and secondary research upon which the book is based is hidden from the reader’s view. Students fascinated, for example, by the engaging account of the raising of the 54th Massachusetts Regiment or the struggle for black commissions will not have easy access to the authors’ sources, should they wish to pursue further research. Fortunately, the authors’ excellent annotated bibliography mitigates part of this problem.

Overall, the authors do an excellent job in revealing the complexity of the black soldiers’ war in a concise and readable fashion. As in most books, some minor errors slip in. The authors twice claim that Martin Delany was the first African American to hold the rank of major. Yet the claim that his appointment in February 1865 was the “highest rank to date to an African American” is immediately followed by the account of the complaints, made the previous year, of six white surgeons concerning “Dr. Alexander T. Augusta, a black surgeon commissioned a major.” Indeed, Augusta became major in April 1863 and, at war’s end, was brevetted lieutenant colonel. These minor quibbles, however, should not overshadow the considerable value of this book as a college text.

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Northern Men with Southern Loyalties: The Democratic Party and the Sectional Crisis
By Michael Todd Landis

This study is the fullest account of the Northern Democrats in the 1850s since Roy F. Nichols’s prize-winning The Disruption of the American Democracy (1948). Both studies focus on politics, especially party machinery and the distribution of patronage, and locate the coming of the Civil War in political decisions that disastrously misfired. However, unlike Nichols—who examines both the Southern and Northern wings of the Democratic party in the context of the Buchanan administration, and who is more attuned to the disruptive economic, social, and cultural forces that contributed to the chronic political turmoil and factionalism—Landis covers the entire decade of the 1850s and is concerned almost exclusively with the political infighting of Northern Democrats both at the national and
state levels, most notably in Indiana, Pennsylvania, and New York.

Landis is unsparing in his indictment of the Northern Democrats’ role in enabling Southern slaveholders to dominate the party and bend it to a pro-slavery agenda. With far more detail than Leonard Richards could provide in his broad survey, *The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860* (2000), Landis’s extensive research in the papers of Northern Democrats provides him with ample evidence to show just how and why Southern control was exercised. More so than in any other study, the “doughfaces”—the contemporary pejorative label for Northern men with Southern principles—come alive in this account as ruthless political operatives driven primarily, if not only, by their quest for profitable offices. Jesse Bright, the Kentucky slaveholder who made his political home in southern Indiana and ruled that state with an iron fist in the 1850s, personified all the greed and disdain for majority rule that characterized the doughfaces. His Indiana political machine, Landis writes, “was more akin to an organized crime family than a partisan operation, with himself as the patriarch commanding a host of unflinchingly loyal lieutenants” (p. 21).

Whenever a key piece of national legislation deemed vital to the interests of slavery was in doubt, or whenever a presidential aspirant was to be promoted or rejected based on his stand on Southern issues, a Bright, to say nothing of a Democratic president such as Franklin Pierce or James Buchanan, was ready to wield patronage and cash to reward Democrats who fell in line with Southern demands or to punish those who did not. Pushed to the extreme in the party purges that followed Democratic defections after Kansas’s admission into the Union under the fraudulent Lecompton Constitution, these dictatorial tactics set off internecine party warfare that left the Democrats in organizational shambles as the fateful election of 1860 unfolded.

Landis has marshalled the evidence to back up his condemnation of the doughfaces. Indeed, his evidence is so compelling that he well might have pushed it further and probed more deeply into what Nichols hinted at but never fully developed—namely, the extent to which the sheer number and lucrativeness of the patronage prizes represented an antidemocratic structural weakness that made a mockery of Democratic claims to majority rule. Striking in Landis’s analysis of the doughfaces is the extent to which they openly flouted the will of their constituents. They could do so with impunity because of the strength of the party machines at the state level and their control of patronage. Insulated from the wishes of their constituents, they continually expressed surprise at the unpopularity of the pro-slavery measures that they were instrumental in passing and
enforcing. As a result, the Northern Democratic Party was a hollow shell of its former self by 1860, and the resultant bitterly polarized political groupings lacked any legitimate basis for brokering a settlement to blunt the drive of secession.

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Learning from the Wounded: The Civil War and the Rise of American Medical Science
By Shauna Devine

Shauna Devine’s title, Learning from the Wounded: The Civil War and the Rise of American Medical Science, accurately describes the perspective of her book. This volume is not for the novice because it is neither an overview of Civil War medicine nor an examination of a specific part of it. In addition, it uses quite a bit of unexplained medical terminology. Rather, Devine takes particular incidents, doctors, and patients and shows how they helped point postwar American medicine in a scientific direction through the use of microscopes, autopsies, and the sharing of specimens at the Army Medical Museum, among other means.

Devine attempts to put Civil War medicine in the context of nineteenth-century medicine, briefly explaining the situation at the start of the war and then showing how wartime developments spurred or affected scientific changes and perspectives in the postwar period. Devine is especially interested in the role of the Army Medical Museum, established by Surgeon General William A. Hammond in 1862. All Union medical officers were ordered to collect interesting specimens and case studies and send them to the museum. These examples composed a basis for the important postwar publication The Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion (1870–1888), as well as a source of information for civilian and military doctors after the war. Devine has used the raw materials submitted to the museum—rather than the published summaries in The Medical and Surgical History—the as source material for her book. On occasion, her commendable zeal to present specific examples of these