

letters and diaries are not typical, they do express the views of ordinary people. The same cannot be said of the diaries of such people as Gideon Welles and George Templeton Strong, which Smith uses extensively. Nevertheless, if the heavy use of such material does not qualify Smith as a new social historian—a goal that he does not seek in any case—it does give his story a dramatic quality that is absent in so much of modern historical scholarship.

Because this book is not intended to be a work of original scholarship, it would be improper to criticize it for its failings on that score. One questions, however, if Smith has fully achieved his purpose, if the book will reach the audience for which it was designed. A thousand pages of text present a forbidding task even for an avid reader. Although the many interesting anecdotes and descriptions might hold a reader's attention, they might also obscure the major themes Smith attempts to present.

At the same time, despite its inordinate length, the book scants important parts of the story. Smith gives little attention to what may be called economic reconstruction—the roles of merchants, landowners, blacks, and northerners in building a new work regime and credit system and in writing the laws and establishing the precedents necessary to build a free labor society on the ruins of the slave labor system. Sharecropping, tenancy, and the crop lien do not even get the attention necessary to warrant an entry in the index.

Despite these reservations, the book can be recommended to the readers for whom it is designed. Smith has written good popular history. In these days when so much of the history written for the popular audience is bad history, Smith's achievement is an important one.

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How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War. By Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983. Pp. xii, 762. Maps, illustrations, notes, figures, appendixes, tables, bibliography, index. \$24.95.)

Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones here present a major study of the military conduct of the Civil War, with special emphasis on strategy and logistics. The beginning student of Civil War military history will find the work an unmatched guide to how war was fought in the midnineteenth century. Anyone already well versed in Civil War history will find immensely stimulating the authors' interpretations of Union and Confederate

strategy, interpretations that will have to be grappled with by all subsequent historians of the subject.

Unfortunately, flaws in presentation may distract some readers from the solid values of the book. Hattaway and Jones too often are not content merely to present analyses; they go out of their way to chide other historians for alleged shortcomings. Even while dedicating the book to T. Harry Williams and somewhat unctiously proclaiming their respect for him in the introduction, the authors gratuitously belabor the differences between their interpretations and his, proclaiming, with an immodesty that proves characteristic of their style, that "as Marx felt he had found Hegel standing on his head and turned him rightside up, we think we have done the same for Williams" (p. x). With similar gratuitousness, they deviate from their narrative to reprove Douglas Southall Freeman for using Civil War rather than modern staff terminology. In typical passages they castigate other historians for alleged errors not of fact but of opinion and interpretation (see, for example, pp. 108, 169). Since there can be no clearcut right or wrong verdict in such instances, Hattaway and Jones themselves apparently are unable to distinguish between fact and opinion.

In addition to making a number of grammatical errors throughout the volume, Hattaway and Jones are also not as thoroughly in command of the relevant historical literature as their pretensions might imply. They would not claim that in 1862 "Lincoln himself still remained indifferent toward total abolition and eventual integration" (p. 270) if they had carefully read LaWanda Cox's *Lincoln and Black Freedom* (1981), or indeed a multitude of recent works. When they write that successful reconstruction of southern states early reconquered by the Union "would have the added advantage of supplying political supporters for the Lincoln administration's policies against their radical opponents" (p. 430), they imply a sharp division between Lincoln and the radicals, thereby suggesting that far from turning T. Harry Williams rightside up they have not read anything about Lincoln and the radicals more recent than Williams's early work.

Such limitations in dealing with any topics outside narrow military history cannot but weaken even Hattaway's and Jones's analyses of strategy. Nevertheless, their contributions to the strategic as well as operational and tactical history of the war do indeed make their work a major study. The authors build their discussions of strategy upon an unexcelled account of American military education before the Civil War in order to explain the preconceptions with which the generals began. They explain much more adequately than any previous historians the specific ways

in which the precepts of Antoine Henri Jomini shaped the conduct of the Civil War. They surpass previous historians in their perceptions of the influence of logistics on Civil War strategy; particularly they make clear that in the western theater the Union's inability to go on making consistent use of river lines of communications after Shiloh had a crippling effect on further offensives. In detailing the logistical realities, they go far to rehabilitate Henry W. Halleck as a general with an especially acute grasp of those realities. They show that Halleck was also among the first Civil War commanders to recognize that a strategy of annihilating enemy armies in the classic, Napoleonic fashion would no longer work because the rifled firepower and the maneuverability of Civil War armies as well as their size made them almost impossible to destroy within any politically acceptable time limits and with an acceptable casualty rate on one's own side.

The authors conclude that because of the failure of a classical strategy of annihilation, Grant, Halleck, and William T. Sherman devised a war-winning "strategy of exhaustion," which defeated the Confederacy by stripping it of the economic ability to supply its armies, especially through Sherman's marches and through destructive cavalry raids. While this reviewer will not emulate the authors' style by stating categorically that their conception of the decisive effects of a strategy of exhaustion is in error, nevertheless their judgment must be considered dubious. The fact remains that the destruction of southern resources essential to carrying out Hattaway's and Jones's version of a strategy of exhaustion could not begin to be achieved on a scale adequate to Union purposes until the Confederate armies had already been substantially destroyed, whatever the costs of a strategy of annihilation.

The authors' strategic analysis, however, cannot be quickly dismissed. All Civil War students should read the book and ponder its arguments for themselves.

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Black Liberation in Kentucky: Emancipation and Freedom, 1862-1884. By Victor B. Howard. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983. Pp. viii, 222. Notes, sources, index. \$23.00.)

Victor B. Howard states that it is his intention to write an "integrated" history that incorporates the previously neglected experience of blacks into the whole of Kentucky's history, and he has achieved this objective admirably. The book is an exemplary