

tural barriers that hampered their mutual efforts to defend the first two through practical military cooperation and profitable commercial exchange. In essence, the British-Indian teaming was one of necessity and opportunism, an always uneasy and unstable entente held together solely by firepower and furs. Calloway asserts that most crown and tribal leaders recognized the calculated pragmatism that underlay their dealings, but his research also indicates that little empathy or fondness existed between Britons and Indians.

Calloway's conclusions are persuasive because he bases them upon an impressive array of primary sources as well as recent ethnohistorical studies. He also understands and overcomes the dangers lurking in the ethnocentrically biased writings of his eighteenth and nineteenth century commentators. Other than an inadequate index that lists mainly personal and place names, the work's only shortcomings result from its topical approach. The text sometimes becomes less an investigation than a compilation of the observations Calloway has collected. Of more importance, he never defines what makes this association and these years unique when compared to other white-Indian relationships and other eras.

In one sense, however, this weakness of *Crown and Calumet* is also its greatest strength. Within its circumscribed topical parameters, Calloway excels in explaining the social, political, and economic contexts that are indispensable background for anyone engaged in reading, researching, or teaching about interethnic contacts anywhere along the early North American frontier. Although the book does not give a comprehensive, coherent account of British-Indian affairs in the Old Northwest or elsewhere during the post-Revolution era, it does set down the interpretive foundation essential to prepare the narrative overview still wanted of the British-Indian alliance that challenged but failed to halt the expansion of American settlement for thirty years. One hopes that Calloway, who here demonstrates his mastery of the relevant sources and their meaning, will continue his project by undertaking such a survey.

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*Land Fever: Dispossession and the Frontier Myth.* By James M. Marshall. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986. Pp. viii, 239. Illustrations, appendixes, notes, works consulted, index. \$21.00.)

This book presents the autobiography and scattered writings of a pioneer farmer and juxtaposes his narrative and experience

with the realities of history and the myths, songs, and literary tradition of the rural Middle West. The autobiography—the work of Omar Morse, maternal great-grandfather of the author—is a unique document. There are all too few memoirs of migrating farmers, farm laborers, and small-town craftsmen. The autobiography, roughly seventy pages in length, covers the last three-quarters of the nineteenth century and offers a personal view of social and technological change and economic trends as well as a rare insight into the rural mentality.

Unfortunately, James M. Marshall has not served his ancestor well. His editing of the autobiography and letters is pedestrian. His effort to set the autobiography in a literary context seems strained if not overblown. The autobiography can carry Hamlin Garland but not William Dean Howells and Theodore Dreiser. The historical treatment is little better. It is marred by small errors and large misunderstandings. Marshall links and praises C. Vann Woodward and Richard Hofstadter on Populism as if they agreed. He confuses the reader by using the word *homestead* to mean a place of residence as well as land obtained under the Homestead Law. Morse, incidentally, never homesteaded, but Marshall insists that he failed not primarily because of cyclical depressions but because the government's land policy served the speculators and not the real farmers in the Midwest. He raises the issue of Populist anti-Semitism from long-exploded sources. Ironically, Morse's autobiography is devoid of prejudice, but Marshall does not see in this further proof to refute Hofstadter, Oscar Handlin, *et al.* For him, it seems, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

The autobiography is very revelatory. Morse is a typical pioneer farmer, breaking lands, building farms, and drifting. He sells off improvements or fails to make payments on loans. He suffers the hardships of labor, but he is never without capital, can always borrow, and he seems even in poor times to have resources. He is euchred out of money through innocence; physicians charge outrageous fees to treat his fatally ill wife; and his family and friends often prove to be the real Shylocks in his life. Cherishing his freedom to farm, or loaf, or visit, Morse at the end advises his son, who works for the railroad, to get some land so he can be independent of employers. Morse turned the Jeffersonian myth into a reality. One can only wonder what he would have thought of his descendant who writes of him as both a victim of the system and a gullible loser.

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