

to add some valuable material which contributed to Philip's presentation.

Although these scholars did not always agree, in most instances their criticism was constructive and contributed to the success of the conference. This book is an important contribution to understanding the present state of scholarship regarding the history of the native American.

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*Sectionalism, Politics and American Diplomacy.* By Edward W. Chester. (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1975. Pp. xiii, 348. Bibliography, indexes. \$12.50.)

This is a disappointing book. Purporting to be the first scholarly synthesis of primary and secondary literature bearing on the effects of sectionalism and politics on American diplomacy from the Revolutionary era to the Vietnam War, it instead is a simplistic, almost kaleidoscopic review of numerous well known events in American diplomatic history (without footnotes and other scholarly paraphernalia) which is basically textbookish in scope and quality. Edward W. Chester argues that "Perhaps the most important generalization that might be made on the basis of this data is that one-party domination of a section often leads to sustained bloc-voting on diplomatic questions in Congress" (pp. iv-v). In this sense, he says, "Southern Democratic bloc voting" appeared years before the presidency of Woodrow Wilson (p. v). Probably the most significant development since World War II, Chester claims, is the decline in "southern internationalism" (p. 230), which he attributes primarily to that section's racism and to its change to industrialism and resultant call for tariff restrictions. Chester declares that in addition to his roll call analysis, "supplementary data reveals that such factors as economics, race, ethnicity, and metropolitanism vs. ruralism have played a major role in the shaping of American foreign policy" (p. v). Unfortunately, he does not substantiate the above assertions with either convincing evidence or sound reasoning.

Primarily the author fails to analyze the importance of the events to American diplomacy. Though showing over and over that the sections split over issues, he does not explain adequately why they did so. Nor does he discuss whether their shifting stands constituted real sectional alignments

or just coincidental, temporary agreements on policy. It is not sufficient, for example, to label the South's motives as predominantly "racist" (pp. 44, 232, 242-43, 279-82); not only did other elements affect its behavior, but countless scholarly studies have shown American racism to have no geographical boundaries. It also is questionable whether one can draw valid conclusions about the role of economic factors in American diplomacy merely by summarizing an issue, listing the public figures involved, and stating that economic gains resulted from such policy. In another instance, the author casually observes that the South was pro-Russian in the midnineteenth century partly because of "certain valid parallels between Russian serfdom and southern slavery" (p. 100). In another simplistic connection, he writes that several American newspapers carried the full text of one of Hitler's speeches before the Reichstag in 1939, "thus negating the theory that there was a correlation between isolationism and ignorance" (p. 209). And in perhaps the lightest statement made, Chester declares that "The South, . . . despite the severe economic dislocation it suffered because of [the Embargo Act of 1807], failed to turn to manufacturing, a development which, had it occurred, might have acted as a deterrent to slavery and helped therefore to prevent the Civil War" (p. 23). The text abounds with unexplained and undefended statements such as the above.

Perhaps the author could have put together a noteworthy book—if he had offered more analysis and less summary; if he had attempted to tie events together instead of merely allowing them to follow one another because they conveniently did so in time span; if he had shown more of the interrelationship between domestic and foreign policy; and if he had relied upon more primary materials than Congressional records, newspaper editorials, and opinion polls. In fact, several standard secondary works do not appear in his bibliography. Chester laments that "there is not a single monograph in print which comprehensively measures these sectional and political trends" (p. iv). Yet instead of offering some hypotheses about why these trends developed, he concludes that his book "stops at charting prominent trends rather than attempting to formulate some universal law" (p. 285). This shallow overview of familiar facts adds little to any in depth understanding of American diplomatic history.