

handling his press relations. He was a gifted newsmaker who thrived on the personal element in his relationship with newsmen; he was fascinated by journalism and understood the medium. Some of the book's most interesting passages deal with Roosevelt's management of news and his rapport with the Washington correspondents. Wilson's style of dealing with the press contrasted with Roosevelt's. Yet in Wilson's time, as the author explains, the press acquired more of its modern posture. Especially through the introduction of the presidential press conference, Wilson developed a structure for dealing with the press that was a harbinger of things to come. Juergens considers the press relations of Roosevelt and Wilson at length and allows readers to see these men in their moments of irritation as well as triumph with journalists. By comparison, he devotes one chapter, accurately entitled "The Wrong Man," to President Taft. That is space enough in which to explain this president's mishandling of press relations. Juergens suggests that American journalism had entered the age of the reporter, a fact that presidents henceforth would neglect, as Taft did, at their own peril.

News from the White House is an appealing book. Aside from his neglect of manuscript sources, Juergens's research is impressive, and his presentation of material shows sound judgment. Readers will find this a well-written, informative, and engaging volume.

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Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment. By James H. Jones. (New York: Free Press, 1981. Pp. xii, 272. Illustrations, notes, note on sources, indexes. \$14.95.)

A *Washington Post* correspondent broke the news in July of 1972: the United States Public Health Service (PHS) had been conducting a study of the effects of untreated tertiary syphilis on black men in Macon County, Alabama, since the early 1930s. The "Tuskegee Study," so called because Tuskegee was the county seat for this impoverished rural area, included as subjects 399 victims of syphilis and 201 "controls" who were free from the disease. Although the disease progressively ravaged its victims, the PHS made no effort to treat or cure its patients; rather, it sought to compile statistics on the effects of advanced syphilis as they revealed themselves over a lifetime by annual examinations and ultimately through autopsies.

The subjects were not told that they had syphilis—only “bad blood,” which was not a synonym for syphilis in the black community. In effect they suffered experimentation with their bodies without their consent. They did so because they were ignorant and because they received modest benefits such as a burial fee, free aspirin, and “body tonics,” and were often chauffeured to the examination site in an automobile by a zealous black nurse who gave a club-like quality to the experience.

The “Tuskegee Study” would seem objectionable for many reasons. Only blacks were used, and perhaps one hundred men experienced premature death and many others needless suffering—all the more so after penicillin became an effective cure beginning in the 1940s and 1950s. The PHS deliberately lied to the men under study, and no data assembled in the study could ever prevent, find, or cure the disease. Nevertheless, few doctors in the PHS or in Macon County, where physicians assisted the study, objected to it on scientific or ethical grounds. Nor was there a national outcry when findings of the study were periodically made public.

The heart of James H. Jones’s book is his analysis of this response. He weighs the evidence fairly and judiciously. Racism was a factor, as was the absence of an effective cure for syphilis when the study began. Bureaucratic momentum and the pretensions of science to supplant conventional ethics, particularly the staple that the end justifies the means, also contributed.

This is an important and well-researched book, but it has limitations; at times it is repetitive and, because of the scientific discussion, unexciting. The author might have reinforced his case with a discussion of the pretensions to power of physicians of that period. And he might have allowed for the humanizing influences of the 1960s, which produced the exposure and denunciations in 1972.

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The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950. By Charles M. Dobbs. (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981. Pp. xii, 239. Notes, bibliographical essay, index. \$18.50.)

This well-researched and clearly written study of America’s postwar involvement in Korea illustrates that the longer the United States remained in that country, the longer it had to stay. Charles M. Dobbs argues that Korea was not vital to