couples—including such notable figures as Carl and Paula Sandburg and Robert and Belle Case La Follette.

The book begins with an introductory essay that explores the theoretical and methodological problems in the study of marital assimilation and surveys and critiques previous treatments (primarily sociological) of the subject. The first chapter then sets the stage by detailing the size, composition, and distribution of Wisconsin's immigrant population. (In 1900, 25 percent of the state's residents were foreign born, another 46 percent were native born of foreign parents; the comparable figures for Indiana were 6 percent and 15 percent.) The three subsequent chapters—the heart of the book—deal with the questions "how much" and "why" by examining the statewide intermarriage rates of the major immigrant groups, the individual factors (e.g., age, class, exposure to other cultures in childhood) that inclined immigrants toward or away from exogamy, and the group factors (demographic "availability" and socioeconomic "desirability") affecting the process.

The results of these analyses are detailed, complex, and subject to many qualifications. The relative importance of the various individual and group variables, in particular, cannot be readily summarized in a brief review. Suffice it to say that many immigrants in early twentieth-century Wisconsin did indeed marry across nationality lines, western Europeans slightly more often than eastern Europeans. The author's findings seem to support his contention that "recent studies stressing cultural and structural pluralism . . . may have improperly deemphasized the assimilative side of immigrant life in America" (p. 124). More studies will be needed to test that proposition, and this book likely will be an important point of departure for such work. While the author's empirical findings are certainly welcome, in the long run the greatest value of this careful study may well be its theoretical and methodological underpinnings.

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*Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945.* By Russell F. Weigley. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981. Pp. xviii, 800. Maps, illustrations, notes and sources, index. $22.50.)

Addressing an audience at the Pentagon in 1946, Winston S. Churchill declared that the rapid expansion of the American

armed forces during World War II had been a military miracle, surpassed only by the ability of the United States to "find the leaders and staffs capable of handling these enormous masses . . . and leading them to victory." This volume, the first comprehensive, analytical account of the operations of the U.S. Army and Air Forces in France, Belgium, Holland, and Germany during the final year of the war, examines how leaders and staff gained their objectives.

But the author provides much more than a history of the supreme command and its decisions. Russell F. Weigley focuses attention on the supreme command, army group, field army, and corps levels because he feels that in trying to avoid the old-fashioned drum and trumpet approach practitioners of the "new" military history too often have ignored combat, the ultimate reason for the existence of any army. Therefore he follows the implementation of command decisions down to the cutting edge of combat, examining the performance of divisions, regiments, and even smaller units in battles, engagements, and small actions from Normandy to the Elbe and the Danube. And when the actions of individuals affected the outcome, these too are described.

Weigley aims at providing a complete picture, warts and all, noting achievements as well as shortcomings. His major theme is that the U.S. Army had not developed a clear concept of warfare. Its doctrine, he states, had been shaped by two conflicting legacies. From its frontier days the army inherited the lessons of tactical mobility; from its Civil War experience, the value of sheer massed power, demonstrated by Grant. These two legacies, never fully reconciled, affected both the force structure of the army and the conduct of its operations. They provided for the most mobile army ever put into the field up to 1944 but also for an army that had not yet fully understood the solutions to the problems of movement and fire. American generalship, Weigley writes, "by and large was competent," but it tended to prefer prosaic plans rigidly executed over risk-taking improvisations, the "broad front advance" over the "single thrust" approach. It was only special opportunity or dire crisis that allowed a deviant like George Patton to emerge after D-Day in France. These shortcomings were shared by British commanders, only too aware that they led the last British army. In the end, Weigley concludes, the American-led allies won because they could call on superior resources in men and material to offset their lack of brilliance in the higher art of war.

Contributing to the difficulties encountered was unexpectedly stiff resistance by the Germans, who, until early 1945, proved ruthless and skillful enemies with tactical skills and weapons still superior to those of the allies and with a command structure that proved resilient in adversity. At the same time, American doctrine and practice still were not fully attuned to the need for the integration of armor, infantry, and close tactical air support. The infantry divisions, less than half the number originally called for in war plans, had too little firepower to carry out sustained missions against the more experienced enemy and, suffering heavy losses, scraped the bottom of the manpower pool by late 1944. And American armored divisions were still considered primarily as instruments for exploiting a breakthrough; lacking machines with adequate guns, the divisions had to sacrifice tanks to overcome the heavier and better armed Panthers and Tigers. Finally, although the allies had clear quantitative and qualitative superiority in the air, the preoccupation of leading airmen with independent strategic bombing delayed the development of truly effective close air support for the ground troops.

Still, the Americans learned. If in the summer of 1944 there were only a few divisions capable of matching the Germans on a one-to-one basis, leadership, men, and tactics matured while, with the logistic logjam broken, American industrial capacity was finally effectively translated into battlefield assets. On the debit side of the ledger, however, there never were enough well-trained replacements for infantry and armor.

All this and much more is analyzed in a lucid and compelling narrative. To write history with such scope and yet with so much detail requires magisterial knowledge, clear thinking, and considerable literary skill. Weigley demonstrates that he possesses these talents. The result is one of those rare works which sets a new standard for the state of the art while also providing much-needed perspectives for the future. *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* will fascinate the specialist, challenge the average reader, and provide food for thought for contemporary military planners. In the aftermath of Korea and Vietnam, it is by no means clear that the lessons learned in the two German wars have been truly absorbed. This admirable book, meticulously produced by Indiana University Press, deserves the widest possible audience. Not only history at its best, it also is a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about national defense.

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