1,325 men in his command perished from malaria before they could be removed and quarantined at Montauk Point on Long Island. Despite the fact that the 8th Ohio saw no combat, Hard's account is filled with interesting personal observations about important personalities and operations of the expedition. He records both his disgust with the crusty and often profane commander of the campaign, General William R. Shafter, and his sympathy for General Nelson A. Miles, commanding general of the United States Army, who was passed over for command in Cuba and given the lesser job of occupying Puerto Rico. His own second in command, Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. F. Dick, was then secretary of the Republican National Committee and later, while a member of the United States House of Representatives, authored the Dick Militia Act of 1903, which enacted federal support for state National Guards and formalized their relationship with the regular army.

Hard's prose is easy to follow and his observations, perhaps reflecting his midwestern upbringing, are refreshingly direct and concise. He was proud of his regiment and his state and entered service with the same carefree attitude as his men. Before long, however, the Ohioans saw their romantic notions of war collide with unpleasant realities of disease in the Caribbean and the muddled attempts of the War Department to cope with the rapid expansion of the army. The rush to get to Cuba and the front was followed in short order by a corresponding rush to get back to America and home.

Ferrell has done an admirable job in editing Hard's journal and has added an introduction and conclusion, a complete roster of the regiment, eleven pages of notes, a bibliography on the war itself, and a number of previously unpublished photographs of the 8th Ohio in 1898. Banners in the Air provides an interesting and readable eyewitness account of America's last fling with heroic warfare and first encounter with its worldwide role in the twentieth century.

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The Great Silent Majority: Missouri’s Resistance to World War I.

American historians have usually assumed that while both apathy and opposition to the Great War existed—especially outside the urban Northeast—most citizens eventually came to support the nation's participation. Christopher C. Gibbs argues, however, that "the great silent majority" of Missourians opposed involvement
throughout the war "by slacking when possible, resisting where necessary, and going along when no other course of action was available" (p. 156).

Gibbs refutes those critics who accused the war's opponents of being pacifists, pro-German, or political radicals. Pacifism, he contends, did not have deep roots in Missouri, and while significant numbers of German-Americans and Italian-Americans lived in the state, opposition to mobilization cannot "be explained by ethnicity alone" (p. 43). Nor does radicalism (Socialists were the most organized opponents) account for the widespread resistance. Rather, opposition emerged from longtime political and economic traditions, particularly "localism, faith in democracy, and anticorporate sentiment" (p. 41). The dominant theme of opponents, according to Gibbs, was that "Wall Street bankers, arms dealers, [and] food speculators . . . wanted war because they would get richer while the common people paid in money and blood" (p. 43).

Gibbs's monograph is based on several collections, including the papers of the Missouri Council of Defense, as well as about three dozen state newspapers. His chapter on the council is most interesting and tends to confirm similar research on other states. Created by "bankers, businessmen, and state officials" (p. 50), the Missouri council became like a "private club" in which "workers, blacks, and women were hardly represented at all" (pp. 53, 52). Its purpose was to mobilize the state as it tried to eliminate dissent. The impetus to suppress dissent, according to Gibbs, came not from the grass roots but from businessmen, public officials, and the press.

The major difficulty with this work stems from documenting the extent of opposition to the war. Newspapers, as the author acknowledges, pose problems because they usually denied dissenters a forum and as a result, news coverage and editorials leave the impression of widespread support for the war. Still, Gibbs says, "a careful reading of Missouri's press uncovers a second level of news" that mentions slackers and lack of support for mobilization (p. 28). Gibbs also uses evidence from the mobilizers themselves to show that their campaigns often did not meet their own criteria for success. Interestingly, he notes that only 3.8 percent of Missourians participated in the second Liberty Loan drive and less than 11 percent in the third, compared to the national averages of 10 and 18 percent respectively. Still, this reviewer remains skeptical that opposition was as pervasive as the author claims.

But this reservation is one of degree and should not obscure the fact that this book goes beyond John C. Crighton's *Missouri and the World War, 1914–1917* (1947) in adding to an understanding of the homefront during the war. It is a nice contribution to the recent literature that has examined mobilization at the state
and local levels. Students of twentieth-century American nationalism will find this book valuable, too, as an example of how the federal government increased its presence in the lives of citizens.

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The essays in this volume focus on the foremost mass-production industry in the twentieth century. Edited by Nelson Lichtenstein and Stephen Meyer, with contributions by sociologists, historians, industrial relations experts, and economists, the essays illuminate the dynamics of the labor process, assess the character of shop-floor relations, and evaluate the relative power of workers and managers to control the structure and organization of work.

Wayne Lewchuk argues that the organization and militance of skilled metal workers in Britain (but not in the United States) precluded the imposition there of Fordism’s machine-paced production and close supervision. Thomas Klug discusses the various strategies used by auto employers to control the Detroit labor market, which further enhanced the ability of American managers to shape production in the preunion era. Tracing the social history of machine tool design and technical innovation in the industry from the 1900s to the 1950s, Meyer argues that Fordism was flexible enough to accommodate semispecial and automated machines and challenges scholars who hail the recent rise of an allegedly new system of flexible specialization that will reskill—not deskill or degrade—labor. Steve Jefferys shows how radicalized workers at the Dodge Main plant in Hamtramck, Michigan, in the 1930s established a strong shop-floor tradition that legitimized sectional bargaining and industrial action, in stark contrast to the situation that prevailed in General Motors plants. Asking why women were not retained on production jobs after World War II, Ruth Milkman argues that Fordism’s emphasis on high wages offered auto managers no incentive to substitute women for men and that management’s hiring policies, not union inaction or collusion, determined the composition of the postwar automotive labor force. Lichtenstein assesses the brief history of auto foremen’s unionism and speculates on the relationship of the “man in the middle” to the formation of working-class identity and consciousness at midcentury. Stephen Amberg offers an historical perspective on the contemporary transformation of the auto industry in an analysis of Stude-