

As for T.R. and his seventh world, that of war and peace, when he reached the presidency his early jingoism was supplanted by a strong desire for good international relations. The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded him for bringing about the end of the Russo-Japanese War. Contrary to general opinion, he did not publicly advocate United States intervention in World War I until Germany announced unrestricted submarine warfare on January 31, 1917.

The book is singularly free from error, and the style is charming. Nothing important is omitted. There was just so much of Roosevelt that his shortcomings and egotism are overtowered by his greatness. An anti-Roosevelt reader can find support for his opposition; an ardent admirer can find additional proof for his position; an impartial student most probably will believe that Wagenknecht has given him a "Square Deal."

Indiana University

Heber P. Walker

The Army Air Forces in World War II. Edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. Volume VII, *Services Around the World*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. lii, 666. Maps, illustrations, notes, glossary, index. \$8.50.)

This, the seventh and concluding volume of *The Army Air Forces in World War II*, brings together accounts of various world-wide service activities of the Air Forces. The preceding volume, *Men and Planes*, tells the story of the supporting activities in the continental United States. Together the two volumes bring to mind those logistical and service activities which have so often been neglected in military history. Even these volumes, however, do not exhibit the integration and the focus necessary to permit analysis of logistical problems as a whole and in relation to combat operations.

The present volume, following the pattern of its predecessors, is a collection of six monographs. The first, and longest, is an account of the Air Transport Command written by John D. Carter and Frank H. Heck. The authors discuss the important questions of command and control involved in giving effect to the revolutionary idea of a strategic command for air transport. Attempts to include Navy air transport in this world-wide system failed, but the organization was the forerunner of the unified MATS which was formed after the war. Relations with the civilian air lines and with their employees, who were serving under contract alongside military personnel doing the same jobs under less favorable circumstances, were a source of friction, but their co-operation was essential. The ATC grew to a force of 200,000 officers and men, with 3,700 aircraft. In the month of July, 1945, it carried 275,000 passengers and 100,000 tons of cargo. Operations included service to the Middle East, North Africa, across the North Atlantic, northwest to Alaska, across the Pacific, and over the "Hump" to China.

The second part of the book, by John E. Fagg, is the story of the aviation engineers—the men whose job it was to prepare and keep in repair airfields and other air installations. A special group of engineers was organized into air-borne battalions intended to drop by parachute

with light equipment and prepare advance fields for the support of air-borne operations, but their actual use never justified the effort spent.

Jonas A. Jonasson is the author of chapters on the AAF Weather Service and the Army Airways Communications System. Chapters on medicine, morale, and air-sea rescue are written respectively by George V. LeRoy, Martin R. R. Goldman, and Jonasson. With good reason, flight surgeons and air commanders stressed the medical and morale problems peculiar to air combat. These problems pertained especially to the physiological effects of flying at high altitudes and to psychological effects of combat flying. Still the problems of stress and of the effects of high casualty rates were not peculiar to the Air Corps. In some ways they were of greater significance in infantry and armor combat, where there was no hope of rotation and reassignment to the States after an allotted number of missions. And when one reads of the envy with which airmen regarded the Navy on seeing how sailors were living the "more abundant life," he may be moved to think that Air Force morale might have been boosted by more intimate contact of its personnel with the infantrymen and their austere existence.

The concluding chapters give an account of women in the AAF—the air WAC's, the flight nurses, and the civilian auxiliary, Women Air Force Service Pilots (WASP) representing a merger of the WAFS (Women's Auxiliary Ferrying Squadron) and the Women's Flying Training Detachment—by Kathleen Williams Boom, and a résumé of the complex problems of redeployment and demobilization by Chauncey E. Sanders, formerly of Indiana University.

Two types of problems reappear throughout the volume—the matter of obtaining the necessary equipment and of training the men needed for these technical services and, secondly, the matter of organization and control. Sometimes it seems that struggles really aiming at an independent air force were allowed to dominate war activity to the detriment of objectives at hand. The theme, "Unity of Command," always is stressed to justify vertical expansion of air force commands and for maintaining control of organizations across theater lines or in areas reserved to other services. But the principle of unity of command is ignored when it means control of air force units by the Ground Forces or the Service Forces. Thus there were continuous efforts to divorce the aviation engineers from the Corps of Engineers, and there was a long struggle for an independent (i.e. from the Army Surgeon General) medical service for the Air Forces, which was even to include control of general hospitals where presumably physicians would be more in sympathy with ideas of air power.

Interpretations and conclusions in this history generally reflect an Air Forces point of view, but they appear to have been arrived at honestly and without any compulsion or censorship. The editors' Foreword, as in all the volumes, gives an excellent survey of the material covered in the separate monographs. Indeed a valuable short history of the AAF might be formed by bringing together in a single small volume the forewords from the seven volumes. On the conclusion of this massive historical project, congratulations are due the editors,

Air Force Historian Albert F. Simpson, and the USAF Historical Division for a job well done and an invaluable contribution to the history of World War II and to the military history of the United States.

Purdue University

James A. Huston

White House Images & Realities. By Holman Hamilton. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1958. Pp. xi, 98. Bibliography, index. \$3.50.)

This brief volume includes three addresses which Professor Holman Hamilton gave at the University of Florida in 1958 as the university's second speaker in its recently established lecture series on American civilization. In his talks Hamilton considered: "Roads to the White House," "Greatness and Failure," and "The Presidential Image." A wealth of interesting information is packed into these lectures.

Very likely Professor Hamilton here endeavored to reach principally undergraduates and nonspecialists in American history. In his two volumes on Zachary Taylor, as well as through his continued research and writing regarding the Compromise of 1850, he has earned his spurs as a professional historian able to fend for himself. His *White House Images & Realities* blends his skill as a professional historian with some of the lessons in writing for the general public which he doubtlessly learned earlier as an editorial writer on the *Fort Wayne Journal-Gazette*.

Hamilton offers much detail regarding the varied roads which men have traveled to the White House. He regards Lincoln, Washington, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Wilson, and Jefferson as among the great presidents, while Harding and Grant are evaluated as the weakest of them all. Hamilton is especially fond of Old Hickory and also of FDR. But even Hamilton's great have feet of clay, while his weak receive some commendation. Perhaps Grant and Harding were given D's rather than F's much as numerous undergraduates receive D's when they deserve F's. Hamilton reserves his A's for the presidents who in his opinion have been effective and forceful leaders in meeting the issues and requirements of their times. The question of the extent to which such greatness depends upon intrinsic qualities and abilities versus the question of the extent to which it involves the accidents of time and place is a problem which, though touched upon now and then, is perhaps wisely left for continued seminar study.

Professor Hamilton, both within and between the lines, indicates concern over the lack of decisive presidential leadership, including the lack of personal vigor and command, on the part of President Eisenhower. He considers this shortcoming most serious at a time when the future of the country, and even of civilization itself, seems to be almost literally at stake. Hamilton, however, would grant that there are pros and cons to his appraisal of current leadership, and American patriot that he is, he obviously hopes that its ultimate results are far superior to what he fears they might be in certain emergency situations.