

Discussion

Fritz Breithaupt: My task as commentator is easy. These papers are very clear and powerful, they are an excellent introduction for us. But I won't simply step away at this point, because we have our rituals. And rituals of course have the wonderful function of suppressing futures. Our Workshop has a lot of ritual... and I have to complain heavily that we are not in our normal room [Editor's Note: the Distinguished Alumni Room was not available, so the first two panels happened in the IMU Maple Room], so it feels that our rituals are out of place. But we will be there again... tomorrow? At some other time in the future, at least.

One of our rituals is that the speakers don't actually get to speak. Or, they get to speak, but only after a long comment. I will try not to make my own comment too long, I will just summarize, introduce the authors, and then try to push the two papers together by bringing out one conceptual pair that they don't really use but that could be interesting for us which is the relation between the individual and the collective. To introduce the authors, I could just say that Daniel Fulda is the European equivalent of Rebecca [Spang]: look at them [Laughter]....He has written two books and edited another ten or twelve on subjects from cannibalism to the objects of the eighteenth century. The paper that we have read by him makes a very bold claim. It takes apart something that I had always taken for granted, the claim by Reinhart Koselleck that the idea of an open future comes only from the late eighteenth century, from the "Saddle Time" of the 1760s and 1770s. Daniel Fulda says "no," if you look at the early eighteenth century, you see many authors already have this idea ... Rebecca just asked us to pay attention to "genre," and if you look at the texts on which Daniel Fulda draws they are not just one genre, they are many genres. But they are all planning documents—the future is something that has to be planned.... The question I have is about causality. If the open future is there already in 1700, then what does that mean for the Enlightenment? I have always thought that first you have the Enlightenment, then the future can be open. But maybe it's the other way: maybe it's when the future isn't known, that then you can open your eyes and then there is Enlightenment. Koselleck says two things happen in the late eighteenth century: the future becomes "open" (that is, unknown and malleable) and the thinking of history itself changes. Suddenly there is a new idea that can weave history together as a narrative—not with a *telos*—but with narrative as a way of holding things together. Daniel splits these two developments: he agrees that the last happens in the late eighteenth century but the first, almost a hundred years earlier.... My question for him: Could it be that this open future began around 1700 as a collective venture, and that then (around the 1770s) this collective open future got folded back into the individual? It therefore became much more manageable because it was individual—or it was totalistic, it involved all of us, but *as individuals*—and so it wasn't something that we had to plan collectively any more. So that's a big question, but I think it's one that could interest all of us. Another overall question might be about affect. Was the open future "dark"—that was Rebecca's immediate thought—or is it something else? Is it maybe sometimes dark and sometimes not? When was it dark and when was it inviting?

Now I come to the second paper. Jonathan Sachs comes to us from Canada, where he is Associate Professor of English at Concordia University. ...He has published widely on time [lists article titles and books, including "The Time of Decline."] Like Fulda's paper, his paper is very clear. I will focus on the second part: the main argument is that the acceleration that we usually

associate with the period around 1800 is connected with the discovery of a new phenomenon, “slowness.” That modernity is about speed, but it’s even more about a recalibration between speed and slowness. ... The interesting thing is that he discovers in speed, moments of slowness. There is too much going on, we can’t register all of it, and so we become slow, stupid. Then there is the slowness of evolutionary processes that span enormous time periods... Jonathan suggests that Darwin may have been inspired by Wordsworth. So here, in Jonathan’s paper, it is a jump from the individual to the collective level. When we talk about Wordsworth’s depiction of the beggar, it’s an individual who moves slowly. But when we get to Darwin, to evolution, there is no individual who is slow. Every animal and so on may be moving quite quickly, it’s only for the observer—the second-order observer who wants to see change—that evolution is slow. ... This slowness only appears if you skip from the individual to the collective. How did the line between individual and collective become so thin, that it was something you could skip around 1800? Is it about new media, or is speed itself a medium?

So we will give you a brief chance to reply, but only brief, and then I will manage the slow and fast conversation around the room.

Daniel Fulda: Yes. Thank you very much for your very exact condensation of my paper. I agree with this completely. But I am not sure if there is really a shift toward individual future in the 1770s. Yes. You are thinking about novels, perhaps? In the German literature, *Bildungsromane*. Normally these novels don’t try to explore the way of the central figure into a wider future. Its central figures are young people, and when they marry, the story is finished, yes? I don’t see this, this...

Breithaupt: I was thinking...

Fulda: ... this direction onto the future in novels of the end of the eighteenth century. And on the other side... I think Condorcet’s piece, *Histoire tableau historique... Comment s’appelle exactement...* yes, “d’un Tableau”.... It’s a *picture* of the development of society as a whole and not the development of individuals. Therefore, I don’t agree with this idea that in the end of the eighteenth century, the perspective skips from collective future again to individual futures.

Breithaupt: Mmhmm. Mmhmm. Okay. I mean that the collectives become treated as individual; like the nation state becomes a subject. But...

Fulda: The nation state is an individual among other states. But it is a collective enterprise related to individuals, like you and me.

Breithaupt: Mmmhmm. Mmmhmm. I’ll respond later to that... [laughter] I want to open the floor. But first: Jon.

Jonathan Sachs: I’m not sure how much I want to add to what you said already. I think it’s a terrific summary of the two papers and a really nice way of thinking about how they might go together. I would add briefly to your suggestion that with the later part of the eighteenth century comes this transition from the individual back to the collective. There’s one other aspect of

Wordsworth's writing that I think is important to know, or think, about and that is the way that for Wordsworth—and in relationship to this jargon—this isn't only about the shift from say an individual beggar to the collective idea of evolution and species change, but also the way that, for Wordsworth, he's using individual examples to model for us modes of attentiveness that are meant then to be collectivized, right? He's giving us a way of attending to writing in his poetry that he hopes will be taken up by the larger and wider reading public at this moment. That's one thing that I would suggest.

The second thing is: I think we're going to be talking a lot about the "open future" over the next two or three days, and I want to add a little bit to that. You mentioned this article on "the time of decline," and I just finished a book on decline. One of the fundamental premises of the book is about the relationship between decline and progress in the eighteenth century. One of the things I think is significant about "the time of decline" is that what it does is (in fact) it closes an open future, and I wanted us to think a little bit about that. And I want to make a connection about that to raise a question from Daniel's paper—for all of us, really—which is: "Is the future left or right?" [laughter] No, what I found very interesting about the frontispiece that you use in your paper [Editor's Note: from Friedrich Gladov, *Versuch einer vollständigen und accuraten Reichs-Historie*, 1717] is that the future appears on the left; we would never do that, I don't think. Never. I mean, we're completely accustomed to time series, line graphs, and individual images in which the future always moves to the right. So um, that's one thing, the second thing I wanted to say...

The third thing (and this will be the last thing, because you asked me to be brief) has to do with dating time and origins, right? I mean this idea that what do you do Koselleck's argument that these big significant changes happen in the early 1770s... Well, if you push them back to circa 1700, instead of circa 1800, then what do you get; right? And I think what you get is a long and sustained argument that we will probably be having over the next few days... And you [to Daniel Fulda] have a very clear sense of the payoff... But I want us to think very carefully as well about origin stories and about the relationship between what might actually be conceived of as an origin and what might actually feel like an origin, right? Because anytime you talk about origins in the streets, somebody like Tony Grafton steps up and gives you seventeen examples from Scholasticism about things that happened [laughter], you know, hundreds of years before what you're saying happened at the moment that you're saying that it happens. But the other thing about that is that oftentimes novelty is not necessarily about whether something is actually new, but whether it feels new to those who are experiencing something. And so that's something I want us to think about in connection with this.

And for my own work, the project I'm starting now is in fact a project on slow time; so this article fits the transition between the two. And what's important for me there is the relationship between Koselleck's theory of acceleration and the emergence and development of geology and increasing estimates of the age of the Earth (of the sort of thing that Jesse writes about in his paper). And what I'm interested in there is the convergence of these two things, right: these longer estimates for the age of the earth, which would suggest how slowly time is moving; and this sense of acceleration, which would suggest how fast it's moving. So when I was reading Daniel's paper, one of the things I kept thinking about was, "Okay, so if we push Koselleck back, what does that do for that convergence? Does that matter or not?" I don't know, I'll be

thinking about it a lot over the next few days and I'll be curious to hear what others say. I'll leave it there. Thank you.

Breithaupt: Excellent. Well, this is the moment that you all should raise your hands if you want to speak—Jesse was very quick here—but I will take names now quickly. So Jesse will go first, but who wants to be on the list?

Rebecca Spang: Um...*Rachel* will go first. [Editor's Note: Students jump the queue.]

Breithaupt: Ah, yes, it's true... Trumping over here... [laughter] So Rachel will trump Jesse... But who else wants to...? Okay, good. Rachel, you go first.

Rachel Seiler-Smith: I feel so powerful being trump. I just had a really quick question for Daniel, and forgive me for its particularity. But you were pressing against Fritz's argument by reading the novel and marriage as a foreclosure of futurity, whereas I always understood marriage to be a marker of futurity (or a promise of it) through reproduction. So I was just wondering: even if the novel closes, the idea is that a futurity lingers in union. I guess this is what I wanted to ask... about generationality in that sense, then.

Fulda: Yes. The novel which I had in mind is *Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre*; it's the most important novel in German literature, in perhaps of all literature. And the main figure comes to a marriage at the end of the novel, but he already has a son. And the new element in the marriage, becoming...—excuse me [inaudible in German]... “making children,” yes? [laughter] — will not happen in this completely new way in this novel because there is still the child of the main figure. But normally you are perfectly right. [laughter] And the young son is named “Felix”: from “into the future” or “for the future”...

Breithaupt: Jesse.

Jesse Molesworth: Jon, I'm actually going to lay down the gauntlet here...

Sachs: So early... [laughter]

Molesworth: You know, I love that you're going after Koselleck and Virilio and all these big people. From my perspective—working on the novel, I mean—this argument about slow time seems incredibly obvious. You know, I just hear Franco Moretti, you know, sort of lecturing, “The eighteenth century novel: incredibly fast paced; all hinge points, no filler. The nineteenth century novel: all filler, no hinge points. The novel slows down from the eighteenth century to the nineteenth century.” And for him, you know, it has nothing to do with the acceleration of print, media (you know, the way you're understanding this) ... For him, it's simply bourgeois experience: our lives move in a different sort of temporal rhythm; our lives are inoculated against catastrophe by things like insurance and modern medicine and so forth. You know, I just wonder how does Wordsworth comes to this privileged stature for you? I love what you do with the slowness of the beggar in some ways, but...

Sachs: Yeah...

Molesworth: Why can't we do that with, say, Lizzy Bennet, mulling over her thoughts in her boudoir; why can't we do that with Dorothea Brooke; why can't we do that with Emma Bovary? The novel slows down! I mean, it's incredibly obvious. [laughter]

Sachs: Or does it? I mean: *Clarissa*. Is *Clarissa*...? *Clarissa*'s pretty slow to me.

[extensive laughter, inaudible comments between Sachs and Molesworth]

Sachs: There's a larger point here too that gets into some of the work that Tina has been doing, and that has to do with the actual experience of reading: the fact that reading itself takes time, right? It's another element of this slowness.

Molesworth: Right, right...

Sachs: And so in part, it's difficult for me to speak to the promise of a future project that hasn't yet really developed its substance and its teeth yet. But in part, you know, one of the things I'm interested in is the relationship between this problem of speed and slowness in poetic form, and so in that sense it doesn't have to be something that is exclusive to the novel or exclusive to narrative. It just happens to be that the way my own thinking has developed, I've become less interested in narrative and fiction... in part because they just take too much damn time to read. [laughter] And in my eagerness to do readings and to develop ideas, I've found that it's easier for me and more interesting for me to work with poetry. I've got a lot shorter attention span as I get older...

That's a joking response to your question. But as a more serious response, right... I mean, the specific kind of slowness that I'm talking about here is the relationship between, in my case, poetry (we could say "this wider context of literature") and the development of geology and the new model for slowness that we're getting from geology and natural history. And I do think that that is what forces me to do this project as a late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century project. So in that sense, right, you could talk about the slowing down of the nineteenth-century novel, but part of what I would suggest is that the lexicon for thinking about that slowness is something that is mutually developing between different discourses and different kinds of knowledges. And we do have people who have done excellent work—some of them in this very room—on the relationship between narrative fiction and geology. And that's what I would want to insist on for that kind of time.

Breithaupt: Taking notes here on who's speaking... Yes, we actually have a couple of hooks now. So can you show that [hook gesture made with finger] again to model this for everyone? Look at Monique, what she did... She did a hook, and there's another one here. I'll hook you both back-to-back here... Maybe in that case because it's a hook, you three do back-to-back and then it goes back to Jonathan.

Monique Morgan: I also had a question about the sort of privileged place of Wordsworth in your piece, which was brilliant and I greatly appreciate it. But you do acknowledge that you take the term “slow time” from Keats, from “Ode on a Grecian Urn,” and you know Keats’ “Odes” are meditations on time in various forms. But I was thinking more of “Hyperion” and the Miltonic verse, and the description of—I believe, it’s Saturn—sitting there endlessly...

Sachs: Yes, and...

Morgan: So I guess my question is: how pervasive do you see this “slow time” among the Romantic poets? Or is Wordsworth really exemplifying it in a specific way that allows you to link into geology...?

Sachs: Ultimately this...

Breithaupt: Ah, ah...! [laughter] Tina is first... Short comments...

Christina Lupton: Okay, so I’m piggybacking on Jesse’s... I’m joining “Team Jesse.” Because I think that the performative element of the poem would, of course... One way of reading that through media history would be to suggest that poems participate in a quickening process by offering themselves up as formally limited experiences. As opposed to novels, which, if they are applying the brakes in some way, do that all the way down, at every level of their own structure, which would support Jesse’s argument. So I guess I’d like you to respond a bit more on that; you got off too easy. [laughter]

Sachs: Okay. I’ll go from Monique to Tina. In answer to your question about whether this is a Wordsworthian project: it most emphatically is not. And in fact one of the things I’m trying to do is to re-conceive Romanticism. I mean, I want to ask what happens when we think about Romanticism as a problem of pace, right? What happens when we rethink Romanticism not as a response to revolution, but as a response or aspect of evolution, right? That’s a slogan-y way of putting it. So it’s something I want to think about across the spectrum of Romantic poetry, and that I want to move backwards (as most of my work has been going back into the eighteenth century) to ask what in fact is different about the later part of the century. So that’s a short answer; I want to make sure we have time to talk about other things as well.

But in response to Tina’s question, and this idea of fiction... and poetry as being a short form, right... One of the things I think about in this context is someone like Vicesimus Knox: this late eighteenth century, you know... *Elegant Extracts*, right, where the idea, “I can save you time by taking all the good bits and putting them into one volume.” But the other generic implications of Knox’s argument is that he advocates for the essay, right; he argues explicitly and is in some ways writing against Newton. His basic point is: “Look, nobody has got time to read Newton. What we really need is this short, moral essay, that in the half-hour that commercial life allows you between your business and your children, you know... Take an essay, take half-an-hour to get something really moral out of it.” And the point here—your point—is that poetry fits into that, and I agree. But one of the things I think is also happening with poetry in the later part of the eighteenth century is that—because of the very problems of time that I’ve been writing about

and you've been writing about—one of the things that this issue of the press of time (in the sense of the haste of life) generates are questions and concerns about posterity and duration. And one of the ways for reading poetry that is being developed and formulated by Romantic writers is that, “Yeah, sure, you can read this in half-an-hour, when you aren't dealing with your kids and don't have any business to attend to. But what you really should do is quit your business, kick your kids out of the house, and spend the whole day reading this thing, because it has that much value.” So what I think is being modeled here and what is being suggested is an idea of certain kinds of writing—and with the fears of writing in Romanticism, this is largely poetry—as being that which endures; and which is worth your time if you don't have that much time; and that which you should attend to and read in a slower way. So I'll be interested to hear what people have to say about poetry and the novel in this context, but that's my initial gambit.

Breithaupt: Okay, so we have two more hooks, and we have a list of eight regular people. [laughter] So we'll do two hooks, and no one has really modeled a proper hook yet—we had the finger, but—a proper hook is like three sentences and then the person here in the front says, “Yes” or “No” [laughter]... or “I'll kick you later outside” or something like that. So we've yet to still practice that art. Max and Oz will do hooks right now, hopefully, and then we'll move down the list... Max.

Max Nagano: Yeah, so I'm kind of responding to Jesse's criticism of this project. I work a lot with geology, and my understanding of geology at this time is it allows people to gain understandings of basically nesting timescales; in the sense that you have geological time, you have timescales of populations, you have individuals, and then later we find out something like atomic isolations nested within individuals, or something like that... But the point is, you know... So I think it's a little different from the mere kind of experience of slow time, something more about... Particularly in the passage where you're talking about the beggar, where you see kind of different timescales (kind of). There's an interruption there between slower timescales and faster—an oscillation I guess... So I'm just wondering, and again this may kind of not be what you're talking about... When you're talking about this beggar, I think (you're on page 44 here)...I was kind of more interested in seeing if this is what you were talking about. Because you seem to be talking about a slow, labored reading of this passage, when to me this is really a kind of interruption of caesura—it's about different scales of time coming into conflict, and I wonder if you can speak at all to that?

Sachs: Is that the kind of question for a yes/no answer?

Breithaupt: [inaudible] We are slowing our roll, but we want real hooks that can be things that only make sense in that moment, so we'll still fiddle Oz into this idea...

Oscar Kenshur: That's right, but of course the moment was a couple of moments ago. [laughter] This is a quick comment that I would've expected Nick Williams to make with regard to the length of time (the duration of time) required by different genres. Think of Blake's *Milton*, or long Blake-ian poems that don't fit into that long/short paradigm.

Sachs: I'll try and integrate these both. Sorry, but when you say that Blake's poems don't seem to fit into the long/short paradigm, how do you mean that?

Kenshur: Well, we don't think of them as short, Romantic poems.

Sachs: No, but...

Kenshur: ... Or ones that you can squeeze into a half-hour.

Sachs: Sure, but nor for that matter would you make that argument for something like Wordsworth's "Prelude."

Kenshur: Right...

Sachs: And that's part of my point here. It's not that short poetry is fast poetry; this has very little, this has less to do with the number of lines on the page, right. It has more to do with the modes of attentiveness that are required to read them. And in that context, to read a short lyric like Shelley's "Montblanc" might take just as much time as it would take you to read a short novel like Goethe's *Werther*. (I am sure Germans would disagree.) [laughter] And I don't mean to make that an argument about the relative merits of those two works. But just that because of the kind of modes of attentiveness that poetry comes to see as required, it can take a very long time to read something very short. But, there was another... I'm sorry your name again was...?

Nagano: Max.

Sachs: Max. In response to Max's question about nested and layered timeframes: this is exactly what I'm pushing towards, right? And I hope that it is clear in the piece that that is what I'm after, right? That time is not experienced in a singular way as either slow or fast, but that what we're talking about here is a certain quality of heterochrony; but a heterochrony that is constituted through the experiences of multiple timeframes. And, in part, that those really long timeframes, and the idea that an event can play itself out beneath the level of observation, is something that I want to think about as potentially being new in the later part of the eighteenth century. Who knows, I may leave here in two days and say, "That was a terrible idea," and never write this book. [laughter] But I will push, and we'll see what people will say.

Breithaupt: Okay, I'll just read from the list who's on here, so if you're not on it but think you're on it, let me know. So I have as the next speaker, person on here is Helge; then I have Sarah; I have Joanna, then... Manushag?

Manushag Powell: Nush, yes.

Breithaupt: Nush. Okay, that's a little bit easier for me... David, John, and Richard. Did I miss someone? Okay. Helge...

Helge Jordheim: So I think we will spend a lot of time discussing “the open future,” so I thought I’ll just raise a question to that debate, I guess. Yeah. I think the way you put it at first, Fritz—moving from the collective to individual—that was exactly the opposite move that I thought you were going to do...but I think it’s right. I think actually that you move from this collective multiplicity of times and end up with Herder (for instance) doing the full genesis and the autogenesis and the [inaudible] *Zeit*, the “ages of man”—this is exactly what you’re getting to. And that fits so well with nationalist history writing and there’s something to be said for that. But that was not really my point.

My point was to say that the big question in many of these papers is: what’s the relationship between the idea of an open future and the idea of contingency? Start with contingency. So is that the same? If we... The way we can push the idea of the “open future” back is to say, “Well, it’s any unexpected thing, [that] is an indication of an open future.” So we can push it back to Machiavelli and the question of *fortuna* as open future, as you do with Castiglione; that’s when the strategical thinking of *The Courtier* is the open future. Going from Machiavelli, we would actually end up in Cicero in the end, with the Romans. [laughter] So I’m just wondering how far can we push this entanglement—this overlap—between contingency and open future? The thing that seems to... If we use Koselleck for this, we could say that, “Well, the thing that is not a part of contingency—a necessary part of the contingency argument—is the ‘new.’” I mean, Koselleck spends more time discussing the “new” than discussing “future,” in a certain sense. So the question is: Could it be that open future consists of two parts? One would be the part of contingency; the other would be the idea of the “new”, and related to the question of uncertainty and malleability. And that to think about the open future, at least in the Koselleckian sense, we need both? So we need the more radical idea of the “new” than what we find in Machiavelli and Castiglione and the advice literature. It’s contingency, yes; it’s *fortuna*, yes; but is it “new”? And how “new” must it be to be really, well, indicative of something “open”? I guess would be the question.

Fulda: The possibility of the “new” is strongly required for an open future; uncertainty is not enough. But I wrote in my paper (it was an important point) to distinguish between political foresight in Machiavelli and this *prudentia politica* for every man, which is not restricted to a small part of the society and, the second point, thinking of the possibility of the new. And I could add more evidence to this kind of historical moment (the early Enlightenment in these Protestant universities in Germany): the possibility of the “new” is emphasized—is emphasized. And on this point I agree with you.

I should answer your question about the two sides of the picture: the left side and the right side. I agree with you that normally for our modern consciousness, the left side is the older side, yeah? Every graphic of economic growth and so on in mathematics... But I don’t know any pictorial representation of history and of different time phases—time periods—where you can say: “There was the part of the past and there was the part of the future.” I only know one frontispiece before this frontispiece by Gladov where one can distinguish a past side and a future side, and there the future side is also on the left. There is a wagon, a [searches for word]...

Breithaupt: Carrier.

Fulda: ... Carrier with figures representing the four faculties of the university, philosophical faculty in the front—yeah?— the first one and they are driving ... there is an alternative: should they drive with *Esel* [donkey or ass]... What is *Esel* in English?

Breithaupt: Mule.

Fulda: Mule? Really? ... Should they drive with a mule to the right side into the past time of Scholasticism. Or should they move with the help of *historia* to the left side and the better future? The basic idea is similar to this frontispiece by Gladov—it is the same distinction between future and past, and right and left, like Gladov. But do you know any pictures with the other order of times? Yeah? You know one? [laughter]

David Alff: So my very short yes-or-no, hook question is... Just to say, I love what you did moving into seventeenth-century British discourse of political prognostication with Defoe... I wonder if you've looked at/thought about the literature on astrology and practical politics in seventeenth-century Britain? Because it seems to me the practice of astrology and the iconography of astrology might be very interesting in thinking about the open future, the closed future, and that third thing (which I think Jon actually might be talking about) the “mysterious future,” which a slow and interpretative attention might help one to appreciate, obey, enjoy.

Fulda: Do you think astrology is a good way of...

Alff: William Lilly is the major figure for this, any way.

Fulda: Mmhm. I have been concerned a little bit with astrology in Germany, but I don't know if there is any important difference. But this astrology tries to read the stars, yes? But the premise—premise?—is that the future might be read by the stars because the future is *not* open; there is a providence.

Alff: There's the astrological discourse, and there is the counter-discourse: the anti-astrologers and a working through of that, right, in this period...

Breithaupt: Helge had a hook as well.

Jordheim: This hook is just an ad for my talk tomorrow, actually... I will show you pictures of things where future is not on the right side: it's down; it's in the lower part of the picture. So the whole argument of left-to-right is based on the timeline; if you don't have timelines, if you have other kinds of spatial representation of time, then the future will be in other places.

Sachs: That's my point, though, is that I want to think about...

Jordheim: Yeah, I know.

Sachs: ... at one point do we start to get that orientation? And what causes it?

Fulda: I could refer to another frontispiece: it is the frontispiece of the last volume of the *Theatrum Europaeum*, the most important historiography (historiographical?)... Series of history books from... beginning in the 1630s and the last volume is of 1732. And there is a god, Janus—Janus?...

Spang: Mm-hmm.

Fulda: Janus and he is looking to both sides, literally, and the sides have changed, yes? It's our modern idea of going into the future on the right side. Fifteen years later...

Breithaupt: It feels like fifteen years later... Sarah, your moment has come.

Sarah Knott: Well it does feel later, and I wonder if this is not the time for an exercise in proliferating our categories, but maybe that's the sort of exercise we need to do in an opening session and think of it in the guise of that. So I wanted to move the discussion away a little bit from genres and disciplines to other eighteenth-century categories of analysis. Because it seems as if thinking about slowness and acceleration might be interesting in relation to a series of activities like society and culture and economy and polity, right, all of which were spheres identified by our eighteenth century (not just by ourselves retrospectively). So it seems as if there are other ways of parsing this (aside from genre or discipline) that might be provocative.

And I'm just going to play the historian's card also and say that thus far we have mostly been talking about an elite conversation, say, right? And it's one that sounds as if it's located in the commercialization of society, transmissions in print culture, and revolution, right: so grand stories and we're all comfortable with that in the eighteenth century. So what I'd like to lay next to those are colonization, mobilization, dislocation: other kinds of historical phenomena that would surely impinge on the stories that we want to tell about the eighteenth century's own story about its experience of slowness, acceleration, past-present-future...things like that.

Sachs: Is there a question there?

Knott: Well, I mean, there's a question about what balls are we throwing into the air, right, in terms of the categories with which we think eighteenth-century figures are themselves thinking through questions of past and future or slowness and speed. And my proposition was that they were thinking in terms of politics, society, culture, and economy. And the other question was about how we think historical phenomena outside of the immediate purview of the thinkers we've discussed so far—like colonization, mobilization, dislocation, right: going beyond European metropolises and the discourses produced in them to a much more globalized eighteenth century that we also know a lot about... Is there a way to bring the conversation we've had so far into discussion with that, those historical realities?

Sachs: That's a great question, and what I particularly like about it is that it, of course, seeds potential future conversations that we can have over the course of the next couple days. But what I'll say in response to it is that part of what I'm wondering about in relationship between these

questions about speed and slowness as they come to connect to this idea of eighteenth-century futures is: how do you parse the relationship between futurity and pace, right? What does pace do for us as a category of analysis, right; and is that contiguous with the problem of futurity? And so, if what... In my own little project, right, what I'm trying to ask is: what happens if we think about Romanticism through the question or problem of pace, right? But there is a bigger question here, right, which is how do questions of pace and speed and acceleration and slowness relate to the problem of the future? Because one of the things that the future raises is this question of "when," right? And we get this repeatedly in contemporary discussions about climate change, right. Is it too late? Have we missed the moment? Or is it going to be too late if we don't do something now? Or is this really just a problem for 200 years from now? I suppose my way of answering your question is: I think questions of pace, speed, and slowness are fundamental to a discussion of futurity. But I also think, along with you, that we need not restrict this to questions of poetry or revolution at all.

In fact, the big payoff that I'm trying to get to in this next book is to pressure the question or problem of rupture, right. That one of the things you get when you introduce slowness into the question of acceleration is you trouble stories of rupture and catastrophe and break. And that's what I would argue is important. Because for the other categories of analysis that you are introducing, I would argue that those problems are ongoing; they are neither ruptured into nor behind us. Anyways... I'll stop there.

Breithaupt: Joanna.

Joanna Stalnaker: Ok, so I'm hoping that this is now a comment that has turned into a hook. [laughter] So I was really interested in what you had to say about the dating of deep time. And I wanted to ask you a question about the specificity of some of those numbers when attempting to date deep time (or look for an origin for the Earth) in relation to possible efforts to date extinction in the future in a similar, specific way. So I've been thinking about this with respect to Buffon's *History of the Earth* where, you know, we have this strange sort of specificity of numbers that he gives, 74,832 years, whereas at the same time—which is on the basis of [inaudible] experiments about the history of the Earth—whereas at the same time in his private manuscripts, he's thinking, "It could be three million, it could be ten million." So why do you need such an incredibly specific number, whereas at the same time, it could be so far from the numbers he's actually thinking about? He also predicts in the future extinction through the progressive cooling of the Earth, but from what I've seen, at least for him, he doesn't ever try to date that future with the same degree of empirical specificity. So I'm wondering if you've encountered other examples of attempts to sort of use that sort of empirical specificity with relation to the future or dating the future?

Sachs: Great question. And the Buffon question is an open question, right; you know how Rudwick answers it?

Stalnaker: Yes.

Sachs: Rudwick wants to say that he's making these speculations public because he thinks that 75,000 or so years is more tenable to people's ears, whereas 3 million will just be untenable. I don't know. I want to hear what other people want to say about that claim by Rudwick. He's somebody whose work I have almost a pathological respect for [laughter] and don't want to trouble, but I would be interested to hear...

With respect to the dating of the future: I'll give two examples, both of which are very different, but which I've written about together in a piece that's about to come out in *Poetics Today*. One is: I've seen a lot of people writing about Anna Barbauld and "Eighteen-Hundred and Eleven", right, but what's interesting about that poem for me—especially in respect to Mercier's *2440*—is the way that in Barbauld's poem, the present is dated and the future is not. So we have a very clear sense that, at some point in the future, London will be in ruins; but we have no sense as to *when* at all. There's another poem that hasn't been much discussed, by this guy called Thomas Littleton that comes out in, I think it's... It's published in the 1780s, but I can't remember the exact date of it. At any rate, the point is that he dates... His poem is also similar to Barbauld in the sense that it's set in an imagined future of ruin. But it's dated at the portico of Saint Paul's in 2199, and it's a letter from one friend to another from the imperial capitol of Boston. [laughter] And what's ironic about this is—if I remember it correctly, the publication date is 1782. So you look at it and think "Oh, great, you know, he's worried about the American War and he thinks that now that the colonies have been lost, it's over." But Littleton actually wrote the poem in 1770, so before this war even broke out. But that's one example of a kind of forwardly-bounded future that imagines when it's going to happen. Whereas with Barbauld the only date you get is the present date, 1811; with Littleton, the only date you get is the future date. And like I just said, right, that plays into what the poem will be reflecting on, based on its publication, history, and its composition...

Breithaupt: We still have a whole half-an-hour, so I will use this moment as a short breather for all. And I will just give you some kind of discussions—I will just throw them out as big bubbles of things we've talked about so far. But we still have a full list of questions here. And I will just name the topics here that I've seen have had a lot of traction. One of them was the question of genres, or as Sarah called them "spheres," other—astrology is one domain of reasoning where things happen. The question is: do some spheres or genres move fast or slower; do they have different future senses or not? That was one discussion we've already started here. I don't think it's a discussion—no one has mapped this clearly for us, but it's a discussion. The second discussion that is in the room is the question of slowing down. Fiction is one thing that becomes slower in the nineteenth century, and it can become a deliberate attempt to slow things down. Jonathan called it a kind of deliberate attempt to counter, move against acceleration, and that was a discussion we had here also in terms of the large-scale novel—Jesse started that. That's a second, larger discussion I've noted here so far. There I think we've made some progress—appear to be a little further in that one. And then we have this interesting, new discussion here of *when* does the future start: when is the moment that this happens; can one date it; is there something about it where exactly it happens. Jonathan has also spoken up here as well. Then we have a lot of kind of individual, little ideas that will probably be picked up: we have Rebecca's darkness of the future; we have questions of the radical new, obviously; and a lot of different

other things. So those are little kind of baits for you to kind of hook up with larger discussion to try to bring us forward here. But we have a list of speakers here. So: Nush...

Powell: Thank you. Okay, I have a very quick comment for Jonathan and then a question that maybe will speak to both papers. I'm always very anti-authoritarian when it comes to genres—Jesse and I have butted heads—I don't give a crap about "the novel." If we're doing Romantic time, right, the name that's popping up for me, of course, is de Quincey. You want to talk about slow time? well there are his opium trips where a thousand years pass. But on the other hand, the English mail coach (where the speed is absolutely horrifying to him) leads to an existential crisis. Right? I assumed you had thought about that.

Sachs: Yeah, you got it. I mean, this is the project, right?

Powell: Yeah, yeah. And it's so interesting. Because everybody knows those moments, but we don't talk about them...

Sachs: Yeah.

Powell: So my broader question was more about, since we're both kind of addressing the perception of time, right... I was surprised not to hear any discussion so far of technology. I mean, of course you have something like Stuart Sherman's *Telling Time*. Is time slowing down or speeding up because suddenly people can watch the minutes going by, which we never could before; that's one of the huge sea-changes in terms of eighteenth-century perceptions of reality. And it's elite, but it's not super elite; over the course of the century it becomes much more popularized. And of course in here with Sherman we have the diurnal writing: diary-keeping; newspapers; time is being segmented in a way that it hasn't before. And that certainly has got to have an effect on the way that time is talked about and measured going into futurity. So I would just like to hear some comments about that.

Sachs: I'll start very quickly. I mean, the one thing I would say in response to that is that Stuart's idea, right, is "diurnal form."

Powell: Right.

Sachs: And that's the issue, right?...

Powell: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Sachs: ... Is how do these new questions of time and temporality impact *form*, right? You can think about that. I don't want to gesticulate wildly and do a lot of that right now, because I think that's something that's more of interest to literary scholars. But that's also a question right there, right: to what extent are we really having interdisciplinary conversations? And to what extent do I really want to navel gaze on this question of form, or to what extent do I want to try to

broadcast form outwards, and try to make it relevant in other contexts and other ways? That's one thing I would ask about.

But in response to this question of watching time, right... The person that I've been writing a lot about is this guy William Playfair, who invented the time-series line graph; and that's about the visualization of time, of seeing time, right? So my response to that would be, you can see time in ways other than simply watching it tick off on a clock, right.

Powell: Sure.

Sachs: That when you start to invent new technologies for visualization, that's also one of the things that contributes to a sense of time speeding up. Because one of the effects of a time-series line graph is that time takes less time to see. And William Playfair, the guy who invents them, is very explicit about this, right? He's inventing this chart—this *form*—for men of business, whose time is pressed. He says, “They can do in five minutes what would take, you know, days if they had to do it with tables.” And here you have this really odd, interesting problem where, you know, he wants you to use the time-series line graph because it enables you to work with large amounts of data. But it also speeds up seeing and saves you time, but it also makes your time feel more pressed. Because there's yet one more thing you can do with your limited time, you know; it contributes to this problem of multi-tasking. And what else did I want to say about that? I think I'll leave it at that. Yeah.

Fulda: The authors to which I refer are academics at a university in a small, German town. But, perhaps you know, in Germany, universities are the centers of intellectual life. And this is the time when the first newspapers for academics... There is a rise... not exactly newspapers...magazines? *Zeitschrift*?...What is?... Yes, a journal. But these journals are numbered, a new number comes every week; this number has to be filled. They are producing news... It's also a product of new forms of publication. And in this field, authors strive to become famous. And especially this unknown—completely unknown—author, Gladov, to whom I refer, is such a young scholar who tries to establish himself as an academic intellectual. And I think this... competition?

Breithaupt: Competition.

Fulda: Yeah, this competition, which is theoretically conceived by the *prudentia politica*, takes place here in Halle and other university cities in Protestant Germany. This has a media side too.

Breithaupt: Media, yes... I'm sure we'll talk much more about that. Dave.

Alff: Daniel, so you talked about who possesses *prudentia politica*, who has the agency to undertake political projection. I'm curious about the fact that these political projections come to have their own histories. I wondered what happened at [inaudible] Grammar School: does it matter that Defoe was on the run from his creditors, was bankrupt when he writes *Essay Upon Projects*? And I'm wondering if the failure of political projection—political projection that can

be proven false or does not come to realize itself—can that call into question or jeopardize an open future in the eighteenth century?

Fulda: Jeopardize an open future? What does “jeopardize” *übersetzen*? Someone who does not succeed with his project, does he try to make a new project, or does he never try to make a new project? I think he tries to make a new project and in this sense, jeopardizing or not succeeding with your project is not a factor for foreclosing the future.

Breithaupt: It begs for the argument by Joseph Vogl, who says that in the eighteenth century, historical forces become so unmanageable, invisible, that you can’t manage them any longer; which means that no one can prove that you messed up because it could still have happened. There’s something to that.

Alff: There was a published project in the late seventeenth century to create an Office of Projectors to pay attention to and regulate all of these people who had become discreditable. [laughter]

Breithaupt: I actually didn’t know about that office, that’s great. I seriously do want to know about this. But John...

John Han: It seems like what we’re kind of talking about is the ability, or the difficulty, of articulating a future. And it seems like there’s... I’m talking about Michael’s paper—what was it? the legibility of history... And that struck me with Daniel’s paper: the containment of the uncertain, right. The fact that’s the precondition for an open future, if I’m understanding correctly. And Jonathan you’re talking about the sort of ruptures of time...

Sachs: I’m talking against the ruptures of time.

Han: Oh, you’re... Right, which actually makes it easier for me, because... Okay. It seems that poetry allows that containment of uncertainty, versus the novel, because you’re thinking about Frank Kermode’s notion of “tick-and-tock”: that there’s some sort of telos; some sense of an ending. You feel...that moment is felt time. Whereas poetry is centered outside of time: it doesn’t have that same sort of telos; that sort of, you know, the dates on *Pamela*, when she was at... And there’s something about the way that poetry encloses—not encloses, but contains... That certainly that allows it to get outside, you know, of a larger novel.

Sachs: Well, I mean, I’d want to ask about that.

Han: Okay.

Sachs: I’m amenable to that, but I also think that you could turn around and say, “Well, that’s a classic instance of the Romantic ideology.”

Han: Right.

Sachs: In the sense that Romantic poets want you to think that poetry is worth taking more time.

Han: Right.

Sachs: And that poetry requires modes of attentiveness...

Han: Right.

Sachs: ... That fiction doesn't. And part of what I'm trying to ask is... Part of what I'm trying to say is that all of these questions about the time of reading, the time for reading, the time that one should devote to reading, and whatnot... I don't have an answer for this. But if these are in fact more pressing questions in the later part of the eighteenth century, right, then these understandings of poetry in relationship to time (or novels in relationship to time) become later-eighteenth-century questions or later-eighteenth-century problems, and become related to these questions of futurity and the new kinds of attentiveness to time that speculation or anxiety about futurity generate.

Han: Right, and you know, in Jesse's paper, the idea of plot in some degree kind of delimits time, to a certain degree; it has to. Whereas poetry, I think... I don't know. Formally...

Sachs: Or are you talking about... But again, this is where we get into questions of genre. Because you could suggest that lyric poetry doesn't work like that.

Han: Yeah, yeah.

Sachs: But epic poetry might.

Han: Right, right.

Sachs: Or narrative poetry itself...

Han: Right, right.

Fulda: I only wanted to recall that there is a long tradition for reclaiming timelessness for poetry. As you all know the lines by Horatius, "*exegi monumentum aere perennius.*" That is: "I have erected a monument longer lasting than..."

unidentified female speaker: Bronze. Bronze.

Fulda: Thank you: bronze. It's important for argumentation that you can show that the time becoming slower in your text is something different than this poetical tradition.

Sachs: That sounds about right, right? And this is of course a poetic tradition, and a long one, right: you can go even before Horace, you can go to Virgil; you can go to the *Aeneid*, right? The whole future projection that happens in the first book of the *Aeneid* and the way that the poem is meant to preserve that futurity. So the question becomes, “Okay, given this tradition of poetry as being something that is durable, or that endures through time, how do new temporal pressures that arise—and we’ll say just for the sake of it—in the course of the eighteenth century, come to bear on those kinds of arguments, right?” Are the kinds of arguments that Romantic writers like Wordsworth, Shelley, de Quincey, Barbauld... Are those kinds of arguments that are being made for the duration and timelessness or lasting quality of poetry—or of “Literature” with a capital “L”—are they different as a result of the temporal pressures that are coming through in the late eighteenth century? What I want to argue is that, in fact, they are. And they are because, when someone likes Wordsworth says, “Look, there’s so much more stuff coming out. It gives this sense of eventfulness, it leads to a craving for eventfulness, which changes the kinds of things that people read. We need to make them read something different; we need to make them care about something different.” And he sees that as an ethical project and a political project.

Fulda: It’s a rejection of acceleration.

Sachs: Yeah. And so that’s what I would say. It’s not that... again, with this question about novelty or origin, right? This argument for the endurance of literature is not new or novel in the later part of the eighteenth century. But it’s charged with a language of temporality that is different. That’s what I would say.

Breithaupt: Richard.

Richard Nash: Oh, you got to me much quicker than I was expecting. [laughter] Jonathan, you mentioned at one point—after I had signaled that I was going to ask a question—you said, “What does pace do for us as a category of analysis?” and that immediately distracted me; handicappers for a long time have been debating precisely that issue. [laughter] And I was thinking of that not only glibly, but also seriously, because when handicappers consider the effect of pace, they’re thinking of the effect of pace on speed. And pace and speed are not the same thing, and yet we’re somehow using them interchangeably here. And so I’m thinking a little bit about this question of slow and fast, but trying to think of it in more nuanced ways rather than thinking of it as preferring one to the other—but about various, about what are the variables that affect that? And it seems to me that could extend well beyond genre (which we have been talking about). I’m struck by how these two papers speak to what I tend to think of as either ends of how we mark our period (defined as “the eighteenth century”) and, at the same time, doing so across disciplines. So that, on the one hand, there’s a nice bit in the first part of Daniel’s paper, where you might think of the “Quarrel of Ancients and Moderns” as setting something of a start point for an attitude towards futurity in relation to an attitude towards the past: somehow balanced or poised against each other. That when we get to your [Sachs’s] payoff, at what I think of as the end of the eighteenth century, there’s a very different sense of the importance of how you’re imagining time being conceived. There’s a changed sense of temporality. What I’m wondering about—trying to put these two together and get ready to think about all weekend long—is

whether our construction of this period *as a period* continues to make sense? It could be considered a very real... On the one hand, it would be easy to set these two as very different moments in time that *we're* claiming speak to one another, and yet that presumes a scale of reference in which this is a particularly meaningful, historical time period. And yet it seems to me that a lot of the questions that we're talking, when you were giving a glib answer early and then disavowing it about poetry, I was thinking, "Now you sound exactly like how my undergrads actually do talk about poetry: why does it take so long?" [laughter] But reading... We read differently at different times: we read slow, or we read fast, or we teach people how to read slow. And in a very real sense, you are reading quite differently if you're reading rock formation than if you're reading a poem, right? A lyric poem is a different text to read than a geological formation. At that level, I find myself wondering in this conversation as we're using categorical terms like "pace" or "speed," how much the change in reference is particularly one that we're just not... For me, I find it very hard to make a very coherent argument about futurity in "the eighteenth century" from this conversation alone. Now I know we've got many conversations ahead of us and it will all make sense to me at the end of the weekend... This was going to be a question if it hadn't come on me so fast, but I've gone on long enough... So there's a certain sense where I'm still trying to put these two papers together as something other than bookends that make me wonder: "Is there a thing between the bookends?"

Sachs: Well, if I may, I can riff with what you're pushing toward and try to think about it in terms of categories that might perhaps have more of a payoff... But I take the heart of your question to be this issue of "What is pace, really?" right? And part of what I'm trying to say, and... What is pace really? How does pace come to bear on our understanding of futurity? And to what extent is this an eighteenth-century problem? Does that seem like a fair trio of takeaway questions?

Nash: Yeah, can I add one more to that?

Sachs: Sure.

Nash: Because I'm wondering... There's something... I want to consider the possibility of fluctuation in pace, rather than particularly always trying to make it into a trend.

Sachs: Exactly. So part of what I'm trying to do, or think about, in this larger context is to suggest that if you want to think about futurity, that is inevitably a question of "when". "When" is also a question of "how soon"; or "how far"—"how near" or "how far"; "how sudden" or "how slowly." So to think about futurity is also to ask questions about pace. I think I have said that already... But pace in this sense is not simply about creating an opposition between fast and slow, but about recognizing qualities of speed which can be fast (or slow) as imbricated with each other, right. And one of the narratives that we like to tell ourselves about modernity is that this process of acceleration starts in the eighteenth century and, that from the eighteenth century forward, acceleration is what marks modernity. And part of what I'm trying to do is to say, "Well, that's pace. But pace is actually more complicated than just speed; it's about a mutual

imbrication of speed and slowness whose contours need to be developed.” So I can’t speak to exactly how that would be developed at this point; maybe someday I’ll finish this other book.

But the other question about that is that once you start to develop an idea of the future as a problem of pace, then you’re into—and this might play into some of the stuff that you’ve been writing about—you’re into a problem of relation. And I think, for me, this is what I want to bring to bear on this question of the eighteenth century. When you start to think about the problem of relation, you can start to play around with it and potentially develop new and interesting ways to periodize. And I think that one of the ways we tend to periodize is that we tend to periodize in very linear ways, and to say that we move from the Restoration to the eighteenth century to Romanticism in the context of English literary history. But what does that mean? And what happens when you start to play around with scale in that sense? What happens when you start to think about a Regency within Romanticism, or a Georgic period within the eighteenth century that has its variants One, Two, and Three? And so part of what I’m trying to do with this, and I’ve played around with this in other contexts—I did a MLA talk last year—is when you start to think about a periodization as relational, you can start to ask about what a year looks like in the context of the period. You can start to think about what happens when you toggle between a year and what we would typically consider to be a literary period, or a larger period. And this is a very vague way of putting it; I have to develop this. But I think it allows for a more dynamic model of periodization, one that can stretch across the rupture that we like to perceive between, say, eighteenth century, Romantic, and Victorian. But not in a way that says these periods don’t exist, these periods are unreal; but in a way that says these periods are more complicated than we’re assuming.

Fulda: This is another question to Jonathan...

Breithaupt: We... Okay, okay... We have three more speakers on our regular list; but now we have Tracey hooking, but it has to be brief.

Tracey Hutchings-Goetz: It’s really brief.

Breithaupt: Everything very brief now, we treasure our coffee breaks.

Hutchings-Goetz: So Richard’s comment helped me formulate a question, which is: when does slow time locate violence?

Sachs: Yeah, I mean, you can talk to someone like Rob Nixon, that’s going to be a postmodern problem: that’s going to be a problem that comes out in the later 1960s; that comes out in the relationship between the emergence of ecological writing. Part of what I’m trying to argue in the paper is that so many of these things that we consider to be postmodern are very much present in the period of the eighteenth century. With the takeaway from that for me is what we’re talking about here is modernity. Modernity is a vague, slippery, kind of shitty term, but let’s see what we can do with it. But the thrust of the argument is that postmodernity is crap, basically. [laughter]

Spang: It’s a meaningless term.

Sachs: Yeah, and that it's just ludicrous to talk about it; and that all of these problems that you want to locate as being postmodern can actually be found in much earlier instantiations. And somebody, I'm sure, could turn around to me and say, "Well this is all prior to the eighteenth century," and you know, there's our horse race of origins—pun, Richard.

Nash: Always appreciated. [laughter]

Hutchings-Goetz: Just to follow quickly... I sort of meant: in the kind of experience of slow time, is violence always in the future, or is it in a perpetual kind of presentness? So it was less the kind of theoretical question, and more... Yeah.

Sachs: Okay. Sure. Well in Wordsworth's case, it's in the past, right? The Cumberland beggar and the old man travelling have experienced violence on their bodies that caused them to walk this slowly. And that violence is unmarked and past.

Breithaupt: This dangling question—we will note that for later. The last three that will ask questions are: Johannes, Helge, and Christine.

Johannes Türk: Okay, so I will go back a little bit to what Helge said earlier, partly because I don't really understand what we're talking about; I think we are talking about very different things and I thought already the papers were almost too different to really talk about them. But I think I finally figured out a way to maybe think about them. And I'll just propose something and maybe you think it's completely meaningless or maybe it is... So it seems to me that any hypothesis like Koselleck's about an open future is really very naïve, in spite of all the distinction... in spite of the image of historiography, right. Because he thinks something happens in historiography: all of a sudden, history becomes open because historiographers think about it as an open process. And I think that assumes, in a way, a lot of... It covers over, in a way, distinctions that need to be made. And I think some of those... I mean: times are multiple. And I think that your, in a way, critique—or, let's say, amendment—to Koselleck makes us aware of that. You know, so there are institutional times; there are individual times; there are very different times that always exist. And the question is, "Are they more homogenous, are they less homogenous?"

And I think you touch a number of points. You touch the question of "How is a future open for these different agents?" For example, when you say that in the realm of sovereignty nothing new happens. So because sovereign agents have a certain art of conducting history, right, they prevent something new from happening. So that's why, I think... And then, you know, there are administrative sciences that integrate the Ciceronian and Stoic things like *prudentia* into a governmental science. They collect new data and then, all of a sudden, something new can happen. But it happens as an agent; so, in other words, just to think "open future" means "anything can happen" is not enough. We need to think, "Well, the future is actually doable." And there are different institutions that operate with different time scales. And part of this openness of the future is also, "I can do something later"; it's not just that the new will happen, right? So I think, on one level of course, it's necessary to say "deviation"—to distinguish

deviation from newness: we're capable of integrating newness; we're capable of having an open future. That's like the basic step. But then which types of knowledge are inhabited, you know, by this open future in what way: how do they imagine the future; how do they operate on it; what modes of deferral, of differentiation do they have; what data sets do they use in order to actually turn history into this thing in which new things can happen? So that presupposes at least two things. On the one hand, like a very open vision, you know: the future can be open; new things can happen. But also an idea about the doability: so something like a thick future that has to do with data; it has to do with projections; it has to do with modes of attributing agency.

And I think your paper, the second paper, in a way, touches a lot of these question, but I think less focused on the open future, but rather on the question of how do we represent time. And it's clear that in Darwin, you know, there's this whole... (And I forgot to mention, by the way, the knight, right? In this image of historiography; it's kind of totally absurd that the knight goes into the open future in the early eighteenth century? Right? [laughter] I mean, that's kind of... So that has to do with the agent...)

Fulda: Well, the knight is on the right side...

Türk: But in yours, it seems to me, what was really interesting about it... I mean, it's clear that Darwin grapples with this problem explicitly, right? Because he needs to draw on analogies such as breathing, such as, right?... That, in a way, humanize by turning it into the result of an activity that is well-known. And building a bridge to these timescales that are imperceptible, that we don't perceive. And so by integrating geological and biological time into the realm of the doable, right, I think he manages to open these dimensions of time. And so it seems to me that the representation of time, but also the question of "who" represents it on the basis of "what" knowledge and "how," you know, is really an interesting way of talking about it. Which means that you're probably talking about at least two things: about representing time and about time itself. So there's a doubling of it, in a way, and then I think you need agency. And I think those things together would create a slightly more complicated image, and would open (at the same time) venues for talking about both papers in a meaningful way. You know, where does acceleration come out of? How does it actually... From where does it reach us? How can it capture us? Who is doing it, right?

Breithaupt: Okay, I think we are now... It was a long comment. So...[laughter]

Spang: We don't—we have...

Breithaupt: We will not have answers; we allow the last two people to also makes comments now.

Spang: Right, but we also built in half-an-hour for a break, which is a long break, so that there can be a little bit of wiggle room.

Breithaupt: Yeah... I mean, the suggestion will not be forgotten that the doability or malleability as we encountered in, say, Daniel's paper is the key term he proposed as the

bridging term between the two papers. But I want to hear Helge and then Christine, and then we will have the speakers for a final... And you may make comments at this point too; it doesn't have to be anything but a question. So Helge, whatever you want to say.

Jordheim: Thank you. Okay, this was sort of perfect way to sort of bridge into my question. Because I'll try to link sort of what you said about institutional time—administrative time—knowledge and agency. And my question to you would be sort of about the politics of slowness—slowing things down—because it's politically opportunistic to slow things down. Because as long as, I mean... The dream of utopia is to stop time, right, because if you stop time, nothing can bad can happen: there can be no revolutions, no changes, this wonderful society would just exist. But stopping time is a hard thing. The fantastic example of this is Holberg, the Danish author, who has written about his journey to the center of the Earth, where he comes to this utopian society and it's utopian because things are incredibly slow. [Editor's Note: *Nicolai Klimii iter subterraneum*, 1741] So the rulers are stalling reception, so they need plenty of time before they get it, and then they have to consider the options for three weeks before they can make a decision. ...The important thing is that you put in place an administrative time that slows everything down. I mean, it comes into your question of revolution and time that you're addressing, Jonathan, and goes into the question of the *prudentia* also... I mean, it seems like good politics, if you want to keep stable political structures, to slow things down.

Sachs: A quick response that's not even a response: Hartmut Rosa, right? That's the terms that's gotta be put on the table. That Hartmut Rosa's modification of Koselleck's argument by acceleration. That's what you're talking about right there.

Jordheim: Yeah.

Sachs: And then the second thing would be slow food, right: these contemporary movements that see themselves as highly political because they want to slow things down. Part of what I want to do by complicating the slow-fast is to say "slow is not the answer." That's all I'm saying.

Spang: You're not going to feed 7 billion people with slow food. [laughter]

Breithaupt: Christine now.

Christine Zabel: Yeah, it's just a quick comment about the... I think in Koselleck, the notion of the future is—although his whole theory is about the future—the future itself is very understudied and undertheorized. And disciples like Lucian Hölscher in Germany right now think much more about the depth of the future. And I think that is what I think both papers kind of allow you to think about much more. When narrative and the open future don't emerge at the same time and when we rethink about the recalibration of slowness and acceleration: I was wondering if you could think about the recalibration of slowness and acceleration as a kind of trying to hold on a little longer to the past—to bring it into the future—but it still accepts that the future is new. But we need a time of transition. And that plays into (kind of) when does the future start. And one can accept that the future will be new, but maybe people at the end of the

eighteenth century tried to kind of delay that point of departure and have a transitional phase? And so, I mean, in nineteenth-century literature, as far as I know, there is this whole move to travel literature, that when people walk through—like [inaudible]—they walk through Germany by themselves. And observation is now much more... And that plays into my own project on speculation: that there is an acceptance of an open future, but we still need observation—but it is [no longer] observation of experience, but observation of ever-changing constellations. And in order to react to these ever-changing constellations, we need to close the observer to what's happening. So we need this slowness in order to address the open future and maybe have this kind of transition or delay when a rupture can emerge.

Sachs: Just very, very quickly... Yes! That's why I want to ask, right: why is it that, in so much of Wordsworth's poetry, we are talking about old men walking slowly through a landscape? [laughter]

Zabel: Yes, and it seems the walking is exactly...

Sachs: Yes, the walking is key. But again, to push on this postmodern/modern thing, right? When you think about this genre that you think of as so postmodern: psychogeography. Psychogeography—Iain Sinclair, right?—is about walking slowly. [laughter] It's not new!

Zabel: Yeah.

Sachs: Anyways...

Breithaupt: Daniel, you have the final word.

Fulda: Yeah, I would like to ask you—and all—if there is a necessary relation between acceleration and an open future? Is it a requirement for acceleration that the future is open, or is it possible to think acceleration in a closed horizon of futures? And I think one of the... Today's critique against acceleration is: society does not think in an open way—doesn't conceive of the future as open, but as something determined by economic and political constraints, yeah?

Breithaupt: Or time constraints. [laughter] Let's thank the speakers. [applause]