Cochrane argues effectively that beginning in the 1920s the adoption of new technologies tremendously improved the productivity of American farmland. His analysis indicates, however, that such growth has begun to level off and that perhaps farmers will have to adopt new techniques to increase production in order to maintain present profit levels.

The author's second major topic in his discussion of modern American agriculture concerns the results of the government's farm policy beginning in the 1930s. Although Congress has increasingly reacted to farmers' demands by passing bills providing such aids as price supports and production controls, these programs have not, says Cochrane, solved the farmers' problems. They have only changed the characteristics of those problems. Rising costs and indebtedness have not been eliminated; in general, expenses have increased to the point where a farmer needs more capital than ever before. One of the related but unpredicted effects of federal legislation in the past twenty-five years has been the consolidation of farmland into fewer, larger operations at the expense of the small, family-owned unit.

Cochrane does not make predictions for the future of American agriculture, but he provides much valuable information about the past, as well as models to be used in evaluating current trends. The book as a whole is interesting reading and should prove a helpful resource for those concerned with the evolution of American agriculture and government farm policy.

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"There is no reform that Americans have talked of more and done less about than that of world peace," states Charles DeBenedetti in his new book on peace reform (p. xi). Indeed, it is an appropriate statement when one considers the past violence and wars of America, a nation that professes adherence to Christian ideals of love and peace.

The purpose of this book is to survey the history of the peace movement. It is not based on primary documentation but is a smooth synthesis of existing scholarly writing. DeBenedetti defines the peace movement as either an attempt to form ideal
communities that serve as models or as organizations that try to reform society. He has approached the topic by dividing the past into eight chapters: the colonial years, in which he discusses European heritage and sectarian groups; the period 1763 to 1815, when the movement was influenced by the revolutionary spirit; the humanitarian era, which was part of the romantic antebellum reforms; the cosmopolitan period after the Civil War and until the end of the century, when the movement increased Anglo-Saxon ties and accepted Social Darwinism; the progressive years, labeled by the author as the birth of the modern peace reform movement; the period between the world wars, when the movement was divided about America's role in the world; the 1940s and 1950s, when anti-Nazi and anti-Communist feelings became more important than peace; and, finally, the youth causes of the 1960s and early 1970s, which stimulated new organizations concerned about peace.

Broad in scope, the book examines a myriad of topics and arrives at a number of conclusions. DeBenedetti states that the movement remained modest in size and limited in effectiveness, that it generated its greatest appeal among professionals and educators with a Christian conscience, and that it was located in the metropolitan northeast, with some more recent participation in cities of the upper Midwest and west coast. Yet overall, "organized peace seeking has never succeeded as a movement in penetrating the dense layers of American society" (p. 199). The author concludes that the reason for failure is that the movement was a subculture opposed to the dominant values and power structure in America.

Although dealing with the peace movement as a national issue, DeBenedetti also discusses a few relevant Hoosiers, such as Eugene Debs, who was in opposition to the Great War, and Louis Ludlow, the congressman of the 1930s who attempted to amend the Constitution so that a national referendum would be required before Congress could declare war. The proposal brought chills to President Franklin Roosevelt and was defeated, never reaching the states for ratification.

DeBenedetti has written a fine book. He relates the peace movements to the general social trends of each era. His chapters are logical, the writing precise and literate, making the book a pleasure to read. Perhaps the only demerit demonstrates the writer's merits—one wishes the book was longer and more comprehensive. For example, most readers will demand more than just a few pages on all the anti-war protests of the Viet-
Book Reviews


Roger Keeran's solidly researched book moves the quarter-century debate over the role that Communists played in the organization and early years of the United Automobile Workers to a more fruitful and politically meaningful level. Along with Bert Cochran, but in greater detail, Keeran demonstrates the extent to which the very formation of a strong and permanent industrial union in the automobile industry depended upon the dedication of a cadre of individuals whose own social vision far transcended the union movement itself. Relying on internal party documents, numerous oral interviews, and a wide range of labor archives, Keeran clearly demonstrates that Communist activity in the automotive industry provided an unbroken link between the revolutionary dual unionism of the late 1920s, the American Federation of Labor federal locals of the mid-1930s, and many of the strongest UAW locals thereafter. In this context Communists easily moved into influential posts as the UAW grew in size and strength. As Keeran emphasizes, their "legitimacy" as trade-union militants in the UAW arose out of their day-to-day work in building the union itself.

The author devotes the latter half of his book to answering the question: why did the Communists fail to hold the strength that they had built in the 1930s? Keeran's analytical framework in answering this query runs largely parallel to that of the Communist party itself, and he argues that party influence waxed and waned for a multitude of reasons, not all of which were directly related to developments on the world scene or the party line. In keeping with the postwar Communist critique of its wartime activities under the leadership of Earl Browder, Keeran believes that the party failed to take advantage of the favorable conditions that existed in the first half of the 1940s. Communists relied too heavily upon alliances with friendly, sometimes opportunistic, nonparty union officials, while its wartime defense of the no-strike pledge seriously eroded Communist support among many rank-and-file workers. Keeran argues,