

## Discussion

**Rachel Seiler-Smith:** Sure. Thank you very much for that, and I really appreciate you filling people in (although some people probably know about inoculation), that's one of the sections that I didn't get to put in here, about inoculation. And I actually use the Esposito formulation of the immunization paradigm.

But as to your question. I think it might help for me to answer it by sort of saying where the project comes from. It's sort of two prongs. The project began by asking the question—and it was not necessarily trying to retell or tell Foucault's story faithfully or even favorably, but to re-think this idea not just of when the population is something that needs to be managed—but when we felt an ethical obligation to engage with population as such. So, when we stopped thinking about other forms of relations (and not necessarily in terms of nationality either), but instead in terms of “population.” And that comes with other things. What I thought was very interesting was that...Coming from a feminist perspective, I was interested in the ways in which the “ethics of care” (as it's been formulated) has used the eighteenth century as this space where the ethics of care is a divergence from this ethics of politics and justice that might seem Foucaultian.

And so, there's this ethics of care that's against the “care of the self” that Foucault describes (which is very disciplinary and about managing the body) and that is an attempt to sort of make things personal, as you were talking about. It forms not a pure care, but it forms a form of care that seems to be recuperative or that is promising for a politics that is progressive and potentially non-violent. And so, the feminist ethics of care is an attempt to go against what they see as an ethics of justice that's constituted by... you know, law as constituted by violence, that type of thing. I was very interested in the ways in which—not so much that care shifts with biopolitics—but that care and biopolitics might be mutually constitutive in a particular way. And so, I begin by thinking about someone like Hobbes, who is obsessed with and terrified of the multitude, and how he comes to sort of render that in medical terms and in terms of managing your own body in a particular way. And how what emerges is these questions of, as Alysa Levene points out, forms of charity and care that also have this utility to it.

So, for me, I'm wondering... My biggest question—it's a contemporary one, but one that I think the eighteenth century has resounding and complex form of answers to—is: if we're trying to move toward a politics of non-violence, can we think of that outside the paradigm of optimization? Of, “Well, it's more good (or less bad) because we've done less violence.” Or, you know, “we are going to,” you know, “justify a war because it's going to enact peace,” right? So, in many ways Foucault's idea about negation of life being a way to foster viability becomes an ethical problem. I think the eighteenth century is so fruitful, and I think much earlier than Foucault suggests. I think the eighteenth century has a lot of interesting concepts. And so, for me, I don't think that there is a bad care and a good care, or a pure care and non-pure care; I think what's so interesting is the things that we would call bad care are still care, you know, and nonetheless it's seen as this thing that we do and that we're compelled to do.

And, I think that in very obvious ways, even someone like Hanway (who I have some problems with in the text) proposes to, you know, the way that he proposes to care for the infants, there's an ethical obligation there. He recognizes and, you know, there's this feeling that he's responsible (in a way that Britain very strongly pushed against for a long time; they didn't want to be like France who had the, you know, the babies from amorous relationships, they didn't want to be like that, they were moral in a different way). So, all of a sudden morality becomes about saving these children, and it has to become about negotiating why these children are

worthwhile. And so, on the one hand, even the attempt to foster an ethical obligation to these children comes out of an attempt to negate them (in a really interesting way), and so I think you seize on that perfectly.

So for me, I wonder if we can think about care not as something that's fractured, but as something that's registering on multiple levels at once. I don't think about it as something that's fractured, I guess, I think about care not as something that's prompted by aggression or a response to aggression, but care might be aggression by other means? Or it might a form that enacts aggression inadvertently and sometimes intentionally, among other things. So, I'm going to put that out there.

**Fabienne Moore:** I think I wanted to go back to a question that Nick had posed about, you know, finding something valuable for our moment in the work that we do. And this, you know, for me, the provocative question "The Eighteenth Century: Who Cares?" initially was about understanding what is it in that particular period that is helpful to understand some of the momentous changes that are happening (now); and, in particular, when we had this Arab Spring of revolutions that sort of competed with the spread from Tunisia to, you know, Libya and Syria and Yemen. It was really amazing to have a sense of *déjà vu*, you know, and to sort of anticipate and fear sort of the evolution of the initial revolutionary, sort of, impulse.

And so, I've been fascinating to understand, you know, the direct aftermath of the Revolution precisely what precedes the Terror, understand that period which I think oftentimes gets just collapsed, and so it's as if there's no time between the Declaration and the Storming of the Bastille and the Terror. In fact, there is some time there of really provocative, profound, yes, utopian, but sort of beautiful, generous impulses before everything sort of takes a turn for the worse. And so, I've been wondering about that, and what we can learn from that. And, it's interesting that a common point is both the presence of women, which I actually wouldn't qualify as marginalized, I think they were hyper-present: they are there in the tribunes, they are there applauding, they are there in the revolutionary movements, just like they were very present in the Arab Spring, you know, in many ways. And, the media, the role of the media in, sort of, conveying... you know, uniting and conveying and circulating ideas. And so, when I try to link and I try to understand what we might learn from that particular period of the Enlightenment leading the Revolution and then leading to, sort of, the bad turn... You know, that's sort of what I was trying to look at.

**Johannes Türk:** Rob?

**Rob Schneider:** I have a comment about the Girondins of the Circle [*Cercle Sociale*]. I think there's something really interesting about their, sort of, naiveté and... They're the losers, you're right, but they're well-positioned and they're not faint at heart, really. I mean they are revolutionaries. But, even the name of the newspaper, *Bouche de Fer*, and the Latin tag that they use, on page 227, "With eloquence you govern the people, O Gallic man." I mean—unlike the Jacobins, ultimately—they're not into starting over, I mean, although the king is still there. And, in fact, this really relates to the old Gallican tradition (going back at least to the sixteenth century) and I think the *Bouche de Fer* is actually a kind of re-fashioning of the myth of Gallic Hercules with his golden chains attached to his tongue? And with that (i.e., with eloquence) he draws the people in his wake, which was seen as a sort of salutary use of oratory (in the aftermath of the Wars of Religion) to galvanize the people, to unify the people, to unify the people with their king. It was a moment when rhetoric, in the classical sense, was invested with a great sense of

purposefulness and power. And, the fact that these people sort of held on to that and tried to refurbish it is, I think, on the one hand, their self-conscious realization that this is a revolutionary moment and so the old ways are not...the old myths cannot just be resurrected. And, on the other, that they're still holding onto the forms and still connected to something that (again) was and is still deeply classical and deeply French in its meaning.

**Moore:** Yes, no totally, it's not a tabula rasa. I think there is a great tradition that they're drawing upon, and—sort of almost on a literal level—supporting.

**Türk:** Erica and Kirk, you were almost at the same time, I don't know who, but Erica.

**Erica Charters:** Thanks. I just... I had a...It's kind of a question for Rachel, but thinking a bit about responses to comments; because one of the thoughts I had is ... This is, you know, we're thinking about care and one of the questions is, I think...These debates over how to care, but also, *who* should care because (it struck me in the comments) Foucault talks about the state and we're talking about the state, but actually the interesting point here—and maybe the contrast is between France and England—is that this is not the state, right? The Foundling Hospital doesn't exist because of Parliament. Part of the whole motivation behind this British form of care is that it not be the state because there's a very explicit fear of having something that is going to be like a too powerful state. It struck me that a lot of the things that we might read as being uncaring (like the emphasis on numbers), the motivation behind it is an appeal to public subscriptions and to parliamentary practice which demands a kind of openness and transparency... and the notion that numbers will achieve this. Whether or not that's the case, I think we can debate, but I think the rhetoric is partly anti-state and actually trying to avoid what is seen to be something like, unh, um—

**Schneider:** ... the French. [Group chuckles].

**Charters:** —an over-powerful state. Again, obviously this is the point of the debate, but I suppose—I know I said this earlier, but—I think there's always this argument [to be made] that there's a rejection of another kind of model of care. I think this British model is clearly a rejection of something that's seen as un-voluntary through the state and through the church. And hence it goes through these other means and these other forms of rhetoric.

**Seiler-Smith:** I would complicate the idea that it's not related to the state. Especially when you consider the context of the aftermath of the General Reception<sup>1</sup> and because the hospitals themselves want to relate to the state in terms of warfare and other mechanics...So it's certainly an institution that is legitimated by the state, right? Coram spends seventeen years trying to get that approval, and historians who write about the hospital say that what's so interesting about the British Foundling Hospital (as opposed to other models) is that it's a hybrid form of state and private charity. So, what you get—and this is one of the things that I think needs playing up—is... If I'm talking about what fosters ethical responsibility or obligation to these vulnerable forms in our population, the idea that it's not just a state model, but also one that's sort of negoti-

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<sup>1</sup> [Editor's Note] From 1756-1760, the British government paid the Foundling Hospital to take in *all* the children presented to it (roughly 15,000 infants), hence the name.

ating with other forms, right? Absolutely. But I don't think it's a non-state and I don't think it's any state, and, in fact, you're invoking the idea of statistics; statistics means state—

**Charters:** Well—

**Seiler-Smith:** —it's from the word “state,” so the numeracy there, to me, is absolutely... I don't think it's just happening in the state, but that account, the accountancy there, I think you're right is, is something a bit more complex, but that's what I'm trying to sort of unpack a bit more. What were you going to . . . ?

**Charters:** I was just going to say that, I mean, statistics is a word that doesn't mean numbers in this period—

**Seiler-Smith:** Absolutely.

**Charters:** So, again I think there's different ways of reading it and what they mean by “state.” But, I think it's clear people are trying to avoid the biopolitics that we're talking about, right? And whether or not they're successful is another question, but I think there's... it's, it's an awareness, right? It's not as if people aren't aware of issues of whether or not you're going to inoculate the entire population because then that would be much better.

**Seiler-Smith:** I think what's interesting is the Foundling Hospital was an attempt to correct or at least complement... I mean a lot of historians talk about it in terms of “complementing” something like the workhouse. So, there were eighteenth-century forms of welfare, you know, in terms of parish workhouses, and, of course, Hanway has this whole section (I had to cut for this paper), but he has this whole section in which he is talking about basically very vile things that the parish officers did, but he sort of excuses them. He's like, “well, they have a hard lot” at the same time. And so what he sees is that... You know, Coram was trying to sort of say “What we have is not enough structurally, we need something else.” And, of course, the problem is that the state not only approved it and, you know, underlined some of its funding when the General Reception happened and the state coopted it entirely for a time and then maintained hold of it of some other ways afterward... such that it absolutely became like, you know, the workhouse.

So, I think some of the things that need to be played up more, for me, are that in the early stages of the Foundling Hospital not only did the public see it as something that might be different, but I think that there were ... a certain, you know, at the times, even though there's limitations in forms there's a sort of possibility there that then gets tampered, but, in part, because of state interjection because they have so many children that they start to want sending them there, and it's at the time that they begin to open the possibility of taking on so many more children from the state that the inoculation tests start happening, as well. So, I think you're right there, but I think the hybridity, as they describe it, of what the institution was, complicates our understanding of the state relations. But, I think you're right.

**Türk:** Brendan with a pointed remark.

**Brendan Gillis:** I just wanted to chime in, and say that the other examples that were running through my mind when I was reading about the numbers (especially in your paper) were the rise

of the insurance market and the slave trade in this period—and, they're obviously not examples of unproblematic care. But, yeah, that's more just a comment. And the second part: I was wondering if you've thought at all about the place of children legally in this period? Because in a lot of ways, the Poor Law is reducing adults to the position of children. The children—the concept of child as dependent—provides a model that is, is legally powerful for dealing with other people who are no longer independent.

**Seiler-Smith:** Are you talking about in terms of when they go to apply for certain types of... like, to the parishes?

**Gillis:** Yeah, I mean just sort of conceptually; it reaches out to the idea of the, sort of, the apprentice or the dependent within the household and what happens legally to someone when they apply for poor laws, they are claiming to be a dependent of the parish.

**Seiler-Smith:** Yes, and therefore, “entitled, like they call it “entitlements,” right? They’re “entitled” to certain forms of protection and succor from either the state or the apprenticeship, and, of course, the Foundling Hospital sent out children to apprenticeships and negotiated these, these... Yeah, I think that that’s true, my problem is that that doesn’t necessarily mean that there aren’t forms of exploitation that happen. Again, this is one of the sort of struggles of my project in trying to say, you know... I think it’s something compelling to think about how we try and create these forms of protection. My problem is when we just sort of...in creating the protections we provide forms of relief, but not always for the subjects whom we’re trying to protect. So that the relief comes for those who provided it and, therefore, “we’re relieved we provided this...”

So, you know, on the one hand, Ruth McClure at the end of her book talks about the children who went out to apprentice when they were older, and there’s a couple of them for whom we do have a few, small minor accounts and the only ones that we have are kind of skewed. She doesn’t really trust them because they’re the good ones. You know, there’s only a couple where they come back to them saying, “oh, you know, I’ve done well,” ...and then she said there’s a couple where they sort of have to serve trial and the Foundling Hospital gets involved. And she said, but you know, the idea is not all apprenticeships were sort of protecting. But, is that sort of—?

**Gillis:** Yeah, and I didn’t want to imply that that undercut your argument in any way. I think, actually, in sort of thinking through how... I mean, you’re right to point out that historians and critics have looked back and wanted to apply a sort of charitable lens, but at the time I think this model actually spoke to much broader social issues where there wouldn’t necessarily have been an expectation that this sort of dependence was different than other, often exploitative approaches.

**Seiler-Smith:** And, I think that the distinction I’m trying to make and that I think I need to be much more careful about here is the difference between how it was received and how I’m trying to frame it. I want to trace it back for us to think about what we’ve embraced and what we’ve lost in not reading it in these particular ways. So, certainly, I mean, my whole point is if you’re not Swiftian, you don’t necessarily see this as a problem, per se, right; Hanway thought this was great, the fact that, you know, only one child died, yay, you know, that’s great! And, the fact that this serves a public good, that you’re doing these works that are not only charitable, but that are reasonable, is ideal, that that’s definitely something they saw as good, and I don’t think that they

saw it as an ethical problem. The fact that I'm, you know, as a feminist, trying to look back and say how have we inherited this and why are we now still expecting welfare to not be exploitative, you know, for example. In the way that we still get frustrated, and we're like we want to support welfare programs, etcetera, but for me I'm tracing this back to this eighteenth-century moment. So, I think you're right. I don't think they would see this, just like Hanway is trying really hard to forgive these parish officers for what he knows is probably a really seedy business of trafficking children, you know, he's really trying to sort of make it so that they have public good in mind even if they're selling these children off to "wicked nurses," he says, right, so to kill them, to give a morbid example, but...

**Türk:** Kirk?

**Kirk Wetters:** This is a comment that I'm to some extent bringing from this morning, but I saved it for the foundling paper because I thought maybe it fits best here. It's also to some extent a carry-over from many conversations that we've had about the topic so far and, in particular, trying to pick up a little bit on the Foucault questions that you could say started yesterday and continued this morning and were also addressed by Johannes just now in his introduction. And, I mean ... If I have a topic for this comment, it's something like "care and discursivity" as a kind of a problem or a connection that we've come up against over and over. So it's a kind of, let's say, Foucault-oriented topic, which I try to not necessarily think about with Foucault—although it's probably inevitable that we'd make some connections there. But, I mean... In particular, I think you can see somehow how a lot of the cases we've looked at... You have care feeding into or producing discourses of different kinds and, at the same time, discourses of different kinds are able to also produce care again. So, it's a kind of cyclical function; you could almost picture it maybe.

I'll give a few examples from...—and certainly they apply to different papers, but something like silences in either historical records or the kind of discretion that the novel gives in not exposing a character to the reader: I mean, those are just the kind of a direction I'm still thinking about. Also, biographical narratives that are constructed for historical and, to some extent, semi-fictional figures. I mean, also, scripts as a form of discourse that we talked about this morning, as well, so these kind of projective scripts that encourage a kind of performance. And the thing that I see as a tension, if I try to kind of pull this comment together (which is then still a reflection on the question about what our role is, or how we're relating to these different processes) is I think there is a kind of tension between a desire to fill those silences in the historical record or to give voice to the voiceless and those who are overlooked and, on the other side, a kind of fear of ...

I mean, in certain ways with Swift of something like the idea that we're complicit with discursivizing practices that feed back into problematic power structures basically.

**Seiler-Smith:** I think that that's absolutely right. I think that my biggest... I don't necessarily want to give a voice to the voiceless. I have interesting tensions with advocacy as a political practice; at the same, I think with us it's sometimes inevitable (as we're dealing with dead people) that they're voices in these particular ways, and I think it's also so hard. I deal with, in other chapters, with poor populations, and it's so difficult, right, because there's just not... I work on one chapter with Mary Toft and people are like, "what about her account of her pregnancy?" And, I'm like, "there isn't one." You know, I mean, so this difficulty when people, you know, are sort of asking you again to give this voice and I'm trying so hard to, you know, pose these

questions without necessarily trying to step in and concretize and repeat the same practices that I'm necessarily critiquing. But, I think you're right, there's this sort of stickiness, absolutely.

I think that academics need a little bit of prodding about complicitness in the system. I think that—you know, maybe it's from a graduate student's perspective that I think this is necessary—but I think that when we get uncomfortable we are at our most promising moments in academia. When we understand that a lot of the work that we're doing and a lot of the stories we're telling and how we're telling them come to show us, in many ways... As do the politics and the ideal politics... A lot of times we try and put forth as ideal, or as alternative, or as opening up these spaces—when we come to understand that even then, there's a certain complicitness and ways in which we participate in forms of exposure and violence. I think that's a necessary conversation that needs to happen. And, Swift is certainly complicit in forms of... You know, that's why I think Swift is so interesting. If you start to turn to how Swift talks about sex workers, you're going to get a very different narrative of how Swift works ethically with certain vulnerable populations... but when you think about how Swift is thinking about these children and, you know, especially there's a great article by Fred Powell on Swift and the Dublin Foundling Hospital (specifically) and talks more about his pamphlets and work there. It's going to look different. So he's complicit as well in many ways; and yet, he has this stinging critique that I think we, in many ways, need to model.

**Türk:** So, waiting to get in the conversation, there's Jesse, Michael, and Colin (I didn't overlook you). So, Jesse.

**Jesse Molesworth:** Yeah. So, Rachel, Hogarth kind of appears as a villain in this.

**Seiler-Smith:** No! [Group laughter.]

**Molesworth:** You kind of take him to task for his portrayal of the children here in the shadows on page twenty-seven, but, you know, I'm going to bracket that. Moses, Moses has to be... You know, *Tom Jones* is not the most famous example of a literary foundling, it's Moses. And, you know, apropos of what Johannes said about the religious imagery, I mean there's obviously Christ-like imagery here in this image. But, one might read this as a sort of translation of Moses leading the Israelites out of the darkness and into the light, and, instead, we've Coram leading these foundlings out of the darkness of unacknowledgement and into the light of parental acknowledgement, which we have on the right. I mean it's not (at least to me) that he's uninterested in representing these children. It's much more that he's translating something that, you know, would've been recognizable to his viewers, and—

**Seiler-Smith:** That's great and... I have several things to say about it. First of all, I do say, in all fairness, I say Hogarth does try really hard to represent the children [group laughter], but even leading them into the light, most of them are still in the shadow. And, you know... I use the coat of arms here—I think that's one that I didn't get to talk about, and I have a lot more to say about the iconography of the hospital. Hogarth has some really interesting images of children and of vulnerable populations, I think that he does a lot of really great work.... I don't, you know, I don't think Hanway is a villain, either. I mean, I'm certainly critical of these practices, but I wouldn't ascribe villainy to them. I would say that it's a complicitness, and also a sort of part and parcel. . .

And, this great interesting thing about Moses—and I know you [Türk] mentioned religiosity as well—the first coat of arms was a Moses figure. And Moses is stamped all around that hospital.

**Molesworth:** Hogarth donates his picture of the Pharaoh's daughter receiving Moses to the hospital.

**Seiler-Smith:** And that was a very famous feature of the hospital. And that's what's so interesting to me, right? The hospital was such a paternalistic operation and yet, like, in the coat of arms it's Lady Britannia and a multi-breasted woman. I don't know who she is, does anybody, I mean, is that a—?

**Schneider:** Nature.

**Seiler-Smith:** Nature? Okay, alright, that makes sense then. You know, Nature and Britannia then are sort of, you know, the ones in between ... and there's this child in the middle gesturing to it, so there's that sort of way in which the coat of arms doesn't actually... it tries to capture everything but it actually elides a lot of things. I'm actually a big fan of what Hogarth tries to do. I think that the tension I'm picking out in this image is exactly that struggle of representation that I think he's part and parcel of his narrative, but it's obviously a sort of struggle. And, I think that the interesting thing about someone like Hanway and others in the Foundling Hospital is they are trying to legitimize their practice, so they're writing against figures who are saying "we shouldn't do this, why do we care about, let them die," right? Sort of like a later Malthusian, this is a check on the population in a way. Or people saw them as burdens or worse, even though, you know, more than half of the children weren't illegitimate in the hospital. Nevertheless, illegitimacy was a major concern and that this was a product of vic,... and so, in large part this representation is rhetorical and strategic, but it's strategic in a way that I think has problems. I love Hogarth.

**Molesworth:** Me too.

**Türk:** Michael?

**Michael Meranze:** I think Colin was actually first.

**Türk:** Really?

**Meranze:** His hand went up before mine.

**Türk:** Then he raised his hand again because I overlooked him first. Okay. Sorry.

**Meranze:** Yeah, he was up before me.

**Türk:** Okay.



**Colin Jager:** This is a question for Fabienne, actually. I really... Hi, I really loved the sense of a revolution that happens and then was undone or that might have happened or didn't quite happen—and is very much like Shelley that I was talking about yesterday. So, my question is focused on a moment where you quote Fauchet talking about Rousseau and Fauchet says, "Well, Rousseau was pretty pessimistic, now we can see that, that things, you know, really turned out better than he thought they would." And, my first thought was, of course, "Yeah, Rousseau actually *was* right." Then I was thinking about this from the British context; I was thinking about Burke—he was just so, so negative about the Revolution right from the beginning. For three years, he seems to be on the wrong side of the history, and then the Terror happens and then everybody said, "oh, Burke was right all along." And that's, that's how sort of (in a very loose way) Burke is—I think—still received. He saw something in the Revolution that he didn't like, and it took a while time to manifest itself, but Burke being Burke he saw it.

So, my question is... We've got this kind of utopian... or this moment of possibility. It's undone by the Terror or, in this account, it's undone by the king fleeing, and then we've got the pessimism that we can read back into that moment to say, "No, they were wrong, the optimists were wrong, the utopians were wrong. It was never going to turn out that well. Burke was right all along or Rousseau's pessimism was actually..." So, it's kind of a methodological question: how do you tell the history of a utopia or a possible utopia knowing what you know, knowing what we know about what happens? How does one do justice to the possibility in the face of that kind of skepticism? So, it's not the past being pulled into the present, it's sort of the future being pulled into an immediate past. That, you know, that's the danger, that it re-writes a sense of what might've happened.

**Türk:** Rebecca with this pointed intervention.

**Rebecca Spang:** I will be very pointed, though I do not want to be rude to our guests. But I will say that Colin, if you took more *care* in the way you characterized the French Revolution, you would note that it's not an "it" to start with, it's a process.

**Jager:** Yeah.

**Spang:** And as long as you pay careful attention to process—instead of imagining that you know right from the beginning, "Oh, yeah, Okay, we had a revolution, that's done. We know what we're doing, we have our goals in mind"—then, the whole way you frame the question becomes less pertinent. I think this is a bit of what Fabienne was after: a sense of the process, that the people living through it... they don't know what's going to happen.

**Moore:** Right. Which is what I think captured my interest in the periodical is precisely that sense of immediacy of the moment, and sensing changes along the way that are sort of subtle and the actors themselves being surprised. And, particularly, the flight of the king is sort of a shocking realization; these things kind of turn around. But, you know, that question about sort of how to account for those moments... You know, when I was reading your paper [Jager's], I sort of, I was startled by the repetition of "failure" as applied to the Revolution. Because I don't consider it as a failure. So it's really interesting that, from the British side of things, the Revolution is a failure. I mean, it...you know, it, sort of... what are we talking about exactly? I mean, I think when you sort of look at that moment after the storming of the Bastille, after the passing of the

Declaration... I don't think there's a sense of failure there. And, even, you know, and how long, how many years does it take to reflect back on the Revolution and to understand that, well... was it a failure? I mean, it did abolish privilege, it did bring out the Declaration of Rights, so what are we doing when we today look back... So, I have a sort of hard time with the term "failure," especially considering those years in between and prior to the Terror.

**Türk:** Yes, small, Richard?

**Richard Nash:** Yeah, I think I want to hook here because I'm now—and I no longer know if I'm speaking to Rebecca or to Colin or to both—but this is somehow getting us... or at least for me, it's helping me with a question that I've never asked myself before: How do you tell a revolution from a hospital? [Group laughter.] Which, which... It's that on the one hand we're talking about a process, whereas, on the other hand you are very much describing an institution that would be a solution to a problem that was (it seemed to me) the premise of the way Colin was asking the question originally. And so, it's as though the two papers are talking about two modes of caring. One, which is the Revolution, needs to be in the process. Whereas the idea of the Hospital—the fantasy of the Hospital—is that it's somehow going to create a solution to a problem. Which leads Colin to ask his question in the way Rebecca says he shouldn't. [Group laughter.] If I got that right?

**Meranze:** I'm not certain that's right actually.

**Nash:** Pardon me?

**Meranze:** I'm not sure that's right.

**Nash:** Okay.

**Türk:** Sarah with a small one?

**Sarah Knott:** I just wanted to hook onto that because it seems to me that the paper does treat the Hospital as institution, although it often doesn't treat the Hospital's stories about itself as primarily a story for those on the outside (rather than the inside). So, it inherently cannot tell the story of those on the inside, because it's interested in soliciting a response from those on the outside. But, in terms of thinking about the Hospital as a process... What strikes me in terms of the way children get figured in that process is actually the way in which physicians who get caught up in the Foundling Hospital go on to make hay about children more generally, right? And, so, the insider knowledge that's created for physicians in that hospital is then used to talk about children more generally. And so you might—if you want to produce this fairly antagonistic reading of what those physicians and founders were up to—you might want to think about the ways in which those children are positioned as standing in for the children of people of condition whose mothers and nurses could do well by noticing that plain and simple living does better by their charges, right. And so, there's a way in which the physicians in their own way and distinctive to the founders are erasing those children from consideration in a way that may be more on the ground than the very obvious appeal to the state and to donors that's about a useful future work force and the fate of the nation.

**Seiler-Smith:** Yeah. The medical section is still being written, but in it I talk a lot more about the doctors, the attending physicians who came in and produced this work. So, I talk about some of the more, ominous, sort of, you know... they're like Cadogan's main experiments and they failed. I'm like, "Well, how, how did they fail?" So, I talk little about some of his findings and Jenner's experiments as well, and, and Sloane, etcetera. But, you're absolutely right, I think that is another form, that part of medical progress is, is banking on the idea that these children form test subjects that you can then go out and foster other children. So, these children are also useful because they protect other children, and that's where the immunization paradigm comes in for me. That the office that these children are sort of holding is, in many ways, not just inoculating themselves... Not just being inoculated so as to protect vitality in the hospital, but a national vitality that was epistemological and medical, etcetera, as well as this bodily matter.

**Knott:** Can I just add one quick thing to that? So, it seems like inoculation is the sort of great test case for you to make this point, right, that the children are being treated as a collectivity and a very useful collectivity. One of the things that I noticed when I went back and re-read William Cadogan (because you made me curious about him) is that he, in the early 1740s, makes a claim that children feel less pain than adults. Okay? So, he makes a claim that it's like a twig being less affected by a storm than an oak, so that's the metaphor; but it's a different history than the one I was expecting, because in Joanna Bourke's history of pain, she sees that as a *late* eighteenth-century development. And so, I'm wondering... I'm wondering if it's not your institutions that would produce that first generalization, because until that moment you have what I would see as a much more intuitive reading—which is that infants are uniquely susceptible to stimulus and to disease environment. So if you could, if there's a... it seems to me that there might well be a medical history that plays very nicely to the broader critique you want to mete out. But I think in terms of the register of pain, not the kind of test case of inoculation.

**Türk:** Finally, Michael.

**Meranze:** I have I guess two inter-related thoughts in response to this discussion, one for Fabienne and one for Rachel. You know it seems to me that part of the issue that's come up has to do, and it's sort of what Colin was "incorrectly" pointing to—

**Spang:** Oh, I'm sorry!

**Meranze:** There is in a way... there are real questions here about historical perspective. You know, when you say that someone like Hanway is complicit... I don't even know what that means, in the sense that Hanway was trying to create a particular society. It wasn't that Hanway was claiming to be liberating children and instead, you know, secretly selling them off to slave traders; Hanway thought that a disciplined bourgeois society was simply better for everybody, and he wanted to create institutions like that. So, the only real way I think "complicit" works with someone like Hanway is that if you assume that Hanway should have known that the only way to solve the problems that Hanway wanted to solve was by virtue of a revolution, and (in that case) Hanway's reformism was preventing something more radical. Right? But, A) there's no way for Hanway to know that and B) Hanway thought bourgeois society was what you wanted. So, he's not "complicit," he's a creator of this world or he wants to be a creator of this world.

Complicity implies a certain either ignorance or bad faith, it seems to me. When you say, as a graduate student, that academics are complicit in things... You know, the point is that we claim that we want to have equality while we're underpaying you and doing all sorts of other things that faculty members do and, therefore, we're complicit in a system that allegedly goes against our values. But Hanway wasn't complicit in a situation that went against his values, these *were* his values. So, that's question number one; that's for you, Rachel.

**Seiler-Smith:** Okay..

**Meranze:** And then, I wanted to get back to something that Rob said about Fabienne's people being naïve which is where Colin's incorrect interpretation comes in [group laughter]...

**Schneider:** You're never going to live that down....

**Spang:** I'll just resign now....

**Meranze:** There's a way, there's a really interesting way in which we're all very keen to assume that all these discourses have power. Except in the sense that you've got a community—and there was an equivalent one in England around Wollstonecraft and others—who believe that in some ways you could create a new world out of better conversation and better conversational communities. So, there's a way in which, when it comes to the notion that speaking in a different way could actually create a better world, we're prepared to say it's naïve—

**Schneider:** Alright, you got me. [Group chuckles].

**Meranze:** —whereas, when we're inclined to think of a speech as part of complicity and the oppression of others, we're willing to give power to speech. And it seems to me that we take... You know, this is a sort of a question of what do you expect speech to accomplish, and you're attempting to recover a moment where people actually believed that speech could make a *good* difference; whereas, most everyone else is talking about speech that, in a certain way, is *damaging* somebody else. Except for Shelley, who doesn't know what he's talking about [group chuckles] and, therefore, we can discount him—right? So, there's an interesting set of things about historical perspective, but also about the way in which we're taking perspectives on different sort of speech, that seems to me floating around this panel.

**Seiler-Smith:** I don't necessarily agree with you. I think that we can call Hanway complicit in the sense I think that not only is this still an intensely patriarchal society that also is, you know, establishing empire and, you know, involved forms of trade and, you know, increasingly sought, you know, in these social stratifications to both attempt to try to create a labor force, but also not give them a lot of sustainable forms of life. And, I think that even though he was trying to form a rational institution and form of reform that could at least account for and try protect some of them, there's certain forms of complicity that I think he takes part of and part of that complicity is seeing the children as, you know, this source of labor that, you're absolutely right, I don't think that he would anticipate as problematic; but, that nonetheless as we're thinking about it and as we're wondering where our history of welfare and other social programs come from and as an eighteenth-centuryist I'm a staunch believer that a lot of the stuff we get for good and for ill, are,

you know, things, the eighteenth century matters, right, who cares, we care about the eighteenth century because it matters.

**Meranze:** But it's the... I guess the question I would ask would be: Was George Bush complicit in the Iraq War or was the Iraq War what George Bush was creating? We wouldn't say "George Bush was complicit in the Iraq War." We might say "Hillary Clinton was complicit in the Iraq War."

**Seiler-Smith:** Sure. Hanway was not the creator of the Foundling Hospital.

**Meranze:** No, but he was the creator of a lot of things, and this is part of a much larger program that has to do with prisons and marine laws and a lot of things.

**Seiler-Smith:** Absolutely. And poor laws...

**Meranze:** And so in that sense this is simply one node of his activity.

**Seiler-Smith:** Absolutely, and he was a governor of the hospital, he wasn't creator of the Hospital. And, once more, I do think that—and I didn't talk about it here, so you know, part of it is representational fairness, I didn't get to show it here—but I think when he's talking about parish officers, there's this intense complicity in how he accepts the children's death at the hand of the workhouse officers. The way he formulates... and it's very clear that he's, whether it's for political posturing or, you know, intentional, we can't really know, but they way that he positions it... it's very clear that he understands it, that this is something that is very reprehensible, and yet they're doing this, and he offers them this boon and he also offers this recuperative reading—and then situates himself as someone who's doing something similar, but that ultimately they have this alternative space for it. And, for me, that is a form of complicity. You know, I think there's, you know... There's a lot of things George Bush was complicit in, the Iraq War was just one of the things that he generated out of it, but Hanway wasn't a creator of that, he wasn't a creator of the prison system either. So, I guess the question is: are reformers complicit or are they creators? But, that becomes a problem, right, because reform is in part new and in part taking something and re-shaping it.

**Meranze:** That's why I think the word is problematic. I mean "complicity."

**Seiler-Smith:** Complicity, yeah, sure.

**Ellen Malenas Ledoux:** Dick Cheney engineered it, I think. [Group laughter].

**Moore:** I just want to add, you know... I appreciate your, that sort of pitching the two papers in that way because I do think that, you know, *Bouche de Fer* is on the side of performative... sort of the word as sort of performative action, and so the psychologization of the word. I mean, you know, the speech act as being able to change people and ideas. And so, I think it's—and Shelley's very much relevant, poetry is relevant, Bonneville was a poet—and so you have this sort of very odd mixture of political speech couched in sort of poetical images and metaphors. I found that fascinating. The belief, you know, in the transformative, performative aspect of language is

sort of inspiring and interesting, because I wonder whether this is something that is still...especially in the context of revolution, is still the case. And so how, you know, what are the drawbacks and what are the... sort of optimistic side of that?

**Türk:** Small by Alex?

**Alex Tipei:** I was just going to say I think the complicit question is actually related to the issue of Colin's interpretations of the French Revolution in the sense that he ascribes a particular type of intentionality to it, instead of taking it on its own terms. I taught the French Revolution with Rebecca, and one of the things I would ask the students is "have you heard the word 'revolution,' yet anywhere in the texts?" If you go through...I don't remember what year they got to before they found the word "revolution" in a reading. So to say that somebody is complicit is to say they seem complicit from my point of view, or to say we know it was a revolution so we now give them the intentionality that we have with hindsight. You know, instead of saying, "well what did he...?" or "I don't know if it was political posturing or not." You know, how can we know? We can't, right.

**Seiler-Smith:** But we can know what he represents and what it's doing. For me, the best example I can give is Swift; I don't think I'm the only one reading these things this way, and I think there's eighteenth-centuryists who do. You know, for one example, just to sort of connect it back to the transformative thing... Obviously I think language is transformative, I just think that it's powerful and transformative in some ways we might not like or that might be violent, but you were talking about the Mary Wollstonecraft circle and what's so interesting is ...Absolutely she saw, you know, better conversation inspiring, but she also saw the dangers of certain forms of representation, right. She's constantly reading against certain fictions of women and also fictions or representations of sympathy that, to her, actually shield a lot of the problems going on. So, for her writing against Burke in *Rights of Woman* she says, "you talk about, you shed all these tears for Marie Antoinette and you have all these feelings for this woman and yet, you know, it's actually this sort of classist and really problematic view" and she says it actually throws this veil over those suffering from actual violence. And so, she says: the whipped slave, the sick person dying in the ditches, the woman who's been neglected, and the prisoner who is, you know, neglected in the cell... So her whole point is a lot of times when we're claiming sympathy for a woman, right, ...

**Meranze:** Right. But that's a critique of—and I agree—in part that's a critique of the culture of sensibility's fetishism of the individual sufferer. Which is why it seems so powerful to claim that they don't actually provide narratives of these individual kids. We're still the inheritors of this culture of sensibility to the extent that we think they should actually be providing individual kid narratives, rather than the statistics.

**Türk:** Before we go to Christy, I want to make a remark myself. There's a wonderful text we should have included in the reader which is by Jacob Burckhardt, and it's called *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, so of *Happiness and Unhappiness in World History* where he talks exactly about that. How difficult it is not to read a life in the eighteenth century and think, "man, this guy was really unhappy, and I want to liberate him." [Group laughter]. Out of the tradition that was founded by the German school of historiography where you think objectivity has to do with not,

with withholding my own values from what I describe and we're back to a model that's more rhetorical, right; the way rhetoric was taught that you use everything as an example, and I think that that's a very imperial move toward the past.

**Meranze:** Which one?

**Türk:** The rhetorical model because it assumes there is actually no real essential historical difference [between now and then] and that's why... but, Laura.

**Laura Stevens:** I wanted to come back to Fabienne, and to ask you... You talk on page 229 of the reader about *Le Cercle* as a "*symbole éternel de l'égalité*." And thinking about the question of "who cares?" I'm wondering about the fashioning of this group as *cercle*, as a *Cercle social*, and I'm thinking about the history of the idea of these *cercles* and the *société* as sort of closed societies and the sort of elitist history of that notion of the *cercle*. I'm just wondering, sort of... what is the social and political valence of the activities of *cercle* as a *cercle* in terms of the subjects that they're looking at and their sort of banner missions? It sort of strikes me that the way in which what's going on here—in terms of the way they're speaking for these people and translating the *Contrat Social*—that they're sort of replicating what ends up shaking down in the National Assembly where they're sort of, "No, third estate people you don't get to represent yourself, I the aristocrat will represent you. I can speak better to your needs." And so, I'm just, I'm not sure, but I'm wondering about this idea of *the Cercle* "*symbole éternel de l'égalité*" and at the same time it's a closed circle.

**Moore:** Except that it's a huge one; it's cosmic in its size. It is meant to be global; it is meant to be all encompassing. And, the distinction there would be more with the club as a sort of code word for *salon*, but I think it doesn't want to be that... It doesn't want to be factious that way and that's why it's reaching out to the provinces; it's reaching out to, you know, America... to sort of elsewhere wanting to incorporate all those different perspectives. That said, you know, of course that there's a tension within the members around participation in freemasonry. And so, there would be more about whether or not the secrecy of freemasonic rites and gatherings is important or necessary... and I think they were trying to get out of that. They're really trying to sort of... They see the suspicion that surrounds freemasonry and sort of want... And some of them, you know, they are masons, and so it's very much present, especially in Bonneville. I think that's why there is this controversy about the style Bonneville, uses which often Fauchet perceives as sort of too esoteric and too mystical. So there is a tension, but it would be more towards the kind of circles that freemasons have created.

Now, what's been difficult about, you know, evaluating *La Bouche de Fer* is trying to understand the kind of contributions that might not have been selected. The ones that were silenced; you know, all those letters that might have been dropped in "*la bouche de fer*" [the mailbox] that we know nothing about. I don't know how to... you know, sort of, I don't know how to deal with that. The periodical doesn't really have a narrator, but there is, there are editors. And so, then, what kind of editing job do they do and how do we know about that? That's really difficult because there are a lot of contradictory voices, so I feel there is a sort of representation... but to what extent, I'm not sure about that. So, I wonder about outside of their circle, what letters may have been rejected or not? I don't know.

**Meranze:** Was it a stoic circle? Was it...I mean, Sarah and I used to talk about this, because there was a Quaker imitation of a stoic circle that gets imported in the eighteenth century in the Anglo context. You know, the sort of stoic circle of the world that emanates out and isn't just a club, and then the Quakers take it over in order to model how far emotion can go and it starts within the family and then goes out and covers the whole world eventually.

**Moore:** I don't know.

**Knott:** I've not seen a French version of that. *The Circle of the Social and Benevolent Affections* is first published in 1789 in tandem with the passing of the U.S. constitution, so very much of this revolutionary moment, of thinking about society that...

**Meranze:** And it's a take on an older, Classical...

**Moore:** There are connections with lodges, Freemasons' lodges in England, you know—and they're very sort of respectful and eager in anticipation about those connections.

**Jager:** But everybody hates freemasons, right? [Group chuckles].

**Türk:** There's Laura—is that right?

**Stevens:** Thank you. I just had just two comments for Rachel. First, I don't know if this would be helpful for you, but Bernard Mandeville's *Essay on Charity* might be something worth looking at maybe in keeping with Swift. I think your critique of the Foundling Hospital would be more powerful if you devote a little bit more time to considering the, the intentions and the rhetoric of the Hospital on its own terms. So, building on the earlier comment on religious iconography, I'm wondering if you've given any attention to...I believe there were charity sermons preached for the Foundling Hospital, that might be a good source to look at just to see how the theology of charity is developing in these sermons. Maybe a point of triangulation would be (or just sort of a comparison anyway) would be the SPCK, Society for the Promoting of Christian Knowledge: their annual sermons, especially for the charity schools which were actually preached to like four thousand charity school students across London. So, that would be an interesting point of comparison for thinking about charity and caretaking in relationship to children. I'm just wondering... Even if you just flip through the sermons and looked at what biblical text was used in each sermon, it could give you a sort of survey of how child-centric this is. How...you know, I haven't read these surveys, so I don't know if they're primarily about an abstracted ideal of care or if they're citing Jesus let the children come to me—that would be a very different theological message. But I feel like I'd like—I, for one, would like—to see more of what the theology and philosophy is that is being brought to the founding of the Foundling Hospital and the ongoing work of fundraising.

**Seiler-Smith:** They... I have read the sermons actually, and I was going to include for your amusement, but I decided not to because it's actually kind of horrific... A lot of the hymns that they wrote for the Foundling Hospital. A lot of the sermons are about gratitude, a lot of the sermons are about gratitude, and a lot of them are about work. I don't remember the exact passages and my Bible skills are repressed in a lot of ways, but I do remember that overwhelmingly they



were about gratitude and... sort of work and charitable work as well. And then the hymns themselves: there are a couple that are very much, you know, the “Jesus loves all the children, Jesus loves me” type thing—there were certainly ones like that. But a lot of them also contain this theme of gratitude, in which they’re saying “I’m so grateful that God is providing for me in this particular way.” So, it’s—

**Stevens:** So the sermons are speaking for the children?

**Seiler-Smith:** Some of them, and some of them are dictating for the children... You know, “oh, precious child... oh, how grateful you must be” like, you know. But, yeah, absolutely some of them are written from the perspective of the children, but they’re obviously scripted not by the children. And then, they have children come and sing, and so the people who, you know, wrote music would come ... and there were also lots of concerts held, right? The Hospital became a fashionable place to see art and to see music and concerts. But, the children were often, except for the choir, kept out of sight at these things.... except for parts where they come into perform, it was often empty of the children in the rooms and it was where people would come for the galleries. And, they still maintained the rooms, I don’t know how they accomplished this feat, the actual original Foundling Hospital building is gone, but they rooms that they had remain. But, yes, the sermons are definitely there. [pause]

**Türk:** I think the silence is an expression of happiness, actually. [Group laughter].

**Robin Bates:** Yeah. I wanted to ask about the flight to Varennes because it’s the last part of the paper. It’s the last thing in the periodical, and it seems to also be an ending in a third way—in that it sort of represents a foreclosure of a moment when more things were possible. The line is, “There no longer exists this alleged convention of a people with our Kings; Louis abdicated royalty; from now on Louis is nothing for us, unless he becomes our enemy.” In a way this is odd because no one dates the Terror this early, I don’t think. The monarchy continues for a year (which in revolutionary time is a long time), the war hasn’t started yet. So what is about the flight to Varennes that makes it the turning point in some ways?

**Moore:** You know... I know from that sort of reading in the moment, I think it’s an enormous sense of betrayal and disappointment.

**Bates:** Yeah.

**Moore:** I think there was interest in keeping the monarchy and wanting to go the way of the constitutional monarchy. There was no sort of contradiction between the Declaration and the monarchy until that happened. And then, you know, that beautiful rhetoric that one has at the beginning of the periodical turns quite ugly and, sort of... You know there is in their mouths a sort of very critical and sort of fairly disgusting song about the king. And so, very quickly, you know... With Bonneville, it’s like a switch: the figure of the king becomes vile because of what he’s done, because of his betrayal. And, I think what happens at the end, it’s sort of the ellipses at the end of my paper. The question that really divides everyone is should we care about the king and the queen now? Should they be forgiven? And, should they be tried and if tried what should be the consequences and the punishment? And, I think this, you know, suddenly no one can agree on

that. Particularly the Girondins, and they're so divided that it actually becomes they're undoing. The Jacobins are much more united about the death of the royalty and then let's start over; whereas, the Girondins can't quite decide one shouldn't care.

**Bates:** Yeah.

**Türk:** We have Ellen and Rebecca with a small remark, and we have one minute maximum, so I'm not sure—

**Spang:** We can go a little late because we've got half an hour until the next session.

**Ledoux:** Robin actually asked my question, so I'm going to cede the floor to Rebecca.

**Spang:** I was just going to bring the flight to Varennes more directly to our theme. Before there's a question of whether or not we care about the king—which, I agree, does get posed at that moment of the flight to Varennes—but what that the flight to Varennes makes so obvious is that the king doesn't care about his people. Right? So that whole fiction of constitutional monarchy is shattered at that point, which is why the Constituent Assembly develops this whole elaborate story of how he was stolen, he was king-napped [group chuckles]... So that it's not... That's what they come up with, so that it wasn't his intention. He may be somehow "complicit"...

**Meranze:** It was the *curés'* fault.

**Spang:** Right. "It was the awful Austrians." So, that's how they can then stick with the idea of a king for the next thirteen months, if he wasn't responsible.

**Türk:** Anyone?

**Meranze:** And it's true ...You know, during the American Revolution, right, they... It takes them...The king basically disowns them seven months before they can bring themselves to declare independence. And when they finally declare independence, basically they just are mimicking the English Bill of Rights about James. They're basically saying George III is now James II, but they're actually at war for a year before they can bring themselves to disown the king and the king has disowned them as of December 1775. So, there's something weirdly... They can't bring themselves to bring down their king, which we now know as presidents [group laughter].