

The subjects were not told that they had syphilis—only “bad blood,” which was not a synonym for syphilis in the black community. In effect they suffered experimentation with their bodies without their consent. They did so because they were ignorant and because they received modest benefits such as a burial fee, free aspirin, and “body tonics,” and were often chauffeured to the examination site in an automobile by a zealous black nurse who gave a club-like quality to the experience.

The “Tuskegee Study” would seem objectionable for many reasons. Only blacks were used, and perhaps one hundred men experienced premature death and many others needless suffering—all the more so after penicillin became an effective cure beginning in the 1940s and 1950s. The PHS deliberately lied to the men under study, and no data assembled in the study could ever prevent, find, or cure the disease. Nevertheless, few doctors in the PHS or in Macon County, where physicians assisted the study, objected to it on scientific or ethical grounds. Nor was there a national outcry when findings of the study were periodically made public.

The heart of James H. Jones’s book is his analysis of this response. He weighs the evidence fairly and judiciously. Racism was a factor, as was the absence of an effective cure for syphilis when the study began. Bureaucratic momentum and the pretensions of science to supplant conventional ethics, particularly the staple that the end justifies the means, also contributed.

This is an important and well-researched book, but it has limitations; at times it is repetitive and, because of the scientific discussion, unexciting. The author might have reinforced his case with a discussion of the pretensions to power of physicians of that period. And he might have allowed for the humanizing influences of the 1960s, which produced the exposure and denunciations in 1972.

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*The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950.* By Charles M. Dobbs. (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981. Pp. xii, 239. Notes, bibliographical essay, index. \$18.50.)

This well-researched and clearly written study of America’s postwar involvement in Korea illustrates that the longer the United States remained in that country, the longer it had to stay. Charles M. Dobbs argues that Korea was not vital to

American interests, but the paradox was that "the less strategic an issue (and the less understood) the greater its value as a symbol, precisely because of its unimportance" (p. 93). Korea became "an unwanted symbol" of America's resistance against communism (p. 159), and as the symbol became prominent with prolonged occupation the chances for withdrawal became more remote. Though the occupation command claimed no political leanings, its "affinity for wealthy elements" who favored "hierarchy, order, and the status quo" (p. 41) placed Americans on the side of Koreans who spoke English and against the guerrilla leaders who "could not bridge the linguistic and cultural gap" (pp. 41-42). By January, 1949, the State Department referred to Korea as the "only remaining foothold of democracy" in northeast Asia (p. 161), and President Truman soon declared it "a beacon to the people of northern Asia in resisting the control of communist forces" (p. 162). Thus the United States, Dobbs declares, built a "trap from which there would be no escape" (p. 152).

Dobbs's work raises several questions. He speculates that the Soviets believed that their enemies had developed a "master plan" for the "encirclement" of the USSR and "may have undertaken reasonably coordinated action in Korea and Berlin to protest such a worldwide American plot" (p. 145). Thus the North Koreans in June, 1948, shut off electric power in the country on the same day that the Soviets blockaded Berlin, while the USSR perhaps intended its military withdrawal from North Korea to pressure the United States out of Germany as well as South Korea. On another matter, Dobbs argues that Acheson's "defense perimeter" speech of January, 1950, was an attempt to exploit a rift between Moscow and Peking by signalling Red China that the Truman administration was dropping support for the Nationalists. But as Dobbs notes, such policy was impossible in a political environment in the United States that soon would take the label of "McCarthyism."

Despite the undeniable pitfalls in America's Korean involvement, it is not clear from this study that Washington had a viable alternative. Immediate withdrawal in 1945 would have suggested to occupied Japan a lack of commitment to democracy, and it would have demonstrated to Americans that the Truman administration was unwilling to draw the line against Soviet expansion. Dobbs admits that America's view of the postwar world as bipolar necessitated the belief that "native communists were Soviet puppets" (p. 194) and led to the acceptance of "repressive regimes" with "staunch anticommunist

credentials" (p. xi). The United States, he vaguely claims, should have established "strong regional powers all opposed to one another" in Asia that might have turned to Washington for assistance; instead, it "opposed legitimate nationalism and allowed the Soviet Union to appear as the defender and friend of anti-colonial movements" (p. 196). Worse, Dobbs concludes, America's later policies in Asia followed the pattern in Korea: "policy drift, the subordination of local reality to requirements of the superpower confrontation, the elevation of symbols, a deepening and unwanted commitment, and, finally, a quandary from which there was no escape 'with honor' and a minimal loss of prestige" (p. 189). The combination of America's occupation of Japan and the fall of China, Dobbs might have emphasized, caused Korea to fade as symbol and to become essential to American interests in Asia.

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*Architectural Photography: Techniques for Architects, Preservationists, Historians, Photographers, and Urban Planners.*  
By Jeff Dean. (Nashville: American Association for State and Local History, 1981. Pp. x, 132. Illustrations, figures, tables, appendixes, bibliography, index. \$19.95.)

With the growing interest in the preservation and restoration of our architectural heritage, it would be hard to find a more timely publication than Jeff Dean's *Architectural Photography: Techniques for Architects, Preservationists, Historians, Photographers, and Urban Planners*. Dean's book is a primer intended specifically for the non-professional photographer who may frequently need to take architectural photographs skillfully in conjunction with his work or hobby. The book gives a concise review of the many problems encountered by the architectural photographer and the techniques and equipment required to overcome them. Dean pays particular attention to solving the problem of converging parallel lines in architectural photographs, which is caused by the lack of perspective control on the lenses of most 35-millimeter cameras, the standard equipment of most amateurs.

Additionally, the author gives many useful hints on selecting the right film, lenses, screens, filters, and other equipment; some basics of good photographic composition; and when the best times of the day are for taking pictures. He also provides information on how to submit photographs to the National