story with the statement about the origin of the Tennessee campaign which Grant made in the letter he wrote Washburne on March 22, 1862, which lacks reference to any previous letter to Washburne on the subject.

⁷⁴ "Plan of the Tennessee Campaign," *North American Review* (248 vols., Boston, New York, 1815-1940), CXLII (1886), 342-347.

say she witnessed the battle. But Mrs. Greenbie quoted her as saying, "When I saw the dead and dying as they lay upon the field, and witnessed the sad sight of the ambulance wagons bearing the wounded to the hospitals, my heart sank within me." In another place her biographer said Anna was in the "midst of" and in a third place that she was "present" at the engagement. As if she feared her reader might be incredulous, Mrs. Greenbie explained that Belmont was "near St. Louis,"⁷⁵ when in fact it is one hundred fifty miles away by straight line, much farther by river. To anyone familiar with the facts about the battle of Belmont, Miss Carroll's claim that she was present must be utterly fantastic. But would it not seem that Mrs. Greenbie must have found the claim clearly set forth in some of Miss Carroll's papers?

One of the strangest points in the Carroll story is that she strongly condemned the capture of Fort Donelson. Provoked because Dr. J. W. Draper gave credit to Halleck for the Tennessee River operation, she wrote him in 1870, asserting bluntly that the movement had been undertaken "in pursuance of a direct order of President Lincoln," and adding that "it cannot be doubted but that, immediately upon the fall of Henry he [Halleck] should have advanced his victorious column without turning aside to take Donelson or giving any thought to Columbus."⁷⁶ Actually the very day that Henry fell three gunboats started up the Tennessee, going as far as Muscle Shoals, and bringing back on their return trip a large steamer the Confederates were converting to a gunboat, together with all the timber and plating necessary to finish the work. Military persons, however, have thought it was better for Grant to move twelve miles and capture nearly fifteen thousand men than leave them in his rear to do mischief, or to retreat to Nashville to fight another day.

What do Miss Carroll's protagonists make of her condemnation of the capture of Fort Donelson? Mrs. Greenbie spoke of McClellan, Halleck, and Grant being "refulgent in Anne's great idea," and described the gunboats as playing Santa Claus to the army at Fort Donelson.⁷⁷ The fact of course

⁷⁵ *My Dear Lady*, 145, 153. On page 165, Mrs. Greenbie referred to Anna's horror in remembering the wounded and dead on the battlefield of Belmont.

⁷⁶ *House Miscellaneous Documents*, 44 Cong., 1 Sess., no. 179, pp. 118-119.

⁷⁷ *My Dear Lady*, 179, 181.

was that the gunboat attack at that place was a dismal failure, two of the boats being badly damaged and the other two soon withdrawing from action. Noble on his part closed his documentary by saying that Miss Carroll's last day of life fell on the anniversary of the fall of Fort Donelson, which "so triumphantly launched the great campaign she had planned."⁷⁸ To give her the credit, the day on which the fort fell was distorted by two days!

There is some very decisive evidence as to how much value Lincoln had for Miss Carroll, and how much heed he paid to her proposals. Among her papers in the Maryland Historical Society there is a copy of a long letter she wrote the President on April 1, 1862, urging him to veto the bill abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia. Lincoln not only signed the bill, but issued a statement strongly commending it. In July, when Halleck was brought to Washington as General in Chief, Miss Carroll was still working on politics. In a letter to Lincoln dated the fourteenth, she referred to reasons she had previously submitted for "immediately antagonizing the abolition party, as essentially necessary to the salvation of the government." The moment, she averred, was propitious for doing just that, on account of the recent congressional passage of the Confiscation Bill. "By your veto the Republic may yet be saved," she declared. Then she perorated: "Mr. President, just as sure as effect follows cause, so sure it is that abolitionism and the Republic cannot both live. Better, far better, then, that abolitionism in the land perish, than that the Republic be forever lost."⁷⁹ Lincoln folded the letter, wrote on the back, "Anna Ella Carroll—July 14, 1862—discusses public affairs," and in spite of some objections signed the bill.

Mid-August brought another letter that began: "I am just informed that at a public dinner table, in a Washington hotel, a gentleman, whose name I do not know, stated, that the President had said 'a lady demanded fifty thousand dollars, for writing a document,' etc., meaning myself." She forebore discussing, said Miss Carroll, as she desired to forget, "the very disagreeable manner" in which "it was represented" that the remark had been made, but she said it was plain that Lincoln had not understood her in a recent conference, as

⁷⁸ *Woman with a Sword*, 408.

⁷⁹ Lincoln Papers, LXXXI, 17048-17061. The papers are in the Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

she had indicated at the time, though he had insisted that he had. Miss Carroll recounted how "many of the ablest men in the Nation" had said the government should extensively circulate the three tracts she had already written, and had suggested that she could render good service by going to Europe to write in behalf of the United States. Accordingly in the recent conference she had suggested that she go abroad with fifty thousand dollars—a small sum, her friends had said—of public money, as a sort of modest Office of War Information. Of course this would have left Lincoln to run the war with no one to help but the generals, but according to Miss Carroll herself he objected for another reason. Here are her words: "When you said to me, that my proposition was 'the most outrageous one, ever made to any government upon earth,' I remarked that 'the difference between us, was in our view upon the value of intellectual labor, in the administration of government.'"⁸⁰

In this long letter, in which Miss Carroll lectured Lincoln and sought to exhibit both her ability and the service she had rendered, and explained how Napoleon had the habit of using smart people to help him, there is no reference to her Tennessee plan, nor a statement that can be taken as a veiled allusion to it. If in the interview referred to Lincoln had before him the person he believed responsible for the great February successes, would he have made the harsh remark Miss Carroll herself recorded? Ingratitude was certainly not a trait of Lincoln's. Surely Miss Carroll knew that Lincoln had never seen her paper.

Miss Carroll's August letter also made it clear that Lincoln was in no way responsible for the printing of her pamphlets, though she told him that as a lawyer he knew the government was bound to make good on Scott's promises. Yet Miss Carroll's recent biographer stated without any authority, that Lincoln personally ordered the printing of fifty thousand copies of the reply to Breckinridge.⁸¹

The unpleasant conference referred to had been secured though the use of a letter from Senator Orville H. Browning of Illinois, and the one remaining letter in the Lincoln Papers

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, LXXXIII, 17654-17667.

⁸¹ *My Dear Lady*, 118. Mrs. Greenbie asserted that Lincoln's order officially marked the beginning of "the partnership of Mr. Lincoln and Anne Carroll."

from Miss Carroll, written in October, sought another interview.⁸² Though Lincoln was not a particularly difficult person to see, the great, unrecognized member of his cabinet, evidently did not just knock on his door and then walk in.

The final question is this: Was the paper that Miss Carroll inserted in her memorials and petitions to Congress actually the same as the one she gave to Thomas Scott? The original document is not in the Lincoln Papers, and Scott left no papers. Until the paper is found—perhaps in unpublished material in the war archives—all that one has is Miss Carroll's word and that of Scott. Certainly her statement alone is not sufficient, and if Scott in 1872 seemed completely confused about the trip he had made to the West, it is not likely that he recalled reliably the contents of a paper he had read over ten years before.

The point, however, is not worth insisting upon. But it is interesting and a little ironical that the letter, only recently available, which proves how little influence Anna Carroll had on Lincoln, either politically or militarily, should have been written by herself. When she later asserted so strongly that Lincoln would have recognized her as the originator of the Tennessee campaign, had he but lived, Anna Carroll probably forgot about the letter she had written on August 14, 1862.

⁸² Lincoln Papers, XC, 19120.