

validity to this kind of popular history? On the one hand, such works may be the general reader's only source of history. On the other hand, the commercial imperatives seem to require broad brush oversimplification, exaggerated and categorical characterization when the truth is highly uncertain, and the publishing of outright error—so that what the general reader gets is erroneous or distorted information.

The best seller lists notwithstanding, people who take their history seriously have cause to be disappointed with this book.

*Indianapolis, Ind.*

Alan T. Nolan

*The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant. Volume 11, June 1-August 15, 1864; Volume 12, August 16-November 15, 1864.* Edited by John Y. Simon. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984. Pp. xxvi, xxv, 497, 520. Illustrations, notes, maps, indexes. \$45.00 per volume.)

The man who wrote the correspondence in these two volumes was described in 1864 as ordinary, scrubby-looking, with a slightly seedy look. This description does not fit the image of a successful military leader. In Ulysses S. Grant's case, appearances were deceiving. Grant was an outstanding military leader and the greatest American military strategist of the nineteenth century. Grant understood modern warfare as it developed in the Civil War. No longer could victory be obtained by checkmating the enemy army or capturing enemy cities. The opposing army had to be destroyed, and the will of the enemy populace subdued. These harsh goals could be achieved only by bringing all resources to bear on the enemy. Of all the major participants in the Civil War, only Grant, William T. Sherman, and Abraham Lincoln understood these concepts.

These two volumes document the period from June 1, 1864, to November 15, 1864. On June 1, 1864, Grant was at Cold Harbor, a battle which he regretted because of heavy Union casualties. These casualties so distressed Grant that on June 5, 1864, he wrote Robert E. Lee proposing that both sides send unarmed men between the skirmish lines to tend the wounded whenever the battle ceased. The North had superiority of men and matériel over Lee's Confederates. Since Lee could not replace men and matériel as fast as the North, such battles wore down the Confederacy's strength.

Grant's humor shows through in a letter to his wife, Julia, dated July 18, 1864, where he remarks that General William S. Rosecrans "never obeyed an order in his life that I have yet heard of." In addition, many letters to his wife illustrate Grant's great

love and longing for his family. The multitude of orders to his generals and letters to President Lincoln indicate the efficient operation of his command system as well as his complete grasp of the strategy and tactics needed to defeat the Confederacy. Grant's real concern for the wounded and prisoners of both sides is exhibited in his correspondence with Lee.

Both volumes are handsomely produced. The annotations are sufficient to place the correspondence in context. A helpful chronology has been included at the beginning of each volume as well as a calendar at the end. The Grant correspondence—much of it printed for the first time—makes fascinating reading and portrays the likeable, human side of a great military leader.

Indianapolis, Ind.

John A. Houff

*But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction.* By George C. Rable. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1984. Pp. xiii, 257. Notes, bibliographic essay, index. Clothbound, \$23.50; paperbound, \$10.00.)

In this book, Professor George C. Rable of Indiana's Anderson College offers the most complete study to date of violence in the post-Civil War South. Informed by social-scientific studies of violence and historical studies of the general course of revolutions, Rable enlarges the context in which he assesses the phenomenon. Feeling powerless to control their fate after Appomattox, southerners experienced the sort of concentrated and prolonged frustration that social scientists say produces aggression in humans, Rable writes. "Conditions that a twentieth-century psychologist might describe as a combination of alienation and anomie resulted in anger among the region's traditional leaders" (p. 9).

Rable generally organizes his study chronologically, describing the early race riots of 1866 in Memphis and New Orleans, and moving to the relatively unfocused violence of 1868 to 1870, the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, and finally to the southern Democrats' adoption of violence as a calculated strategy to regain political power. However, Rable's decision to provide a full description of violence in every southern state compels him to violate his chronology in order to limn developments in particular states. This tends to obfuscate his most important points—the way violence in one area led to violence in another and the development over time of a conscious strategy of violence.

Rable offers a number of informative insights. His comparison of the Memphis riot to the antiblack riots of 1919-1920 in the North is innovative and persuasive (although his comparison of them to the black riots in Watts, Detroit, and Newark in the