Every prediction made concerning Russia up to this time has failed for the simple reason that men have been guided by their prejudices and their hopes and have ignored the plain facts before them. [James P. Goodrich to Arthur K. Remmel, January 24, 1922.]

Had it not been for the famine of 1921, it is unlikely that James P. Goodrich, Indiana's retiring Republican governor, would ever have visited Russia. Having just completed a rather unhappy four-year term as chief executive, it was Goodrich’s intention to return to his banking business at Winchester, Indiana, and never again play a public role. Instead, he was unexpectedly asked by Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover to help supervise the Russian operations of the American Relief Administration. His four trips to Russia turned Goodrich into an enthusiastic admirer of the long-suffering Russian people. “I like the Russian people,” he wrote a friend, “they are so much like our own folks.” Optimistically, in reality too optimistically, Goodrich concluded that Russia, as a result of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's New Economic Policy, was embarking upon the road to capitalism. Unlike most contemporary observers, however, Goodrich saw clearly that the revolution was an accomplished fact with which the West had to come to terms sooner or later. His recommendation, which he offered calmly and unemotionally to the Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge administrations, was that America should extend diplomatic recognition to Moscow and restore Soviet-American trade. At the time he was often regarded as a man who had lost touch with reality,
and his views were ignored. Practically the only occasion during his entire lifetime when he agreed with a Democrat was in 1933 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt exchanged ambassadors with the Soviet Union, an action which substantially vindicated Goodrich.2

James Putnam Goodrich was born at Winchester, Indiana, on February 18, 1864. He was the third of five sons born to John and Elizabeth Goodrich, but he had little recollection of his father, who died of tuberculosis when James was only eight years old. Considering the modest economic circumstances of his youth, Goodrich was probably lucky to have graduated from high school. Among the nine graduates in his class at Winchester High School were James E. Watson, later a Republican United States representative and senator; John R. Commons, who became a prominent economist at the University of Wisconsin; and Cora Frist, whom Goodrich married in 1888. He attended DePauw University for two years but did not graduate, nor did he have a law degree although he passed the bar examination after reading law in the office of Enos Watson, the father of his high school classmate. Thereafter Goodrich became financially successful as an attorney, as the receiver of the Chicago, Cincinnati and Louisville Railroad, and as president of the People's Loan Company at Winchester.3

Republican politics, not business, was Goodrich's real calling. In his uncompleted autobiography, written in 1938–1939 for his son Pierre, Goodrich devoted just 28 pages to his childhood and education and 160 pages to his political career. In 1897 Goodrich was elected county chairman for Randolph County, and from 1901 to 1909 he served as Republican state chairman. “I might say without egotism here,” he rather egotistically wrote in his autobiography, “that from that time on down until 1921, the general policy of the Republican party so far as the organization was concerned was directed by me.” Organizing, not speechmaking, was his strong point, and for many years he was content to remain in the political background and showed no interest in seeking elective office. Goodrich always regarded himself as a liberal Republican, an assessment which was accurate enough from an Indiana, if not from a national, perspective. In 1912, reflecting his sense of loyalty to the Republican organization, he discreetly supported William Howard

Footnotes:
1 Goodrich's role in the Russian operations of the American Relief Administration is briefly traced in Harold H. Fisher, The Famine in Soviet Russia, 1919–1923: The Operations of the American Relief Administration (New York, 1927), 143-50; Frank Alfred Golder and Lincoln Hutchinson, On the Trail of the Russian Famine (Stanford University, Calif., 1927), 75-89; and Benjamin M. Weissman, Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia: 1921–1923 (Stanford University, Calif., 1974), 97, 109, 130, 136-38, 180-81.
2 James P. Goodrich autobiography, pp. 1-29, manuscript, Box 4, Goodrich Papers.
Taft against Theodore Roosevelt. Four years later he changed his mind about running for public office and decided to seek the governorship. To cover his campaign expenses he wrote a personal check for $40,000; and with the assistance of Will H. Hays, "the best publicity man that ever lived," Goodrich easily carried the election while condemning the Democrats for excessive state spending.4

As an experienced politician heading a united party and having control of both houses of the legislature, Goodrich should have been a successful governor. To his shock he found himself the target of unexpected backstabbing by his fellow Republicans. "It was a strange situation in which I found myself," he recalled. "The men who had been associated with party politics ever since 1900 complimented me during the campaign on the promises made and almost invariably said that it was 'good stuff.' But after my inauguration, they began to express grave doubts as to the wisdom and political expediency of so many new and unusual things." First of all, Goodrich was thwarted by senators of "small mind and narrow vision" when he proposed an excise tax on corporate property in order to equalize the state tax burden between agriculture and industry. The governor was also frustrated when he sought to abolish the Indiana Oil Inspection Department on the ground that there was no work for it to perform. Even more discouraging was that much of his time as governor was spent in the hospital. In August, 1917, he was seriously ill with typhoid fever. Then, soon after his recovery, his car was struck by a truck, and Goodrich spent several more months in the hospital with fractures of the hip, skull, ribs, collarbone, and left hand. For the rest of his life Goodrich walked with a cane.5 Goodrich was undoubtedly in earnest when, in the final year of his term, he wrote Senator Harry S. New: "I have no desire or ambition to do anything but finish my administration as best I can and then go back to my business. I am done with politics for ever and a day." And, with only two months remaining as governor, he wrote a friend: "I will be the happiest man in Indiana when the tenth day of January comes and I can once more be free. Never again will I even think of rendering any service to the people in an official capacity."6

4 Ibid., 53, 110.
6 Goodrich to Senator Harry S. New, April 3, 1920, Box 13, Goodrich Papers; Goodrich to Ezra Mattingly, November 6, 1920, Box 7, ibid.
Goodrich’s retirement coincided with the catastrophic Russian famine which swept the Ukraine and the Volga region in 1921. A combination of drought, civil war, and foreign intervention led to the destruction of even seed grain and draft animals, and numerous cases of cannibalism were recorded. According to a British estimate, thirty-five million people were starving to death. A famous appeal for aid by the writer Maxim Gorky made the world aware of the Russians’ plight. Secretary of Commerce Hoover, speaking for the United States, signified his willingness to organize a program of famine relief. Hoover had already earned an international reputation as a humanitarian for his relief activities in Belgium during World War I. During the Paris Peace Conference he had headed the American Relief Administration, an official agency that had distributed food supplies on credit to war-torn Europe. Once the war was over, the ARA remained in existence in New York as a private organization with close ties to the American government, and Hoover continued to serve as chairman.7

Selecting personnel for the Russian relief program was Hoover’s first step. To head the operation he chose Colonel William N. Haskell, who had previously supervised ARA operations in Roumania and Armenia. Goodrich’s name was first mentioned to Hoover by Postmaster General Will H. Hays of Indiana following a Cabinet meeting. Hoover responded enthusiastically and suggested to Hays that he would like to send Goodrich to Russia as “one of the important divisional heads” under Haskell. “I believe it would be of substantial benefit to this country,” wrote Hoover, “to have a man of such experience as Governor Goodrich obtain a real knowledge of what the real difficulties of this foolish economic system are.” Goodrich, who was vacationing in New York, was highly flattered by the suggestion, which was conveyed to him by Hays, and wrote his friend that he felt he could get his financial affairs in order if he were definitely asked to go. Hoover then responded with a telegram asking Goodrich to come to Washington “to discuss [the] Russian situation.” After a brief interview with “the Chief” and Haskell, Goodrich agreed to go to Russia “with an open mind to investigate the entire famine situation, learn the truth about Russia and return as soon as the preliminary investigation was completed.” Officially Goodrich served the ARA as a “special investigator.” No salary went with the imposing title, although he was compensated for his travel expenses.8

---

7 Fisher, Famine in Soviet Russia, 49-67; Weissman, Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief, 5, 46-52.
8 Herbert Hoover to Will H. Hays, August 22, 1921, Box 276, Records of the American Relief Administration (Archives of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, Calif.). This collection is hereafter cited as ARA Records. Goodrich to Hays, August 22, 1921, ibid.; Hoover to Goodrich, August 23, 1921, ibid.; Goodrich, “Manuscript on Various Trips to Russia, 1921–1922,” Introductory Chapter, p. 7, Box 16, Goodrich Papers.
Governor James P. Goodrich and Russia

On the surface Goodrich was not very well qualified for such a mission. His entire experience had been in the world of business and domestic politics. Although he was not an isolationist, his knowledge of foreign policy was slight; and he possessed only the most rudimentary information about Russia's history, geography, and culture. Goodrich readily admitted, "I had never been in Russia and I knew nothing about the country of the Great Bear excepting what I had learned at school and what I had read since in the American newspapers and magazines." Yet, in a sense, his lack of preparation was an advantage in that he undertook his mission without holding intense anti-Soviet convictions (with the exception that Goodrich, like most westerners, regarded the communist economic system to be contrary to human nature). Demonstrating a rather youthful curiosity, he saw his position with the ARA as an opportunity to combine a worthwhile humanitarian service with a last great adventure. At age fifty-seven, having achieved financial security and having attained all he desired in politics, Goodrich was at peace with himself and politically obligated to no one, Hoover included. He took literally Hoover's request that he approach the subject with an open mind and returned with some unexpected conclusions.

Three weeks were required for Goodrich to reach Moscow. First he traveled with his wife on the liner Kroonland to England where he met briefly with ARA officials. His route then took him across the channel and by train through France, Germany, and Lithuania to the Russian frontier. It was immediately apparent to Goodrich that he had entered a different and more primitive world. Along the railroad he observed women working side by side with men as section hands. The station at the border was "dirty, cold, ill-smelling, and absolutely unlighted." Yet, in his first encounter with the Russian people, Goodrich found himself strangely attracted to the

---

8 Goodrich, "Manuscript on Various Trips to Russia, 1921–1922," Introductory Chapter, 6-7, Box 16, Goodrich Papers.

10 As a general rule Goodrich was not inclined toward introspection; moreover, his Russian visit was arranged in such haste that he had little time or energy to spend on self-analysis. When one considers his correspondence with Hays and Hoover, his diary entries, and his later writings about Russia, however, it is clear that Goodrich was highly flattered to have been selected to make the trip for the ARA. At the same time, he was naturally apprehensive about his personal safety and physical comfort while traveling in a country ruled by the Bolsheviks. At London, according to his diary for September 29, 1921, he purchased a winter outfit that was sufficient “to go to the North Pole if the Bolsheviki don’t get it all.” And it was probably worry that led Goodrich to record on September 27 that he was not sleeping well. James P. Goodrich diary, September 27, 29, 1921, Goodrich Papers. Nevertheless, his sense of anxiety was overshadowed by a feeling that he was about to undertake a journey of unique personal, political, and historical significance. Throughout his first and later trips to Russia, Goodrich took pains to make daily entries in a compact traveler’s diary with the intention of publishing a book about his experiences. He began this project in 1922 but abandoned it after completing a first draft of three hundred pages.
GOVERNOR JAMES P. GOODRICH'S
AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION
IDENTIFICATION CARD

TO ALL COMPETENT AUTHORITIES IN RUSSIA,

The bearer Mr. James P. Goodrich
whose photograph is attached is a member of the
American Relief Administration, is travelling in Russia
in the interests of that organization. All Competent
Russian Authorities are hereby requested to afford
him all assistance in their power.

Chief Russian Unit,

American Relief Administration,
MOSCOW, 6th October 1921

ВСЕМ ПОДЛЕЖАЩИМ ВЛАСТЯМ В РОССИИ.

Предъявите сего, в-е предъявленную фото-карточку с приложением,
является членом Американской Администрации По-
мощи, проезжющий по России по делам вышеука-
занной организации.

Подлежат русские власти прилагаться ока-
зывать ему всякое содействие.

Signature of Holder.
Печать владельца.
"noisy laughing crowd of dirty ragged Russians jabbering in a strange tongue not a word of which I could understand." At a private home near the depot he was served a "very good dinner" consisting of a sour soup, potatoes, fish, meat, black bread, and beer, for which he was charged the equivalent of sixteen cents. Twenty-four hours later, on October 6, 1921, Goodrich finally arrived in Moscow only to discover that no one was there to meet him because the telegram he had sent announcing his arrival had never been delivered. Soon he was established at ARA headquarters in "the Pink House" and after dinner seized the opportunity to take a bath.\footnote{Goodrich diary, September 27–October 6, 1921, Box 17, Goodrich Papers.}

After two days Goodrich was able to secure first class accommodations on the train to Samara in the drought-stricken Volga region. The plan was for the governor to be accompanied by Professor Frank A. Golder of Stanford University, George Repp (an ARA employee), and a Russian interpreter. If possible Goodrich and his party hoped to link up with Haskell who was on his own inspection tour of the Volga. Had Goodrich based his opinion of Russia solely upon the primitive travel conditions encountered during his first trip to the Volga, he could justifiably have thrown up his hands in despair and vowed never to return. At Moscow the train was advertised to leave at 10:00 p.m. but on short notice left at 1:30 p.m. instead. In the confusion the interpreter and Repp, who had all "the grub," were left behind. Fortunately Golder, who had been born in Russia and was an experienced and resourceful traveler, rose to the occasion. Soon he had foraged cheese and bologna sandwiches made of black bread. For breakfast Goodrich and Golder dined on millet bread and raw turnips which they washed down with pumpkin rind tea. "At a little way station," noted Goodrich, "Dr. Golder jumped off the train returning in a few minutes with a roast chicken on which we dined in the evening." To pass the time the two played poker, the first of many such games, with Goodrich emerging victorious by 120,000 rubles (the equivalent of $1.20).\footnote{Ibid., October 8–12, 1921; Golder and Hutchinson, \textit{On the Trail of the Russian Famine}, 75–78.}

Upon reaching the Volga, Goodrich's first impression was that the reports of famine were "greatly exaggerated." A casual walk through the streets and bazaars of Samara, Simbirsk, Kazan, and Marxstadt revealed healthy, red-cheeked men, women, and children and ample supplies of food (with the exception of bread) offered at prices far below those prevailing in the United States. It was only when Goodrich went into the orphanages, hospitals, and warehouses and examined account books that he appreciated how
little food was available before the next harvest. In a preliminary report to Hoover, Goodrich told of seeing peasants methodically gathering "famine weeds" (cockle burrs, wild rose pods, and miscellaneous seeds) to be ground and combined with rye and millet and made into bread. The leftover straw was stacked for use as cattle feed, and Goodrich was told that the livestock would eat it only when everything else was exhausted. In the countryside he observed that anything having food value, even cabbage leaves and melon rinds, was carefully saved. In one commune near Saratov he saw not a single dog and was informed that they had all been butchered for sausage. Typhus, spread by lice, added to the distress. After visiting a young Quaker who was hospitalized with typhus at Samara, Goodrich found it difficult to sleep as he imagined typhus-infected lice were crawling over him.13

Instead of continuing down the Volga by boat to Saratov and the German colonies, Goodrich, on the advice of government authorities, proceeded by train on the grounds that it would be faster—a prediction that proved highly optimistic. Once again he was accompanied by Golder, who was now joined by Professor Lincoln Hutchinson of the University of California at Berkeley. True to form the interpreter missed the train, and the three Americans were left with a first class compartment in which to pursue their poker game. Saratov, the first stop, impressed Goodrich as clean and prosperous. For only 19½ cents he was able to purchase "an excellent meal" of soup, bread and butter, lamb chops, tea, and pastry. Joined by Repp, Goodrich then proceeded by boat to his final inspection site, the communes of the Volga Germans near Marxstadt. He and Repp were assigned a "very comfortable room" in the bow portion of the vessel. From the deck they watched as an enormous crowd sought to board the ship. "I helped 'hook' two ladies on with my cane and brought down the guard on me," Goodrich recorded, "but at least had the goodwill of the women."14

The further south he traveled the more "appalling" was the evidence of famine: parched fields, empty grain warehouses, and emaciated, discouraged peasants. In one communal graveyard he counted "198 new made graves over which the grass had not started to grow." Nearby he saw a small boy wearing a skeeplskin coat. "He seemed so sturdy," Goodrich noted in his diary, "I slapped him on the shoulder and was shocked to find him nothing but skin and bones. I learned on inquiry both his parents had died a few weeks ago and they were going to send him out to Marxstadt to the

---

13 "Governor Goodrich's Preliminary Report on Russia," November 1, 1921, in Documents of the American Relief Administration, 1921–1923, ed. H. H. Fisher and Suda L. Bane (11 typed volumes, Stanford University, 1931), II, 403-404; Goodrich diary, October 13, 1921, Box 17, Goodrich Papers.
14 Goodrich diary, October 19, 1921, Box 17, Goodrich Papers.
THE TRAVELS OF JAMES P. GOODRICH IN RUSSIA
1921–1925

Courtesy Benjamin D. Rhodes.
[children’s] home. I gave them 50,000 rubles [about 50¢] and told them to get him some bread to eat on the way.”15 Visiting the commune of Houk, thirteen miles from Marxstadt, Goodrich encountered two girls, ten and twelve years old, shivering and crying in a small shed. Since the death of their parents and two brothers the week before, they said, they had had nothing to eat except for a few cabbage leaves and carrots. “They were barefooted and had on no clothing except their cotton dresses extending to their knees,” Goodrich recorded. “They said that they were very hungry. They looked as if they were in great distress, were exceedingly thin and emaciated.” When Goodrich asked the communal authorities why they did not energetically seek to discover such cases, “they did not give a very good excuse.” The governor also had difficulty understanding the answer to a question that he put to a group of peasants in the same commune, “Why is it when many of you have bread to eat so many others die of hunger?” After a long silence one man replied, “It cannot be helped, some must die for if help does not come we all must die.”16

At Marxstadt, Goodrich and Repp were met by Golder and Hutchinson. Jointly they returned to Saratov by boat. Delayed by a fog, Goodrich, Golder, and Hutchinson again played poker, in part to pass the time but also to determine who would get the best place to sleep. On this occasion the governor’s luck deserted him, and he had to settle for an empty corner; Hutchinson won the top of the table, and Golder that part of a sofa not occupied by a sleeping Russian. By November 1 Goodrich was finally back in Moscow and able to recommend to Hoover that the ARA expand its child and adult feeding operations in the Volga region. He further suggested that stocks of seed grain should be loaned in preparation for spring planting. “It is a condition that requires continued and effective action if the saving of human life is worthwhile,” he concluded.17

Following short trips to Kazan and Petrograd, Goodrich returned to Washington to report to Hoover in person. When he left Moscow on November 14, Goodrich took with him a comprehensive memorandum from Haskell outlining for the benefit of Hoover the major problems faced by the ARA. Haskell stressed that he wished to avoid the sudden arrival of large quantities of food and seed grain because of the inability of the Russian railroads and government departments to handle it. “Governor Goodrich,” he added, “can

---

15 Ibid., October 22, 1921.
16 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Russian Relief: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 67 Cong., 2 sess., December 13, 14, 1921, p. 6.
A TARTAR-RUSSIAN BOY LEAVING AN AMERICAN RELIEF ADMINISTRATION KITCHEN WITH HIS DAILY FOOD

Reproduced from Frank Alfred Golder and Lincoln Hutchinson, *On the Trail of the Russian Famine* (Stanford University, Calif., 1927), opposite 34.
explain the difficulty of obtaining any correct statistics on railways or anything else in Russia." Haskell stressed, and Goodrich agreed, that a large number of American personnel would be required to supervise the relief to prevent pilfering and avoid "the curse" of the inefficient and suspicious Russian bureaucracy. The ARA, Goodrich was asked to tell Hoover, "was really up against it at the present moment for the proper supervision of our supplies." 18

Armed with the reports of Haskell and Goodrich, Hoover adopted the realistic strategy of appealing directly to Congress as the fastest method for raising sufficient relief funds. With the support of President Harding, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives to appropriate ten million dollars to purchase corn and seed grain "for the relief of the suffering people of Russia through the American Relief Administration." On December 13, 1921, Goodrich was invited to testify on the bill before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. His candid description of what he had seen brought home clearly and poignantly to his listeners the extent of the calamity. Before he was through, Goodrich had practically single-handedly persuaded the committee to double the amount of assistance proposed in the bill. 19

In his presentation Goodrich carefully traced the devastating effects of civil war and drought upon the Volga region. Using statistics that he had painstakingly collected from communal leaders, Goodrich demonstrated that "the brass-tack facts" proved the region faced mass starvation unless humanitarian help was provided. He effectively illustrated his figures with personal vignettes of peasants collecting famine weeds and of the two girls who "probably would have starved to death if we had not found them." He told also of seeing at Saratov a man and his wife who had not eaten for a week and who were "lying at the point of death." Was the proposed ten-million-dollar appropriation sufficient to save the starving of Russia, he was asked? "No sir," he replied, "I do not think it is enough, gentlemen. It ought to be doubled. It ought to be 20,000,000 bushels of corn and 5,000,000 bushels of wheat sent over from this country to save that situation." By December 22 both houses of Congress had approved twenty million dollars for Russian relief. President Harding promptly signed the measure into law and appointed a five-member Purchasing Commission, which included Goodrich as one of its members, to acquire the needed supplies and distribute them through the ARA. 20

In undertaking his mission to Russia, Goodrich fully appreciated that he had been sent to gather information, not to offer un-

---

18 Colonel William N. Haskell, "Memorandum for Governor Goodrich on matters to be taken up with Mr. Hoover," November 14, 1921, Box 276, ARA Records.
19 Fisher, Famine in Soviet Russia, 146-51, quotation p. 146.
20 U.S. Congress, Russian Relief Hearings, 3-13, quotations 6, 7; Fisher, Famine in Soviet Russia, 146-51.
solicited political advice. Surely, however, it would have been strange had Goodrich, a lifelong politician, failed to take into account the political implications of furnishing aid to Soviet Russia. As he considered the famine situation, Goodrich found that many humanitarian and political questions were intricately intertwined. Would famine relief to the starving people of Russia bolster an ideologically repugnant government? Was Communist Russia the final product of the Russian revolution? And, if it appeared that the Soviets were solidly entrenched, should America abandon nonrecognition and restore United States–Russian trade?

At first Goodrich had his hands full just coping with the travel and information-gathering aspects of his mission. As time went on, he was more and more intrigued by political considerations. In particular he came to feel, as he implied in letters to Hoover and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, that famine relief might accelerate the return of capitalism to Russia. “On every hand,” Goodrich wrote Hughes, “I see the most conclusive evidence of the return of the Government to a capitalistic basis.” Goodrich told Hoover that he had observed “such a complete abandonment of the underlying principles of communism that I care not by what name they call it, tactics or what not, it marks the complete failure of communism and out of this will grow not by revolution, but by evolution, a state wherein the right of property and of the individual to the fruits of his toil will sooner or later be respected and protected.” The governor’s almost utopian vision of the future was shaped by his basic misreading of Lenin’s New Economic Policy, which had been introduced six months prior to Goodrich’s first Russian trip. Under the NEP the peasants were permitted to retain a portion of their grain, small-scale private manufacturing was permitted, and a system of state banks was established to finance new ventures and attract foreign accounts. Neither Goodrich nor many members of the Communist party appreciated that the NEP was meant to be only a temporary retreat from communism.

On his return from Russia Goodrich brought with him opinions on several other political questions. Basing his conclusions on numerous conversations with Russians and his ARA colleagues, Goodrich found no evidence of any organized opposition to the government or of any desire to return to tsarism. He found that he received the same answer regardless of whether a Russian translator was present or not. “I do not find anyone who even has the

21 Goodrich to Charles Evans Hughes, November 2, 1921, Box 24, Goodrich Papers; Goodrich to Hoover, November 2, 1921, ibid.
hope of any revolution," he wrote Hoover. “I found not one particle of sentiment for the old order and the Russian people will have none of it.” Since the new government was in control and showing capitalistic tendencies, Goodrich felt it was shortsighted not to encourage trade. Learning that the Russians were interested in purchasing a large number of English tractors, Goodrich alertly wrote Hoover, “It seems to me that there should be a chance for America here for we make the best tractors in the world.”

On the all-important question of recognition, it is likely that Goodrich had already made up his mind. There is every reason to believe that he was in agreement with Hutchinson, who advised Hoover as early as November 9, 1921, that the Soviets were “firmly in the saddle” and that the United States should abandon its “holier than thou” policy of moral condemnation and extend recognition. For the time being Goodrich kept his opinions on recognition and trade to himself. When asked point-blank by Representative Tom Connally of Texas whether he favored the diplomatic recognition of Russia and the resumption of trade, Goodrich tactfully replied, “That, again, is a question I would rather not discuss except in executive session.” His discreet public silence was a demonstration that he appreciated the hazards of saying anything favorable about the government of Lenin. Soon he received a reminder of the controversial nature of his new subject. For telling the Foreign Policy Association of New York that the Soviet leaders were “honest, sincere, misguided enthusiasts,” Goodrich found himself assailed as a “Red” by Ralph Easley, the secretary of the American Defense Society.

By mid-February, 1922, Goodrich was once again on his way to Russia to survey the food situation. On the day of his departure he ended his silence on the question of recognition and began a quiet personal campaign to convince the Harding administration that the recognition of Russia was inevitable and justified. Writing to Hoover, he described attending a business luncheon with the president of the Westinghouse Company and representatives of oil, railroad, and agricultural equipment companies. All the executives, he found, were anxious to restore trade with Russia and were concerned that the Germans and British would monopolize Russia’s foreign trade. The meeting confirmed Goodrich’s view that the United States should seize the initiative and “take positive action with reference to Russia.” Echoing an argument previously advanced by Hutchinson, Goodrich contended, “The Revolution is an

---

23 Goodrich to Hoover, November 2, 1921, Box 24, Goodrich Papers.
accomplished fact and we might as well recognize it and, under proper assurances, cooperate in a friendly way in the rebuilding of Russia." Finally, Goodrich urged that Hoover, Hughes, and Harding meet "and determine the position of our country." As a practical man, Goodrich could not have been too surprised that his letter failed to produce a top level meeting and a diplomatic revolution. He understood that presenting the "facts" about Russia as he saw them was going to require great persistence, but he could not have guessed that the debate over recognition would last until 1933.

Soon after Goodrich reached Moscow on March 9, he took up with Haskell the most unpleasant aspect of his trip. As a humanitarian organization dedicated to feeding the starving, the ARA might have been expected to be immune to misconduct on the part of its personnel. On the contrary, Hoover had been shocked to receive reports of heavy drinking on the part of the Moscow staff. Goodrich was told to get to the bottom of the problem. In the resulting investigation Goodrich learned that the drinking bouts had occurred during Haskell's absence in London; moreover, he found that one of the offenders in Moscow had also carried on an illicit relationship with a Russian woman. Demonstrating a hard-boiled side to his personality, Goodrich concluded that heads had to roll. On his recommendation two supervisors at Moscow were dismissed, and the ARA supervisor at Riga was disciplined for "philandering with the wives of some of the American personnel." In addition, based on information verified by Golder, Goodrich purged the ARA supervisor at Petrograd for intoxication and for repeatedly having prostitutes transported to ARA headquarters in an official automobile. On Hoover's recommendation Cyril J. C. Quinn was named as Haskell's chief assistant; as a result Goodrich found that the general atmosphere was greatly improved, enabling him to concentrate once again upon the famine.

Goodrich's intent was to retrace his route of the fall, going by rail to Samara and then continuing to Orenburg two hundred miles further to the east. The entire trip was to take no more than a week. Once again Goodrich found that the schedules of Russian railroads could not be relied upon and that the plans of the traveler to Russia were often made to be broken. All went well on the trip to Samara where he found that conditions were steadily improving due to the arrival of several trainloads of American corn. A program devoted especially to feeding starving children was serving

---

25 Goodrich to Hoover, February 18, 1922, Box 276, ARA Records.
26 Hoover to Haskell, February 16, 1922, Box 19, Goodrich Papers. Goodrich personally delivered this letter to Haskell. In it Hoover complains about reports of heavy drinking and recommends the appointment of Quinn as assistant director. Goodrich to Walter L. Brown, March 10, 1922, Box 16, ibid.; Goodrich to Brown, March 16, 1922, ibid. The two Goodrich letters describe the misconduct in Moscow.
2,400 a day, and the freezing of the ground made it possible to distribute the corn rapidly via the primitive roads of the countryside. Sixty miles from Orenburg Goodrich's train was delayed by reports that a gang of bandits was blocking the track. Then overnight “a terrific snow storm” developed. Ascertaining that he would be unable to reach Orenburg, Goodrich asked to have his car coupled to a freight train en route to Samara. At the town of Bogotai, however, the train became stuck in “an insurmountable drift.”27 For five days the line was closed by conditions which, in Goodrich’s opinion, would not have tied up traffic in the United States for more than twenty-four hours. “The delay here,” he concluded, “is due to lack of equipment, absence of executive ability, and utter inefficiency in dealing with a situation of this kind.” At least the experience gave him an opportunity to interview at length the peasants who had come in sledges drawn by horses and camels to transport American corn back to their villages. He found them to be “in general, a pretty happy, good-natured lot of folks.” Their happy dispositions were possibly due to the fact that they were about to receive their first real food in many months. At the same time that Goodrich observed the peasants to be strong and ruddy, he was told by English Quaker relief workers that ten to fifteen persons a day were dying in the vicinity from hunger and typhus; and he noticed one man eating a “very dark, greenish bread. We inquired of what it

27 Goodrich to Harding, March 24, 1922, Box 24, Goodrich Papers.
GOVERNOR JAMES P. GOODRICH AT THE RUSSIAN VILLAGE OF BOGOTAI, MARCH, 1922

Courtesy American Relief Administration Collection, Archives of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, California.
GOVERNOR JAMES P. GOODRICH AT THE RUSSIAN VILLAGE OF BOGOTAI, MARCH, 1922

Courtesy American Relief Administration Collection, Archives of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, California.
GOVERNOR JAMES P. GOODRICH AT THE RUSSIAN VILLAGE OF BOGOTAI, MARCH, 1922

Courtesy American Relief Administration Collection, Archives of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, California.
was made, and he said of camels' dung mixed with grass. The various peasants who heard him make the statement nodded their heads in approval."

On his return to Moscow, seeing that the famine situation in the Volga region was coming under control, Goodrich spent a final three days gathering political and economic information. First, with some trepidation, he and Golder interviewed Feliks Dzerzhinsky, the commissar of railroads. Formerly Dzerzhinsky had headed the Cheka, the dreaded secret police who had displayed great vigor in crushing opponents of the regime. Instead of a bluebeard Goodrich was pleasantly surprised to meet "as kindly mannered a man as ever scuttled a ship." Goodrich, who had once run a railroad and who had had dismal experiences with the Russian rail system, was fascinated by the subject. He was assured that the seed sent from the United States would be distributed in time for spring planting and that service would be substantially improved by the purchase of 187 steam locomotives from Germany and Sweden. In answer to a direct question from Goodrich, Dzerzhinsky said that the Transport Department preferred American steam engines produced by the Baldwin Company and had only purchased the German and Swedish models out of necessity. Goodrich came away with the impression that diplomatic recognition of Russia by the United States would be followed by the flowering of Soviet-American trade.29

The question of Russian-American trade relations arose again the next evening following a dinner given for A. Scheinmann, the director of the Russian State Bank. The Americans in attendance were Goodrich, Golder, Hutchinson, and Quinn. According to Golder's notes Goodrich expressed a desire to have business relations opened but said the American people were not yet ready to support diplomatic recognition. "Why talk about the people," Scheinmann cynically retorted. "They have nothing to do with the matter, it is the government that is against us and not the people." When Goodrich remarked that the ARA was in Russia merely to feed the hungry with no ulterior motive whatsoever, "the expression on Scheinmann's face indicated that he wondered if I thought he was foolish enough to believe that sort of thing."30 Finally Goodrich lost his temper and stated that if the Soviet government "enjoyed playing such petty politics and such childish games, he was through with them." Golder was especially outraged by such high-handed conduct. "Three months ago Governor Goodrich was in favor of recognition," he recorded, "but he has now lost much of his enthusi-

---

29 Ibid., 452-53.
asm. Six months ago I regarded the Bolo [Bolshevik] leaders as real statesmen, but today I see in them cheap east side politicians and shopkeepers.” Perhaps his pique was accentuated by the adverse results of the poker game played after Scheinmann’s departure in which Golder lost 300,000 rubles to Goodrich and Quinn.31

After a good night’s sleep Goodrich’s resentment had subsided. As he prepared for his long trip home, he drafted lengthy reports for Hoover and President Harding. Going beyond the mere presentation of information, he offered unambiguous advice about the direction American policy should take. In general he felt encouraged by the course of the ARA work despite some obstruction on the part of the inefficient Soviet bureaucracy and the delays caused by the decrepit railroad system. Turning to political matters, Goodrich admitted having had some misconceptions. Perhaps as a result of his encounter with Scheinmann, he would concede some doubts about his earlier idea that the Soviet leaders were merely honest idealists who were ignorant of economic principles. Still he could see no chance at all of any challenge to the government, which led him back to his original conclusion. As he wrote Hoover, “I am still of the opinion that the situation will be solved sooner, and the Russian people be more quickly relieved from this intolerable burden by the recognition of its Government, by the setting up of diplomatic and consular corps, with commercial agents throughout Russia, and the opening up of Russia to the outside world.” He remained convinced, he advised Hoover and Harding, that America’s policy of nonrecognition had failed, that the revolution was an accomplished fact, and that America ought to extend recognition and permit American capital to participate in Russia’s economic development.32

In deference to Hoover’s request that he be “guarded upon questions of political recognition of Russia until conferences here,” Goodrich confined his views to official channels. Nevertheless, Hoover was open minded enough that he made no attempt to silence Goodrich. A few weeks before, Hoover had been asked by the editor of the Philadelphia Public Ledger whether, in his opinion, the newspaper should print several articles on Russia that Goodrich had agreed to write. Specifically Hoover was asked “just what kind of angled stuff” the governor was likely to submit. The editor added, “We’ve had glimmers that he comes out of Lenine-land pretty well saturated with Soviet ideas and with the notion that all is lovely there.” Through his assistant, Christian A. Herter, Hoover defended Goodrich, saying he felt anything the governor wrote

31 Frank A. Golder to E. D. Adams, April 1, 1922, Box 14, Papers of Frank A. Golder (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace).
32 Goodrich to Hoover, April 3, 1922, Box 24, Goodrich Papers.
“would be pretty good stuff. He [Hoover] is not particularly afraid of any Bolshevik tinge which it might have.”

On April 20, after a journey of sixteen days, Goodrich was back in Washington having breakfast with “the Chief.” During an “extended conference” Hoover and Goodrich discussed the progress of ARA operations, and Hoover said he was especially pleased that Haskell and Goodrich had enforced discipline by “getting rid” of the “bad actors.” Hoover than asked Goodrich to make a final Russian inspection trip with his departure scheduled for May 17. Afterward a glowing statement was given out to the press under Goodrich’s name extolling the ARA (and indirectly Hoover) for having broken the back of the famine. Actually the press release was drafted by Hoover and George Barr Baker, the public relations officer of the ARA, and it was decidedly premature in its claim that the famine was “under control.” In late April many areas of the Volga were just receiving their first American aid, and ARA operations in the Ukrainian famine districts bordering the Black Sea had not yet gotten under way.

By the end of May Goodrich reached England after “a very tedious voyage.” Waiting for him was a wire from Haskell stating that encouraging reports were coming in from the famine areas concerning their food prospects. Goodrich was especially pleased by the good news from Samara. If the state of Samara could take care of itself, he reasoned, then it was likely that the rest of the famine areas were well on the way to recovery also. Goodrich was especially pleased to learn that the famine was ebbing because it would leave him more time for politics. As he wrote Hoover, “This [the optimistic crop estimates] will leave me time enough to go into the political situation and ascertain what, if anything, can be done with the outfit at the head of the Russian government.” In London the governor’s spirits were further buoyed when Walter Lyman Brown, the ARA director from Europe, agreed to permit Golder, the poker playing history professor, to accompany him to Moscow as his translator.

On his previous visits to Moscow, Goodrich had confined himself to conducting official ARA business. On his third visit to the Russian capital (June 7–21, 1922) Goodrich seized the opportunity to conduct with high Soviet officials wide-ranging political discussions that went far beyond issues of humanitarian relief. Although the talks did not alter the status quo, they did produce the fullest

33 Hoover to Goodrich, April 14, 1922, enclosed in Christian A. Herter to Edgar Rickard, April 14, 1922, Box 276, ARA Records; Fred W. Wile to Herter, March 30, 1922, ibid.; Herter to Wile, April 8, 1922, ibid.
34 Goodrich to Haskell, April 20, 1922, Box 19, Goodrich Papers; New York Times, April 21, 1922; George Barr Baker to Herter, April 19, 1922, Box 276, ARA Records.
35 Goodrich to Hoover, May 28, 1922, Box 24, Goodrich Papers.
Governor James P. Goodrich and Russia

exchange of United States–Soviet views between the breaking of relations in November, 1917, and their resumption in November, 1933. At first, however, Goodrich was stymied by the problem of how to initiate political talks with the “higher-ups.” After all, the purpose of the ARA was to feed the hungry, and the organization had specifically promised to refrain from political activity. According to Golder’s notes, while he and Goodrich “were scheming how to bring about a meeting with [Karl] Radek [chief of the Propaganda Bureau] and [Lev B.] Kamenev [chairman of the Soviet Relief Commission] without taking the first steps,” an invitation luckily arrived from Radek asking the two Americans to have tea with him at the Kremlin. The discussion began on a sour note as Radek launched a bitter attack on America, contending that the United States was the greatest enemy of the Russian nation. Goodrich was able to break into the speech several times to say that America sought an understanding with the Soviets, and he made Radek smile when he remarked that the bankers of America and not the Communists of Russia were the true internationalists of the day. Finally Radek said that the Russian government would consent to a declaration of its willingness to pay its debts and suggested that Goodrich should meet with Kamenev and “other important Communists.” Alexander Eyduck, the Soviet liaison with the ARA, agreed to make the arrangements.36

Almost two weeks were required to get all the parties together. In the meantime Goodrich had a unique experience when Eyduck asked if he would like to visit a warehouse to examine some property belonging to the government. Under the impression he was going to be shown some furs, Goodrich agreed. Instead of seeing furs the governor was introduced to a jeweler from Moscow who brought forth three sealed iron chests. In Goodrich’s presence the seals were broken and the chests opened revealing the crown jewels of the Romanov monarchy. “It was a perfectly marvelous collection,” Goodrich noted. “The old Czar’s crown, the crowns of the Czarina and the various members of the royal family, with diamonds varying from one to 200 carats, all of the purest water, and wonderful color. Crowns of diamonds, of diamonds and pearls, emeralds, rubies and amethysts; collars, bracelets, necklaces. The scene beggared description. I never saw anything like it; it did not seem possible there could be so many jewels in the world.” After Goodrich had viewed the scene “until my eyes were weary with the blaze of light,” the tour came to an end. The apparent purpose of the demonstration was to show the world through Goodrich that the Soviets had not broken up the collection, as had been widely rumored.37

36 Memorandum by Golder, June 9, 1922, Box 19, Goodrich Papers.
37 Goodrich diary, June 14, 1922, Box 19, ibid.
Over the next week Golder was able to secure separate invitations for Goodrich to meet with such "higher-ups" as Kamenev, Leon Trotsky (commissar for war), Maxim Litvinov (assistant commissar for foreign affairs), Aleksei Rykov (assistant to Lenin), Leonid Krassin (commissar of foreign trade), and Grigori Sokolnikov (commissar of finance). Recalling his less than satisfactory interviews with Scheinmann and Radek, Goodrich resolved to avoid separate discussions and insisted that only a joint meeting was acceptable to him. Such a forum, he concluded, would be the most efficient way to discover the real prospects for establishing normal relations. At last Kamenev arranged for a meeting of all those officials with whom Goodrich wished to speak to be held at his Kremlin office the afternoon of June 19; only Trotsky was unable to attend. Accompanied by Golder, Goodrich opened the talks by stating that the Harding administration had asked him to explain informally the American attitude toward Russia. Without revealing that he disagreed with America's nonrecognition policy, Goodrich cited a statement issued by Secretary of State Hughes on March 25 listing certain conditions that must be met prior to recognition. In order, Goodrich took up the points listed by Hughes and was told it was Soviet policy to respect the safety of human life and the sanctity of property and contracts, as well as the free status of labor.38

With only a few exceptions the general tone of the meeting was conciliatory and businesslike. One point of dispute arose when Goodrich questioned whether the government was orchestrating a public demonstration the next day to demand the death penalty for thirty-four Socialist Revolutionaries who were on trial for sedition. Goodrich was not at all satisfied by Kamenev's assurance that the demonstration was a spontaneous manifestation of public opinion. (When Golder and Goodrich attended the parade the next day in Red Square, Golder found out from the marchers that they had been paid their wages for the day in return for participating; Golder also heard the presiding judge promise the crowd that the prisoners "would receive all that was coming to them"; and he observed that when the prosecutor asked the crowd, "Shall we inflict the death penalty on the prisoners?" the reply translated into good old American meant 'Give them hell. Shoot them!' ) The other major topic of dispute involved the repudiation by the Soviets of all debts owed by previous governments. Goodrich flatly stated, "You are wasting your time with America unless you are ready to recognize the debt and issue obligations promising to pay in the future." Kamenev and Krassin replied that all revolutionary parties since the Revolution of 1905 had agreed that the tsar's debts must never be

---

38 Golder to E. D. Adams, June 24, 1922, Box 14, Golder Papers.
paid; but they suggested that if America were to extend credit, some expedient could easily be devised to settle what was actually a small sum. After two hours Kamenev concluded the discussion by observing that the Soviets had "a real desire" to improve relations with America, that there was no major obstacle to a settlement of the debt question, and that the next step would be to submit the issues under dispute to persons who were officially empowered to act.39

From Goodrich's perspective the meeting had provided a useful exchange of views, but the governor did not deceive himself into thinking that significant new ground had been broken. After his return to the Pink House he decided that his report of the meeting was not important enough to justify the expense of transmitting it to Washington by telegraph instead of by regularly scheduled courier. On the positive side Goodrich was mildly encouraged by the civility of the Soviet officials and by the discovery that the positions of the two powers were not too far apart. Nothing occurred at the meeting to alter Goodrich's view that the Soviets were deserving of diplomatic recognition.40

Goodrich's final week in Russia was spent in a whirlwind tour of Nizhnii Novgorod, Kazan, and Samara. With few exceptions he found the food situation to be much improved, thanks to the American corn and the prospects of a good harvest. Where the crops were not so good, Goodrich blamed inefficient management rather than the weather. At one commune where a manager directed 105 men with indifferent results, Goodrich observed, "I can take a dozen Americans and with proper equipment secure better results than he is getting with his hundred." At another commune Goodrich was told by the inhabitants that they needed additional American aid to survive and that they had only 18 sheep left as opposed to 200 the previous year, only 38 cows left of 180, and no hogs at all. Yet in his tour of the commune Goodrich observed several hogs roaming about, and in the distance he saw a herd of cows that appeared to consist of more than 38 animals. Then as he left, a herd of sheep came in from the pasture, and Goodrich, as inconspicuously as possible, counted 52 sheep and 47 lambs. "I do not believe they made a single truthful statement about their livestock and crops," he concluded. In his judgment the Volga region, even though it was not fully recovered, would be able to get along without large scale American aid during the winter of 1922–1923.41

The governor's optimistic findings confirmed those already reached at a conference of ARA supervisors held at Moscow on June 17. "I am absolutely certain that our position will be sustained by

39 Goodrich diary, June 19, 1922, Box 19, Goodrich Papers; Golder to E. D. Adams, June 24, 1922, Box 14, Golder Papers.
40 Goodrich to Hoover, June 19, 1922, Box 276, ARA Records.
41 Goodrich diary, June 24, 1922, Box 19, Goodrich Papers.
future events," Goodrich wrote Hoover on his way to London. "I am not unmindful of the responsibility we take in advising the course outlined in our wire, yet after our trip through the Volga valley I would make the statement stronger rather than weaker!" Two weeks after his return to the United States, Goodrich attended a meeting of the ARA directors in New York. The directors concluded that adult feeding should be ended with the new harvest on September 1 and that child feeding should be continued on a reduced scale through existing institutions such as schools and orphanages. The phasing out of the famine relief operation meant that many fewer employees were required. Now the Moscow staff of the ARA would be able to handle the work of inspecting a smaller operation.\textsuperscript{42} Thus after three exhausting trips to Russia, Goodrich, with the assistance of the ARA, had worked himself out of a job.

Over the next year Goodrich was able to concentrate upon his neglected business affairs while he continued to work quietly to modify the official nonrecognition policy that bore little relation to the Russia he had seen with his own eyes. By 1923 Goodrich had adopted a new strategy to normalize United States–Soviet relations. Previously he had advocated diplomatic recognition and trade. Now he emphasized establishing business relations as a first step without making any mention of diplomatic recognition. Ordinarily Goodrich would have addressed his arguments to the State Department of Charles Evans Hughes. In Goodrich's opinion, however, the secretary of state's mind was completely closed upon the subject of recognition. "I can't talk to Hughes about it," Goodrich complained to Hoover. "He takes the view of a technical lawyer . . . ."

Considering Hughes a lost cause, Goodrich used Hoover as a sounding board for his ideas. He pointed out to Hoover that without exception the ARA men with experience in Russia, men such as Haskell, Golder, Hutchinson, and Quinn, all favored the opening of trade relations with the Soviets. Seeking to convert Hoover, Goodrich cleverly quoted a letter he had received from Haskell:

\begin{quote}
I think a great mistake is being made in not negotiating with the Soviet towards a trade agreement at least. In my mind it is foolish to pay any attention to what is published in their newspapers as what they do at some frontier etc. etc. . . . All those things are so insignificant compared to the big show. Furthermore, they would all disappear if friendly relations, i.e. business relations, were inaugurated. Of course, they are bad in one sense and silly in another but when understood one can get on with them. We are doing business today with worse people.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

Using an argument later advanced by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Goodrich maintained that it was unnatural and fraught with dan-

\textsuperscript{42} Minutes of a Conference of District Supervisors at Moscow, June 17, 1922, Box 16, Goodrich Papers; Goodrich to Hoover, July 2, 1922, Box 276, ARA Records; Fisher, \textit{Famine in Soviet Russia}, 297-307.

\textsuperscript{43} Goodrich to Hoover, January 30, 1923, Box 240, Commerce Papers (Hoover Presidential Library).
Governor James P. Goodrich and Russia

In principle, Hoover agreed with much of what Goodrich had to say. "On the general question of some sort of trade relationship I am, of course, in agreement with you," Hoover replied. As a potential successor to Harding, Hoover apparently felt, however, that any public endorsement of the controversial views of his ARA colleagues would be too risky politically. Goodrich then turned to Harding and urged the sending of a commission to explore a trade agreement. "The sooner we have the courage to recognize the solution the sooner will real peace be established and the return of the world to normalcy be accelerated," he wrote. Finally, he expressed the wish to see Harding before the president left on his summer vacation trip to Alaska.  
The meeting with Harding was never held because, on his return from Alaska, the president became ill at San Francisco and died there on August 2. His successor, Calvin Coolidge of Vermont, was even less informed and less interested in foreign policy than his predecessor. In effect the change in presidential leadership meant that Goodrich had to start all over in seeking to promote a more moderate American policy toward Russia.

Recognizing that in politics timing is all important, Goodrich resisted making overtures about Russia to Coolidge until the right psychological moment. On his return to the United States from his fourth and final trip to the Soviet Union in December, 1925, Goodrich decided the time had arrived for broaching the controversial subject. Goodrich, his wife, Haskell, and Golder had just completed an intensive five-week Russian tour. Starting at Leningrad, they had traveled to Moscow and from there proceeded to the Volga to observe the extent of that region's recovery from the famine. Goodrich's general impression was that "remarkable progress" had been made in restoring the railroads, manufacturing, finance, and agriculture.  
The contrast between 1921 and 1925 was particularly great in the German communes of the Volga. Once the scene of death and desolation, the region was now producing plentiful supplies of grain, meat, and the best melons Goodrich had ever eaten. At one stop Goodrich was recognized by a peasant woman who, in tears, threw her arms about his neck and said that the ARA had saved her children from starvation. "Soon a crowd of people were gathered around me," he recorded, "and I saw several faces whom

---

44 Ibid.
45 Hoover to Goodrich, February 1, 1923, ibid.; Goodrich to Harding, June 5, 1923, Box 31, Golder Papers.
46 Goodrich diary, September 1, 1925, Box 18, Goodrich Papers.
I recognized among those I met three years ago. It was a wholesome looking lot of folks gathered around here, ignorant as far as the ordinary education goes, but with a world of good hard common sense and of great industry; educated and given a fair chance in life they will give a good account of themselves."

Back in Moscow Goodrich found industry and transport humming. The train station was distinguished by its “unbelievable cleanliness,” although a thief stole his briefcase when he set it down while haggling with the driver of a droshky. A young army officer found out from bystanders who had taken it, and in a few minutes the thief was under arrest. Goodrich’s property was returned minus only a fountain pen and a pencil. In the Russian capital he found it no more difficult to transact banking business than in the West. Golder found some rare books that he wished to purchase for the Hoover War Library at Stanford University. Goodrich, therefore, cabled New York in the afternoon for one thousand dollars and by 9:00 a.m. the next day the funds were credited to his account. Everywhere he found great curiosity about the United States, and he was repeatedly asked about Henry Ford and the “Dayton Monkey Trial.”

Before leaving Goodrich interviewed several high Soviet leaders including Litvinov, Radek, Trotsky, and Joseph Stalin. All denied any connection between the Soviet government and the inflammatory propaganda of the Third International, and all claimed that they favored a prompt solution to all United States-Soviet disputes so as to make possible full diplomatic recognition. Stalin especially impressed Goodrich as “a man of rare good common sense, sound judgment, and in my opinion [he] is easily the most powerful factor in Russia.” Stalin stressed that Russia could not, for political reasons, repeal its repudiation of foreign debts, but he assured Goodrich that a settlement could be easily achieved on a mutually satisfactory basis. In conclusion, Stalin told Goodrich “that the Russian people liked the Americans and preferred closer cooperation with them to any country on earth.”

On his return to the United States Goodrich was in a quandary. More than ever he was convinced that the Soviet Union was a permanent fixture in world politics. But convincing President Coolidge that America should abandon its nonrecognition policy seemed hopeless, as the new president’s mind was definitely closed on the subject. Knowing that the odds were overwhelmingly against him, Goodrich decided nonetheless to write the president urging him to modify his views. Under Stalin, Goodrich told the president,

---

47 Ibid., September 20, 1925.
48 Ibid., September 7, 11, 1925.
49 Ibid., September 27, 29, October 1, 1925.
Russia was moving steadily to the right and was building a western-style industrial society. "It is safe to say today," he wrote in November, 1925, "that the working classes of Russia are in better condition and better satisfied than they were under the Tsar." Recognition, Goodrich advised Coolidge, would advance world stability, strengthen American business ties with Russia, and "accelerate rather than retard the march now going on from communism to capitalism." Even Goodrich must have been discouraged when the only response from the White House was a bland two-sentence note from Coolidge thanking him for his "interesting letter."

In the remaining fifteen years of his life Goodrich was active as a banker and as a member of several governmental commissions, including the International St. Lawrence Waterways Commission. He continued to play a prominent role in Indiana politics and was a delegate to every Republican convention through 1940. In domestic politics his views were consistently conservative. In 1928 he was an enthusiastic supporter of Hoover and was subsequently appointed by Hoover to a commission to study conservation. His main disagreement with Hoover was that the president failed to slash government spending sufficiently to balance the federal budget. On the subject of Russia, however, Goodrich remained an advocate of recognition and trade. President Roosevelt's decision to recognize the Soviet Union in November, 1933, met with Goodrich's hearty approval, and Goodrich received a note from Roosevelt thanking him for his support. With this exception, however, Goodrich was shocked by the New Deal's "crazy" expenditures on public works, agricultural price supports, and relief and by its experiments in public power and social security.

In 1937 Goodrich planned an extensive tour of the Soviet Union, hoping to study its industrial progress under Stalin's Five-Year Plans. Whether such a trip (which coincided with the brutal purging of Kamenev, Radek, Rykov, and others) would have caused him to reappraise his opinion of Stalin is unknown because Goodrich was forced to cancel the visit as the result of a serious heart condition. He died of heart failure on August 16, 1940, shortly after attending the Republican convention at Philadelphia which nominated Wendell Willkie of Indiana for president. In the entire life of this Indiana Republican there was only one unconventional aspect: his love affair with the Russian people who reminded him of "the folks at home."

50 Goodrich to Coolidge, November 23, 1925, Box 3, Goodrich Papers; Coolidge to Goodrich, December 2, 1925, ibid.
51 Winchester, Indiana, Journal-Herald, August 16, 1940; New York Times, August 17, 1940; Goodrich to James E. Watson, March 29, 1932, Box 28, Goodrich Papers; Goodrich to Hoover, March 5, 1935, Box 11, ibid.; Goodrich to Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 6, 1933, Box 23, ibid.; Louis McHenry Howe to Goodrich, November 10, 1933, ibid.
During his lifetime James P. Goodrich, despite his four trips to Russia and his contacts in both the Republican party and the Communist party, had little visible success in moderating American policy toward Soviet Russia. Since hardly anyone took him or his recommendations seriously, he can, in this respect, be viewed as a failure; the prevalent view was that he was a babe in the Russian woods whose views were unworthy of serious consideration. At the beginning of his ARA mission in 1921 it was true that Goodrich was a dilettante about all things Russian. Over the next four years, however, he became much better informed about Russia as a result of his travels, his conversations with Soviet leaders, and his association with historian Frank A. Golder. Still his lack of information about the revolution and its background contributed to his failure to see that Lenin’s New Economic Policy was only a temporary retreat. Simplistically viewing the Bolsheviks as honest but ignorant idealists, he failed to appreciate the deep ideological commitment of the Soviet leaders to establishing socialism.

If he was not always right on the details, Goodrich frequently saw the overall picture more clearly than the so-called “experts” who confidently expected the Soviets to collapse. His assessment of the “plain facts” about Russia led him to conclude that the revolution was an accomplished fact, that the Soviets had the support of the vast majority of the Russian people, that they were capable of maintaining law and order, and that they faced no visible opposition whatsoever. The “brass-tack facts” led him to the conclusion that the United States should extend diplomatic recognition, restore trade, and accept Russia as a legitimate factor in world politics. Demonstrating a remarkable degree of intellectual independence, Goodrich refused to be stampeded by the conventional wisdom of the day and made up his mind on the basis of the evidence before him. His pragmatic approach to Soviet-American relations never wavered from the morning on the Volga when he recorded:

October 19 [1921]. My cup of bitterness and dissatisfaction is now full and running over. At exactly 4:00 a.m. the secretary to the governor came thundering at our door telling us to hurry to make the boat as it would soon sail. In fifteen minutes we were ready and after much trouble a Cadillac car turned over to Denikin and captured by the Soviets conveyed us to the dock. No boat in sight and finally we were told it would not sail until the next day. I was mad enough to swear, but what was the use; they wouldn’t understand English so I laughed instead and made up my mind not to hem and haw, but to take Russia as it is and not as I would have it.52

52 Goodrich diary, October 19, 1921, Box 17, Goodrich Papers.