

*Race Relations in Wartime Detroit: The Sojourner Truth Housing Controversy of 1942.* By Dominic J. Capeci, Jr. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984. Pp. xii, 240. Map, notes, selected bibliography, index. \$37.95.)

This is a gem of a book—small but valuable! It is a detailed, well-documented, balanced account of a 1942 race riot in Detroit connected with black occupation of a housing project bordering a white ethnic neighborhood.

Dominic J. Capeci, Jr., sets the stage by tracing the history of race relations in Detroit from the Civil War through the introduction of restricted covenants in 1910 to the creation of a black ghetto in the 1920s. He demonstrates severe inadequacies in health care, education, and housing for Detroit's black population in 1940, as well as a racially biased city police force. He indicates that when the riot occurred high paying war jobs, earlier available only to whites, had just opened up for blacks, increasing racial tensions in the workplace. Capeci's main thesis is that the 1942 race riot marked a transition from an older system of race relations based on white dominance and black submission to a new more equitable racial situation in Detroit. He contends that failure to appreciate the significance of the 1942 riot and the strength of the social forces behind it resulted in the larger more serious riot of 1943.

Capeci's account of the disturbance over the housing project is based on a wide range of sources: files of the Justice Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and Urban League; the Labor Archives of Wayne State University; and the local press. He painstakingly dissects the Detroit community to display the complex network of social relationships within the city and the pressures on them as war production drew in thousands of newcomers, especially from the South.

The largely Polish 7-Mile Fenelon Improvement Association, led by two Italian realtors, opposed black occupation of the Sojourner Truth Homes near their area. Congressman Rudolph G. Tenerowicz supported them, as did some Catholic priests, Fundamentalist Protestants, Ku Klux Klan members, and other right wingers. The Citizens Committee supporting the move included most black organizations, white liberals, Communists, and top leaders in the United Automobile Workers Union. For the union the issue was internally divisive, as its membership mirrored the entire community.

Compounding the problems were the vacillating behavior of the mayor and incredible bureaucratic confusion. Federal and

local housing agencies made different decisions and gave conflicting promises to community groups. One section of the Federal Housing Administration decided to proceed with black occupation while another section refused guaranteed FHA loans in 7-Mile Fenelon Park if blacks moved near it. Capeci's story is as complex as life itself and sheds much light on the difficult process of social change.

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*One For All: NATO Strategy and Logistics through the Formative Period (1949-1969).* By James A. Huston. (Newark, Del.: University of Delaware Press, 1984. Pp. 332. Notes, illustrations, figures, bibliography. \$38.50.)

The distinguished military historian Michael Howard has described logistics as a "forgotten dimension" of strategy. James A. Huston, former professor of history at Purdue, undertook this book in part to elevate the study of logistics to its proper place. Unfortunately, this mediocre volume may deepen scholars' disdain for logistics, not end their neglect of it.

The book's most serious defect is lack of a unifying theme. Huston has organized the study into four parts. The first, dealing with the origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and early logistics efforts of the United States, bears scant relation to what follows. (It also suffers when compared with recent work by Timothy Ireland, Escott Reid, and Lawrence Kaplan.) The second part describes logistics planning and some of the strategic and logistics dilemmas that the alliance faced. This section, too, stands by itself. The third part—the heart of the book—presents five case studies of NATO logistics programs. The last part contains Huston's conclusions. Here and in the preface he argues that common logistics programs did more to make NATO effective than any other alliance activity. This theme appears nowhere else, not even in part three, where one would most expect it. Instead, these chapters dwell more on limits than accomplishments. Occasional perceptive comments remain isolated and undeveloped. The result is a whole considerably less than the sum of its parts.

The volume's most frustrating characteristic for a historian is the way Huston ignores time. He often describes events without indicating when they occurred. He will ignore decades and then give detailed descriptions of bureaucratic structures and programs in a particular year. These seem neither typical nor extraordinary, so the criterion for selection is unclear. The uneven treatment distracts, bewilders, and eventually annoys.