

form rescues and other service functions more effectively. Harrison's most important step toward gaining worker support was to order the police to be neutral in strikes, instead of wading in swinging their clubs against strikers and clearing the way for scabs to enter factories. In doing so, Harrison won some worker support but lost the backing of industrialists who had organized the Citizen's Association and the more elite Commercial Club, powerful lobby groups determined to shape the city to suit themselves.

The Haymarket Square bombing and Anarchist scare of 1886 changed that pattern. The police, several of whom were victims of the bomb, launched an all-out war on Chicago's

Anarchists, the long-term results of which were to harden the police against strikers and to win back industrialists' enthusiastic support. Mitrani's story continues after Haymarket to cover the Pullman Strike and others, but the bombing established a pattern of police attitudes and harsh tactics that persisted for decades.

Mitrani has produced a well-written and thoroughly researched study of the Chicago police's development, proving that police history is alive and doing well.

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### *Slavery, Race, and Conquest in the Tropics: Lincoln, Douglas, and the Future of Latin America*

By Robert E. May

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. xi, 296. Illustrations, maps, notes, index. Clothbound, \$80.00; paperbound, \$26.99.)

Beginning with his *Southern Dream of Caribbean Empire, 1854-1861* (1973), Robert E. May of Purdue University has done more than any historian to document and explain the proslavery expansionism that overshadowed U. S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean during the antebellum decades. His definitive biography of John A. Quitman, published in 1985, explored the life of this Mississippi governor and would-be filibusterer of Cuba who rose to general in the

Confederate Army. May's *Manifest Destiny's Underworld* (2002), provided a thorough account of the numerous filibustering expeditions to the Caribbean and Central America through which Americans sought to establish extra-legal outposts of empire. While the filibusterers found supporters throughout the United States, their base of support and most enthusiastic participants were white men from the Old South who idealized slaveholding as the key to wealth, masculinity, and

power. The book under review builds on that career of research and writing.

With this book, May demonstrates that proslavery expansion into the Caribbean lay not on the periphery but near the center of antebellum political conflict. May argues that historians have focused too narrowly on the tension over the expansion of slavery west across the continent. Equally important, May believes, was the clear determination of many southern Democrats, as well as northerners like John O'Sullivan, to expand the territory of the United States into the tropics. This endeavor would create new territories where slaveholders could prosper, and ultimately new slave states. The ambition to spread slavery offended antislavery men throughout the North and in the national legislatures many spoke against it, including Abraham Lincoln.

May advances his interpretation through a creatively written and well-documented exploration of the critical rivalry between Stephen A. Douglas and Lincoln. After brief sketches of the political background of these men—disciples of Andrew Jackson and Henry Clay, respectively—May's narrative picks up steam with the election of 1844. Lincoln supported Clay, of course, but Douglas supported the Democratic insurgent James Polk, who made the annexation of Texas the cornerstone of his candidacy. When Polk won, Douglas became a forceful proponent of the joint resolution calling for the annexation of Texas.

Significantly, May shows that it was during these debates that Douglas first proposed the important concept of "popular sovereignty," the idea that the citizens of any new state should decide whether or not slavery would extend to their state. Popular sovereignty threatened to undermine the Missouri Compromise, and Douglas's incorporation of the idea into his Kansas-Nebraska bill provoked heated controversy. But May shows that Douglas intended to extend the principle even further. Speaking before a New York City audience in 1854, Douglas stated that popular sovereignty should be applied to any new territory the United States might acquire, "whether it be Kansas, Nebraska, Oregon, Mexico, Cuba, or the Sandwich Islands" (p. 104). Douglas had also supported taking all of Mexico after the U. S.-Mexican War in 1848, and from his seat on the influential Senate Committee on Foreign Relations he had championed the purchase of Cuba, beginning in 1850. Douglas would go on to support the filibusterer of Nicaragua, William Walker, who was ultimately executed for his astounding provocations.

Throughout this period, Abraham Lincoln took an opposite stance. May does not believe that Lincoln opposed territorial expansion categorically, but during the war with Mexico it became clear to Lincoln that territorial expansion and the expansion of slavery were becoming too entangled to support one without the other. Lincoln supported David Wilmot's

amendment to ban slavery from any territory acquired from Mexico and then retired to private practice. When Lincoln again sought office in 1858, he attacked Douglas's support of territorial expansion. Ironically, the man remembered as the great "liberator" used territorial expansion to question Douglas's adherence to white supremacy. If the U. S. acquired all of Mexico, Lincoln asked sarcastically, would Douglas have the "mongrels" of Mexico, none of whom were "pure white," help decide the question of slavery for the people of that new state? May reminds us that Lincoln faced a deeply racist electorate whose votes he had to secure, but it remains startling to see his language in such stark display.

Lincoln's attitudes about the place of non-white peoples in American society retain an important place in May's final chapters, where he argues persuasively that Lincoln's strong opposition to proslavery expansionism was intimately related to his support for the colonization of free black people in tropical colonies. As president-elect, Lincoln's antagonism to expansionism emerges most clearly in his rejection of the Crittenden compromise, which proposed that the 36° 30' division established by the Missouri Compromise be extended westward to determine the fate of

slavery in all territories "hereafter acquired." In a letter to Thurlow Weed, Lincoln warned that such a measure "would lose us every thing we gained by the election; that filibustering for all South of us, and making slave states of it, would follow" (p. 215). Lincoln hoped to maintain the tropics as a potential haven for free-labor colonies of formerly enslaved African Americans. Recent scholars such as Eric Foner also take Lincoln's colonizationist stance quite seriously. But May argues uniquely that Lincoln's colonizationism played an important role in his opposition to proslavery expansionism. In Lincoln's view, the tropics needed to be secured for the establishment of free black colonies, not simply to thwart the expansion of slavery.

May has illuminated yet another fascinating dimension of America's imperial history, as well as the centrality of slavery in the nineteenth-century Atlantic world. Teachers and students of this history should read this marvelous book.

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