ENDANGERING MASCULINITY IN KOSOVA: CAN ALBANIAN WOMEN SAY NO?

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“We have become a singularly confessing society...one goes about telling, with the greatest precision, whatever is most difficult to tell. One confesses in public and in private, to one’s parents, one’s educators, one’s doctor...in pleasure and in pain, things it would be impossible to tell anyone else, the things people write books about.” (Foucault, 59)

In the recent war in Kosova, repeated almost in the same manner as in Bosnia and Croatia, sexual violence was used as a means of genocide. The mass rape of Albanian women by the Yugoslav Army, and Serb police and paramilitary forces, has again confirmed the conclusions “that rape is more then a war crime, it is a weapon of war” (West, ed. 65). As it is well know sexual violence during armed conflict is not a new phenomenon. In her book Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape, Susan Brownmiller presented stark accounts of rape and other sexual atrocities that have been committed during armed conflict throughout history. A turning point was made in the early 1990s as a result of sexual atrocities committed during the wars in Bosnia & Hercegovina and Croatia, and it seems that the issue has emerged as a serious agenda item of the 'international community', and of women's and feminist groups and movements. The main difficulty has been not only to explain how and why this takes place, but also how to construct theories and projects which allow greater agency on the part of women to give their own meanings of identities effected by violence. It is important to remember that wartime politics of identity are based not on choice but absence of choice, not on negotiations but on survival, and it must not be forgotten “that violence is that missing link between discourse and dying” (Povrzanovic, 153).

My aim is to attempt to account for the effects of sexual violence in Kosova by considering the social and cultural context, the representations and constructions of political subjects as gendered and as “ethnic”, which make rape such an effective weapon in war. By considering the important issues of representation and national and gender identities in Kosova, I wish to argue that violence and domination become embodied by both men and women, and practiced in everyday life. My concern for this issue is multifaceted. As a student of anthropology I believe it is necessary to ask the question why there emerged a need for the anthropology of Eastern Europe, especially “after the fall of communism”, and how various feminists have theorized Southeast European women and men as political and analytical categories. On the other hand my concerns are informed from my position as an Albanian/Kosovar/East European woman. At conferences I can present the most abstract theoretical paper and still the question which is asked is: “So how are things for women in Eastern Europe?”

In the past years many ‘western’ anthropologists working in Eastern Europe had turned towards a policy oriented, can-do science-a concern with practical economic and political questions-while neglecting social and ideological concerns. The sub-textual theme has remained: Eastern Europe as a thing apart, an utter other (Kideckel, 1998), while the complex position and work of local scholars, writing about their “at home”, has been reduced to one of readily accessible, polite, English-speaking natives. Although this is a much more complicated topic for discussion it informs the major considerations of this paper where I aim for a strategy that refuses teleological narratives, which rely on dichotomized explanation of time, space and identity. As Haraway argues feminist accountability requires a knowledge tuned to resonance, not to dichotomy (Haraway, 588).

Attempting to explain why and how rape has been so effective as a means of
genocide in the Yugoslav wars involves theorizing constructions of womanhood and manhood, which can be specific to the ethnic groups involved, and realizing that gender identities have been constructed as playing a functional role for the grander politics of nationalism. Arguing against notions of essentialized and eternally juxtaposed “ethnic groups”, and without any intention to minimize the social dangers of nationalism, it becomes crucial to understand how each group narrates, imagines, and practices its own national story and identity. As Povrzanovic has shown war induced essentialism is part of an imposed process of identity formation (Povrzanovic, 154). Pre-war circumstances are blurred with experiences of the war violence, and the supposed reconciliation (and opposition to reconciliation) which needs to take place at the end of the wars, to create a coherent memory and identity out of one which is much more fragile and unstable.

**General Consequences of the Conflict**

The war in Kosova turned more than a million people into refugees, killed thousands, and resulted in rape, torture, separation of families, and widespread physical and psychological trauma. After more than a year of armed conflict between Yugoslav Army (VJ) and Serb paramilitary forces with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and three months of NATO bombing, approximately 70% of the Albanian population had been either displaced within Kosova (500,000 to 600,000 people) or had fled as refugees to other countries (780,200 people). Since July, when NATO forces entered Kosova, more than 810,000 people have returned to Kosova after residing in camps or with host families in Albania, the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro (Yugoslavia), Bosnia and Herzegovina and other countries. A recent assessment, undertaken in 450 villages affected by the conflict, showed that 50,000 homes were destroyed or are inhabitable. Although there is increasing disagreement over the number of deaths various estimates place the number between five to ten thousand with almost the same number of those who are still in jails in Serbia. The Serbian and Roma population is now the target of reprisals and is forcefully being made to leave Kosova by Albanian Kosovars.

With the end of the war two main international institutions, NATO and the UN, have been primarily in charge of administering and creating an interim-government of Kosova. The combination of Albanian, Serb and international representatives in government is also a particularly important site where national(ist) politics on the one hand, and “democracy building measures” on the other, often contradict and create a particularly unstable reality in Kosova. During the ten year ‘status-quo’, and repression by the Serbian state, many argued Kosova played the role of a huge NGO providing for checks and balances to Serbian state hegemony. Now Kosova has become one of the main places where NGOs and various agencies work to “build a democratic civil society”, where so-called ‘gender issues’ have taken a leading role. As civil society continues to be seen as the main prerequisite for Kosova’s transition to democracy, judgments made about women’s status, roles, and the whole range of factors that go into gender politics, are used as markers on a barometer of Kosova’s progress. Gender is nonetheless seen as synonymous with woman, and so the opposition to the current gender inequalities are leaving men outside of these debates sometimes so narrowly constructed that they pose relative opposition to the practices of men.

**In Honor of the Nation: Imagining the rape victim**

As it has been argued violence against women is not restricted to war; it is known that its roots are well established in peaceful times and thus the use of sexual violence against women in times of war cannot be understood without understanding preexisting socio-cultural dynamics. As anthropologist Gail Kligman has argued “political self-determination in the region [Easter Europe] has always been linked to the control of women’s bodies. That was true for the communists, and it is true for the regimes that have followed them.” Thus a discussion of sexual violence that occurred in Kosovo would in no way be complete without a discussion of nationalism, whereas only a gendered perspective (one which links sexuality to national identity) can adequately ascertain for women as agents in shaping and defining the condition of post-war Kosova and not just bystanders, or symbols of traditional life whose roles are created by masculine state/power politics. As constructs both “nation” and “gender” are arbitrary but through their utilization in social life they become real and seemingly natural; both are basic means for social classification. What is here necessary is to understand how these, “nation” and “gender”,...
intersect and implicate one another (see Verdery, 1996).

Under Yugoslav state-socialism gender inequalities were officially said to have been resolved. The state legally was to provide equal employment, education, and participation at all institutional levels. Nonetheless as Renata Salecl has argued, “once patriarchal domination officially ceased to exist it also became officially invisible, which means it also became much more difficult to recognize its effects” (Salecl, 370). In same way as nationalism which did not officially exist, but nonetheless remained at work in a concealed way, “patriarchal domination, although officially overcome, remained a surmise of political discourse” (Salecl, 37).

Yugoslav federal laws reflected these arrangements and where highly selective based on national lines. Laws on abortions, for example, usually favored legalization in Kosova, while at the same time curtailing abortion in Serbia by creating welfare incentives (Morokvasic, 1998; 75). Kosova nonetheless continued to have the highest birth, but also infant mortality rates in Europe. The rate of population increase, based on 1987 statistics, was 24.7 per thousand with an annual population growth of 2.4% (Reineck). Today the average age of Albanians is twenty-four, making them the youngest ethnic group in Europe. As Janet Reineck has shown, in her study of gender relations in Kosova’s villages, high birthrates in Kosova have been maintained as a complex of multiple coping strategies to resist and modify the economic-political environment. During Ottoman rule each family was obligated to give one son for military service thus demanding women to bear as many children as necessary to provide heirs for the family. Large family units have also been maintained to provide labor for agricultural production, provide care for the elderly, and to maintain a “balance” due to the migration of men for labor in western Europe (Reineck).

As Serbia continued to have decreasing birth rates, something both doctors and politicians in Serbia coined as “the white plague,” Albanians were accused of coercing women to maintain high birth rates- “multiplying like rabbits”. In what also became a struggle for political power between Serbia and Kosova to define welfare, family planning, and the health system two very contradictory rationalizations emerged. Serbia’s perceptions of a growing Albanian threat was directly linked to this demographic, resulting in representations of Albanians as backward. Being that the Albanian population is predominately Muslim, Islam was seen as the cause of this resulting in racialized representation of Albanians and Bosnjaks (Bosnian Muslims). It also became a direct comment of Serbia’s ‘progress’ in terms of gender equality. Albanian discourse, which attempted to hide men’s control over women’s reproductive choice, relied on nationalist explanation. As one of Reineck’s informants noted “We’ve always been too busy struggling against political oppression and poverty to worry about the emancipation of women and other issues of change” (Reineck). The national cause for independence took precedence over any attempts to contest this situation. The woman’s role would be to ‘reproduce’ the nation, in all the ways Anthias and Davies have noted, against the perceived Serbian threat. The ‘traditional Albanian family’ would be the main pillar of the national project because it was seen as a particularly important asset to Kosovar ‘cultural uniqueness’ which separated it from its Slavic neighbors.

This expression of nationalism has also been connected to an acceptance of the inevitability of (vuajtje) suffering. Albanians cope with marginality by cultivating their identity as an oppressed people. As a key element in the "discourse of identity," persecution may be interpreted, Herzfeld tells us, ideologically as well as literally (1985:21). Albanians accentuate an ideology of persecution in order to transform the inferiority associated with marginality into a sense of superiority associated with uniqueness. They counter this debased status by defending their collective worth on the basis of racial purity, moral uprightness, and as the keepers of a tradition uncorrupted by the breakdown of gender barriers and the individualism found among their neighbors (Reineck).

As Ana Maria Alonso has argued, constructions of gender and sexuality have been constant factors for the formation of ethnic and national subjectivities and collectivities. The technologies of what Foucault has called bio-power wielded by the state have had different consequences for men and women, for homosexuals and heterosexuals, for ethnic minorities and majorities. The ultimate means of control by states and organizations has thus involved control over the bodies of their subjects. And as Salecl has observed, because of Yugoslavia’s ‘hidden patriarchy’ “it was not difficult for the post-socialist moral majority to
articulate patriarchy in a new way: to present the return to “natural” sexual roles as an attempt to introduce morality in a previously “immoral” social regime, and to reinterpret the moral majority ideology in a nationalist way.”(Salecl, 37).

Once “The Breakdown” of Yugoslavia began national identities were being refuged in such ways that they also demanded a (re)creation of proper womanhood and manhood. This in turn required redefinitions of ‘tradition’. As Lass asserts this “depends on meaning-fulfilling acts through which tradition is concretized as part of the everyday…world.”(Lass, 456). As Lass states, an additional explanation should be added to this statement, whence in contrast to common understandings of tradition as the surviving past, as a relatively inert, historicized segment of social structure, it can be a very important part of how people see their future. Nationalism as a selective process depends on the mobilization of tradition which is concretized as part of the everyday spatio-temporal world (Lass1988, 456). Yugoslavia has provided the best example of the reversal, whence something which appeared as the most backward element, a left over of the past, emerges as the element of the future in the present context, as the premonition of what lies ahead. Williams who has argued for a much stronger definition states that “tradition is in practice the most evident expression of the dominant and hegemonic pressures and limits” (Williams, 1995:115). This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that what is identified as tradition is always already a selective process and one based on forgetting as much as it is about remembering.

The reconciliation of blood feuds in Kosova was exemplary of this process in which men’s traditional role to defend the honor of the family was explicited once again, but also redefined and extended to the whole nation. In the early 90s a retired folklorist Anton Qeta, supported by the whole Albanian political specter, began a huge campaign to reconcile blood feuds throughout Kosova. Blood feuds have been present in Albanian proper and Kosova for hundreds of years relying on the Cannon of Lek Dukagjiniiii, a prince from northern Albania, who enforced laws for the organization of property, family, with a specific morality which maintained the “patriarchal Albanian family”. Previously men were expected to defend their family’s honor by avenging the murder of their family member, and by extension protecting their authoritative role. Refusing to “revenge the blood” (“me hakmarre gjakun”) would mean to disgrace ones family, by failing to protect the interests of the lineage and the property (land, women and children), and would mean not to be a man.

It is important to note that the word for man which is “burre” in Albanian, also has the meaning of husband. Hence “mashkull” (man) and “burre” (husband/man) can be used interchangeably, but it is by way of this imagined relationship which the family that a man creates and observes his roles and can enact his masculinity/manhood. In this context enacting manliness, “burrerine”, requires the observance of familial hierarchy and values. When women were required to “revenge blood” they are said to have acted as a real “burre”, which does not denote masculine physical traits, rather manly characteristics such is the defense of honor (these representations are frequent in literature, poetry, public discourse, etc).

Lek’s laws, which have been cited and mis-cited by many, ranging from exceptionally romanticized representations to those which condemn its ‘barbarity’, have been reproduced in various texts, in the imagination, and practices of people, to provide a justification for the observance of many “wrongs” for the sake of the family and the nation. Nonetheless the reconciliation process, “Forgiving blood”, which could be seen as contradictory to this type of manhood and masculinity and tradition, was rationalized through a nationalist discourse which required men to be honorable and manly by forgiving for the sake of the a great family-the nation. In the mass gatherings which were organized hundreds of people gathered to ‘participate’ in the re-making of a new identity, it brought together a newly constructed ethos of forgiveness and the respect for the lives of “brothers”. The speeches made, and the media coverage, defined these moments as a step forward in the direction of civilized Europe; Kosova was to leave behind its “backward” traditions and this required men who were willing to forgive.

These social and cultural redefinitions, and the pledges which men made, did not require official or legal legitimacy because they relied on the men’s word to keep their promise. The concept of giving ones word, “besa” has always been of crucial importance in the ways Albanians have perceived and constructed their martyrs and heroes. It would be unlike an Albanian man not to keep his besa because it signifies his dignity and sacrifice. In what became the predominant
discourse whence men by being required to protect the well-being of the nation, they were ‘once again’ the central agents in this seemingly rational and linear narrative of national progress. Political and social conflicts then would have to be resolved on a basis of universal individual rights, by exercising and participating in the new transition to democracy. The whole process presented itself as both faithful to the perceived Albanian unique traditions of the past normalizing this redefinition of manhood, while at the same time creating a picture of future national stability.

Without wishing to homogenize an otherwise more complex picture of the creation of gender identities and their contestation in Kosova, I have here merely shown the forms dominant representations took. The manhood and masculinity of Albanian men was nonetheless being challenged not only from within Albanian society, but also by growing nationalism in Serbia. In Serbian mythology, as Salecl argues, the enemy is revealed to be impotent (Salecl, 81). Albanian men were portrayed as rapists of the Serbian nation (hence the discourse around the threat of Serbian religious and cultural monuments in Kosova) reinforced by allegations (in media and public opinion) of actual attempts of Albanians to rape Serbian girls. But more importantly these rapes were always attempted ones, and as Salecl argues “this portrait is based on the fantasy of the enemy’s impotence-the enemy tries to attack, to rape, but is confounded, as impotent, in absolute contrast to the macho Serb” (Salecl, 81). By extension it was to prove the strength and determination of Serbia to protect Kosova, the “cradle of the Serbian state and culture”, by presenting an impotent and weak enemy: the unmasculine Albanian man.

So while Kosovars continued to be “proud” of their non-violent resistance, by these means appealing to international public opinion and politics, there was also growing dissatisfaction with the “policy of waiting” for things to change. The non-violent resistance was seen as too passive by many and thus effected the growth of support for armed resistance. The Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) emerged as an important force to combat this picture of passivity, but also unmanly men who were not fighting with al means possible to protect their homes and families. The KLA first emerged in the Drenica region, which has had a long history of violent opposition to the Yugoslav (the first and second Yugoslavia) and Serbian state. The icon during the war was Adem Jashari, and the whole Jashari lineage, and now after the war streets, theaters, and buildings have been given his name as a celebration of not only his resistance to Serb repression, but also a ‘renewed’ Albanian masculinity. A whole myth has emerged, out the history of the family, exemplified by the way the family strategically send one son to western Europe to be able to continue the family line, while the four other brothers remained in Kosova to fight against Serbia. After thirty members of the family were killed Hamez Jashari has returned to Kosova to rebuild the family. This is a story now being preserved in various text and presents an ideological basis for the existence of the KLA. While most members of the KLA during the war were peasants who joined their ranks as an immediate response to Yugoslav Army offensives, while still remaining loyal to Rugova’s politics, it became the duty of every man to fight. Hundreds of Albanian men living in Europe and the US, many whom had left because of fears of conscription during the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, returned to fight and prove that “Kosova still has the men its history is proud of” (Koha Ditore, “The boys are coming back”, July 25, 1998, 1).

Many anti-nationalist feminists from all of Yugoslavia have developed an analysis following the typology explicated by Anthias and Yuval-Davis, focusing on the various ways women have tended to participate in ethnic and national processes and state practices. All of the successor republics of Yugoslavia, and now also Kosova, have also mobilized women into their national projects, most often by defining women’s roles as demographic and service (taking care of the wounded, refugees, and displaced persons, and holding family life together while men serve at the front). War rapes in Yugoslavia would not have been such effective weapons of torture and terror if it were not for concepts of honor, shame, and sexuality that are attached to women’s bodies in peacetime (Olujic). On the other hand rape has been effective in breaking up family cohesion and questioning the masculinity of Albanian men, not only because of the shame experienced by women once their chastity suffers (and is thus both a physical and moral attack), but because of the humiliation and dishonor of husbands, brothers, fathers, and sons who were not able to protect the victims. This particularly effected the representation of KLA soldiers who were thus unable to perform their roles.
A huge number of interviews with women give evidence that rape was also strategically organized to occur not only in seclusion but by having male members of the village and family witness the rapes (Physicians for Human Rights, 1999, 80-82). According to Olujic, in these circumstances women’s honor reflects that of men’s, which in turn reflects that of the nation (Olujic, 38). Women thus conceal the suffering to protect what would be the man’s public shame. At the same time rape as a means of ethnic cleansing is connected to the notions that the ethnic groups is characterized by a “pure bloodline”. Because decent and lineage is traced by the male (blood) line’ the purpose of rape, which might seem as contradictory to the imagination of a “pure” ethnic groups, was to “clean” women of their ethnicity and thus takes away the men’s ability to ‘reproduce’ the nation.

I would argue accordingly with anthropologist Marija Olujic that the final transformation (at the war’s end) “is the reformation of the social body back into the individual body, making the individual body once again the focus of dominance and aggression as the acceptable social “order” (Olujic, 1998). In war individual bodies become metaphoric representatives of the social body. Rape thus becomes an assault on both the individual and her family and community. As well as an attempt to dominate, humiliate, and control behavior while it disables the bonds of family and society and forces entire communities into flight. The honor/shame dichotomy is evident in the highly guarded aspects of women’s virginity, chastity, marital virtue, and especially fertility. For women, honor and shame are the basis of morality and underpin the three-tiered hierarchy of statuses: husband, family and village. Further medical, religious and government institutions reinforce the wartime process by manipulating the individual body into a body politic, thereby controlling and defining “human/life” and the political uses of rapes (Olujic, 46).

These categorizations-also in regard to research and/or ethnographic inquiry- should nonetheless also draw our attention to issues of methodology and epistemology (especially as these are sites where “east” and “west” are constructed). Janet Reincek in a her ethnography (1993) of Kosova villages states that:

“Personal and collective identity among Albanians has been forged primarily in terms of symbols derived from the past. The Yugoslav political regime discouraged the masses from eliciting their identity from a contemporary political agenda. Instead, the Albanians seized upon tradition as the guide to personhood. They appropriated history as a repository of sacred, ancient, "uniquely Albanian" values: honor (ndera), the oath (besa), hospitality (mikpritja), right conduct (sjellja) and identification with one's clan (fisi). Tradition is expressed in the observance of age and gender stratification, submission to the will of the collective, the restriction of women's movement outside the home, arranged marriages, inflated bride-wealth and wedding rituals, and, in some rural districts, the denial of secondary education to girls.

Though obedience to these doctrines varies in intensity from rural people living in extended families to the "elite" urban class, it is this set of attitudes that distinguishes Albanians from neighboring societies which have severed themselves more completely from the hold of pre-war values and customs.”

In just one paragraph we are given the complicated matrix, which is anything but homogeneous. The lived reality is not one which can explained by dichotomized notions which separate the traditional from the modern, the rural from the urban, masculine from feminine. Rather there is a breakdown of these in that in the signifying process we realize the existence of “hybrid identities” (Gupta, 1998)-an alternative modernity, which demands a better understand of culture as a meaningful continual process which is always being negotiated and contested. In Kosova pertinent sites for investigation where opposition can be found can no longer be separated according to place (village vs. city) one has only to take under account the massive restructuring of the population after the war; households or whole villages where only women exercise power since they have lost all the men in the war and/or because they are working abroad. New economic constraints may have the effect of running counter to not only official policy but also social values of far longer standing.

Numerous scholars have engaged in analyzing, often through very different theoretical frameworks, the continual (re)creation and manipulation of the “public” and “private” spheres (Denich 1990; Verdery 1996; Herzfeld 1990; Salecl 1994) by women in Eastern Europe. One process nonetheless has remained fairly unexamined-the discursive practices of not only women who are intellectuals, political activists or some sort of official representatives of a specific
Silence, as Susan Gal has argued, can be seen as one of the many strategic actions/"choices"/responses and can have different meanings within specific institutional and cultural contexts. (Gal, 1990; 176). These meanings are not always stable, nor passively reproduced and accepted by speakers. The various links between linguistic practices, power and gender are themselves culturally constructed but speakers do not necessarily follow cultural dictates. While this Silence can be seen as a reflection of the patriarchal order it is also constituting a new one and is indexical of the larger system of inequality. Control of the representations of reality is not only a source of social power but also a likely locus of conflict and struggle (Gal, 1989; 348). The reluctance of women to speak about their experiences can thus be seen as accepting but also negating “talk” and “consciousness” as synonyms. The institutions and various spaces (hospitals, media, health centers etc.) which are persistently demanding the need that “Albanian women speak out”, transform the meanings of articulation and are “techniques” that “have become the generalized and diffuse means of exercising power through judgment, categorization, surveillance, and documentation of individuals and populations.” (Gal 1989; 353).

If “voice” is the ability to articulate one’s own representation it would seem ‘natural’ that “silence” is the failure to produce one’s own significant discourse. Without feeding into the romanticized notions of matriarchy the power which women have been able to strategically exercise in the private sphere has always presented an important site for resistance. In a way that Foucault has argued in regard to this question: “points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single focal point of great Refusal…Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case.”(Foucault 1980: 96) Thus it is crucial to examine current conceptualizations of the private, the public, and the way “nature” and “work” (labor) has been used as a political category in the region. This conflict is apparent in Kosova today between official political structures, which ignore a discussion of male domination and sexually abused women, and various women’s centers, NGOs, political activists, etc. While in Bosnia & Hercegovina and Croatia rape was manipulated to entice Western military intervention (Scheper-Hugher and Lock 1987) in Kosova Albanian political structures have tried to ignore the reality. In Serbia and Croatia as well, Dubravka Zharkov has shown through her analysis of government controlled media, that various textual strategies were used to exclude certain “sexually violated bodies” from territories where they did not belong, a “sexual geography of ethnicity” (Zharkov in Hayden 32:2000).

On the other hand western discourse, whether it is one of development, civil society, democratization etc., engages in a process for legitimizing its own repressive hierarchies. The “traditional” is distinguished as being outside of and resistant to the “modern”, i.e. backward. These perceptions are very much a part of
policies of international institutions which position subjects in a homogenized narrative of economic development. This backwardness becomes more directly a form of contemporary identity where the realities of poverty (classified as underdevelopment) are internalized by women and become subjective experience of the self. As a new social order and different identities are constituted the particular role and influence of various international institutions requires special attention. With the new international UN administration, the influx of numerous quasi and non-governmental organizations and the building of a new ‘state’/civil administration gender roles inevitably will be altered (some pertinent areas of influence will be family planning, women’s health, economic independence etc). The frameworks, which are being created, will position women as new subjects (citizens-which still remained a male project, mothers etc.) whose roles in society are being redefined.

In order to envision and successfully define these processes it is important to remember that state socialism was not clear of organizational structures besides the family and the state. There was a whole range of informal but essential non-state organizations related to the state bureaucracy, medical care, and economy. (Gal 1977, Salecl 1994, Verdery 1996). To this list I would also add the various avenues for art production (music, theatre etc.), which intersected with an increasingly growing and diverse market. It is impossible that the kinds of negotiations which occurred in these emergent practices provided for alternative articulations. These new (re)definitions are essential in understanding the new state and nation building processes which are being (re)created in Kosova and the region. Shifts in gender relations and the continuing subordinate position of women have in the past decade been considered possible to remedy through first socialist equality, and latter institutions of civil society. For the most part in Central and Eastern Europe civil society was seen as what these “societies in transition” were lacking and once it was achieved many of the problems would be resolved. Nonetheless the discourse of transition has recently engendered an excellent critique.”

When analyzed from the perspective of feminist theory, as Susan Gal has argued, civil society in the West or Eastern Europe is hardly a neutral space in which women can organize. (Gal, 1997; 43).

The disappointment that Western feminists experienced once they realized that feminist movements do not “naturally” emerge with the establishment of civil society, has added to the understanding that feminism is not an automatic reflex of gender identity, nor a necessary outgrowth of women’s opportunity to organize in response economic and political oppression. Many feminist theorists in Zagreb, Ljubljana, Belgrade and recently in Prishtina, have traced the pressures on women on increasingly nationalized civil society to fulfill the roles listed above as explicated by Anthias and Yuval-Davis. As Gal argues “we cannot assume that “woman” denotes an unproblematic, self-evident, political category, or that such a political category is stable across social formations.” (Gal, 1997; 32). In Kosova nonetheless the post-conflict discourse of various Western governments and numerous other institutions resembles that colonial and post-colonial discourse. This presents a particularly interesting matrix and as Hertzfeld has observed should be considered as part of the critique of Eurocentric ideas and teleological narratives that have served both to constitute and to stabilize the identity and hegemony of “the West.”

References


Notes

i See Povrzanovic 2000.

ii Maliqi, Shkelzen. Koha Ditore.

iii The canon was preserved in a oral tradition from the 15th century until it was written in the 1930s by Shtefan Gjeqovi.

iv As biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities; as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups; as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture; as signifiers of ethnic/national difference—as a focus and symbol in ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction, and transformation of ethnic/national categories; as participants in national, economic, political, and military struggles.(Anthias & Davis, 1989).

v In a seen from the movie “Welcome to Sarajevo” a group of Chetniks enters a UN bus, which, transporting children orphaned by the war to a safe zone, chose which children to take with them based on their last names on a list.

vi See Verdery 1996.