The format is twelve, twelve-page essays, each dealing with a different chronological period, sandwiched between introductory and concluding essays by editors Bruce Collins and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones. Each author deals with some aspect of growing federal power or, nearly as frequently, with the evolution and significance of a rationale in opposition to it.

A point of view that most of the authors have in common is an implicit approval of the expansion of federal power. As editor Jeffreys-Jones observes, this perspective may well stem from an English trust in a powerful central government. Indeed, by way of an essay on Henry Carey, editor Bruce Collins finds his modern American bête noire in Milton Friedman, whom he accuses of misusing history in his arguments against the welfare state.

As is usually the case with such collections of essays, the value of the works varies considerably, and space does not permit an extended critique of each. It might be noted, however, that at least two essays, those on the Washington, D.C., race riots of 1919 by Adriane Cook and on the Peace Corps by Gerard T. Rice, contribute nothing to the discussion of federal power. On the other hand, particularly stimulating and sophisticated are the essays by David Turley on the abolitionists, by Anthony Badger on recent historical research on the relationship of localities and the New Deal, and by Harold Hyman on the current debate on the nature and value of federalism. All the essays indicate a familiarity with pertinent recent scholarship, and a number show evidence of considerable research in archival sources.

For the most part these essays are worthwhile reflections on a significant topic. Their audience, however, will be limited largely to professional historians and political scientists.

Saint Mary's College and Holy Cross Junior College, Notre Dame, Ind.

Bernard F. Donahoe


Russell F. Weigley's study, the History of the United States Army, updated and reprinted by Indiana University Press, is not for the casual reader. Neither is it for the reader looking for a one-volume "drum and trumpet" history of American wars. (For that, readers should refer to the West Point Atlas of American Wars, 1962, which will give them an extensive overview of United States wars.) It is not an attempt to show how the United States army fits into the social, economic, and political fabric of the
nation, as Walter Millis's *Arms and Men* (1958) does. This is pure institutional history. Admittedly, it is rather unique institutional history—the history of General Motors or IBM would not read the same way—but it is as close to being history in a vacuum as one could imagine for an organization that is so complex and subject to outside forces.

These are not negative comments. Indeed, Weigley's book is essential for anyone trying to understand how the army works. By isolating that organization from society as a whole, Weigley has been able to examine it from the inside, looking at the philosophies, struggles, successes, and failures of the men who have shaped the army since the Revolution. In so doing, he follows the argument that has existed throughout American history—whether to maintain a large professional army or to rely on a citizen army to be raised when needed. There have been several works detailing the ongoing debate within American society that balances concern for the cost of a large standing army against the perceived need for sufficient military power to deter possible aggressors. But few works have treated the army establishment's feelings on the matter. Weigley does this well. As would be expected, most of the military leaders favored the professional approach, subscribing to the philosophy of General Emory Upton in their disdain for the citizen soldier and in their warnings of dire consequences if the nation did not maintain a large professional army. Interestingly, however, not all leaders felt this way. There grew up, especially after World War II, a large influential minority, led by the ideas of John McAuley Palmer, who believed that the citizen soldier, if properly trained and led, could be as reliable as the professional soldier. This belief not only made good sense to the American public and hence to the politicians, but was also the only acceptable philosophy within the American tradition. The army might work to strengthen its forces and hone its skills, but only inside the parameters imposed on it by political reality.

Weigley carries this discussion through his last chapter, which he added more than fifteen years after the first edition. In dealing with the army and its problems during and after Vietnam, Weigley concludes that the army would do well not to neglect its reserve forces. Although a Soviet invasion of Europe would have to be fought and contained initially by the highly professional and highly trained regular army with its extremely sophisticated weapons, Weigley foresees an eventual stalemate developing that would necessitate quick involvement of the reserve forces and the conscripted citizen soldier.

*Indiana Historical Society*,

Raymond L. Shoemaker

*Indianapolis*