

OUTSIDE THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE: THE TYRANNY OF ETHNICITY POLITICS IN KOSOVA

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In April of 1999 I went to the border of Kosova and Macedonia to escort a bus load of expelled residents of Suha Reka to Albania. In retrospect, as I sat in the frosty early morning bustle of Blace camp among those who had lost husbands, sons, wives and, sisters, I realize I was witness to a dramatic visualization of the theoretical that haunts my work as an historian. I went to Blace to implement a "negotiated" settlement, one that took place in Skopje and Geneva between representatives of the UNHCR and the Macedonian government. As mass murder and rape was taking place just across the border, the concern of international agencies and governments was what to do with this mass of humanity (classified in a variety of terms by the respective governing entities) that was being pushed to the border.

The systematic deportation of Kosova's population marked a classic case of the modern practice of organizing human capital to fit government and societal expectations. "Ethnic cleansing," using tactics of murder, stuffing trains with women and children and the burning and desecration of homes and places of worship is not new to the world scene. What was being enacted was a manifested expression of modernist strategies which identified more than two million people along lines that significantly reduced their individual existence to one that was expendable and managed. What most of the journalists and well-intentioned volunteers did not understand as they swarmed upon these desperate human beings is that the very mechanisms that mobilized paramilitary forces and church clergy to conduct such acts of barbarity were being reasserted in their own narratives and operating principles of humanitarianism.

Diplomats and the media frenzy that informed them generalized this human matrix. This generalizing tendency identified the bus load of young men and women being snuck out of Macedonia as a logical end point, an end point which said: "Albanians" would be more comfortable with fellow "Albanians" in Albania, a "natural" home for victims of this "primordial" war between "Albanians and Serbs," "Christians and Muslims." What I was doing on that bus

that winded its way to the Albanian border was the end product of negotiations between systems of operation (and governance) that were administered by people who placed themselves morally and eventually, bureaucratically, outside the boundaries of responsibility for the guardianship of individual identity and the right to represent oneself.

Amid the threatening gestures and ominous bureaucratic compromises, there were the human individuals who were heading towards the unknown. Interestingly, outside the politics of the events, the collective spirit of the bus was one very much reflective of some larger sense of human collectivity. The process of finding security among others overwhelmed everyone there, none of whom had ever been to Albania, but for completely different reasons felt that going to Albania could not be worse than what they had just gone through. Despite the fear of being driven against their will to a country they had never seen, by force of their collective expulsion and their maltreatment by Macedonian police, Albania served as a psychological refuge for minds unwilling to let go of their only sanctuary: their personal existence. Listening quietly to the voices around me, I noted that the sense of being part of the tragedy that left these people with uncertain futures gave them, at some basic level, an immediate sense of a commonality never before articulated. The interchange between the conceptual and the practice did not stop at the bus, however.

The act of sending Kosovar "Albanians" to Albania seemed to correspond with assumed natures. The conceptual territoriality of modern nation-states and the associations of collective identities mobilized bureaucratic responses to the crisis in a number of arenas. The international community and Macedonian politicians exploited the tenor of the time that categorically structured human communities much as paramilitary forces were doing inside Kosova. Much like Belgrade, the UN and Skopje ethnicized the spaces of possible refuge for people who had just lost everything. Macedonia, an inter-war construct that was complex, was deemed off limits for geopolitical

reasons that reduced the 45 people on that bus to an ethnic category deemed dangerous.

Again, it is key to remember similar territorial/ethnic associations were at work in Kosova. As Kosova was being violently cleansed of "Albanians" on account of territorial acquisitions made by Serbia in a turn-of-the-century parceling out of Ottoman populations, the international community was operating along the same rationalist ground that associated security with some categorical notion of a homogeneous population. It was Albania's unquestioned ethnic *raison d'être*, asserted in almost biological precision by UN employees and Macedonian fascists alike that determined where bus loads of Kosovar deportees could find shelter, food and compassion. The modern nation-state and their ethnic markers clearly separated the commonalities of human dignity at such moments when the budgets of non-governmental agencies and UN bureaucracies experienced a windfall of emergency funds to care for "Albanians" in need. What is interesting here is that the politicized (and ethnicized) social tensions, which determined Slavic Macedonian characterizations of the events as "dangerous" and "unsettling," were uncritically adopted by supposedly impartial members of the international community. The maintenance of essentialist categories of operation determined the fate of Kosovar deportees and ultimately, how they would be administered by the UN administration established in July of 1999.

We reached the border by eight in the morning. It was the last interrogation and strip search of some of the young men that finalized the distance between this bus load of Kosovars and the rest of the world. The tiny state of Albania, a geographical construct of Great Powers in 1912 and 1918, stood off in the distance. The trip to that symbolic, categorical home, one that conceptually had to be an acceptable alternative to Macedonian abuse, was a rude awakening to Kosovars who at the time wanted to believe what they were told, that they were "Albanians." Unfortunately, Albania's shattered physique, torn spirit and impoverished soul immediately stated to that busload of Kosovar deportees that they had not found refuge. The collective recognition was immediate and brutal; these Kosovars realized they were being deported once again. To press the point, Macedonian police took the International Red Cross identity cards given each person as they entered Blace. Like the Serb

state, Macedonia, and by default, the international community, stripped these people of name, origin and soul: they were now simply Albanians never again to leave their pathetic patch of earth.¹ The silence in the bus as we winded our way down the mountain into the Elbasan valley was heartbreaking. Silent tears fell as the experience of loss, death, and exile came to the surface once again. These Kosovars realized they were further from home than ever and no one in the world was capable of (or willing to) understanding why.

Identity in Practice

What is at work here is something far more embedded into the operative mechanisms of human interaction than my theoretical musing. As demonstrated in the work of Michel Foucault and those who have followed, the particularities of rationalist objectifications of the world have been instrumental to asserting and perpetuating structures of power since the 18th century. The particular qualities of the modern state are key in engaging in this appreciation of what happened in 1999 in the Balkans. The war in Kosova should raise new questions about the nature of inter-human exchange and the viability of certain patterns of self-governance and self-articulation when confronted by institutions that are central to our concept of modern government and society. The war and Kosova's subsequent administration by the international community have produced a number of interesting responsive discourses that not only have implications to those who live in Kosova but also to those of us exploring the parameters of modernity and identity.

Tragically, scholars and more importantly, UN bureaucrats have rarely sought to understand the structural politics set behind many of the principles they promote. The discourses of "Democracy," "Human Rights" and "Law" are at their core mobilized with social and historical essentializations resulting in crude sociological models that help both the media and the academic community explain human tragedy to an audience disinterested in detail (Campbell 1997). While we should not lose touch with the operational value of reductionism in the production of knowledge, I want to use the case of the international administration of Kosova in particular to demonstrate why citing such categories—especially "ethnicity" in the context of Kosova's "multi-ethnic" context—fails to properly critique a number of pre-determined

"reforms" and "humanitarian interventions" which were expected to bring peace and prosperity and as a consequence, "democracy" to Kosova and the Balkans.²

One of the more distinct methods of governance associated with modernity is the appropriation of sociocultural traditions to assert a categorical hierarchy of subject. In its capacity to secure a monopoly of coercive powers and the many methods that emerge from these strategies of governance, the modern state also served as the site of origin for the academic disciplines that articulate historical, political, cultural and economic change. It is no longer debatable that the links between the social sciences and the articulation and dissemination of power has created important mechanisms of control that cover most aspects of civil and individual life. What have been clearly resisted by many in the academy, however, are the practical implications of the persistent utilization of much of this foundational terminology that infuses the social sciences, and more importantly, our ability to interpret the world as bureaucrats, citizens and human beings.

In many ways, the Albanian in yesterday's headlines serves as the perfect example of how, what I called the self-conceived westernized world, has retained stereotypes of the nineteenth-century for contemporary consumption. It is the resilient images of the Albanian in settings limited to social chaos and violent confrontations that fill the collective minds of the outside world. Much work on the Balkans demonstrates an indebtedness to the governing codes of subjectivity in international relations—assuming pre-given agents with autonomous, intractable, and observable identities—codes that allow authors to portray a seamless, ethnically ordered world in which no other conceptions of identity have political import, and where group relations cannot be other than mutually exclusive and naturally conflictual. This suggests there has been no temporal transitions made from these unexplored idealizations of, as Milica Bakic-Hayden and Robert Hayden note (1992), the noble savage prevalent in nineteenth century literature to the painfully self-conscious, politically correct representations of domestic life today. It has been clear from my numerous interactions with policy makers, journalists and academics that modes of representation have not significantly changed in spite of a heightened awareness of the nature of ideas, images and historical

discourse most prominently addressed by Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Edward Said.

The ultimate goal here is to begin to apply a standard of inquiry that is often overshadowed by the arbitrary forces of current events. By doing this, it is hoped both consumers and producers of Balkan history begin to ask deeper questions about the conclusions made in various media forums and the origins of their assumptions. I propose that identities are precarious sociological moments, vulnerable to a variety of transformative elements contingent to both environmental and ideological factors.

One presumes after reading all the literature that has appeared since 1999 that Albanians constitute a community based on a variety of shared linguistic, physical, spiritual and social traits. Unfortunately it is not so clear cut. As I have noted elsewhere (1998), the historical tensions between various Albanian communities signifies a fundamental problem with the deterministic qualities an ethnic identity implies. This is manifested in a number of ways, often obscured by the very acts of homogenizing enacted by states (the expulsion of 1.5 million human beings from their homes) and residual analytical/administrative spaces monopolized by NGOs and the academy.

The precariousness of identity that shifted throughout the bus ride to the Albanian border and beyond, is prevalent in most periods of interface with Europe for the "Albanian." What is so important to learn from the experience I had on the bus is that collective aspirations are often shaped by forces larger and more influential than the individuals being objectified. "Albanians" have been collectivized so crudely that, as will be demonstrated below in the case of the UN administration of Kosova, it is impossible for individual identities to surface in historical or journalistic narratives that ultimately claim their voices. As a consequence, their silence becomes a justification for pervasive government as being practiced by UNMIK today.

Interestingly, as indicated in the bus that April, collectivizing human beings has a way of obliterating the very factors that may connect them, if at least temporarily, with each other. I wish to address this point first in the following example of how "Albanians" from Kosova, so clearly associated with ethnic oppression today, were categorized in such a manner by post-war

European states that their personal experiences of state oppression and ultimately, expulsion, did not register in "host countries" during one of the prominent waves of Kosovar migration in the period of 1945-1981. In this context, I will suggest "Kosovars" who ended up in Western Europe before Kosova reached the newspapers in Europe, have ironically, often not even been identified as "Albanians." Identified along lines set by host states, usually as the generic migrant worker, it becomes suddenly clear that specific criteria of self-identification, even if they are based on linguistic/ethnic associations, often do not matter; it is how the state so wishes to categorize the individual in the context of its "population" that is determinant of how individuals interact. The issue, therefore, is not that we can identify the Albanian *per se* but that we are not able or willing to delineate distinctions between individuals that they themselves make in a constantly shifting dialogue between self and other. After exploring how European societies dealt with Kosovars since the end of the Second World War, my study on the role of international administrative practices in Kosova since 1999 has even greater theoretical implications.

Theorizing the Migrant Space

The history of migration within Europe after World War II is an excellent case of how administrative principles distinguished groupings within populations. Europe was an impoverished continent until the early 1950s when massive development and the reindustrialization of European cities created high labor demands. According to conventional wisdom, large flows of "Greek," "Italian," Portuguese, and later "Turkish" migrants created dynamics of exchange that have continued to impact how social scientists read events today in Europe. In a process I call second-tier migration, large numbers of Albanian-speakers were among the Greek, Italian, Yugoslav and Turkish migrants that settled in Europe's cities and towns since the early 1950s. What is key here is to note that their existence was all but denied in official records that characterized them as ethnic attachments to their country of immediate origin. I suggest this phenomenon of second-tier migration compelled individuals to adopt identities in search of a place in the bureaucratic and social spaces provided by host countries, reflecting the fluid and shifting possibilities of individual lives seeking to fit into local life.

Importantly, not being recognized as distinctive members of this larger category of migrant worker had important implications for Kosovars. The desire to shed the stigma of being a foreigner was exaggerated among Albanian-speakers who for a number of reasons, failed to establish their distinctiveness in western Europe until Kosova became an area of diplomatic and media attention in the 1980s. Such failures, I suggest, resulted in the marginalization of individuals, ultimately translating into manifestations of denial of self and the seeking out of adopted, secondary identities that traumatized individual lives even further.

Factors of shifting identities point to communal fragmentation that leaves the immediate appellation of being Albanian meaningless as far as being a member of a "community" is concerned. Since Kosovar Albanian-speakers were not seen as products of political persecution in the 1950-1980 period, it was impossible for many to dissociate themselves from the secondary identities applied to them by the administrations of their host country. This was seen as highly problematic because the often abusive relationship German employers had with "Turks" greatly affected the hundreds of thousands of Albanians who had been expelled by Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s to Turkey. Since for many, Turkey was but a temporary home, those who joined the exodus of *gasarbeiter* to Europe were lost in associational categories that obliterated their experience of being expelled and thrust them into statistical categories that did not reflect their actual experience as individuals.

The consequences of not being able to sustain links to a homeland or have one's plight as a persecuted human being be recognized are enormous for the individual and her relationship with the outside world. Not in control of how the world perceives her, the generic migrant is in a constant struggle to articulate a distinctive identity that ultimately contributes to communal fragmentation. What is so discouraging about this period is that it demonstrates how one-sided the relationship between host societies and migrants were. The exclusivity of being "native" had developed powerful traditions of personal and collective discursive exchanges, implicitly ostracizing individuals so tied to such imageries. The sense of being viewed in the derogatory light of "foreigner" compelled many to abandon all evidence of their selves, completing a form of "ethnic cleansing" that is as racist in nature as

the form that involves masked-gunmen and the destruction of historical buildings.

It is clear from reading testimonies of migrants from all over the world that diasporas in general have been attributed a universal identity that is almost impossible to shed (Pan 1990). Being a migrant, refugee or some derivation of an administrative category parallels the "ethnic" stigmas I briefly noted above. The consequences of being identified as Arab or Chinese migrants in Western Europe speaks of deeply ingrained conceptualizations of the "other." These stereotypes circulate amongst the mainstream cultures of host (European/Western) cultures, often beyond the reach of those so identified. Most damaging is how ethnic stereotypes, often disguised in academic production, collectively mark migrants who fit such "ethnic" profiles. The forcing of Germany's Jews to pin a yellow star of David onto their clothing is not necessary for migrants from the Balkans, the Middle East, Asia or Africa. It is probably more obvious with the plight of the "Chinese" migrant who must endure the phenomenon of Hong Kong produced Kung Fu movies that are popular in the West or the globalization of generic "Chinese" cuisine, but the qualities of "Albanianess" have also developed their own universalisms over the years since the 1980s.

Outward displays of racism and state policies to segregate outsiders are largely things of the past. That does not mean, however, that European societies have been expunged of their methods of "othering." Physical, cultural or material coding have replaced more obnoxious displays of racist segregation. Even in the academic world, self-appointed as the conscience of a new Europe, racist criteria are used to *understand the world*. What I am suggesting here is that being identified as a collective unit and persecuted as such in say Kosova, has never been epistemologically contradicted in Western democracies. Europe has more or less accepted the logic of Serbian Fascism by ethnicizing conflicts such as those in Kosova today in their analysis. Failing to challenge the very premise for slaughtering human beings has deep consequences that can be revisited in how migrants have experienced Europe since the end of WWII, or how those forty-five people on the bus imagined their lives.

By framing the conditions for one's flight from all corners of the world in such

simplistic terms as being "victims of ancient hatreds," "ethnic wars" or guest worker has in many ways codified the identity of people who are diverse and highly dynamic. Today, having been deported from their homes, "refugees" are not given the chance to be individuals in Europe, they are still "Albanians," "Kurds" or "Tamils," victimized by ancient hatreds far too deep and primitive for Western societies to solve. When one of these "refugees" speaks, he/she "speaks as" a refugee, Albanian etc., and in the process loses his/her subjectivity.³ This same phenomenon has silenced individuals inside Kosova since June of 1999.

While it is widely forgotten today because of the veritable explosion of new and equally repugnant stereotypes of the Albanian as drug-dealer, terrorist, victim and perpetrator of ethnic cleansing,⁴ in the 1950-1980 period, being Albanian carried an essential character to it that indelibly limited the space in which members of these diasporas could operate as individuals and as communities. While the images were generally benign in comparison to what is being said today, nevertheless, the socioeconomic space available for the individual so identified as being Albanian was surprisingly restrictive. It is often noted in my conversations with "members" of these various diasporas in Europe and North America the frustrations they feel at the arbitrary associations "locals" make about them, the "outsider." Interestingly, due to the special condition concerning Albanians in postwar Europe, many of these Albanians' ethnic and communal identity was ambiguous. The limited information about Albanians in Europe during the period in question had often resulted in a rather benign curiosity about their "plight" and a more normative assumption that they were just *looking for a "job" and to take advantage of the generous social security system of European states*, just like the "rest" of the migrants.

Finding a Voice

One of the most telling expressions of communal identities is their active attempt to influence how their host societies see them. The most important instrument of countering stereotypes has been to collectively influence how and through what means images of the community are disseminated to the host society. Communities will hold demonstrations, participate in parades, distribute literature, support exhibitions and other "outreach" programs. The case of Albanian-speakers, either

as "migrants" to the post-war industrialized world or "refugees" in the 1990s demonstrates the dramatic failure of the various Albanian diasporas to counter stereotypes about the Albanian prevalent at the time. Until the 1990s, the issue was not that there were negative images of Albanians being circulated per se; on the whole the problem lay in the fact that the existence of an Albanian community in Stuttgart, Zurich or London was not known.

Yugoslavia, until 1981 at least, as far as the collective notions of the ethnic composition of such a mysterious place were concerned, did not permit three million Albanian-speakers to exist. As far as mainstream popular images were concerned, Yugoslavia was a singular political, national and thus ethnic unit. The Albanian was fixed geographically at the time to the actual country. What is interesting here is that the consequences of the Stalinist, hermit-state of Enver Hoxha was that Albanians were more or less a forgotten people wherever they settled. Their history, their complexities and most importantly, their plight in Greece, Macedonia, Kosova and Montenegro was all but ignored because of the fact that the numerous diasporas could not generate a reliable voice to educate their host societies.

It is often ignored but a number of factors help individuals retain associational links to others in conditions adverse to their sense of dignity and economic well-being. Living the life of a migrant, be it for economic or political reasons, carries many self-inflicted emotional not to mention social stigmas. There is great pressure to avoid such stigmas, often at the expense of communal "unity." Any community is reinforced by positive manifestations of its place in the world order. Positive images of the migrant community, however, are hard to come by in host societies. It is therefore critical that such positive images are highlighted.

It is rarely considered what impact mass media has on creating psychological spaces for such positive reinforcement but I suggest for migrant communities, their ability to communicate to their host society through mass culture is key to their success. A number of possible ways of reaching the masses are available. Probably the most effective ways are to make links to cultural figures who are often seen in mass media. International sports stars transcend the politics of race and ethnicity better than any flag-waving demonstration. Collective

sympathies from host countries are probably most shaped by the successes of sports stars who come from one's homeland. Sharing the glory of a victorious football team or even the popularity of a bomb shell international actress dilutes tensions of personal exchanges between migrant and host. The social spaces in which the divides of suspicion, jealousy and fear are best traversed are often at the local bar while a sports match is keeping the patrons affixed to the TV screen. For the Albanian, unfortunately, there is no example of such internationally produced comfort zone. Albania's political and cultural isolation and the inability of Albanians in Yugoslavia to represent that country in sports or cultural forums as Albanians meant no visible figure could provide a positive representation of the self (that is the individual Albanian) to this wider forum.

For the last sixty years, probably the most famous migrant Albanians—John Belushi and Mother Tereza—actively downplayed their family origins.⁵ It has been this phenomenon of silence in the commercial entertainment world that has shaped, in part, the relationship Albanian communities have had with each other and the outside world. With no significant claim to a popular historical record and no prominent internationally-accepted voice representing them, there was little incentive for the outward representation of one's Albanianess in the 1950s and 1960s. With this failure to represent oneself beyond the confinements of a largely ignorant host-society's understanding of what Albania was Stuart Hall's suggestion (1990) that communities should seek to find new spaces to represent themselves is all the more interesting in this case because Albanians have failed so miserably to emit such a voice. I suggest, as a result, Albanian identity claims by individuals throughout 1944-1989 were largely submerged in superficial layers of adopted identities, identities that reinforced a sense of borrowed national-pride as well as economic security at the expense of their Albanian heritage(s).

As a particularly important consequence, the issue of identity becomes especially problematic and potentially traumatic to individuals. The "Albanian" in post-war Europe represents the perfect case study of fused, hybrid and even contradictory identities that dictate social and economic interaction and create, I suggest, apolitical constituencies who wish to disengage from the politics of identity that are the direct cause of their seemingly

endless flight from persecution and marginalization.

The Creation of Apolitical Communities: The UN in Postwar Kosova

Here lies the crux of the issue of post-war migration for Albanians, at least until 1981 and the period of international administration in Kosova. The exasperated experience of the politics and economics of identity intimidated individuals enough that they concealed their individual/collective voices and activities. The phenomenon of the Jewish parvenu is a good example of this problem. Being marginal within a demographic of spatial and cultural grading may have induced individuals to seek assimilation through this denial. In studies on migration the process of assimilation is often ignored at the personal level but interviews with those who successfully made the transition from being "Albanian/Outsider" to Turk/Greek/Italian or even, for the "lucky ones" German/insider, reveal enormous guilt and pain. The often unaccounted for violence of being the outsider does not only translate in attacks by skin-heads, they are articulated in the long stares at supermarkets, the distrust expressed by merchants, the lack of service at department stores, and the persistent uncertainty of the individual's legal status that accompanies a foreigner every day. A longing to fit in rather than stand out leads to deeper shading and silencing of communal activities. A vicious circle is constructed around the incapacity of the host-society to adequately deal with the consequences of differences substantiated by all the unmonitored expressions of that distance.

A cycle of what one could call internal "ethnic cleansing" is created under these epistemological conditions. Marginal identities fail to articulate themselves through traditional outreach programs due to feelings of persecution or isolation. Failure to educate and familiarize the world of one's uniqueness results in a further silencing of the second generation which sees little incentive to appropriate identities that only limit the possibilities of finding work, marriage, and education in the outside world. This is clearly happening again in Kosova since 1999. The stigma of being Albanian and all its negative associations have created real tensions within selves and communities. The kind of distinctions that were so important to diaspora communities are also evident in Kosova. The urban/rural divide, always a product of the

negative image Albanians carried in Yugoslavia, has resurfaced with a vengeance since 1999 where the international community has recreated the image of the Albanian in ways that induce self-monitoring and internal cleansing.

Individuals have the explicit power to construct the memory of the homeland, to create myths and sustain them. But when there lacks a positive psychological environment in which all certainties are in question, denial of one's "negative" self is desirable. William Safran's (1991) notion of a 'diaspora consciousness' had been dramatically under-intellectualized among Albanians. Their existential condition under constant attack by self-defense mechanisms that denied existence from the inside as much as the hostility from outside created an environment in which "Albanian" interests contradicted individual ones.

How this is translated in organizing communities is key to shedding new light on diasporas in Europe during this period and how Kosova is developing since 1999. It is here that I wish to suggest my concern over the mechanics of categories such as ethnicity has relevance for contemporary issues.

The masking of all human activity in the discursive framework of ethnicity makes it impossible for communities, which never constituted a single "Albanian" community, to represent themselves outside the parameters of their assumed "ethnic" identity. This is important in Kosova, for UNMIK has taken a position of institutional management that requires a rigid "restructuring" of political life along these same "communal" lines.⁶ UNMIK and its appointed administrative leader, Bernard Kouchner, mobilize a rhetoric of liberal democracy through institutions which operate on the grounds of these ethnic divisions.

The Interim Administrative Council (IAC), for instance, set up on the heels of UNMIK's failed Transitional Council intuitively wants to bring the "two sides" --Serb and Albanian--to the same table. What such a performative gesture assumes however, is that the body, constituting four members of the "Albanian" community, one from the "Serb" and four from the "International" are representative of easily identifiable constituents. The notion that the IAC is a representative council only reconfirms the immutable boundaries between each "ethnic" group as opposed to creating any cohabitational spirit. The very

institutionalization of "ethnic" difference implicitly accepts the racist pretext that "Albanians" and "Serbs" are distinctive and must have, to use a cliché, separate but equal facilities to conduct daily life. This is no different than what Milosevic set up in Kosova since 1989.

At the same time, and in many ways this is the most interesting point of contention, the IAC "advisory" board functions in a way that makes a clean break in time and spirit with the UNMIK's conceptualization of the "past." The IAC is to mark a new beginning, thus delegitimizing all that existed in Kosova prior to June as some archaic form belonging to the terrible years of apartheid. Both the networks of Yugoslav internal security (MUP) AND "Albanian" local councils not attached to UNMIK need to be eradicated.

While that may seem justifiable to most on the surface, the IAC, much like Milosevic's apartheid system, intentionally does not recognize local authority. To both state-building operations, all remnants of a social order must be eliminated in order to "build," in Kouchner's case, a multi-ethnic democracy. This democracy is directed from the central state which sets the formal expression of communal interest. Communal identities are framed in the very "ethnic" categories which UNMIK deems antithetical to democratic norms. The "ethnic hatred" assumed to have been manifested in "ethnically-based" institutions such as local village councils must be replaced by UN-sanctioned institutions that preach "communal harmony and equality."

Since over 95% of the population of Kosova constituted in the demographic data represent one "group," they would obviously live and organize their lives in communities constitutive of "ethnically pure" social and political spaces. UNMIK's prescribed political mechanisms actively seek to sidestep such mechanisms. The four leaders "representing" these Kosovar Albanians are responsible to serve as liaisons between Prishtina and the community (note, singular) at large. Outside the parameters set in this "coalition" there no longer remains the possibility to develop local solutions. What is happening is traditional powers that were dispersed locally are now being appropriated by Prishtina and distributed to pliable "partners" who are eager to maintain a good standing with UNMIK and thus the spoils of power.⁷ The inherent diversity of Kosova's political, cultural

and economic life is being reduced to fit manageable boundaries for administrative purposes. Worse yet, the responsibility of maintaining one's life is no longer in the hands of Kosovars.

My contention is that these "Albanians" who are being denied their communal-based networks today, never interacted as "ethnic" Albanians but as constitutive communities (in the plural) who throughout the twentieth century managed their own civic lives. These diverse community networks were key to resisting Belgrade's eighty years of colonialism in Kosova by maintaining schools, rudimentary health services, local markets and the like. With power so fluid and dispersed, it was impossible to assert Belgrade's control over Kosova's indigenous peoples. Ironically, it is the assertive legitimization of UNMIK's assumption of power that is diluting the capacity of individual communities to function as in the past. The grounds have been set for serious confrontations as old networks are attacked as archaic and the new only impose a stronger sense of marginality and not surprisingly, greater political divisions within Kosova's political life.

Revisiting State Power Through the Eyes of UNMIK

Much of this process forces us to explore the relationship between state power and its constituents. I see UNMIK as but a copy of institutional agents and their practices that have found ascendancy in the post-Enlightenment world. UNMIK's operational relationship with Kosova's population shares the intrinsic tensions of power over agency that have hampered social and political growth throughout the world. From the Soviet Union to a variety of operational models found in the "West," the dominance of organizational and conceptual media situated in the modern state have transformed the world since the nineteenth century (i.e. see Marglin 1990). Categories, framed in pseudo-scientific terms, including ethnicity, have found important operational niches in the reconfiguring of first, Europe and later the Third World.⁸ Such categories—ethnicity, race, creed, class—while dependent on the coercive capacity of those who use them, have had enormous explanatory value in dealing with difference, a process which defined physical, cultural and ultimately moral boundaries for those who evoke them. Such boundaries have a way of solidifying distinctions, leading ultimately to tensions of

interests as articulated exclusively in these terms. Such constructions are deemed essential to self-constitutive efforts, but as Bill Connolly has so brilliantly noted (1991), they have important moralizing elements that close possibilities as opposed to expanding interaction. Such inherent "border-drawing" tendencies, I argue, build registers of power; those who can impose notions of right/wrong, beauty and love, shape the contours of human life in a given social space and determine the nature of self for all.

In this sense, it would serve us well to understand that Kosova today is situated within a geographical context that overly determines how the world has analyzed its conflict. The Balkans, as a cartographic construct, have been ostracized from Europe on grounds widely studied elsewhere (Gran 1996; Wolff 1004). What has not been adequately explored, however, is the rhetorical value social and political acts within this geographical space are given. According to policy makers and "specialists," it is the inherent ethnic tensions between distinctive and spatially conceived actors—Albanians and Serbs in this case, usually tied to larger, cartographic entities—that shape the operational limits of intervention in history.⁹

This perspective has a distinctive bias to it. As Michael Shapiro correctly observes (1997:15-20), state-centric academic and political discourses have approached these limits only by way of legitimating the authority of nation-states, the dominant political order of our time. It must be added that such discursive media also serve as powerful devices to assert a preconceived "West" and its moral authority on such "primordial" conflicts. What this relationship between conceptual hierarchies based on geographic place does is limit the points of analysis to those determined by "state" institutions situated in the self-righteous "West."

In this context, as is often the case when issues of sovereignty are involved (a cause célèbre for like-wise oriented Western democracies), the use of a framework of analysis based on ethnicity, inherently reinforces the oppressive state's ideological thrust. In the case of the Balkans, it is Yugoslavia (Serbia), which has set the terms of engagement with Bosnians, Croats and Kosovars on account of its sovereign membership as a recognized state. It legitimized mass murder by evoking sociological and political categories "originating" from European traditions, lending further legitimacy to its voice

in face of the cluttered, at times inept representations uttered by Serbia's victims. In other words, Kosova as seen in the media and diplomatic corps is an "ethnic" quagmire that pitted "Albanian rebels," (sometimes called guerrillas, sometimes terrorists) against the "security forces" of Serbia. While the war was situated in the Balkans, a setting all too familiar to the global viewer of CNN, the terms of the conflict were more or less how Serbia framed them and hence, pursued its policy of genocide: a sovereign state rooting out its "terrorists." The language of exclusive, sovereign rights, the privilege of state over subject, silenced "Albanians" in their attempt to frame a historical narrative to assert "rights" beyond the dictates of Serbia. The world, finding little sympathy for constructs that complicate their geostrategic fixation on the firmly defined nation-state, refused to engage "Albanians from Kosova" on any other terms than as "separatists," "rebels," and/or "victims." The same holds true today, where it is Kouchner's state that holds the keys to expression, it is he who determines validity and tenor of information that circulates to the outside world.

By way of recasting Kosova in the 1990s in terms readily used by the practitioners of genocide (whose actions served as the context for international intervention), the internal dynamics of Kosova's many communities was never considered. In a process Derrida would call "coup du force," the internal dynamic of racist domination, articulated by a sovereign state, forced outside observers to articulate the crisis in terms privileging that perspective: a clash between ethnic groups within a sovereign state (1992:14-19). Not only was there no other way of identifying the principals, but as we will see, the international community, trapped in these discursive conventions, have subsequently perpetuated Belgrade's racist ethnography as it assumed authority over Kosova in June of 1999.

To summarize this theoretical intervention, what has changed in Kosova since June of 1999 is the tone of rule, not the discursive relationship between power and subject. "Ethnic Albanians" are still the issue, a construct with distinguishable boundaries from others—a "minority Serb population" and the international community—who ultimately must be reformed, guided and punished when applicable.¹⁰ This persistent resourcing of essentialist categories, by way of mobilizing ethnicity as a explanatory tool to distinguish

ruler from ruled, will ultimately create failures far more spectacular than the latest outbreak in Mitrovica.¹¹

Administration Convergence: Power Demanding Uniformity

The international community has hastily determined that local communities in Kosova constitute part of a larger "ethnic" community. In the context of an ethnic war for which "both" sides are guilty, this determination suggests that wholesale institutional reform was in order. The practical side of such a strategy to make Kosova "multiethnic," "peaceful" and a "model" for the rest of the Balkans, has led to a position that demands that political representation be universalized in the form of "national" parties. As suggested earlier, in this way, there is an administrative convergence between Milosevic's apartheid system and UNMIK. Both states articulated Kosova's political and cultural life in terms of the population's ethnicity, leading each state to define in highly undemocratic terms both the structural nature of state/society interaction (both assume there is a need to provide institutionalized protection for "minority" groups) and those who constituted "legitimate" representatives.

Putting the question of violence aside for the moment, the international administration, run quite firmly by Bernard Kouchner and in some ways, Daan Everts, "Ambassador" of the OSCE, has taken on structural measures that have attempted to profoundly control how state and civil society interact.¹² While theorists rightly question the strong state/society dichotomy in the Western context, I insist in the case of Kosova, efforts by earlier state entities to transgress, penetrate and ultimately destroy autonomous sources of power have largely failed. The proof is simply in the fact that Kosova is 95% populated by an "ethnic" group Serbia has for eighty years attempted to eliminate. What the international community is presently attempting to accomplish, either by conscious design (I have no doubt some elements of the regime are conscious of the effects such policies are bringing) or through unquestioned loyalty to academic paradigms with little theoretical introspection, is to centralize administrative power by eliminating local autonomy.¹³ To do this, Prishtina, never before representing anything more than a bus station or a place to go see a movie for the overwhelming majority of Kosovars, has become

the epicenter of all social, economic and political life.

The bureaucratic necessities of a strong administrative state seeking to "bring peace to Kosova" [sic] demanded all external sources of legitimacy and economic and social production be eliminated or channeled through Prishtina. Through this imposition, only UNMIK had legitimate claim to authority in Kosova. Upon entering Kosova, all administrative bodies, the "self-declared" Provisional Government and the LDK-run Republic of Kosova had to stop operations (Dedaj 1999). The KLA had to be disarmed and break ranks in three, controlled stages as the new authority in Kosova assumed a monopoly of military force.¹⁴ All "Albanian" political parties, economic and social organizations had to be registered with Prishtina or face persecution. All matters concerning education, legal complaints, water supply, road repair, or mine clearance were no longer to be addressed by locals. Since Prishtina did not recognize the authority of local governments it refused to allocate funding or material assistance to the many organizations ready to begin rebuilding Kosova from day one. I will comment on some of these assertive decrees below, but first I wish to explore further the implications of this overall, draconian posture.

The Kosova Liberation Army is a particularly interesting case here because security and the unacceptably high crime rate has been the focus of much criticism levied towards UNMIK. The KLA was disbanded in three orderly segments. A rudimentary and as of yet only partially constituted civilian, some would say humanitarian, Kosova Protection Force, the TMK, was created in order to absorb a chosen few out of KLA ranks. The agreement signed between Agim Ceku, the military commander of the KLA, and members of the international community, came only after the intentions of the international community were made public, that is to take over security matters in Kosova.¹⁵ There was clearly little that could be done from Ceku and Hashim Thaci's side. The choice between resisting disarmament or cooperation seemed hardly debatable at the time. It was under such seemingly advantageous conditions that the international community sought to, hastily I suggest, dictate a complete and unambiguous dissolution of Kosova's civil society, of which the KLA was an integral part.¹⁶ The end result is rampant mafia activity that operates with impunity along the border areas of

Serbia/Montenegro/Macedonia/Albania and Kosovo.

For the international community, the commonsense approach at the time was to initiate a strategy that would "fill in a security vacuum" created by the departure of Serb forces. The very idea that the outside world could conceive of a Kosovo without Serbian forces as a situation of concern indicates just how critically uninterested its contributing members were in the dynamics of Kosovo's political life. There were not many Kosovars who felt secure while Serb forces were in Kosovo. But this is exactly where the dividing line lies between the international community and Kosovo's indigenous population. With Belgrade's secret service and military leaving, there was a "Security vacuum" that needed to be filled.

The pressure to seek ultimate coercive power in Kosovo relied on a combination of KFOR forces (constituted mainly of NATO contingents with a mixture of Russian and smaller power contributions) with a UNMIK civilian police force made up of contributions from member states.¹⁷ The failures to keep the peace in Kosovo are well known. The persistent factor of organized crime—coming mainly from crime rings established during the 1980s under the cover of still Communist and heavily corrupt police forces in all Balkan countries—revenge killings and acts of sabotage instigated by Milosevic's agents and ambitious Kosovar Albanians all speak of the underlying issue at play. UNMIK, instead of adapting a strategy of learning from one's constituents, embracing locals and learning from how social order was maintained in the overwhelming majority of Kosovo during the height of Milosevic's repression, UNMIK chose to delegitimize all elements of Kosovo society.

I suggest that locals have a strong sense of duty to maintain order in their lives. Their fight with Belgrade's colonialism represented a dynamic of communal bonding and self-sacrifice that could have been cultivated by UNMIK. UNMIK and the international community could have worked with Agim Ceku to strengthen the centralization of the KLA, to make it into a real organization with a command structure and accountability. With a dedicated and goal-oriented defense force, properly treated as a professional security force, the international community could have relied on Agim Ceku to establish law and order. The onus for the

security for all of Kosovo's inhabitants would have been on his head. The problem is UNMIK and its largely Western paymasters did not seek to contradict the rhetoric coming from Belgrade and Moscow. In place of a sound and imaginative departure from business as usual, UNMIK sought to completely delegitimize Kosovo's indigenous structures. The failure to understand local patterns mostly stemmed from its embedded distrust of local constituencies. This is the story of the modern state and the power of embedded discursive practices that permit most observers to countenance the racist representation of a whole population as "drug-runners," "thieves" and "terrorists." Instead of relying on local knowledge to identify criminality, the international community sought to shut out completely the inhabitants of Kosovo from being responsible for their own lives.

The technologies of surveillance as studied by Foucault, the sociocultural ideologies of collective resentment identified by Nietzsche, and prevailing dynamics of "othering" noted by William Connolly are consistently reappearing under new guises in this so-called post-modern world. My ultimate observation for Kosovo's administration is that while social theorists still focus on the narrow, eurocentric domain that asserts factors of globalization, the break-up of the state, in reality, the internationalization of administrative powers, namely operated by the UN and NGOs, demonstrates a firm institutional affinity for state expansion efforts that reflect those at the end of the nineteenth century. This demonstrative rearticulation suggests modernity and its incumbent residuals of colonial racism (engineered in ethnic categories today) is alive and well.

Much as with the question of peace and order in Kosovo, UNMIK has utterly failed in creating suitable civil structures to attend to the most basic needs of Kosovo's population. Aside from actively ignoring local communities as they constantly sought permission and assistance, not necessarily in that order, to rebuild their devastated lives, UNMIK was slow to institute civil structures. For example, the strategy to "winterize" Kosovo's villages (constituting a blue plastic sheeting to cover one room in a burnt out house) was deemed by early August 1999 as a success (KFOR 1999). The fact that there were a few months left and a few months already had past in which most of UNMIK's focus was centered on establishing a government infrastructure and accommodation for its

hundreds of agencies and growing number of employees speaks of a disturbing disregard for the plight, feelings and aspirations of two and a half million people. Needless to say, hundreds of thousands of Kosovars had a very cold winter.¹⁸

Nothing was more emblematic of this defiant disregard than the endless traffic jams created in Kosova as trucks loaded with supplies entered into Kosova to help construct Camp Bondsteel, a veritable city in Eastern Kosova, housing far more than the reported 5000 US troops offered by the Pentagon. As Kosovars would huddle in their "winterized" room in the shell of their burnt out home, UNMIK and KFOR officials sat in comfort in the apartment blocks, factory complexes and new cities they commandeered over the first eight months of their administration of Kosova. The emblem of UN arrogance were the hundreds of white-painted Toyota 4x4's and the rising prices caused by their "exotic" tastes (especially Romanian and Russian prostitutes) and affinity for imported goods.¹⁹

Political Marginalization

The power of recognition determines the immediate associational capacity of local communities. Belgrade never bothered dealing with local communities on such an administrative level, formal recognition was never deemed desirable nor feasible, the two realms were clearly distinct in most cases. Due to this distinctive space between Kosova and Belgrade's apartheid state, many communities were able to maintain institutions that functioned as formal state structures in an independent political, economic and social realm. This parallel society, again winning praise of the "free world" in the past, had many qualities to it that resembled nineteenth Century America, as observed by Alex de Toqueville.²⁰ In spite of (or due to) decades of repression, a high-level of local trust, mutual dependency and sense of collective responsibility created a civic environment unmatched in most parts of the industrial world.

These same cornerstones of early democratic societies are viewed from the perspective of a modern bureaucratic state as disruptive mechanisms denying the intentions of "reform." It is here that the international administration of Kosova adopted measures of control that are at once destroying indigenous social institutions and at the same time,

destroying any hope for a "multi-ethnic" democratic society.

The unyielding use of ethnic categories to identify those engaged in these autonomous, locally-produced social institutions have created pressures never before experienced in Kosova. The rural economy in particular has been greatly affected. In the past, remittances from overseas family members and the production from farms fed these communities; there was an economic self-sufficiency that permitted this communal independence from the colonial state. Today, that capacity has been taken away by the strategic campaign of genocide pursued by Belgrade which murdered men and women, mined fields, killed livestock, poisoned the water supply, burnt down villages and looted personal savings.²¹ But the pressure on local economies does not stop there. Since May of 2000, host societies throughout Europe, balancing domestic xenophobic pressures to rid their countries of "drug-dealers" and unemployed foreigners, sent back to Kosova tens of thousands of Kosovars, many of whom had been living in Europe since the 1970s. The assumption, at least publicly, was that they belong "home." No consideration was made for the fact that income earned from Europe financed extended families or that many of these people no longer had "homes" in Kosova but in Germany, Switzerland and Scandinavia. Now that most homes have been destroyed and these Kosovars have been denied their only source of income, the conditions in rural Kosova have only been exasperated since UNMIK took over.

It is here that I suggest Kosovars themselves, while instinctively resistant to efforts to homogenize them, set in the current situation, must abandon their inherited and largely intact principles of communal cooperation. In the conditions set by an unapologetic Prishtina, to survive Kouchner's brave new world means Kosovars have to abandon tried and true social practices. Because of the manner in which Prishtina has coordinated the distribution of foreign assistance, these people, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, are existentially externalized from their familiar world and must act within boundaries of behavior set by the discourse of ethnicity. As individuals and members of now highly dependent communities seek assistance from of all places, Prishtina, they must do so in a discursive context that has largely marginalized them.

The ethnic categorization of criminal behavior is of particular interest here for it has led to a retention of real choices for individual communities. By implicating all "Albanians," Prishtina created a social ontology that forced its adopted "communal" leaders, Rugova, Thaçi and others, to perform a definitional shift. By creating the IAC in this context, Kouchner established the firm ground for engagement, ground on which the terms state: if you want to participate you must publicly distance yourself from "divisive language" and accept institutional guidelines as set forth by Prishtina. This has led to the effective silencing of real dissent. In particular, Hashim Thaçi, in June and July probably hands-on-favorite in any election, is now diminished to a sorry addition to a council of puppets.

The process of "dependent uncertainty" has also permeated to the "simple" farmer who has lost everything. Any deviation beyond the permissible institutional and rhetorical space provided for the simple civilian is considered "anti-democratic" and a threat. Being an "Albanian" at once limits where one can go to voice one's complaints and how expressions of anger can be articulated before the international community. The problem is that this same administrative agency has not established institutions to address the very concerns expressed by Kosova's population.

This theme has found residency in most statements coming out of the many agencies located in Prishtina and most governments of the world, for important reasons. While a uniform condemnation of "ethnic cleansing in reverse" on the surface seemed just and appropriate, I argue there were highly manipulative reasons for this smear campaign of 95% of the population. The tone was set in Prishtina by the legitimate and authorized administration of Bernard Kouchner. His various agencies had for the first three months made it a policy to publicly condemn acts of violence against "Serbs" as "revenge" attacks, acts of "barbaric and inhuman" nature perpetrated by "Albanians."

There are two important points to make here. First it is simply not true that "Albanians" undertook a "systematic campaign to ethnically cleanse Serbs" from Kosova.ⁱ After numerous challenges at daily news conferences held in Prishtina, I never was able to modify the implicit and at times explicit associational ploy operated by the various agencies that issued statements to the press.ⁱⁱ The acts were continuously called "inhuman," "baseless," and expressions of

"uncivilized" hate, all language pertinent to the Balkans. This fed into the generalizations that ran rampant in the mass media and reinforced all assumptions about Kosova, its inhabitants and the legitimacy of UNMIK in its thankless task. At the time, the results were deemed largely positive by the amateur spin-doctors who manned Kouchner's press team: the Kosovar "Albanians" were on the defensive, everyone from Hashim Thaçi, to the farmer trying to pick up the shambles of his life had some explaining to do. Little did the press team at UNMIK headquarters know, the consequences for such slash and burn tactics would have dire consequences.

This policy of applying pressure on all of Kosova's "Albanians" through this media campaign of guilt by association was done for one principal reason: there was a crisis of legitimacy that plagued the international community. While NATO forces were seen as saviors, the premise of UNMIK's introduction into Kosova was inherently contradictory to what the population sought: independence (Reçica 1999). UNMIK's mandate was not to develop an independent Kosova but one which would remain formally inside the "recognized" borders of Serbia.ⁱⁱⁱ Kosova, as far as UNMIK was concerned, was a space that remained a part of a hierarchy of order that produced "angles of vision" requiring it assumed goals that could produce a potential clash with a "population" which had different aspirations (Foucault 1991). These angles were predicated on goals of the international community which had to impose a level of administrative distance between what had just happened in Kosova—the attempt to wipe out more than two million inhabitants from their ancestral homes—in order to "rebuild" Kosova as a "multiethnic" society that would, in the end, remain a part of that very state that had committed genocide. A daunting task and probably an impossible sell if made directly to Kosovars. The mantra of "forgiveness" was a privilege only available to those who have families, bank accounts and two car garage homes waiting for them somewhere in Europe or North America.

For this reason, I believe, at least instinctually, some elements of the international community felt it needed to pummel potential opponents who had still significant support among large numbers of people. I am speaking

here in particular about members of the Provisional Government of Kosova, in particular Hashim Thaçi. For some members of the international community, Hashim Thaçi was an unknown commodity that was making too many dangerous inroads in international circles. His local popularity, his strong backing from the Rubin/Albright faction in the US State Department and the many inevitable contingencies that would arise from the transitional process posed a threat to members of the international community who wanted to assure Kosova remain part of Serbia. The same elements in the G7 Group of Nations, the Security Council and NATO that had hoped the KLA would just go away since 1998, was now keen on seeing Kosova's inevitable shift to independence stymied. The politics behind the selection of Bernard Kouchner and the allocation of sectors to various countries, while too complicated for this project, should inform us about what attitude Kouchner and his team brought when they finally assumed power in July (Brzezinski 1999).

There are direct correlations between the missing institutional systems and the operational husbanding of such duties by local communities. Justice is just one domain, schooling, water and electricity services, security and political administration have been others in which UNMIK state aspirations clash with realities on the ground. There is becoming a systemic marginalization, which intensifies Kosovars' sense of political powerlessness. The growing tenor of new bodies of political advocacy speak to these frustrations and fears, ultimately fulfilling the negative stereotypes imposed from the outside world as only radical voices gain attention.

The geographic space of civic life is also an interesting marker of these marginalizations. Prishtina has created a highly bureaucratic and thus, clumsy network of distribution for the shrinking resources at its disposal. All NGOs must register and request "security" clearances before setting out on projects, which suggests the unequal distribution of assistance and the sporadic, if at all, visits to many of the outer areas of devastated regions are products of Prishtina's making. Authority and the power to distribute all external sources of aid must pass through Prishtina's bureaucracy. The aforementioned local networks in Kosova no longer benefit from unmitigated outside support.ⁱ Local chapter's of "Nena Teresa" (a highly decentralized organization that supplies medical

services to rural populations) and local teacher boards, failing registration in Prishtina have been excommunicated from the network of aid. Prishtina's political centrality have peripheralized communities with no connections with the capital.

This has powerful consequences for the civic culture of Kosova. Once highly cooperative on the local level, families have become individuated as the search for suitable housing to survive the winter and the search for cash in a generally cashless society have forced everyone's eyes away from neighbors and towards Prishtina. The very operational mechanisms of this centralized bureaucracy, interestingly, have remained largely in Prishtina. As of August 18, 1999, when I posed the question at the daily press conference, the spokesperson for Bernard Kouchner, the supreme leader of Kosova, admitted that he had never visited Drenica, Dukagjin, or Malisheva, areas that represented the heart-and-soul of the Kosovar identity as a political unit and the areas most ravaged by the war.ⁱⁱ The fact that only Mitrovica, Prizren and Peja had permanently staffed offices of either the OSCE or UNMIK spoke of factors beyond the mechanical. In October of 1999, a full five months after UNMIK assumed power, the appointed representative to Podujeva, David Violet, finally met with local civic leaders in what was basically a lecture on what UNMIK had planned to do in the region (Përvetica 1999).

This has created aspects of what Ulrich Beck has called a "risk society" (1992). Seen in the context of disruption and forced differation, an anxiety (as I call it) to strive beyond parameters set by the discursive standards established by Prishtina have forced people to locate spheres of representation in worlds highly alien to them. Political fragmentation and individual interests rising above community interests have become more evident. The wish to cash in on the only game in town has meant political parties have taken on a Prishtina-centered perspective, a process of depopularizing political representation. Such patterns I suggest are also creating a more radical polity, as the "ethnic" criteria has been used to strengthen distinctions between, not only "Serb" and "Albanian," but between those whose rhetoric has followed the guidelines set by the international community and those who resist. The more "nationalist" one is, the more one's

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role in the war is positive, and the greater one's attractiveness is to small pockets of supporters. Anti-Serb credentials have become of great political value in the context of a Kosova divided discursively along ethnic lines.²⁷

In the meantime, UNMIK has been manipulated by Belgrade's persistent, if not remarkably sophisticated long-term strategy to partition Kosova. The international community, eager to find some access to its "ethnic Serb minority," have distributed enormous political capital to long-time racists such as Oliver Ivanovic and Momcilo Trajkovic. The mobilization of "ethnicity" and the inherent tensions has fed Belgrade's networks inside Kosova with ample ammunition to disrupt and exert maximum return from UNMIK. The positioning of the terms of UNMIK's administration along ethnic grounds have given enormous power to "Serbs" who in most cases, understand that they can assert greater pressure on Prishtina and New York from a position as "a besieged, defenseless minority." The problem lies in the fact that the representatives of that galvanized community are the one's most responsible for the racism that permeated official policy throughout the 1990s. Their own political legitimacy stems from their close links to security structures set up since Milosevic's rise to power. The respected and innocent in this community have absolutely no power in a constructed world of polarities. In the political climate Kouchner has reconstituted, only extremism and their long-time proponents (who have nationalist thugs intimidating non-conformists) have found their way to influence. For all Kosovars to see Milosevic's former ally (Trajkovic) and the man who organized the cleansing of Mitrovica (Ivanovic) representing their "community" and invited to participate in the IAC, has greatly diminished the credibility Prishtina has among all segments of the population. Not only will "Serb" community leaders continue to block any significant efforts to stabilize the political environment (in spite of the "changes" in Belgrade in September of 2000), but, as has happened in Bosnia, their mere presence insults their victims' sense of justice.

The masking of all human activity in the discursive framework of ethnicity makes it impossible for individual communities, which never constituted a single "Albanian" unit, to represent themselves outside the parameters of their assumed "ethnic" identity. This is extremely important in Kosova for UNMIK has

taken a position of institutional management that requires a rigid "restructuring" of political life along these same "communal" lines.²⁸ UNMIK and its appointed administrative leader, Bernard Kouchner, have mobilized a rhetoric of liberal democracy through institutions that operate on the grounds of these ethnic divisions. The institutional structure of such a redefining of Kosova and pervasive efforts to MAKE Kosova "tolerant" and "democratic" speaks directly to notions of governmentality that are embedded in modernity and are far more authoritarian than acknowledged.

What is happening is traditional resources of problem-solving that were dispersed locally are now being appropriated by Prishtina and distributed to pliable "partners" who are eager to maintain a good standing with UNMIK and thus the spoils of power.²⁹ The inherent diversity of Kosova's political, cultural and economic life is being reduced to fit manageable boundaries for administrative purposes. The consequences of this is a long and drawn out continuation of UNMIK's presence in Kosova, creating a level of dependency reminiscent to African societies that have been reduced to semi-sovereign entities dependent on a UN bureaucracy that is corrupt and incompetent.

Conclusion

It is individual Kosovars' identity as an "Albanian" today, as in April 1999, that determines their relationship with the international community and the organizations they administer. From how money is allocated to bureaucratic attention, ethnicity has dominated UNMIK Kosova. In Kosova, "Albanians" are held collectively responsible for acts of violence conducted by individuals against other "ethnic" communities. "Albanians" are to fill quotas while seeking jobs, they make claims for property and education for their children as members of an ethnic community, something well beyond their historical experience as members of far smaller communities or their experience as individuals. In a process I term the internalization of marginality, the dynamics of Kosova's communal life, one which resisted Belgrade's colonialism for seventy years, is now reduced to a collective unit based on an uncritical use of notions of ethnic identity, an identity that very strategically at once distinguishes the Western, democratic and rational "peace-maker" from the crudely put, savage Balkan ethnics.

What is significantly transformed since the period of early modernity is the globalization of contingency which is manifested in the realities competitive imperialism instill on social spaces, which, again, are forces at work in Kosova today. Kosova has become a space of contention, the center piece where boundaries are delineated conceptually, or as in the late Ottoman period, by commissions usually drawn by men who have never seen (or even heard of) the places under consideration. These forces create a series of pressures for closure in imperial/state politics that were and are being articulated most effectively in the form of one's supposed collective identity. By globalizing the contingencies of communal life, there was/is an intensified pressure to preserve the appearance of internal consistency and order which thus requires the leveling of internal contradictions that have historically characterized the region's heterogeneous population.

The UN "state" becomes not only the monopoly of coercive power but it may more effectively be characterized as the ultimate agency of self-conscious and collective political action. Other institutions and affiliations, such as family, corporations, crime rings, religious entities, regional groupings, racial divisions, and gender identifications provided in the past alternative sites of identification and produced aggregate social effects through their actions and transactions. In the Balkans of the international community's vision, it is the state that has become the official center of self-conscious collective action and it is largely responsible for setting the terms for any other affiliation. The state operating in Prishtina today is the institution of last recourse and highest appeal, the one that symbolizes the collective identity of Kosovars in ways antithetical to their largely localized memories. The social categories set by UNMIK behind, in particular, ethnic categories—Serbs, Albanians, Gorans and Roma—supersede the importance of family, parish, market or region. The state asserts the conditions for collective identity to be expressed.

As for those young people on the bus in April of 1999, their "return" to Kosova since the end of the war has been scarred by new determining vocabularies they learned as people with no other identity than as Albanian/Refugee. I have kept in contact with only three of them, their village in the Suha Reka valley is yet to be rebuilt and everyone has been scattered in search of shelter, a means to earn a living. This post-

war trauma has only been exaggerated by the persistent categorizations that instrumentalized them for the International Community's purposes. Not much has changed since the days of March in 1999 when masked men came to their village and expelled them, en masse, from their homes. These human beings still are not permitted to articulate individual needs, claims and positions; a state and a discursive rigidity has confined them into collectivities that are impossible to escape.

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Notes

¹Without these temporary identity cards, people who were stripped of everything by Serb forces had no way of proving they were from Kosova. The strategy is transparent and despicable in its simplicity. Since the project started, any number of Serb nationalists, even the recently elected President, Kostunica, has been quoted by saying there is no way of knowing how many "Albanians" were in Kosova before the war and consistently give a lump sum of "one million," half what most people agree lived in Kosova before March of 1999. That Macedonia participated in this policy under the eyes of the international community is one of the many untold crimes of the war.

²By international community, I do not wish to suggest it is a monolith. There is enormous diversity within this rubric that in the case of Kosova, has often quite opposite views as to what should be done, including the final "legal" status of Kosova.

³Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak discusses this process of distancing from the self as one is being attributed universalist identities.

⁴Ardian Vehbiu's study has provided a troubling demonstration of the Italian media and how it has represented Albania in face of its experience of migration since 1990.

⁵In Turkey today, possibly the most popular performing artist, Candan Erçetin is of Albanian origin, but the politics of identity would penalize Ms. Erçetin if she stressed that heritage. She therefore has suppressed her heritage, failing to provide a sense of communal pride and even serve as a bridge between Turkish society and its colorful multi-ethnic reality.

⁶See "Main Tasks" in www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo12.htm

⁷IAC divisions are distributed to "the political parties" of Kosova, most of which are only focused on securing favor in Prishtina. See

www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/reg_s.html

⁸Michel Foucault has been the most widely identified voice in exploring this aspect, see Burchell, et. al.

⁹Chaim Kaufmann's articles exemplify the conceptual assumptions concerning identity among many authors on the region's recent past (i.e. 1996).

¹⁰The check list of councils and advisory centers set up by the OSCE, the "lead organization for the institution-building tasks of UNMIK" are impressive. The underlying thrust of their "mission" is "to promote the development of a mature, democratic society." The following will suggest these self-affirming goals are burdened with powerful assumptions about what Kosova is and what needs to be done for its inhabitants. See the OSCE's Mission in Kosova website: www.osce.org/kosovo.

¹¹See "Ethnic Rioting Eases in Flashpoint Kosova City," Reuters, Feb. 23, 2000.

¹²These two administrative entities have been given separate, but often overlapping duties which has led to debilitating clashes in which I have personally been involved. The underlying positions of both autonomous agencies (they are responsible both fiscally and bureaucratically to two entirely different entities) can be summarized in their respective web sites: www.osce.org/kosovo and www.un.org/peace/kosovo.

¹³The International Crisis Group in a report dated August 31, 1999 comes to the same conclusion. See www.crisisweb.org/projects/sbalkans/reports/Kos27rep.htm#3

¹⁴The process formally ended in September. An entirely civilian structure has been created, subsequently, to provide positions for some 3000 former members, the Kosova Defense Force (TMK in Albanian). See how the transition was articulated by the KLA in Pasqyra, (Nr. 12, September, 23-30, 1999), 22-25.

¹⁵For a chronology see UNMIK press release, September 21, 1999.

¹⁶The process formally ended in September. An entirely civilian structure has been created, subsequently, to eventually provide positions for some 3000 former members. See how the

transition was articulated by the KLA in Pasqyra, (Nr. 12, September, 23-30, 1999), 22-25.

¹⁷The OSCE has also initiated a project to train a local (depoliticized and ethnically-mixed) civilian police force. Much like its other endeavors, the lack of funding has greatly hampered such projects.

¹⁸The situation for the 2000-2001 winter is even more serious as a result of most funding being allocated to Serbia and "minorities" in Kosova. According to unpublished sources, there are still "three to four hundred thousand people in Kosova who do not have a home." A staggering 20% of the "Albanian" population in Kosova will live through another Balkan winter under plastic sheeting. One wonders why resentment is rampant. Personal conversation, Prishtina 2 October, 2000.

¹⁹It is the UN's dirty little secret that the widely publicized trade in women and drugs are largely meant to service the more than 50,000 foreigners who make their living administering Kosova.

²⁰Of course, in the America Toqueville visited, there were not bands of paramilitaries and tens of thousands of special police and soldiers that persecuted policies of hatred.

²¹The data bears this out, Kosova is an impoverished, dependent land, no longer capable of feeding, clothing or developing itself. One aspect which none of these reports reveal, is the dramatic shortage of cash among the hundreds of villages that fed both resistance to Belgrade and potentially UNMIK. Without money, people have to abandon old patterns and seek out new channels of survival.

²²It is telling that as the failures of Kouchner's policies have come to mount and Belgrade is exerting more and more influence on the "Serb" minority, UNMIK is very careful today to emphasize the individual nature of the acts of violence perpetrated against "ethnic" enemies. Read the telling shift in rhetoric over the last month in KFOR's daily press conferences which in the past said simply Albanians now uses "individual Albanians." See www.kforonline.com.

²³For the period between July and September of 1999, I conducted numerous interviews among UNMIK officials and attended the daily press-briefings held at KFOR HQs in Prishtina. See respectively the archives of

www.kosovapress.com and www.nato/kosovo/press/1999 for sporadic, poor transcriptions of the question and answer periods.

²⁴This was reiterated during a visit by Kofi Annan to Prishtina, whose insensitive, almost arrogant refusal to discuss anything beyond Kosova's continued attachment to Serbia, had incited weeks of angry editorials in local media (Shala 1999).

²⁵The OSCE has only opened a NGO Council of local NGOs and established guidelines for NGO registration in late January, 2000, a good seven months since the international community has taken over distribution of goods and services in the country. In the interim period, local NGOs were largely shut out of operations (OSCE Mission 2000).

²⁶The fact that his advisors escorted Kouchner that very day for photo ops in Prkaz (only "Albanian" reporters were notified) indicated the power of imagery they wanted to maintain and avoid a major embarrassment with locals.

²⁷The growing number of "war diaries" among the politically wishful have led to a sharp rise in marking loyalty on the basis of participation in the war for liberation (i.e. Hamzaj 1999).

²⁸See "Main Tasks" in www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo12.htm

²⁹IAC divisions are distributed to "the political parties" of Kosova, most of which are only focused on securing favor in Prishtina. See www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/regulations/regulations.html