

tion of invention at the turn of the century as the loose, quasi-Bohemian culture of early inventors came under the sway of corporate industry; and second, the diffusion of values and symbols of order, precision, and systematic control from technology to politics and culture.

Hughes's book reaches its climax when it covers the period between 1919 and 1945, as "Taylorismus and Fordismus" inspired Americans and Europeans alike with a "white socialism" of mass production and consumption overseen by engineers (p. 289). Hughes brilliantly demonstrates that it was European Modernists, Weimar social democrats, and Soviet revolutionaries who laid the groundwork for American social planning in the 1930s and the military-industrial complex of the 1940s by translating technics into artistic form and political ideology. But the culminating creations of that enterprise—the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Manhattan Project—also set the stage for the disillusionment with "The System" during the 1960s. Hughes concludes with a survey of the ideas of Jacques Ellul, Mumford, and other theorists of technological dystopia. Despite the Reagan administration's hope of salvation through Star Wars, Hughes asserts that the revolutionary enthusiasm for American technological systems has ended.

Hughes's masterful study of this critical moment in Western culture interweaves elegant portraits of American inventors and systems-builders with its overarching theory of the dialectic of technics and civilization. At times, however, this synthesis comes undone. Some chapters veer between overly technical discussions of scientific matters and summary statements about the culture of technology that lack grounding in other relevant developments, such as the ideology of progress, popular images of technology, and the emergence of a consumer culture. By neglecting popular attitudes about technology and the representation of systems in mass culture, Hughes misses the monkey wrenches of skepticism, sarcasm, and outrage that ordinary people have often tossed into the works of the systems builders. As a result, Hughes gives the impression that the technological ideologues were right in arguing that systems had replaced human beings—a form of technological determinism at odds with his keen Mumfordian insights into modern history.

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Should America Go to War? The Debate Over Foreign Policy in Chicago, 1939–1941. By James C. Schneider. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989. Pp. xxii, 289. Appendix, notes, bibliography, index. \$37.50.)

How and why do democracies go to war? James C. Schneider addresses this question in an engaging and well-researched exami-

nation of how the citizens of Chicago grappled with the momentous issues posed by German and Japanese aggression in the three years before Pearl Harbor. He selects Chicago for his grass roots study because of the diversity and activism of its civic leaders, media, and ethnic communities. He details the opinions and activities of the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Chicago Daily News*, the local chapters of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDA) and the America First Committee (AFC), as well as veterans' groups, women's organizations, university students and faculty, black journalists, and others. The varying responses in Chicago to the 1940 presidential candidacy of Indiana's Wendell Willkie are covered. The author interweaves local concerns with international issues and provides some often-difficult-to-discern links between public attitudes and foreign policy.

Schneider draws clearly the lines of debate over United States entry into the war. The *Chicago Tribune* and AFC contended that the war itself was dangerous to the United States and must be avoided. Even aid to Britain was unacceptable because it would only lead America to war. The *Daily News* and CDA argued, on the other hand, that Nazi tyranny and ambition were the real dangers and that aid to Britain would, in fact, help avoid United States military involvement. With passage of the lend-lease act in March, 1941, the proaid position became United States policy, but the debate itself continued. The invective and attacks by both sides on the integrity of the other escalated. With repeated and unsubstantiated assertions that the majority of Americans opposed aid to the Allies and that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was duping the public into war, the isolationists obscured their best arguments about the risks of intervention. Conversely, the internationalists hurt their cause and muddled the issues by charging that the administration's critics hated Roosevelt more than Hitler and were doing the Nazis' work in America.

Realist critics of American foreign policy such as Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Norman Graebner have argued that both the isolationists and internationalists overdemand and wanted something for nothing. Schneider adds a new and disturbing implication. The public debate gave the president no positive guidance and produced no foreign policy consensus. Some scholars assert that Harry S. Truman and Lyndon B. Johnson should have sought congressional declarations of war in Korea and Vietnam. Schneider's study suggests that public debate does not necessarily lead to consensus on domestically divisive wars.

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