

impression that Wayne was impetuous. The general, he shows in a detailed review of Wayne's long military career, was "a prudent and careful officer" (p. 2) who never wavered in his belief in the subordination of military to civilian authority. Clearly the best evidence for Nelson's argument can be found in Wayne's successful campaign against the Indians in the Northwest Territory in 1794. According to Nelson, "shrewd caution was . . . the hallmark of [Wayne's] methodical assault on America's enemies north of the Ohio River" (p. 245).

Despite his impressive research and his effective demonstration of Wayne's respect for organization and planning, Nelson does not succeed in removing the onus placed on the general by his nickname. Wayne was not crazy, but his behavior was often rash. Throughout his life he was a man of strong opinions and passionate language. He treated both his mother and his wife abominably and virtually ignored his children. He plunged into imprudent economic enterprises, such as his efforts to cultivate rice on a Georgia plantation in the 1780s. He craved public adulation and preferred the excitement of military life and Philadelphia social circles to the world of his family. Easily offended, he held grudges for years and never seemed to develop any perspective on himself. If something went wrong, he always found someone else to blame. In short, while Wayne was a brave man and a competent general, he was also arrogant, insecure, intolerant, and immature.

Nelson describes Wayne's life well; his narrative is sure-footed and sympathetic. But his biography would have been more successful if he had not been so eager to rescue Wayne from the myth of his nickname and if he had placed the general more fully and profoundly in the context of the larger tensions of life in a revolutionary republic. Perhaps Wayne's passion for discipline, his Federalist political principles, his love of uniforms and other displays of status were more than personal quirks. Perhaps they were the marks of a man who, like many of his fellow officers, was struggling to find the keys to fame and fortune in a world that he had helped to turn upside down.

Ball State University,  
Muncie, Ind.

Andrew R. L. Cayton

*"Let the Eagle Soar!" The Foreign Policy of Andrew Jackson.* By John M. Belohlavek. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985. Pp. x, 328. Maps, appendixes, notes, bibliography, index. \$28.95.)

In the total sweep of American diplomatic history, the foreign policy of Andrew Jackson assumes only minor proportions.

Commercial agreements with Muscat, or even with Great Britain, and settlements of damage claims with Naples, or more importantly with France, can scarcely be termed diplomatic landmarks. Yet, even if Old Hickory's historical significance remains firmly rooted in his battles with the Bank of the United States rather than with Malayan pirates, he did indeed have a foreign policy. In this well-written account John M. Belohlavek argues that Jackson's "symbiotic" blend of national honor and commercial ambition (p. 252) was essentially a continuation of John Quincy Adams's international objectives. Unlike his predecessor and rival, however, Jackson got results. Through a combination of brashness and tact Jackson successfully concluded a number of treaties and agreements that greatly expanded United States commerce.

Jackson's diplomacy was at its best in the settlement of damage claims against France arising out of the Napoleonic wars. Although the French foreign office agreed in 1831, after many years of discussions, to compensate American losses, the French Chamber of Deputies refused to appropriate the funds. Pursuing a firm but temperate course, Old Hickory kept pressure on the legislators in Paris, as he had often done with the American Congress. His famous temper erupted only once with the French. In 1834 he threatened economic sanctions and the seizure of French property if the Chamber continued to block the settlement, and soon afterward the French deputies yielded. His angry warning coincided with his rage over senatorial censure for his removal of federal deposits from the Bank of the United States. It is, in fact, this interweave of the domestic turbulence of Jacksonian politics with the diplomatic chronicle that is the most notable strength of Belohlavek's book.

The author encounters a few problems in attempting to impart long-term significance to Jackson's diplomacy. To label Edmund Roberts's missions to Asia in the 1830s a "keystone in . . . a bridge" to the Far East is a bit exaggerated (p. 177). Similarly, it is an unwarranted assertion of United States influence to declare that the United States "allowed" the Latin American nations to drift toward oligarchy (p. 212). On the other hand, Belohlavek documents well Jackson's caution during the Texas Revolution and refutes effectively the contention of some historians that Old Hickory conspired with the Texans against Mexico.

*"Let the Eagle Soar!"* is a fine, scholarly treatment of a neglected subject. It contains a wealth of insights and information gathered from archival sources and is a welcome addition to the literature on nineteenth-century diplomatic history.

University of Indianapolis,  
Indianapolis

David L. Anderson