Kentucky. Already under construction is the multimillion-dollar Barkley
Dam and hydroelectric plant on the Cumberland River. In championing
his cause the author points out a few facts which speak well for TVA:
the annual saving of $103,000,000 for civilian power consumers (which
does not include the tremendous savings of the government in power
for defense); the fact that TVA is actually $68,000,000 ahead of schedule
in its Treasury payments; the in-lieu-of-taxes payment of $45,000,000
to the states and counties of the valley, a sum which does not include
an additional $64,000,000 paid by municipalities and rural cooperatives.

In looking at the future, conservationist King warns that with
the tremendous growth of population and the demands of modern
industry we must take every means to conserve water. Further, he
feels that the only way to succeed in conserving our natural resources
is through a unified conservation administration. Resource problems
must be above party politics and cannot be solved with policies based
on nineteenth-century concepts.

*The Conservation Fight* is much more than a memoir of Judson
King. It is a documented study written with care. Each chapter is
footnoted and sources are cited. Because of the nature of the study,
the author has drawn heavily upon the *Congressional Record* and a
myriad of House and Senate hearings, documents, and committee reports.
Unfortunately, the volume is slightly marred by printing errors which
should have been corrected in proof.

The author did not live to see his book in print. He finished the
manuscript just two weeks before his death on July 4, 1958. We are
indebted to Judson King for his unceasing efforts on behalf of the
conservation of natural resources and for the written record which
he has left behind.

*Indiana University*  
Robert A. Frederick

*American Diplomacy: A History.* By Robert H. Ferrell. (New York:
references, appendix, index. $6.00.)

This book is a welcome addition to the group of excellent text-
books now available on American diplomatic history. It is somewhat
shorter than the others; it supplies for each chapter a well-selected
and critically evaluated list of references; it reads easily enough to
hold the attention of the average undergraduate; and it reveals clearly
the author's opinion on practically every important subject of con-
troversy. Its proportions are weighted heavily in favor of the twentieth
century; the author gives more than twice as much space to the years
following as to the years preceding 1900. But this does not mean that
the earlier period is less carefully studied than the later. Throughout
the volume the author shows that he has read the books and articles to
which he refers, and he does not hesitate from time to time to name
in the text the historians whose findings he accepts or rejects. He
quotes also, with considerable freedom and good effect, both from source
and secondary material. In short, this study adds up to an excellent
analysis of the position the United States occupies in the contemporary diplomatic world, together with an admirable exposition of the historical stages by which the nation arrived where it is.

Congratulations are especially due the author on his willingness to state definite conclusions on matters where historical judgment is divided. In general, he goes along with the latest theories advanced, and they may not always be right. But undoubtedly the author reflects in most cases the best current opinion among historians. A few instances will suffice to make this point clear. The principal cause of the War of 1812, Ferrell asserts, was “freedom of the seas,” despite the theories of Pratt, Hacker, and others; and he cites cogent evidence in favor of an interpretation that takes us “right back where we started from.” He brands the attack on Mexico in 1846 as “a war of aggression,” while at the same time regretting the absence of a Mexican statesman able enough and smart enough to sell what he could not defend, as Napoleon sold Louisiana in 1803. Ferrell questions whether McKinley “could have defied the war hawks of 1898 in Congress” and so prevented the war with Spain. “If the Spanish government had granted Cuba immediate independence, this alone might have prevented hostilities.” He is convinced that “there is no doubt that Germany’s submarine measures, above everything else, brought the United States into the first World War.” He blames “the traditionally isolationist outlook of the American people toward foreign affairs” rather than the wilfulness of Senator Lodge and his associates for American failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. He concludes that “it defies common sense to believe that President Franklin D. Roosevelt would have constructed in diabolical cleverness a Pacific back door to war” in Pearl Harbor. He holds “American military unpreparedness, rather than any such factor as public statements by the secretary of state or General MacArthur” (who said that “only a lunatic would fight on the mainland of Asia”), responsible for the Communist attack on South Korea. These are courageous statements, for they will cost him adoptions that he might not have lost by the safer noncommittal on-the-one-hand-on-the-other dodges.

The one conspicuous flaw in the book is that the index is not adequately analytical. Long lists of figures following an item are an irritation rather than a help.

University of California, Berkeley

John D. Hicks


The two books listed above merit careful consideration by teachers and students of general American history and especially by individuals interested in American economic history. Although written for use as