

local housing agencies made different decisions and gave conflicting promises to community groups. One section of the Federal Housing Administration decided to proceed with black occupation while another section refused guaranteed FHA loans in 7-Mile Fenelon Park if blacks moved near it. Capeci's story is as complex as life itself and sheds much light on the difficult process of social change.

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*One For All: NATO Strategy and Logistics through the Formative Period (1949-1969).* By James A. Huston. (Newark, Del.: University of Delaware Press, 1984. Pp. 332. Notes, illustrations, figures, bibliography. \$38.50.)

The distinguished military historian Michael Howard has described logistics as a "forgotten dimension" of strategy. James A. Huston, former professor of history at Purdue, undertook this book in part to elevate the study of logistics to its proper place. Unfortunately, this mediocre volume may deepen scholars' disdain for logistics, not end their neglect of it.

The book's most serious defect is lack of a unifying theme. Huston has organized the study into four parts. The first, dealing with the origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and early logistics efforts of the United States, bears scant relation to what follows. (It also suffers when compared with recent work by Timothy Ireland, Escott Reid, and Lawrence Kaplan.) The second part describes logistics planning and some of the strategic and logistics dilemmas that the alliance faced. This section, too, stands by itself. The third part—the heart of the book—presents five case studies of NATO logistics programs. The last part contains Huston's conclusions. Here and in the preface he argues that common logistics programs did more to make NATO effective than any other alliance activity. This theme appears nowhere else, not even in part three, where one would most expect it. Instead, these chapters dwell more on limits than accomplishments. Occasional perceptive comments remain isolated and undeveloped. The result is a whole considerably less than the sum of its parts.

The volume's most frustrating characteristic for a historian is the way Huston ignores time. He often describes events without indicating when they occurred. He will ignore decades and then give detailed descriptions of bureaucratic structures and programs in a particular year. These seem neither typical nor extraordinary, so the criterion for selection is unclear. The uneven treatment distracts, bewilders, and eventually annoys.

The writing is poor. Huston needed a good editor to tighten his prose and give it direction; the press did not provide one. Phrasings are awkward, passive voice abounds, sentences do not relate to one another, and paragraph transitions are weak. Huston has trouble saying simple things simply. Instead of "combat" or "war," for example, he prefers "a war situation" (p. 230), "a war emergency" (p. 231), or, incredibly, "a war emergency situation" (p. 229). Careful proofreading would have eliminated the numerous typographical errors that litter the manuscript.

In short, while the history of NATO logistics is an important subject, Huston's treatment of it is best forgotten.

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*JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy.* By Herbert S. Parmet. (New York: Dial Press, 1983. Pp. viii, 407. Notes, index. \$19.95.)

The second in a two-volume biography of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, this book should remain for some time as the most thoughtful and accurate of many books on the subject. Based on published accounts, memoirs, oral histories, and special studies such as the *Pentagon Papers* and the Church Committee investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency, it considers both the man and his era—the public and private together, the admirable with the commonplace. The picture that emerges is of an extraordinarily poised, graceful, witty, inspiring, and handsome but fully human individual. Kennedy had a capacity for error, a large ego, a desire to satisfy the high expectations of his father, an attraction to women, and a chronic back ailment, but he was a president who was courageous in his loyalty to nation and to constitutional democracy. Personally ambitious and master of electoral politics, unfortunately Kennedy learned the nature and limits of presidential power only after entering the Oval Office. The Kennedy administration, rhetoric to the contrary, was actually a continuation of the Dwight D. Eisenhower policies, with some of the same officials. The youthful Irishman from Massachusetts, who was the pride of the liberal intellectual establishment, was, it turned out, a budget-balancer by instinct, who worried about deficit spending by the government just as he fretted about the free spending of his wife for dresses. A practical politician who was aware of the narrowness of his victory in 1960, he was unwilling to confront the dominant conservative block of Republicans and Southern Democrats in Congress, advocating civil rights legislation only when forced by disturbances in the