Three factors shaped global society in the period after 1945 -- capitalism, colonialism, and cold war. Of these three, anthropologists have almost entirely ignored the cold war in the recent wave of theorizing about global processes. And now we are in the process of ignoring the reformulation of the international security order in the decade after the end of the cold war. If I can be permitted to play with Arjun Appadurai's language about global flows and structures, I would like to suggest that, in addition to "ethnoscapes," "mediascapes," and "financescapes," global society is patterned by "securityscapes." Far from producing deterritorialization in the new global order, these "securityscapes" regulate the flow of people and resources between countries, distribute nation-states into hierarchies and alliances, and produce complex discourses of identity and enmity. Especially for those working in the security apparatuses of the superpowers, the cold war provided lived realities, structures of feeling, and cultural imaginaries articulating the innermost recesses of the self to the nation-state.

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the cold war "securityscape" has buckled and twisted into a strange new shape. In the new world order that is now congealing, Russia is no longer an enemy but is not quite a friend, is no longer communist but not exactly capitalist, and is no longer a superpower but, with its 12,000 nuclear weapons ready to destroy us (Norris and Arkin 1997), is hardly a country like any other. It is the rapid dislocation and ambiguity of Russia's position in this "securityscape", and the ambivalence Russian and American security personnel feel towards one another as new discourses are superimposed across old ones, that I want to explore in this paper. The paper is based on fieldwork conducted at both of America's nuclear weapons laboratories -- Los Alamos and Livermore -- and among Russian nuclear weapons scientists at a variety of sites.

Let's begin with a little Orientalist sensationalism. In their best-selling book, One-Point Safe, the journalists Andrew and Leslie Cockburn describe the New Russia thus:

The country was bleeding to death stripped and robbed of its assets by their former guardians, like the Gypsy children roaming the streets... The vast arsenal
once built up regardless of cost... was waiting to be hauled away and sold in lots
to black market customers ... Russia ... was about to turn into the greatest thieves' 
kitchen in history. The high command of the Russian military, custodian for tens 
of thousands of nuclear weapons, was in the front rank of the looters.(Cockburn & 
Cockburn 1997:34).

This is the emergent image of "the Russian threat", recently popularized in the Hollywood film 
Peacemaker, featuring a corrupt and drunken Russian military officer who steals an ICBM 
warhead and sells it to Yugoslav terrorists who want to destroy New York.

Western and Soviet discourses on security in the 1980s had represented Russia quite 
differently. Those discourses divided the world into two tiers: the first tier was occupied by the 
superpowers and their European allies. In this tier the superpowers, despite their enmity, were 
represented as sharing a common heritage of technical rationality that made them mature enough 
to discipline their rivalry into nuclear deterrence. In the second tier were so-called "developing" 
nations who, in the Orientalist imaginary of a national security elite, were seen as too irrational 
and too internally chaotic to be entrusted with nuclear weapons. In the 1990s the Russians, while 
retaining their nuclear arsenal, have slipped from the first to the second tier in Western security 
discourse. The Russian threat is no longer seen to be a well disciplined "evil empire" but a 
poverty stricken, chaotic state that cannot defend its old sphere of influence and which threatens 
to spew nuclear materials among the second tier nations, and to sub-national terrorists, as it 
struggles to reorient itself.

In this new securityscape egalitarian rivalry has given way to hierarchical cohabitation. 
The U.S., as the sole superpower, is expanding NATO into the old Soviet sphere of influence, 
has forced Yeltsin to accede to a START II Treaty the terms of which are skewed against the 
Russians, is unilaterally reinterpreting the Antballistic Missile Treaty in America's favor, and 
sending its oil companies to secure the reserves of the Caspian. Meanwhile the U.S. has spent 
$265 million buying Russian weapons so that they can be studied (Rothstein 1995), and has 
started to sub-contract scientific research to former Russian nuclear weapons scientists, who now 
constitute a high-tech version of the reserve labor armies throughout the third world whose 
existence enables American employers to function more efficiently. For example, shortly after 
cutting the Los Alamos Laboratory's budget for magnetic fusion research by two thirds, the U.S.
government gave $90,000 to Russian scientists to do the same research (Hickox 1992). They also gave $3 million to former Russian weapons scientists to work on new technologies for nuclear waste disposal (Easthouse 1994). Russian science is becoming a yard sale in which the American state can rummage for bargains. Describing this new situation, one manager at the Livermore Laboratory told me, "the Russians worked on everything ... You gotta sift through all of that ... so we start out at the Russian Academy of Sciences and work our way through the system, see who's good, who isn't good... and then we target those people ... and see if there's something there this country's interested in."

Most of the American money has been spent, however, on securing Russian nuclear warheads and fissile material from theft or purchase. The U.S. government has spent several billions of dollars buying Russian uranium to keep it off the market (Bukharin 1993; Cockburn and Cockburn 1997), providing equipment to help dismantle Russian nuclear weapons, making sensors and video technology to protect Russian nuclear material in storage, and developing special containers and railcars for transporting the material (Associate Press 1995; Lockwood 1993, 1994, 1995). Many hundreds of millions of dollars have also been spent on the new science center at Dubna, where former weapons scientists are subsidized by Western governments hoping to keep them out of trouble.

These assistance programs, often called the "lab-to-lab programs," have generated increasingly frequent and extensive contacts, and even joint experiments, between the Russian and American nuclear weapons scientists who were, throughout the cold war, only able to communicate by seismographic semaphore, as each side listened for the muffled sounds of the other's underground explosions far across the world. As Russian and American weapons scientists struggle to make sense of each other and of their own histories in the light of a new geopolitical order, there are four themes I want to pick out in their discourse. They are Russian backwardness, Russian pride, doubleness, and what I want to call militarist utopianism.

First, Russian backwardness. The encounters between Russian and American scientists have been structured and enabled by the fact that Russia lost the cold war and its economy and society are in disarray. On the Russian side these encounters have also been inflected by a national discourse about Russian backwardness reaching back at least to Peter the Great. American scientists told me, with some amusement, that the Russian technology they saw reminded them of American technology a quarter century earlier. Russian weapons scientists, at one point three
months behind on their salaries and growing their own vegetables to get by, told me of the
disappointment they felt at having their life's work frozen by a state that had simply run out of
resources, complaining, for example, that the Livermore Laboratory is building a $1.2 billion
laser to simulate thermonuclear explosions, while Minatom cannot afford such a facility. One
Russian scientist visiting the Livermore Laboratory said, "In Moscow, most of us live in small
flats. I marvel at how spacious and modern your houses are ... And the vast size of your lab, the
sophistication of your equipment ... is simply wonderful" (Independent 1989).

Akhil Gupta argues that discourses of underdevelopment constructed in the West are
internalized in other countries, where identity incorporates what he calls a "pervasive sense of
being underdeveloped" (Gupta 1998:x). As Russia slides down the ladder of nations, its
scientists are developing just such a sense. But Gupta remarks that national identities are
structured by "contradictory logics and incommensurable discourses" (p.6), and that this sense of
underdevelopment may coexist in dialectical tension with a sense of nationalist pride. We find
the coexistence of these contradictory logics not only in Russian scientists' own discourse, but
mirrored as well, interestingly enough, in the discourse of American scientists who believe, in an
almost mystical way, in the theoretical acuity of the Russian physicist's mind. One American
weapons scientist, focusing on the Russians' intellectual ability rather than their technological
prowess, said, "we're good at the theoretical stuff too, but they're really good at it. maybe it's
because they don't have the machines we do ... but they really know how to write elegant
equations" (Easthouse 1991). Another American, saying that the first Soviet H-bomb design was
better than the first American design, told the story of John Wheeler, an American physicist,
finally meeting Zel'dovich, one of the designers of the Soviet H-bomb, and presenting him with a
male-shaped salt-shaker and a female-shaped pepper shaker. Alluding to the superiority of the
Soviet H-bomb, he said that the "male" was Zel'dovitch and the "female" was Teller, the inventor
of the American hydrogen bomb. In a context where Russian scientists lack the resources to do
cutting edge physics today, nationalist nostalgia for such glorious achievements in the past is
increasingly important. Thus Yuli Khariton himself, the Russian Oppenheimer, now in his 90s,
has taken it upon himself to write his own account of the Soviet A and H bomb programs,
emphasizing that the Soviets had no assistance from spies at Los Alamos in their hydrogen bomb
program. Insisting on Soviet priority, he concludes, "American colleagues have clearly
underestimated the significance of the Soviet test in August 1953, which must be considered the
first test in the world of a hydrogen bomb" (Khariton and Smirnov 1993:30). Thus has the arms race which has been stifled in the present been projected back into the past.

The third theme I want to foreground is "doubleness" -- the awareness on the part of both Russian and American weapons scientists that they have formerly secret doubles in another country -- "the guys on the other team" as one Livermore scientist called them (Cockburn and Cockburn 1997:27). One Los Alamos scientist, when I asked what it was like to meet his counterparts for the first time, banged the table and exclaimed, "they're just like us!" He added, "even their directors are like ours. The director of Chelyabinsk is shy and retiring, like John Nuckolls [of Livermore], and the director of Arzamas is amiable and easygoing like Sig [Hecker of Los Alamos]." One Livermore scientist, who I will call Henry Mullins, said, "I went over there and met the Henry Mullins counterpart, who had worked nuclear bombs, reactor lasers, electron lasers, gas lasers, solid state lasers ... It's a tremendous camaraderie. I found it to be like working with my brother ... Similar excitement about working together. Similar excitement about the science. Similar work ethic ... You get into equations right away. You know it was like a door opened to these people."

This experience of doubleness has recently moved Los Alamos and Arzamas-16 to become sister cities, in a move eerily recapitulating, yet displacing, anti-nuclear strategies of the 1980s, which tried to use U.S.-Soviet exchange programs to undermine the arms race. The two cities have exchanged delegations and gifts, developed a pen-pal program for their children, and Los Alamos has raised $10,000 in medical aid for Arzamas-16. Arzamas-16 presented the Los Alamos City Council with a ceremonial brass bell. When a delegation from Arzamas-16 visited in 1995, a Los Alamos councilor read this proclamation: our "two communities ... share unique histories [sic], similar national security missions, similar educational, family and patriotic values, and similar beliefs in the benefit of science to all mankind" (Schaller 1995). It is this sense that the American and Russian weapons scientists together constitute a single transnational community applying science to the betterment of humankind that I call militarist utopianism. I heard it in the words of the Livermore scientist who said, "you have the people who do things for the love of science and your country... Our bond first was science and then we're trying to bond the two countries ... We feel that what we were doing in retrospect was the right thing. Building nuclear weapons for deterrence stopped World War III." And I heard a similar utopian vision in the words of a senior scientist from Arzamas-16. He was describing a joint experiment between
Los Alamos and Arzamas-16. "After the experiment the scientists were unscrewing the shields that protected the diagnostic equipment. You couldn't tell who was Russian and who was American. They were all just scientists working together on a task. At first it looked as if the data were lost. But then the data appeared on the screen, and a collective cheer went up."

To conclude: during the cold war, when the United States and the Soviet Union were equals, American and Russian weapons scientists shared a discourse of mutual antipathy, grounded in the rivalry of the arms race, which obscured the ironic commonality of their projects. As we move beyond the cold war world and Russia is partially absorbed into a clientilistic relationship with the U.S., Russian and American weapons scientists are at last allowed, albeit in carefully restricted and monitored situations, to meet and even to collaborate on occasion. As old discourses morph into new shapes, the rivalries of the cold war melt and reappear in the register of nostalgia. Meanwhile an old, submerged sense that Russian and American scientists, despite the antipathy of their governments, were engaged in a single project has now burst forth in a startling discourse of commonality and cooperation. In this context, paradoxically, a utopian image of a divided international community restored to wholeness works to further the projects of the national security state in the world after the cold war -- a world in which Russian and American weapons scientists re-imagine their cold war rivalries as a collaborative project and cautiously join together to ensure the endurance of their dark art.

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