

STATE IMMIGRATION LAWS AND IMMIGRANT ECONOMIC INCORPORATION
ACROSS THE 50 UNITED STATES

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States within the US have increasingly taken initiative regarding immigration matters by enacting laws that escalate state-level immigration enforcement, limit immigrants' access to work and social benefits, or conversely, extend benefits to immigrants. These developments in immigration federalism have forced immigrants to navigate a greater range of contexts and raise the question of how variation in state policy portfolios impact the economic outcomes of first- and second-generation immigrants. This dissertation identifies four types of state-level immigration policy configurations: *exclusionist* states treat immigrants as criminals by ramping up state-level enforcement and denying them rights and benefits; *rights restrictionist* states limit immigrant access to rights, benefits, and jobs, but remain uninvolved in immigration enforcement; *inclusionist* states view immigrants as contributors and allocate additional rights and benefits to them; and *noninterventionist* states do not enact immigration laws. In my first empirical chapter, I use 2000-2015 American Community Survey data together with inferred legal status derived from cross-survey multiple imputation (CSMI) to show that exclusionist states depress unauthorized women's participation in the labor force. This finding challenges assimilation theories' presumption that all anti-immigrant policies limit immigrant integration. Exclusionist states' legal violence, or the ever-present fear resulting from immigration enforcement, may be key in blocking immigrant economic success. However, using 1998-2015 Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG) and CSMI, my second empirical chapter finds that state policy does little to alter the authorized-unauthorized

wage gap; this wage gap closed during the economic recession, across all state policy contexts. Using 1998-2015 CPS-MORG data, my third empirical chapter demonstrates that state laws do not affect the labor force participation and wages of the second generation or their wage gap with non-Hispanic, native-born whites. Therefore, despite highlighting the distinctive policy configurations that immigrants meet, this dissertation shows substantial homogeneity in immigrants' economic outcomes across the fifty states. State policy effects may not be felt due to vertical differentiation in the context of reception. National economic trends may limit variation in wage offerings and local business practices may attenuate the impact of state policy on the employment of immigrant and second-generation workers.

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Chapter One – Introduction

The 2000s saw an upswing in the passage of US state-level immigration laws, or laws related to immigrant entry, immigrant exclusion, and the physical expulsion of immigrants. Upon signing one such law, Georgia’s Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act in 2011, Governor Nathan Deal stated, “This immigration reform measure fulfills my promise to Georgians to crack down on the influx of illegal immigrants into our state... we wish to partner with the federal government to enforce the current law of the nation.” Before 1996, state-level immigration laws such as Georgia’s violated the federal government’s plenary power, or sole authority, over immigration policymaking.¹ In 1996, however, the federal Illegal Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) allowed for state participation in immigration enforcement through the 287g program, a program that trained state and local-level law enforcement officers in immigration enforcement. This piece of legislation marked the rise of immigration federalism, where the federal government redistributed and shared its immigration powers with the states. However, not all states have embraced their new role as immigration enforcers. States have prohibited state and local police from inquiring about a person’s immigration status and have refused to hold immigrants in custody to be transferred to Immigration and Customs Enforcement. These state governors have expressed their frustration with the US immigration system; for example, Governor Jerry Brown proclaimed, “While Washington waffles on immigration, California’s forging ahead.”

¹ In *Chae Chan Ping v. United States* (1889), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the federal government had the sole control over immigration policy, or laws regulating immigrant entry and exit, but states could regulate immigrant integration. The federal government still maintains primary authority over immigration enforcement, but states have passed immigration laws.

Similarly, states' role in immigrant integration has expanded since 1996. That year, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which delegated decisions regarding immigrant welfare eligibility to the states. In response, state governments have taken initiative and passed immigrant social rights laws, or laws regulating noncitizens' access to work and benefits. States have passed integrationist social rights laws that have increased legal immigrants' access to state-funded welfare benefits and have gone even further by passing laws providing unauthorized immigrants with access to professional licensing opportunities, driver's licenses, and higher education. Extending these rights to immigrants has been framed as a way to benefit the state community and economy. For instance, extending driver's licenses to unauthorized immigrants generates revenue for states; allowing unauthorized immigrants to obtain in-state tuition increases society's overall education level. But states have also restricted both legal and unauthorized immigrants' access to work and public benefits. Proponents of restrictionist rights laws have framed immigrants as unfair competitors for jobs, threats to national security, and free-riders on the welfare system.

The rise of immigration federalism has coincided with the geographic dispersion of immigrants across the United States. Historically, immigrants predominately settled in six US states: California, New York, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, and Illinois (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Immigrants settled in these states because they were geographically close to their homelands and so reduced the cost of their journey; Asian immigrants frequently settled in California and other states along the west coast, Mexican immigrants often settled along the southwest border, and many Eastern European immigrants settled in the northeast. Concentration in these states continued through the operation of ethnic networks, as family and friends provided assistance to fellow coethnics (Liaw and Frey 2007; Massey et al. 1998). However,

since the 1990s, immigrants have geographically dispersed across the United States (Massey 2008). The largest absolute concentrations of immigrants remain in traditional migration states, but Southern and Midwestern states have seen the greatest growth in the size of their immigrant population (Marrow 2011; Massey 2008). The geographic dispersion of immigrants into “new destination” states resulted from selective border militarization along the U.S.-Mexico border, which shifted the migration path for many immigrants, and from local minimum wage and zoning ordinances, which pushed immigrants out of traditional destinations (Light 2006; Massey 2008). Economic factors have pulled immigrants to new states, such as the expansion of employment opportunities and more affordable housing (Massey 2008; McConnell 2008).

Taken together, geographic dispersion and immigration federalism have resulted in immigrants navigating a greater variety of contexts within the United States. These developments raise the question of how state policy context impacts the economic incorporation of immigrants. Immigration scholars have emphasized the importance of the context of reception, or the structural and cultural features of a location that affect immigrants’ incorporation (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). As a form of native reception, policy, along with economic structure and coethnic community presence, influences immigrants’ economic success (Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Reitz 2002). Immigration research has shown the effects of federal policies on immigrants’ economic outcomes (Donato, Durand, and Massey 1992; Donato and Massey 1993; Donato, Aguilera, and Wakabayashi 2005; Donato et al. 2008; Donato and Sisk 2012; Gentsch and Massey 2011; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Phillips and Massey 1999), but it has not yet systematically examined the influence of state-level policy. A consideration of state-level laws is important, as research has demonstrated the power of state-level laws to reproduce or reduce racial and gender inequality (Beggs 1995; Kmec and Skaggs

2014; Stainback, Robinson, and Tomaskovic-Devey 2005). Further, the combination of immigration laws and social rights laws at the state level may result in unique contexts of reception. This project shifts the focus of immigration research to the state level and analyzes the effects of both immigration and social rights laws through the creation of a state typology. This dissertation is guided by the following research questions:

1. Is US state policy context associated with the labor force participation of immigrants?
2. Does US state policy context moderate the wage gap between authorized and unauthorized immigrant workers?
3. Is US state policy context associated with the labor force participation and wages of second-generation immigrants?

All analyses rely on a new measure of state policy context. To date, studies that have examined the effects of state-level policy on non-economic outcomes have used measures that do not differentiate between immigration and social rights policy or only examine one type of policy. For example, studies examining immigrant political incorporation have used counts of anti-immigrant legislation (Okamoto and Ebert 2010); those examining immigrant settlement used an internal border control measure that only includes enforcement and restrictionist rights laws (Leerkes, Bachmeier, and Leach 2013); and those examining education used a scale that only includes inclusionist rights laws (Filindra, Blanding, and Garcia Coll 2011). This dissertation recognizes that states regulate both immigrant admission and rights (Tichenor 2002) and that these two types of policies may affect immigrant economic integration. It creates a state policy typology to capture states' position on immigration and social rights policies.

Analyses use multi-level quantitative methods on two large nationally-representative datasets, the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS), in conjunction with state-level contextual data. ACS and CPS are the most-often used data sources

for studying labor force and wage inequality, yet scholars have noted that the lack of information on immigrant status is a weakness of these data (Massey and Bartley 2005). This dissertation relies on cross-survey multiple imputation (CSMI) to infer legal status in the ACS and CPS. CSMI predicts unauthorized status in the ACS and CPS by using the characteristics of known unauthorized immigrants in a “donor” sample, the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). CSMI techniques are applied to the first and second analyses to assess the extent to which state laws promote or hinder immigrants’ economic success above and beyond, or in conjunction with, their legal status.

Background

Laws regulating immigrant entry and exit have been considered the domain of the federal government, but the passage of IIRIRA and PRWORA marked the beginning of a “new era of immigration federalism” (Suro 2015). IIRIRA established that states could participate in immigration enforcement, and states have passed immigration-type laws that seek to either exacerbate or buffer federal efforts. Laws regulating immigrant integration, through the designation or denial of social rights, have largely fallen under state domain. The passage of PRWORA, which disqualified authorized immigrants who had lived in the United States for fewer than five years from welfare benefits, transferred the authority to states to make additional immigrants eligible for benefits. This section reviews relevant federal and state immigration and social rights laws enacted since the 1980s.

Immigration Laws

In an attempt to control unauthorized migration, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986. IRCA provided amnesty to millions of unauthorized immigrants in the United States, but it also increased border enforcement and established

employer sanctions, which allowed the federal government to fine employers when they knowingly hired undocumented workers. In 1996, Congress again increased border enforcement and amplified interior enforcement through IIRIRA. This act increased the number of Border Patrol agents to 10,000 and required the construction of a 14 mile-long fence along the Mexico-U.S. border (Fragomen 1997). IIRIRA established the 287(g) program, which gave INS/DHS the authority to enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies. These agreements allow state and local police to assist federal authorities in the arrest and detention of unauthorized immigrants. IIRIRA also increased the offenses for which migrants could be deported, including some misdemeanors, and expedited the removal of immigrants who attempted to enter through a port of entry with fraudulent documents. The 1996 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) increased the number of immigrants subject to deportation; any immigrants who had ever committed a crime in the past, even those who were legal permanent residents, were subject to deportation. Finally, the 2001 Patriot Act authorized the Attorney General to deport any noncitizen, without a hearing or presentation of evidence, if they are suspected of committing, furthering, or facilitating acts of terrorism. Congress has yet to pass legislation that is not punitive against the unauthorized population.²

Many states and counties have entered agreements with DHS to enforce federal immigration law. In 2002, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement became the first enforcement agency to enter a 287(g) agreement (Meissner et al. 2013). States also cooperate with ICE by sharing the legal status information of unauthorized immigrants who have applied for state-level benefits or programs. Other states have pre-empted the federal government in

² However, President Obama issued a 2012 executive order, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), which offers temporary work permits to unauthorized immigrants who entered the country at a young age.

immigration enforcement by taking on enforcement officers' responsibilities. In 2010, Arizona enacted SB 1070, which required state and local enforcement officials to ask about the immigration status of a person involved in a stop, detention, or arrest. SB 1070 also made it a crime not to carry immigration papers and allowed state police to arrest anyone that they had "probable cause to believe" had committed a crime and could be deported. While an injunction was filed on the law after it was passed, in 2012 the Supreme Court upheld the provision in 1070 that allowed state and local law enforcement to check an individual's immigration status during police procedures. Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah have passed laws patterned after the Arizona law. States have also heightened their enforcement efforts by preventing unauthorized immigrants from obtaining bail, bond, or parole. These laws view unauthorized immigrants as a flight risk and keep them in custody to facilitate their deportation.

Instead of increasing immigration enforcement, other states have implemented sanctuary laws. Originally, the passage of IRCA led some cities to pass sanctuary ordinances in response to local law enforcement officers being involved in employer audits (Wells 2004). Sanctuary laws vary from state to state, but generally, these laws prohibit state employees from inquiring about a person's immigration status or from disclosing information about an individual's immigration status. Stronger state sanctuary laws are non-cooperation laws that prevent law enforcement officers from complying with an ICE detainer unless the detainee has been convicted of a felony. Some state sanctuary laws also prevent the use of state resources or institutions for the enforcement of federal immigration. Finally, some states have added protections for immigrants during the judicial process; these laws require courts to advise defendants of immigration consequences when pleading guilty or *no lo contender*. If found guilty, immigrants could be

viewed as having committed an “aggravated felony,” which initiates removal proceedings for both legal permanent residents and undocumented immigrants.³

Social Rights Laws at the Federal Level

IRCA, IIRIRA, PRWORA, and the Real ID Act have delineated immigrants’ rights to work and rights to benefits at the federal level. IRCA’s employer sanctions require all employers to fill out I-9 forms to document that they verified the identity and immigration status of their new employees. To complete an I-9 form, employers examine a new employee’s documentation and determine if it “reasonably appears to be genuine.” Employers retain the I-9 form for their records and make it available for inspection by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) if they are audited. DHS fines employers who do not fill out an I-9 form for each employee or who employ individuals that they know are unauthorized to work in the United States. In 1996, IIRIRA piloted the “Basic Pilot” program. Instead of relying on employers’ determinations of immigrants’ legal status, the Basic Pilot program allowed employers to electronically verify new employees’ documentation with INS. Employer participation in the Basic Pilot program was voluntary and was available in five states: California, Florida, Illinois, New York and Texas. In 2003, Congress expanded the program to all 50 states, and in 2007, renamed the program to E-Verify. In 2008, Congress required all federal contractors to use E-verify.

Congress restricted immigrants’ access to welfare through PRWORA. Before PRWORA legal permanent residents, refugees and asylees, and immigrants residing under PRUCOL (“Permanently Residing Under Color of Law” – signifying that INS was aware of an undocumented person’s presence in the US but had no plans to deport him or her) were eligible

³ An “aggravated felony” does not need to be “aggravated” or a “felony” to be considered an aggravated felony as deemed by Congress. Examples of aggravated felonies include theft, falsifying a tax return, and missing a court date.

for federal benefits. PRWORA distinguished “qualified” from “not-qualified” immigrants. Qualified immigrants included lawful permanent residents, refugees and asylees, Cuban/Haitian entrants, abused immigrants and their children, and certain persons granted withholding of deportation and removal. Not-qualified immigrants included undocumented immigrants and authorized temporary immigrants. The law prohibits not-qualified immigrants from enrolling in federal benefit programs such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Food Stamps, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and Medicaid. The law also implemented a “five-year bar,” which prohibits qualified immigrants who entered on or after the law’s passage on August 22, 1996 from receiving these benefits for five years after securing qualified immigrant status. The benefit programs verify immigrant eligibility through the use of the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE), where a copy of an immigrant’s documents are forwarded to DHS for verification in their database. PRWORA also designated nonimmigrants and unauthorized immigrants as ineligible for professional occupational licenses, and IIRIRA designated unauthorized immigrants as ineligible for postsecondary education benefits.

In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act, which provided a set of requirements for state driver’s licenses if they were to be accepted by the federal government of for “official purposes,” such as boarding commercially-operated airline flights. The REAL ID Act resulted from the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and requires the inclusion biometrics and other machine-readable information on the ID cards in an effort to reduce the likelihood of counterfeiting. As part of the law, all noncitizen applicants for driver’s licenses or state identification cards must provide documentation of their lawful presence in the United States. States use the DHS’ SAVE system to verify the documents. States may issue driver’s licenses or identification cards to nonimmigrants (such as temporary guest workers and students) if the

license expires at the same time as their visa. REAL ID prevents unauthorized immigrants from obtaining drivers licenses. REAL ID has been implemented through phased enforcement, with half of the states in compliance as of this writing.

Social Rights Laws at the US State Level

In large part, states have extended or limited immigrants' social rights in response to federal legislation. States have expanded on IRCA to increase the penalties for employers found to have hired unauthorized workers. States revoke business licenses, impose additional fines, or prevent businesses from receiving government contracts if they have been found to hire unauthorized workers. With the establishment of E-verify, states began mandating the use of the program to ensure that employers did not hire unauthorized workers. In 2006, Georgia and Colorado were the first states to pass E-verify laws that required verification of worker eligibility by public employers and contractors (National Conference of State Legislatures 2016). Only two states, California and Illinois, have passed laws prohibiting state and city governments from requiring employers to use E-Verify. In addition to using E-Verify, states have regulated immigrants' access to the job market by serving as gatekeepers for immigrants' access to professional and trade occupations. Many state boards of licensing require immigrants to submit proof of their authorized legal status before obtaining a license to practice, and some teaching licenses or certifications require immigrants to be naturalized citizens. However, PRWORA allows states to extend licenses to unauthorized immigrants if states pass a law doing so. California, Florida, and Illinois have opened occupational opportunities to unauthorized

immigrants by providing a license to any immigrant who meets the qualifications, regardless of his or her legal status.⁴

Many states have expanded immigrants' rights to benefits, such as welfare, a college education, or a driver's license. PRWORA allowed states to use their own funds to provide benefits to LPRs during the five-year bar. As of 2015, 15 states extended this benefit to LPRs. However, PRWORA also provides states with the option of providing LPRs and other eligible immigrants with benefits using federal funding after the five-year ban. Some states, such as Texas, Indiana, and South Carolina, have chosen to deny benefits to all of their noncitizen population, even after the five-year ban. States have also expanded immigrants' rights by providing them with access to a college education by offering in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrant students, usually as long as they have graduated from high school in the state. In contrast, other states bar unauthorized immigrants from attending the state university system or from qualifying for in-state tuition. Without in-state tuition, many immigrants cannot afford to attend college. Finally, states have countered the REAL ID Act by allowing unauthorized immigrants to obtain driver's licenses. By offering unauthorized immigrants drivers' licenses, these immigrants will be less likely to be stopped for driving without a license, which could result in the start of the immigrant's deportation process. On the other hand, some states not only require authorized legal status for a driver's license, but they have also linked driver's license expiration dates to the expiration date on immigrants' green cards or visa.

Finally, some states have gone one step further than the federal government by passing cultural regulations. The federal government requires English language proficiency for

⁴ Florida certifies unauthorized immigrants and Illinois certifies DACA recipients to practice law within their states. California offers all professional/occupational licenses to unauthorized immigrants.

immigrants to obtain citizenship, but it has not passed a law designating English as the official language of the United States. Many US states have designated English as the official language for state government documents, records, legislation, and hearings. English-only laws can prohibit non-English speaking immigrants from effectively representing themselves or obtaining state services. However, a few states have required some of their state agencies or programs to provide interpreters or interpreted materials to non-English speakers.

Immigrant Economic Incorporation

Economic and sociological theories explain immigrants' economic incorporation in terms of individual, country of origin, and country of reception characteristics. Early theories of immigrants' economic incorporation focus largely on the individual characteristics immigrants brought to the United States. Under human capital theory, immigrants' individual characteristics, such as high levels of educational attainment, strong English language skills, and a greater amount of time in the United States, predict their likelihood of economic success and integration into the host society (Alba and Nee 2003; Bean and Stevens 2003). Selection theory builds on human capital theory by arguing that the conditions in immigrants' country of origin either encourage the migration of immigrants low in human capital (negative selection) or high in human capital (positive selection). Positively-selected immigrants high in human capital will then be more likely to achieve economic success in the United States. The cultural transmission thesis highlights the cultural role of immigrants' countries of origins. This theory argues that childhood socialization into gendered norms and values in the country of origin will continue to shape women's attitudes towards work in the destination country; origin countries with conservative gendered norms will suppress female immigrants' economic incorporation in the US. In contrast, both segmented and new assimilation theory recognize that immigrants'

economic attainment depends on the context of reception they meet within the United States (Alba and Nee 2003; Marrow 2011; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). A hostile government reception, poor economic times, or a lack of a coethnic community prevent immigrants from capitalizing on their education and skills. Researchers have applied these theories to a wide range of indicators of immigrants' economic incorporation, including immigrants' labor force status, occupational status, and earnings (Akresh 2008; Borjas 1987; Chiswick 1999; Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004).

Selection Theory

Immigrants' characteristics differ from those of nonmigrants in the country of origin, and the difference in the characteristics is the immigrants' degree of selectivity. Immigrants may be positively or negatively selected; positively-selected immigrants have more education, skills, ability, or ambition than nonmigrants who remain in their country of origin; negatively-selected immigrants have less of these traits compared to those who remained (Borjas 1987). Because positively-selected immigrants have greater skills and ability, these immigrants are more successful in the destination country's labor market than negatively-selected immigrants. However, negatively-selected immigrants are rare (Feliciano 2005); instead, the degree of positive selection indicates the extent to which an immigrant group has more skills, ability, or ambition than another migrant group in the US and explains their better economic outcomes.

Economic, geographic, and political conditions in the country of origin influence the selectivity of the immigrant group. Immigrants from less-educated and developing nations are more likely to be positively selected (Feliciano 2005). Less-educated and developing nations commonly experience a "brain drain," where individuals who have obtained a higher education and advanced skill sets migrate to more developed countries to better reward their skills.

Immigrants from countries that are geographically close to their destination countries are more likely to be negatively selected (Borjas 1987; Feliciano 2005; Stewart and Dixon 2010; Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004). Immigrants who move greater geographic distances experience greater migration costs, so they must expect a large wage return to their education and skills. Consequently, individuals with more human capital will migrate, as they expect employers in the destination country will recognize their skills. Because the distance traveled is further, these immigrants are less likely to expect to return to their country of origin, and further invest in their human capital once settled. Political suppression or instability forces refugees to migrate, resulting in negative selection. In comparison to other legal immigrants, refugees have lower wages and occupational prestige (Akresh 2008; Connor 2010). However, immigrants from politically unstable countries, such as Iran, Cuba, and Vietnam, are positively selected (Borjas 1987). Immigrants from politically unstable countries, especially those countries transitioning to a Communist regime, may be positively selected because they seek refuge within and prefer the market economy.

Socialization & Cultural Transmission

Under selection theory, the political and economic conditions in the country of origin influence who migrates and their success within the host country. In addition to the political and economic conditions in the country of origin, a country's cultural norms influence immigrants' work attitudes and behaviors. Immigrants learn gendered values, norms, and attitudes in their country of origin. After migrating to the United States, immigrants from gender conservative countries experience more gender equality and opportunities for labor force participation. However, people draw on their cultural "tool-kits" to accomplish action, and immigrants continue to construct their action on their cultural equipment in changing circumstances (Swidler

1986). Under the cultural transmission thesis, elements of the origin culture that conflict with the host society's culture continue to influence behavior in new circumstances, especially if they are supported by social interaction. Immigrant women maintain gendered attitudes (Parrado and Flippen 2005), and immigrant women's work hours in the United States are positively associated with labor supply in the country of origin (Blau, Kahn, and Papps 2011). These findings suggest that conservative gender values learned in the country of origin have a persistent effect on female immigrants' workforce participation.

Context of Reception

Both segmented assimilation theory and new assimilation theory recognize that structural factors within the destination country provide opportunities for or restrict immigrant success (Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). A bifurcated economic structure, the lack of a coethnic community, or hostile societal reception and policy prevent immigrants from capitalizing on their education and skills. Research using the context of reception framework has compared immigrant group across different receiving nations to exploit variation in these factors (Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004), or has compared different national origin groups within the United States, as policy, societal reception, and coethnic community vary across groups (Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

Economic Structure

The restructuring of the American economy in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in an hourglass-shaped labor market with many low-wage service jobs and high-wage professional jobs, but few mid-level, skilled manufacturing jobs (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Skilled manufacturing jobs provided a key middle step in the economic mobility of immigrant families; without these jobs, low-skilled immigrants and their descendants must bridge jobs requiring a

high school degree or less and jobs requiring a college degree within one generation. While fewer economic opportunities in manufacturing result in fewer opportunities for economic mobility, the overall health of the labor market, rather than the health of a specific sector, provides job opportunities to immigrants. The lower the native unemployment rate, the lower the immigrant unemployment rate (Chiswick, Yinon, and Zach 1997; Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004). Additionally, many low-skilled immigrants have experienced upward mobility by breaking out from an informal labor market and ethnic economy into the formal labor market (Hagan, Lowe, and Quingla 2011).

Coethnic Community

The relative size of the immigrant group in the destination plays an important role in immigrants' economic outcomes. Larger immigrant groups provide an ethnic community that assists immigrants' adaptation to a new place. Large communities help new immigrants find jobs, often by practicing social closure (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Waldinger and Lichter 2003). If an immigrant group has a large enough presence within a certain company or economic sector, immigrants ensure that any new positions are filled with fellow coethnics. They maintain control over new hires by ensuring that job openings are not formally posted. Instead, immigrants know when fellow coethnics plan to leave their jobs and recommend other coethnics to their hiring managers. Additionally, higher education levels of the immigrant group may benefit new immigrants. If the coethnic community has many professionals or entrepreneurs, immigrants may hire coethnic immigrants in their businesses or provide them with the financial capital to start their own business. Research has shown that larger group size benefits immigrants' economic outcomes (Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004) and that immigrants in groups with high levels of education obtain higher wages (Levanon 2014).

Societal Reception: Boundaries & Social Closure

Both segmented and new assimilation theory argue that how natives receive immigrants impact their integration. New assimilation theorists draw on a boundary processes framework to explain how native reception of immigrants matters for immigrants' life chances. A boundary is a distinction made by actors to categorize people and separate them into groups (Lamont and Molnár 2002). In the United States, immigrants are distinguished from natives by their racial and ethnic differences and their noncitizen status (Alba 2005; Baubock 1994; Zolberg and Long 1999). These boundaries are socially-constructed; for example, racial boundaries highlight physical differences, but actors associate these physical traits with cultural or behavioral differences (Omi and Winant 1994); the native-immigrant boundary differentiates groups by their cultural practices; and citizenship differentiates groups on their birthplace, but birthplace is associated with "proof of belonging," such as knowledge of a US history or the English language (Alba 2005). Over time, the boundaries and beliefs about each group become widely-agreed upon and shape how society is organized. Negative associations toward one group lead to social closure, or behavioral patterns resulting in unequal access and distribution of resources between groups (Lamont and Molnár 2002). For example, racial minorities and immigrants are excluded from resources such as jobs, housing, or public accommodations. Group boundaries codified into law sustain between-group inequalities and further shape beliefs about the social categories.

Because boundaries are socially-constructed, not all boundaries are alike, and they vary across space and time (Alba 2005; Fox and Guglielmo 2012). Bright boundaries clearly distinguish group insiders from outsiders, but blurred boundaries transform clear-cut dichotomies into gradients so that a person's group membership is ambiguous (Alba 2005; Baubock 1994; Zolberg and Long 1999). In turn, the type of boundary in place affects immigrant incorporation.

Laws codifying bright immigrant-native boundaries facilitate the preservation of economic opportunities for native group members. To obtain these opportunities, immigrants must cross the boundary, either through naturalization or cultural assimilation. Laws blurring immigrant-native boundaries facilitate immigrant integration by providing them with access to natives' socioeconomic opportunities even without immigrant membership in this group. Evidence on the impact of boundaries has compared nations' citizenship regimes. Ethnic citizenship regimes (e.g. Switzerland, Germany, Austria) draw bright boundaries between citizens and immigrants by basing citizenship on parental origin of birth and imposing difficulties in obtaining citizenship, while civic citizenship regimes (Australia, Canada, France, and the US) base citizenship on universal political rights and immigrants have an easier naturalization process, thereby blurring the lines between citizens and noncitizens (Brubaker 1992). Countries with laws preventing access to citizenship are associated with lower immigrant political and sociocultural integration (Alba 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Countries with blurred citizenship policies and lean welfare states have relatively higher immigrant labor market participation (Koopmans 2009).

This dissertation focuses on state-sanctioned boundaries that differentiate immigrants from natives based on immigrants' legal status. In the United States, federal legislation has established bright boundaries between the immigrant and native population, and within the immigrant population based on their legal status. IRCA brightened the boundary between the authorized and unauthorized immigrant population by heightening border enforcement and establishing employer sanctions, which allowed the federal government to fine employers when they knowingly hired undocumented workers. IIRIRA again increased border enforcement and increased the offenses for which migrants, both legal permanent residents and unauthorized

immigrants, could be deported. PRWORA shifted the boundary so that legal immigrants must have lived in the United States for five years before receiving benefits, such as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and Medicaid. PRWORA designated nonimmigrants and unauthorized immigrants as ineligible for welfare benefits and other public benefits such as student loans for postsecondary education and professional occupational licenses.

Contributions

Together, human capital, selection, cultural transmission, and context of reception theories go far in explaining immigrants' economic performance in the United States. This dissertation contributes to research on immigrant incorporation by using the boundary processes framework to examine variation in immigrant reception by US state. Scholars have argued that "the striking [feature] of... the United States is not so much the variability of localities and regions, but the extent to which there is homogeneity in the enforcement of laws and regulations of the federal government" (Alba and Nee 2003:53). With the new era of immigration federalism, policy now differs across policy levels; the boundaries codified in state laws may either brighten or blur the native-immigrant boundaries within federal law, and federal and state laws may simultaneously affect immigrants (Marrow 2011).

Research has shown that federal policies matter for immigrants' economic incorporation, but state laws could matter as much or more because they are a more immediate context. This expectation is informed by policy research, which demonstrates that US state policies affect race and gender employment equality (Beggs 1995; Stainback, Robinson, and Tomaskovic-Devey 2005). Qualitative immigration research suggests that state-level laws that brighten native-immigrant boundaries, such as Arizona's SB 1070 that heightened immigration enforcement, has resulted in employers refusing to hire immigrants (Menjívar and Abrego 2012). I build on this

research by comparing immigrants' economic outcomes over time and across state policy contexts.

This dissertation makes a second contribution to immigration research by analyzing the effects of policies that blur boundaries between natives and immigrants. Past immigration research in the US has focused on the effects of bright boundaries; for example, by examining how federal enforcement laws or federal welfare restrictions affect immigrants' outcomes. However, cross-national policy research suggests that laws which blur native-immigrant boundaries, by ensuring equal access to citizenship and social rights, increase immigrants' political and cultural integration. Therefore, I expect states that blur the native-immigrant boundary to promote immigrants' economic integration and states that heighten or maintain the native-immigrant boundary to hinder immigrants' economic incorporation.

Effects of Bright Boundaries: Legal Status Stratification

Because citizenship boundaries are a form of "legalized discrimination" (Wimmer 2008), they serve as a mechanism for social closure and limit opportunities for citizens. In the United States, citizenship boundaries at the federal level designate rights for each legal status immigrant group. Bean and colleagues (2015) suggest that the varying rights and forms of societal membership condition immigrant integration. Under the membership-exclusion framework, they proposed that unauthorized immigrants may not achieve certain kinds of integration because they are blocked from jobs and opportunities that require legal membership. Many empirical studies have shown that unauthorized immigrants are blocked from economic integration. For example, unauthorized Mexican workers earn anywhere from 3 to 40 percent less than authorized Mexicans (Donato and Massey 1993; Donato, Aguilera, and Wakabayashi 2005; Donato et al. 2008; Donato and Sisk 2012; Flippen 2012; Hall, Greenman, and Farkas 2010; Kossoudji and

Cobb-Clark 2002; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Phillips and Massey 1999; Rivera-Batiz 1999). The wage gap between documented and undocumented Mexican immigrants holds for other Latin American national-origin groups (Donato, Aguilera, and Wakabayashi 2005; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002).

The wage gap between authorized and unauthorized workers occurred after the implementation of the IRCA in 1986 (Donato and Massey 1993). IRCA brightened the boundary between authorized and unauthorized workers by effectively limiting the right to work to authorized immigrants. IRCA established employer sanctions, which allowed the federal government to fine employers when they hired unauthorized workers. These potential fines increased the cost of hiring unauthorized workers, which encouraged employers to lower their wages (Hall, Greenman, and Farkas 2010; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Phillips and Massey 1999). Additionally, because unauthorized workers depend on their employer for their undetected presence in the United States, they accept lower wages to avoid being reported to immigration authorities (Rivera-Batiz 1999). More recent federal legislation, such as IIRIRA and the Patriot Act, which increased immigration enforcement and further brightened the authorized-unauthorized boundary, also increased the gap between authorized and likely-unauthorized Latin American immigrants' wages (Orrenius and Zavodny 2009).

Research examining the impacts of IRCA, IIRIRA, and the Patriot Act has shown how “legal status distinctions shift and depend on where migrants reside... [and the] policymaking specific to that place and time” (Donato and Armenta 2011:535). These laws have brightened boundaries and limited the right to work to authorized immigrants, which increased legal status stratification. However, state laws have worked to uncouple immigrant legal status and rights. Status and rights often go together, but citizen membership can exist without rights, for example,

by restricting political rights for incarcerated citizens (Vink 2017). Similarly, US states have further restricted the rights offered to legal permanent residents, but have not revoked their legal status. On the other hand, states have also extended rights to noncitizens that were previously limited to citizens. By extending rights to noncitizens, states have adopted a type of postnational citizenship where noncitizens receive rights based on their personhood, rather than their legal status (Soysal 1994). This uncoupling of legal status and rights suggests that inequality between legal status groups will lessen in states with blurred citizen-noncitizen boundaries.

Existing research on the effect of state-level laws has focused on the impact of E-verify laws on authorized and unauthorized immigrants. Economists have used CPS data in the 2000s and early 2010s to compare immigrants' employment, labor force participation, and hourly earnings (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 2014; Orrenius and Zavodny 2015). Because CPS does not include information on legal status, the authors treated foreign-born individuals who had a high school education at most, were not naturalized citizens, and who were either born in Mexico (Orrenius and Zavodny 2015) or identified as Hispanic (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 2014) as likely-unauthorized immigrants. Findings are not consistent: Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2014) found that E-Verify laws resulted in a decline in unauthorized men and women's employment, but had no effect on authorized immigrants' employment. This suggests that a law brightening the link between rights and legal status increases legal status stratification. In contrast, Orrenius and Zavodny (2015) found that E-Verify mandates did not affect unauthorized men's employment, but did lower their earnings. For unauthorized women, E-Verify increased their labor force participation and employment, as a result of their spouse's lower earnings. E-Verify mandates also improved labor market outcomes for Mexican men who are naturalized

U.S. citizens, as their employment and earnings increased. This suggests a law brightening the link between rights and legal status increases legal status stratification for men's wages only.

Contributions

This dissertation improves upon the legal status literature methodologically and theoretically. First, existing quantitative studies using CPS data rely on an indirect approximation of unauthorized legal status; all Hispanic, noncitizen immigrants with a high school degree or less are considered to be unauthorized (Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak 2012; Orrenius and Zavodny 2015). This dissertation's CSMI technique improves upon these studies by using the characteristics of known unauthorized immigrants in the SIPP to predict unauthorized status in the ACS and CPS. Second, CSMI allows for the inclusion of unauthorized immigrants from outside of Latin America and Mexico in analyses so that I can test whether these immigrants similarly experience wage penalties. This is an improvement over existing studies that largely focus on Mexican immigrants. Finally, this dissertation further analyzes how legal status penalties shift based on context. It is the first study to consider how state policy contexts moderate the effect of unauthorized legal status. I expect that states who decouple rights from legal status and blur the citizen-noncitizen boundary will curb the wage gap between authorized and unauthorized workers. I expect states that brighten boundaries by revoking immigrant rights will exacerbate legal status stratification.

Spill-Over Effects of Bright Boundaries: Second-Generation Economic Incorporation

Second-generation immigrants' economic incorporation has often been studied by comparing their outcomes across different source country groups and with third-generation and higher non-Hispanic whites, African-Americans, and Puerto Ricans (Alba and Nee 2003; Bean and Stevens 2003; Kasinitz et al. 2008; Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Among second-generation

immigrants in New York City, South Americans are the most likely to be employed, whereas Dominicans and West Indians are the most likely to be unemployed (Kasinitz et al. 2008). In a comparison of second-generation Mexicans to third-generation non-Hispanic whites and African Americans, second-generation Mexicans were no less likely than whites to be employed and less likely than African Americans to be unemployed (Waldinger, Lim, and Cort 2007). Many second-generation national origin groups' wages are on par with those of native whites (Kasinitz et al. 2008), but second-generation Mexicans and Asian American men who do have high levels of education earn less (Bean and Stevens 2003; Kim and Sakamoto 2014; Waldinger, Lim, and Cort 2007). Overall, economic differences remain both between second-generation national-origin groups and between second-generation groups and native whites.

Some differences in second generation employment and wages could be due to the bright boundaries in policy. Much of federal policy explicitly targets unauthorized workers, but the anti-immigrant sentiment in federal policy “spills over” and negatively affects later generations of immigrants (Aranda, Menjivar, and Donato 2014). IRCA sanctions affect some employers' hiring decisions and result in employment discrimination against legal immigrants and “foreign appearing” U.S. citizens (Lowell, Teachman, and Jing 1995; U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 1990).⁵ The U.S. GAO performed a hiring audit study and surveyed employers on their hiring practices. In the audit study, white and Hispanic pairs matched closely on their traits applied for low-skilled, entry level jobs in Chicago and San Diego. White job applicants received 52 percent more job offers than Hispanic applicants. The employer survey determined that 14

⁵ Notably, Calavita (1990) argues that IRCA does not deter employer hiring of unauthorized or likely unauthorized workers. Under IRCA, employers must not “knowingly hire” unauthorized workers, but as long as employers check workers documents and fill out an I-9 form, they have complied with the law. In her interviews with employers, Calavita found that the widespread presence of false documents made employers' compliance with IRCA relatively easy while still allowing them to hire unauthorized workers.

percent of employers reported that they began hiring only persons born in the United States because of IRCA.

Lowell and colleagues (1995) supplemented the GAO employer survey with data on the percentage of an employer's employees who were Hispanic so that they could examine how employer practices affected hiring. They found that the more aware employers were of IRCA employer sanctions, the more likely they were to examine the documents of employees who appeared foreign. In turn, employers practicing these discriminatory acts employed fewer Hispanics (Lowell, Teachman, and Jing 1995). In addition to national origin discrimination in hiring, Davila and colleagues' (1998) analysis of NLSY found that wage returns to training were lower for Mexicans than whites in the post-IRCA period.⁶ Overall, evidence suggests that IRCA has increased employment discrimination against U.S.-born Hispanics (Davila, Pagan, and Grau 1998; Lowell, Teachman, and Jing 1995; GAO 1990).

IRCA sanctions and increased immigration enforcement may have resulted in discrimination against native Hispanics because employers feel that in order to avoid IRCA fines for hiring unauthorized workers, they should be able to differentiate between legitimate and forged documentation. Due to their inability to distinguish forged documentation, employers instead relied on other observed signals, such as skin tone or last name, to infer job applicants' legal status and avoid hiring anyone who might be unauthorized (Lowell, Teachman, and Jing 1995). Qualitative research has described how many native-born, non-Hispanic whites associate brown skin tone and Spanish surnames with unauthorized status (Jiménez 2008). Even if employers are relatively unconcerned about being audited by DHS, they may be less likely to

⁶ Mexicans included both Mexican-Americans and long-term Mexican immigrants. The authors did not distinguish between the two groups in analyses.

hire Hispanics or authorized Latin American immigrants because of the cost of sorting through paperwork to determine an employee's legality (Davila, Pagan, and Grau 1998). Alternatively, employers may be unsure of the future enforcement level of IRCA sanctions and so rely on observed signals when hiring to limit their hiring of unauthorized immigrants (Davila, Pagan, and Grau 1998).

Contributions

Research on second-generation immigrants' economic outcomes usually has a national focus (Alba and Nee 2003; Bean and Stevens 2003; Waldinger, Lim, and Cort 2007) or only compares second-generation groups within one state, such as New York (Kasinitz et al. 2008). Yet second generation incorporation may differ across states. Because there is evidence that federal enforcement policy negatively impacts the work outcomes of US-born Hispanics, state enforcement laws might also result in employer discrimination against second-generation immigrants. This dissertation builds on research testing the spillover hypothesis. Current research suggests that second-generation Latinos living in cities that had passed an anti-immigrant ordinance and had large shares of coethnics reported higher levels of discrimination (Ebert and Ovink 2014). Therefore, like federal immigrant legislation, state legislation may result in poorer economic outcomes for second-generation immigrants, even though laws do not target them.

Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation's overarching objective is to determine how US state policy context impacts the economic incorporation of first and second generation immigrants. To analyze the impact of state policy context, it creates an innovative state policy typology that considers state-level immigration and social rights laws. The dissertation then uses this typology to 1)

investigate the association between state policy context and first generation immigrants' labor force participation; 2) examine if state policy context exacerbates or decreases the unauthorized-immigrant wage gap; and 3) explore whether the effects of immigration and immigrant rights laws spill over to second generation immigrants' labor force participation and wages.

Overall, the dissertation will advance thinking on immigrant incorporation. First, it moves the study of the effects of government policy on immigrant integration from an emphasis on national-level policy to focus on variations at a more proximate level of government. It directly tests the expectations of citizen-noncitizen boundary processes framework to determine whether bright boundaries at the state-level exclude immigrants from economic opportunities and whether blurred boundaries at the state-level integrate immigrants into the state economy. Second, by creating a state immigration policy typology, it recognizes greater complexity in policy effects. Past research largely focuses on the effects of *immigration* policy and does not account for the effects of immigrant *social rights* policy, despite these laws directly regulating immigrant access to work opportunities. Third, the dissertation contributes to legal status research by identifying whether a new source of stratification, state-level policy, exacerbates or ameliorates the disadvantages of unauthorized legal status. Finally, the project contributes to the literature on the unintended effects of anti-immigration policy, as it explores whether policies aimed at the immigrant population spill over to affect second-generation immigrants.

The following chapter describes the methodological approach used by this dissertation. It includes a detailed description the creation of a state immigration typology which considers both immigration and social rights laws. Chapter 2 also includes details on how I performed CSMI and presents demographic comparisons of the characteristics of the unauthorized population

identified through CSMI with unauthorized populations from other data sources where legal status is directly measured. Chapters 3 through 5 present empirical results. Chapter 3 explores how blurred and bright boundaries, as measured through the state typology, influence first-generation immigrants' labor force participation. I use multilevel models on 2000-2015 American Community Survey data and account for other state factors and individual characteristics. Chapter 4 examines how legal status stratification is curbed or exacerbated by blurred and bright boundaries. In this chapter, I use the 1998-2015 Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current Population Survey (CPS-MORG) to show the existing wage-gap between authorized and unauthorized immigrants and how it has changed over time. I then evaluate the interaction between state policy type and immigrant legal status. Chapter 5 tests whether the effects of bright or blurred citizen-noncitizen boundaries spill over to affect second-generation immigrants, even though these immigrants fall squarely within the citizen in-group. This chapter uses 1998-2015 CPS-MORG data to evaluate the association between state typology and second-generation labor force participation and wages. The final chapter summarizes the main findings of the dissertation and outlines the main contributions made to immigration research. The dissertation ends with a discussion of the implications of the findings for future research and for immigration policymaking at the state and federal level.

Chapter Two – Methodology

Because my primary interest is understanding whether state-level immigration laws are associated with the economic well-being of immigrants and the second-generation, my empirical approach involves a comparison of immigrants' economic outcomes over time and across US states. Analyses use multi-level quantitative methods on two large nationally-representative datasets, the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS), in conjunction with state-level contextual data. The methodological approach is motivated by two key considerations: first, how should we classify states based on the immigrant-native boundaries codified in their immigration laws? Second, how can we account for the varying legal statuses of the immigrant population, a piece of information that is not commonly collected by nationally-representative surveys? This chapter first describes the development of the key independent variable, a new measure of state policy context that captures state positions on immigration and immigrant social rights policies. It then goes on to describe how I account for immigrant legal status using cross-survey multiple imputation and detail the strengths and limitations of this method.

State Immigration Typology

Past Approaches to Measurement

To date, US states primarily have been seen in an anti-immigrant or pro-immigrant light. Political scientists have developed measures to examine why some states adopt laws hostile to immigrants while other states adopt welcoming laws to help them integrate (Chavez and Provine 2009; Monogan 2013). These studies have used the National Conference of State Legislature's (NCSL) compilation of state laws related to immigrants to count the number of anti- or pro-immigrant laws passed. Sociologists have examined the effects of state-level laws on immigrant

incorporation, usually outside the economic realm. For example, Okamoto and Ebert (2010) have shown that increased levels of threat, as measured by the number of anti-immigrant laws passed by the state, increased immigrant protest. However, pro- and anti-immigrant legislation counts do not differentiate between immigration laws and immigrant social rights laws, and not all laws included in these measures are directly or indirectly related to immigrants' participation in the workforce.

Other scholars have measured state context by examining states' social rights laws. Hero and Preuhs (2007) examined why states chose to extend welfare eligibility to immigrants and constructed a factor score for each state based on whether states provided TANF, general assistance, food stamps, SSI, and Medicaid to immigrants. They also constructed a multiculturalist factor scale that considered whether undocumented immigrants were eligible for a state driver's license or resident tuition, captured the amount of state funding for limited English proficiency programs, and identified if the state had certification for bilingual and ESL instructors, English only laws, or a Cesar Chavez Day. Filindra and colleagues (2011) used these measures to show a positive association between welfare policies and high school graduation rates for children of immigrants, but a negative association between multiculturalism policies and graduation. Van Hook and colleagues (2006) used the Urban Institute's "Safety Net" scale (Zimmermann and Tumlin 1999) to show that high benefit levels do not reduce the likelihood of immigrant naturalization, except in states with highly receptive native populations. However, all of these social rights measures omit any consideration of immigration enforcement and are limited to one point in time (1999).

Other scholars have examined the impact of state-level immigration laws, usually by comparing conditions before and after the passage of Arizona's SB 1070. In this line of work,

Santos and Menjivar (2013) demonstrate that the passage of Arizona's SB 1070 weakened immigrant youths' sense of being American and reduced their psychological well-being. Toomey and colleagues (2014) show that mothers were less likely to utilize public assistance after SB 1070 passed. In one of the most comprehensive measures, Leerkes and colleagues (2012) created a latent variable of internal border control. They included the percentage of firms that were enrolled in E-Verify; whether or not there were any state laws that intended to restrict unauthorized immigrants' access to driver's licenses, the labor market, and public benefits; and the percentage of counties involved in 287g. They went on to demonstrate that internal border control resulted in a negative effect on unauthorized residence in those states. However, this latent class measure fails to differentiate states who are welcoming to immigrants from states that are relatively uninvolved with immigration legislation. Further, this measure collapses states' involvement in immigration enforcement with those who restrict immigrants' rights. The measure assumes states who enact immigration enforcement regimes and deny immigrants with rights and benefits are similar to those states who only refuse to provide immigrants with rights and benefits.

Researchers have begun to identify states with certain combinations of immigration laws. For example, Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram (2014) identified pro-integration states as those states who may have passed limits on detainers, limits on E-Verify, driver's licenses for unauthorized immigrants, and in-state tuition and financial aid for unauthorized immigrants. Karoly and Perez-Arce (2016) at RAND identified states as unrestrictive, mixed, or restrictive based on whether they had passed omnibus immigration legislation, immigration-related law enforcement, E-Verify, in-state tuition, driver's license, or health care access laws. RAND's measure recognizes both immigration and immigrant rights laws, but this measure is limited to

one point in time (2015) and again does not recognize the unique combination of enforcement and rights laws.

Current Approach

State-level immigration and immigrant rights laws are two distinct types of laws that could influence immigrants' economic incorporation. Immigration laws signal the likelihood that unauthorized immigrants will be able to remain and have access to the labor market without the fear of being removed. Immigrant social rights laws enable or restrict immigrants' access to the labor market, either directly, by preventing their hiring, or indirectly by making it easier to obtain a job; for example, immigrants may have higher LFP if they can more easily drive to their job, obtain needed higher education, or rely on benefits to use as a brief stopgap for unemployment.

This dissertation creates a state typology which classified states based on their bright and blurred immigration and immigrant social rights laws. I drew on the National Conference of State Legislatures (2016) and Ebert, Estrada, and Lore's (2014) state immigration law databases to create a comprehensive list of all immigration laws passed between 1997 and 2015. This comprehensive list allowed me to identify immigration laws that related to states' level of cooperation with ICE, level of enforcement of autonomy, treatment of immigrants within the court system, and view of the federal immigration system. I also identified social rights laws regulating immigrants' access to the labor market, access to benefits, and recognition of cultural diversity. Specifically, I identified laws regulating the use of E-Verify for immigrant hiring and laws regulating immigrant access to professional and occupational licenses, state-funded Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF),⁷ driver's licenses, higher education, and

⁷ For TANF eligibility, I supplemented NCSL and SIP databases with Urban Institute's Welfare Rules Databook. Urban Institute surveyed states caseworker manuals and regulations yearly to determine eligibility for states cash assistance programs for needy families.

access to language translation. Although the laws that I use are relatively detailed and encompassing of different immigrant integration realms, they are not exhaustive. However, I include some of the most-commonly adopted laws to serve as a signal of the overall state policy environment toward immigrants. Additionally, these laws all relate, either directly or indirectly, to immigrants' ability to obtain a job within the state. Finally, each of these laws relates to the brightening or blurring of a boundary set in place at the federal level.

I use 1997 as a baseline for this typology because IIRIRA and PRWORA's passage in 1996 signaled that the states should increase their participation in immigration and immigrant rights legislation. I relied on other sources to determine if states had passed immigration laws or immigrant rights laws prior to 1997. For cooperation with ICE, I referred to the DHS website's (2016) list of active and expired 287g agreements. For professional and occupational license laws, I surveyed each state's 1997 statutes to examine whether the state required citizenship or authorized legal status for four occupations: teachers, nurses, cosmetologists, and contractors. For driver's licenses, I used the National Conference of State Legislatures' (2015b) list of state laws providing access to driver's licenses or cards, and for higher education laws, I used the National Conference of State Legislatures' (2015a) list of tuition benefits for immigrants. For English official laws, I used data provided by two organizations that track English Only laws: US English and English First.

After identifying what states had enacted these laws and when, the laws were coded based on two factors: first, whether the law brightened or blurred the federal-level boundary between immigrants and natives, and second, with a three-point scale recognizing the law's potential scope. A law brightened the immigrant-native boundary if it sought to remove immigrants from the state or limited the resources, benefits, or rights an immigrant could obtain.

A law blurred the immigrant-native boundary if it disregarded immigrant status, either by preventing immigration enforcement, or by extending benefits, resources, or rights to a formerly excluded immigrant group. See Table 2.1 for a summary of the native-immigrant boundaries codified at the federal level. Scope scores quantified the law's potential impact. A score of 1 signified that the law affected many or most immigrants, 0.5 signified that the law affected some or a proportion of immigrants, while .25 signified that the law was symbolic.

Refer to Table 2.1

An example of a bright law with a scope score of 1 is Utah's SB 81, passed in 2008. This law required county sheriffs to make a reasonable effort to verify the immigration status of confined foreign nationals. It brightened the boundary between immigrants and natives by mandating that local law enforcement try to identify a person's immigrant status, and it received a scope score of 1 because it potentially affects all immigrants who come into contact with local law enforcement. In contrast, Kansas' HB 2145 (2004) is an example of a blurred law of limited scope. HB 2145 extends in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants if they had graduated from a Kansas high school and filed an affidavit stating their intent to legalize when able to do so. This law blurred the boundary between immigrant and native by extending higher education opportunities to unauthorized immigrants. However, because only unauthorized immigrants who had graduated from Kansas high schools were eligible (disqualifying older unauthorized immigrants who may want to return to college for their degree), I coded the scope of the law as 0.5. See Table 2.2 for a list of included laws, whether they blurred or brightened the federal boundary, and their scope scores.

Refer to Table 2.2

Based on these laws, I created an aggregate score for each of the two dimensions so that states could be classified as having bright, blurred, or no immigration laws and bright, blurred, or no social rights laws (see Figure 2.1). I reclassified states whose scores resulted in a null score due to bright and blurred laws canceling out. In these cases, I prioritized states' work-related laws and enforcement autonomy laws for their re-classification.⁸ After categorizing states on these two axes, I identified four types of states policy contexts related to immigration.

Refer to Figure 2.1

State Policy Contexts

Exclusionist states brighten boundaries on both the immigration and social rights dimensions. These states deny rights to immigrants and actively seek to detain or deport the unauthorized immigrant population because they are viewed as lawbreakers or criminals. Arizona is the most-commonly known exclusionist state. Arizona has brightened boundaries through enforcement as it entered into 287(g) agreements and SB 1070 required its state law enforcement officials to attempt to determine and verify the legal status of immigrants pulled over on a stop or arrest. Further, Arizona has passed laws requiring its employers to use E-Verify, penalizing employers through the revocation of their business license if they are found to have hired unauthorized immigrants, and upholding English as the official language for government business.

Rights restrictionist states brighten boundaries on the social rights dimension but do not brighten or blur boundaries on the immigration dimension. These states are not actively involved

⁸ For the social rights typology, E-Verify laws were considered the most important, followed by driver's license laws, access to TANF, access to college, access to occupational/professional licenses, and finally, language translation. For the immigration typology, enforcement autonomy laws and cooperation with ICE were the most important.

in immigration enforcement, but view immigrants as unfair competitors in the labor force, a drain on public services, or cultural threats. Instead of deporting immigrants, the environment in these states is unwelcoming and might encourage immigrants to “self-deport.” For example, Nebraska views immigrants as unfair competitors and brightened the boundary between immigrants and natives by requiring employers to use E-Verify. Texas views immigrants as a drain on public services and does not consider legal permanent residents past the five-year bar eligible for TANF benefits. Massachusetts views immigrants as cultural threats and passed an English-only law (in public schools).

Noninterventionist states do not brighten or blur immigration and social rights boundaries. These states are hands-off on immigration issues and did not pass any laws this dissertation identified as key to immigrants’ economic outcomes. Some noninterventionist states, such as Idaho or Iowa before the year 2000, do not have a large immigrant population. Other noninterventionist states, such as Michigan and Minnesota, have sizeable immigrant populations, but largely remain uninvolved in immigration regulation. Because they do not take their own stance on immigration, noninterventionist states may reflect federal-level immigrant-native boundaries.

Finally, **inclusionist states** blur social rights boundaries and reflect or blur immigration boundaries. These states view immigrants as complementary to the labor force, contributors to the tax base, or enrichers of US culture. For example, California passed laws prohibiting localities from mandating the use of E-Verify, providing legal permanent residents with TANF, and requiring state agencies or programs to provide translation services. Additionally, some of these states also blur immigration boundaries. States such as California, Oregon, and Connecticut have prohibited state law enforcement officials’ participation in immigration enforcement; these

states welcome immigrants' presence and blur the line between authorized and unauthorized immigrants. Figure 2.2 shows how states were classified in the most recent year of the data.

Refer to Figure 2.2

Change over Time

Overall, between 1997 and 2015, rights restrictionist states were the most common (43%), followed by inclusionist (26%), exclusionist (21%), and noninterventionist states (10%). However, this distribution shifted over time (see Figure 2.3). In 1997, most states were rights restrictionist, given that many states had passed English only laws in the 1980s and 1990s. By the early 2000s, however, many states transitioned into inclusionist states by extending welfare benefits to immigrants that had been excluded by PRWORA. 2002 saw an increase in exclusionist states, perhaps due to increased enforcement efforts from 9/11. From 2005 to 2015, the proportion of exclusionist states increased due to rights restrictionist states passing enforcement legislation. Meanwhile, from 2005 to 2012, the proportion of inclusionist states decreased, usually because states who had extended some kind of welfare benefit then restricted immigrant access to work through E-Verify or professional license laws (such as Nebraska) or rescinded benefits formerly extended to immigrants (such as Tennessee extending driver's licenses to unauthorized immigrants then requiring authorized status a few years later). In 2013, inclusionist states begin to increase, largely due to an uptick in driver's licenses laws being extended to unauthorized immigrants. By 2014, all states have taken some kind of stance on immigration and/or immigrant rights within their states. In 2015, states were closely split

between exclusionist (36%), rights restrictionist (30%), and inclusionist (34%) categories.

Notably, only one-fifth of states remained in the same typology over the entire time period.⁹

Refer to Figure 2.3

Why State-Level Laws?

States are not the only actors involved in immigration and immigrant social rights legislation. An increasing number of counties and municipalities have also passed these types of laws. Counties often decide to enter into 287(g) agreements and municipalities have enacted sanctuary city policies, which usually declare that local law enforcement will not cooperate with federal immigration enforcement officers except in cases of felony crimes (Varsanyi 2010). Some cities have passed ordinances penalizing local employers for hiring unauthorized residents, while others have extended municipal ID cards to immigrants to help them obtain city services.

Local-level laws are important; however, I choose to focus on state laws because laws at the state level have a larger reach than local-level laws and potentially affect more immigrants (Wong and Garcia 2015). Immigrants cannot move as easily in and out of state jurisdiction as they can cities and counties; therefore, state laws will be more likely to have a consistent impact on the immigrant population. A focus on the state-level also complements the existing studies of immigrant integration, which have primarily examined immigrants' outcomes in traditional immigrant-receiving metropolitan areas, such as New York and Los Angeles. Finally, the federal government views states as primary actors in immigration enforcement and immigrant integration – IIRIRA and PRWORA specifically delegate responsibility for immigration

⁹ States remaining in the same typology over the entire time period were: Arizona (exclusionist); Arkansas (rights restrictionist); Kentucky (rights restrictionist); Mississippi (rights restrictionist); New Hampshire (rights restrictionist); New Mexico (inclusionist); North Dakota (rights restrictionist); Oregon (inclusionist); Washington (inclusionist), and West Virginia (rights restrictionist).

enforcement and immigrant integration to the states. Therefore, a consideration of state-level laws is a first step in determining the impact of multilevel immigration regimes on immigrant incorporation.

Accounting for Unauthorized Status in American Community Survey and Current Population Survey Data

American Community Survey (ACS) and Current Population Survey (CPS) data are commonly used for studying labor force participation and hourly wages. Unlike other surveys of immigrants, such as the Los Angeles Family and Neighborhood Survey, the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study, and the Survey of Income and Program Participation, ACS and CPS include a large number of immigrants from states across the country. Unlike the Mexican Migration Project and the Latin American Migration Project, ACS and CPS include data on immigrants from a wide variety of origin countries. And unlike the New Immigrant Survey, ACS and CPS include data on immigrants who are currently unauthorized. However, a weakness of these data is that they do not indicate immigrant legal status (Massey and Bartley 2005). Because the share of the unauthorized population grew before the advent of the 2008 economic recession, and because state laws have changed the awards and penalties for unauthorized immigrants, it is important to be able to distinguish this group to account for the legal disadvantages associated with this status.

Fortunately, Van Hook and colleagues (2015) have accounted for unauthorized legal status in ACS and CPS data using cross-survey multiple imputation (CSMI). Researchers employ CSMI to impute variables that are missing in one dataset but observed in another. To reliably perform CSMI, the samples in the datasets should be drawn from the same universe and all other variables must be observed in both datasets. Following Van Hook, I used the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) modules from 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 to impute

unauthorized legal status in ACS and CPS data. The SIPP asks immigrants about their legal status with the following question: “When [respondent] moved to the United States to live, what was [respondent’s] immigration status?” Answer options included: 1) immediate relative or family-sponsored permanent resident; 2) employment-based permanent resident; 3) other permanent resident; 4) granted refugee status or granted asylum; 5) nonimmigrant (e.g. diplomatic, student, business, or tourist visa); 6) other. Publicly-available data collapse categories 1 through 3 into legal permanent residents (LPRs) and 4 through 6 into other, non-LPR status. All respondents who were not LPRs were asked “Has [respondent’s] status been changed to permanent resident?” Immigrants in the non-LPR status whose status had not changed were assumed to be unauthorized immigrants.

One concern is that the SIPP sample does not sufficiently capture the unauthorized population, a population that can be difficult to reach and may not honestly report their unauthorized status. There may also be concerns that immigrants will simply not answer questions about their legal status. However, Bachmeier and colleagues (2014) show that only 13 percent of noncitizen immigrants had an ambiguous legal status due to nonresponse and that nonresponse to legal status questions was not higher than nonresponse to other immigration-related variables, such as place of birth or year of immigration. Second, comparisons of the characteristics of unauthorized immigrants in SIPP compare favorably to the characteristics of the unauthorized population produced using the residual estimation method. Under the residual estimation method, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) determines the total size of the foreign-born population living in the United States from ACS or Census data (Hoefer, Rytina, and Campbell 2006). Then, the DHS subtracts the legally-resident, foreign-born population size, as determined from Department of State administrative records, from the total size of the

foreign-born population. Comparisons showed that a similar share of unauthorized immigrants in DHS and SIPP are from Mexico (57 and 55 percent, respectively), lived in California, and were male (Bachmeier, Van Hook, and Bean 2014). These similarities suggest that misreporting of legal status is not so widespread in SIPP that it biases representations of the unauthorized population.

CSMI Methodology: SIPP to ACS

To impute unauthorized status in ACS data, I follow Van Hook's CSMI method. This method pools SIPP and ACS data and "treats the absence of an unauthorized status indicator in the latter as a missing data problem to be addressed by multiple imputation techniques" (339). I impute an indicator of unauthorized legal status for noncitizen immigrants using multiple chained equations. I use Stata 14 to create 5 datasets and perform analyses using *mi* routines.

To prepare SIPP data for CSMI involved four steps. First, I limited SIPP data to foreign-born immigrants of non-US citizen parents aged 25 to 54 with known birth country. Birth country and/or region significantly predicts unauthorized status and therefore is important for imputation. SIPP data list 114 birth countries, but collapses others into "elsewhere." Immigrants in the elsewhere category are not missing on their country of birth; instead, SIPP did not provide the specific country, possibly because of small numbers. Immigrants from "elsewhere" were excluded (N=73). Second, I adjusted for the over-reporting of citizenship within the surveys.¹⁰ I reassigned respondents who reported they were naturalized citizens, but had lived in the US for fewer than 5 years (the requirement for naturalization), and were not born in a US territory, had migrated after the age of 17, and did not have US citizen spouse (N=265, or 2.8% of the foreign-

¹⁰ Van Hook and Bachmeier (2013) showed that over-reporting of citizenship was common in the ACS. Misreporting is high among all immigrants who have lived in the US for fewer than five years.

born SIPP sample). Third, authorized and unauthorized legal status responses allocated by the Census Bureau due to nonresponse were set to missing. The Census Bureau allocated missing responses using hot-deck imputation, a method where Census researchers match a record with missing data to a record with similar characteristics and then replace missing values from the matched case. These cases are usually matched on sex, race, age, marital status, disability status, and the presence of own children in the household (Westat 2001). However, it is not clear if researchers match individuals on country of birth or year of arrival when they allocate missing legal status. Therefore, I treat these allocated values as missing (N=5,142).

Fourth, SIPP immigrants were re-assigned from the unauthorized category to the LPR/authorized category if they had characteristics that suggested they were refugees or nonimmigrants. To identify possible refugees, I used data from the DHS' Office of Immigration Statistics (2016) to determine the proportion of immigrants admitted from a given country in a given year who were admitted as refugees (proportion = number of refugees/number of LPRs).¹¹ I merged these proportions to each noncitizen in SIPP based on his/her country of birth and year of entry.¹² For each noncitizen in SIPP, I took a random draw from a uniform distribution and compared it to the proportion refugee. If the proportion refugee exceeded the random draw, and the immigrant had not already identified as an LPR, he or she was reassigned to the LPR/authorized category (N=167). To identify possible nonimmigrants, I used criteria such as time spent in the US and the occupation/industry in which the individual worked. Table 2.3 lists

¹¹ For data between 2001 and 2015, I use the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. For data before 2001, I use INS' "Immigrants Admitted to the United States" data, available at ICPSR.

¹² SIPP does not provide exact year of entry and instead provides an interval range. Proportion refugee was calculated as an average across this range. SIPP 2008 did not release country of birth data for foreign-born respondents and instead provides birth region. Proportion refugee was calculated as the weighted average proportion of refugee from countries in the region (weighted by the total number of LPRs from each country).

the criteria used to identify nonimmigrants; a total of 327 individuals were reassigned as authorized.¹³ I also reassigned individuals who had military service (N=23), persons who worked in the public sector (N=125) or a job requiring legal immigrant status (N=4), and persons who likely qualified for IRCA legalization because they had lived in the US since before 1982 (N=137).

Refer to Table 2.3

To prepare ACS data for CSMI, I limited the data to foreign-born immigrants of non-US citizen parents aged 25 to 54 with known birth country. Similar to SIPP, ACS data list 171 possible birth countries, but collapses some into “other.” Immigrants in this category were excluded (N=1250).¹⁴ I adjusted for the over-reporting of citizenship common in government surveys using the same method as I used in SIPP (described above). 10,815 (or 0.4% of the foreign-born sample) were reassigned. I then generated a dichotomous unauthorized variable set equal to missing for all noncitizens.

ACS and SIPP noncitizens were pooled and a weighted logistic regression model predicting unauthorized status was estimated separately for men and women. Because ACS data are cross-sectional over time, imputations were also performed separately by sets of matched survey years. ACS 2000-2003 data were matched to SIPP 2001 data, ACS 2004-2008 data were matched to SIPP 2004 data, and ACS 2009-2015 data were matched to SIPP 2008 data.¹⁵ Models were weighted using ACS person weights and SIPP person weights for wave 2. Predictors used

¹³ Rules used to identify nonimmigrants generously provided Dr. James Bachmeier.

¹⁴ For CSMI, I only excluded ACS immigrants from “elsewhere.” Immigrants from an identified region but with an unspecified birth country (e.g., “Central America, not specified”) remained in the imputation sample.

¹⁵ ACS 2000 data matched more closely to SIPP 2000 data than SIPP 1996 data. Wave 2 of SIPP 2008 was largely asked in 2009, so characteristics of SIPP 2008 noncitizens more closely match ACS 2009 noncitizens.

for estimating unauthorized status included age and age-squared, education, race, birth region, English language ability, years lived in the US and its squared term, marital status, parental status, employment status and occupational status score, home ownership, income-to-poverty ratio, and health insurance coverage. Table 2.4 lists how these variables were operationalized for each imputation set and compares them to the variables used by Van Hook and colleagues. Because some variables used for imputation were not asked of individuals living in group quarters (income to poverty ratio, home ownership), I did not impute the legal status of individuals in group quarters (N=38,928). Years lived in the US and occupational status were sometimes missing in SIPP, so these data were also imputed. I used Stata 14's *mi chained* routine to impute 5 datasets for each sex and time interval combination. All analyses in Chapter 3 use a fully imputed ACS 2000-2015 dataset that drops SIPP observations and appends ACS naturalized citizens.

Refer to Table 2.4

Evaluation of SIPP-ACS CSMI

ACS and SIPP noncitizens display similar characteristics on average, suggesting that CSMI is appropriate for these samples (see Table 2.5). Noncitizens in both ACS and SIPP usually have less than a high school degree, are Latino/a, and were born in Central America/Mexico. They are married to noncitizen spouses and are parents with children in their household. Additionally, most men and women are employed (although the employment rate is lower for noncitizen women than men) in jobs with low occupational prestige. Noncitizens are unlikely to own their own homes, and men live in households with average incomes about 250 percent above the poverty line, while women live in households with average incomes around 230 to 240 percent above the poverty line.

Refer to Table 2.5

However, differences between the noncitizens in ACS and SIPP suggest that ACS may capture slightly more unauthorized immigrants than SIPP. Noncitizen men and women in the ACS were more likely to hold less than a high school degree, to be non-white, to be born in Central America or Mexico, and to speak only some English. ACS noncitizens are also more likely to be single and less likely to be parents or own their own home. Because SIPP is a longitudinal survey, and immigration status is asked during the second wave, rather than the first, it is possible that SIPP has difficulty following the unauthorized immigrant population, and therefore captures fewer unauthorized immigrants.

Table 2.6 presents comparisons between characteristics of the unauthorized population from the SIPP and ACS, after imputation, for years at the beginning, middle, and end of the sample. In addition, it presents a comparison of the SIPP and ACS data with residual based estimates published by the DHS. The residual method allows the DHS to report unauthorized immigrants' years in the U.S., country of birth, state of residence, age, and gender. The DHS offers a comparison of the characteristics of the unauthorized population, with the caveat that these estimates include immigrants of all ages who migrated to the US since 1980.

Refer to Table 2.6

The ACS, SIPP, and DHS estimates of the unauthorized population are not radically different. ACS does include a slightly higher percentage of unauthorized immigrants than SIPP. Variation exists with respect to the duration of residence – a greater proportion of the unauthorized population in the SIPP and ACS have lived in the US for 5 years or less. This may be because SIPP and ACS estimates do not include younger immigrants, many who have lived in the US for much of their lives (as the 1.5 generation). In terms of region and country of birth,

Mexicans predominate, but compared to DHS estimates, ACS and SIPP estimates suggest that a larger share of the unauthorized population consists of immigrants from Asia. A larger share of the unauthorized population in the ACS and SIPP samples lives in two established destination states – California and New York – but also other states outside of established and common new destinations. Differences in location estimates may be due to populations moving after filing for legal status. Finally, the DHS provided the total population size falling within certain age groups by gender, so I that I could calculate the percent of the population age 25 to 54 falling within three age categories and the percentage of the population aged 25 to 54 that is female. The age breakdowns and percent female of the unauthorized populations are similar across the estimates. In sum, the ACS estimates of the unauthorized population are comparable to SIPP and DHS estimates. In instances where the estimates diverge, it may be due to the limited age range of the population in ACS or due to the fact that immigrants may have moved since they filed paperwork with the DHS. I find little to suggest that ACS CSMI estimates are greatly biased.

CSMI Methodology: SIPP to CPS

Authors using the CSMI technique to infer immigrant legal status have not applied it to CPS-MORG data. However, Van Hook and colleagues (2015) used CPS-ASEC data, and CPS-MORG data meet the requirements of CSMI – the samples in the databases are drawn from the same universe, the dependent variable for analyses (wages) is observed in both datasets, and most other variables used to predict immigrant legal status are jointly observed in both datasets.

I prepared SIPP data for CSMI to CPS using most of the same limitations and adjustments as used for the ACS CSMI. I limited SIPP data to foreign-born immigrants of non-US citizen parents aged 25 to 54 with a known birth country. I adjusted for the over-reporting of citizenship within the survey by re-assigning respondents' legal status to missing if they reported

that they were naturalized but had lived in the US for fewer than 5 years, were not born in a US territory, had not migrated before the age of 17, and did not have a US citizen spouse.

Authorized and unauthorized legal status responses allocated by the Census Bureau due to nonresponse were set to missing. Immigrants were re-assigned from the unauthorized category to the authorized category if they had characteristics that suggested they were refugees or nonimmigrants. As an additional step, I limited SIPP data to the wage-eligible population captured by CPS-MORG. Immigrants who were not in the labor force, unemployed, self-employed, employed in the armed forces, or employed as unpaid family workers were dropped from the sample (N=8,323). Immigrants who earned less than \$1/hour or more than \$250/hour in 1999 constant dollars were excluded from CSMI (N=172 or .01% of the final sample) so that outliers would not bias unauthorized status imputation.

I prepared 1998-2015 CPS-MORG data for CSMI by limiting the data to foreign-born immigrants of non-US citizen parents aged 25 to 54 with known birth country. I adjusted for the over-reporting of citizenship by re-assigning respondents legal status to missing if they were naturalized but had lived in the US for fewer than five years and were not likely to receive citizenship through a parent or spouse (2,508 were reassigned, or 1.37 percent of the sample). CPS-MORG data were limited to the noncitizen, wage-eligible population. I then generated a dichotomous unauthorized variable set equal to missing for all CPS respondents.

I pooled CPS and SIPP data to impute unauthorized status using multiple chained equations. Imputations were performed separately for men and women, and were performed separately by sets of matched survey years: CPS 1998-2000 data were matched to SIPP 1996 data, CPS 2001 to 2003 were matched to SIPP 2001 data, CPS 2004-2008 data were matched to SIPP 2004 data, and CPS 2009-2015 data were matched to SIPP 2008 data. Predictors used to

estimate unauthorized status included wage and occupation-related predictors, such as logged hourly wage, whether the immigrant held a professional occupation, whether the immigrant received his or her wages on an hourly basis, whether the immigrant was a member of a union or covered by a union in his or her workplace, potential years of work experience (age – educational attainment in years – 6), and work experience squared. Predictors also included financial well-being indicators, such as whether the immigrant had health insurance, the immigrant family’s income-to-poverty ratio, whether the immigrant owned his or her home, the number of people and number of families living in the household. A number of individual characteristics were included: the number of years lived in the US and its square term, educational attainment, birth region, marital status, and parental status. Indicators for US state or region and year were also included. Table 2.7 lists how these variables were operationalized.

Refer to Table 2.7

CPS-MORG does not include questions on health insurance or family income; however, these measures were included for the CPS respondents who were in the outgoing rotation group during the month of March, when respondents were asked the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC). Years lived in the United States, health insurance, income-to-poverty ratio, and hourly wages were sometimes missing, so these data were imputed in addition to unauthorized status. I imputed 10 datasets for each sex and time interval combination using Stata 14’s *mi chained* routine.

Evaluation of SIPP-CPS MORG CSMI

Noncitizen wage and salary workers have similar profiles in the SIPP and CPS data (see Table 2.8). Average noncitizen men and women have considerable work experience and low levels of educational attainment. These workers do not hold professional occupations, are not

union members, and are paid hourly. Noncitizen men and women are usually married to other noncitizens, are parents, and live in households with four other people. The average wage and salary worker earns low hourly wages but lives more than 200 percent above the poverty threshold. The similarities between wage and salary workers in the SIPP and CPS suggest that the samples are appropriate for CSMI.

Refer to Table 2.8

However, there are some differences between noncitizen workers in the SIPP and noncitizen workers in the CPS. Male and female noncitizens in SIPP are more financially secure than those in CPS. For example, men surveyed by SIPP earned slightly higher wages – about \$14.10 per hour compared to \$13.80 per hour in CPS. Women in SIPP earned \$12.20 per hour compared to \$11.60 per hour for women in CPS.¹⁶ Men and women also have higher income-to-poverty ratios in SIPP than in CPS. Men and women in CPS are also less likely to have migrated from North American and Europe and are instead more likely to have been born in Central or South America. These differences suggest that men and women in the CPS may be slightly more likely to have unauthorized legal status. Again, this may be an artifact of the SIPP being a panel survey. The legal status question is not asked until the second module, at which point in time, unauthorized immigrants may have dropped out of the survey.

¹⁶ Hourly wage information is collected differently in CPS and SIPP. SIPP asks respondents their monthly earnings (including tips and overtime pay) and how many hours respondents worked per week. SIPP hourly wage is calculated as the monthly wage divided by the number of weeks in the month and the number of hours worked per week. CPS hourly wage is calculated by dividing weekly earnings by hours worked last week. Both estimates replaced the hourly wage rate reported by the respondent if he or she was an hourly worker and this rate was higher than the calculated hourly wage based on earnings and hours worked. However, higher SIPP hourly rates correspond with higher income to poverty ratios; the overall picture suggests that SIPP captures fewer unauthorized immigrants than CPS.

Table 2.9 presents weighted descriptive statistics for unauthorized wage and salaried workers after imputation.¹⁷ In 2001 and 2004 the unauthorized population makes up a larger share of the noncitizen population in CPS than it does in SIPP. However, the characteristics of the unauthorized population are similar across the two datasets. Many unauthorized immigrants have lived in the US for fewer than 5 years, except for 2009, when more unauthorized immigrants have lived in the US for 6 to 10 years (among CPS respondents). The smaller share of immigrants having lived in the US for fewer than five years in 2009 is not surprising given the decline in unauthorized migration to the US during the economic recession. Across both datasets, the largest share of unauthorized immigrants is from North America, more specifically, Mexico. Most unauthorized immigrants are usually younger (25 to 34) and male.

Refer to Table 2.9

In addition to comparing the unauthorized population's descriptive characteristics across the two samples, I also evaluated the imputation of unauthorized status by graphing the convergence of the variable's means and standard deviations across datasets. These diagnostics did not show any linear trends, suggesting that convergence was effective and 10 imputations are sufficient for analyses.

Limitations of the CSMI Method, ACS, and CPS Data

There are some notable limitations of the CSMI method and using ACS and CPS data to evaluate immigrant labor force participation and wage levels. First, due to how legal status is measured in SIPP, CSMI cannot account for the specific legal status of immigrants in ACS and CPS. CSMI cannot identify nonimmigrants who have authorization to work, immigrants with

¹⁷ I do not present DHS residual-based estimates as a comparison because DHS statistics describe the entire unauthorized population, regardless of whether or not they are wage or salary workers.

temporary protected status, or immigrants who received DACA authorization. For the most part, these immigrants have characteristics similar to the unauthorized population. For example, many workers enter on H2-A or H2-B visas to work in low-skilled occupations or agriculture.

Immigrants with temporary protected status are commonly Salvadorans or Hondurans who were granted this status due to violent conflict in their home countries. DACA recipients were formerly unauthorized immigrants who were granted temporary authorization to work. If these immigrants are imputed as unauthorized when they, in fact, have work authorization, the estimates for unauthorized status will be conservative; the addition of some authorized workers in the unauthorized group draws the unauthorized coefficient closer to that of authorized workers.

SIPP, ACS, and CPS survey design often undercount unauthorized immigrants. These surveys may miss unauthorized immigrants in their sample as many unauthorized immigrants are a mobile population and follow work around the country. For example, many unauthorized workers follow the crop harvest or wherever the weather is suitable for construction. Therefore, the unauthorized immigrants included in these surveys are more likely to be established and settled within their communities. Mobile unauthorized immigrant populations who follow work opportunities may be more likely to be employed than unauthorized workers who remain in one community. If the sampled unauthorized immigrants are less likely to be employed or participate in the labor force than the unobserved unauthorized immigrants and the authorized immigrants, then unauthorized coefficients may be over-stated for labor force participation models. At the same time, unauthorized workers who follow work have lower incomes (Hernandez, Gabbard, and Carroll 2016) and their wages may be lower. The unauthorized coefficient for wages estimates will then be a conservative estimate.

Unauthorized immigrants may also be less likely than authorized immigrants to participate in SIPP, ACS, and CPS surveys because of their fear of government authorities. These surveys are collected by the US Census Bureau, and unauthorized immigrants may assume that the survey asks about their legal status, and if so, that information will be shared with ICE. Therefore, the surveys may miss some of the most vulnerable unauthorized immigrants – those who are fearful of government officials may also be fearful of employers, and therefore not participate in the labor force, or accept exploitative working conditions and low wages. Again, this suggests that the unauthorized coefficient will be a conservative estimate. If immigrants are especially fearful to participate in the survey because of their state policy context (for example, unauthorized immigrants are more fearful in exclusionist states with strict enforcement regimes), the effect of state policy context on unauthorized immigrants will be limited.

I propose that the limitations of CSMI and ACS/CPS data result in mostly conservative estimates so that the effects of unauthorized status and state policy context will not be overstated. Meanwhile, the main strengths of CSMI are that it produces unbiased estimates, as long as certain conditions are met, and that it increases sample size and power. Increased sample size and power are necessary for producing estimates across US states. Until researchers can access immigration administrative records or surveys add questions about legal status, CSMI is a promising method for the evaluation of immigrants' economic outcomes across state policy contexts.

Summary


In this chapter, I provided an overview of my main independent variable, state policy context, used in the empirical chapters of the dissertation. I argued that previous measures of state policy context overlook important distinctions between state laws that restrict immigrants'

rights and laws that increase immigration enforcement. Often these measures only view state laws as pro or anti-immigrant, or only capture the effects of one law on the immigrant population. My proposed measure of state policy context improves on past measures by distinguishing two types of “anti-immigrant” states and accounting for the pro-immigrant policies of other states. This chapter also provided a detailed description of how I used CSMI to account for unauthorized legal status in ACS and CPS data. While CSMI and ACS/CPS data have some weaknesses, I argue that these weaknesses result in conservative estimates and that, overall, the characteristics of the unauthorized population in ACS and CPS data are remarkably similar to the unauthorized population in SIPP data and captured by DHS estimates. The following chapters apply this method and new measure to provide a better picture of how immigrant and second-generation labor market outcomes are associated with state policy.

Figure 2.1 Classification of US States by Immigration and Social Rights Laws


		Immigrant Social Rights Laws		
		More Bright Rights Laws	No Rights Laws	More Blurred Rights Laws
Immigration Laws	More Bright Immigration Laws	Exclusionist States		
	No Immigration Laws	Rights Restrictionist States	Noninterventionist States	Inclusionist States
	More Blurred Immigration Laws			

Figure 2.2 Immigration Typology for the US States in 2015



Source: Author’s calculations from National Conference of State Legislatures (2016) and Ebert, Estrada, and Lore’s (2014) state immigration law databases

Figure 2.3 US State Immigration Typology, 1997-2015



Source: Author's calculations from National Conference of State Legislatures (2016) and Ebert, Estrada, and Lore's (2014) state immigration law databases

Table 2.1 Existing Federal-Level Boundaries between Natives and Immigrants

	Federal Law	Boundary
Enforcement	IIRIRA & AEDPA (1996)	Authorized without criminal record vs. authorized with criminal record and unauthorized immigrants – increased the offenses for which migrants can be deported
Labor market	IRCA (1986)	Authorized vs. unauthorized immigrants – established employer sanctions to prevent the hiring of unauthorized workers
Occupational licenses	PRWORA (1996)	Authorized vs. unauthorized immigrants – established that unauthorized immigrants are not eligible for State public benefits, including professional licenses
Federal TANF	PRWORA (1996)	Eligible immigrants (mainly LPRs who have lived in the US for at least five years, refugees/asylees) vs. ineligible immigrants (mainly LPRs who have lived in the US for fewer than five years and unauthorized immigrants – only eligible immigrants may qualify for federal TANF
Driver’s licenses	REAL ID Act (2005)	LPRs vs. nonimmigrants and unauthorized immigrants – unauthorized immigrants cannot obtain driver’s licenses; driver’s licenses for nonimmigrants must expire at the same time as their visa
Higher education	PRWORA (1996)	LPRs and refugees/asylees vs. nonimmigrants and unauthorized immigrants – nonimmigrants (except for T-visas or VAWA recipients) and unauthorized immigrants do not qualify for federal student loans
Cultural recognition	Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964	Inclusive of all immigrants – protects from discrimination based on race, religion, national origin, and citizenship

Table 2.2 State Laws Included in State Immigration Typology, by Boundary Type and Scope of Impact

	BRIGHTEN				BLUR	
	1 – many/most	.5 – some	.25 – symbolic	.25 - symbolic	.5 - some	1 – many/most
IMMIGRATION						
Level of cooperation with ICE	State law enforcement entered into 287g agreement; State law prohibits sanctuary cities	State law enforcement and other state agencies must inform ICE of unauthorized immigrants who are arrested or apply for benefits			Prevents disclosure of legal status information by state agencies or individuals	State law enforcement does not honor ICE detainers or hold immigrants for immigration violations
Level of enforcement autonomy	State law enforcement must verify legal status while making a stop, detention, arrest and/or verify legal status through DHS databases					Prohibits state agencies or law enforcement from inquiring into or verifying legal status
Treatment of immigrants in court system		Unauthorized immigrants not allowed to obtain bail, bond, or parole (unless released to ICE) or status considered for parole			Requires courts to advise defendants of immigration consequences when pleading guilty or no lo contender	
View of federal immigration system			Resolutions request the US to secure its borders and/or increase funding to stop unauthorized migration	Resolutions request comprehensive immigration reform with a path to legalization/citizenship		

		BRIGHTEN			BLUR		
		1 – many/most	.5 – some	.25 – symbolic	.25 - symbolic	.5 - some	1 – many/most
SOCIAL RIGHTS							
Immigrant access to labor market	Requires some or all employers to use E-verify to validate immigration status; additional penalties for employers who hire unauthorized workers						Prohibits some or all of employers from using E-Verify to validate workers' immigration status
Immigrant access to professional/occupational licenses		Reiterates that an applicant for a state license (to become a teacher, nurse, cosmetologist, or contractor) must be an LPR or a citizen				Allows unauthorized immigrants or DACA recipients to obtain a state license (in some professions)	
Immigrant access to welfare benefits	Does not consider LPRs eligible for federal assistance after the 5-year bar						State-funded TANF provided to LPRs during the five-year bar
Immigrant access to driver's licenses	Links driver's license expiration dates to the expiration date on immigrants' green cards or visas						Extends driver's licenses to unauthorized residents of the state
Immigrant access to higher education		Bars unauthorized immigrant students from in-state tuition benefits				Provides in-state tuition to certain unauthorized immigrant students	
Cultural recognition	English is the official language of the state for government documents, hearings, etc.			Resolutions encourage diverse use of languages other than English		Requires some state agencies to provide interpreters or materials in other languages than English	

Table 2.3 Rules to Identify Nonimmigrants in SIPP

Visa Type	How Identified	# Identified
A Visa: Diplomats & Foreign Government Officials	<p>Foreign government protection</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lived in the US for fewer than 10 years AND • Held manager/administer occupation in national security/international affairs AND • Was employed or unemployed <p>Personal aid</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lived in the US for fewer than 10 years AND • Was not a family member/related to household reference person AND • Was a nursing aid/orderly/attendant or held a personal service occupation who worked in national security/international affairs 	0
FM Visa: Students	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Migrated between the ages of 17 and 64 AND • Held at least a high school degree AND • Was enrolled in college, graduate, professional, or vocational/technical school in all four months of the reference period (asked of all respondents age 15+) AND • Worked fewer than 26 hours in research/development industry or at a college/university OR • Worked fewer than 20 hours in an industry other than research/development or college/university 	111
J Visa: Exchange Visitors	<p>Professor/Research Scholar</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participated in the labor force AND • Lived in the US for fewer than 5 years AND • Worked in research/development industry or at a college/university as a: college instructor, architect, surveyor/cartographer, aerospace engineer, chemical engineer, civil engineer, electrical engineer, industrial engineer, metallurgical engineer, mechanical engineer, petroleum/mining/geological engineer, or other engineer, computer scientist, computer software developer, actuary, operations and systems researcher, mathematician, agricultural/food scientist, biological scientist, forester/conservation scientist, medical scientist, physicist, chemist, geologist, other physical scientist, economist, psychologists, urban planner, social scientist, dentist, dietician, optometrist, physician, podiatrist, speech therapist, or veterinarian <p>Health Workers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participated in the labor force AND • Lived in the US for fewer than 3 years AND • Was not a private, for-profit employee AND • Worked in a hospital, nursing/personal care facility, or health services industry as a: dentist, physician, speech therapist, medical scientist, occupational therapist, physical therapist, respiratory therapist, speech therapist, other therapist, or other health/therapy occupation <p>Physician Program for US Graduate Medical School Education</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participated in the labor force AND • Lived in the US for fewer than 7 years AND • Was not a private, for-profit employee AND • Was younger than 35 AND • Worked fewer than 30 hours per week AND • Earned less than \$11,460 in a year (1999 constant \$) AND • Worked at a college/university as a: dentist, physician, speech therapist, medical scientist, occupational therapist, physical therapist, 	30

	<p>respiratory therapist, speech therapist, other therapist, or other health/therapy occupation</p> <p>Au-Pairs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was not a family member related to the reference person AND • Had lived in the US for fewer than 4 years AND • Did not live with his/her mother, father, or spouse AND • Did not live with his/her own children AND • Worked as a child care worker or personal service worker 	
H-1 Visa: Nurses	<p>Registered Nurses</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participated in the labor force AND • Lived in the US for fewer than 3 years AND • Was not a private, for-profit employee AND • Worked in a hospital, nursing/personal care facility, or other health services industry as a: registered nurse or licensed practical nurse <p>Nursing Students</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participated in the labor force AND • Lived in the US for fewer than 7 years AND • Was younger than 35 AND • Worked fewer than 30 hours per week AND • Earned less than \$11,460 in a year (1999 constant \$) AND • Worked in a college/university as a: registered nurse or licensed practical nurse 	0
H-1B Visa: High-Tech Workers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participated in the labor force AND • Lived in the US for fewer than 6 years AND • Was a private, for-profit worker or a non-profit worker AND • Held at least a Bachelor’s degree AND • Worked as a: accountant, financial specialist, surveyor/cartographer, aerospace engineer, chemical engineer, civil engineer, electrical engineer, industrial engineer, metallurgical engineer, mechanical engineer, petroleum/mining engineer, other engineer, computer systems analyst, computer software developer, actuary, statistician, mathematician, agricultural/food scientist, biological scientist, conservation scientist, medical scientist, physicist/astronomer, atmospheric/space scientist, chemist, geologist, physical scientist, economist, psychologist, urban planner, social scientist, high school/college instructor, editor, technical writer, engineer technician, physician, biological technician, chemical technician, other technician, airplane pilot, broadcast equipment operator, programmers of numerically controlled machine tools, precision tool and die makers 	160
L-1 Visa: Intra-Company Transfers	<p>Managers, Executives, or Specialized Knowledge Workers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participated in the labor force AND • Lived in the US for fewer than 5 years AND • Was a private, for profit worker or a non-profit worker AND • Worked as a: chief executive/public administrator, manager/specialist in marketing, financial manager, human resources manager, purchasing manager, material recording/scheduling/production clerk, service organization manager, other manager/administrator, purchasing agent or buyer of farm products, buyer/wholesaler of retail, personnel/HR specialist, operations systems researcher, management analyst, management support worker, accountant, insurance underwriter, other financial specialist, advertising or sales worker, salesperson, sales engineer, personal service job supervisor, 	117

	supervisor of sales jobs, office supervisor, supervisor of construction work, supervisor of mechanics and repairers, or production supervisor	
G-1 Visa: Diplomatic Visa or International Organization Workers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participated in the labor force AND • Lived in the US for fewer than 5 years AND • Was a private, for profit worker or a non-profit worker AND • Worked in national security/international affairs as a: librarian, lawyer, secretary, typist, office machine operator, administrative support worker, telephone operator, telecom operator, computer operator, or chauffeur 	0
R-1 Visa: Religious Workers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participated in the labor force AND • Lived in the US for fewer than 3 years AND • Worked as a clergy or religious worker 	4
O-1 & P-1 Visas: Athletes & Entertainers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participated in the labor force AND • Lived in the US for fewer than 3 years AND • Did not live with his/her mother or father AND • Was a private, for profit worker or a non-profit worker AND • Earned less than \$29,032 in a year (1999 constant \$) AND • Worked in newspaper publishing, printing, motion pictures/theater, entertainment/research services, museum/art gallery, or professional services as a: art maker (painter, sculptor, etc.), designer, actor/director/producer, athlete/sport instructor/official, dancer, musician/composer, art/entertainment performer, writer/author, or photographer 	0
TN Visa: NAFTA Professionals (Canadians)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participated in the labor force AND • Had at least a Bachelor's degree AND • Was born in Canada AND • Worked as a: accountant, computer systems analyst, architect, surveyor/cartographer, agricultural/food scientist, biological scientist, forester/conservation scientist, medical scientist, physicist/astronomer, chemist, geologist, economist, psychologist, urban/regional planner, social worker, lawyer, HS/college instructor, librarian, technical writer, dentist, dietician/nutritionist, pharmacist, occupational therapist, physical therapist, other therapist, veterinarian, registered nurse, insurance adjuster, timber/logging/forestry worker, dental lab technician, architect, biological technician, chemical technician, engineering technician, other science technician, or other technician 	10

Note: An immigrant could fall under multiple visa categories. For example, immigrants identified as possibly on a J-1 visa were also commonly identified as possibly being on an H-1B visa.

Table 2.4 Variables Used to Impute Unauthorized Status in SIPP-ACS CSML, by Imputation Group

Variable used for SIPP-CPS ASEC CSML in Van Hook et al. 2015	Van Hook et al. 2015 Measure (if specified)	Dissertation Measure	SIPP-ACS 2000-2003	SIPP-ACS 2004-2008	SIPP-ACS 2009-2015
Age		In years and square term	✓	✓	✓
Educational attainment	In years	5 categories: less than high school; high school degree; some college; college education; advanced degree	✓	✓	✓
Place of birth	Dummy equal to one if born in Mexico	11 categories: North America, North/West Europe, South/East Europe, East Asia, South Central Asia, Southeast-West Asia and Pacific, Africa, Caribbean, Central America, South America, and Mexico Note: In 2009, SIPP did not provide birth countries, only birth regions – Mexico is collapsed into Central America for these years	✓	✓	✓
Duration of U.S. residence	In years	In years and square term	✓	✓	✓
U.S. state of residence		47 categories, one for each state, but collapses Maine-Vermont; North Dakota-South Dakota-Wyoming	✓	✓	✓
English language proficiency		5 categories: speaks only English; speaks English very well; speaks English well; speaks English, but not well; does not speak English	Not asked in SIPP	✓	✓
Occupational status		Hauser-Warren Socioeconomic Index	✓	✓	✓
Marital status		3 categories: single, married to noncitizen spouse, married to citizen spouse	✓	✓	✓
Parental status		Dichotomous variable equal to one if immigrant's own children are present in the household	✓	✓	✓
Household size		Number of individuals in the household	✓	✓	✓
Number of families in household		Number of families in the household	✓	✓	✓
Homeownership		Dichotomous variable equal to one if dwelling is owned by household members	✓	✓	✓
Income-to-poverty ratio		The immigrant's family income as a percentage of the appropriate official poverty threshold (based on family size, the number of people in the family who are children, and the age of the householder (under/over age 65)); top coded at 500% and bottom coded at equal to the poverty line	✓	✓	✓

Variable used for SIPP-CPS ASEC CSMI in Van Hook et al. 2015	Van Hook et al. 2015 Measure (if specified)	Dissertation Measure	SIPP-ACS 2000-2003	SIPP-ACS 2004-2008	SIPP-ACS 2009-2015
Welfare recipient		Dichotomous variable equal to one if immigrant receives state or federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Supplemental Security Assistance, and/or General Assistance	✓	✓	✓
Health insurance coverage	Dummy equal to one if immigrant was covered by employer, other private, Medicaid, and other public health insurance	Dummy variable equal to one if the immigrant had employer-provided health insurance, privately-purchased health insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, military care, or Veterans Administration	Not asked in ACS	Not asked in ACS	✓
Functional limitations	Number of limitations	Dummy equal to one if immigrant has a physical or mental health condition that causes difficulty working (for SIPP); Dummy equal to one if immigrant lists 4 or more functional limitations (for ACS)	Only included when also using health insurance	Only included when also using health insurance	✓
Self-rated health	Dummy variable indicating fair/poor health	Not included			

Table 2.5 Comparative Profiles of ACS and SIPP Noncitizens, 2000-2015

	SIPP Men 2001, 2004, 2008		ACS Men, 2000-2015		SIPP Women 2001, 2004, 2008		ACS Women, 2000-2015		
	Count	Mean/%	SD	Count	Mean/%	SD	Count	Mean/%	SD
% Unauthorized	3918	27.8%			4059	25.8%			
<i>Employment Status</i>									
Employed	6253	85.6%		683624	85.2%		6270	57.9%	664401
Unemployed	6253	6.7%		683624	5.2%		6270	5.8%	664401
NILF	6253	7.7%		683624	9.6%		6270	36.3%	664401
<i>Demographics</i>									
Age	6253	37.3	8.2	683624	37.1	8.0	6270	37.8	664401
<i>Education</i>									
Less than HS	6253	34.7%		683624	40.0%		6270	32.0%	664401
HS degree	6253	23.3%		683624	23.3%		6270	22.8%	664401
Some college	6253	17.6%		683624	13.7%		6270	21.3%	664401
College degree	6253	13.7%		683624	12.1%		6270	15.5%	664401
Adv. degree	6253	10.8%		683624	11.0%		6270	8.3%	664401
<i>Race</i>									
White, non-Hispanic	6253	21.9%		683624	13.3%		6270	22.8%	664401
Black, non-Hispanic	6253	7.7%		683624	6.0%		6270	8.5%	664401
Asian	6253	15.5%		683624	17.1%		6270	18.6%	664401
Latino/a	6253	53.9%		683624	62.3%		6270	48.8%	664401
Other	6253	1.0%		683624	1.3%		6270	1.2%	664401
<i>English Ability</i>									
None	4653	11.1%		683624	12.5%		4728	14.6%	664401
Some	4653	24.8%		683624	27.4%		4728	23.9%	664401
Well	4653	18.4%		683624	23.5%		4728	15.0%	664401
Very well	4653	25.3%		683624	26.2%		4728	24.2%	664401
Only	4653	20.4%		683624	10.4%		4728	22.3%	664401
Years in US	5142	10.8	8.9	683624	12.5	9.0	5237	10.5	664401
<i>Birth Region</i>									
N America	6253	2.3%		683624	1.6%		6270	2.3%	664401
NW Europe	6253	4.2%		683624	3.7%		6270	4.4%	664401
SE Europe	6253	4.7%		683624	4.1%		6270	5.6%	664401
E Asia	6253	5.8%		683624	6.2%		6270	7.5%	664401
S Ctrl Asia	6253	6.0%		683624	6.6%		6270	5.7%	664401
SEW Asia	6253	7.9%		683624	7.2%		6270	9.1%	664401

Table 2.6 Comparative Profiles of the Adult Unauthorized Foreign-Born in the United States

	2000 Comparison			2005 Comparison		
	DHS 2000	ACS 2000	SIPP 2001	DHS 2005	ACS 2005	SIPP 2004
% Unauthorized	-	25.9%	23.1%	-	26.6%	23.4%
<i>Years in US</i>						
0-5 yrs	-	51.0%	50.4%	29.2%	43.3%	43.9%
6-10 yrs	-	25.9%	26.3%	29.8%	30.9%	36.1%
11-15 yrs	-	17.3%	19.3%	19.9%	16.6%	10.6%
16-20 yrs	-	4.4%	3.3%	11.1%	7.4%	7.7%
21+ yrs	-	1.4%	0.7%	10.0%	1.8%	1.7%
<i>Region of Birth</i>						
North America	72.6%	63.5%	65.5%	72.4%	70.3%	74.1%
Asia	14.3%	20.6%	18.6%	12.4%	12.9%	10.9%
South America	7.1%	6.2%	5.5%	7.6%	8.0%	8.1%
Europe	3.6%	5.9%	6.5%	4.8%	5.3%	3.8%
Other	2.4%	3.8%	3.9%	2.9%	3.5%	3.1%
<i>Country of Birth</i>						
Mexico	55.3%	49.2%	52.2%	56.9%	57.9%	61.1%
El Salvador	5.1%	3.9%	3.2%	4.5%	3.4%	2.6%
Guatemala	3.4%	2.5%	1.8%	3.5%	2.5%	3.9%
Honduras	1.4%	1.7%	2.6%	1.7%	1.7%	1.0%
Philippines	2.2%	2.2%	1.8%	2.0%	1.2%	0.8%
India	2.1%	3.3%	3.1%	2.7%	2.1%	1.5%
Korea	2.4%	2.1%	2.0%	2.0%	1.6%	1.0%
Ecuador	1.9%	1.0%	1.3%	-	1.4%	0.7%
Brazil	1.2%	0.8%	0.9%	1.6%	1.7%	2.5%
China	1.9%	3.2%	2.3%	2.2%	2.2%	2.0%
Other	23.0%	30.0%	28.9%	23.0%	24.4%	22.8%
<i>State of Residence</i>						
California	29.7%	32.1%	32.8%	28.4%	26.8%	27.9%
Texas	12.9%	11.5%	10.4%	14.0%	13.2%	12.2%
Florida	9.5%	5.2%	5.2%	8.7%	6.5%	7.9%
New York	6.4%	9.6%	11.5%	5.7%	8.3%	8.7%
Illinois	5.2%	4.8%	3.4%	5.3%	3.7%	3.3%
Georgia	3.9%	3.2%	3.5%	4.8%	4.1%	4.3%
Arizona	2.6%	2.7%	2.0%	4.9%	4.6%	4.3%
North Carolina	4.1%	2.5%	3.0%	3.7%	2.9%	3.8%
New Jersey	3.1%	5.4%	3.9%	3.9%	3.2%	3.3%
Nevada	2.0%	1.7%	2.6%	2.5%	1.4%	0.4%
Other	20.7%	21.4%	21.7%	18.0%	25.2%	24.0%
<i>Age</i>						
25-34	-	59.8%	61.0%	-	58.2%	58.6%
35-44	-	28.0%	25.3%	-	30.2%	27.7%
45-54	-	12.2%	13.7%	-	11.7%	13.6%
% Female, 25-54	-	46.9%	45.8%	-	45.8%	48.5%

	2009 Comparison			2012 Comparison	
	DHS 2009	ACS 2009	SIPP 2009	DHS 2012	ACS 2012
% Unauthorized	-	30.6%	27.9%	-	28.9%
<i>Years in US</i>					
0-7 yrs	-	38.2%	50.7%	13.5%	32.7%
8-12 yrs	-	32.2%	28.4%	28.4%	31.6%
13-17 yrs	-	15.9%	12.3%	25.5%	20.3%
18-27 yrs	-	12.7%	8.3%	15.0%	14.4%
28+ yrs	-	1.0%	0.2%	17.5%	1.0%
<i>Region of Birth</i>					
North America	79.4%	78.3%	82.8%	78.1%	77.7%
Asia	9.3%	9.8%	7.4%	11.4%	11.2%
South America	6.5%	6.3%	4.4%	6.1%	5.5%
Europe	2.8%	3.3%	2.9%	2.6%	3.0%
Other	1.9%	2.4%	2.5%	1.8%	2.6%
<i>Country of Birth</i>					
Mexico	62.0%	59.0%	-	58.8%	56.6%
El Salvador	5.0%	6.3%	-	6.0%	6.6%
Guatemala	4.0%	5.5%	-	4.9%	6.0%
Honduras	3.0%	3.1%	-	3.1%	3.6%
Philippines	2.0%	1.0%	-	2.7%	1.1%
India	2.0%	2.4%	-	2.3%	3.2%
Korea	2.0%	0.9%	-	2.0%	0.9%
Ecuador	2.0%	1.5%	-	1.5%	1.3%
Brazil	1.0%	1.2%	-		.9%
China	1.0%	1.3%	-	1.8%	1.6%
Other	15.0%	17.9%	-	16.8%	18.3%
<i>State of Residence</i>					
California	24.0%	27.2%	27.2%	28.0%	26.2%
Texas	16.0%	10.6%	9.6%	18.2%	10.0%
Florida	7.0%	5.9%	5.2%	7.3%	5.7%
New York	5.0%	6.8%	4.7%	5.8%	7.2%
Illinois	5.0%	4.5%	5.2%	5.4%	4.4%
Georgia	4.0%	4.8%	4.2%	4.0%	4.5%
Arizona	4.0%	3.0%	2.8%	3.5%	2.2%
North Carolina	3.0%	2.9%	4.7%	3.6%	3.4%
New Jersey	3.0%	4.2%	3.8%	4.3%	4.6%
Nevada	2.0%	1.7%	2.4%	-	1.6%
Other	25.0%	28.4%	30.2%	20.1%	30.3%
<i>Age</i>					
25-34	47.9%	51.3%	47.8%	43.7%	49.1%
35-44	38.5%	36.2%	36.3%	39.6%	37.5%
45-54	13.6%	12.5%	15.9%	16.7%	13.4%
% Female, 25-54	41.9%	41.7%	43.5%	46.8%	45.2%

Note: SIPP & ACS estimates are for the unauthorized population aged 25-54; DHS estimates are for the total unauthorized population (all ages) except for author-derived calculations for age and % female. ACS & SIPP estimates are weighted.

Table 2.7 Variables Used to Impute Unauthorized Status in SIPP-CPS CSMI

Unauthorized Status	0=authorized 1=unauthorized
Work Experience	in years (age - educational attainment - 6)
Work Experience Squared	in years
Educational Attainment	1=less than HS degree 2=HS degree 3=some college 4=Bachelor's degree 5=advanced degree
Years in the US	in years (capped at 40)
Years in the US squared	in years
Birth Region	1=North America/Europe 2=Asia/Pacific Islands 3=Africa/Caribbean 4=Central/South America 5=Mexico (before SIPP 2008)
Marital Status	1=single 2=married, citizen spouse 3=married, noncitizen spouse
Parental Status	0=no children (under age of 18) in household 1=children in the household
Household Size	number of persons
No. of Families in HH	number of families
Owns home	0=rents/does not own home 1=owns home
Income-to-poverty ratio*	continuous (1 to 501)
Has health insurance*	0=no health insurance 1=health insurance
Logged Hourly Wage	in 1999 constant dollars (\$1/hr to \$250/hr); highest of weekly earnings or hourly wage
Union Member	1=covered/member 2=not covered/not member
Professional Occupation	0=not professional 1=professional
Paid Hourly	1=paid hourly 2=paid in another way
State/Region of Residence	1=CA 2=FL 3=IL 4=NJ 5=NY 6=TX 7=Pacific/Southwest (AK, AZ, HI, NV, NM) 8=Northwest (CO, ID, MT, OR, UT, WA) 9=Midwest (IN, IA, KS, MN, NE, ND, OK, SD, WY) 10=Great Lakes (MI, OH, WI) 11=Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, PA, RI, VT) 12=Mid-Atlantic (DE, MD, VA) 13=Southeast (GA, NC, SC, WV) 14=Deep South (AL, AK, KY, LA, MS, MO, TN)
Year	Dichotomous indicator for each year of data in the sample
*Only available in CPS outgoing rotation groups surveyed in March, during the ASEC supplement.	

Table 2.8 Comparative Profiles of CPS-MORG and SIPP Noncitizens, 1996-2015

	SIPP Men			CPS Men			SIPP Women			CPS Women		
	1996, 2001, 2004, 2008	1998-2015	1996, 2001, 2004, 2008	1998-2015	1996, 2001, 2004, 2008	1998-2015	1996, 2001, 2004, 2008	1998-2015	1996, 2001, 2004, 2008	1998-2015	1996, 2001, 2004, 2008	1998-2015
	N	Mean/%	SD	N	Mean/%	SD	N	Mean/%	SD	N	Mean/%	SD
% Unauthorized	3875	24.4%			2523	18.2%						
<i>Work-Related</i>												
Wage	5620	14.1	10.6	102593	13.8	10.5	3832	12.2	9.8	66158	11.6	9.3
Logged Wage	5620	2.5	0.6	102593	2.4	0.6	3832	2.3	0.6	66158	2.3	0.6
Work Experience	5757	18.8	9.1	103106	18.9	9.0	3929	19.4	9.5	66576	19.6	9.4
Professional Occupation	5757	18.5%		103106	17.0%		3929	23.3%		66576	21.1%	
Union Member	5757	9.4%		103106	7.3%		3929	10.8%		66576	8.1%	
Paid hourly	5757	60.5%		103106	63.4%		3929	64.9%		66576	67.4%	
<i>Educational Attainment</i>												
Less than HS degree	5757	36.3%		103106	39.9%		3929	27.3%		66576	30.7%	
HS degree	5757	23.1%		103106	24.6%		3929	22.2%		66576	25.3%	
Some College	5757	16.2%		103106	11.2%		3929	23.8%		66576	15.7%	
College degree	5757	13.0%		103106	12.8%		3929	17.3%		66576	17.5%	
Advanced degree	5757	11.3%		103106	11.4%		3929	9.4%		66576	10.8%	
Years in the US	4722	10.2	8.6	103098	11.5	8.6	3190	10.6	8.6	66572	11.9	8.8
<i>Region of Birth</i>												
N Am/Europe	5757	11.5%		103106	8.6%		3929	14.1%		66576	12.1%	
Asia/PI	5757	19.7%		103106	19.7%		3929	24.3%		66576	24.4%	
Africa/Caribb	5757	10.6%		103106	9.5%		3929	15.2%		66576	13.6%	
Ctl/S Am	5757	27.6%		103106	35.6%		3929	25.3%		66576	32.0%	
Mexico	5757	30.7%		103106	26.5%		3929	21.1%		66576	17.9%	
<i>Marital Status</i>												
Single	5757	34.2%		103106	30.4%		3929	36.1%		66576	35.5%	
Married to noncitizen	5757	46.6%		103106	52.1%		3929	35.9%		66576	41.6%	
Married to citizen	5757	19.2%		103106	17.6%		3929	27.9%		66576	22.9%	
Parent	5757	59.4%		103106	56.7%		3929	66.8%		66576	66.4%	
<i>Economic Well-Being</i>												
HH size	5757	4.0	2.0	103106	3.9	1.9	3929	3.8	1.9	66576	3.7	1.8
No. families in HH	5757	1.4	0.8	103106	1.3	0.8	3929	1.3	0.7	66576	1.1	0.5
Owens Home	5757	39.9%		102923	36.3%		3929	48.2%		66456	44.4%	
Inc-to-Pov ratio	5757	269.0	149.4	8342	262.5	151.5	3929	284.9	150.2	5425	272.5	155.8
Has health insurance	5757	56.4%		8342	55.1%		3929	69.3%		5425	64.9%	

Note: Wage and salaried noncitizens aged 25-54. CPS & SIPP estimates are weighted.

Table 2.9 Comparative Profiles of Unauthorized Wage and Salaried Workers, 1998-2015

	1998 Comparison		2001 Comparison		2004 Comparison		2009 Comparison	
	CPS	SIPP	CPS	SIPP	CPS	SIPP	CPS	SIPP
	1998	1996	2001	2001	2004	2004	2009	2009
% Unauthorized	10.8%	12.9%	22.7%	21.6%	23.9%	21.6%	25.2%	25.6%
<i>Years in US</i>								
0-5 yrs	55.2%	60.7%	43.0%	47.0%	45.5%	39.0%	26.3%	37.4%
6-10 yrs	32.3%	31.4%	35.5%	29.1%	23.3%	39.0%	41.9%	35.0%
11-15 yrs	11.6%	7.8%	13.2%	18.5%	22.8%	13.1%	14.6%	17.3%
16-20 yrs	0.9%	0.1%	6.5%	4.3%	6.2%	7.2%	13.3%	7.8%
21+ yrs			1.8%	1.0%	2.2%	1.7%	4.0%	2.4%
<i>Region of Birth</i>								
North America	67.4%	68.9%	71.0%	69.6%	76.0%	75.7%	76.9%	82.9%
Asia	15.3%	15.4%	13.1%	11.5%	11.8%	10.9%	8.5%	6.4%
South America	8.6%	7.8%	7.5%	6.4%	7.4%	7.8%	9.0%	5.3%
Europe	5.8%	5.1%	6.8%	8.5%	3.4%	3.2%	2.7%	2.4%
Other	2.9%	2.8%	1.6%	4.1%	1.3%	2.5%	3.0%	3.0%
<i>Country of Birth</i>								
Mexico	44.3%	46.3%	52.6%	54.8%	59.1%	62.1%	57.8%	-
El Salvador	7.1%	9.8%	5.6%	3.2%	5.4%	3.2%	7.1%	-
Guatemala	5.2%	3.3%	2.8%	2.1%	2.9%	4.5%	4.3%	-
Honduras	0.9%	2.8%	1.8%	3.5%	2.7%	1.3%	3.1%	-
Philippines	3.0%	4.7%	1.6%	1.5%	1.7%	1.1%	0.9%	-
India	2.0%	2.1%	2.5%	2.1%	2.6%	1.2%	2.3%	-
Korea	0.8%	1.0%	1.1%	0.4%	0.8%	0.6%	0.4%	-
Ecuador	1.4%	2.6%	1.9%	2.2%	1.1%	0.7%	1.8%	-
Brazil	2.0%	0.7%	1.2%	1.0%	1.0%	1.5%	1.8%	-
China	2.6%	1.6%	2.3%	1.5%	2.1%	2.6%	1.6%	-
Other	30.9%	25.1%	26.6%	27.7%	20.5%	21.2%	0.6%	-
<i>State of Residence</i>								
California	35.0%	43.1%	34.3%	31.6%	26.0%	26.7%	26.4%	26.1%
Texas	7.0%	7.8%	10.9%	10.4%	13.8%	12.9%	8.7%	9.2%
Florida	3.3%	2.5%	7.2%	5.5%	4.8%	6.3%	4.3%	4.4%
New York	11.1%	7.3%	12.2%	13.6%	7.5%	8.5%	9.8%	7.0%
Illinois	10.1%	9.7%	4.7%	3.9%	3.5%	3.8%	4.2%	5.9%
Georgia	0.6%	0.5%	2.5%	3.1%	4.7%	5.9%	4.7%	3.9%
Arizona	2.5%	1.7%	1.7%	1.0%	5.4%	4.3%	2.3%	3.1%
North Carolina	0.5%	0.3%	2.1%	3.7%	5.9%	4.7%	3.8%	4.5%
New Jersey	5.5%	6.9%	2.2%	2.8%	3.0%	3.0%	6.0%	4.1%
Nevada	0.9%	0.4%	0.8%	2.6%	1.7%	0.5%	1.3%	1.6%
Other	23.4%	19.8%	21.4%	21.9%	23.7%	23.2%	28.5%	30.1%
<i>Age</i>								
25-34	57.7%	63.0%	59.5%	63.8%	58.4%	58.9%	51.8%	46.7%
35-44	31.4%	28.1%	29.6%	24.5%	31.0%	29.2%	33.0%	36.1%
45-54	10.9%	8.9%	10.9%	11.6%	10.5%	11.9%	15.2%	17.2%
% Female	36.3%	31.9%	29.7%	30.1%	31.6%	34.3%	28.9%	32.1%

Note: Wage and salaried noncitizens aged 25-54. CPS & SIPP estimates are weighted.

Chapter Three – Foreign-Born Labor Force Participation and State Policy Contexts of Reception

Immigrants to the United States have long been perceived as economic movers, motivated by better employment chances or higher wages. This view of immigrants takes their labor force participation as a given. Yet immigrants' labor force participation within the US varies across states. Among male Mexican immigrants, for example, 96 percent participate in the labor force in Maryland, while 90 percent participate in Massachusetts (author's calculations from ACS data). Among Chinese immigrant men, 94 percent participate in the labor force in New Jersey, but only 85 percent participate in Louisiana. There is even wider variation in among women: 68 percent of Mexican women participate in the labor force in Rhode Island, but only 51 percent participate in Louisiana. Among Chinese women, 81 percent participate in the workforce in Hawaii, but only 63 percent participate in New Hampshire. Differing patterns of labor force participation across states suggest that immigrants' labor market participation depends on other factors besides their incentive for migration. The receiving society in immigrants' choice of destination provides them with unique opportunities and constraints for their labor force participation.

Within the US, states have different structural characteristics that influence immigrant incorporation, and the landscape of opportunities and constraints for immigrants has become more varied since 1996. In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which allowed for state participation in federal immigration enforcement. In the same year, Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which devolved welfare allocation and decisions regarding immigrant eligibility to the states. These acts mark the rise of immigration federalism where the federal government redistributed and shared its immigration powers with the states

(Suro 2015).¹⁸ In response, state governments have taken initiative regarding immigration matters, and the 2000s saw an upswing in the passage of state-level *immigration laws*, or laws related to the enforcement of immigrant entry and exit, and *immigrant social rights laws*, or laws regulating immigrants' access to education, work, health care, and public benefits (Varsanyi 2010). States have passed two types of immigration laws with opposing objectives: enforcement laws aim to remove unauthorized immigrants from the state, while sanctuary laws aim to limit state law enforcement's involvement with federal enforcement. Similarly, states have passed two types of immigrant rights laws: exclusionist laws limit work and benefits to U.S. citizens, while inclusionist laws facilitate immigrants' access to work and extend other social rights to them, often regardless of their legal status. These developments in state immigration and social rights laws raise the question of how state policy context of reception impacts immigrant labor force participation. This chapter asks: how is state policy context associated with immigrant labor force participation?

Immigrant Economic Incorporation

Early theories of immigrants' economic incorporation focus largely on the individual characteristics immigrants brought to the United States. Under human capital theory, immigrants' educational attainment, English ability, and labor market experience increase their degree of success in the labor market (Borjas 1987). Selection theory draws on the human capitalist framework to argue that the conditions of immigrants' country of origin encourage either the migration of immigrants low in human capital (negative selection) or high in human

¹⁸ In *Chae Chan Ping v. United States* (1889), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the federal government had the sole control over immigration policy, or laws regulating immigrant entry and exit, but states could regulate immigrant integration (immigrant rights laws). The federal government still maintains primary authority over immigration enforcement, but states have passed immigration laws, and the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld state involvement in immigration enforcement.

capital (positive selection), with negative selection resulting in poorer economic outcomes. A gendered perspective on immigration and labor force participation emphasizes the importance of household characteristics. In general, the presence of young children prevent women from entering the labor market and women may not enter the labor market unless necessitated by low household income. Further, immigrant women are frequently tied movers, which often results in a legal status that does not give them the authorization to work.

Both new assimilation theory and segmented assimilation theory recognize that immigrants' labor market outcomes also depend on the receiving society, or the "context of reception" (Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Zhou 1993). Contextual factors, such as the size and education level of the coethnic community (Levanon 2014), natives' view of immigrants (Waldinger and Lichter 2003; Waters 2009), and government policy (Donato, Durand, and Massey 1992; Portes and Rumbaut 2001), impact immigrants' employment, occupational attainment, and wages. To understand how contextual factors like government laws influence immigrant incorporation, scholars have drawn on the boundary processes framework (Alba and Nee 2003; Alba 2005; Baubock 1994).

Boundaries are distinctions made by actors to categorize people and separate them into groups (Lamont and Molnár 2002). Immigrants are usually distinguished from natives based on their nonwhite race, cultural differences (such as speaking a language other than English), and non-citizenship status (Alba 2005; Baubock 1994; Zolberg and Long 1999). As group boundaries become widely agreed upon, they result in stable behavioral patterns that reproduce unequal access to and distribution of resources between groups (Lamont and Molnár 2002). Group boundaries then become coded into law, which continues to reproduce between-group inequalities (Omi and Winant 1994). However, not all boundaries are alike, and they vary across

time and space (Alba 2005; Fox and Guglielmo 2012). While bright boundaries clearly distinguish group insiders from outsiders, blurred boundaries transform clear-cut dichotomies into gradients so that a person's group membership is ambiguous (Alba 2005; Baubock 1994; Zolberg and Long 1999). In turn, the type of boundary in place is theorized to affect immigrant incorporation. Laws codifying bright immigrant-native boundaries facilitate the preservation of economic opportunities for native group members (Alba 2005). To obtain these opportunities, immigrants must cross the boundary through naturalization or assimilation. Laws blurring immigrant-native boundaries facilitate immigrant integration by providing them with access to natives' socioeconomic opportunities, even without immigrant membership in this group.

In the United States, federal legislation has upheld bright boundaries between the immigrant and native population. Over the past 30 years, the federal government has enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the Illegal Immigration and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), and the Patriot Act, all of which have sought to remove unauthorized immigrants and authorized immigrants with a criminal record. The passage of laws that reinforce the bright boundary between immigrants and natives negatively impacted both authorized and unauthorized immigrants' economic outcomes (Donato et al. 2008; Donato and Sisk 2012; Gentsch and Massey 2011). However, not all boundaries are alike; variation in immigrant-native boundaries occurs at the state level. For example, state-level enforcement laws brighten the federal boundary between natives and immigrants by further discouraging noncitizens' presence in the state. States also draw bright boundaries when immigrant rights laws prevent noncitizens from obtaining employment or benefits. Conversely, sanctuary laws blur the immigrant-native boundary by not differentiating unauthorized and authorized immigrants from the citizen population, and

inclusionist social rights laws provide noncitizen immigrants with resources often reserved for citizens.

I use a boundary processes framework to examine the extent to which state-level policies hinder or promote immigrants' economic integration. The analysis is informed by policy research, which demonstrates that state policies affect race and gender employment equality (Beggs 1995). State laws could matter as much or more than national policy because they are a more immediate context (Marrow 2011). In fact, state policy context has affected immigrant political participation (Okamoto and Ebert 2010), naturalization (Van Hook, Brown, and Bean 2006), educational attainment (Filindra, Blanding, and Garcia Coll 2011), and settlement (Leerkes, Bachmeier, and Leach 2013). I build on this research and consider labor market participation because labor market opportunities are key motivators for migration, but can be withheld due to law. Labor market participation is also a key factor for immigrant incorporation, as obtaining a job is a form of structural integration which can lead to entrance to other institutions of the host society and possible upward mobility (Gordon 1964). From a boundary processes framework, I form the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1a: Bright boundaries, as codified by immigration enforcement and restrictive immigrant social rights laws, curb immigrants' participation in the labor force.

This dissertation makes a second contribution to immigration research by analyzing the effects of policy contexts based on the blurring and brightening of both immigration and social rights laws. Past immigration research has been mainly limited to examining the effects of enforcement laws (bright immigration laws) (Donato, Durand, and Massey 1992; Donato and Massey 1993; Donato, Aguilera, and Wakabayashi 2005; Donato et al. 2008; Gentsch and Massey 2011; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Orrenius and Zavodny 2009; Phillips and

Massey 1999) or welfare reform (bright social rights laws) (Van Hook and Balistreri 2006) because of its focus on federal law. Meanwhile, state-level research has mainly focused on the effects of anti-immigrant laws, including enforcement laws, laws preventing immigrant access to welfare benefits, laws mandating the use of E-Verify, and laws limiting unauthorized access to state tuition and driver's licenses (Filindra, Blanding, and Garcia Coll 2011; Leerkes, Bachmeier, and Leach 2013; Okamoto and Ebert 2010; Orrenius and Zavodny 2015; Van Hook, Brown, and Bean 2006). However, anti-immigrant states may differ in their effects depending on their involvement with immigration enforcement. In their study of the effects of state-level enforcement laws, Menjívar and Abrego (2012) identify these types of laws as forms of legal violence. Legal violence is “embedded in the body of law that, while it purports to have the positive objective of protecting rights or controlling behavior for the general good, simultaneously gives rise to practices that harm a particular social group” (Menjívar and Abrego 2012:1387). The very implementation of the law results in suffering, pain, and unintentional negative consequences. For example, enforcement laws resulted in Central American immigrants having a pervasive sense of fear of social spaces, often preventing them from going to work or school. The legal violence and resulting fear of social spaces may especially be associated with bright immigration laws, rather than bright social rights laws, as immigrants voiced fears of deportation and separation from families – risks which are not associated with bright social rights laws. Legal violence research suggests that not all bright boundaries are equal; therefore, I propose a modified hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1b: Bright boundaries that are forms of legal violence, such as immigration enforcement laws, will have a larger negative impact on immigrants' labor force participation than bright social rights laws.

Data and Methods

For testing whether state policy context is associated with immigrants' labor force participation, I use American Community Survey (ACS) data from 2000 to 2015. The ACS is a cross-sectional survey collected by the Census Bureau, with each sample representing between .4% and 1% of the population. The large size of the ACS ensures adequate immigrant representation across states and includes many national-origin immigrant groups. Analysis begins in 2000, the earliest year ACS data are available.

I restrict the ACS data to foreign-born adults, excluding those born abroad to American parents. I focus on the working-age population, between the ages of 25 to 54. Foreign-born adults whose country of birth is unspecified or listed as a general region (N=26,946, or 1% of the sample) were dropped from the sample. I also restrict my sample to the population living outside of group quarters (N living in group quarters=38,928, or 1.6% of the sample). Data on individuals living in group quarters were not collected by ACS before 2006, so I drop these individuals to have a consistent sample for the entire period of study.¹⁹ Finally, I restrict my sample to the non-student population, since students are less likely to participate in the workforce due to visa restrictions or time limitations (N of students=175,462 or 7.36% of the sample). After these limitations, my total sample size is 1,074,114 foreign-born men and 1,135,986 foreign-born women.

Dependent Variable

The outcome of interest is labor force participation. Individuals participated in the labor force if they: worked at all for pay in the last week; performed at least 15 hours of unpaid labor

¹⁹ Group quarters include institutionalized individuals, such as those living in correctional facilities, nursing homes, or mental hospitals and non-institutionalized individuals living in college dorms, military barracks, missions, or shelters.

for a family business in the last week; had a job but were temporarily not at work due to illness, bad weather, industrial dispute, or vacation; or had been looking for work in the past four weeks. Otherwise, they are outside of the workforce.

Independent Variable of Interest: State Policy Context of Reception

States are classified as either exclusionist, rights restrictionist, noninterventionist, or inclusionist. Exclusionist states and rights restrictionist states are both anti-immigrant, but exclusionist states have adopted immigration enforcement laws *and* have restricted immigrants' social rights, whereas rights restrictionist states have only restricted immigrants' social rights. Noninterventionist states do not have any immigration laws or immigrant rights laws on the books. Finally, inclusionist states have extended rights normally reserved for citizens to immigrants. State policy contexts of reception are merged to individuals with a one-year lag.

State Control Variables

Other time-varying state contextual variables control for other aspects of the context of reception, including the coethnic and economic contexts and native attitudes towards immigrants. A table summarizing the control measures is available in the Appendix. Correlations between state-level control variables and state policy context are presented in Table 3.1.

Refer to Table 3.1

Economic Structure

The overall health of the labor market provides new job opportunities to immigrants. To measure labor market differences between states, I use the Bureau of Labor Statistics' (2016) yearly unemployment rate for each state. I use the gender-specific state unemployment rate (e.g., for immigrant men, I use the male state unemployment rate). I also control for demand for immigrant labor by using the percentage of total employment in the state in "immigrant"

industries – for men, I control for the percentage of total employment in agriculture, construction, and computer technology; for women, I control for the percentage of total employment in accommodations, food services, and health (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017). These industries were selected because immigrants were over-represented in the industry in 2010.²⁰ Because immigrants are bifurcated between the high-skill and low-skill workforce, I include one high-skill immigrant industry and two lower-skill immigrant industries in my measure.²¹

Societal Reception: Native Attitudes

A host society's view of immigrants influences the employment opportunities offered to them; natives who hold negative attitudes toward immigrants rate them unfavorably on job applications (Blommaert, van Tubergen, and Coenders 2012). However, employers sometimes prefer immigrant labor if they view immigrants as hardworking and docile (Waldinger and Lichter 2003; Waters 2009). The General Social Survey, the American National Election Studies, and the 2006 Social Capital Community Benchmark survey have captured native attitudes towards immigrants, but they do not survey a large enough number of respondents to produce reliable state-level measures of attitudes toward immigrants. Further, these surveys are only available for selected years. As an alternative, I proxy native attitudes toward immigrants using Berry et al.'s (1998) measure of citizen ideology. This measure captures citizens' position on a liberal-conservative continuum, ranging from 0 to 100, with 100 indicating the most liberal views. Those with liberal views may be less likely to discriminate against immigrants and

²⁰ In 2010, immigrants were 15.8 percent of the total employed population. An immigrant industry is defined as industry where immigrants were over-represented (where immigrants make up more than 15.8 percent of the industry) (Singer 2012).

²¹ Immigrants were over-represented in private households; however, BLS does not publish estimates of employment in private households.

welcome their participation in the labor force. It has been shown to influence state adoption of immigrant welfare laws (Hero and Preuhs 2007) and has been used as a control for native attitudes when examining how social movements influence immigrant policy making (Steil and Vasi 2014). Data through 2013 were provided by Michigan State University's Correlates of the State Policy Project (Jordan and Grossman 2016). Data were linearly extrapolated through 2015.

Coethnic Community

Larger coethnic communities can assist immigrants during their job searches and can ensure employment by practicing social closure within certain businesses or economic sectors (Levanon 2014; Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Additionally, state policy contexts influence immigrants' settlement decisions; anti-immigrant state legislation has resulted in smaller coethnic communities as immigrants moved out of hostile states (Leerkes, Bachmeier, and Leach 2013). Outmigration either results in fewer coethnics to provide resources or less competition within the labor market. Further, coethnic group size influences how immigrants experience legislative effects. In counties with anti-immigrant ordinances and large shares of coethnics, Mexicans reported experiencing more discrimination (Ebert and Ovink 2014), which might discourage immigrants from job seeking. I measure the size of an immigrant group in the state relative to the total population of the state by aggregating individual-level information in the ACS and calculating the immigrant group's share of the total adult-aged (25 years or older) population. Because of smaller sample sizes for some national-origin groups in each year, I calculate a five-year rolling average. For the year 2000 and earlier (used for lagged measures), I use Census aggregates and linear interpolations between 1990 and 2000.

Further, if the coethnic community has many high-educated individuals, these communities usually have more entrepreneurs who are willing and able to hire fellow coethnics

in immigrant businesses (Portes and Zhou 1993). Higher-educated individuals may also have more knowledge about the labor market and opportunities available. I calculate the percent of the adult-aged immigrant group with a bachelor's degree or higher.²² I again aggregate individual-level data in the ACS and calculate the percent based on five-year rolling averages, using Census aggregates and linear interpolations for the year 2000 and earlier.

A well-established immigrant community may be more effective at finding and locating jobs for fellow immigrants than a less well-established or newer community. To account for differences between new and established destinations, I control for percent change in the foreign-born population in the state in the previous decade (Malone et al. 2003; Migration Policy Institute 2017). Most states that experienced high levels of immigrant growth were new destinations where the immigrant population was not established.

Local-Level Immigration Policy

I control for state immigration policy at lower levels of government using the percent of the state's population living in a county with an active 287g agreement. DHS (2016) lists all counties that have ever entered into a 287g agreement on their website. If a city or town entered into a 287g agreement rather than a county, I included the entire population of the county/ies within the city. State and county population data are from Census 2000 (for years 2000-2005) and Census 2010 (for years 2006-2015). Census data were standardized to 2010 county lines (Minnesota Population Center 2016).

²² The percent of the coethnic community with a bachelor's degree or more is calculated at the national average rather than the state average. Because there are 154 national origin groups in ACS 2000-2015 data, many state-level estimates would be based on small sample sizes (less than 25), making them unreliable. I recognize that there may be state-level variation in the coethnic community's level of education, as many high-educated immigrants may be drawn to the tech industry in California, for example.

Although the definition of a sanctuary city or policy is contested, I consider a locality that limits compliance with ICE detainer requests as a “sanctuary” locality. The Catholic Legal Immigration Network (2014) provides a list of cities and counties that do not honor any ICE detainer requests, restrict compliance to cases where ICE has obtained a warrant from a judge, or only honors detainers when the locality will either be reimbursed for the costs of detention or if the individual has been convicted of a felony. The list also includes the year the locality adopted the sanctuary policy. I then calculated the percent of the state population living within a sanctuary county. If a city or town was listed, I included the entire population of the county/ies within the city for a given year. Population data are from Census 2000 and 2010, with counties standardized to 2010 boundaries.

I use the percent of the state population living in a county with a 287(g) agreement or sanctuary policy, rather than a dichotomous indicator of whether the immigrant lives in a county with these policies, for two reasons. First, not all counties are identifiable in ACS. Counties are only identifiable if they are coterminous with a Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA) or if they contained multiple PUMAs which did not extend into other counties. About 11 percent of the sample did not live in an identifiable county. Second, a dichotomous indicator measured at the county level would suggest the use of a three-level model to account for individual characteristics, county characteristics, and state characteristics. Because the focus of this dissertation is on the state level, rather than the local level, I use a state-level measure.

Control Variables: Country of Origin, Individual-Level, and Household Characteristics

I use country of origin fixed effects to account for possible selection effects and differences in gendered cultural norms related to work. Using a country of origin indicator captures group differences in the conditions in the country of origin that influenced outmigration,

the level of selectivity of the immigrant group, and group attitudes toward female labor force participation. I control for the following countries and world regions: Canada, Mexico, El Salvador, other Central American countries, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, other Caribbean countries, Colombia, other South American countries, Germany, other Northern/Western European countries, Southern/Eastern European countries, India, China, Philippines, Vietnam, South Korea, other Asian countries, Middle Eastern countries, African countries, and Oceanic countries.

At the individual-level, I control for *age* in years and *educational attainment* in five categories: less than high school degree, high school degree, some college, college degree, or advanced degree. Additional controls account for immigrants' familiarity with US culture and labor market institutions, including *duration of residence* in the United States in years and years-squared and *English language* use and proficiency at home (speaks only English; speaks English very well; speaks English well; speaks English, but not well; does not speak English). I control for *racial-ethnic group* with dummy variables for white, non-Hispanic; black, non-Hispanic; Asian or Pacific Islander; Hispanic (any race); and other race or multiracial. I account for *immigrant legal status* (naturalized citizen, authorized immigrant, unauthorized immigrant; see methodology in Chapter Two for more information) through CSMI. Because multiple imputation does not allow me to identify refugees, I include a dichotomous indicator for whether an immigrant was born in a country whose migrants were usually refugees.²³ Household controls include *marital status* with a dummy variable indicating if the respondent is married, *children*

²³ The refugee variable was set equal to one if an immigrant was born in a country where 60% or more of the immigrant population between the years 1970 and 2015 were refugees. Countries included: Cuba, Bosnia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, USSR, Cambodia, Laos, Bhutan, Burma, Iraq, and Somalia (author's calculations from Department of Homeland Security and Office of Immigration Statistics data).

under the age of 5 currently living in the household, and, for women, the amount of *other family income* as an indicator of necessity for entering the labor force.

Method of Analysis

I use multilevel random intercept logistic regression to predict the likelihood of an immigrant being active in the labor market. I use a multilevel logistic regression model because immigrants are clustered within US states and because state-level variables are the main variables of interest. A simple logistic regression model would fail to take into account the multilevel structure of the data, neglect the error terms at the contextual level, and underestimate the standard errors of the coefficients. I write the multilevel random intercept model for the probability of labor force participation as follows:

$$\text{Logit}\{\Pr(y_{ijt} = 1 | x_{ijt})\} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{ijt} + \beta_2 Z_{jt-1} + \beta_3 Y_t + \zeta_j + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where i indexes individuals, j indexes states, and t indexes time. The probability of labor force participation is modeled as the function of an intercept (β_0), a vector of person-level covariates at the time of the survey (X_{ijt}), state-level covariates lagged one year (Z_{jt-1}), and year fixed effects (Y_t). ζ_j is the random intercept for state j , which accounts for unobserved time-constant characteristics of state j and assumed independent of the covariates. ε_{ij} is a residual error term (or a person-level random effect). All state-level controls variables are mean-centered for each year. Age and years in the US are centered on the sample mean for men and women, respectively.

This model yields a weighted average of within- and between-level estimates and is preferred to a fixed effects model so that I do not omit US states whose immigration policy contexts remain the same over the time period (10 out of 50 US states). I estimate models separately for males and females because of gender differences in labor force participation. To account for legal status, I estimate the model across 5 imputed datasets for men and 3 imputed

datasets for women using Stata's *mi estimate* command.²⁴ This command estimates the model on each imputed dataset and combines the results using Rubin's rules.

Descriptive Results

Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the difference in immigrant labor force participation across state policy contexts for foreign-born men and women. Among foreign-born men, labor force participation is high across all state policy contexts, but exclusionist states show the highest rates of labor force participation (93 percent). Immigrant labor force participation is lower among foreign-born women than foreign-born men, but women in exclusionist states also have the highest labor force participation rates (about 64 percent). Women in inclusionist states participate at similar levels (about 63 percent). Higher labor force participation in exclusionist states could be due to demand for immigrant labor – exclusionist states also have the highest share of the employed population in immigrant industries. Immigrant characteristics are relatively similar across exclusionist, rights restrictionist, and inclusionist states, suggesting that differences in labor force participation may be due to state context rather than immigrant characteristics. The exception is immigrants in noninterventionist states, who have higher levels of education, are more likely to identify as white, non-Hispanic, have higher English language skills, and are less likely to be unauthorized immigrants.

Refer to Table 3.2 and Table 3.3

The Labor Force Participation of Foreign-Born Men

Building on the descriptive analyses above, Models 1 through 3 in Table 3.4 present coefficients from the random-intercept logistic regression predicting foreign-born men's labor

²⁴ The computational power required for estimating these models is large. Although I used Indiana University's Karst Computational System, my models for women's labor force participation did not converge across five imputed datasets. Therefore, I use only three imputed datasets for women's analyses.

force participation using five imputed datasets. Model 1 presents the likelihood of labor force participation by state context of reception while controlling for year fixed effects. Inclusionist states, where the largest share of immigrants live, serve as the reference category. Male labor force participation does not significantly differ across states, but we see a slightly negative coefficient for rights restrictionist states, as compared to inclusionist states. Model 2 shows the likelihood of labor force participation for foreign-born men once accounting for differences in state coethnic, economic, and attitudinal context. Incorporating other state characteristics presents a similar picture for immigrant men. Male labor force participation remains the lowest in rights restrictionist states, but it still does not differ significantly across state policy contexts.

Refer to Table 3.4

Model 3 accounts for individual-level characteristics. The addition of these characteristics to the model does not greatly alter the impact of exclusionist and rights restrictionist states. However, the likelihood of male labor force participation drops in noninterventionist states. Foreign-born men in noninterventionist states were more likely to have higher levels of education, English ability, and have authorized legal status. After accounting for these characteristics, noninterventionist states' labor force participation rates are lower than expected based on the high human capital of their foreign-born men. However, coefficients for state policy context fail to meet statistical significance.

If state policy context has little influence on male labor force participation, what other state characteristics influence immigrants' employment behaviors? Model 3 indicates that coethnic group characteristics are the only contextual characteristics that are significantly associated with foreign-born men's labor force participation. A larger coethnic group and a more highly-educated group decrease labor force participation. If the coethnic group grows from the

smallest share of the state (less than 1 percent) to the largest share (around 15 percent), the odds of being in the labor force decline by a factor of 0.85 ($p < 0.001$).²⁵ If the coethnic group's share of college-educated members increases from the lowest levels (about 3 percent with a college degree) to the highest level (about 76 percent with a college degree), the odds of being in the labor force decline by a factor of 0.75 ($p < 0.001$).²⁶ Instead of offering opportunities for social closure and ensuring work opportunities for coethnics, a larger, more-educated coethnic group could reflect higher competition for employment and discourage some foreign-born men from participating in the labor market.

Individual-level factors explain much of male immigrants' work behavior. Immigrant labor force participation increases with higher levels of education and English language ability. Latino and white immigrant men are more likely to participate than black and Asian immigrant men. Time in the US mostly increases labor force participation, with a dip in labor force participation when immigrants have been in the US for many years. Being married and having children increases men's labor force participation. Compared to citizens or authorized immigrants, unauthorized men are less likely to participate in the labor force ($p < 0.001$). We would expect unauthorized immigrant men to have some of the highest labor force participation rates, as men often migrate to the US to work (Borjas 2017). Examination of SIPP data shows that the negative relationship holds (see Supplemental Table 3.2) even without legal status imputations. Many unauthorized immigrants in SIPP reported not being in the labor force because they had a mental or physical disability that prevented them from working. One possibility is that if unauthorized immigrants formerly worked in a high-risk industry, such as construction or food assembly work, an injury on the job prevents them from working. Other

²⁵ $.85 = \exp(-.011 * 15.2)$

²⁶ $.75 = \exp(-.004 * 72.9)$

unauthorized immigrants who were not in the labor force reported working in construction or landscaping, jobs that are seasonal and insecure from week to week (Flippen 2012).

In sum, the labor force participation of foreign-born men is greatly impacted by coethnic competition in their state and their individual-level human capital. While the magnitude of the state policy context coefficients suggest that foreign-born men have lower levels of labor force participation in rights restrictionist and noninterventionist states, these differences failed to reach statistical significance thresholds.

The Labor Force Participation of Foreign-Born Women

Models 4 through 6 in Table 3.4 present coefficients from the random-intercept logistic regression predicting foreign-born women's labor force participation using three imputed datasets. When controlling for year fixed effects, female labor force participation is lower in exclusionist states compared to inclusionist states and rights restrictionist states (see Model 4). Living in an exclusionist state decreases the odds of being in the labor force by a factor of 0.97 compared to living in an inclusionist state, holding all other variables constant ($p < 0.05$). Living in an exclusionist state also decreases the odds of being in the labor force by a factor of 0.97 compared to living in a rights restrictionist state (chi-squared(1) = 6.19, $p < 0.05$). Model 5 adds other state-level controls and foreign-born women's likelihood of labor force participation remains lower in exclusionist states than in inclusionist states ($p < 0.05$) and rights restrictionist states (chi-squared (1) = 5.10, $p < 0.05$).

In Model 6, with the addition of individual and household characteristics, the exclusionist state coefficient suggests that women's labor force participation is lower in these states than in inclusionist states, but the difference is only statistically significant at the $p < 0.10$ level. However, even with controls, women in exclusionist states remain less likely to participate in the labor

force than women in rights restrictionist states (t statistic = -2.49, $p < 0.01$), and the magnitude of the coefficient is similar; all else held constant, the odds of participating in the labor force for women living in exclusionist states decrease by a factor of .97 compared to women living in rights restrictionist states.²⁷ The persistent difference in labor force participation between exclusionist states and rights restrictionist states highlights the role of bright enforcement laws suppressing women's labor force participation.

In addition to state policy context, other state characteristics influence women's labor force participation. Model 3 indicates that, similar to men, a larger coethnic group and a more highly-educated group decrease immigrant women's labor force participation. Additionally, living in a new destination, as indicated by a growing population, increases women's labor force participation. If the foreign-born population increases at the largest rate (273 percent), the odds of immigrant women's labor force participation increases by a factor of 1.21 ($p < 0.001$).²⁸ Past research suggests that the immigrant networks are less established in new destinations, making it more difficult to locate a job (Flippen and Kim 2015). Instead, women may be pulled into the workforce in new destinations – this measure may be capturing aspects of demand for immigrant labor not measured by immigrant industries (such as household employment or opportunities in food processing). Additionally, more liberal and positive attitudes towards immigrants, as indicated by citizen ideology, are associated with a higher likelihood of female labor force participation ($p < 0.05$). Yet the magnitude of the effect is small; a 10 point increase on the ideology scale increases the odds of women's labor force participation by a factor of 1.01.

The likelihood of women's labor force participation also increases with women's individual human capital. Immigrant women are more likely to enter the workforce with higher

²⁷ $.97 = \exp[.001 - (-.029)]$

²⁸ $1.21 = \exp(.007 * 27.3)$

levels of education and English language ability and more time in the US. Unauthorized women are less likely than citizens and authorized immigrants to enter the labor force ($p < 0.001$). Black immigrant women are the most likely to enter the workforce, while white immigrant women are the least likely to enter. Being married and having young children in the household decreases women's labor force participation, while economic need increases the likelihood of LFP.

In sum, state policy context, in addition to coethnic competition, native attitudes, and human capital, matters for immigrant women's labor force participation. The difference in labor force participation in exclusionist versus rights restrictionist suggests that "anti-immigrant" states are not uniform. Instead, the combination of enforcement laws and rights restrictionist laws found in exclusionist states plays a greater role in reducing labor force participation among women than rights restrictionist laws on their own.

Differing Immigrant Experiences

The immigrant experience is not uniform. Immigrants may experience state policy contexts differently based on their education level, legal status, and racial-ethnic group. This chapter goes on to examine how different immigrant groups experience state policy context.

Policy Effects by Education Level

Highly-educated immigrants and immigrants with less than a high school education enter two different types of labor markets. Immigrants with lower levels of education enter a low-skilled labor market often characterized by informal hiring processes (Flippen 2012; Waldinger and Lichter 2003). In response to employer sanctions in IRCA, many employers in immigrant-intensive industries switched to the practice of subcontracting (Gentsch and Massey 2011). Under a subcontracting arrangement, an employer hires a subcontractor, who is usually a US citizen or legal permanent resident, to undertake a task. The subcontractor then provides the

workers to complete the task, and the employer avoids the liability for hiring unauthorized workers under IRCA. Subcontracting arrangements characterize entire industries, such as construction and garment manufacturing. In addition to subcontracting, immigrants can be hired but remain off-books and paid in cash (Catanzarite and Aguilera 2002; Flippen 2012). Therefore, immigrants with lower levels of education may not be discouraged from entering the labor market, even when laws are passed restricting immigrants' rights or job opportunities, because many industries have adopted practices to ensure that low-skilled immigrants will continue to be hired. On the other hand, bright immigration enforcement laws may especially affect immigrants with lower levels of education. Because low-skill industries and workplaces are known for hiring unauthorized immigrant workers, state-law enforcement officials can target immigrants who drive to these workplaces. For example, Menjivar and Abrego (2012) noted that immigrants working in the service industry were afraid to go to work.

In contrast, higher-skilled labor markets often have formalized and bureaucratic hiring procedures subject to restrictive hiring laws. Higher-educated immigrants may become discouraged from participating in the labor market in rights restrictionist states if there are no established ways to circumvent bureaucratic hiring procedures. Bright immigration enforcement laws may not have effects above bright social rights laws; workplaces and industries known for hiring highly-educated workers may not be targeted for enforcement because of the association between high-skill and employment authorization.

Results by Education Level

Table 3.5 presents the likelihood of labor force participation from random-intercept logistic regression models estimated separately for foreign-born men with less than a high school degree (Model 7) and foreign-born men with a college degree or more (Model 8). Among men

with less than a high-school degree, state policy context coefficients suggest that labor force participation is lower in both exclusionist and rights restrictionist states than inclusionist states. However, these differences fail to reach statistical significance. Among highly-educated foreign-born men, coefficients suggest that the likelihood of labor force participation is actually the highest in exclusionist states (see Model 8). Rights restrictionist states and noninterventionist states suppress labor force participation of highly-educated men compared to inclusionist states. Again, however, state policy context has no significant effects of men's labor force participation. These findings do not offer strong support for the expectation that exclusionist states would suppress low-skilled immigrants' labor force participation, while rights restrictionist states would suppress high-skilled immigrants' labor force participation.

Refer to Table 3.5

Models 9 and 10 in Table 3.5 show the same models estimated for women. In Model 9, among foreign-born women with less than a high school degree, those women living in exclusionist states are the least likely to enter the labor force ($p < 0.01$). Living in an exclusionist state as compared to an inclusionist state decreases women's odds of being in the labor force by 7.5 percent.²⁹ Further, living in an exclusionist as compared to a rights restrictionist state decreases women's odds of being in the labor force by 8.8 percent (t statistic = -4.07, $p < 0.001$).³⁰ Model 10 shows a different pattern among higher-educated women. Coefficients indicate that women in exclusionist states have lower likelihoods of entering the labor force, but the difference is not statistically significant. The results in Table 3.5 support the expectation that lower-educated and lower-skilled women are fearful of entering the labor force in exclusionist states, but that the effects of rights restrictionist states may be circumvented. This may especially

²⁹ $7.5 = 100 * [\exp(-.078) - 1]$

³⁰ $8.8 = 100 * [\exp(-.092) - 1]$

be the case if women with less than a high school degree are working in personal homes as cleaners or child care workers. However, results do not support the hypothesis that higher-skilled female immigrants are affected by rights restrictionist laws.

Policy Effects by Legal Status

As Menjivar (2014) has noted, “the multilevel immigration regime has... turned legal status into a critical resource for most (if not all) endeavors in which immigrants engage” (7). Much, but not all, of state immigration legislation has been targeted toward unauthorized immigrants, and these laws have either explicitly prevented certain kinds of structural integration because immigrants lack authorized status, or they have allowed for unauthorized immigrants to obtain certain rights and benefits. In comparison, authorized immigrants and naturalized citizens have not been targeted or hindered in the same manner. On the other hand, authorized immigrants and naturalized citizens may be impacted by the symbolic effects of the laws and the overall environment of the state toward immigrants. If state policies make them feel unwelcome, then their labor force participation will also be impacted. Studies have shown that the passage of IRCA at the federal level, which targeted unauthorized immigrants, negatively impacted both authorized and unauthorized immigrants’ economic outcomes, but the negative effect was much larger for unauthorized immigrants (Donato et al. 2008; Donato and Sisk 2012; Gentsch and Massey 2011).

Results by Legal Status

Models 11 through 13 in Table 3.6 present coefficients from random-intercept logistic regression models estimated for unauthorized men, authorized men, and citizen men, respectively. State policy contexts fail to significantly predict male labor force participation across the legal status groups, therefore I cannot conclude that exclusionist and rights

restrictionist laws differentially affect the unauthorized and authorized population. Still, coefficients are in the expected directions – among unauthorized men, the likelihood of labor force participation is lower in exclusionist states where men may be especially afraid of deportation. In comparison, authorized immigrants and naturalized citizens likelihood of labor force participation is not lower in exclusionist states than in inclusionist states.

Refer to Table 3.6

Models 14 through 16 in Table 3.6 present the same models for immigrant women. Unauthorized women in exclusionist states are less likely to participate in the labor force than women in rights restrictionist states (t statistic = -2.70, $p < 0.01$). All else held constant, the odds of participating in the labor force for women living in exclusionist states decrease by a factor of .92 compared to women living in rights restrictionist states.³¹ This supports the expectation that unauthorized immigrants will especially feel the effects of exclusionist laws. In comparison, authorized immigrant women's labor force participation does not appear suppressed in exclusionist states (see Model 15). Among citizen women, coefficients indicate that their likelihood of participating in the labor force is the lower in exclusionist states (see Model 16); but the difference is not statistically significant.

Policy Effects by Racial Group

State immigration legislation is based on immigrant legal status is generally “color-blind” in its language. However, enforcement laws, deportation, and “illegal” immigrant status have long been associated with Latinos/as. The 1924 Johnson-Reed Immigration Act's establishment of the Border Patrol resulted in the hardening of the US-Mexico border and increased

³¹ .92 = $\exp[.036 - (-.051)]$

deportations of Mexican immigrants without a proper visa (Ngai 2004).³² The passage of the 1965 Hart-Cellar Act limited the number of immigrants who could move to the United States from the Western Hemisphere, while at the same time terminating the Bracero Program, a program that allowed for the authorized entry of Mexican workers for farm labor. Consequently, the number of unauthorized immigrants from Mexico and Central America skyrocketed, while actual migration numbers remained about the same. Popular discourse and the media espouse the Latino threat narrative – Latinos/as are portrayed as dissimilar from other immigrant groups who assimilate into the US (Chavez 2013). Latinos/as are characterized as the quintessential illegal aliens, which under the public discourse, signals that they are criminals and undeserving of social benefits. In practice, DHS targets Latino men for deportation; the DHS has disproportionately focused on removing unauthorized immigrants with origins in Mexico, Guatemala, and Honduras over unauthorized immigrants with origins in China, Canada, and the UK (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013). Because most unauthorized immigrants are Latino/a, because Latinos/as are criminalized as unauthorized immigrants, and because Latinos have been targeted for deportation, I expect that bright immigration enforcement laws and rights restrictionist laws may be especially salient for Latino/a immigrants' labor force participation.

Results by Racial Group

Models 17 through 20 in Table 3.7 present the likelihood of labor force participation from random-intercept logistic regression models estimated separately for four racial-ethnic

³² Ironically, Mexican immigration was not subject to quota restrictions, but the head tax and entry fee required for a visa was prohibitively expensive, resulting in Mexicans crossing the border to work without authorization. In contrast, European immigrants, who were subject to quota restrictions, were not commonly deported because they obtained legal status through family reunification or by moving to Canada and being admitted to the US legally after living in Canada for five years (Ngai 2004).

groups of foreign-born men: non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, Asians, and Latinos.³³ Across the racial-ethnic groups, state policy contexts fail to reach statistical significance; an exception is that black immigrant men's labor force participation is lower in noninterventionist policy contexts (see Model 18). Living in a noninterventionist state compared to an inclusionist state decreases black immigrant men's odds of being in the labor force by a factor of 0.68 ($p < 0.01$). One possibility is that the measure for noninterventionist policy context is picking up on the unique economic context of noninterventionist states where black immigrant men live, mainly Michigan, Minnesota, and Ohio. These states have some of the highest black unemployment rates, and black unemployment rates are much higher than the overall unemployment rate in the state (Gable and Hall 2013; Wilson 2015). Therefore, black immigrant men may lack job opportunities in these states.

Refer to Table 3.7

Among non-Hispanic white immigrant men (see Model 17), coefficients suggest that their labor force participation is slightly higher in exclusionist states and lower in noninterventionist states. In Model 19, coefficients suggest that exclusionist states boost Asian immigrant men's labor force participation. Finally, among Latinos (see Model 20), coefficients suggest that their labor force participation is lower in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states than in inclusionist states. The pattern provides limited support for my expectation that the effects of exclusionist and rights restrictionist states are targeted at Latino men, but again, effects are not statistically significant.

³³ Because the ACS only collects data on self-identified racial-ethnic group, I use this measure for these analyses. A measure of skin color would be more appropriate because racialization may affect immigrants with darker skin or indigenous features more than immigrants with lighter skin tones (Telles and Ortiz 2008). Variation in skin tone is high among Latinos and Asians; my model for Latinos attempts to control for some of this variation by including a dichotomous indicator for whether an immigrant identified as a nonwhite race.

Models 21 through 24 in Table 3.7 present the logistic regression coefficients from random-intercept models estimated separately for four racial-ethnic groups of foreign-born women. Model 21 shows that the labor force participation of non-Hispanic white immigrant women is slightly lower in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states than in inclusionist states, but the difference fails to reach statistical significance. Black immigrant women's labor force participation is the highest in noninterventionist states; living in a noninterventionist state increases women's odds of being in the labor force by a factor of 1.31 ($p < 0.01$; see Model 22). With high black unemployment rates in noninterventionist states, the noninterventionist policy context may capture the unemployment effect; black immigrant women may be pulled into the labor market to compensate for low levels of black male unemployment. The coefficients in Model 23 suggest that Asian women's labor force participation increases slightly in rights restrictionist states, but declines in noninterventionist states. Finally, Model 24 shows that Latinas' labor force participation is the lowest in exclusionist states. Living in an exclusionist state compared to an inclusionist state decreases the odds of Latina women entering the labor force by a factor of 0.95 ($p < 0.05$). Additionally, there are differences in the labor force participation of Latina women living in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states. Living in an exclusionist state compared to a rights restrictionist state decreases the odds of Latina women entering the labor force by a factor of .96 ($p < 0.05$). These findings support my expectation; exclusionist policy contexts are especially detrimental to Latinas' involvement in the labor force because policies that treat immigrants as criminals are commonly associated with the Latino/a population.

Together these subgroup analyses show that the effects of state policy context are felt by vulnerable populations. Exclusionist states discourage labor force participation among women

with less than a high school degree, Latina women, and unauthorized women. These women are commonly targeted by immigration officials, and states' efforts to ramp up enforcement may increase their fear of public spaces and suppress their involvement in the labor market.

Supplemental Analyses

I also conduct supplemental analyses to evaluate whether alternative specifications of the policy context qualify the main results. I measure policy context with the enforcement and rights scales I used as the axes to create my state typology. The enforcement scale ranged from -3.75 to 2.25. A negative score represents states that had passed more bright immigration laws than blurred immigration laws (weighted by their potential population scope of impact). A zero on the scale represents states that have passed an equal number of blurred and bright enforcement laws and states that have not passed any laws. The rights scale ranged from -5.5 to 3.5. A negative score represents a state that had passed more bright rights laws than blurred rights laws (or restricted immigrants' rights more than extended rights to them, as weighted by the laws' potential population scope of impact). Again, a zero on the scale represents states that have passed an equal number of blurred and bright rights laws and states that have not passed any laws. For immigrant men, the immigration law scale had a small negative effect size and was not statistically significant. The rights scale was positively associated with men's labor force participation, but the effect was not statistically significant. Like the policy typology, the scale measures fail to predict men's labor force participation. For immigrant women, both scales had small effect sizes and were not statistically significant. Considering the two types of laws separately may not capture the additive effect of bright immigration and rights laws.

I determine whether the findings presented are sensitive to the inclusion of extreme exclusionist states. Arizona is known for being an especially harsh exclusionist state, as it was

the first state to pass a law requiring its state enforcement officials to inquire about immigrant legal status in a stop or arrest (SB 1070). Results are robust. Even without Arizona in the model, women in exclusionist states are less likely to participate in the labor force than women in rights restrictionist states (t-statistic=-2.49, $p<0.05$). For men, the pattern of state policy context coefficients remains the same, and effects are not statistically significant.

Finally, I conduct supplementary analyses to determine whether results are reproducible in SIPP data. SIPP data allow me to control for immigrant legal status without having to perform CSMI. However, SIPP data only include a fraction of the number of immigrants; immigrants outside of the traditional destinations of California, New York, Florida, Illinois, and Texas are not as well-represented in the data. Supplemental Table 3.2 compares models using SIPP data and ACS data. Models 25 and 28 use SIPP 2004 and 2009 data to predict men's and women's labor force participation, using listwise deletion for any missing variables. Models 26 and 29 use SIPP 2004 and 2009 data to predict labor force participation, but use imputed data for missing responses, including imputed data for missing legal status or legal status that was allocated by the Census Bureau. Due to smaller sample sizes in SIPP, the SIPP models are simplified by collapsing or combining some categorical variables and by estimating a weighted logistic regression model with clustered standard errors, rather than a multilevel model. Models 27 and 30 present the full ACS model but using ACS data from 2004 and 2009 only.

Refer to Supplemental Table 3.2

While there are no statistically significant effects for state policy context for immigrant men in the SIPP data, the coefficients for state policy context in SIPP models (Models 25 and 26) suggest that immigrant men's labor force participation is lower outside of inclusionist states. The ACS model only points to a decline in labor force participation in exclusionist and

noninterventionist states. Among women, labor force participation is lower in exclusionist states in the ACS, but not in SIPP. What explains the different results from the two surveys? SIPP cannot account for the exact national origin group of immigrant women because 2008 publicly-available SIPP data only present general world region of birth. Many immigrant women living in exclusionist states are Cubans, who have higher levels of labor force participation than immigrant women on average. SIPP models may be attributing some of the Cuban effect to exclusionist states, resulting in its positive (Model 28) or small (Model 29) coefficient size. On the whole, the effect (or lack thereof) of state policy context is similar across SIPP and ACS data for immigrant men, but more inconsistent between SIPP and ACS data for women.

Discussion and Conclusion

Does state policy context matter for immigrant labor force participation? On the whole, exclusionist states inhibit the labor force participation of women, especially those who are unauthorized or have characteristics commonly associated with unauthorized status, such as lower levels of education or Latina race/ethnicity (see Table 3.8 for a summary of results). The boundary processes framework, which suggests that bright immigrant-native boundaries facilitate the preservation of economic opportunities for natives, receives some support. However, my findings also point to caveats and limitations in the boundary processes framework – not all types of bright boundaries limit immigrant labor force participation, and bright boundaries do not limit the labor force participation of all immigrants.

Refer to Table 3.8

I find a difference in effects between rights restrictionist states and exclusionist states. I find that exclusionist states, more so than rights restrictionist states, curb immigrant labor force participation. I argue that exclusionist states practice legal violence (Menjívar and Abrego 2012),

more so than rights restrictionist states. Exclusionist states' laws criminalize immigrants, seek to banish them from the state, and result in psychological and social consequences for the immigrant population. Fear and anxiety made possible through these laws have led to withdrawal from public spaces, including the labor market. The rights restrictionist laws have a more limited scope – their laws do not target immigrants for removal. I argue that rights restrictionist policy contexts reflect a desire for immigrants *in the state* to work. Rights restrictionist states have adopted laws to increase immigrant workers' fear and docility, but do not threaten to banish immigrant workers from their jurisdiction. Rights restrictionist laws may result in a fearful and docile immigrant workforce, but they do not inhibit immigrant participation in the labor force.

I also find that exclusionist states have a targeted, gendered effect; exclusionist states suppress women's labor force participation, but not men's. More specifically, exclusionist states discourage labor force participation among women with less than a high school degree, Latina women, and unauthorized women. Women's decisions to enter the labor force are influenced by the family or household dynamics. Given that Latino men are commonly targeted for removal (Golash-Boza and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013), women may refrain from entering the labor market in enforcement states because they fear family separation. Mixed status families are common (Fix and Zimmermann 2001), and if both mothers and fathers enter the labor market and are deported, US-born children could be left in the United States without a guardian. Latina women, women with lower levels of education, and unauthorized women may be especially fearful of being deported in enforcement states because if they enter the workforce, they would be in public spaces that state-level enforcement targets. For example, state police and sheriffs may patrol highways or roads that immigrants use to take to work, especially outside of businesses known to

hire immigrant workers. By withdrawing from the labor force when the risk of apprehension is high, women can reduce the risk that US-born children would lose both their parents.

Finally, these results have important policy implications. One aspect of legal violence is the general public's "acceptance of the suffering of an entire class of people because 'it is the law'... unflawed and beyond question" (Menjívar 2013:234). The public believes that immigrants are "living on the margins" and do not deserve jobs because they "broke the law" (Menjívar 2013:235). This chapter undermines the idea that certain types of immigrants will not join the labor force and work due to their individual characteristics. Instead, it highlights the role of the receiving policy context in shaping immigrants' labor force participation. Exclusionist states seek to deter poor, unauthorized immigrants. Although harsh enforcement laws encourage outmigration (Leerkes, Bachmeier, and Leach 2013), they do not deter all immigrants and negatively affect immigrants remaining in the state. By seeking to remove poor, unauthorized immigrants these states actually contribute to impoverishing the immigrants remaining in their state by preventing immigrant women from entering the labor market. States without these policies do a better job ensuring a productive immigrant population.

Table 3.1 Correlations between State Policy Context and State-Level Control Variables

Panel A. Correlations for Foreign-Born Men												
	Excl	RtsRest	Nonint	Incl	Attit	287g	Sanct	FB%Ch	%Grp	%Coll	Unemp	ImmInd
Excl	1.00											
Rts Rest	-0.31	1.00										
Nonint	-0.07	-0.08	1.00									
Incl	-0.51	-0.62	-0.14	1.00								
Attitudes	-0.36	-0.20	-0.01	0.47	1.00							
% 287g	-0.01	-0.11	-0.09	0.13	-0.07	1.00						
% Sanct	-0.15	-0.16	-0.05	0.28	0.09	-0.02	1.00					
FB % Ch	0.28	0.21	0.00	-0.41	-0.37	-0.09	-0.29	1.00				
% Imm Grp	-0.18	0.02	-0.09	0.15	-0.09	0.31	0.07	-0.09	1.00			
% College	0.00	-0.04	0.05	0.03	0.13	-0.09	0.02	-0.08	-0.54	1.00		
Unemp	-0.02	-0.23	0.01	0.22	0.03	0.25	0.12	-0.21	0.09	0.00	1.00	
Imm Ind Emp	0.07	-0.18	-0.13	0.14	-0.18	0.28	0.01	0.12	0.31	-0.11	-0.23	1.00
Panel B. Correlations for Foreign-Born Women												
	Excl	RtsRest	Nonint	Incl	Attit	287g	Sanct	FB%Ch	%Grp	%Coll	Unemp	ImmInd
Excl	1.00											
Rts Rest	-0.30	1.00										
Nonint	-0.07	-0.08	1.00									
Incl	-0.51	-0.62	-0.14	1.00								
Attitudes	-0.37	-0.19	-0.01	0.46	1.00							
% 287g	-0.01	-0.10	-0.09	0.12	-0.09	1.00						
% Sanct	-0.15	-0.16	-0.05	0.28	0.08	-0.02	1.00					
FB % Ch	0.28	0.21	0.00	-0.41	-0.37	-0.07	-0.29	1.00				
% Imm Grp	-0.18	0.03	-0.08	0.13	-0.09	0.30	0.07	-0.09	1.00			
% College	0.01	-0.05	0.05	0.02	0.11	-0.09	0.02	-0.05	-0.56	1.00		
Unemp	-0.03	-0.19	-0.04	0.21	-0.11	0.30	0.18	-0.23	0.17	-0.03	1.00	
Imm Ind Emp	0.12	0.12	-0.02	-0.19	0.13	-0.02	0.29	-0.11	-0.17	0.08	0.22	1.00

Source: 2000-2015 ACS data, foreign-born individuals aged 25-54.

Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Foreign-Born Men, Aged 25-54, Across State Policy Contexts 2000-2015

Dependent Variable	Exclusionist		Rights Restrictionist		Noninterventionist		Inclusionist	
	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD
<i>Labor Force Status</i>								
In the LF	93.0%		92.4% ^a		90.3% ^{ab}		92.2% ^{abc}	
State Controls								
<i>Local Immigration Policy</i>								
% Pop in 287g	11.9	20.0	9.1 ^a	15.7	0.0 ^{ab}	0.0	14.5 ^{abc}	17.8
% Pop in Sanctuary	1.2	7.7	1.9 ^a	7.9	0.0 ^{ab}	0.0	12.4 ^{abc}	24.9
<i>Native Attitudes</i>								
Citizen Ideology	47.2	8.7	52.0 ^a	13.7	55.0 ^{ab}	8.6	61.1 ^{abc}	8.4
<i>Coethnic Group</i>								
% Change in FB pop	85.0	60.3	74.5 ^a	50.3	58.0 ^{ab}	35.9	38.4 ^{abc}	31.3
% State Pop	1.9	2.9	4.1 ^a	5.2	0.4 ^{ab}	0.5	4.7 ^{abc}	6.1
% w/ Coll Degree	25.9	20.5	24.4 ^a	21.8	33.6 ^{ab}	21.3	26.4 ^{abc}	22.1
<i>Economic Context</i>								
Male Unemployment Rate	7.1	2.9	6.2 ^a	2.0	7.4 ^{ab}	3.3	7.7 ^{abc}	2.6
% Emp Male Imm Ind	7.6	1.6	6.9 ^a	1.2	5.8 ^{ab}	0.7	7.5 ^{abc}	1.8
Individual Characteristics								
Age	39.8	8.2	39.7 ^a	8.2	39.6 ^a	8.1	40.3 ^{abc}	8.2
<i>Education</i>								
Less than HS degree	26.9%		32.1% ^a		20.3% ^{ab}		30.5% ^{abc}	
HS degree	23.5%		22.4% ^a		18.7% ^{ab}		21.7% ^{abc}	
Some college	18.6%		16.2% ^a		17.6% ^{ab}		17.6% ^{ab}	
Bachelor's	16.5%		15.2% ^a		19.4% ^{ab}		16.4% ^{bc}	
Adv. degree	14.5%		14.0% ^a		23.9% ^{ab}		13.8% ^{abc}	
<i>Racial-Ethnic Group</i>								
White, non-Hispanic	17.4%		17.3%		37.1% ^{ab}		17.1% ^{abc}	
Black, non-Hispanic	8.2%		4.6% ^a		4.8% ^a		4.8% ^{ab}	
Asian	18.9%		21.8% ^a		31.7% ^{ab}		28.3% ^{abc}	
Latino	53.8%		54.8% ^a		24.5% ^{ab}		48.3% ^{abc}	
Other/Multi	1.7%		1.5% ^a		1.9% ^b		1.6% ^{abc}	
<i>English Ability</i>								
None	6.7%		8.0% ^a		3.3% ^{ab}		7.3% ^{abc}	
Some	17.7%		20.1% ^a		13.1% ^{ab}		19.7% ^{abc}	
Well	23.2%		24.3% ^a		23.7% ^{ab}		25.0% ^{abc}	
Very well	36.1%		34.4% ^a		40.0% ^{ab}		34.0% ^{abc}	
Only	16.3%		13.3% ^a		19.9% ^{ab}		14.0% ^{abc}	

	Exclusionist		Rights Restrictionist		Noninterventionist		Inclusionist	
	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD
<i>Legal Status</i>								
Citizen	42.0%		40.5% ^a		45.1% ^{ab}		44.9% ^{ab}	
LPR	41.1%		44.7% ^a		46.9% ^a		40.5% ^{bc}	
Unauthorized	16.9%		14.7%		8.0% ^{ab}		14.7% ^{ac}	
Years in the US	17.0	11.1	17.2 ^a	11.0	16.1 ^{ab}	11.6	18.8 ^{abc}	10.8
Married	69.5%		72.5% ^a		76.3% ^{ab}		70.0% ^{abc}	
Child <5 in HH	21.6%		22.6% ^a		25.4% ^{ab}		20.8% ^{abc}	
Refugee Origin Country (>60)	9.5%		3.9% ^a		9.4% ^b		2.6% ^{bc}	
<i>National Origin</i>								
Canada	2.4%		1.9% ^a		5.5% ^{ab}		1.7% ^{abc}	
Mexico	25.8%		36.7% ^a		16.5% ^{ab}		33.5% ^{abc}	
El Salvador	2.7%		3.0% ^a		0.7% ^{ab}		3.6% ^{abc}	
Other Ctrl Am	6.4%		4.2% ^a		1.8% ^{ab}		3.9% ^{abc}	
Cuba	6.8%		2.2% ^a		0.7% ^{ab}		0.4% ^{abc}	
Puerto Rico	4.2%		3.1% ^a		2.5% ^{ab}		1.9% ^{abc}	
Dominican	1.2%		1.5% ^a		0.3% ^{ab}		1.7% ^{abc}	
Other Caribbean	5.6%		2.6% ^a		1.4% ^{ab}		2.8% ^{abc}	
Columbia	2.5%		1.4% ^a		0.5% ^{ab}		0.8% ^{abc}	
Other S Am	6.1%		4.7% ^a		2.4% ^{ab}		4.1% ^{abc}	
Germany	1.2%		1.0% ^a		2.5% ^{ab}		0.8% ^{abc}	
Other N&W Europe	3.7%		3.4% ^a		5.6% ^{ab}		3.4% ^{ac}	
S&E Europe	4.6%		6.1% ^a		10.6% ^{ab}		6.2% ^{abc}	
India	5.5%		6.2% ^a		10.2% ^{ab}		5.3% ^{abc}	
China	2.1%		2.6% ^a		3.8% ^{ab}		4.3% ^{abc}	
Philippines	1.9%		3.4% ^a		3.0% ^{ab}		4.8% ^{abc}	
Vietnam	3.0%		2.9% ^a		3.1% ^{ab}		3.8% ^{abc}	
S Korea	1.6%		1.6% ^a		2.5% ^{ab}		2.5% ^{ab}	
Other Asia	4.7%		5.0% ^a		9.5% ^{ab}		7.7% ^{abc}	
Middle East	3.1%		2.6% ^a		11.0% ^{ab}		3.2% ^{abc}	
Africa	4.1%		3.2% ^a		4.9% ^{ab}		2.6% ^{abc}	
Oceania	0.8%		0.8% ^a		1.0% ^a		1.0% ^{ab}	
N	215180		293635		19567		545732	

^a Significantly differs from an exclusionist state ($p < 0.05$).

^b Significantly differs from a rights restrictionist state ($p < 0.05$).

^c Significantly differs from a noninterventionist state ($p < 0.05$).

Source: IPUMS ACS 2000-2015 data limited to foreign-born men with known birth country, aged 25-54, not in school.

Note: Legal status based on 5 imputed datasets.

Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of Foreign-Born Women, Aged 25-54, Across State Policy Contexts 2000-2015

Dependent Variable	Exclusionist		Rights Restrictionist		Noninterventivist		Inclusionist	
	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD
<i>Labor Force Status</i>								
In the LF	69.5%		66.3% ^a		65.0% ^{ab}		68.8% ^{abc}	
State Controls								
<i>Local Immigration Policy</i>								
% Pop in 287g	12.1	20.4	9.2 ^a	15.7	0.0 ^{ab}	0.0	14.4 ^{abc}	17.8
% Pop in Sanctuary	1.2	7.6	2.0 ^a	8.1	0.0 ^{ab}	0.0	12.6 ^{abc}	25.1
<i>Native Attitudes</i>								
Citizen Ideology	47.4	8.7	52.3 ^a	13.9	55.0 ^{ab}	8.7	61.3 ^{abc}	8.4
<i>Coethnic Group</i>								
% Change in FB pop	82.9	58.4	72.3 ^a	48.7	57.6 ^{ab}	35.6	37.6 ^{abc}	29.8
% State Pop	1.8	2.9	3.9 ^a	5.1	0.4 ^{ab}	0.4	4.3 ^{abc}	5.9
% w/ Coll Degree	28.0	20.0	25.9 ^a	21.5	35.4 ^{ab}	20.2	27.9 ^{bc}	21.7
<i>Economic Context</i>								
Female Unemployment Rate	6.5	2.1	6.0 ^a	1.6	6.1 ^{ab}	2.1	7.1 ^{abc}	2.2
% Emp Female Imm Ind	22.0	2.0	21.8 ^a	3.3	20.9 ^{ab}	1.6	20.8 ^{abc}	2.5
Individual Characteristics								
Age	40.1	8.1	39.9 ^a	8.2	39.6 ^{ab}	8.2	40.5 ^{abc}	8.1
<i>Education</i>								
Less than HS degree	22.3%		28.6% ^a		19.3% ^{ab}		28.1% ^{abc}	
HS degree	23.3%		22.9% ^a		20.8% ^a		21.0% ^{ab}	
Some college	21.9%		18.6% ^a		20.8% ^{ab}		19.3% ^{abc}	
Bachelor's	19.8%		18.4% ^a		22.6% ^{ab}		19.6% ^{bc}	
Adv. degree	12.7%		11.6% ^a		16.5% ^{ab}		11.9% ^{abc}	
<i>Racial-Ethnic Group</i>								
White, non-Hispanic	18.0%		17.0% ^a		36.0% ^{ab}		16.1% ^{abc}	
Black, non-Hispanic	8.6%		4.9% ^a		4.7% ^{ab}		5.6% ^{abc}	
Asian	22.7%		25.4% ^a		37.2% ^{ab}		32.3% ^{abc}	
Latino	48.8%		51.1% ^a		20.0% ^{ab}		44.4% ^{abc}	
Other/Multi	1.9%		1.6% ^a		2.1% ^{ab}		1.6% ^{abc}	
<i>English Ability</i>								
None	8.2%		11.2% ^a		4.6% ^{ab}		10.0% ^{abc}	
Some	18.3%		20.7% ^a		15.6% ^{ab}		21.0% ^{abc}	
Well	21.4%		21.7% ^a		22.8% ^{ab}		22.1% ^{abc}	
Very well	35.2%		33.2% ^a		37.4% ^{ab}		32.8% ^{abc}	
Only	16.9%		13.3% ^a		19.6% ^{ab}		14.2% ^{abc}	

	Exclusionist		Rights Restrictionist		Noninterventionist		Inclusionist	
	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD
<i>Legal Status</i>								
Citizen	46.3%		43.9% ^a		47.4% ^{ab}		48.8% ^{abc}	
LPR	39.9%		42.7%		43.3%		39.1%	
Unauthorized	13.9%		13.4%		9.3%		12.1%	
Years in the US	16.7	11.2	16.9 ^a	11.0	15.9 ^{ab}	11.8	18.3 ^{abc}	10.8
Married	71.4%		73.1% ^a		79.8% ^{ab}		70.0% ^{abc}	
Child <5 in HH	21.8%		22.7% ^a		25.2% ^{ab}		20.4% ^{abc}	
Other Family Income (/100)	361.4	480.9	383.3 ^a	503.6	444.8 ^{ab}	505.0	403.6 ^{abc}	535.2
Refugee Origin Country (>60)	8.8%		3.7% ^a		8.9%		2.5% ^{abc}	
<i>National Origin</i>								
Canada	2.6%		2.1% ^a		5.9% ^{ab}		1.7% ^{abc}	
Mexico	20.4%		32.4% ^a		12.0% ^{ab}		29.1% ^{abc}	
El Salvador	2.2%		2.7% ^a		0.5% ^{ab}		3.4% ^{abc}	
Other Ctrl Am	5.7%		3.6% ^a		1.6% ^{ab}		3.5% ^{ac}	
Cuba	6.1%		1.9% ^a		0.5% ^{ab}		0.3% ^{abc}	
Puerto Rico	4.4%		3.5% ^a		2.6% ^{ab}		2.2% ^{abc}	
Dominican	1.5%		2.0% ^a		0.5% ^{ab}		2.4% ^{abc}	
Other Caribbean	6.3%		3.1% ^a		1.3% ^{ab}		3.6% ^{abc}	
Columbia	3.4%		1.9% ^a		0.7% ^{ab}		1.0% ^{abc}	
Other S Am	7.2%		5.0% ^a		2.8% ^{ab}		4.4% ^{abc}	
Germany	1.9%		1.4% ^a		3.2% ^{ab}		0.9% ^{abc}	
Other N&W Europe	3.5%		3.0% ^a		5.2% ^{ab}		2.8% ^{abc}	
S&E Europe	5.2%		6.4% ^a		11.4% ^{ab}		6.4% ^{ac}	
India	4.9%		5.6% ^a		9.3% ^{ab}		4.6% ^{abc}	
China	2.5%		3.1% ^a		4.3% ^{ab}		5.0% ^{abc}	
Philippines	3.9%		5.2% ^a		5.8% ^{ab}		6.6% ^{abc}	
Vietnam	3.2%		3.1% ^a		3.4% ^b		4.1% ^{abc}	
S Korea	2.6%		2.5% ^a		4.1% ^{ab}		3.4% ^{abc}	
Other Asia	5.7%		6.2% ^a		10.8% ^{ab}		9.0% ^{abc}	
Middle East	2.4%		1.9% ^a		8.7% ^{ab}		2.6% ^{abc}	
Africa	3.6%		2.8% ^a		4.4% ^{ab}		2.3% ^{abc}	
Oceania	0.7%		0.7% ^a		1.0% ^{ab}		0.9% ^{abc}	
N	225932		306693		20082		583279	

^a Significantly differs from an exclusionist state ($p < 0.05$).

^b Significantly differs from a rights restrictionist state ($p < 0.05$).

^c Significantly differs from a noninterventionist state ($p < 0.05$).

Source: IPUMS ACS 2000-2015 data limited to foreign-born women with known birth country, aged 25-54, not in school.

Note: Legal status based on 3 imputed datasets.

Table 3.4 Multilevel Logistic Regression Coefficients for Immigrant Labor Force Participation, 2000-2015

	Foreign-Born Men			Foreign-Born Women		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	Policy Context	+ State Ctrls	+ Indv Ctrls	Policy Context	+ State Ctrls	+ Indv Ctrls
<i>State Immigration Type</i> (vs Inclusionist)						
Exclusionist	0.002 (0.02)	-0.000 (0.02)	0.006 (0.026)	-0.029* (0.01)	-0.033* (0.01)	-0.029 (0.016)
Rights Restrictionist	-0.030 (0.02)	-0.030 (0.02)	-0.022 (0.021)	-0.002 ^a (0.01)	-0.008 ^a (0.01)	0.001 ^a (0.013)
Noninterventionist	-0.015 (0.04)	-0.011 (0.04)	-0.042 (0.046)	0.003 (0.03)	-0.007 (0.03)	-0.019 (0.028)
State Controls						
<i>Local Policy</i>						
% Pop in 287g (/10)		-0.004 (0.00)	-0.005 (0.004)		0.004* (0.00)	-0.001 (0.002)
% Pop in Sanctuary (/10)		0.003 (0.00)	0.001 (0.004)		0.002 (0.00)	0.003 (0.002)
<i>Native Attitudes</i>						
Citizen ideology (/10)		-0.031** (0.01)	-0.011 (0.010)		0.009 (0.01)	0.016* (0.007)
<i>Coethnic Group</i>						
Foreign-Born Pct Change (/10)		0.002 (0.00)	0.001 (0.002)		0.003* (0.00)	0.007*** (0.001)
Coethnic Group % Pop		0.018*** (0.00)	-0.011*** (0.002)		-0.046*** (0.00)	-0.008*** (0.001)
% College Degree		0.004*** (0.00)	-0.004*** (0.001)		0.001*** (0.00)	-0.002*** (0.000)
<i>Economic Context</i>						
Unemployment Rate		-0.006 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.005)		0.011*** (0.00)	0.005 (0.003)
% Emp in Imm Ind		0.015 (0.01)	0.014 (0.010)		0.003 (0.00)	-0.006 (0.005)
Individual Controls						
Age			-0.024*** (0.001)			-0.003*** (0.000)
Age-Squared			-0.001*** (0.000)			-0.001*** (0.000)
<i>Education (vs <HS degree)</i>						
HS degree			0.311*** (0.013)			0.275*** (0.008)
Some college			0.493*** (0.013)			0.517*** (0.009)
College degree			0.819*** (0.016)			0.727*** (0.011)
Adv. degree			1.138*** (0.022)			1.186*** (0.013)
<i>Racial/Ethnic Group</i> (vs. Hisp, any race)						
White, non-Hispanic			-0.024 (0.032)			-0.107*** (0.017)

Black, non-Hispanic			-0.206***			0.519***
			(0.038)			(0.023)
Asian			-0.084*			-0.012
			(0.037)			(0.020)
Other/Multiracial			-0.320***			-0.057*
			(0.039)			(0.023)
<i>Eng. ability (vs very well)</i>						
None			-0.039*			-0.372***
			(0.018)			(0.010)
Some			0.023			-0.183***
			(0.012)			(0.009)
Well			0.109***			0.299***
			(0.012)			(0.009)
Only			0.042**			0.131***
			(0.016)			(0.011)
<i>Legal Status (vs. unauthorized)</i>						
Citizen			0.633***			0.584***
			(0.046)			(0.039)
LPR			0.621***			0.253***
			(0.054)			(0.043)
Years in the US			0.002**			0.017***
			(0.001)			(0.000)
Years in the US-squared			-0.001***			-0.001***
			(0.000)			(0.000)
Refugee Origin			-0.393***			0.360***
			(0.027)			(0.018)
Household Controls						
Single			-0.444***			0.606***
			(0.009)			(0.006)
Child < age 5			0.104***			-0.696***
			(0.012)			(0.006)
Other family income (/100)						-0.005***
						(0.000)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ntl Origin Fixed Effects			✓			✓
Intercept	2.686***	2.698***	2.489***	0.826***	0.857***	0.076
State-Level Variation	0.030***	0.025***	0.018***	0.046***	0.045***	0.023***
N Indv	1074114	1074114	1074114	1135986	1135986	1135986
N States	50	50	50	50	50	50
N Imputed Datasets	5	5	5	3	3	3

* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

^a Indicates coefficient significantly different from exclusionist states (p<0.05).

Notes: All state controls centered on state mean at time $t-1$. Age and years in the US centered on sample means.

Unauthorized status imputed with CSMI.

Source: IPUMS ACS 2000-2015 data limited to foreign-born men and women with known birth country, aged 25-54, not in school.

Table 3.5 Multilevel Logistic Regression Coefficients for Immigrant Labor Force Participation among Immigrants with Low and High Levels of Education, 2000-2015

	Foreign-Born Men		Foreign-Born Women	
	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
	<HS degree	College+	<HS degree	College+
<i>State Immigration Type</i>				
<i>(vs Inclusionist)</i>				
Exclusionist	-0.023 (0.043)	0.040 (0.046)	-0.078** (0.028)	-0.032 (0.027)
Rights Restrictionist	-0.022 (0.036)	-0.013 (0.039)	0.014 ^a (0.023)	-0.013 (0.022)
Noninterventionist	0.083 (0.080)	-0.073 (0.074)	-0.002 (0.055)	-0.016 (0.046)
State Controls				
<i>Local Policy</i>				
% Pop in 287g (/10)	-0.010 (0.006)	-0.021** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)
% Pop in Sanctuary (/10)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.014 (0.008)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
<i>Native Attitudes</i>				
Citizen ideology (/10)	-0.005 (0.017)	0.013 (0.016)	0.010 (0.012)	0.043*** (0.012)
<i>Coethnic Group</i>				
Foreign-Born Pct Change (/10)	-0.007* (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006** (0.002)
Coethnic Group % Pop	0.002 (0.003)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007* (0.003)
% College Degree	-0.010*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
<i>Economic Context</i>				
Unemployment Rate	0.002 (0.009)	-0.019 (0.010)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.007)
% Emp in Imm Ind	0.025 (0.016)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.007)
Individual Controls				
Age	-0.021*** (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.001)	-0.013*** (0.001)
Age-Squared	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
<i>Education</i>				
<i>(vs <college degree)</i>				
Adv. degree		0.282*** (0.034)		0.461*** (0.018)
<i>Racial/Ethnic Group</i>				
<i>(vs. Hisp, any race)</i>				
White, non-Hispanic	-0.141* (0.059)	-0.092 (0.067)	-0.151*** (0.038)	-0.142*** (0.034)
Black, non-Hispanic	-0.412*** (0.078)	-0.209* (0.082)	0.336*** (0.055)	0.564*** (0.046)
Asian	-0.254*** (0.071)	-0.181* (0.076)	0.240*** (0.047)	-0.138*** (0.040)

Other/Multiracial	-0.425*** (0.068)	-0.461*** (0.083)	-0.003 (0.046)	-0.159** (0.049)
<i>Eng. ability (vs very well)</i>				
None	-0.308*** (0.022)	-0.338*** (0.075)	-0.560*** (0.013)	-0.545*** (0.045)
Some	-0.065*** (0.017)	-0.268*** (0.034)	-0.239*** (0.012)	-0.409*** (0.021)
Well	-0.099*** (0.021)	0.384*** (0.023)	0.037* (0.016)	0.478*** (0.020)
Only	-0.533*** (0.028)	0.379*** (0.033)	-0.401*** (0.021)	0.389*** (0.024)
<i>Legal Status (vs. unauthorized)</i>				
Citizen	0.411*** (0.043)	1.116*** (0.155)	0.366*** (0.030)	0.890*** (0.026)
LPR	0.599*** (0.052)	1.086*** (0.187)	0.146*** (0.031)	0.587*** (0.031)
Years in the US	-0.018*** (0.001)	0.020*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.033*** (0.001)
Years in the US-squared	-0.000* (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)
Refugee Origin	-0.567*** (0.057)	-0.363*** (0.056)	0.189*** (0.040)	0.410*** (0.037)
Household Controls				
Single	-0.452*** (0.014)	-0.358*** (0.022)	0.556*** (0.009)	0.848*** (0.015)
Child < age 5	0.101*** (0.019)	0.088*** (0.024)	-0.602*** (0.010)	-0.756*** (0.011)
Other family income (/100)			-0.003*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ntl Origin Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Intercept	2.483***	2.559***	0.257***	0.312***
State-Level Variation	0.045***	0.008***	0.029***	0.012***
N individuals	322960	325747	305803	357275
N States	50	50	50	50
N imputed datasets	5	5	3	3

* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

^a Indicates coefficient significantly different from exclusionist states (p<0.05).

Notes: All state controls centered on state mean at time $t-1$. Age and years in the US centered on sample means. Unauthorized status imputed with CSMI.

Source: IPUMS ACS 2000-2015 data limited to foreign-born men and women with known birth country, aged 25-54, not in school.

Table 3.6 Multilevel Logistic Regression Coefficients for Immigrant Labor Force Participation by Immigrant Legal Status, 2000-2015

	Foreign-Born Men			Foreign-Born Women		
	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16
	Unauth	Auth	Citizen	Unauth	Auth	Citizen
<i>State Immigration Type</i> (vs Inclusionist)						
Exclusionist	-0.041 (0.095)	0.007 (0.048)	0.030 (0.034)	-0.051 (0.041)	0.004 (0.023)	-0.040 (0.023)
Rights Restrictionist	-0.004 (0.057)	-0.029 (0.036)	-0.018 (0.028)	0.036 ^a (0.032)	0.027 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.019)
Noninterventionist	0.035 (0.145)	-0.051 (0.089)	-0.091 (0.060)	-0.040 (0.136)	-0.007 (0.040)	-0.035 (0.041)
State Controls						
<i>Local Policy</i>						
% Pop in 287g (/10)	-0.035*** (0.008)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.009 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
% Pop in Sanctuary (/10)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.006)	0.013* (0.005)	0.002 (0.008)	0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
<i>Native Attitudes</i>						
Citizen ideology (/10)	0.004 (0.032)	0.013 (0.018)	-0.034** (0.013)	0.035* (0.015)	0.029** (0.010)	0.011 (0.010)
<i>Coethnic Group</i>						
Foreign-Born Pct Change (/10)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Coethnic Group % Pop	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)
% College Degree	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.000)
<i>Economic Context</i>						
Unemployment Rate	0.010 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)
% Emp in Imm Ind	0.042 (0.032)	0.001 (0.016)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)
Individual Controls						
Age	-0.023*** (0.003)	-0.020*** (0.002)	-0.019*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.010*** (0.001)
Age-Squared	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
<i>Education (vs <HS degree)</i>						
HS degree	0.157*** (0.036)	0.291*** (0.024)	0.437*** (0.016)	0.153*** (0.016)	0.239*** (0.010)	0.398*** (0.011)
Some college	0.124 (0.069)	0.388*** (0.032)	0.664*** (0.017)	0.211*** (0.032)	0.435*** (0.012)	0.705*** (0.011)
College degree	0.161 (0.084)	0.559*** (0.046)	1.121*** (0.021)	0.188*** (0.028)	0.613*** (0.013)	1.008*** (0.013)
Adv. degree	0.441** (0.146)	0.982*** (0.087)	1.425*** (0.026)	0.397*** (0.075)	1.089*** (0.015)	1.539*** (0.016)
<i>Racial/Ethnic Group</i> (vs. Hisp, any race)						
White, non-Hispanic	-0.013 (0.105)	-0.069 (0.069)	-0.046 (0.041)	-0.078 (0.096)	-0.177*** (0.025)	-0.069** (0.024)

Black, non-Hispanic	-0.289*	-0.312***	-0.057	0.422***	0.407***	0.652***
	(0.147)	(0.086)	(0.052)	(0.084)	(0.037)	(0.033)
Asian	-0.131	-0.132	-0.030	-0.105	-0.064*	0.061*
	(0.096)	(0.077)	(0.047)	(0.078)	(0.031)	(0.028)
Other/Multiracial	-0.180	-0.479***	-0.234***	-0.079	-0.112***	0.002
	(0.111)	(0.074)	(0.051)	(0.191)	(0.032)	(0.031)
<i>Eng. ability (vs very well)</i>						
None	0.022	-0.100**	-0.854***	-0.410***	-0.386***	-0.801***
	(0.058)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.023)
Some	0.137***	0.021	-0.234***	-0.177***	-0.168***	-0.285***
	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Well	-0.084*	0.072**	0.158***	0.246***	0.334***	0.239***
	(0.036)	(0.024)	(0.015)	(0.038)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Only	-0.316***	-0.047	0.115***	0.000	0.130***	0.062***
	(0.056)	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.014)	(0.013)
Years in the US	-0.042***	-0.005***	-0.002	0.002	0.017***	0.011***
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Years in the US-squared	-0.003***	-0.001***	-0.000***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Refugee Origin	-0.298**	-0.412***	-0.326***	0.252*	0.384***	0.372***
	(0.112)	(0.059)	(0.037)	(0.101)	(0.029)	(0.025)
Household Controls						
Single	-0.148***	-0.301***	-0.718***	0.691***	0.736***	0.385***
	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Child < age 5	0.075*	0.110***	0.093***	-0.693***	-0.708***	-0.712***
	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Other family income (/100)				-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***
				(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ntl OriginFixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Intercept	2.562***	3.245***	2.766***	0.049	0.299***	0.620***
State-Level Variation	0.076***	0.015***	0.016***	0.021***	0.022***	0.021***
N Individuals	155943- 172033	439081- 455739	463000	144535- 143747	455980- 459033	533206-
N States	49	50	50	49	50	50
N Imputed Datasets	5	5	5	3	3	3

* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

^a Indicates coefficient significantly different from exclusionist states (p<0.05).

Notes: All state controls centered on state mean at time $t-1$. Age and years in the US centered on sample means. Sample size of unauthorized and authorized immigrants varies between imputed datasets. Unauthorized status imputed with CSMI.

Source: IPUMS ACS 2000-2015 data limited to foreign-born men and women with known birth country, aged 25-54, not in school.

Table 3.7 Multilevel Logistic Regression Coefficients for Immigrant Labor Force Participation across Racial-Ethnic Groups, 2000-2015

	Foreign-Born Men						Foreign-Born Women					
	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26	Model 27	
	NH Whites	NH Blacks	Asians	Latinos	NH Whites	NH Blacks	Asians	Latinos	NH Whites	NH Blacks	Asians	Latinos
<i>State Immigration Type</i>												
<i>(vs Inclusionist)</i>												
Exclusionist	0.035 (0.050)	-0.006 (0.063)	0.083 (0.043)	-0.033 (0.037)	-0.040 (0.031)	-0.001 (0.054)	0.006 (0.028)	-0.055* (0.023)				
Rights Restrictionist	-0.021 (0.041)	-0.047 ^a (0.060)	-0.004 ^a (0.036)	-0.031 (0.031)	-0.026 (0.026)	-0.016 (0.052)	0.043 (0.022)	-0.013 ^a (0.019)				
Noninterventivist	-0.095 (0.077)	-0.383 ^{**a} (0.119)	-0.030 (0.068)	-0.066 (0.079)	-0.003 (0.050)	0.268 ^{**a} (0.109)	-0.054 (0.045)	-0.001 (0.052)				
State Controls												
<i>Local Policy</i>												
% Pop in 287g (/10)	-0.021* (0.008)	0.006 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.003 (0.013)	0.008 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)				
% Pop in Sanctuary (/10)	0.002 (0.009)	0.000 (0.015)	-0.016* (0.007)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.011* (0.005)	0.001 (0.011)	0.009* (0.004)	-0.000 (0.003)				
<i>Native Attitudes</i>												
Citizen ideology (/10)	-0.024 (0.018)	0.036 (0.024)	0.010 (0.014)	-0.017 (0.016)	0.039** (0.012)	0.037 (0.023)	0.021 (0.011)	0.017 (0.010)				
<i>Coethnic Group</i>												
Foreign-Born Pct Change (/10)	0.003 (0.004)	0.014** (0.005)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.007 (0.004)	0.005* (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)				
Coethnic Group % Pop	0.023* (0.010)	0.066 (0.034)	0.057*** (0.009)	-0.017*** (0.002)	0.009 (0.006)	0.155*** (0.026)	0.031*** (0.006)	-0.002 (0.001)				
% College Degree	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.007*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.001)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.004** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.009*** (0.001)				
<i>Economic Context</i>												
Unemployment Rate	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.035* (0.017)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.008)	-0.035* (0.016)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.007 (0.005)				
% Emp in Imm Ind	-0.007 (0.015)	0.004 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.012)	0.030* (0.014)	0.007 (0.007)	0.015 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)				

Individual Controls

Age	-0.023*** (0.002)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.015*** (0.001)	-0.027*** (0.001)	-0.011*** (0.001)	0.003* (0.002)	-0.003*** (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Age-Squared	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
<i>Education (vs <HS degree)</i>								
HS degree	-0.499*** (0.033)	-0.540*** (0.043)	-0.411*** (0.026)	-0.236*** (0.015)	-0.485*** (0.022)	-0.362*** (0.032)	-0.296*** (0.016)	-0.237*** (0.009)
Some college	0.233*** (0.028)	0.234*** (0.042)	0.051* (0.025)	0.171*** (0.020)	0.308*** (0.016)	0.314*** (0.029)	0.064*** (0.015)	0.295*** (0.010)
College degree	0.615*** (0.029)	0.495*** (0.054)	0.317*** (0.025)	0.481*** (0.028)	0.591*** (0.017)	0.652*** (0.036)	0.282*** (0.015)	0.486*** (0.014)
Adv. degree	0.914*** (0.036)	0.838*** (0.070)	0.644*** (0.034)	0.580*** (0.039)	1.128*** (0.022)	1.106*** (0.052)	0.748*** (0.023)	0.776*** (0.021)

Racial-Ethnic Group

(vs white, Hispanic)								
Nonwhite, Hispanic				-0.088*** (0.011)				0.041*** (0.006)

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Eng. ability (vs very well)

None	-0.373*** (0.064)	-0.429** (0.137)	-0.395*** (0.042)	-0.142*** (0.020)	-0.552*** (0.046)	-1.203*** (0.081)	-0.475*** (0.026)	-0.425*** (0.012)
Some	-0.104** (0.035)	-0.214** (0.070)	-0.234*** (0.023)	0.044** (0.016)	-0.270*** (0.023)	-0.296*** (0.046)	-0.229*** (0.015)	-0.203*** (0.011)
Well	0.168*** (0.028)	-0.059 (0.052)	0.280*** (0.020)	0.039* (0.017)	0.303*** (0.017)	0.035 (0.038)	0.339*** (0.017)	0.307*** (0.011)
Only	0.180*** (0.033)	-0.052 (0.050)	0.233*** (0.031)	-0.293*** (0.027)	0.258*** (0.020)	-0.048 (0.037)	0.215*** (0.021)	-0.120*** (0.018)

Legal Status (vs. unauthorized)

Citizen	0.834*** (0.110)	0.987*** (0.092)	0.940*** (0.131)	0.457*** (0.043)	0.628*** (0.049)	0.693*** (0.052)	0.868*** (0.032)	0.480*** (0.028)
LPR	0.877*** (0.126)	0.836*** (0.106)	0.924*** (0.147)	0.619*** (0.058)	0.442*** (0.049)	0.273*** (0.047)	0.543*** (0.042)	0.197*** (0.030)
Years in the US	0.012*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.008*** (0.001)	-0.011*** (0.001)	0.023*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.001)

Years in the US-squared	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Refugee Origin	-0.187*** (0.039)	-0.329** (0.114)	-0.148** (0.056)	-0.828** (0.298)	0.391*** (0.026)	-0.649*** (0.075)	0.501*** (0.034)	-0.274 (0.237)
Household Controls								
Single	-0.508*** (0.022)	-0.426*** (0.034)	-0.523*** (0.019)	-0.410*** (0.012)	0.634*** (0.016)	0.300*** (0.024)	0.597*** (0.013)	0.627*** (0.007)
Child < age 5	0.102*** (0.029)	0.221*** (0.048)	0.051* (0.023)	0.100*** (0.017)	-0.952*** (0.015)	-0.542*** (0.028)	-0.678*** (0.011)	-0.646*** (0.008)
Other family income (/100)					-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.005*** (0.000)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Ntl Origin Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Intercept	1.968***	2.011***	1.998***	2.393***	0.391***	1.168***	0.647***	0.064
State-Level Variation	0.018***	0.005***	0.008***	0.041***	0.014***	0.016***	0.017***	0.029***
N individuals	188620	58559	264834	545227	194023	67950	325364	529783
N States	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
N imputed datasets	5	5	5	5	3	3	3	3

* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

^a Indicates coefficient significantly different from exclusionist states (p<0.05).

Notes: All state controls centered on state mean at time $t-1$. Age and years in the US centered on sample means. Unauthorized status imputed with CSMI.

Source: IPUMS ACS 2000-2015 data limited to foreign-born men and women with known birth country, aged 25-54, not in school.

Table 3.8 Summary of Results: Association between State Policy Context and the Labor Force Participation of Immigrants, 2000-2015

	Foreign-Born Men (vs. inclusionist states)			Foreign-Born Women (vs. inclusionist states)		
	Exclusionist	Rights Restrictionist	Noninterventionist	Exclusionist	Rights Restrictionist	Noninterventionist
All foreign-born	0	-	-	- ^a	0	-
<i>By education level</i>						
Less than HS degree	-	-	+	-* ^a	0	0
College degree or more	+	0	-	-	0	-
<i>By legal status</i>						
Unauthorized	-	0	+	- ^a	+	-
Authorized	0	-	-	0	+	0
Citizen	+	-	-	-	-	-
<i>By race</i>						
White, non-Hispanic	+	-	-	-	-	0
Black, non-Hispanic	0	-	-*	0	-	+*
Asian	+	0	-	0	+	-
Latino/a	-	-	-	-* ^a	0	0

*Indicates coefficient significantly differs from inclusionist states ($p < .05$ or less).

^aIndicates coefficient significantly different from rights restrictionist states ($p < .05$).

Notes: +/- indicates a coefficient size of .02 or greater, 0 indicates a coefficient less than .02

Source: IPUMS ACS 2000-2015 data limited to foreign-born men and women with known birth country, aged 25-54, not in school.

Supplemental Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of 2000-2015 ACS Foreign-Born Men and Women, Aged 25-54

Dependent Variable	Foreign-Born Men				Foreign-Born Women			
	Mean/%	SD	Min	Max	Mean/%	SD	Min	Max
Dependent Variable								
<i>Labor Force Status</i>								
In the LF	94.9%				68.3%			
Employed	87.3%				62.8%			
Unemployed	5.1%				5.5%			
Not in LF	7.6%				31.8%			
Independent Variable								
<i>State Policy Context</i>								
Exclusionist	20.0%				19.9%			
Rights Restrictionist	27.3%				27.0%			
Noninterventionist	1.8%				1.8%			
Inclusionist	50.8%				51.3%			
State Controls								
<i>Local Immigration Policy</i>								
% Pop in 287g	12.3	17.8	0.0	84.2	12.3	17.9	0.0	84.2
% Pop in Sanctuary	7.1	19.3	0.0	94.1	7.3	19.6	0.0	94.1
<i>Native Attitudes</i>								
Citizen Ideology	55.7	11.7	8.5	96.0	56.0	11.8	8.5	96.0
<i>Coethnic Group</i>								
% Change in FB pop	57.9	48.5	-40.0	273.7	56.3	46.8	-40.0	273.7
% State Pop	3.9	5.4	0.0	15.2	3.6	5.2	0.0	15.2
% w/ Coll Degree	25.9	21.8	3.4	76.3	27.5	21.4	3.4	76.3
<i>Economic Context</i>								
Male Unemployment Rate	7.1	2.6	2.0	15.8				
Female Unemployment Rate					6.6	2.1	2.0	12.7
% Emp Male Imm Ind	7.4	1.6	4.7	11.9				
% Emp Female Imm Ind					21.2	2.7	16.7	34.8
Individual Characteristics								
Age	40.0	8.2	25.0	54.0	40.2	8.1	25.0	54.0
<i>Education</i>								
Less than HS degree	30.1%				26.9%			
HS degree	22.2%				22.0%			
Some college	17.4%				19.7%			
Bachelor's	16.2%				19.4%			
Adv. degree	14.2%				12.1%			
<i>Racial-Ethnic Group</i>								
White, non-Hispanic	17.6%				17.1%			
Black, non-Hispanic	5.5%				6.0%			
Asian	24.7%				28.6%			
Latino/a	50.8%				46.6%			
Other/Multi	1.6%				1.7%			
<i>English Ability</i>								
None	7.3%				9.8%			
Some	19.3%				20.3%			
Well	24.4%				21.8%			
Very well	34.6%				33.4%			
Only	14.4%				14.6%			

	Foreign-Born Men				Foreign-Born Women			
	Mean/%	SD	Min	Max	Mean/%	SD	Min	Max
<i>Legal Status</i>								
Citizen	43.1%				46.9%			
LPR	41.6%				40.1%			
Unauthorized	15.3%				13.0%			
Years in the US	17.9	11.0	0.0	50.0	17.6	11.0	0.0	50.0
Married	70.7%				71.3%			
Child <5 in HH	21.6%				21.4%			
Other Family Income (/100)					390.4	516.1	-188.1	1,357.5
Refugee Origin Country (>60)	4.5%				4.2%			
<i>National Origin</i>								
Canada	1.9%				2.1%			
Mexico	32.5%				27.9%			
El Salvador	3.2%				2.9%			
Other Ctrl Am	4.5%				3.9%			
Cuba	2.2%				1.9%			
Puerto Rico	2.7%				3.0%			
Dominican	1.5%				2.1%			
Other Caribbean	3.3%				3.9%			
Columbia	1.3%				1.7%			
Other S Am	4.6%				5.1%			
Germany	0.9%				1.3%			
Other N&W Europe	3.5%				3.0%			
S&E Europe	6.0%				6.2%			
India	5.7%				5.0%			
China	3.4%				4.0%			
Philippines	3.8%				5.7%			
Vietnam	3.4%				3.6%			
S Korea	2.1%				3.0%			
Other Asia	6.4%				7.6%			
Middle East	3.1%				2.5%			
Africa	3.1%				2.7%			
Oceania	0.9%				0.8%			
N	1074114				1135986			

Source: IPUMS ACS 2000-2015 data limited to foreign-born individuals with known birth country, aged 25-54, not in school. Legal status based on 5 CSMI datasets for men and 3 CSMI datasets for women.

Supplemental Table 3.2 Comparisons of State Policy Context Effects on Immigrant Labor Force Participation between SIPP and ACS Data

	Foreign-Born Men			Foreign-Born Women		
	Model 25	Model 26	Model 27	Model 28	Model 29	Model 30
	SIPP Listwise	SIPP Imputed	ACS 04&09	SIPP Listwise	SIPP Imputed	ACS 04&09
<i>State Immigration Type (vs Inclusionist)</i>						
Exclusionist	-0.228 (0.257)	-0.113 (0.206)	-0.043 (0.065)	0.041 (0.099)	0.013 (0.095)	-0.118* (0.049)
Rights Restrictionist	-0.175 (0.166)	-0.117 (0.137)	0.018 (0.055)	-0.026 (0.084)	-0.025 (0.082)	0.060 (0.045)
Noninterventionist	-0.181 (0.386)	-0.179 (0.312)	-0.117 (0.098)	-0.131 (0.181)	-0.229 (0.154)	-0.061 (0.077)
State Controls						
<i>Local Policy</i>						
% Pop in 287g (/10)			-0.017 (0.010)			0.005 (0.007)
% Pop in Sanctuary (/10)			-0.081 (0.166)			-0.140 (0.106)
<i>Native Attitudes</i>						
Citizen ideology (/10)	-0.005 (0.105)	0.012 (0.083)	-0.019 (0.022)	-0.032 (0.035)	-0.034 (0.033)	0.035 (0.018)
<i>Coethnic Group</i>						
Foreign-Born Pct Change (/10)	0.020 (0.020)	0.021 (0.019)	0.009 (0.005)	0.003 (0.008)	0.001 (0.007)	0.006 (0.004)
Foreign-Born Population	-0.005 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.010)		-0.004 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.006)	
Coethnic Group % Pop			-0.010* (0.005)			-0.013*** (0.003)
% College Degree			-0.005** (0.002)			-0.000 (0.001)
<i>Economic Context</i>						
Unemployment Rate	-0.133 (0.070)	-0.121* (0.060)	0.000 (0.018)	-0.018 (0.032)	-0.006 (0.034)	-0.026 (0.015)
% Emp in Imm Ind	0.025 (0.060)	0.024 (0.051)	-0.008 (0.016)	0.012 (0.017)	0.014 (0.017)	0.003 (0.009)
Individual Controls						
Age	-0.038*** (0.012)	-0.031*** (0.009)	-0.028*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.003)	-0.004*** (0.001)
Age-Squared	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)
<i>SIPP Educ (vs <HS degree)</i>						
HS degree	0.068 (0.229)	0.213 (0.179)		0.134 (0.160)	0.161 (0.147)	
Some college	0.003 (0.249)	0.050 (0.204)		0.406** (0.124)	0.437*** (0.118)	
College degree or higher	0.749*** (0.155)	0.941*** (0.142)		0.726*** (0.160)	0.715*** (0.151)	

<i>ACS Educ (vs <HS degree)</i>						
HS degree			0.261***			0.254***
			(0.034)			(0.020)
Some college			0.462***			0.504***
			(0.039)			(0.023)
College degree			0.770***			0.689***
			(0.046)			(0.026)
Advanced degree			1.108***			1.176***
			(0.056)			(0.032)
<i>Racial/Ethnic Group</i>						
<i>(vs. Hisp, any race)</i>						
White, non-Hispanic	0.055	-0.024	-0.061	0.146	0.165	-0.075
	(0.273)	(0.209)	(0.094)	(0.152)	(0.157)	(0.050)
Black, non-Hispanic	-0.057	-0.041	-0.524***	0.506*	0.512*	0.649***
	(0.390)	(0.254)	(0.118)	(0.253)	(0.248)	(0.073)
Asian	0.347	0.304	-0.115	0.515*	0.491*	0.018
	(0.261)	(0.270)	(0.111)	(0.244)	(0.238)	(0.061)
Other/Multiracial	-0.267	-0.260	-0.410***	0.372	0.353	-0.031
	(0.455)	(0.321)	(0.119)	(0.310)	(0.284)	(0.069)
<i>SIPP English ability (vs some)</i>						
None or little	-0.125	-0.051		-0.556***	-0.488***	
	(0.157)	(0.151)		(0.073)	(0.066)	
Well or Only	0.283	0.242		-0.232***	-0.224***	
	(0.232)	(0.223)		(0.056)	(0.064)	
<i>ACS Eng. ability (vs very well)</i>						
None			-0.174***			-0.381***
			(0.049)			(0.028)
Some			-0.022			-0.217***
			(0.036)			(0.022)
Well			0.119***			0.298***
			(0.034)			(0.021)
Only			0.084			0.181***
			(0.047)			(0.028)
<i>Legal Status (vs. citizen)</i>						
Authorized	0.197	0.151	-0.048	-0.296***	-0.296**	-0.334***
	(0.101)	(0.107)	(0.035)	(0.089)	(0.094)	(0.021)
Unauthorized	-0.266	-0.313	-0.655***	-0.485***	-0.485***	-0.451***
	(0.195)	(0.205)	(0.071)	(0.143)	(0.134)	(0.092)
Years in the US	0.016	0.011	0.002	0.025***	0.022***	0.018***
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.001)
Years in the US-squared	-0.002***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Refugee Origin			-0.366***			0.487***
			(0.083)			(0.056)
Household Controls						
Single	-0.778***	-0.721***	-0.458***	0.731***	0.717***	0.566***
	(0.116)	(0.094)	(0.027)	(0.116)	(0.108)	(0.018)
Parent	-0.132	-0.049		-0.549***	-0.501***	
	(0.149)	(0.155)		(0.068)	(0.063)	
Child < age 5			0.079*			-0.739***

			(0.035)			(0.017)
Other family income (/100)				-0.042***	-0.038**	-0.005***
				(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.000)
Year (vs 2009)						
2004	0.198	0.265	-0.705***	0.094	0.064	-0.267***
	(0.185)	(0.151)	(0.030)	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.018)
2008	0.213	0.250		0.022	-0.011	
	(0.190)	(0.213)		(0.064)	(0.057)	
Region of Origin FE	✓	✓		✓	✓	
Country of Origin FE			✓			✓
Intercept	3.397***	3.257***	3.356***	1.292***	1.235***	0.984***
State-Level Variation			0.011***			0.015***
N	5018	5666	115973	5294	5811	122732
N imputed datasets	0	5	5	5	5	5

* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Notes: All state controls centered on state mean at time $t-1$. Age and years in the US centered on sample means. Unauthorized status imputed with CSMI.

Source: SIPP Wave 2 2004 & 2009 data and IPUMS ACS 2004 & 2009 data limited to foreign-born men and women with known birth country, aged 25-54, not in school.

Chapter Four – The Authorized-Unauthorized Immigrant Wage Gap and State Policy Contexts of Reception

Beginning with the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986, the federal government has sought to reduce unauthorized migration through heightened border enforcement and employer sanctions, but IRCA has largely been ineffective at curbing unauthorized migration to the US or the hiring of unauthorized workers (Massey and Pren 2012).

Unauthorized immigrants have continued to migrate to the US in part because of employer demand for cheap, flexible labor (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). However, IRCA's efforts to prevent employers from hiring unauthorized immigrants has resulted in the increased importance of immigrant legal status for their wages and earnings. Unauthorized workers experience wage penalties and are vulnerable to discrimination and employer exploitation.

A number of US states have adopted laws mirroring or extending IRCA's employer sanctions. For example, states have enacted E-Verify laws, which require employers to use an electronic system to ensure that they are hiring authorized immigrant workers. Some states have gone even further than requiring E-Verify; states have added additional fines or will revoke the business licenses of employers found employing unauthorized workers. Additionally, states have sought to remove unauthorized immigrants from the labor market by adopting laws to increase immigration enforcement. Despite the new policy contexts that immigrants face, research on immigrant wages has focused on establishing the authorized-unauthorized wage gap or examining how federal policy has impacted the gap. This chapter asks, does the authorized-unauthorized immigrant wage gap vary by state policy context? In other words, do state policy contexts exacerbate or ameliorate the unauthorized wage penalty?

The following analysis applies a recent methodology, cross-survey multiple imputation, to infer legal status in Current Population Survey data. By using CPS data, the analyses can

examine the authorized-unauthorized wage gap over time and across different racial-ethnic groups. This study answers calls for research to go beyond the establishment of legal status gaps and instead evaluate how “legal status distinctions shift and depend on where migrants reside... [and the] policymaking specific to that place and time” (Donato and Armenta 2011:535). Conflicting federal and state-level policies complicate unauthorized immigrants’ work experiences (Marrow 2011). This chapter advances the understanding of the impact of legal status by testing whether legal status penalties are context-dependent. It examines whether some of the disadvantages of unauthorized legal status may be lessened when unauthorized immigrants are in welcoming contexts that blur legal status boundaries. Conversely, it also examines whether unauthorized status disadvantages are heightened when immigrants are in contexts that brighten legal status boundaries.

Legal Status Stratification

Citizenship boundaries are a form of “legalized discrimination” (Wimmer 2008). Immigrants are entitled to certain rights and opportunities dependent on their legal status. Among authorized immigrants, legal permanent residents are those who have been admitted for permanent residence, while nonimmigrants (such as international students, temporary workers, and those in temporary protected status (TPS)) are legally present in the US but do not have the right to remain permanently. All legal permanent residents and nonimmigrants with permission to work have access to jobs and are guaranteed a minimum wage. Many nonimmigrants are guaranteed a prevailing wage to ensure that employers hiring immigrant workers do not lower the wages in the industry. However, nonimmigrants on work visas are usually tied to their employer and unable to change jobs at will. Despite these work-related rights, both groups are subject to deportation if they have committed an aggravated felony.

Unauthorized immigrants include visa over-stayers and those who have clandestinely crossed the US border. Unauthorized immigrants do not have the right to reside in the US or hold a job in the US. Still, unauthorized workers are covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MPSA). Under the FLSA, unauthorized workers are entitled to a minimum wage and time and a half for overtime hours. Under the MSPA, farm employers and contractors must pay wages owed to migrants when they payments are due. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also protects both authorized and unauthorized immigrants against employment discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, sex, and religion. But overall, unauthorized immigrants have limited work-related rights, and if their presence is detected by immigration enforcement, they are subject to removal.

These varying rights and forms of societal membership condition immigrant integration. The membership-exclusion theoretical perspective highlights the role of formal social membership in immigrant integration (Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015). Certain kinds of integration are often not attainable without formal societal membership. Structural integration, or higher achievement in labor market outcomes, education, and home ownership, is often contingent on legal status. Unauthorized immigrants may be limited to sociocultural incorporation, such as English language ability or religious orientation, where legal restrictions play less of a role. The membership-exclusion theory posits a “sharp divide” between immigrants with societal membership, whose structural integration should be relatively unhindered, and those without societal membership, who are blocked from achievements that require membership.

The first study to capture significant structural integration differences between authorized and unauthorized immigrants was Donato and Massey’s (1993) comparison of these immigrants’

wages before and after IRCA's passage. Donato and Massey used Mexican Migration Project (MMP) 1987-1991 data that was collected from residents of Mexican migrant-sending communities on both sides of the US-Mexico border. Before IRCA, legal status was not a significant predictor of wage levels for Mexican males, but after the passage of IRCA, unauthorized immigrants earned lower wages than legal permanent residents and had a greater chance of receiving less than minimum wage. Phillips and Massey's (1999) analysis of MMP 1987-1997 data revealed that unauthorized male migrants earned 22 percent less than male legal permanent residents.

The authorized-unauthorized wage gap has been found in other data sources. Rivera-Batiz (1999) examined the hourly earnings of Mexican immigrants using the Legalized Population Survey (LPS), a random sample of 6,193 unauthorized immigrants who sought amnesty through IRCA in 1987 and 1988. Rivera-Batiz compared their wages to Mexican immigrants' wages in the 1990 Census and assumed that Mexican immigrants in the Census were predominately authorized. He found that authorized Mexicans earned about 40 percent more per hour than their unauthorized counterparts. Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002) used LPS' re-interviews with respondents who had been legalized to compare Latino immigrants' wages before and after legalization. The authors used a sample of NLSY Latino immigrants to help establish that changes in LPS immigrants' wages were due to change in legal status rather than changes in the economy that affected other workers as well. They found that legalized men's wages were six percent higher after legalization. Other authors used the Survey of Income and Program Participation to study unauthorized workers' wage penalties (Hall, Greenman, and Farkas 2010). Hall and colleagues concluded that authorized Mexican male migrants earned 7.4 percent more than unauthorized Mexican male migrants. Studies have confirmed that the

authorized-unauthorized wage gap holds for other Latin American national-origin groups besides Mexicans (Donato, Aguilera, and Wakabayashi 2005; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002).

Scholars have also examined the authorized-unauthorized wage gap over time. Most recently, Borjas (2017) identified likely-unauthorized immigrants in the ACS.³⁴ He shows that the wage penalty for unauthorized men persists, but the penalty decreased from about 9 percent in 2005 to about 3 percent in 2014.

Scholars argue that federal policy, especially IRCA, “cheapened” the value of unauthorized immigrants’ labor (Hall, Greenman, and Farkas 2010). IRCA increased the cost of hiring an unauthorized worker through its employer fines. Because of IRCA sanctions, employers pay more attention to signals of legal status. Employers assess the probability that a worker is unauthorized and pass on the fines associated with IRCA sanctions to the worker in the form of lower wages (Hall, Greenman, and Farkas 2010; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Phillips and Massey 1999). Others argue that because unauthorized workers depend on their employer for their undetected presence in the United States, employers capitalize on their power to lower the wages of unauthorized workers. Employers threaten to report unauthorized immigrants seeking higher wages or better working conditions to immigration authorities for deportation (Rivera-Batiz 1999). In addition, unauthorized workers may be less likely to maximize returns to their human capital by searching for new jobs in the labor market (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002; Rivera-Batiz 1999). The risk of apprehension by ICE officers

³⁴ Borjas identified likely unauthorized immigrants using a modified version of the PEW methodology. Borjas classifies a foreign-born person as authorized if he or she meets any of the following conditions: is a citizen, arrived before 1980, receives welfare benefits, is a veteran, works in the government sector, receives public housing or rental subsidies, was born in Cuba, holds an occupation that requires a professional license, or has a spouse that is a legal immigrant or citizen.

incentivizes unauthorized workers to remain in their jobs even if the pay is low (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002; Rivera-Batiz 1999).

Together, past studies show a consistent authorized-unauthorized wage gap, but most research has been limited to low-earning Mexican or Central American immigrants due to data limitations; many general surveys do not collect information on legal status. Other studies suggest that US natives' views of Latin American immigrants are strongly associated with unauthorized immigration (Timberlake and Williams 2012). US-born, non-Hispanic whites often assume that any Latino/a is an unauthorized immigrant (Jiménez 2008), and employers more often verify the legal documents of Latino/a immigrants, who they assume to be unauthorized (US GAO 1990). With the knowledge of their employees' legal status, employers may offer workers lower wages. Because employers are more likely to verify their legal status, I hypothesize that the unauthorized wage penalty is greater for Latino/a immigrant workers than other racial/ethnic groups. The effect of legal status may also vary by educational attainment. Higher-educated immigrants enter different occupations and industries and a more formal labor market than immigrants with lower levels of education. Unauthorized immigrants often enter low-paying, dead-end jobs with little opportunity for internal advancement (Powers, Seltzer, and Shi 1998). Little opportunity for internal advancement coupled with the high risk unauthorized immigrants face searching for new, better-paid jobs, may result in a larger unauthorized status penalty for lower-educated workers than high-educated workers. Therefore, the unauthorized status penalty may not be uniform; we must examine if non-Latino/a workers and higher-educated workers are also stratified by legal status.

In addition to differential effects by race and education level, legal status may vary based on policy context. At the federal level, IRCA brightened the boundary between authorized and

unauthorized immigrants by limiting the right to work to authorized immigrants. By brightening the authorized-unauthorized boundary, IRCA heightened the importance of legal status in wage determinations. However, the decline in the wage penalty over time suggests that the importance of legal status may be waning. One possible reason for the decline in the wage gap may be that some states have worked to decouple immigrant legal status from the rights (or lack of rights) that immigrants receive. Inclusionist states have begun to adopt the notions of what Soysal (1994) calls “postnational citizenship” where rights and privileges should not just be reserved for citizens of the nation. Instead, rights are based on personhood. States go a step further than postnational citizenship and actually confer rights to unauthorized migrants, resulting in a localized, state-based citizenship. Recent research shows that states that decoupled unauthorized legal status from a lack of rights (for example, by extending in-state tuition to DACA recipients) improve the life chances of unauthorized immigrants in those states (Cebulko and Silver 2016). Inclusionist states, which have extended rights to unauthorized immigrants, may help unauthorized immigrants obtain higher wages; for example, unauthorized immigrants in inclusionist states usually have access to higher education, which helps them attain higher wages long-term. Inclusionist states may prohibit or discourage the use of E-Verify to validate workers’ immigration status and signal to employers that verification of legal status for new hires is not a high priority. Unauthorized immigrants may not be as fearful of switching jobs to obtain higher wages in inclusionist states which play down local-level immigration enforcement. Inclusionist states may provide unauthorized immigrants with driver’s licenses, which provide them with the physical mobility to obtain jobs with higher wages.

Still, other states may heighten the importance of legal status. Unauthorized immigrants’ wages are lower in states with E-Verify laws than in states without these laws (Amuedo-

Dorantes and Bansak 2012; Orrenius and Zavodny 2015), and E-Verify increased the wage penalty for unauthorized men (Borjas 2017). Like IRCA, E-Verify laws have brightened the boundaries between authorized and unauthorized immigrants by increasing the penalties employers face for hiring unauthorized workers. Rights restrictionist states have also brightened authorized-unauthorized boundaries by preventing unauthorized workers from obtaining professional licenses that may boost their wages. Preventing unauthorized workers from obtaining a driver's license blocks unauthorized immigrants well-paid jobs that require driver's licenses. Exclusionist states have signaled that enforcement is a priority. Employers may draw on this fear and offer immigrants lower wages; alternatively, unauthorized immigrants may not be able to change jobs so that they can advance and obtain higher wages, a key maneuver used by unauthorized workers (Hagan, Lowe, and Quingla 2011).³⁵ I hypothesize that state policy context moderates the authorized-unauthorized wage gap. Specifically, I hypothesize that the authorized-unauthorized wage gap is the smallest in inclusionist states that blur the boundaries between authorized and unauthorized immigrants; the authorized-unauthorized wage gap is the largest in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states that brighten the boundaries between authorized and unauthorized immigrants.

Data and Methods

I examine noncitizen hourly wages using IPUMS Current Population Survey's Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG) from 1998 through 2015 (Flood et al. 2015). CPS data serve as the primary source of labor force statistics in the United States and are a nationally-

³⁵ Alternatively, Menjivar (2014) observes that enforcement laws lead to the blurring of lines among different legal status groups, especially among Latinos. Legislation might lead to discrimination against all Latinos, regardless of legal status, leading to smaller wage gaps between authorized and unauthorized workers.

representative sample collected by the Census Bureau. CPS surveys housing units for four consecutive months, leaves them out of the sample for eight months, and then includes them again for four more consecutive months. Usual weekly earnings and hours worked are only asked of household members in their outgoing month (four and eight). MORG compiles these outgoing interviews. CPS-MORG data are frequently used in studies focused on gender and racial-ethnic wage differences (Cha and Weeden 2014; Dozier 2010; Pettit and Ewert 2009).

I begin my analysis in 1998 to provide a baseline comparison for all states, as IIRIRA's and PRWORA's passage in 1996 mark the beginning of immigration federalism, states began implementing their new powers in 1997, and I expect a one-year lag in the effect of state-level policy. The MORG analytic sample is limited to noncitizen, non-institutionalized civilian workers aged 25 to 54. Self-employed workers, who are not asked wage questions, are excluded. Respondents missing on wages are also excluded from analyses.³⁶ Workers whose wages fell below \$1/hour or above \$250/hour in 1999 dollars were dropped from the sample (McCall 2001).³⁷ In addition, I only include respondents whose country of birth is specified so that I can

³⁶ The number of immigrants with missing wages is small (N=903, or .54% of the sample) and unlikely to bias results. The number of immigrants with missing wages is small because the Census uses hotdeck imputation to allocate respondents missing earnings values. Hotdeck imputation assigns a missing value by matching the record to an individual similar in age, race, sex, major occupation, educational attainment, and usual hours worked. The Census allocated 31% of my sample their earnings value, but comparisons between immigrants with allocated and unallocated earnings show that unauthorized and authorized immigrants had similar rates of nonresponse (about 30% for men and 32% for women). However, because unauthorized legal status is not included in allocated earnings, the regression coefficient will be attenuated (Hirsch 2004). My analyses then present a conservative effect of unauthorized legal status.

³⁷ The number of workers whose wages fell below \$1/hour and above \$250/hour is small (N=623 and 35, respectively). Workers whose wages fell below \$1/hour usually reported working in a service occupation and most were not paid hourly. These workers may have difficulty reporting their wage if their schedule varied or if they worked piece rate (for example, gardeners and groundskeepers or housekeepers are often paid per job). I am unable to examine the legal status of these immigrants because they were dropped before CSMI so as not to influence imputation results.

account for the influence of the coethnic population on foreign-born noncitizens' wages. After these limitations, the total sample size is 100,200 for men and 64,692 for women.

Dependent Variable

The outcome of interest is hourly wage. The CPS asks how much the respondent usually earns per week at their current job, before deductions, including tips and overtime pay. The CPS also collects the usual number of hours worked per week. I use the IPUMS *earnweek* variable, which divides weekly earnings by hours usually worked, to estimate hourly wage. The CPS also asks how much a respondent earned per hour in their current job, if workers reported that they were paid an hourly wage. The amount given in *earnweek* is the higher of these two values. Wages are top-coded in the CPS to preserve confidentiality, but the top code is consistent from 1998 to 2015. I adjusted wages to 1999 dollars using the consumer price index. Hourly wages are logged in multivariate analyses but are presented in unlogged form in the descriptive analysis for ease of interpretation.

Independent Variable

The independent variable of interest is a triple interaction term between state policy context, unauthorized legal status, and year. A triple interaction term shows how the wages of authorized and unauthorized immigrants change over time, and whether this change varies by state policy context. State policy context, described in more detail in Chapter 2, identifies states as either exclusionist, rights restrictionist, noninterventionist, or inclusionist. Exclusionist states restrict immigrants' rights and increase state-level immigration enforcement. Rights restrictionist states restrict immigrants' rights but do not amplify state-level immigration enforcement. Inclusionist states extend additional rights to unauthorized immigrants and may even refuse to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement. Noninterventionist states have not passed

legislation related to immigration enforcement or immigrant rights. Unauthorized legal status is a dichotomous variable determined through cross-survey multiple imputation, as described in Chapter 2. Year is a set of dichotomous variables so that the analysis captures nonlinear effects in time.

Control Variables

I control for other state characteristics, including state economic context, coethnic community, and native attitudes. The percentage of the labor force that is unemployed is associated with lower wages, especially among Latinos (McCall 2001), as workers compete for scarce jobs. I control for the percentage of the state civilian labor force that is unemployed (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016). I also account for differences in demand for immigrant labor, as higher demand can lead to higher immigrant wage levels. I control for higher demand by using the percentage of total employment in the state in immigrant industries (percent in agriculture, construction, and computer technology for men; percent in accommodations, food services, and health for women) (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017). Demand for immigrant labor is also captured through percent growth of the foreign-born population in the state in the previous decade (Malone et al. 2003; Migration Policy Institute 2017). Much of the growth in the foreign-born population size in new destinations states was due to employer demand for immigrant labor in industries such as meatpacking and food processing (Massey 2008; McConnell 2008).

Coethnic context also influences wage levels. While immigration has little to no effect on the wages of low-skilled whites and blacks (National Academies of Sciences 2016), the wages of Hispanics and Asians, both US-born and immigrant, are lower in areas with higher shares of immigrants (McCall 2001). Immigrants often settle where other coethnic group members live

and compete with other coethnics for jobs in immigrant-dominated segments of the labor market. Further, policy contexts affect the size of the coethnic population living in the state. Anti-immigrant policy contexts decrease the share of the coethnic population (Leerkes, Bachmeier, and Leach 2013), resulting in lower supply, which then drives up remaining coethnic members' wages. I control for coethnic context by including the percent of the state adult-aged population that is an immigrant's own coethnic group. I calculated five-year rolling averages from ACS data for each national origin group. For years prior to 2001, I aggregated Census data and linearly interpolated values between 1990 and 2000. Additionally, I control for the percent of the coethnic group that has a college degree or more. College-educated immigrant groups may have better knowledge of higher-paid open positions on the labor market and refer fellow coethnics to these positions (Levanon 2014).

Natives often hire immigrant workers because they perceive them to be a cheap, submissive source of labor (Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Employers with these views may offer immigrants lower wages. I proxy these attitudes toward immigrants with Berry et al.'s (1998) measure of citizen ideology. Conservative natives may ascribe to the immigrant-stereotype more than liberal natives. I also control for local immigration policy using the percent of the state population living within a 287(g) or a sanctuary county (Catholic Legal Immigration Network 2014; Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2016). Table 4.1 shows correlations among the state-level control variables.

Refer to Table 4.1

Individual-level covariates include region of origin (11 categories), racial-ethnic group (5 categories), potential years of work experience (age – educational attainment in years – 6), potential work experience squared, and duration of residence in the United States. I control for

union membership because union membership boosts wages (Western and Rosenfeld 2011). I also control for occupation and industry, standardized to 1990 categorizations to provide consistency in changes to occupation and industry over time (8 occupational sectors: managerial and professional; technical, sales, and administrative; service; farming, forestry, and fishing; production; craft and repairers; and operatives and laborers; and 9 industries: agriculture and mining; construction; manufacturing; transportation, communication, and utilities; trade; finance; professional services; other services; and public administration). I control for marital and parental status because studies report a marriage premium for men (Bellas 1992), and experimental studies find a motherhood penalty for women’s wages, but a fatherhood premium for men’s wages (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the descriptive statistics for the sample as a whole and by legal status.

Refer to Tables 4.2 and 4.3

Method of Analysis

I use a multilevel random intercept model to predict immigrants’ logged wages. Multilevel models account for unobserved similarities among immigrants within a single state; for example, immigrants moving to New York may be more ambitious and competitive than immigrants who move to New Mexico. Additionally, a regression model fails to take into account the error terms at the contextual level and would underestimate the standard errors of the coefficients. The random intercept model is written as:

$$y_{ijt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Unauth_{ijt} + \beta_2 Characteristics_{ijt} + \beta_3 Policy_{jt-1} + \beta_4 Context_{jt-1} + \beta_5 Year_t + \beta_6 Unauth_{ijt} * Policy_{jt-1} + \beta_7 Unauth_{ijt} * Year_t + \beta_8 Policy_{jt-1} * Year_t + \beta_9 Unauth_{ijt} * Policy_{jt-1} * Year_t + u_j + e_{ijt}$$

where i indexes individuals, j indexes states, and t indexes time. The dependent variable is the natural log of hourly wages. *Unauthorized* is a dummy variable indicating that an immigrant

does not have the authorization to work in the US. *Characteristics* are individual-level covariates listed above. *Policy* indicates the state policy context in place at time $t-1$, and *context* includes other state-level control variables at $t-1$. *Time* is measured as year fixed effects which capture economic trends common to all states (such as the economic recession). Interaction terms between unauthorized status, year, and state policy type allow me to examine how the unauthorized wage gap has changed over time in each state policy context. U_j is the random intercept for state j and e_{ij} is a residual error term (or a person-level random effect). Because unauthorized status was imputed, I estimate the multilevel random intercept model across 10 imputed datasets with Stata's *mi estimate* command. Stata's *mi estimate* estimates the model for each of the datasets and combines the results using Rubin's rules.

Results

Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap

I begin by establishing the authorized-unauthorized wage gap found in other studies and examining how it changes over time. Panel A in Figure 4.1 shows the log wage gap between authorized and unauthorized men, not controlling for any individual or state-level differences. The baseline wage gap between unauthorized and authorized men decreases from about a 38 percent penalty for unauthorized workers in 1999 to about an 18 percent penalty for unauthorized workers in 2015.³⁸ There is a steady decline in the wage gap from 1999 to 2015, with an exception during the housing bubble (from 2006-2008). As seen in Panel B in Figure 4.1, which shows trends in authorized and unauthorized men's logged wage levels, the decline in the wage gap is largely due to unauthorized workers' wages increasing over time (from \$8.57 per hour to

³⁸ 38% = 100*[exp(.323)-1]; 18% = 100*[exp(.166)-1]; predicted values from Stata 14's marginsplot

\$10.55 per hour in 1999 dollars), while authorized workers' wages remained flat (at about \$12.00 per hour) and even decreased slightly during the recession.³⁹

Refer to Figure 4.1

The wage gap is not as large between authorized and unauthorized women as the wage gap is for authorized and unauthorized men. Additionally, the gap does not decline as steadily from 1998 to 2015 (see Panel C in Figure 4.1). In 1999, the unauthorized wage penalty for women was 30 percent, and this penalty decreased to about 17 percent in 2004.⁴⁰ The gap declines again until 2009 but returns to about 19 percent in the recession. The wage penalty remains flat for the rest of the recession and post-recession years until a slight decrease in 2015.⁴¹ The decline in the authorized-unauthorized wage gap is due to an increase in unauthorized women's wages (see Panel D in Figure 4.1). In the early 2000s, unauthorized women's wages increased from \$7.63 in 1998 to \$9.21 in 2004; meanwhile, authorized women's wages leveled off in 2001, at about \$10.09 an hour.⁴²

Because unauthorized workers are more likely than authorized workers to have less than a high school education or to work in low-paying occupations, such as farming or service, individual characteristics might account for much of the authorized-unauthorized wage gap. Figure 4.2 shows the wage gap after controlling for individual characteristics for men and women. Once controlling for these characteristics, the unauthorized wage penalty for men was about 11 percent in 1998 (see Panel A in Figure 4.2).⁴³ Instead of a steady decline in the wage

³⁹ \$8.57 = $\exp(2.149)$; \$10.55 = $\exp(2.356)$; authorized workers' wages range from \$11.55 ($\exp(2.447)$) to \$12.78 ($\exp(2.548)$) per hour.

⁴⁰ 30% = $100 * [\exp(.261) - 1]$; 17% = $100 * [\exp(.160) - 1]$

⁴¹ 19% = $100 * [\exp(.180) - 1]$

⁴² \$7.63 = $\exp(2.032)$; \$9.21 = $\exp(2.220)$; \$10.09 = $\exp(2.312)$

⁴³ 11% = $100 * [\exp(.103) - 1]$

gap, the gap declines through the dot-com burst, returns to about a 10 percent penalty during the housing bubble, and is eliminated during the recession and post-recession years. In the recession and post-recession years, predicted wage values suggest unauthorized men earn about 3 percent *more* than authorized men, although significance tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the wage difference is zero.

Refer to Figure 4.2

Panel B in Figure 4.2 shows the wage gap for women once controlling for individual characteristics. The unauthorized wage penalty significantly differs from zero during the dot-com burst (2001-2003), with unauthorized women earning about 13-14 percent less than authorized women.⁴⁴ However, throughout the rest of the time period, unauthorized women's wages fail to differ significantly from authorized women's wages. Models adding controls in a stepwise fashion (not shown), show that the unauthorized wage penalty declines by 67 percent when the occupation and industry variables are added, another 17 percent when education is added, and is no longer statistically significantly different from zero when time in the US is accounted for.

Hall et al. (2010) also find a small, statistically insignificant effect of unauthorized legal status for women. Unauthorized immigrant women are often limited to a narrow range of occupations, such as housekeeping, child care, and informal textile work. Because of the informal nature of these occupations, authorized legal status may not offer much of a boost in wages.

Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by Education Level

Does the authorized-unauthorized wage gap, or lack thereof among women, hold across educational levels and racial-ethnic groups? An advantage of using CSMI and imputed CPS data is that the sample includes unauthorized workers across educational-levels and racial groups.

⁴⁴ 13% = 100*[exp(.124)-1] in 2001; 14% = 100*[exp(.129)-1] in 2002

Figure 4.3 shows the wage gap by high and low levels of education (some college or more versus a high school diploma or less) for men and women. The predicted wage values in Figure 4.3 are derived from a regression model with a triple interaction term between economic period, unauthorized legal status, and a dichotomous variable for higher levels of education (see Appendix Table 4.2 for the model). Because of the smaller number of higher-educated unauthorized workers, year is collapsed into economic periods: 1998-2000 (tech boom); 2001-2002 (burst in dot com bubble); 2003-2007 (housing boom); 2008-2012 (recession); 2013-2015 (post-recession).

In Panel A of Figure 4.3, the unauthorized wage penalty for men is estimated to be slightly *higher* for higher-educated workers in the years before the recession. During the tech boom, the greatest difference between the education levels, there is about a 19 percent unauthorized wage penalty for higher-educated workers as opposed to a 9 percent penalty for lower-educated workers.⁴⁵ However, the penalty does not differ significantly between low and high education levels because the estimate is imprecise.⁴⁶ The results suggest that unauthorized legal status penalizes even highly skilled workers, and working in a formalized industry with more opportunity for internal advancement may not benefit these workers. Further, the trend in the wage gap holds for workers with higher and lower levels of education. In the recession years, the gap closes completely for men. I conclude that the unauthorized penalty holds across education levels for men. Turning to Panel B, we see that there is no difference between higher-education and lower-educated female workers in the unauthorized wage penalty. For both

⁴⁵ $19\% = 100 * [\exp(.170) - 1]$; $9\% = 100 * [\exp(.090) - 1]$

⁴⁶ A joint significant test of the interaction terms fails to reject the null that the coefficients differ from zero.

higher- and lower-educated women, the wages of unauthorized workers fail to significantly differ from the wages of authorized workers throughout most of the time period.

Refer to Figure 4.3

Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by Racial Group

Figure 4.4 presents the wage gap for Latino/a and Asian workers. These predicted values are from a regression model with a triple interaction term between economic period, unauthorized legal status, and a dichotomous variable indicating Asian racial identification. The sample was limited to Latinos/as and Asians because of the small sample size for white, non-Hispanic and black, non-Hispanic unauthorized workers (together, about 10 percent of the unauthorized sample for men and 16 percent of the unauthorized sample for women). Figure 4.4 Panel A shows the wage penalty is 21 percent for unauthorized Asian men during the late 1990s.⁴⁷ This penalty is higher than the 8 percent penalty for Latinos, but the penalties fail to differ significantly.⁴⁸ Again, the wage gap closes over time for both Latinos and Asians, so that in the recession and post-recession years, unauthorized men's wages are no lower than authorized men's wages. I conclude that the unauthorized wage penalty holds among Asian immigrant men. Panel B in Figure 4.4 shows the authorized-unauthorized wage gap for Asian and Latina women. Throughout most of the 2000s, neither unauthorized Asian or unauthorized Latina women suffer a statistically significant wage penalty. Further, the estimates of the wage gap are similar for Asian and Latina women.

Refer to Figure 4.4

⁴⁷ 21% = 100*[exp(.187)-1] during 1998-2000

⁴⁸ 8% = 100*[exp(.080)-1] during 1998-2000

Trends in Men's Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by State Policy Context

The decline in the unauthorized wage penalty over time hints that the importance of legal status may be waning. For men, the decline in the wage gap and the rise in unauthorized immigrants' wages coincide with the rise of inclusionist states, which have worked to decouple unauthorized legal status from a position lacking rights. Table 4.4 presents the results estimating logged wages among authorized and unauthorized immigrant men while controlling for individual-level characteristics and state context.⁴⁹ The model also includes the results of the interactions between year, unauthorized legal status, and state policy context to examine whether the trend in authorized and unauthorized immigrants' wage levels is similar across exclusionist, rights restrictionist, noninterventionist, and inclusionist states.

Refer to Table 4.4

The individual-level control variables predict wages as expected. Individuals who have higher levels of education and more time in the US have higher wages. White, non-Hispanic and Asian immigrants earn higher wages, as do immigrants who were born in regions outside of Central America and Mexico. Single men earn less than married men, and parents receive a wage premium. Work experience has a slight curvilinear relationship with wage, with returns to wages flattening at the highest levels of work experience. Occupations outside of service, with the exception of farming, are associated with higher wages. Industries outside of the non-professional service industry are also associated with higher wage levels. Union membership results in higher wages.

⁴⁹ Table 4.4 only presents the state-level interaction model for men because unauthorized women do not experience a wage penalty. Models estimating the trends in authorized and unauthorized women's wages by state policy context (not shown) show a lack of a wage gap across all state policy contexts.

State context is also associated with immigrant wage levels. Noncitizen men's wages are boosted by demand from immigrant industries. A one percent increase in the share of the state's workers employed in immigrant industries is associated with a 1.6 percent increase in noncitizens wages ($p < 0.001$). Noncitizen men's wages also receive a small boost from the percent of their coethnic group with a college degree ($p < 0.001$). Surprisingly, the percent of the population living in a 287(g) county increases noncitizens' wages ($p < 0.05$). However, the increase is negligible, with less than a one percent increase when going from the minimum to maximum values of the population covered by 287(g). On the other hand, wages are slightly lowered by foreign-born population growth and higher coethnic group shares of the state population ($p < 0.001$).

However, the model does not support the hypothesis that the authorized-unauthorized wage gap differs between state policy contexts. The interactions between year, unauthorized legal status, and state policy contexts are not significant and a joint significance test indicates that I should fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to zero (f statistic = .22; $p = 1$). This model indicates that the authorized-unauthorized wage gap has declined across all state policy contexts. Figure 4.5 shows the trend in the predicted logged wage gap between authorized and unauthorized immigrants by state policy type. Authorized-unauthorized wage gaps were similar across policy types.

Refer to Figure 4.5

Supplemental Analyses

Supplementary analyses were conducted to examine whether alternative specifications of the state policy context impact the trends in the authorized-unauthorized wage gap. I re-estimated the models using narrowly defined indicators of blurred and bright boundaries related to work. I

included an indicator whether a state 1) had an E-Verify law and a law allowing state law enforcement to verify immigrant legal status; 2) only had an E-Verify law; 3) outlawed the required use of E-Verify *or* state law enforcement inquiring about legal status; or 4) had no laws related to E-Verify or state law enforcement checking legal status. Models showed that immigrant men in states with both E-Verify and state law enforcement involvement earned about 3 percent less than immigrants in states without these types of laws. However, the trend in the authorized-unauthorized wage gap failed to vary by these measures of state policy context. I also estimated a model including an indicator for the enactment of an E-Verify law. Immigrant men in E-Verify states earned less than immigrant men in states without these laws. The trend in the authorized-unauthorized wage gap also failed to vary by E-Verify context. Together, these analyses suggest that state policy context has failed to differentially impact the authorized-unauthorized wage gap over time.

I also tested whether the trend in the authorized-unauthorized wage gap was sensitive to the inclusion of immigrants who earned up to \$250 an hour. I estimated the models by omitting immigrants who earned more than \$100 per hour from analyses. These high earners were more likely to be professionals, work in construction, finance, or professional services, have college degrees, and be born in Asia. The share of unauthorized immigrants was similar among higher-earning and lower-earning male immigrants; 25 percent of high-earning men were unauthorized, similar to 24 percent among lower-earning men. But a higher share of unauthorized immigrants made up the high-earner group among women (22 percent vs 18 percent). Trends in the authorized-unauthorized wage gap are similar when high-earning immigrants are excluded. The decrease in the male authorized-unauthorized wage gap is not driven by a few high earners, and the lack of a gap among women is not driven by high-earning unauthorized women. Further,

trends in the authorized-unauthorized wage gap were similar in SIPP. The authorized-unauthorized wage gap had disappeared in 2009 among immigrant men, and the effect of unauthorized legal status was only significant for women in the 2001 SIPP survey.

Summary and Discussion

This chapter contributes to the literature on immigrant legal status by examining whether the unauthorized status penalty varies by educational attainment, racial-ethnic group, and state policy context. It takes advantage of CSMI to capture variation within the unauthorized immigrant group, including smaller segments of the population – such as higher-educated and Asian unauthorized immigrants – and to ensure adequate unauthorized immigrant representation across many US states. By providing a thorough analysis of the unauthorized immigrant population, we can better understand whether the penalties of unauthorized immigrant status can be mitigated. This chapter answers three questions: Do unauthorized immigrants with higher education levels also experience a wage penalty? Do non-Latino unauthorized immigrants also experience a wage penalty? Do state policy contexts exacerbate or ameliorate the unauthorized wage penalty?

I find that unauthorized male immigrants suffer a wage penalty no matter whether they are Asian or Latino, highly-educated or with a high school degree or less. In fact, while coefficients fail to differ significantly, the legal status penalty was estimated to be slightly larger for Asian and highly-educated immigrants. This goes against the expectations that unauthorized Latino immigrants and unauthorized immigrants in low-skilled, informal sectors would suffer a greater wage penalty than unauthorized Asian immigrants and unauthorized immigrants in high-skilled sectors. These results suggest that unauthorized legal status is a disadvantage in the marketplace that cannot be mitigated with higher levels of education. Also, employer stereotypes

of Latinos as unauthorized immigrants will not prevent employers from verifying the legal status of all “foreign-appearing” immigrants, and Asian unauthorized immigrants suffer from the same job immobility that disadvantages Latino unauthorized immigrants. These results suggest that in wage negotiations, unauthorized status will always be penalized. These findings show the applicability of the membership-exclusion model. Lack of societal membership disadvantages immigrant economic integration, no matter immigrants’ race or education level.

While inclusionist state policy contexts work to decouple unauthorized legal status from some of its disadvantages, findings suggest that these states fail to mitigate the negative effects of unauthorized legal status. But exclusionist and rights restrictionist states do not exacerbate the wage gap, either. Contrary to expectations, legal status distinctions are not dependent on state policy context. As Marrow (2011) suggests, immigrants are constantly navigating the national context, state contexts, and more proximate local contexts, such as the local labor market, local policies, or the organizational policies of their workplace. Given the decline in the authorized-unauthorized wage gap, national contexts may matter more for immigrants wage determination than state-level contexts.

The unauthorized penalty holds among different racial-ethnic groups, different education levels, and across US states, but this chapter shows that legal status stratification is differentiated in other respects. First, among women, unauthorized legal status is not penalized. Past research has shown that as a result of IRCA, women experienced more wage deterioration and more informal working conditions than men (Donato et al. 2008). Both unauthorized and authorized women who work in these low-skilled industries and occupations experience poor working conditions, and there is little room for an additional effect for legal status. Any additional authorized wage premium can be explained by education level and time spent in the US. Most


authorized women have lived longer in the US than unauthorized women. With time in the US, authorized women may have gained additional knowledge on where to find the best-paying jobs and have cultivated their skills, including their English ability, in order to obtain them. Time in the US could also allow immigrant women to shift their gender ideology to redefine motherhood as compatible with paid labor (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1992). If adopted, these women may have more stable work trajectories than women whose gender ideology limits their involvement in work.

Second, among men, the unauthorized wage penalty declines over time. Although state policy initiatives do not explain the decline in the wage penalty, we know that legal distinctions shift. This finding leaves open several questions for future research. What explains the decline in the authorized-unauthorized wage gap? One possibility is that the recession resulted in an exodus of unauthorized workers from the United States, yet employers still preferred to hire unauthorized immigrant workers because of stereotypes about their deferential manner and work ethic. Due to lower supply, employers may have offered unauthorized immigrants better wages. Higher wages for unauthorized workers may not translate into higher incomes, however, if the bump in wages occurred simultaneously with an involuntary shift to part-time employment. Other scholars have shown that immigrant men were more likely to shift into part-time work than US-born whites, blacks, and Latinos (Sisk and Donato 2016). The convergence in the authorized-unauthorized wage gap may also be due to employers failing to reward authorized immigrants' skills and education during the recession, resulting in a flattening of authorized immigrants' wages.

Theoretically, the declining authorized-unauthorized wage penalty raises the possibility that the membership-exclusion model is losing ground to a universal model of citizenship.


Instead of societal membership conditioning structural integration, nation-based legal status may no longer be important for securing certain rights and opportunities. Postnational citizenship poses that the “universalistic rights of personhood transcend [national boundaries]” (Soysal 1994:8) and that the human rights accorded to all people help unauthorized immigrants integrate into society. However, I argue that postnational citizenship cannot explain the declining authorized-unauthorized wage penalty. If postnational citizenship was the main factor driving the closing of the authorized-unauthorized wage gap, we would expect to see a general rise in the wages of unauthorized workers as they capitalized on their human rights to better their economic situations. Instead, my model shows that a *decline* in authorized men’s wages, in addition to an increase in unauthorized men’s wages, resulted in a closing of the wage gap. The decline of authorized men’s wages challenges postnational citizenship by suggesting that immigrants’ economic circumstances have not been directly improved by increasing the value of their human rights. Instead, membership and its rights are now devalued so that the authorized experience is more similar to the unauthorized one. Moving forward, it will be crucial to identify the circumstances where 1) unauthorized legal status no longer blocks incorporation, and 2) the rights associated with authorized legal status no longer secure structural integration. We especially need to understand both dynamics so that we can ensure continued growth in authorized and unauthorized immigrants’ hourly wages.

Figure 4.1 Baseline Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap and Authorized and Unauthorized Wage Levels, 1998-2015




Notes: Predicted wages are based on a multilevel regression model using 10 imputed datasets to account for legal status.
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, authorized and unauthorized men and women aged 25-54.

Figure 4.2 Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap and Authorized and Unauthorized Wage Levels, Controlling for Individual Characteristics, 1998-2015



Notes: Predicted wages are based on a multilevel regression model using 10 imputed datasets to account for legal status. Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, authorized and unauthorized men and women aged 25-54.


Figure 4.3 Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by Education Level, 1998-2015



Notes: Predicted wages are based on a multilevel regression model using 10 imputed datasets to account for legal status.

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, authorized and unauthorized men and women aged 25-54.


Figure 4.4 Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by Racial-Ethnic Group, 1998-2015



Notes: Predicted wages are based on a multilevel regression model using 10 imputed datasets to account for legal status.

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, authorized and unauthorized Latino/a and Asian men and women aged 25-54.

Figure 4.5 Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by State Policy Context, 1998 to 2015



Notes: Predicted wages are based on a multilevel regression model using 10 imputed datasets to account for legal status. Models include a triple interaction term between state policy context, legal status, and year. Models control for state and individual-level characteristics.

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, authorized and unauthorized men aged 25-54.

Table 4.1 Correlations among State-Level Variables for Wage & Salaried Noncitizen Men and Women, 1998-2015

Panel A: Correlations Among Wage/Salaried Noncitizen Men												
	Excl	Rest	Nonint	Incl	CitziIdeol	287g	Sanct	FB%ch	Grp%pop	%Coll	Unemp	ImmInd
Excl	1.00											
Rts Rest	-0.35	1.00										
Nonint	-0.10	-0.18	1.00									
Incl	-0.36	-0.65	-0.19	1.00								
CitziIdeol	-0.24	-0.13	-0.09	0.35	1.00							
287g	0.05	-0.14	-0.11	0.15	-0.04	1.00						
Sanct	-0.08	-0.17	-0.06	0.25	0.06	0.07	1.00					
FB%ch	0.20	0.16	-0.03	-0.30	-0.36	-0.08	-0.22	1.00				
Grp%pop	-0.14	0.00	-0.11	0.16	-0.08	0.32	0.09	-0.04	1.00			
%Coll	0.00	-0.02	0.06	0.00	0.16	-0.07	0.00	-0.12	-0.48	1.00		
Unemp	0.05	-0.24	-0.08	0.24	0.09	0.34	0.18	-0.15	0.13	0.01	1.00	
ImmInd	0.04	-0.09	-0.10	0.10	-0.23	0.14	0.00	0.24	0.38	-0.19	-0.22	1.00
Panel B: Correlations among Wage/Salaried Noncitizen Women												
	Excl	Rest	Nonint	Incl	CitziIdeol	287g	Sanct	FB%ch	Grp%pop	%Coll	Unemp	ImmInd
Excl	1.00											
Rts Rest	-0.35	1.00										
Nonint	-0.10	-0.18	1.00									
Incl	-0.36	-0.65	-0.18	1.00								
CitziIdeol	-0.25	-0.11	-0.10	0.34	1.00							
287g	0.05	-0.12	-0.11	0.13	-0.06	1.00						
Sanct	-0.08	-0.16	-0.06	0.24	0.04	0.07	1.00					
FB%ch	0.21	0.15	-0.02	-0.29	-0.38	-0.04	-0.21	1.00				
Grp%pop	-0.13	0.00	-0.10	0.14	-0.08	0.31	0.10	-0.04	1.00			
%Coll	0.01	-0.03	0.05	0.00	0.14	-0.09	-0.01	-0.09	-0.49	1.00		
Unemp	0.06	-0.20	-0.12	0.20	-0.05	0.40	0.22	-0.12	0.22	-0.06	1.00	
ImmInd	0.08	0.09	-0.08	-0.11	0.18	0.14	0.18	0.04	-0.11	0.09	0.19	1.00

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, authorized and unauthorized wage and salaried immigrants aged 25-54.

Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics for Wage & Salaried Men, Aged 25-54 in CPS-MORG 1998-2015

	All Noncitizen Men		Unauthorized Men		Authorized Men	
	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD
Dependent Variable						
Wage	14.00	10.56	10.93	8.04	14.95	11.05
Independent Variables						
<i>State Policy Context</i>						
Exclusionist	16.2%		19.6%		15.2%	
Rights Restrictionist	38.6%		34.3%		39.9%	
Noninterventionist	4.9%		3.3%		5.4%	
Inclusionist	40.3%		42.9%		39.5%	
<i>Legal Status</i>						
Unauthorized	23.7%					
State Controls						
<i>Local Immigration Policy</i>						
% Pop in 287g	7.5	15.3	8.3	16.0	7.3	15.1
% Pop in Sanctuary	3.8	14.5	3.7	14.1	3.9	14.6
<i>Native Attitudes</i>						
Citizen Ideology	54.5	12.8	53.7	12.8	54.8	12.8
<i>Coethnic Group</i>						
% State Pop	4.2	5.3	5.0	5.5	3.9	5.2
% w/ College Degree	21.4	21.5	13.6	16.8	23.8	22.2
<i>Economic Context</i>						
Male Unemployment Rate	6.3	2.4	6.5	2.4	6.3	2.4
% Emp in Male Imm Industry	7.4	1.7	7.4	1.7	7.4	1.6
% Change in FB Pop	64.9	51.6	73.9	61.0	62.1	47.9
Individual Characteristics						
Work Experience	19.1	9.1	18.3	8.4	19.3	9.2
<i>Occupation</i>						
Professional	17.9%		6.1%		21.5%	
Tech/Sales/Admin	12.9%		9.1%		14.1%	
Service	15.5%		19.0%		14.4%	
Farming	8.0%		12.1%		6.7%	
Production/Manufacturing	20.3%		24.3%		19.0%	
Operations/Labor	25.5%		29.4%		24.2%	
<i>Industry</i>						
Agriculture/Mining	8.2%		11.9%		7.1%	
Construction	18.5%		25.6%		16.3%	
Manufacturing	17.5%		15.5%		18.1%	
Transp/Comm/Utilities	6.4%		4.7%		6.9%	
Trade	20.7%		22.7%		20.0%	
Finance	3.3%		1.8%		3.8%	

	All Noncitizen Men		Unauthorized Men		Authorized Men	
	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD
Professional Services	10.2%		4.9%		11.9%	
Other Services	14.3%		12.5%		14.8%	
Public Administration	0.9%		0.4%		1.1%	
Covered by Union	7.7%		5.8%		8.3%	
<i>Education</i>						
Less than HS degree	39.1%		53.3%		34.7%	
HS degree	24.4%		26.6%		23.8%	
Some college	11.1%		8.1%		12.1%	
Bachelor's	13.2%		6.7%		15.2%	
Adv. degree	12.1%		5.3%		14.2%	
<i>Racial-Ethnic Group</i>						
White, non-Hispanic	15.2%		7.8%		17.5%	
Black, non-Hispanic	4.7%		2.4%		5.4%	
Asian	18.6%		8.8%		21.6%	
Latino/a	61.3%		80.8%		55.3%	
Other/Multi	0.3%		0.2%		0.3%	
Years in the US	19.07	9.06	8.4	5.9	12.4	9.2
Refugee Origin Country	3.4%		1.8%		3.9%	
<i>Region of Birth</i>						
North America	1.9%		0.5%		2.3%	
North/West Europe	3.9%		1.2%		4.7%	
South/East Europe	4.4%		2.3%		5.0%	
East Asia	5.9%		2.5%		6.9%	
South Central Asia	7.7%		3.7%		8.9%	
South/East/West Asia	7.8%		3.8%		9.1%	
Africa	2.8%		1.5%		3.1%	
Caribbean	5.5%		2.4%		6.5%	
Central America	27.7%		39.6%		24.0%	
South America	6.0%		7.1%		5.7%	
Mexico	26.6%		35.4%		23.8%	
Married	68.6%		63.1%		70.3%	
Parent	56.9%		49.3%		59.3%	
N	100200		23720.7		76479.3	

Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics for Wage & Salaried Women, Aged 25-54 in CPS-MORG 1998-2015

	All Women		Unauthorized Women		Authorized Women	
	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD
Dependent Variable						
Wage	11.60	9.31	9.79	8.37	11.99	9.46
Independent Variables						
<i>State Policy Context</i>						
Exclusionist	16.2%		15.8%		16.3%	
Rights Restrictionist	38.6%		33.6%		39.7%	
Noninterventionist	4.7%		3.5%		5.0%	
Inclusionist	40.5%		47.1%		39.1%	
<i>Legal Status</i>						
Unauthorized	17.8%					
State Controls						
<i>Local Immigration Policy</i>						
% Pop in 287g	7.5	15.5	8.7	15.7	7.3	15.5
% Pop in Sanctuary	3.7	14.4	4.3	15.5	3.6	14.1
<i>Native Attitudes</i>						
Citizen Ideology	55.5	13.2	55.3	12.7	55.5	13.3
<i>Coethnic Group</i>						
% State Pop	3.5	5.0	4.4	5.5	3.3	4.8
% w/ College Degree	24.3	20.3	18.1	18.5	25.6	20.5
<i>Economic Context</i>						
Female Unemployment Rate	6.0	1.9	6.1	2.0	5.9	1.9
% Emp in Female Imm Ind	19.9	3.3	19.5	3.0	20.0	3.4
% Change in FB Pop	61.7	49.0	68.1	57.2	60.3	46.9
Individual Characteristics						
Work Experience	19.7	9.4	18.9	8.9	19.8	9.5
<i>Occupation</i>						
Professional	21.0%		10.1%		23.3%	
Tech/Sales/Admin	23.0%		19.5%		23.8%	
Service	35.8%		44.2%		34.0%	
Farming	2.0%		3.3%		1.7%	
Production/Manufacturing	3.2%		3.8%		3.0%	
Operations/Labor	15.0%		19.2%		14.1%	
<i>Industry</i>						
Agriculture/Mining	1.8%		2.9%		1.6%	
Construction	0.9%		1.1%		0.8%	
Manufacturing	15.1%		16.7%		14.8%	
Transp/Comm/Utilities	2.9%		2.4%		3.0%	
Trade	22.3%		26.4%		21.4%	
Finance	4.6%		2.8%		5.0%	

	All Women		Unauthorized Women		Authorized Women	
	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD	Mean/%	SD
Other Services	23.8%		28.7%		22.8%	
Public Administration	1.3%		0.8%		1.5%	
Covered by Union	8.4%		5.6%		9.1%	
<i>Education</i>						
Less than HS degree	30.7%		42.5%		28.1%	
HS degree	25.4%		26.8%		25.1%	
Some college	15.7%		10.1%		16.9%	
Bachelor's	17.3%		12.8%		18.3%	
Adv. degree	10.9%		7.8%		11.5%	
<i>Racial-Ethnic Group</i>						
White, non-Hispanic	18.7%		10.2%		20.5%	
Black, non-Hispanic	7.3%		6.1%		7.6%	
Asian	22.5%		13.9%		24.3%	
Latino/a	51.1%		69.6%		47.1%	
Other/Multi	0.4%		0.2%		0.4%	
Years in the US	11.92	8.82	8.1	6.0	12.8	9.1
Refugee Origin Country (>60)	4.0%		2.5%		4.3%	
<i>Region of Birth</i>						
North America	2.8%		0.7%		3.3%	
North/West Europe	5.1%		1.4%		5.9%	
South/East Europe	5.9%		3.0%		6.6%	
East Asia	8.0%		5.0%		8.7%	
South Central Asia	5.0%		3.5%		5.3%	
South/East/West Asia	12.1%		7.2%		13.2%	
Africa	3.1%		3.3%		3.0%	
Caribbean	9.0%		6.3%		9.6%	
Central America	23.6%		36.3%		20.8%	
South America	7.6%		10.1%		7.0%	
Mexico	17.8%		23.5%		16.5%	
Married	63.7%		56.0%		65.4%	
Parent	66.5%		61.8%		67.5%	
N	64692		11540.7		53151.3	

Table 4.4 Multilevel Random Intercept Regression Coefficients for Logged Wages of Noncitizen Men Regressed on Year, State Policy Context, and Unauthorized Legal Status Interaction; with State and Individual Controls

	B	SE
State-Level Controls		
<i>Local Immigration Policy</i>		
% Pop in 287g	0.004*	(0.002)
% Pop in Sanctuary	0.001	(0.002)
<i>Coethnic Group</i>		
% State Pop	-0.005***	(0.001)
% w/ College Degree	0.003***	(0.000)
<i>Economic Context</i>		
Male Unemployment	-0.005**	(0.002)
% Emp in Male Imm Ind	0.015***	(0.004)
% Change in FB Pop	-0.002***	(0.001)
<i>Native Attitudes</i>		
Citizen Ideology	0.002	(0.004)
Individual Characteristics		
<i>Education (vs less than HS)</i>		
HS degree	0.135***	(0.004)
Some college	0.185***	(0.006)
Bachelor's	0.406***	(0.007)
Adv. degree	0.557***	(0.008)
<i>Race (vs Latino)</i>		
White, non-Hispanic	0.069***	(0.009)
Black, non-Hispanic	-0.006	(0.010)
Asian	0.070***	(0.011)
Other/Multi	0.041	(0.027)
Years in the US	0.006***	(0.000)
<i>Region of Birth (vs Ctrl America)</i>		
North America	0.169***	(0.015)
North/West Europe	0.139***	(0.014)
South/East Europe	0.021	(0.013)
East Asia	-0.039*	(0.016)
South Central Asia	0.015	(0.018)
South/East/West Asia	-0.065***	(0.014)
Africa	-0.097***	(0.015)
Caribbean	-0.010	(0.011)
South America	-0.011	(0.008)
Mexico	0.029***	(0.007)
Refugee Origin	-0.030**	(0.009)
Single	-0.031***	(0.004)
Childless	-0.040***	(0.004)

Work Experience	0.003***	(0.000)
Work Exp Squared	-0.000***	(0.000)
Occupation (vs Service)		
Professional	0.448***	(0.007)
Tech/Sales/Admin	0.251***	(0.006)
Farming	-0.083***	(0.011)
Production/Manufacturing	0.149***	(0.006)
Operations/Labor	0.052***	(0.005)
Industry (vs other services)		
Agriculture/Mining	0.015	(0.010)
Construction	0.083***	(0.006)
Manufacturing	0.022***	(0.005)
Transp/Comm/Utilities	0.036***	(0.007)
Trade	-0.120***	(0.005)
Finance	0.061***	(0.009)
Professional Services	-0.153***	(0.006)
Public Administration	0.007	(0.015)
Union member	0.118***	(0.006)
Intercept	2.109***	(0.041)
State SD	0.003***	(0.001)
N	100200	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Triple interaction between year, unauthorized legal status, and state policy context included, but not shown. Unauthorized status estimated through CSMI. Estimated separately on 9 imputed datasets and results combined using Rubin's rules and Stata's *mi estimate* command. All state-level variables are lagged one year and centered on year-specific grand means. Estimated using CPS-MORG 1998-2015 data, for men aged 25-54. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Supplemental Table 4.1: Models used for Figures 4.1 and 4.2 Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap, 1998-2015

	Men		Women	
	Baseline (Model for Figure 4.1)	w/ Indv Ctrls (Model for Figure 4.2)	Baseline (Model for Figure 4.1)	w/ Indv Ctrls (Model for Figure 4.2)
<i>Year (vs 1998)</i>				
1999	0.041** (0.013)	0.025* (0.010)	0.026 (0.015)	0.018 (0.012)
2000	0.049*** (0.013)	0.039*** (0.010)	0.054*** (0.015)	0.037** (0.012)
2001	0.115*** (0.017)	0.066*** (0.013)	0.079*** (0.021)	0.056*** (0.015)
2002	0.109*** (0.015)	0.069*** (0.013)	0.093*** (0.024)	0.073*** (0.015)
2003	0.098*** (0.014)	0.072*** (0.012)	0.095*** (0.022)	0.093*** (0.014)
2004	0.099*** (0.019)	0.084*** (0.015)	0.076*** (0.020)	0.057*** (0.016)
2005	0.088*** (0.016)	0.075*** (0.014)	0.088*** (0.019)	0.072*** (0.015)
2006	0.095*** (0.018)	0.086*** (0.013)	0.073*** (0.019)	0.059*** (0.017)
2007	0.102*** (0.018)	0.082*** (0.015)	0.078*** (0.019)	0.060*** (0.018)
2008	0.113*** (0.018)	0.083*** (0.015)	0.076*** (0.021)	0.061*** (0.017)
2009	0.089*** (0.018)	0.048*** (0.014)	0.097*** (0.017)	0.066*** (0.013)
2010	0.077*** (0.019)	0.038* (0.016)	0.075*** (0.018)	0.046*** (0.013)
2011	0.067*** (0.017)	0.023 (0.014)	0.089*** (0.016)	0.057*** (0.013)
2012	0.075*** (0.018)	0.021 (0.014)	0.074*** (0.018)	0.042** (0.013)
2013	0.076*** (0.017)	0.016 (0.014)	0.067*** (0.017)	0.030* (0.014)
2014	0.073*** (0.016)	0.017 (0.014)	0.067*** (0.017)	0.038** (0.013)
2015	0.101*** (0.017)	0.050*** (0.015)	0.095*** (0.017)	0.071*** (0.013)
<i>Legal Status (vs authorized)</i>				
Unauthorized	-0.298*** (0.054)	-0.102* (0.042)	-0.205** (0.069)	-0.032 (0.057)

Supplemental Table 4.1 Continued

	Men		Women	
	Baseline (Model for Figure 4.1)	w/ Indv Ctrl (Model for Figure 4.2)	Baseline (Model for Figure 4.1)	w/ Indv Ctrl (Model for Figure 4.2)
<i>Year x Legal Status</i>				
1999#unauth	-0.022 (0.044)	-0.002 (0.036)	-0.056 (0.061)	-0.032 (0.048)
2000#unauth	-0.020 (0.047)	0.010 (0.036)	-0.043 (0.057)	-0.018 (0.051)
2001#unauth	-0.003 (0.068)	0.027 (0.049)	-0.049 (0.110)	-0.092 (0.078)
2002#unauth	0.002 (0.061)	0.036 (0.046)	-0.068 (0.106)	-0.097 (0.071)
2003#unauth	0.000 (0.053)	0.034 (0.044)	-0.054 (0.107)	-0.091 (0.069)
2004#unauth	0.018 (0.071)	0.005 (0.061)	0.045 (0.101)	0.015 (0.077)
2005#unauth	0.035 (0.064)	0.014 (0.057)	0.042 (0.096)	0.005 (0.067)
2006#unauth	0.016 (0.073)	-0.002 (0.057)	0.033 (0.096)	0.002 (0.078)
2007#unauth	0.024 (0.073)	0.011 (0.063)	0.047 (0.092)	0.008 (0.083)
2008#unauth	0.023 (0.078)	0.011 (0.066)	0.062 (0.110)	0.008 (0.081)
2009#unauth	0.083 (0.056)	0.133* (0.053)	0.024 (0.068)	0.081 (0.055)
2010#unauth	0.070 (0.057)	0.128* (0.061)	0.031 (0.071)	0.079 (0.058)
2011#unauth	0.084 (0.050)	0.136* (0.053)	0.028 (0.066)	0.068 (0.052)
2012#unauth	0.075 (0.051)	0.127* (0.053)	0.031 (0.078)	0.064 (0.058)
2013#unauth	0.083 (0.055)	0.131** (0.051)	0.034 (0.080)	0.073 (0.065)
2014#unauth	0.090 (0.050)	0.131* (0.053)	0.037 (0.076)	0.073 (0.058)
2015#unauth	0.106 (0.060)	0.136* (0.058)	0.094 (0.070)	0.107* (0.053)

Supplemental Table 4.1 Continued

	Men		Women	
	Baseline (Model for Figure 4.1)	w/ Indv Ctrl (Model for Figure 4.2)	Baseline (Model for Figure 4.1)	w/ Indv Ctrl (Model for Figure 4.2)
Individual Characteristics				
<i>Education (vs less than HS)</i>				
HS degree		0.137*** (0.004)		0.102*** (0.005)
Some college		0.192*** (0.006)		0.174*** (0.007)
Bachelor's		0.421*** (0.007)		0.370*** (0.007)
Adv. degree		0.574*** (0.008)		0.510*** (0.009)
<i>Race (vs Latino/a)</i>				
White, non-Hispanic		0.079*** (0.009)		0.050*** (0.010)
Black, non-Hispanic		-0.011 (0.010)		0.067*** (0.010)
Asian		0.070*** (0.011)		0.067*** (0.013)
Other/Multi		0.049 (0.027)		0.066* (0.029)
Years in the US		0.006*** (0.000)		0.005*** (0.000)
<i>Region of Birth (vs Ctrl America)</i>				
North America		0.246*** (0.015)		0.181*** (0.016)
North/West Europe		0.217*** (0.013)		0.118*** (0.014)
South/East Europe		0.088*** (0.012)		0.047*** (0.014)
East Asia		0.071*** (0.014)		0.068*** (0.016)
South Central Asia		0.179*** (0.014)		0.133*** (0.016)
South/East/West Asia		0.028* (0.013)		0.061*** (0.014)
Africa		0.002 (0.014)		0.027 (0.015)

Supplemental Table 4.1 Continued

	Men		Women	
	Baseline (Model for Figure 4.1)	w/ Indv Ctrls (Model for Figure 4.2)	Baseline (Model for Figure 4.1)	w/ Indv Ctrls (Model for Figure 4.2)
Caribbean		0.025* (0.011)		-0.001 (0.011)
South America		0.045*** (0.008)		0.048*** (0.009)
Mexico		0.013* (0.006)		0.008 (0.008)
Refugee Origin Country		-0.061*** (0.009)		-0.054*** (0.010)
Single		-0.030*** (0.004)		-0.008* (0.004)
No children		-0.038*** (0.004)		0.009* (0.004)
Work Experience		0.003*** (0.000)		0.001*** (0.000)
Work Exp-Squared		-0.000*** (0.000)		-0.000*** (0.000)
Occupation (vs Service)				
Professional		0.451*** (0.007)		0.425*** (0.007)
Tech/Sales/Admin		0.256*** (0.006)		0.172*** (0.005)
Farming		-0.086*** (0.011)		-0.040* (0.018)
Production/Manufacturing		0.149*** (0.006)		0.107*** (0.011)
Operations/Labor		0.051*** (0.005)		-0.026*** (0.007)
Industry (vs other services)				
Agriculture/Mining		0.014 (0.010)		-0.014 (0.019)
Construction		0.082*** (0.006)		0.148*** (0.019)
Manufacturing		0.020*** (0.005)		0.064*** (0.007)
Transp/Comm/Utilities		0.036*** (0.007)		0.045*** (0.011)
Trade		-0.123*** (0.005)		-0.098*** (0.005)

Supplemental Table 4.1 Continued

	Men		Women	
	Baseline (Model for Figure 4.1)	w/ Indv Ctrl (Model for Figure 4.2)	Baseline (Model for Figure 4.1)	w/ Indv Ctrl (Model for Figure 4.2)
Finance		0.059*** (0.009)		0.109*** (0.009)
Professional Services		-0.154*** (0.006)		-0.021*** (0.005)
Public Administration		0.006 (0.015)		0.068*** (0.016)
Union Member		0.118*** (0.006)		0.096*** (0.007)
Intercept	2.447*** (0.022)	2.046*** (0.014)	2.237*** (0.021)	1.838*** (0.016)
State SD	0.018*** (0.004)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.003*** (0.001)
N	100200	100200	64692	64692

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Unauthorized status estimated through CSMI. Estimated separately on 10 imputed datasets and results combined using Rubin's rules and Stata's *mi estimate* command. All state-level variables are lagged one year and centered on year-specific grand means. Estimated using CPS-MORG 1998-2015 data, for men and women aged 25-54. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Supplemental Table 4.2: Models used for Figure 4.3 Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by Education Level, 1998-2015

	Men		Women	
	B	SE	B	SE
<i>Economic Period (vs 1998-2000)</i>				
2001-2002	0.041***	(0.012)	0.052***	(0.014)
2003-2007	0.056***	(0.011)	0.062***	(0.012)
2008-2011	0.018	(0.013)	0.042***	(0.011)
2012-2015	-0.008	(0.014)	0.036**	(0.011)
<i>Legal Status (vs Authorized)</i>				
Unauthorized	-0.086*	(0.038)	-0.050	(0.048)
<i>Period x Legal Status</i>				
2001xUnauth	0.013	(0.042)	-0.055	(0.061)
2003xUnauth	0.000	(0.045)	0.018	(0.056)
2008xUnauth	0.091*	(0.044)	0.085	(0.048)
2012xUnauth	0.116**	(0.045)	0.097*	(0.048)
<i>Educational Attainment</i>				
Higher Education (some college +)	0.195***	(0.010)	0.200***	(0.012)
<i>Period x Ed</i>				
2001xhied	0.025	(0.016)	0.001	(0.018)
2003xhied	0.031**	(0.011)	-0.007	(0.015)
2008xhied	0.048***	(0.012)	0.015	(0.015)
2012xhied	0.063***	(0.014)	0.011	(0.014)
<i>Legal Status x Ed</i>				
Unauthxhied	-0.082*	(0.040)	0.004	(0.066)
<i>Period x Status x Ed</i>				
2001xunauthxhied	0.044	(0.069)	-0.047	(0.092)
2003xunauthxhied	0.019	(0.051)	-0.012	(0.075)
2008xunauthxhied	0.059	(0.050)	-0.012	(0.078)
2012xunauthxhied	0.089*	(0.045)	0.008	(0.063)
<i>Race (vs Latino)</i>				
White, non-Hispanic	0.087***	(0.009)	0.054***	(0.010)
Black, non-Hispanic	-0.028**	(0.010)	0.050***	(0.010)
Asian	0.071***	(0.011)	0.064***	(0.013)
Other/Multi	0.044	(0.028)	0.064*	(0.029)
Years in the US	0.005***	(0.000)	0.004***	(0.000)
<i>Region of Birth (vs Ctrl America)</i>				
North/West Europe	0.277***	(0.013)	0.151***	(0.014)
South/East Europe	0.142***	(0.012)	0.097***	(0.014)
East Asia	0.165***	(0.014)	0.144***	(0.015)
South Central Asia	0.285***	(0.014)	0.228***	(0.016)
South/East/West Asia	0.062***	(0.013)	0.097***	(0.014)
Africa	0.048***	(0.014)	0.060***	(0.015)

Supplemental Table 4.2 Continued

	Men		Women	
	B	SE	B	SE
Caribbean	0.053***	(0.011)	0.018	(0.010)
South America	0.084***	(0.008)	0.077***	(0.009)
Mexico	0.004	(0.006)	-0.002	(0.007)
Refugee Origin	-0.064***	(0.009)	-0.058***	(0.010)
Single	-0.041***	(0.009)	-0.008*	(0.004)
Not a parent	-0.041***	(0.004)	0.009	(0.004)
Work Experience	0.001**	(0.000)	-0.001***	(0.000)
Work Exp-Squared	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
Occupation (vs Service)				
Professional	0.548***	(0.007)	0.507***	(0.007)
Tech/Sales/Admin	0.290***	(0.006)	0.189***	(0.005)
Farming	-0.099***	(0.011)	-0.046*	(0.018)
Production/Manufacturing	0.149***	(0.006)	0.107***	(0.011)
Operations/Labor	0.053***	(0.005)	-0.030***	(0.007)
Industry (vs other services)				
Agriculture/Mining	0.017	(0.011)	-0.013	(0.019)
Construction	0.074***	(0.006)	0.139***	(0.019)
Manufacturing	0.022***	(0.006)	0.066***	(0.007)
Transp/Comm/Utilities	0.035***	(0.007)	0.046***	(0.011)
Trade	-0.135***	(0.005)	-0.108***	(0.005)
Finance	0.071***	(0.009)	0.105***	(0.009)
Professional Services	-0.116***	(0.006)	-0.011	(0.005)
Public Administration	0.034*	(0.016)	0.086***	(0.016)
Union Member	0.116***	(0.006)	0.102***	(0.007)
Intercept	2.126***	(0.013)	1.887***	(0.014)
State SD	0.003***	(0.001)	0.003***	(0.001)
N	100200		64692	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Unauthorized status estimated through CSMI. Estimated separately on 10 imputed datasets and results combined using Rubin's rules and Stata's *mi estimate* command. All state-level variables are lagged one year and centered on year-specific grand means. Estimated using CPS-MORG 1998-2015 data, for men and women aged 25-54. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Supplemental Table 4.3: Models used for Figure 4.4 Trends in the Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap by Racial-Ethnic Group, 1998-2015

	Men		Women	
	B	SE	B	SE
<i>Economic Period (vs 1998-2000)</i>				
2001-2002	0.039***	(0.012)	0.045**	(0.015)
2003-2007	0.054***	(0.010)	0.061***	(0.013)
2008-2011	0.020	(0.013)	0.045***	(0.012)
2012-2015	-0.011	(0.015)	0.023	(0.013)
<i>Legal Status (vs Authorized)</i>				
Unauthorized	-0.078**	(0.027)	-0.032	(0.046)
<i>Period x Legal Status</i>				
2001xUnauth	0.018	(0.035)	-0.067	(0.059)
2003xUnauth	0.001	(0.037)	-0.003	(0.057)
2008xUnauth	0.077	(0.040)	0.061	(0.046)
2012xUnauth	0.108**	(0.041)	0.079	(0.050)
<i>Race (vs Latino/a)</i>				
Asian	0.105***	(0.025)	0.078**	(0.027)
<i>Period x Race</i>				
2001xAsian	0.008	(0.018)	0.005	(0.021)
2003xAsian	0.005	(0.013)	-0.013	(0.017)
2008xAsian	0.022	(0.015)	-0.020	(0.016)
2012xAsian	0.046**	(0.017)	0.013	(0.017)
<i>Legal Status x Race</i>				
unauth#Asian	-0.110*	(0.054)	-0.030	(0.056)
<i>Period x Legal Status x Race</i>				
2001xunauthxAsian	0.059	(0.091)	-0.022	(0.077)
2003xunauthxAsian	0.034	(0.072)	0.004	(0.087)
2008xunauthxAsian	0.103	(0.065)	0.023	(0.067)
2012xunauthxAsian	0.114	(0.076)	0.081	(0.072)
<i>Education (vs less than HS)</i>				
HS degree	0.130***	(0.004)	0.100***	(0.006)
Some college	0.188***	(0.007)	0.174***	(0.008)
Bachelor's	0.420***	(0.008)	0.376***	(0.008)
Adv. degree	0.581***	(0.009)	0.522***	(0.011)
Years in the US	0.006***	(0.000)	0.005***	(0.000)
<i>Region of Birth (vs Ctrl America)</i>				
North America	0.189***	(0.051)	0.082	(0.056)
North/West Europe	0.082*	(0.040)	0.062	(0.050)
South/East Europe	0.229***	(0.034)	0.096**	(0.035)
East Asia	0.045	(0.024)	0.077**	(0.025)
South Central Asia	0.155***	(0.024)	0.147***	(0.026)
South/East/West Asia	-0.017	(0.023)	0.066**	(0.024)

Supplemental Table 4.3 Continued

	Men		Women	
	B	SE	B	SE
Africa	0.087	(0.059)	0.022	(0.078)
Caribbean	0.005	(0.012)	-0.011	(0.012)
South America	0.047***	(0.008)	0.050***	(0.009)
Mexico	0.005	(0.005)	-0.000	(0.007)
Nonwhite	-0.021*	(0.008)	-0.013	(0.010)
Refugee Origin	-0.044***	(0.011)	-0.044***	(0.012)
Single	-0.028***	(0.004)	-0.009*	(0.004)
No children	-0.037***	(0.004)	0.002	(0.005)
Work Experience	0.002***	(0.000)	0.000	(0.000)
Work Exp-Squared	-0.000***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
Occupation (vs Service)				
Professional	0.428***	(0.008)	0.397***	(0.008)
Tech/Sales/Admin	0.243***	(0.007)	0.161***	(0.006)
Farming	-0.078***	(0.011)	-0.034	(0.019)
Production/Manufacturing	0.149***	(0.006)	0.095***	(0.012)
Operations/Labor	0.058***	(0.006)	-0.027***	(0.007)
Industry (vs other services)				
Agriculture/Mining	0.015	(0.011)	-0.022	(0.020)
Construction	0.089***	(0.006)	0.166***	(0.021)
Manufacturing	0.016**	(0.006)	0.051***	(0.008)
Transp/Comm/Utilities	0.056***	(0.008)	0.034**	(0.013)
Trade	-0.110***	(0.006)	-0.095***	(0.006)
Finance	0.070***	(0.010)	0.107***	(0.011)
Professional Services	-0.144***	(0.008)	-0.021***	(0.006)
Public Administration	0.030	(0.020)	0.078***	(0.019)
Union Member	0.132***	(0.006)	0.112***	(0.008)
Intercept	2.074***	(0.013)	1.867***	(0.014)
State SD	0.003***	(0.001)	0.003***	(0.001)
N	80039		47605	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Unauthorized status estimated through CSMI. Estimated separately on 10 imputed datasets and results combined using Rubin's rules and Stata's *mi estimate* command. All state-level variables are lagged one year and centered on year-specific grand means. Estimated using CPS-MORG 1998-2015 data, for men and women aged 25-54, who identified as Asian or Hispanic (any race). Standard errors are in parentheses.

Chapter Five – State Policy Contexts and the Second Generation’s Economic Well-being

The two previous chapters sought to understand the association between state-level immigration policy contexts and the economic outcomes of first-generation immigrants. In this chapter, I shift focus to second-generation immigrants, or US-born children of immigrant parents. Upward mobility and the successful economic outcomes of the second generation are the realization of their parents’ American Dream. Is the dream still attainable? Has the hard work of second-generation immigrants resulted in as much economic success for them as for their native peers? These are not new questions, and many social science researchers have shown that second-generation economic outcomes are usually higher than those of the first generation, but lag behind those of third-generation or higher, non-Hispanic white natives (Bean and Stevens 2003; Kim and Sakamoto 2014; Kim and Zhao 2014; Perlmann 2005; Waldinger, Lim, and Cort 2007). However, it is still debated why second-generation economic outcomes fall below those of white natives.⁵⁰ Cultural repertoires, family structure, school quality, and racial discrimination have been proposed as promising explanations, but another possibility is that institutional barriers based on ethnic and cultural differences block the economic success and prosperity of second-generation immigrants.

The movement toward immigration federalism and the importance of state context for immigrant incorporation necessitate an examination of how state policy has affected not just immigrants’ economic outcomes, but those of their children. Even though state immigration laws are targeted at the first generation, they spill over and affect those born in the US; for example,

⁵⁰ In this chapter, I use the terms “whites”, “native-born whites” and “non-Hispanic whites” to refer to third-generation or higher non-Hispanic whites. These are individuals who identify racially as white, do not identify ethnically as Hispanic, and who have parents who were born in the United States. Similarly, I use the terms “blacks”, “native-born blacks”, and “non-Hispanic blacks” to refer to third-generation or higher non-Hispanic blacks. The term “natives” indicates third-generation or higher individuals.

state enforcement and restrictive rights policies have affected immigrants across generations, national origins, and nativity (Aranda, Menjívar, and Donato 2014). Exclusionary ordinances have resulted in higher reports of perceived discrimination among Latinos, including those born in the US (Ebert and Ovink 2014), and increased arrests among the Latino population (Donato and Rodríguez 2014). The increased heterogeneity of the policy landscape is coupled with the fact that many immigrants moved outside of traditional destination states in the 1990s to raise their children in states in the South and Midwest, typically states that later passed anti-immigrant laws in the 2000s and 2010s.

Most research on the second-generation has focused on their socioeconomic attainment in gateway cities such as Los Angeles, New York, San Antonio, and Miami. These studies provide an in-depth perspective on second-generation outcomes in high-density immigrant cities, but they cannot generalize beyond the local context. Moreover, because of the uniform policy context in each city, they have not examined the association between policy and the socioeconomic attainment of second-generation immigrants. To build on previous research, this study examines the economic outcomes of second-generation immigrants in the nation as a whole, and it directly measures variation in policy across state contexts of reception. This chapter addresses two questions: First, how do second-generation immigrants' labor force participation and hourly wages compare across state policy contexts? Second, how do second-generation immigrants' labor force participation and wages compare to those of third-generation or higher US natives across policy contexts?

Second-Generation Economic Assimilation

An important component of research on second-generation economic outcomes is scholars' chosen reference group – often either first-generation immigrants or third-generation

and higher natives. This chosen reference group influences the conceptualization of second-generation assimilation as either a process or an outcome (Marrow 2013). Assimilation as a process studies how second-generation immigrants *compare to their first-generation parents or parents' generation*. Assimilation is defined as a process where ethnic origins become less consequential for the outcomes of second-generation immigrants. Second-generation immigrants may experience decline, where their outcomes are worse than those of their immigrant parents; second-generation immigrants may experience stagnation so that their outcomes are similar to those of their first-generation parents; or second-generation immigrants may be upwardly mobile and experience progress as compared to their immigrant parents (Tran and Valdez 2017). Scholars examining work outcomes with the assimilation process perspective show that, in general, second-generation immigrants experience progress; they attain higher wages, higher family incomes, and are more likely to hold white collar or professional occupations than their immigrant parents (Kasinitz et al. 2008; Perlmann 2005; Telles and Ortiz 2008; Tran and Valdez 2017).

Assimilation as an outcome, or convergence to a mean, occurs when there is no longer a gap between immigrants and a “mainstream” reference group attributable to second-generation immigrants’ ethnicity (Alba and Nee 2003). Assimilation as an outcome views second-generation immigrants as experiencing advantage and disadvantage *compared to third-generation or higher US natives*, usually either non-Hispanic whites and/or non-Hispanic blacks. Second-generation immigrants can outperform the white, non-Hispanic native-born population; achieve parity with the white majority and outperform racial minorities; outperform racial minorities but not achieve parity with the white majority; achieve parity with racial minorities; or be disadvantaged compared to both groups. Comparisons with these native reference groups

show that parity with whites has been achieved in some respects: second-generation Mexicans were no less likely than whites to be employed, and more likely than African Americans to be employed (Waldinger, Lim, and Cort 2007). For Dominican, West Indian, South American, Chinese, and Russian second-generation immigrants living in New York, the wage levels of their first job achieved parity with the wage levels of white natives and surpassed the wages of blacks (Kasinitz et al. 2008). However, in other respects, the second-generation has not achieved parity with whites but surpassed racial minorities: second-generation Mexicans earn less than whites, but more than African Americans (Bean and Stevens 2003; Waldinger, Lim, and Cort 2007). Second-generation Central Americans and Afro-Caribbeans are less likely than non-Hispanic whites, but more likely than African Americans, to be in professional positions (Farley and Alba 2002). Asian American men who do not have high levels of education (high school degree or less) have lower earnings than comparable whites (Kim and Sakamoto 2014). Finally, Kasinitz et al. (2008) argue that second-generation groups should be compared to their native-born peers of the same race because it is unrealistic to expect that the second generation would surpass white natives, given a racially-stratified America. Comparisons of second-generation, Latino/a ethnic groups to third-generation and higher Puerto Ricans usually show that second-generation Latino/a groups achieve parity with their racial minorities in terms of professional occupations (Tran and Valdez 2017) and even surpass the wages of racial minorities (Kasinitz et al. 2008).

To explain *why* second generation immigrants do or do not achieve parity with the mainstream, assimilation theorists have pointed to laws which have sought to combat or uphold ethnic discrimination. New assimilation theorists argue that ethnicity is a boundary, or difference, between a cultural majority and minority group, which is institutionalized in different domains, including the law (Alba and Nee 2003). Classic assimilation is a type of boundary

crossing, where second-generation immigrants disregard their cultural and ethnic ties to enter into the majority group. When the boundary is bright, or when differences between majority and minority groups are clear and large, economic assimilation largely occurs through boundary crossing, if it occurs at all. However, equality of outcomes is more likely to occur when boundaries are blurred, or when the social categories and differences between the two sides decline in importance. New assimilation theorists are cautiously optimistic that second-generation immigrants will attain parity with natives because many boundaries between natives and immigrants have been blurred. I argue that in some sense, bright and blurred boundaries in new assimilation theory are similar to the “context of reception” found in segmented assimilation theory. Segmented assimilation theory suggests that national origin groups are usually disadvantaged if they experience hostile government policies (Portes and Zhou 1993). Government policies can codify discrimination and therefore brighten boundaries between immigrants and US natives, or they can extend rights to immigrants and blur boundaries between immigrants and natives. Segmented assimilation theorists, however, are less optimistic about second-generation assimilation, and argue that the hostile policies and reception lead to downward mobility and assimilation to an underclass.

Unfortunately, bright and blurred boundaries and contexts of reception are usually not measured directly in the study of second-generation immigrants’ economic outcomes. Because many studies of second-generation immigrants are in one setting, such as New York City, Los Angeles, San Diego, or Miami, boundaries cannot vary across space. Instead, scholars have argued that different national origin groups face different boundaries or contexts of reception. They show that Mexicans, who experience hostile contexts of reception, have lower occupational attainment than Cubans or Koreans, with more favorable contexts of receptions (Haller, Portes,

and Lynch 2011). An exception is Luthra and colleagues (2017), who operationalized the different aspects of contexts of reception to show that the mean years of schooling, skin color, and legal status of the second generation's coethnic immigrant group impacted second-generation attainment.

The geographic dispersion of first and second generation immigrants has allowed scholars to contrast contexts of reception. New destinations are theorized to be more welcoming contexts of reception; a lack of ethnic networks results in lower levels of competition with coethnics for jobs and economic and job growth in new destinations offer more opportunity for full-time employment. However, new destinations, especially in the South, have long-standing racial prejudices that may make it difficult for dark-skinned immigrants to succeed. Research has found that Latinos/as in new destinations had higher rates of labor force participation and lower unemployment than Latinos/as in traditional destinations (Crowley, Lichter, and Turner 2015). For Chinese, Japanese, Indians, and Filipinos, residence in new destinations is associated with higher wages and occupational status (Flippen and Kim 2015). Additionally, the gap between Latinos/as and natives is smaller in new destinations, usually because natives have lower levels of economic success (Crowley, Lichter, and Turner 2015). However, classifying locations as new and traditional destinations poses a similar problem as using national origin group as a measure for the context of reception or brightness of boundaries. New and traditional destination comparisons cannot show whether bright immigrant-native ethnic boundaries, the economic context, or the coethnic group play a larger role in the economic well-being of second-generation immigrants.

This chapter compares second-generation immigrant national origin groups to one another and to US natives across state policy contexts while accounting for individual human

capital differences and other state characteristics. I hypothesize that bright boundaries codified in state policies result in poorer economic outcomes for second-generation national-origin groups compared to their counterparts in states with blurred boundaries. When compared to US natives, new assimilation theory would suggest that blurred boundaries result in economic equality among second-generation ethnic groups and third-generation white natives, or at least in a smaller gap between second-generation ethnic groups and third-generation white natives than in states with bright boundaries. They might also expect that blurred boundaries would result in greater economic equality between second-generation ethnic groups and their racially-similar peers, while bright boundaries would highlight these groups' ethnic differences. Segmented assimilation theory would suggest that anti-immigrant policies result in similar economic outcomes for second-generation immigrants as third-generation, native blacks.

Racialization & the Effects of Federal Policy

While all second-generation immigrants experience a blurred boundary in terms of citizenship (the United States grants citizenship to anyone born in the US, regardless of their race or ethnic boundary), ethnic groups associated with darker skin tones, often encounter racial discrimination that prevents them from assimilation. Both new and segmented assimilation scholars have noted that assimilation can be slowed or halted by racialization, or designating people of a certain race with a certain position in the social hierarchy (Alba 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Telles and Ortiz 2008). Although state-level enforcement and social rights laws are written in “color-blind” language, there is reason to expect that these laws are racialized. At the federal level, employers were more likely to examine the documents of workers who appeared foreign after the passage of IRCA, and those who examined documents were less likely to hire Hispanic applicants (Lowell, Teachman, and Jing 1995). Wage returns to training were

lower for Mexicans than whites in the post-IRCA period (Davila, Pagan, and Grau 1998). IRCA may have a direct effect on second-generation immigrants, especially Hispanics, because employers felt that they should be able to differentiate between legitimate and forged documentation. Instead of being able to differentiate the two, employers use skin tone or last name to infer job applicants' legal status (Lowell, Teachman, and Jing 1995). More broadly, many white, non-Hispanic Americans assume that second-generation Mexicans are first-generation unauthorized immigrants (Jiménez 2008). These studies show that the effects of policy are racialized. I hypothesize that bright boundaries in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states will be especially detrimental for the economic outcomes of ethnic groups racialized as Latino/a. I hypothesize that Mexicans, Central/South Americans, and Spanish Caribbeans will have a larger exclusionist-inclusionist wage gap than Asian, European, and Afro-Caribbean ethnic groups.

Data and Methods

This chapter compares the labor force participation and hourly wages of second-generation ethnic groups to one another across policy contexts, and to US third-generation or higher groups across policy contexts. I test whether second-generation ethnic groups have better outcomes in contexts where the boundaries between natives and immigrants have been blurred. I use data from IPUMS' Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG) (Flood et al. 2015). CPS data serve as the primary source of labor force statistics in the United States, so they are especially appropriate to answer employment questions and wage questions. Information on usual weekly earnings and hours worked are asked of household members during the fourth and eighth month of the survey (approximately one year apart due to the rotating sampling structure of the CPS – CPS surveys households for four consecutive

months, leaves them out of the sample for eight months, then includes them again for four more consecutive months). Unlike the American Community Survey, CPS-MORG includes a question on parental birthplace, which allows researchers to distinguish second-generation immigrants. Unlike the CPS Annual and Social Economic Supplement (ASEC), it asks about usual wages and hours worked last week, rather than in the past year, so contemporaneous demographic characteristics can be matched to wage characteristics.

Dependent Variables

The economic outcomes of interest include labor force participation and hourly wages. Labor force analyses compare individuals who participate in the labor force to individuals who are not in the labor force. A respondent is considered in the labor force if he or she: worked at all for pay in the last week; performed at least 15 hours of unpaid labor for a family business in the last week; had a job but was temporarily not at work due to illness, bad weather, industrial dispute, or vacation; or had been looking for work in the past four weeks. Individuals were not in the labor force if they were not employed or had not looked for work during the last four weeks.

To measure hourly wages, CPS-MORG asks wage and salary workers how much they usually earn per week at their current job, before deductions, including tips and overtime pay. CPS-MORG also asks how many hours a respondent usually works per week. The IPUMS *earnweek* variable divides the weekly earnings by hours usually worked to estimate their hourly wage. For hourly workers, the CPS asks how much the worker earns per hour, and if this amount is higher than the amount used in the weekly earnings calculation, *earnweek* uses the higher value. Wages are top-coded at \$2884.61, but this top code is consistent over the time period. If *earnweek* was missing due to a worker not reporting their usual hours per week, I calculated their hourly wage using actual hours worked in the past week. Finally, wages are adjusted to 1999

dollars using the consumer price index. Wages are logged for analyses, and workers earning more than \$250/hour or less than \$1/hour were omitted from analyses.⁵¹

Independent Variables

My independent variable of interest is an interaction term between state policy context and ethnic origin. As previously discussed, state policy context is measured as a set of dichotomous variables identifying states as exclusionist, rights restrictionist, noninterventionist, or inclusionist. Exclusionist states have brightened boundaries between immigrants and natives by restricting immigrants' rights and increasing state-level immigration enforcement. Rights restrictionist states brighten boundaries by restricting immigrants' rights, but these states do not amplify state-level immigration enforcement. Inclusionist states blur immigrant-native boundaries by extending additional rights to immigrants. Noninterventionist states have not passed legislation related to immigration enforcement or immigrant rights.

Following Farley and Alba (2002), I use CPS questions regarding individuals' own birthplace and the birthplace of their parents to identify second-generation immigrants and their ethnic group. I use CPS questions regarding individuals' own birthplace, race, and Spanish origin questions to identify third-generation US-born majority and minority groups. I identify second-generation immigrants as those who are born in the United States and have at least one parent born abroad. This group includes individuals born in the US with two foreign-born parents; individuals born in the US with a foreign-born mother, but a US-born father; and individuals

⁵¹ Dropping very low and high earners from analyses is a common practice in studies using CPS-MORG or Census data (Card and DiNardo 2002; Cha and Weeden 2014; McCall 2001; Weeden et al. 2007). Because of the top-code, CPS-MORG does not effectively capture the wages of high earners. Respondents who reported earning less than \$1 per hour were suspect, as many of them were in professional positions (about 20%). I test whether my findings are sensitive to top and bottom wage coding in supplementary analyses.

born in the US with a foreign-born father, but a US-born mother. Individuals who were born in the US but only had birthplace information available for one parent were classified as a second generation immigrant if the birthplace for the parent was outside of the US. I assume that many respondents who do not know one parent's birthplace were raised in single parent families.⁵² If the known parent is foreign-born, I assume the US-born respondent had similar experiences to second generation immigrants who have two foreign-born parents (N=389). If the known parent is US-born, I assume the US-born respondent was a third-generation or higher native (N=1,275).

After identifying second-generation immigrants, I then classify them by their ethnic group. I group second-generation immigrants into six categories: European/Canadian, Asian, Afro-Caribbean (primarily Jamaica and Haiti), Spanish Caribbean (primarily Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico), Central/South America, and Mexico. I identified ethnic group membership through the birth country of second-generation immigrants' mothers.⁵³ If a second-generation immigrant's mother was US-born or unknown, I identified his or her ethnic group through the father's birth country.⁵⁴

I identify third-generation or higher US natives as those who are born in the United States and whose parents were also born in the United States. I then identified racial/ethnic majorities

⁵² As single-parent households are more commonly female-headed, this assumption would receive support if more respondents knew their mother's birthplaces, but did not know their father's birthplaces than the opposite pattern (knowing their father's birthplaces, but not their mother's). The data show some support; 223 respondents knew their mother's birthplaces but did not know their father's, while 166 respondents know their father's birthplaces but did not know their mother's.

⁵³ Using birth country as an indicator for ethnic group is an imprecise measure. Birth country of the parent cannot capture within-country differences in language, culture, and race. This measure best reflects the most dominant or populous ethnic characteristics of the country.

⁵⁴ Among the second generation immigrants with two foreign-born parents, most second generation immigrants' mother and father were born in the same country; only 14 percent had two non-US-born parents who were born in different countries. I prioritize mother's birth country because mothers are often the primary caretakers of children and socialize their children into their ethnic group. This also follows Farley and Alba's classification system.

and minorities using self-identified race and Hispanic origin. Native whites are third-generation or higher individuals who identified as white only and did not indicate that they were of Hispanic ethnicity. Native blacks are third-generation or higher individuals who identified as black or African American only and did not indicate that they were of Hispanic ethnicity. Finally, third-generation or higher Mexicans were identified as individuals who selected “Mexican” in response to the Hispanic ethnicity question, no matter their racial identification. While Kasinitz et al. (2002) use third-generation or higher Puerto Ricans as a native reference group, I use third-generation or higher Mexicans because of their greater geographic distribution across the United States. Farley and Alba (2002) use Puerto Ricans and Mexicans, in addition to third-generation and higher Asians and other Hispanics.

Control Variables

I account for other aspects of the state context of reception theorized to influence second generation assimilation. Similar to state-level immigration policies, local-level immigration policies may affect the second generation. Although a thorough accounting of local level policies is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I control for local immigration policy using the percent of the state population living within a 287(g) or sanctuary county.

Lower shares of professionals in the immigrant generation are hypothesized to limit second-generation immigrants’ referral networks. They may be less likely to locate a job at all, or only be able to find lower-paying jobs. I control for the percent of the coethnic group that had a college degree or more. While coethnics may help one another find jobs (Waldinger and Lichter 2003), previous research has shown that the wages of native-born Hispanics and Asians are lower in areas with higher shares of immigrants (McCall 2001). Because of occupational funneling, coethnics often work in the same types of jobs and may compete with one another for

positions (Vallas, Finlay, and Wharton 2009). Large coethnic groups and high levels of competition may result in second-generation immigrants withdrawing from the labor market or taking a job with lower wages. Population share of the immigrant national origin group also influences how second-generation immigrants experience anti-immigrant legislation, with second-generation immigrants reporting more instances of discrimination when living in a county with anti-immigrant legislation and a large share of coethnics (Ebert and Ovink 2014). Therefore, large coethnic communities may amplify the effects of state immigration legislation. Consequently, I control for the state population share of the immigrant national origin group. Each national origin group's state population share and proportion of persons with a college education was calculated using five-year rolling averages from ACS data (for years 2001-2015) and Census data (for years 1998-2000; values linearly interpolated between 1990 and 2000 Censuses).⁵⁵

Other variables account for state economic context. Industrial restructuring has led to a lack of relatively high-wage manufacturing jobs. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) argue that without these opportunities, second-generation immigrants are relegated to low-wage industries. I measure the prevalence of manufacturing jobs as the share of the state population employed in the manufacturing sector (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017). The decline of manufacturing jobs coincided with the growth of services. While the service sector may ensure jobs for those participating in the labor force, research has shown that the growth of high tech industries is

⁵⁵ National origin group data were matched to second-generation immigrants based on the birth country of their mothers. Specific birth country rather than ethnic group was used. I prioritize mother's birth country because mothers are often the primary caretakers of children and socialize their children into their national origin group. The social ties and familiarity with this group may lead to second generation immigrants pulling on these ties when looking for a job. However, the origin group of the same-sex parent would also be appropriate due to gendered occupational segregation. If I prioritized the birth country of the same sex parent, only 6 percent of the sample's birthplace would change.

associated with lower wage levels for Asian women (McCall 2001), suggesting that women are pulled into low-skilled service jobs to serve those in high-skilled jobs. I measure the prevalence of high-tech industries as the share of the state population employed in high-tech industries (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017).⁵⁶ The growth of the foreign-born population suggests an increasing demand for second generation employment. Second-generation immigrants are often bilingual and can cater to and communicate with immigrant consumers in a wide variety of settings, from retail to hospitals, or can serve as managers of immigrant workers (Waldinger and Lichter 2003). I control for this demand by measuring the percent growth in the foreign-born population in the previous decade (Malone et al. 2003; Migration Policy Institute 2017). Finally, overall employment opportunities within the state are controlled for using the state unemployment rate and state gross product (GSP) per capita (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2017). Higher state unemployment rates result in lower wages for Latinos (McCall 2001), and richer states usually have a higher cost of living and necessitate higher wages.

Natives hold different perceptions of the second generation. The bilingualism of the second generation fills a niche in the labor market, but qualitative research shows that employers often prefer immigrant workers to second generation workers because immigrants are perceived

⁵⁶ High-tech industries are those identified by Hecker (2005). High tech industries are defined as those who have a high proportion of research and development employment (scientists, engineers, and technicians). An industry is considered high tech if the proportion of technology-oriented occupations of that industry's total employment was at least twice the 4.9-percent average for all industries. I use the Level I threshold where these occupations were at least 5 times the average. They include: pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing; computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing; communications equipment manufacturing; semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing; navigational, measuring, electromedical and control instruments manufacturing; aerospace product and parts manufacturing; software publishers; internet service providers and web search portals; data processing, hosting, and related services; architectural, engineering and related services; computer systems design and related services; and scientific research and development services

as harder workers, more docile, and willing to work for lower wages (Waldinger and Lichter 2003; Waters 2009). Natives with these views may be less likely to hire second-generation workers, or if they hire them, more likely to offer them a lower wage. I proxy natives attitudes toward immigrants with Berry et al.'s (1998) ideology measure (provided by Jordan and Grossman 2016). Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the correlations between state-level variables for men and women.

Refer to Tables 5.1 and 5.2

For the labor force participation analyses, I control for age and educational attainment (less than a high school degree; high school degree; some college; college degree; and advanced degree) at the individual level. At the household-level, I account for marital status and if a child younger than 5 years of age lives in the household. CPS-MORG does not provide information on the family or household income, which is a predictor of women's labor force participation, but I proxy family income through spouse's level of education and usual hours worked per week. A dichotomous indicator of a spouse having a college degree or higher level of education is meant to represent a high-income household where women do not need to enter the labor market out of economic need.⁵⁷

I add additional state-level and individual-level predictors for the wage analysis. At the individual-level, I add potential years of work experience (age – educational attainment in years – 6) and its square term. I omit age in these analyses to prevent collinearity. Instead of the presence of children under age 5 in the household, I control for parental status since fatherhood is associated with a wage premium and motherhood is associated with a wage penalty (Correll,

⁵⁷ All single, divorced, separated, or widowed women received a 0 value. All women who reported being married but their spouse was absent from the household also received a 0 value.

Benard, and Paik 2007). I also omit spouse's education level and work hours, as women are already in the labor force. I control for occupational sector (8 categories) and industry (9 categories). At the state-level, I add a control for the overall economic richness of the state by including gross state product (GSP) per capita. This measure is rescaled (divided by 100) and centered on the mean for each year of the data.

Analytical Sample and Methods

The sample is limited to noninstitutionalized civilians of prime working age (25 to 54) living in the 50 United States. I exclude second-generation immigrants if their parents' birthplace is an unspecified region (N=2,982 or 1.7 percent of the sample). Without a national origin group, I cannot account for the influence of the coethnic population in the state.⁵⁸ Additionally, I exclude second-generation immigrants if their mother or father's birthplace fell outside of the ethnic groups listed above. This excludes immigrants from the Middle East, Africa, and Oceania. I exclude these groups because of their small size – there are not enough second-generation immigrants in these groups to compare them across state policy contexts. Further, I exclude third-generation natives who identified as Asian, Native American, or a non-Mexican Hispanic ethnicity. Again, small sample sizes prevent their comparison across state policy contexts. Finally, I drop a small number of women who had missing education information for their spouse (N=1,108). The final sample size for labor force participation analyses is 1,144,184 for men and 1,223,378 for women. The sample for wage analyses is further limited to wage and

⁵⁸ Respondents whose parents were born in an unspecified region (for example, Caribbean, not specified) could be due to the respondent not providing an exact country, or because the CPS had small numbers of individuals from a country and collapsed those numbers into one region. Second generation immigrants with parents from a region, rather than a specific country were less likely to have less than a high school degree and were more likely to identify as black or Asian. There were no statistically significant differences in their labor force participation. However, second generation immigrants with parents from a region reported 3 percent lower wages.

salaried workers. The CPS does not ask self-employed workers the wage questions, so they were dropped from the wage sample. Respondents missing on wages were also excluded from analyses.⁵⁹ The final sample size for wage analyses is 843,669 for men and 839,620 for women.

Because second-generation immigrants are nested within states, I estimate multilevel random intercept models to predict their economic outcomes. While intraclass correlations indicate that about 95 percent of the variation in outcomes is due to within-state variation, I use multilevel models because the state-level variance remains significant and because a cross-level interaction is my main predictor of interest. Multilevel random intercept models allow me to account for all unmeasured time-constant characteristics at the state-level that could otherwise bias results. The random intercept model is written as:

$$y_{ijt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{EthnicGrp}_{ijt} + \beta_2 \text{Policy}_{jt-1} + \beta_3 \text{EthnicGrp}_{ijt} * \text{Policy}_{jt-1} + \beta_4 \text{Characteristics}_{ijt} + \beta_5 \text{Context}_{jt-1} + \beta_6 \text{Year}_t + u_j + e_{ijt}$$

where i indexes individuals, j indexes states, and t indexes time. The dependent variable is either labor force participation or the natural log of hourly wages. A logistic multilevel random intercept model is modeled to estimate the probability of being in the labor force, and a multilevel mixed-effects linear regression model is used to estimate second generation immigrants' logged hourly wages. *EthnicGrp* indicates an individual's second- or third-generation ethnic group membership. *Policy* indicates the state policy context in place at time $t-1$. The cross-level interaction between ethnic group membership and policy context indicates the extent to which state policy context inhibits or promotes a group's economic achievement.

Characteristics are individual-level covariates listed above, and *context* includes other state-level

⁵⁹ Less than one percent of the sample (10,794 respondents) was missing wage data because the Census Bureau allocates missing responses through hot deck imputation.

control variables at $t-1$. *Time* is measured as year fixed effects. U_j is the random intercept for state j and e_{ij} is a residual error term (or a person-level random effect).

Results

Labor Force Participation

Descriptive Results

I begin with descriptive results on men's labor force participation (see Table 5.3). Across all groups and policy contexts, labor force participation is the highest for third-generation white men in noninterventionist states (93 percent) and is the lowest for third-generation black men in inclusionist and exclusionist states (80 percent). Labor force participation rates vary little across state policy contexts for second-generation Europeans/Canadians, Asians, Central/South Americans, and Mexicans. For those ethnic groups whose labor force participation varies (Afro- and Spanish Caribbeans), labor force participation is the lowest in inclusionist states. The participation rates of almost all second-generation ethnic groups are lower than those of whites in inclusionist and noninterventionist states. In contrast, almost all groups participate at the same rates as whites in exclusionist states and rights restrictionist states (the exceptions are Afro- and Spanish Caribbeans). These descriptive statistics offer little support for the idea that bright boundaries in state laws inhibit the incorporation of second-generation immigrants. Second-generation men's labor force participation largely does not vary by state policy context, and when it does, it is higher in exclusionist states. Further, second-generation immigrant groups are more likely to achieve parity with whites in exclusionist contexts, mainly due to whites' slightly lower labor force participation rates.

Refer to Table 5.3

The pattern is different for women's labor force participation (see Table 5.4). Across all groups and policy contexts, labor force participation is the highest for second-generation Asian women in rights restrictionist states and second-generation Afro-Caribbean women in noninterventionist states (82 percent). Labor force participation is the lowest for Spanish Caribbean women in inclusionist states (72 percent). Labor force participation rates vary little across state policy contexts for second-generation Central/South Americans and Mexicans. Meanwhile, second-generation European/Canadians and Asians have lower labor force participation rates in exclusionist states compared to their rates in other policy contexts. In comparison to the labor force participation of white third-generation women, most second-generation groups have achieved parity with whites across state policy contexts. When there are gaps, second-generation women's labor force participation is lower than white natives' in inclusionist or noninterventionist states rather than exclusionist or rights restrictionist states. However, second-generation Mexicans are disadvantaged across all state policy contexts. Therefore, descriptive statistics offer some support for the hypothesis that bright boundaries inhibit the incorporation of second-generation immigrants; Asian and European/Canadian immigrants' labor force participation is lower in exclusionist states. However, when second-generation women do not attain parity with third-generation whites, it is in inclusionist and noninterventionist states rather than exclusionist and rights restrictionist states.

Refer to Table 5.4

Second-Generation Ethnic Groups' Labor Force Participation

Figure 5.1 presents the predicted probabilities for the labor force participation of men by ethnic group and across state policy contexts. Predicted probabilities are estimated from multilevel logistic regression models (shown in Supplemental Table 5.1). Are second-generation

immigrants less likely to participate in the labor force in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states? In short, the answer is no. The probability of labor force participation for each ethnic group varies little across policy context. The probabilities of labor force participation for European/Canadians, Asians, Afro-Caribbean, and Central/South Americans are similar across state types. Among Spanish Caribbeans and Mexicans, labor force participation does vary across state context, but surprisingly, Spanish Caribbeans and Mexicans have higher probabilities of labor force participation in exclusionist states (as compared to rights restrictionist and inclusionist states). On average, living in an exclusionist state compared to living in an inclusionist state increases a Spanish Caribbean man's probability of labor force participation from .88 to .90 ($p < 0.01$). Similarly, living in an exclusionist state compared to an inclusionist state increases a Mexican man's probability of labor force participation from .92 to .94 ($p < 0.01$). Therefore, when men's labor force participation does vary by state policy context, is higher in exclusionist states. Further, contrary to the racialized policy hypothesis, the labor force participation of Mexican and Central/South American men is not penalized to a greater extent than non-Hispanic ethnic groups in exclusionist or rights restrictionist states.

Refer to Figure 5.1

Figure 5.2 presents the predicted probabilities for women's labor force participation, estimated separately from men (models shown in Supplemental Table 5.1). Results are similar to men in that most groups' probabilities of labor force participation do not vary across state policy contexts. Where there is variation across state policy contexts, women's probability of labor force participation is lower in inclusionist states and higher in rights restrictionist states or exclusionist states. For example, among second-generation Asian women, living in a rights restrictionist state increases their probability of labor force participation by .02 compared to

living in an inclusionist state ($p < 0.01$). Among second-generation Spanish Caribbean women, living in either an exclusionist state or rights restrictionist state increases their probability of labor force participation by .03 ($p < 0.001$). Only among second-generation Europeans and Canadians are effects as expected. On average, living in an exclusionist state compared to living in an inclusionist state decreases a European/Canadian woman's probability of labor force participation from .83 to .81 ($p < 0.05$). As for men, when women's labor force participation varies by state policy context, it is higher in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states. There is little support for the racialized policy hypothesis because Mexicans' and Central/South Americans' labor force participation does not vary by state policy context. Instead, European/Canadian women actually have a slightly larger penalty in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states.

Refer to Figure 5.2

Second-Generation Assimilation

Are second-generation immigrants more likely to achieve parity with third-generation and higher whites in inclusionist states? Table 5.6 shows comparisons of predicted probabilities between second-generation male ethnic groups and native groups in each state policy context. Contrary to expectations, second-generation European/Canadian, Asian, Central/South American, and Mexican men achieve parity with white men across all state policy contexts, even those with bright boundaries. Also contrary to expectations, second-generation Afro- and Spanish Caribbean men have lower probabilities of labor force participation than white natives in *inclusionist* and rights restrictionist states, but have similar probabilities of labor force participation as whites in exclusionist states. Further, all second-generation, Hispanic ethnic groups have at least achieved parity with third-generation Mexicans, the exception again being a

group in an *inclusionist* state: Spanish Caribbean men. Almost all second-generation ethnic groups in exclusionist, rights restrictionist, and inclusionist states have higher probabilities of labor force participation than native black men. Overall, these findings suggest that second-generation immigrants are no more likely to achieve parity with native whites in inclusionist states than in states with bright immigrant-native boundaries. The labor force participation of second-generation ethnic groups still surpasses the labor force participation of blacks in states with bright immigrant-native boundaries.

Refer to Table 5.6 or Figure 5.3

Table 5.7 shows the difference between predicted probabilities of ethnic groups and native groups for women's labor force participation. Often when scholars make comparisons between second-generation ethnic groups and native whites, they assume that native whites have the highest levels of attainment (for example, higher levels of education, more occupational prestige, or higher wages). Female labor force participation differs because, after accounting for human capital differences, third-generation white women have the lowest probabilities of entering the labor force and third-generation Mexican and black women have higher probabilities of labor force participation. It is not surprising, then, to see that all second-generation ethnic groups in all state policy contexts have probabilities of labor force participation equal to or higher than those of native white women. However, some second-generation ethnic groups have higher probabilities of labor force participation than both native whites and native blacks. European/Canadians, Asians, and Central/South Americans have higher labor force participation than both groups. However, these groups surpass both blacks and whites in inclusionist and rights restrictionist states, thereby challenging the hypothesis that ethnic groups would have better economic assimilation in states with blurred boundaries. Similarly, second-generation

Mexicans have higher labor force participation than whites and blacks in both inclusionist and exclusionist states. Finally, if we compare second-generation Hispanic groups to third-generation Mexicans, we see that most groups achieve parity across all state policy contexts. These results suggest that second-generation assimilation is no more likely to be accomplished in inclusionist states than states with bright immigrant-native boundaries.

Refer to Table 5.7 or Figure 5.4

Summary

In sum, contrary to expectations, the labor force participation of men and women does not vary by state policy context. Among ethnic groups whose labor force participation does vary across state policy contexts, it is higher in rights restrictionist or exclusionist states where boundaries are bright rather than inclusionist states where the boundaries have been blurred. Also contrary to expectations, Hispanic ethnic groups who are likely to be racialized as Latino/a, do not experience more of a labor force participation penalty than non-Hispanic ethnic groups in rights restrictionist or exclusionist states. In terms of assimilation, it is not more likely for second-generation ethnic groups to achieve parity with native whites in inclusionist states. Most second-generation men achieve parity with white men across all state policy contexts, and second-generation women have similar or higher probabilities of labor force participation than native whites across all state policy contexts. Further, the labor force participation of most second-generation men surpasses that of native blacks, even in states with bright boundaries. Second-generation women's labor force participation is equal to the higher labor force participation probabilities of blacks across all state policy contexts, but some groups even surpass blacks' labor force participation in rights restrictionist states.

Wages

Descriptive Results

This chapter also examines the wage levels of second-generation ethnic groups as wages are a key indicator of socioeconomic well-being. Table 5.6 shows the hourly wages of men for each ethnic group in each policy context. Across all groups and policy contexts, second-generation European/Canadian men in inclusionist states have the highest wages, at \$18.92 per hour, whereas native blacks in exclusionist states have the lowest wages, at \$11.70 per hour. Wages for second-generation ethnic groups vary considerably across state policy contexts, and many ethnic groups have higher wages in inclusionist states. European/Canadians, Asians, Afro-Caribbeans, and Mexicans all have wages higher in inclusionist states than their counterparts in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states. However, when we compare second-generation ethnic groups' wage levels to whites' wage levels, all groups except for European/Canadians and Asians are disadvantaged. The white-Mexican wage gap is similar in exclusionist and inclusionist states, but the white-Spanish Caribbean wage gap and the white-Central/South American wage gap are larger in inclusionist states than in exclusionist states. These patterns show that while second-generation ethnic groups often have higher wages in inclusionist states, they are no closer to achieving parity with whites in these states.

Refer to Table 5.6

The pattern is more mixed for second-generation women (see Table 5.7). Second-generation women's wages vary across state contexts, and for all ethnic groups, their wages are highest in inclusionist states. However, among women, more ethnic groups achieve parity with native whites' wage levels; only Spanish Caribbean and Mexican women have lower wage levels. Further, there is no clear pattern in the difference between the wages of second-generation

ethnic groups and those of native whites across state policy contexts. The white-Mexican wage gap is higher in exclusionist states and rights restrictionist states than inclusionist states, but the white-Spanish Caribbean wage gap is higher in inclusionist states and exclusionist states. Among ethnic groups that have achieved parity with white women's wages, Asians appear the most advantaged in inclusionist states, but European/Canadians, Afro-Caribbeans, and Central/South Americans are the most advantaged in rights restrictionist states. These descriptive statistics offer little support for the idea that bright boundaries inhibit the incorporation of second-generation immigrants – second-generation Mexican women may be the exception.

Refer to Table 5.7

Second-Generation Ethnic Groups' Wages

Figure 5.5 presents second-generation men's predicted logged wages for each policy context by ethnic group. Predicted logged wages are based on multilevel regression models controlling for individual and household characteristics, other aspects of state environment, and year fixed effects (see Supplemental Table 5.2). Once controlling for individual and state characteristics, second-generation men no longer earn higher hourly wages in inclusionist states. Instead, hourly wages do not vary across state policy contexts for European/Canadian men, Spanish Caribbean men, and Mexican men. For the remaining ethnic groups, second-generation men's hourly wages are often lower in inclusionist states than their wages in exclusionist states. Holding all else constant, Asian men's wages are 4 percent higher in exclusionist states than in inclusionist states ($p < 0.01$).⁶⁰ Central/South American men's wages are 5 percent higher in exclusionist states than in inclusionist states ($p < 0.01$).⁶¹ These results go against the expectation

⁶⁰ 4% = $[\exp(2.75-2.71)-1]$

⁶¹ 5% = $[\exp(2.73-2.68)-1]$

that second-generation men's economic attainment would be the highest in inclusionist states. They also go against the racialized policy expectation that Mexicans, Central/South Americans, and Spanish Caribbeans have a larger exclusionist-inclusionist wage gap than Asian, European, and Afro-Caribbean ethnic groups.

Refer to Figure 5.5

Second-generation women's hourly wages largely fail to vary across state policy contexts (see Figure 5.6). Hourly wages only vary across state policy contexts for Central/South American women, and the predicted wage values go against the expectation that second-generation women's economic attainment is the highest in inclusionist states. For Central/South American women, we see the opposite effect. Central American women's wages are 5 percent higher in exclusionist states than in inclusionist states ($p < 0.05$).⁶² Central American women's wage also 5 percent higher in rights restrictionist states than in inclusionist states ($p < 0.01$).⁶³ There is also little support for the racialized policy hypothesis because Central Americans have higher wages in states with brighter boundaries.

Refer to Figure 5.6

Second-Generation Assimilation

Are second-generation men's wages closer to native whites' wages in inclusionist states than they are in exclusionist or rights restrictionist states? The answer is no. The hourly wages of almost all second-generation ethnic groups are lower than the hourly wages of whites in all state policy contexts (see Table 5.10 or Figure 5.7). The exception is Asian second-generation men; however, their wages achieve parity with whites' wages in exclusionist, rather than inclusionist,

⁶² 5% = $[\exp(2.51-2.46)-1]$

⁶³ 5% = $[\exp(2.52-2.46)-1]$, some error due to rounding

states. Even comparing the magnitude of the wage gap between second-generation groups and whites in each policy context suggests that second-generation men's wages are not closer to whites' wages in inclusionist states. For example, second-generation Mexicans earn 11 percent less than whites in exclusionist states and rights restrictionist states, and they earn 10 percent less than whites in inclusionist states.⁶⁴ For those ethnic groups whose wage gaps vary across state policy contexts, the gap is often higher in inclusionist states than in exclusionist states. For example, Asians' wages are similar to whites' wages in exclusionist states, but they earn 7 percent less than whites in inclusionist states.⁶⁵ Central/South Americans earn 5 percent less than whites in exclusionist states but earn 10 percent less than whites in inclusionist states.⁶⁶

Refer to Table 5.10 or Figure 5.7

If instead of native whites, we use third-generation Mexicans as the comparison group for second-generation groups with Hispanic ethnicity, results still do not support the hypothesis that blurred boundaries are more likely to result in equivalent economic outcomes than bright boundaries. Mexicans attain parity with third-generation Mexicans in exclusionist, rights restrictionist, and noninterventionist contexts. But in inclusionist states, second-generation Mexicans' wages are 3 percent lower than third-generation Mexicans' wages ($p < 0.001$). Spanish Caribbeans attain wage parity with third-generation Mexicans in all state policy contexts, and Central/South Americans have higher wages than third-generation Mexicans in all state policy contexts with the exception of inclusionist states, where Central/South Americans' wages only reach parity with third-generation Mexicans.

⁶⁴ 11% = $[\exp(2.66-2.78)-1]$ for exclusionist states; 11% = $[\exp(2.66-2.78)-1]$ for rights restrictionist states; 10% = $[\exp(2.67-2.78)-1]$ for inclusionist states

⁶⁵ 7% = $[\exp(2.71-2.78)-1]$

⁶⁶ 5% = $[\exp(2.73-2.78)-1]$ for exclusionist states; 10% = $[\exp(2.68-2.78)-1]$ for inclusionist states

Segmented assimilation theory suggests that anti-immigrant contexts result in second generation outcomes that are similar to those of native blacks, but this expectation is not supported. All second-generation ethnic groups' wages are above the wages of native blacks, even in rights restrictionist and exclusionist states. Only Afro-Caribbeans in rights restrictionist states, Afro-Caribbeans in noninterventionist states, and Mexicans in noninterventionist states have similar wage levels as native blacks.

Turning to women in Table 5.11, we again see that second-generation women's wages are not closer to native whites' wages in inclusionist states than they are in exclusionist or rights restrictionist states. Similar to men, the hourly wages of almost all second-generation ethnic groups are lower than the hourly wages of white women in all state policy contexts. Two groups attain wage parity with white women: Central/South Americans and Asians. Asians attain wage parity in both exclusionist and inclusionist states; Central/South Americans attain wage parity in exclusionist, rather than inclusionist, states. Additionally, the magnitude of the wage gap between second generation ethnic groups and white women does not vary by state policy context. The wage penalty each ethnic group experiences is very similar across state types. Where the magnitude of the gap does vary, it is larger in inclusionist states. For example, Central/South Americans' wages are similar to white women's wages in exclusionist states, and they only experience a 3 percent wage penalty in rights restrictionist states.⁶⁷ However, Central/South Americans' wages are 8 percent lower than native white women's wages in inclusionist states ($p < 0.001$).⁶⁸

Refer to Table 5.11 or Figure 5.8

⁶⁷ 3% = $[\exp(2.52-2.55)-1]$

⁶⁸ 8% = $[\exp(2.46-2.54)-1]$

Using third-generation Mexicans as a reference group for Hispanic second-generation ethnic groups still does not lend support to the hypothesis that the second-generation is more likely to attain wage parity in inclusionist states than exclusionist or rights restrictionist states. Spanish Caribbeans and Central/South Americans had higher wages than third-generation Mexicans in rights restrictionist states, achieved wage parity in exclusionist states, and either had similar or lower wage levels than third-generation Mexicans in inclusionist states. Second-generation Mexicans achieved wage parity with third-generation Mexicans in rights restrictionist states but had lower wages than third-generation Mexicans in both exclusionist and inclusionist states. These patterns indicate that second-generation Hispanic groups had slightly poorer assimilation outcomes in both exclusionist and inclusionist states when third-generation Mexicans serve as the comparison group.

Women's wage results also do not support the expectations of the segmented assimilation hypothesis. Most second-generation groups have higher wages than native blacks in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states. However, Central Americans' wages are similar to native blacks' in inclusionist states, and Mexicans' wages are similar to native blacks' across all state policy contexts. If the segmented assimilation hypothesis was upheld, Mexicans' wages would be similar to black wages only in rights restrictionist or exclusionist states.

Summary

Overall, second-generation men and women's wages are not higher in inclusionist states than they are in rights restrictionist states and exclusionist states. When second-generation men and women's wages do vary across state policy contexts, they are usually *lower* in inclusionist states. The racialized policy hypothesis received little support because Central/South Americans, Mexicans, and Spanish Caribbeans do not suffer a greater wage disadvantage in exclusionist

states than non-Hispanic second-generation ethnic groups. Furthermore, most second-generation ethnic groups earn less than native whites across all state policy contexts. When ethnic groups do attain wage parity with native whites, it usually occurs in *exclusionist* states. Most second-generation Hispanic groups attain wage parity with third-generation Mexicans across all state policy contexts, and when they did not, they had lower wages in inclusionist states. Finally, across all state policy contexts, most second generation groups earned higher wages than native blacks. If second generation groups only attained wage parity with third-generation blacks, it was not more likely to occur in exclusionist or rights restrictionist states.

Supplemental Analyses

One paradox is that when ethnic groups' economic outcomes actually vary over state policy contexts, groups have higher wage levels in exclusionist states over inclusionist states. Central/South American men and women and Asian men have higher wage levels in exclusionist states over inclusionist states. Why would wages be higher in exclusionist states for Central/South Americans and Asian men? Most second-generation ethnic groups in exclusionist states live in either Florida, Virginia, or Ohio. The wages of Central/South Americans and Asians are higher in Virginia than the wages of other exclusionist states. Upon further investigation of second-generation immigrants in Virginia, I found that higher proportions of Central/South Americans and Asians live in the Washington, DC metro area, which could be driving up these groups' wages, as Washington, DC is an inclusionist policy context as opposed to Virginia's exclusionist context. Nevertheless, wage analyses omitting Virginia from the model still showed that Central/South Americans and Asian men in exclusionist states earned higher wages than those living in inclusionist states. These analyses suggest that models are not sensitive to the higher earnings of workers from one state.

I also examined whether results were sensitive to the inclusion of very high- or low-earning men and women. High earners (operationalized as those who earned more than \$100/hour) were more highly-educated, professional workers, but they were also less likely to be paid hourly or to work full-time. Common occupations included managers/administrators, subject instructors at the high school or college level, and airplane pilots. Wage analyses omitting high earners show that results are robust. Second-generation men's wages do not vary across state policy contexts for European/Canadian men, Spanish Caribbean men, and Mexican men. However, the wages of Asian men and Central American men are higher in exclusionist than in inclusionist states. For women, hourly wages only vary across state policy contexts for Central/South Americans, with women earning higher wages in exclusionist states than in inclusionist states.

Turning to low earners (operationalized as those who earned less than \$3/hour), descriptive comparisons indicate that individuals with less than a high school degree made up a larger share of low earners. Low earners were more likely to work in service, and commonly held jobs as waiters/waitresses, cooks, nursing aides, child care workers, and farm workers. Low earners also worked fewer hours and were less likely to be married or a parent. Non-Hispanic, third-generation or higher whites made up a smaller share of low earners, but non-Hispanic, third-generation or higher blacks made up a higher share. Results changed slightly for second-generation Spanish Caribbeans. The wages of Spanish Caribbean men were 3 percent higher in exclusionist states than in rights restrictionist states ($p < 0.05$), and the wages of Spanish Caribbean women were 3 percent higher in inclusionist states than exclusionist states ($p < 0.01$). Still, overall, wage analyses omitting low earners showed similar results as the full models for

both men and women. Policy context has little effect on the wages of second generation ethnic groups and this finding is robust to the omission of low earners.

Discussion and Conclusion

The rise of anti-immigrant legislation in the states has raised concerns over the assimilation prospects of the second generation. Anti-immigrant state legislation has been shown to disadvantage not just immigrants, but their US-born children in terms of their mental health (Santos and Menjívar 2013) and educational achievement (Filindra, Blanding, and Garcia Coll 2011). As a result, understanding the economic outcomes of the second generation in states across the country has become more pressing. Previous studies of the second generation provide a limited picture by only examining second-generation assimilation in established immigrant destinations or by examining outcomes at the country-level without accounting for state policy differences. Even those studies that compare second-generation outcomes across traditional and new immigrant destinations fail to directly measure the impact of policy. This chapter advances the study of assimilation by directly assessing policy effects, rather than indirectly capturing them through ethnic group membership or new destination. In light of native-immigrant boundaries brightening across the United States, it is important to directly measure the impact of state-level policy on second generation immigrants.

Overall, my assessment of policy effects on second-generation immigrants' labor force participation and wage levels is largely positive. The bright boundaries found in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states do not disadvantage second-generation ethnic groups; instead, they have little effect on second-generation labor force participation and wage levels when comparing ethnic groups across state policy contexts. They are also no more likely to target Central/South American or Mexican ethnic groups, despite immigration laws' association with the Latino/a

population. Brighter state policy contexts may not inhibit second-generation labor force participation or lower second-generation wages for a few possible reasons. This study hypothesized that state policy would have a direct effect on the second generation. Instead of state policy acting directly on employers and second-generation immigrants themselves, they might act through the first generation. Segmented assimilation theory suggests that hostile government policy acts indirectly through immigrant parents. For example, unauthorized status prevents immigrant parents from attaining socioeconomic status and passing on their resources to the second generation. Consequently, we might not see an effect of state policy for another generation, after immigrant parents have experienced additional disadvantages in rights restrictionist and exclusionist states. Another possibility is that state laws are largely symbolic for the second generation, unlike the immigrant generation who can experience deportation and must negotiate this threat with employers.

Two ethnic groups' economic outcomes actually vary over state policy contexts. Central/South Americans and Asian men have higher wage levels in exclusionist states over inclusionist states. As shown in Chapter 3, first-generation Latina women are withdrawing from the labor force in exclusionist states. With these workers no longer available, certain employers may be forced to offer higher wages to draw second-generation immigrants to fill openings. This distortion may result in higher wages for jobs in exclusionist states than for similar positions in other states. Central/South American second-generation immigrants would be likely to fill these positions because of racial segregation in work. If employers in exclusionist states pay a premium to ensure that they are not hiring unauthorized workers, they may also turn to second-generation Asian workers, who are stereotyped as model minorities and not seen as unauthorized immigrants.

The results also show that exclusionist states' and rights restrictionist states' passage of anti-immigrant laws does not result in Hispanic ethnic groups having a large exclusionist-inclusionist labor force participation or wage gap than non-Hispanic groups. Due to the lack of an association between state policy context and second-generation groups' economic outcomes, data provide little support for the idea that state immigration policies have a racialized effect. Mexicans, Spanish Caribbeans, and Central/South Americans do not join the labor force at lower rates or earn lower wages in states with bright immigrant-native boundaries, like exclusionist or rights restrictionist states. However, results show that the wages of second-generation Mexicans and Spanish Caribbeans are lower than those of second-generation Europeans and Asians, no matter the state policy context. Additionally, the wages of second-generation African Caribbeans are some of the lowest of all second-generation ethnic groups, across all state policy contexts. Therefore, racialization may not be more common or heightened in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states; the stereotypes of any darker-skinned ethnic group are present in national discourse throughout the US and may affect wage negotiations no matter the state policy context.

This chapter also considered whether the blurred boundaries in state policies are more likely to result in assimilation, or the reduction of ethnic distinctions so that a group attains equal economic outcomes as third-generation or higher natives. Because second-generation ethnic groups' labor force participation and wage levels do not vary over state policy contexts, blurred and bright boundaries codified in policy have little influence over economic assimilation; we see similar assimilation outcomes for each group in each policy context. In terms of labor force participation, second-generation immigrants have achieved parity with white majorities in all state policy contexts; among women, many second-generation ethnic groups have even outperformed native whites. Further, the labor force participation of most second-generation men

surpasses that of native blacks and second-generation women's labor force participation is equal to the higher labor force participation probabilities of blacks across all state policy contexts.


When we examine wages, most second-generation ethnic groups fail to attain parity with whites but earn higher wages than native blacks. Only second-generation Mexican women did not earn wages significantly higher than blacks, across all state policy contexts. At the same time, women attained parity with third-generation and higher Mexicans. Inclusionist states are the exception not because second-generation Mexicans' wages are lower there, but because third-generation Mexicans have higher wages in inclusionist states.

To return to the overarching question of many second-generation studies – has the hard work of second-generation immigrants resulted in as much economic success for them as for their native peers? – we see that in most cases, second-generation immigrants' efforts are rewarded with higher wages than native blacks, but do not yet meet parity with native whites. Even second-generation Mexican women who do not outearn blacks are at least earning similar wages to third-generation Mexicans. This chapter has ruled out one possible explanation for the wage gap between second-generation immigrants and native whites; exclusionist and rights restrictionist laws have a limited association with the wage levels of immigrants and natives. My findings suggest that assimilation theorists need to be more specific about which boundaries need to be blurred in order for second-generation ethnic groups to attain parity with native whites. It also suggests that assimilation theorists may need to be more specific about how exactly blurred boundaries have an effect. Future research could consider how blurred and bright boundaries shift the hiring practices of employers or the job searches of second-generation immigrants. Moving forward, scholars can also look to other contextual and structural factors that may play a

role in explaining the gap between native whites and second-generation ethnic groups. My results point to the importance of coethnic community and economic context.

In a sense, the lack of an association between second-generation assimilation and state policy context is a positive finding – the bright boundaries in exclusionist states and rights restrictionist states do not widen the wage gap between native whites and second-generation ethnic groups. On the other hand, it also indicates that states that have blurred boundaries between immigrants and natives have not done much to close the gap between native whites and second-generation immigrants. As of now, states that recognize the contributions of their immigrant populations and attempt to blur boundaries to facilitate their incorporation still have a ways to go to ensure equal treatment for later immigrant generations.

Figure 5.1 Predicted Probabilities of Labor Force Participation for Second Generation Men, by Ethnic Group and across State Policy Contexts




Notes: Predicted probabilities are average marginal effects based on a multilevel logistic regression model which controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, men aged 25-54.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ compared to exclusionist states.

Figure 5.2 Predicted Probabilities of Labor Force Participation for Second Generation Women, by Ethnic Group and across State Policy Contexts




Notes: Predicted probabilities are average marginal effects based on a multilevel logistic regression model which controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, women aged 25-54.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ compared to exclusionist states.

Figure 5.3 Predicted Probabilities of Labor Force Participation for Second Generation Men, Compared to Native Majorities and Minorities across State Policy Contexts




Notes: Predicted probabilities are average marginal effects based on a multilevel logistic regression model which controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, men aged 25-54.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ compared to native whites within the same state policy context.

Figure 5.4 Predicted Probabilities of Labor Force Participation for Second Generation Women, Compared to Native Majorities and Minorities across State Policy Contexts




Notes: Predicted probabilities are average marginal effects based on a multilevel logistic regression model which controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, women aged 25-54.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ compared to native whites within the same state policy context.

Figure 5.5 Predicted Wages for Second Generation Men by Ethnic Group and State Policy Contexts




Notes: Predicted logged wages are based on a multilevel regression model which controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, wage and salaried men aged 25-54.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ compared to exclusionist states.

Figure 5.6 Predicted Wages for Second Generation Women by Ethnic Group and State Policy Contexts




Notes: Predicted logged wages are based on a multilevel regression model which controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, wage and salaried women aged 25-54.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ compared to exclusionist states.

Figure 5.7 Predicted Logged Wages for Second Generation Men, Compared to Native Majorities and Minorities across State Policy Contexts




Notes: Predicted logged wages are based on a multilevel regression model which controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, wage and salaried men aged 25-54.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ compared to native whites within the same state policy context.

Figure 5.8 Predicted Logged Wages for Second Generation Women, Compared to Native Majorities and Minorities across State Policy Contexts



Notes: Predicted logged wages are based on a multilevel regression model which controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, wage and salaried men aged 25-54.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ compared to native whites within the same state policy context.

Table 5.1 Correlations of State-Level Variables for Men's Labor Force Participation Analyses

	excl	rest	nonint	incl	iciti	%287g	%sanct	fbpctch	%immgrp	%coll	unemp	GSP	%manuf	%tech
excl	1.00													
rest	-0.40	1.00												
nonint	-0.17	-0.29	1.00											
incl	-0.31	-0.54	-0.22	1.00										
iciti	-0.16	-0.11	-0.06	0.29	1.00									
%287g	0.15	-0.07	-0.12	0.03	-0.02	1.00								
%sanct	-0.05	-0.11	-0.07	0.20	0.05	0.08	1.00							
fbpctch	0.18	0.04	-0.12	-0.12	-0.30	0.04	-0.12	1.00						
%immgrp	-0.03	0.05	0.08	-0.09	-0.05	-0.21	-0.11	-0.06	1.00					
%immcoll	0.13	-0.08	-0.08	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.08	-0.01	0.44	1.00				
unemp	0.20	-0.20	-0.08	0.10	0.09	0.30	0.15	-0.01	-0.15	0.17	1.00			
GSPpc	-0.31	-0.06	0.15	0.22	0.29	-0.11	-0.06	-0.09	-0.14	-0.16	-0.29	1.00		
%Manuf	-0.13	0.06	0.25	-0.12	-0.12	-0.21	-0.12	0.03	0.21	-0.13	-0.22	-0.14	1.00	
%HiTech	-0.09	-0.16	-0.04	0.28	0.16	0.18	0.16	-0.04	-0.32	-0.09	0.13	0.34	-0.15	1.00

214 Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, men aged 25-54.

Table 5.2 Correlations of State-Level Variables for Women's Labor Force Participation Analyses

	excl	rest	nonint	incl	iciti	%287g	%sanct	fbpctch	%immgrp	%coll	unemp	GSP	%manuf	%tech
excl	1.00													
rest	-0.40	1.00												
nonint	-0.17	-0.29	1.00											
incl	-0.31	-0.54	-0.22	1.00										
iciti	-0.16	-0.11	-0.06	0.30	1.00									
%287g	0.15	-0.07	-0.12	0.03	-0.02	1.00								
%sanct	-0.05	-0.11	-0.07	0.20	0.06	0.08	1.00							
fbpctch	0.18	0.04	-0.12	-0.12	-0.30	0.04	-0.12	1.00						
%immgrp	-0.03	0.05	0.08	-0.08	-0.04	-0.20	-0.11	-0.06	1.00					
%immcoll	0.12	-0.08	-0.07	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.07	-0.01	0.49	1.00				
unemp	0.22	-0.15	-0.14	0.07	-0.02	0.35	0.18	0.04	-0.26	0.08	1.00			
GSPpc	-0.31	-0.06	0.15	0.22	0.30	-0.11	-0.06	-0.10	-0.14	-0.15	-0.31	1.00		
%Manuf	-0.14	0.07	0.25	-0.13	-0.12	-0.21	-0.13	0.04	0.20	-0.12	-0.19	-0.14	1.00	
%HiTech	-0.09	-0.15	-0.04	0.28	0.16	0.18	0.16	-0.05	-0.31	-0.10	0.21	0.34	-0.16	1.00

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, women aged 25-54.

Table 5.3 Male Labor Force Participation by Ethnic Group across State Policy Contexts

	Exclusionist	Rights Restrictionist	Noninterventionist	Inclusionist
<i>Second Generation</i>				
European/Canadians	90.9%	92.7%	92.2%	91.2%
Asians	91.0%	89.9%	90.8%	89.2%
Afro Caribbean	86.7%	86.8%	87.8%	83.8%
Spanish Caribbean	88.9%	87.1%	90.6%	83.1%
Central/South American	92.2%	91.2%	90.3%	90.7%
Mexican	92.1%	91.5%	91.5%	89.3%
<i>Third and higher Generation</i>				
Native white	90.5%	91.3%	92.8%	91.4%
Native black	80.3%	81.7%	81.5%	80.0%
Mexican	86.5%	88.8%	89.5%	87.5%

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, men aged 25-54

Table 5.4 Female Labor Force Participation by Ethnic Group across State Policy Contexts

	Exclusionist	Rights Restrictionist	Noninterventionist	Inclusionist
<i>Second Generation</i>				
European/Canadians	77.6%	80.0%	81.1%	80.0%
Asians	77.6%	81.9%	77.5%	79.6%
Afro Caribbean	80.5%	80.7%	82.1%	80.1%
Spanish Caribbean	78.4%	76.3%	73.2%	71.7%
Central/South American	80.6%	81.4%	79.5%	79.7%
Mexican	74.3%	74.2%	76.8%	75.8%
<i>Third and higher Generation</i>				
Native white	77.4%	78.3%	79.8%	79.3%
Native black	76.8%	76.9%	77.5%	76.5%
Mexican	75.2%	74.3%	75.6%	74.5%

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, women aged 25-54

Table 5.6 Logged Wage Levels for Men, by Ethnic Group and Across State Policy Contexts

	Exclusionist	Rights Restrictionist	Noninterventionist	Inclusionist
<i>Second Generation</i>				
European/Canadians	2.88	2.89	2.89	2.94
Asians	2.82	2.79	2.76	2.89
Afro Caribbean	2.59	2.61	2.59	2.72
Spanish Caribbean	2.68	2.67	2.66	2.70
Central/South American	2.73	2.71	2.81	2.74
Mexican	2.53	2.54	2.52	2.62
<i>Third and higher Generation</i>				
Native white	2.77	2.77	2.81	2.84
Native black	2.46	2.49	2.56	2.61
Mexican	2.59	2.54	2.53	2.66

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, wage and salaried men aged 25-54

Table 5.7 Logged Wage Levels for Women, by Ethnic Group and Across State Policy Contexts

	Exclusionist	Rights Restrictionist	Noninterventionist	Inclusionist
<i>Second Generation</i>				
European/Canadians	2.65	2.65	2.63	2.72
Asians	2.68	2.65	2.69	2.79
Afro Caribbean	2.56	2.61	2.61	2.67
Spanish Caribbean	2.51	2.51	2.49	2.56
Central/South American	2.59	2.59	2.60	2.62
Mexican	2.36	2.35	2.33	2.47
<i>Third and higher Generation</i>				
Native white	2.55	2.53	2.55	2.62
Native black	2.35	2.36	2.44	2.52
Mexican	2.41	2.33	2.29	2.48

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, wage and salaried women aged 25-54

Table 5.8 Difference in Predicted Probabilities of Male Labor Force Participation between Second- and Third-Generation or Higher Ethnic Groups across State Policy Contexts

	Compared to Third and Higher Generation:		
	Whites	Blacks	Mexicans
<i>Exclusionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	ns	+.05	+.02
2G Asian	ns	+.04	ns
2G Afro-Caribbean	ns	ns	ns
2G Spanish-Caribbean	ns	+.04	ns
2G Central/South American	ns	+.05	+.02
2G Mexican	+.03	+.07	+.04
<i>Rights Restrictionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	+.02	+.06	+.02
2G Asian	ns	+.04	ns
2G Afro-Caribbean	-.03	ns	ns
2G Spanish-Caribbean	-.02	+.02	-.01
2G Central/South American	ns	+.05	ns
2G Mexican	+.01	+.06	+.02
<i>Noninterventionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	ns	+.07	+.02
2G Asian	ns	+.05	ns
2G Afro-Caribbean	ns	ns	ns
2G Spanish-Caribbean	ns	+.06	ns
2G Central/South American	ns	ns	ns
2G Mexican	ns	+.07	ns
<i>Inclusionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	+.01	+.07	+.01
2G Asian	-.01	+.05	ns
2G Afro-Caribbean	-.04	+.02	-.04
2G Spanish-Caribbean	-.03	+.03	-.02
2G Central/South American	ns	+.07	+.01
2G Mexican	+.01	+.07	+.02
Notes: All differences in probabilities significant at $p < 0.05$ level, otherwise listed as ns. Differences in predicted probabilities are based on a multilevel logistic regression model which controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.			
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, men aged 25-54			

Table 5.9 Difference in Predicted Probabilities of Female Labor Force Participation between Second- and Third-Generation or Higher Ethnic Groups across State Policy Contexts

	Compared to Third and Higher Generation:		
	Whites	Blacks	Mexicans
<i>Exclusionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	+ .04	ns	ns
2G Asian	+ .04	ns	ns
2G Afro-Caribbean	ns	ns	ns
2G Spanish-Caribbean	+ .05	ns	ns
2G Central/South American	+ .06	ns	ns
2G Mexican	+ .06	+ .02	ns
<i>Rights Restrictionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	+ .05	+ .02	+ .02
2G Asian	+ .07	+ .03	+ .04
2G Afro-Caribbean	+ .03	ns	ns
2G Spanish-Caribbean	+ .05	ns	+ .01
2G Central/South American	+ .07	+ .03	+ .03
2G Mexican	+ .04	ns	ns
<i>Noninterventionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	+ .07	+ .03	+ .02
2G Asian	+ .04	ns	ns
2G Afro-Caribbean	ns	ns	ns
2G Spanish-Caribbean	ns	ns	ns
2G Central/South American	ns	ns	ns
2G Mexican	+ .06	+ .03	ns
<i>Inclusionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	+ .05	+ .04	+ .02
2G Asian	+ .04	+ .03	ns
2G Afro-Caribbean	ns	ns	ns
2G Spanish-Caribbean	ns	ns	ns
2G Central/South American	+ .04	+ .03	+ .02
2G Mexican	+ .04	+ .03	+ .02

Notes: All differences in probabilities significant at $p < 0.05$ level, otherwise listed as ns. Differences in predicted probabilities are based on a multilevel logistic regression model which controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, women aged 25-54

Table 5.10 Comparison of Second-Generation Logged Hourly Wages to Third-Generation Groups across State Policy Contexts, Men Aged 25-54

	Compared to Third and Higher Generation:		
	Whites	Blacks	Mexicans
<i>Exclusionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	-.03	+.17	+.06
2G Asian	ns	+.17	+.06
2G Afro-Caribbean	-.09	+.11	ns
2G Spanish-Caribbean	-.07	+.13	ns
2G Central/South American	-.05	+.15	+.04
2G Mexican	-.12	+.09	ns
<i>Rights Restrictionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	-.05	+.15	+.07
2G Asian	-.07	+.12	+.05
2G Afro-Caribbean	-.18	ns	-.06
2G Spanish-Caribbean	-.10	+.09	ns
2G Central/South American	-.08	+.12	+.05
2G Mexican	-.12	+.07	ns
<i>Noninterventionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	-.05	+.13	+.09
2G Asian	-.10	+.08	ns
2G Afro-Caribbean	-.19	ns	ns
2G Spanish-Caribbean	-.11	+.06	ns
2G Central/South American	ns	+.15	+.11
2G Mexican	-.14	ns	ns
<i>Inclusionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	-.04	+.16	+.04
2G Asian	-.07	+.13	ns
2G Afro-Caribbean	-.12	+.07	-.04
2G Spanish-Caribbean	-.10	+.10	ns
2G Central/South American	-.10	+.09	ns
2G Mexican	-.11	+.09	-.03

Notes: All differences in predicted logged wages significant at $p < 0.05$ level, otherwise listed as ns. Differences in predicted probabilities are based on a multilevel logistic regression model which controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.

Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, men aged 25-54

Table 5.11 Comparison of Second-Generation Logged Hourly Wages to Third-Generation Groups across State Policy Contexts, Women Aged 25-54

	Compared to Third and Higher Generation:		
	Whites	Blacks	Mexicans
<i>Exclusionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	-.04	+.07	ns
2G Asian	ns	+.08	+.04
2G Afro-Caribbean	-.08	ns	ns
2G Spanish-Caribbean	-.07	+.03	ns
2G Central/South American	ns	+.06	ns
2G Mexican	-.10	ns	-.04
<i>Rights Restrictionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	-.03	+.07	+.06
2G Asian	-.02	+.07	+.06
2G Afro-Caribbean	-.05	+.05	ns
2G Spanish-Caribbean	-.06	+.04	+.02
2G Central/South American	-.03	+.07	+.06
2G Mexican	-.09	ns	ns
<i>Noninterventionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	-.03	+.05	+.06
2G Asian	ns	+.07	+.09
2G Afro-Caribbean	ns	ns	ns
2G Spanish-Caribbean	ns	ns	ns
2G Central/South American	ns	ns	ns
2G Mexican	-.08	ns	ns
<i>Inclusionist</i>			
2G European/Canadian	-.03	+.06	ns
2G Asian	ns	+.08	+.04
2G Afro-Caribbean	-.08	ns	-.04
2G Spanish-Caribbean	-.04	+.05	ns
2G Central/South American	-.08	ns	-.03
2G Mexican	-.09	ns	-.03

Note: Notes: All differences in predicted logged wages significant at $p < 0.05$ level, otherwise listed as ns. Differences in predicted probabilities are based on a multilevel logistic regression model which controls for individual and household characteristics, state characteristics, and fixed year effects.
Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015, women aged 25-54

Supplemental Table 5.1 Multilevel Random Intercept Logistic Regression Coefficients for Labor Force Participation of Second and Third and Higher Generation Ethnic Groups

	Men		Women	
	B	SE	B	SE
<i>Generational and Ethnic Group (vs 3G Whites)</i>				
2G Eur/Can	0.084	(0.043)	0.345***	(0.031)
2G Asian	-0.116*	(0.057)	0.290***	(0.044)
2G AfCarib	-0.461***	(0.106)	0.128	(0.091)
2G SpCarib	-0.339***	(0.063)	0.067	(0.046)
2G Ctrl/Sam	0.138	(0.086)	0.281***	(0.060)
2G Mexican	0.160**	(0.058)	0.304***	(0.042)
3G Black	-0.657***	(0.034)	0.082**	(0.026)
3G Mexican	-0.061	(0.045)	0.138***	(0.032)
<i>State Policy Context (vs Inclusionist)</i>				
Exclusionist	-0.052**	(0.019)	-0.051***	(0.013)
Rights Restrictionist	-0.057***	(0.015)	-0.036***	(0.010)
Noninterventionist	0.013	(0.022)	-0.023	(0.015)
<i>Gen/Ethnic Group x Policy Context</i>				
2G Eur/Can x Excl	0.018	(0.063)	-0.068	(0.043)
2G Eur/Can x Rts Rest	0.125**	(0.046)	0.015	(0.031)
2G Eur/Can x Nonint	-0.000	(0.072)	0.119*	(0.049)
2G Asian x Excl	0.078	(0.107)	-0.021	(0.076)
2G Asian x Rts Rest	0.106	(0.074)	0.194***	(0.057)
2G Asian x Nonint	-0.029	(0.165)	-0.035	(0.119)
2G AfCarib x Excl	0.200	(0.199)	0.074	(0.159)
2G AfCarib x Rts Rest	0.082	(0.188)	0.088	(0.145)
2G AfCarib x Nonint	-0.149	(0.463)	0.096	(0.373)
2G SpCarib x Excl	0.306**	(0.096)	0.280***	(0.071)
2G SpCarib x Rts Rest	0.092	(0.077)	0.249***	(0.056)
2G SpCarib x Nonint	0.339	(0.210)	0.056	(0.134)
2G Ctrl/SAm x Excl	0.067	(0.158)	0.120	(0.110)
2G Ctrl/SAm x Rts Rest	-0.119	(0.120)	0.185*	(0.088)
2G Ctrl/SAm x Nonint	-0.488*	(0.233)	-0.100	(0.167)
2G Mexican x Excl	0.332**	(0.102)	0.087	(0.062)
2G Mexican x Rts Rest	0.040	(0.064)	-0.037	(0.042)
2G Mexican x Nonint	-0.065	(0.156)	0.107	(0.102)
3G Black x Excl	0.223***	(0.027)	0.194***	(0.021)
3G Black x Rts Rest	0.163***	(0.025)	0.165***	(0.019)
3G Black x Nonint	0.012	(0.036)	0.104***	(0.028)
3G Mexican x Excl	-0.039	(0.066)	0.157**	(0.048)
3G Mexican x Rts Rest	-0.025	(0.047)	0.073*	(0.033)
3G Mexican x Nonint	-0.081	(0.088)	0.167**	(0.061)
State Controls				
<i>Local Immigration Policy</i>				
% Pop in 287g	-0.010*	(0.004)	-0.004	(0.003)
% Pop in Sanctuary	-0.003	(0.004)	0.004	(0.003)
<i>Native Attitudes</i>				
Citizen Ideology	-0.012	(0.007)	0.009	(0.005)
<i>Coethnic Group</i>				
% Change in FB Pop	0.003*	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)

% State Pop	0.002***	(0.000)	0.005***	(0.000)
% w/ College Degree	-0.004**	(0.001)	-0.005***	(0.001)
<i>Economic Context</i>				
Unemployment	-0.020***	(0.004)	-0.004	(0.003)
% Emp in Manufacturing	0.001	(0.004)	0.005	(0.003)
% Emp in High Tech	-0.020*	(0.010)	0.003	(0.007)
Individual Characteristics				
Age	-0.032***	(0.000)	-0.015***	(0.000)
Age-squared	-0.002***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
<i>Education (vs HS degree)</i>				
Less than HS degree	-0.962***	(0.010)	-1.006***	(0.008)
Some college	0.298***	(0.008)	0.373***	(0.006)
Bachelor's	0.890***	(0.011)	0.703***	(0.007)
Advanced degree	1.081***	(0.017)	1.312***	(0.011)
Household Characteristics				
Single	-0.925***	(0.007)	0.173***	(0.006)
Child younger than age 5 in HH	0.386***	(0.013)	-0.818***	(0.006)
Spouse w/ Bachelor's or higher			-0.627***	(0.009)
Spouse Hours Worked			-0.000***	(0.000)
Intercept	2.534***		1.082***	
State Variation	0.047***		0.047***	
N	1144184		1223378	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Fixed effects for year included, but not shown. All state-level variables are lagged one year and centered on year-specific grand means. Estimated using CPS-MORG 1998-2015 data, for men and women aged 25-54.

Supplemental Table 5.2 Multilevel Random Intercept Regression Coefficients for Logged Hourly Wages of Second and Third and Higher Generation Ethnic Groups

	Men		Women	
	<i>B</i>	SE	<i>B</i>	SE
<i>Generational and Ethnic Group (vs 3G Whites)</i>				
2G Eur/Can	-0.035***	(0.007)	-0.033***	(0.007)
2G Asian	-0.067***	(0.009)	-0.011	(0.009)
2G AfCarib	-0.124***	(0.020)	-0.088***	(0.019)
2G SpCarib	-0.096***	(0.011)	-0.041***	(0.011)
2G Ctrl/Sam	-0.101***	(0.013)	-0.079***	(0.013)
2G Mexican	-0.108***	(0.009)	-0.088***	(0.009)
3G Black	-0.194***	(0.006)	-0.094***	(0.006)
3G Mexican	-0.079***	(0.007)	-0.049***	(0.007)
<i>State Policy Context (vs Inclusionist)</i>				
Exclusionist	0.002	(0.003)	0.006*	(0.003)
Rights Restrictionist	0.005*	(0.002)	0.005*	(0.002)
Noninterventionist	0.015***	(0.003)	0.011***	(0.003)
<i>Gen/Ethnic Group x Policy Context</i>				
2G Eur/Can x Excl	0.001	(0.009)	-0.005	(0.009)
2G Eur/Can x Rts Rest	-0.011	(0.006)	0.002	(0.006)
2G Eur/Can x Nonint	-0.011	(0.010)	0.000	(0.010)
2G Asian x Excl	0.040*	(0.016)	-0.011	(0.016)
2G Asian x Rts Rest	-0.002	(0.011)	-0.014	(0.012)
2G Asian x Nonint	-0.029	(0.024)	0.006	(0.025)
2G AfCarib x Excl	0.033	(0.037)	0.004	(0.032)
2G AfCarib x Rts Rest	-0.056	(0.034)	0.040	(0.030)
2G AfCarib x Nonint	-0.065	(0.079)	-0.005	(0.071)
2G SpCarib x Excl	0.023	(0.016)	-0.033*	(0.016)
2G SpCarib x Rts Rest	-0.007	(0.014)	-0.020	(0.013)
2G SpCarib x Nonint	-0.013	(0.030)	-0.007	(0.031)
2G Ctrl/SAm x Excl	0.054*	(0.022)	0.042	(0.022)
2G Ctrl/SAm x Rts Rest	0.025	(0.017)	0.047**	(0.018)
2G Ctrl/SAm x Nonint	0.076*	(0.035)	0.036	(0.035)
2G Mexican x Excl	-0.008	(0.014)	-0.012	(0.014)
2G Mexican x Rts Rest	-0.012	(0.009)	-0.005	(0.009)
2G Mexican x Nonint	-0.032	(0.022)	0.006	(0.022)
3G Black x Excl	-0.008	(0.005)	-0.010*	(0.005)
3G Black x Rts Rest	0.003	(0.005)	-0.006	(0.004)
3G Black x Nonint	0.022**	(0.007)	0.013*	(0.006)
3G Mexican x Excl	-0.012	(0.011)	-0.013	(0.011)
3G Mexican x Rts Rest	-0.044***	(0.008)	-0.041***	(0.008)
3G Mexican x Nonint	-0.054***	(0.013)	-0.048***	(0.013)
State Controls				
<i>Local Immigration Policy</i>				
% Pop in 287g	0.003***	(0.001)	0.002***	(0.001)
% Pop in Sanctuary	-0.003***	(0.001)	-0.001	(0.001)
<i>Native Attitudes</i>				
Citizen Ideology	-0.001	(0.001)	0.004***	(0.001)
<i>Coethnic Group</i>				
% Change in FB Pop	0.000*	(0.000)	0.000*	(0.000)

% State Pop	-0.001***	(0.000)	-0.001***	(0.000)
% w/ College Degree	0.001***	(0.000)	0.001*	(0.000)
<i>Economic Context</i>				
Unemployment	-0.005***	(0.001)	-0.003***	(0.001)
% Emp in Manufacturing	0.008***	(0.001)	0.006***	(0.001)
% Emp in High Tech	0.005**	(0.002)	0.002	(0.002)
GSP per capita	0.006***	(0.000)	0.005***	(0.000)
Individual Characteristics				
Work experience	0.008***	(0.000)	0.006***	(0.000)
Work experience squared	-0.001***	(0.000)	-0.000***	(0.000)
<i>Education (vs HS degree)</i>				
Less than HS degree	-0.204***	(0.002)	-0.175***	(0.003)
Some college	0.090***	(0.001)	0.103***	(0.001)
Bachelor's	0.328***	(0.002)	0.334***	(0.002)
Advanced degree	0.445***	(0.002)	0.481***	(0.002)
Single	-0.088***	(0.001)	-0.022***	(0.001)
Parent	0.046***	(0.001)	-0.016***	(0.001)
<i>Occupation (vs Tech/Sales/Admin)</i>				
Professional	0.144***	(0.002)	0.207***	(0.001)
Service	-0.208***	(0.002)	-0.177***	(0.002)
Farming	-0.378***	(0.004)	-0.240***	(0.008)
Production/Manufacturing	0.009***	(0.002)	0.046***	(0.004)
Operations/Labor	-0.142***	(0.002)	-0.134***	(0.003)
<i>Industry (vs Professional Services)</i>				
Agriculture/Mining	0.174***	(0.004)	0.028***	(0.005)
Construction	0.163***	(0.002)	0.078***	(0.004)
Manufacturing	0.148***	(0.002)	0.124***	(0.002)
Trans/Comm/Utility	0.168***	(0.002)	0.160***	(0.002)
Trade	-0.005**	(0.002)	-0.087***	(0.002)
Finance	0.165***	(0.002)	0.110***	(0.002)
Other Service	0.063***	(0.002)	-0.001	(0.002)
Public Administration	0.204***	(0.002)	0.134***	(0.002)
Intercept	2.579***		2.348***	
State Variation	0.004***		0.004***	
N	843669		839620	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: Fixed effects for year included, but not shown. All state-level variables are lagged one year and centered on year-specific grand means. Estimated using CPS-MORG 1998-2015 data, for wage and salaried men and women aged 25-54.

Chapter Six – Conclusion

In 2011, Alabama passed HB 56, a law modeled after Arizona's SB 1070, which heightened state-level involvement in immigration enforcement and restricted immigrant rights. The law required police to verify the legal status of any person that they have "reasonable suspicion" is not legally present in the US. Additionally, the law required large and small businesses to use E-Verify. NBC News reported that after the passage of the law, Alabama employers thought that immigrants "[felt] like there [was] a negative atmosphere for them here. They [didn't] feel welcome." In a mobile home community of immigrant families, driveways were "full of cars and trucks at midday Tuesday, a time when most residents used to be at work." Immigrants reported that they were "afraid to venture out during daylight" and that "people are just not going to work. They don't want to be arrested" (Rawls 2011). This news story illustrates how state laws can heighten immigrant-native differences and prevent immigrants from participating in the labor force. Alabama's HB 56 is one of many laws passed during the rise of immigration federalism in the 2000s and 2010s. As of 2015, every state had passed some kind of law related to immigrant rights or enforcement.

Despite the rise of immigration federalism, studies of first- and second-generation immigrants' economic outcomes have not accounted for variation in state immigration policy. This empirical gap is striking because it is at odds with theoretical perspectives on immigrant incorporation. Immigration policy and programs for immigrant incorporation are key components of the context of reception, a central concept in assimilation theories. New assimilation theory, through its conceptualization of boundary processes, suggests that immigrants will be more likely to succeed and assimilate when boundaries are blurred between immigrants and natives. Blurred boundaries, in comparison to bright boundaries, fail to

distinguish between immigrants and natives regarding culture or opportunities. Cross-national comparative research and state-level research on non-economic outcomes show that blurred boundaries, in the form of pro-immigrant policies, result in higher citizenship rates, feelings of belonging, and educational attainment for immigrants (Filindra, Blanding, and Garcia Coll 2011; Koopmans et al. 2005; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). This dissertation has contributed to the field of immigration by examining associations between state-level policies and the economic well-being of first- and second- generation immigrants. Two empirical chapters of the dissertation examined the association between state policies and the labor force outcomes of authorized and unauthorized immigrants. A third empirical chapter investigated the association between state policies and economic outcomes for the second generation as compared to natives.

Summary of Findings

Diverse Policy Contexts of Reception

Chapter 2 clearly demonstrates that immigrants experience multifaceted constellations of state policies and programs. After coding a comprehensive database of state laws related to immigrants and immigration, I find that immigrants face four types of state policy configurations. Exclusionist states view immigrants as law-breakers or criminals. They deny social rights to immigrants *and* amplify immigration enforcement with the involvement of state law enforcement officials. Rights restrictionist states view immigrants as a drain on public services or unfair competitors in the labor force and pass laws which deny them social rights and services. Rights restrictionist states do not, however, augment federal immigration enforcement. On the other hand, inclusionist states recognize the economic potential and contributions of immigrants and challenge the idea that national citizenship is required before individuals should have access to certain rights. These states extend many social rights to authorized and

unauthorized immigrants. Some inclusionist states have even adopted laws to resist federal immigration enforcement in an effort to promote an enforcement regime that targets criminals, not families. Finally, noninterventionist states were largely uninvolved in immigration issues. Since 1997, the prevalence of noninterventionist states has declined, further highlighting that immigrants now experience policy environments that differ from the national policy context. As of 2015, states were closely split between exclusionist, inclusionist, and rights restrictionist configurations.

Immigrant Labor Force Participation

In Chapter 3, I find that exclusionist states are associated with lower female labor force participation, especially among Latina immigrants, women with less than a high school education, and unauthorized women. Meanwhile, the labor force participation of immigrant men is similar across state policy types. This finding corrects popular media depictions, such as the one at the beginning of this chapter, that all immigrants are dropping out of the labor force due to state involvement in enforcement. Instead, this finding highlights the gendered effect of immigration enforcement. Because men are more likely to be deported, women often experience anxiety and fear becoming single mothers and facing economic hardship (Dreby 2015). Many unauthorized parents attempt to create emergency plans for their US-born children if they are taken into custody (Enriquez 2015). Another risk management strategy may be that women choose not to enter the workforce to prevent complete family separation. Women remain home and do not participate in the workforce in exclusionist states where the risk of apprehension is high. Their withdrawal from the workforce lowers the risk that US-born children would lose both of their parents. Meanwhile, men's labor force participation may not be susceptible to state policies and threats of deportation because of the breadwinner expectation.

Authorized-Unauthorized Wage Gap

Although past research has shown the existence of an authorized-unauthorized wage gap, in Chapter 4, I find that the late 2000s marked a convergence between authorized and unauthorized immigrants' wage levels. Among immigrant men, a simultaneous increase in the wages of unauthorized men and a decline in the wages of authorized men closed the authorized-unauthorized wage gap during the economic recession. This pattern held among high- and low-educated immigrants and among Latinos and Asians. Analyses also showed that state policy context does not explain the convergence in wages; the convergence in authorized-unauthorized wages was present across all state policy types. This finding suggests that state policy context is not enough to counter national economic forces and common employer practices. The convergence in the authorized and unauthorized wage gap may be due to employers failing to reward authorized immigrants' skills and education during the economic recession, resulting in a flattening of immigrant wages. Some evidence has suggested that legal immigrants no longer receive better returns to their education and time in the US than unauthorized immigrants (Gentsch and Massey 2011). Notably, the wages of non-Hispanic, third generation and higher white natives also decreased over this time period (see Figure 6.1), resulting in a diminishing native-immigrant wage gap, as the authorized-unauthorized gap declined. This trend supports the possibility that employers no longer reward education and skills in the same manner. The convergence in the authorized and unauthorized wage gap may also be explained by the falling supply of unauthorized immigrant workers during the economic recession, resulting in their higher hourly wages.

Second Generation Economic Incorporation

Chapter 5 turns to the US-born children of immigrants, and I compare the labor force participation and wages levels of second-generation Europeans/Canadians, Asians, Afro-Caribbeans, Spanish-Caribbeans, Central/South Americans, and Mexicans, as identified by their parental birthplace. My comparison of second-generation ethnic groups across state policy contexts shows that state policy context has no association with the labor force participation and wage levels of most groups. Further, because second-generation ethnic groups' labor force participation and wage levels do not vary over state policy contexts, these groups have similar assimilation outcomes in each policy context. Across all policy contexts, most second-generation ethnic groups fail to attain wage parity with native-born, third-generation or higher, non-Hispanic whites but earn higher wages than native-born, third-generation or higher, non-Hispanic blacks. These findings contradict my expectation that state policy would have a direct effect on second-generation immigrants' labor force participation and wages. Instead, state policy may act through the first generation.

Segmented assimilation theory suggests that hostile government policy acts through immigrant parents; for example, unauthorized status prevents immigrant parents from attaining higher socioeconomic status whereas refugee status offers no such limitations. Research has also shown how the unauthorized status of immigrant parents affects their children's educational attainment and income (Bean, Brown, and Bachmeier 2015). Similarly, exclusionist state contexts, which limit the labor force participation of female immigrants, may limit the *future* opportunities and wages of second-generation immigrants who grew up in these contexts without

having a direct effect on current second-generation immigrants.⁶⁹ For example, daughters may be less likely to enter the workforce because their immigrant mothers did not participate; higher likelihoods of single-family incomes in exclusionist states may limit children's pursuit of higher education and therefore their ability to attain higher paid jobs.

Implications for Theories of Immigrant Assimilation and Native-Immigrant Boundaries

This dissertation has important implications for the study of immigrant assimilation. Labor force participation results support the premise that “immigrants’ fortunes depend on *where in the country they go*” (Marrow 2005:793). Researchers should recognize that variation in the structural and contextual factors can explain differences in immigrants’ life chances. Analyses that focus solely on individual immigrants’ characteristics are insufficient. Moreover, research at the aggregate, national level is insufficient because variation in state structural and contextual factors go unrecognized. My work has challenged the presumption of a uniform policy context and demonstrated that the US is comprised of different configurations of policies and programs. Further, I argue that a comparison of places, such as new destinations and traditional destinations, is not enough when these comparisons do not account for differences in immigration policy. As this dissertation has shown, exclusionist states have limited female immigrant incorporation, but both new and traditional destinations fall within the exclusionist category. Precise measurement of the structural and contextual factors of each place is needed. My research suggests that we should build on established research findings and examine under what policy contexts they hold, and in what policy contexts they are modified.

⁶⁹ Current second-generation immigrants did not grow up in these state policy contexts because states have only recently enacted their laws (in the late 1990s and early 2000s).

My findings inform assimilation theory and the boundary processes framework. Not all bright boundaries, which are conceptualized to limit immigrant integration, are the same. For example, I find that not all types of bright boundaries limit immigrant labor force participation. Theories of assimilation require further refinement in the face of this new evidence. States have passed laws creating bright boundaries with regard to the physical presence of immigrants and their rights within their jurisdiction. My research shows that exclusionist states, which criminalize immigrants and seek to banish them from the state, result in the withdrawal of the immigrant population from public space (specifically, the labor market). Meanwhile, rights restrictionist states have a limited scope. Their lack of immigration enforcement suggests a desire for immigrants' physical presence in the state, often *to work*. These policies do not inhibit immigration labor force participation, but restricting immigrants' rights may result in a more docile workforce. The difference in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states suggests that boundaries which are violent, resulting in fear and anxiety, are detrimental to immigrant integration. More study should be given to the characteristics of boundaries and why specific laws and policies matter when others do not.

My dissertation also highlights the gendered nature of native-immigrant boundaries and their implications for immigrant assimilation. Past research has shown the gendered effects of federal immigration policy – US immigration policy shapes the order which family members arrive in the country and the ability of tied movers, often women, to work. Similarly, my research indicates that state-level immigration policies are gendered. State-level policies have disproportionately inhibited women's labor force participation, which can prevent them and their families from attaining higher household incomes. Further, because I argue that women are reacting to state policies based on their family dynamics, assimilation theory could benefit by

considering how bright and blurred boundaries affect individual actions within the context of the family. Currently, blurred boundaries are theorized to make it easier for all individuals from one ethnic group easier to cross and succeed in obtaining the opportunities of the majority group. Instead, boundaries may affect individuals differently depending on their gender and their family context.

However, immigrant-native boundaries codified by state policy context are not always associated with immigrants' economic outcomes. One possible explanation for these surprising findings is that state policy effects may not be felt because of vertical differentiation in the context of reception (Marrow 2011). Immigrants experience national, state, and local contexts simultaneously, as well as different organizational and interpersonal environments. Although not directly measured in my dissertation, I propose that competing vertical cross-pressures resulted in null state policy effects. For example, Marrow found that employers at a large food processing plant in North Carolina continued to hire unauthorized workers despite restrictive federal policies against their hiring and strong anti-immigrant sentiment in the county where the plant was based. Like this company, employers and corporations may counter exclusionist and rights restrictionist policies by signaling to first- and second-generation immigrants that they are willing and prefer to hire them, thereby drawing them into the labor force. In the case of immigrant wages, national economic trends may have countered the effects of exclusionist and rights restrictionist state policy contexts. An economic recession ensured low immigrant labor supply, which increased unauthorized immigrants' wages. This national context contradicted the exclusionist and rights restrictionist policies that result in employers "taxing" the wages of unauthorized immigrants to cover potential fines for their hiring (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). The recession may also have contradicted inclusionist policies that would have encouraged higher returns to

immigrants' skills and education. The null effects of state policy contexts hint at the complex process of immigrant integration, and assimilation theories must recognize competing vertical inclusionist and exclusionist pressures that complicate the immigrant experience.

Empirically, my dissertation advances the study of immigrant incorporation by applying cross-survey multiple imputation (CSMI) to account for unauthorized legal status in national-level, representative data. Without accounting for the disadvantages associated with immigrant legal status, research suffers from omitted variable bias. Given current data limitations and the sensitive nature of unauthorized status for immigrants and employers alike, CSMI is the best possible approach to the estimation of outcomes for unauthorized immigrants.⁷⁰ Additionally, my typology of state policy contexts is the first to measure changes in state-level immigration policy over time, to capture both pro- and anti- immigrant sentiment, and to recognize important differences within “anti-immigrant” states in terms of their enforcement and rights policies. This measure allows me to advance the study of second-generation immigrants. Much research has indirectly measured the effects of policy on second-generation economic outcomes through proxy measures, such as national origin group or new destination. By directly measuring policy, I isolate its effects from coethnic community. My research suggests that policy plays a less important role than the coethnic community for second-generation immigrant labor force participation and wage levels, but this may change if there is an intergenerational transmission of state-level policy effects.

⁷⁰ Originally, I had proposed using the restricted version of the SIPP data to access the more refined measure of immigrant legal status. SIPP restricted data differentiate between legal permanent residents (and the type of visa they have, either family or employer-based), nonimmigrants, and unauthorized immigrants. However, my application to access these data was rejected because the Census Bureau does not release detailed information on legal status in order to protect the confidentiality of its respondents.

Immigration Federalism and Policy Recommendations

My dissertation results can help policymakers evaluate the effectiveness of a federalist approach to immigrant integration. Legal scholars and the press have debated whether a federalist system of immigration enforcement is legally valid, but the Supreme Court upheld Arizona's "show me your papers" provision in *Arizona v. United States*. Therefore, an evaluation of immigration federalism must consider its resulting effects.⁷¹ Exclusionist states, or those states who have adopted strict immigration enforcement laws, have not deterred all immigrants from settling and remaining in the state. However, by seeking to remove unauthorized immigrants, these states actually impoverish immigrants by discouraging their participation in the labor force. Because research has shown that immigration enforcement does not completely stem unauthorized migration to the US (Cornelius and Salehyan 2007; Massey and Pren 2012), states that adopt humane immigration enforcement will do a better job at ensuring a productive immigrant population than those who enforce the letter of the law without regard for human consequences.

In contrast to immigration law, the federal government has played a limited role in immigrant integration. The role of integration falls mainly to state and local governments, and we must consider whether a federalist strategy is enough to ensure immigrant integration. My research suggests that it is not. While inclusionist states have extended additional rights to immigrants and seek to incorporate them, first- and second-generation immigrants' wages are no higher in inclusionist states than in states limiting immigrant rights. Across all states, wages are low for Latino/a immigrants with less than a high school degree, averaging \$12.49 per hour for

⁷¹ This dissertation only examines state immigration laws that have not been challenged in court or have been ruled that they do not violate the supremacy clause of the constitution.

authorized immigrant men and \$10.40 for authorized immigrant women in 2015.⁷² This finding suggests that state and local strategies for integration, or integration through a federalist approach, is not enough for immigrant well-being.

Some scholars argue that shifting the weight of integration to the federal government would result in a leveling effect because states could not creatively address the needs of their immigrant population (Rodriguez 2017). However, because the innovative policies of inclusionist states are not associated with improved immigrant outcomes (at least in terms of their labor force participation and wage levels), I argue that the federalist approach has not provided any additional benefits for immigrants. Instead, more involvement from the federal government could be key to immigrant integration. The US could look to Canadian models of integration. Canada's federal department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) strongly promotes and funds immigrant workforce training and naturalization, while still allowing for local community organizations to be the direct providers of these services (Bloemraad 2006). In contrast, the US federal government's support and funding of the Adult Education and Financial Literacy Act (AEFLA), which funds adult education including English language programs for immigrants, declined by 20 percent between 2003 and 2013 (National Immigration Forum 2016). The federal government has yet to create and support a program for simultaneous English learning and workforce training or to create trainings with the native-born population to highlight how immigrants bring value to the workforce and how employers can better recognize and reward their education and skills. The federal government should also work to ensure that all people, including unauthorized immigrants, have strong worker protections. The federal

⁷² Author's calculations from interaction model in Chapter 4. \$8.78 in 1999 dollars converted to 2015 value for immigrant men. \$7.31 in 1999 dollars converted to 2015 value for immigrant women.

government could provide know your rights training to workers and better assist workers in any legal action taken to assert their rights. This approach could help to address workers' hesitation to enter the workforce. Overall, shifting from a federalist approach to one with federal involvement in immigrant integration could boost immigrant and second generation immigrants' economic outcomes across the US.

Finally, politicians have framed anti-immigrant laws as laws that will help the native-born population secure jobs and higher wages. This dissertation shows that exclusionist and rights restrictionist policy contexts do not offer any advantages to most US-born ethnic groups. If policies acted as conservative politicians suggested, we would see higher labor force participation and wages in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states across the board, for all second-generation ethnic groups, third-generation and higher whites, and third-generation and higher blacks. However, this is not the case. We must look to other policies to stimulate US-born labor force participation and wages, such as higher minimum wage levels and policies that promote work-life balance.

Limitations of the Dissertation

One potential limitation of this dissertation is selectivity due to the internal migration of immigrants. Scholars have shown outmigration from anti-immigrant states (Leerkes, Bachmeier, and Leach 2013). It is possible that immigrants who would withdraw from the labor force or have lower wage levels in exclusionist or rights restrictionist states moved to more-welcoming inclusionist states. If this occurred, then the immigrant population remaining in exclusionist and rights restrictionist states would be positively selected on employment and wages, and my dissertation would underestimate a negative association between these state policy contexts and immigrants' economic outcomes. Because I do not have longitudinal data and because CPS-

MORG data do not include an indicator of whether an individual recently crossed state lines, I cannot account for this selectivity. However, there is some evidence that immigrants who moved over the course of a year did not differ greatly in terms of employment. Sisk and Donato (2016) examined the employment of immigrant and native-born men between the years 2005 and 2010 using matched longitudinal CPS data from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement. They used a Heckman two-step procedure to estimate whether the probability of being employed at t_1 affected an individual's transition (either out of the labor force, unemployed, or continued employment) at t_2 and found insignificant effects, suggesting that moving did not affect the employment transition.

This dissertation provides the first comprehensive, national examination of state policy contexts as they relate to immigrant labor force outcomes. But its focus on the state level misses the nuances of within-state variation across cities and counties. Cities, not states, were the first to resist federal immigration enforcement in the sanctuary movement during the 1980s. Many cities have provided municipal IDs to immigrants or have accepted consular identification cards so that they can access city services, and some cities have even allowed noncitizens to vote in their local elections. On the other hand, cities have penalized local landlords for renting to unauthorized residents, passed English-only laws, and have entered 287(g) agreements with Immigration and Customs Enforcement. These local-level policies are sure to impact immigrants' everyday environment and their economic behaviors. However, this dissertation's focus on state-level policy provides a breadth that many immigration studies have been missing and serves to complement smaller city-based studies of immigrant incorporation.

Another limitation is that my measure of state policy context only captures the existence of legislation and does not account for implementation. States may vary in the amount of

resources dedicated to their programs, the priority given to enforcement by state officials, or the capacity of state workers to implement the letter of the law. Within states, some individual cities, counties, or towns may be enthusiastic in their embrace of state policies while others actively or passively resist enforcement. However, one advantage of my state policy context measure is that it captures the prevailing normative climate within states. Research has shown that behaviors often change after the passage of a law, regardless of whether the law is strictly enforced. For example, employers changed their hiring behavior despite weak enforcement of the Equal Employment Opportunity law because of normative pressure from their environment (Edelman 1992). My research indicates that immigrants, too, respond to the normative climate of the state. Still, future research should explore whether immigrant behavior is further modified with the strict implementation or enforcement of these state laws.

Future Research

The conclusions of this dissertation suggest several directions for future research. First, future research should consider why and under what circumstances state-level immigration policy has no effect on immigrants' economic outcomes, especially immigrant wage levels. Calavita's (1990) work on why IRCA sanctions did not succeed in stopping the employment of unauthorized immigrants provides a good example as to how future research could proceed. Calavita's interviews with both employers and employees demonstrated how IRCA resulted in employers relying on fraudulent documents to comply with the requirement of verifying their employees' legal status. Employers and employees in exclusionist or rights restrictionist state policy contexts may alter or adapt their behavior to skirt state laws' intended effects. Alternatively, immigration policy could not have an effect if it is not enthusiastically implemented or funded. Instead of examining the impacts of laws on the books, future research


could measure immigration program funding from state budgets or personnel allocations to determine whether the execution of program impacts immigrant economic behavior.

Although my research has shown limited effects of state policy context on the wages and labor force participation of first- and second-generation immigrants, I argue that policy context should not be considered irrelevant for all immigrant outcomes. My research suggests that differentiating exclusionist and rights restrictionist states may be especially important when relating to immigrants' access to public space. Therefore, other behaviors that these policy contexts could impact include benefit-seeking behaviors, as well as civic engagement and parental involvement in children's schools. Quantitative comparisons could indicate whether policy contexts subdue certain behaviors, and qualitative comparisons could showcase how immigrants, employers, and providers of government services navigate policy contexts differently. Because I argue that exclusionist states promote legal violence, future research could focus on immigrant mental and physical health by policy context. Immigrants in exclusionist states could suffer from higher levels of anxiety and depression, leading to poorer physical health outcomes. Also, my research cannot predict the full implications of state policy as time goes on. Research will need to examine the effects of policy context on the second generation at a future point in time. Exclusionist state contexts have resulted in children growing up with parental poverty, parental fear, and parental disconnect from their communities. Poverty and withdrawal from public space, including school attendance at times, may result in poorer academic and economic outcomes for the next generation. Therefore, the examination of the intergenerational transmission of state-level policy effects may be a fruitful area for future research.

This dissertation has focused on state-level immigration policy contexts, but future research should incorporate a vertical element of immigration policy. Some cities and counties

have passed immigration laws that contradict the laws passed by their states. Notably, cities like Tuscan in Arizona, Austin in Texas, and Charlotte in North Carolina have resisted exclusionist state laws. Although less common, cities have passed ordinances restricting immigrants' rights when they are located in an inclusionist state. For example, in 2006, Hazelton, Pennsylvania made it illegal for unauthorized immigrants to rent housing. At other times, cities have reinforced state efforts. San Francisco has sought to integrate its immigrant population by extending them additional rights, whereas Farmer's Branch in Texas has limited immigrant rights. How do contradictory state and local policies impact immigrant assimilation? Are immigrants more economically successful if they live in place with welcoming laws at the city and the state level? Similarly, future research should consider the interplay between state law and federal enforcement efforts. The Trump administration marks a shift in the federal government's commitment to enforcement, the like of which was not seen in the time period under consideration. How does California's resistance to the Trump administration's enforcement efforts affect immigrant outcomes compared to Arizona's amplification of immigration enforcement during the Obama years? Given the Trump administration's commitment to strict immigration enforcement at the federal level, understanding the interaction of city, state, and federal laws will be paramount to the understanding of immigrant integration.

Figure 6.1 Trends in Third-Generation or Higher, Non-Hispanic White Men’s Logged Wage Levels, Controlling for Individual Characteristics, 1998-2015



Notes: Logged wages are in 1999 dollars, adjusted with the consumer price index.
 Source: CPS-MORG 1998-2015 data, men aged 24-54.

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Appendix: State-Level Control Variables and Data Sources

Variable	Description	Source	Used in chapter:
<i>Local Policy</i>			
Local-level 287g agreements	The percent of the state's population living in a county with a 287g agreement at $t-1$. Rescaled (divided by 10).	Immigration & Customs Enforcement for 287g agreements; 2000 Census for state population for years before 2005; 2010 Census for state population for years 2006 and later	3, 4, 5
Local-level sanctuary policies	The percent of the state's population living in a county with a sanctuary policy at $t-1$. A Sanctuary policy was measured as a city or county that did not honor an ICE detainer request, restricted compliance to cases where ICE has obtained a warren from the judge, or only honored detainees when the locality would be reimbursed the cost. Rescaled (divided by 10).	Catholic Legal Immigration Network and Center for Immigration Studies for sanctuary policies; 2000 Census for state population for years before 2005; 2010 Census for state population for years 2006 and later	3, 4, 5
<i>Economic Context</i>			
Unemployment rate	Percent of men or women aged 16 or older who were unemployed at $t-1$.	Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)	3, 4, 5
Immigrant industry employment	For men – percent of state population aged 16 or older who worked in agriculture, construction, and computer technology at $t-1$ For women – percent of state population aged 16 or older who worked in accommodations, food services, and health at $t-1$	BLS	3, 4, 5
Manufacturing employment	Percent of state population aged 16 or older who worked in the manufacturing industry at $t-1$.	BLS	5
High technology employment	Percent of state population aged 16 or older who worked in a high tech industry at $t-1$.	BLS	5
<i>Attitudinal Context</i>			
Citizen ideology	Berry et al.'s measure of citizen ideology ranging from 0 to 100 at time $t-1$. Higher values indicate more liberal. Data extrapolated for 2014. Rescaled (divided by 10).	Michigan State University's Correlates of the State Policy Project	3, 4, 5
<i>Coethnic Group</i>			
Percent change in foreign-born	The percent change in the state's foreign-born population in the previous decade. Rescaled (divided by 10).	U.S. Census Bureau	3, 4, 5
Coethnic group size	The immigrant group's share of the total adult population (age 25+) in the state at time $t-1$. Values for 1997-1999 were calculated through interpolation from Census data.	Individual aggregates from ACS 2001-2015 (5 year rolling average); individual aggregates from 5% Census 1990 & 2000	3, 4, 5

<i>Coethnic Controls</i>			
Coethnic group education level	Percent of immigrant group age 25 or older with a bachelor's degree in the US at time $t-1$. Values for 1997-1999 were calculated through interpolation from Census data.	Individual aggregates from ACS 2001-2015 (5 year rolling average); individual aggregates from 5% Census 1990 & 2000	3, 4, 5
Note: All variables are centered on average values at $t-1$.			

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EDUCATION

- August 2017 Doctor of Philosophy, Sociology
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN
Dissertation: "State Immigration Laws and Immigrant Economic
Incorporation Across the 50 United States"
- August 2012 Master of Arts, Sociology
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN
Thesis: "Temporary Guest Workers: Challenging an Immigrant Status
Continuum"
- May 2008 Bachelor of Arts, Sociology
Southwestern University, Georgetown, TX
summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa

RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS

Sociology of Immigration	Social Stratification	Work and Occupations
Political Sociology	Public Opinion	Quantitative Methods

PUBLICATIONS

- Torres, Rebecca, Rich Heyman, Solange Munoz, **Lauren Apgar**, Emily Timm, Cristina Tzintzun, Charles R. Hale, John McKiernan-Gonzalez, Shannon Speed, and Eric Tang. 2013. "Building Austin, Building Justice: Immigrant Construction Workers, Precarious Labor Regimes and Social Citizenship." *Geoforum* 45:145-155.
- McManus, Patricia and **Lauren Apgar**. 2012. "Marital Assimilation and Economic Outcomes in the Second Generation." *Population Review* 51:101-126.
- Nenga, Sandi and **Lauren A. Apgar**. 2011. "The Age of Love: Dating and the Developmental Discourse in a Middle School Summer Camp." *Sociological Studies of Children and Youth* 14:109-131.

FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS, AND AWARDS

- 2016-2017 National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant
- 2016-2017 Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy's Dissertation Grant
- 2016-2017 Graduate Student Research Award, Center for Research on Race and Ethnicity in Society, Indiana University
- 2016, 2014 Advanced Departmental Fellowship, Department of Sociology, Indiana University
- 2015 Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences Short Studies Grant for "Americans' Views on Refusal of Services to Same-Sex Couples and Interracial Couples." With Landon Schnabel and Brian Powell.
- 2013-2015 Summer Research Fellowship, Department of Sociology, Indiana University
2014 Grant in Aid of Research for "HAI Surveillance Strategies." Social Science Research Commons, Indiana University. With Fabio Rojas, Emily Meanwell, Nik Summers, Lydia DiSabatino, and Shibashis Mukherjee.
- 2014 First Prize, Midwest Sociological Society Graduate Student Paper Competition for "Temporary Guest Workers: Challenging an Immigrant Status Continuum."

INVITED PRESENTATIONS

- Apgar, Lauren. 2015. *Authorized Status, Limited Returns: The Labor Market Outcomes of Mexican Temporary Foreign Workers*. Presented at the Economic Policy Institute (Washington, D.C.).

PRESENTATIONS

- Apgar, Lauren. 2017. *State Policy Contexts of Reception and Immigrant Labor Market Participation*. Presented at Indiana University's Political, Economic, and Cultural Seminar (Bloomington).
- Apgar, Lauren and Samuel Kye. 2016. *The Effect of Latin American National Group Segregation on Latino Political Participation*. Presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting (Seattle).
- Rojas, Fabio, Lauren Apgar, Emily Meanwell, Shibashis Mukherjee, and Clayton Thomas. 2016. *Bridging Labor in the Hospital and the Organizational Contexts of Infection Prevention*. Presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting (Seattle).
- Apgar, Lauren and Patricia McManus. 2015. *Family Religious Origins, Intermarriage, and Female Labor Force Participation among Children of U.S. Immigrants*. Presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting (Chicago).
- Apgar, Lauren. 2014. *Temporary Guest Worker Advantages? A Comparison of Mexican Immigrants' Work Outcomes*. Presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting (San Francisco).

Apgar, Lauren. 2013. *Temporary Guest Workers: Challenging an Immigrant Status Continuum*. Presented at the Midwestern Sociological Society Annual Meeting (Chicago).

McManus, Patricia and Lauren Apgar. 2013. *Marital Assimilation and Economic Stratification among First and Second Generation Immigrants*. Presented at American Sociological Association Annual Meeting (NYC).

Cox, Lauren. 2009. *Building Austin, Rebuilding Justice*. Presented at Human Rights at UT: A Dialogue at the Intersection of Academics and Advocacy (Austin).

RESEARCH REPORTS

Apgar, Lauren. 2015. "Authorized Status, Limited Returns: The Labor Market Outcomes of Mexican Temporary Foreign Workers." *Economic Policy Institute*. Washington, D.C.
*Cited in testimony before the Indiana Senate's Select Committee on Immigration Issues, 9/21/16

Taliaferro, Megan, Lauren Apgar, Lydia DiSabatino, Meredith Haag, and Landon Schnabel. 2013. "Community Gardens: Improving Food Security and Well-Being in Low-Income Communities." *Mother Hubbard's Cupboard*. Bloomington, Indiana.

Apgar, Lauren. 2010. "2009-10 AANP National NP Sample Survey: An Overview." *American Academy of Nurse Practitioners*. Austin, Texas.

Cox, Lauren, Emily Timm, and Cristina Tzintzún. 2009. "Building Austin, Building Justice: Construction Working Conditions in Austin, Texas." *Workers Defense Project*. Austin, Texas.

*Cited by DOL when assigning more OSHA inspectors to the Austin area

PAPERS IN PROGRESS

Lauren Apgar and Patricia McManus. "Cultural Persistence and Female Labor Force Participation in the Second Generation." R&R at *Social Forces*

McManus, Patricia and Lauren Apgar. "Parental Origins, Mixed Unions and the Labor Supply of Second Generation Women in the US." R&R at *Demography*

Lauren Apgar and Samuel Kye. "The Effect of Latin American National Group Segregation on Latino Political Participation."

Rojas, Fabio, Lauren Apgar, Emily Meanwell, Shibashis Mukherjee, and Clayton Thomas. "Bridging Labor in the Hospital and the Organizational Contexts of Infection Prevention."

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant August 2015 – present
Indiana University Bloomington, IN

Project Title: *Collective Action in New Immigrant Destinations*

Principal Investigator: Dina Okamoto

Responsibilities: Trained and supervised undergraduate students on the coding of newspaper data for immigrant collective action events; compiled and cleaned previously coded newspaper data; collected contextual data on Latino and Asian political officials; created an organizational system for the research project

Project Manager/Interview Supervisor July 2013 – August 2016
Indiana University Bloomington, IN

Project Title: *HAI Surveillance Strategies in Acute Care Hospitals*

Principal Investigator: Fabio Rojas

Responsibilities: Developed a stratified sampling scheme; designed interview guide; piloted interview guide by interviewing infection control practitioners; oversaw the collection of 193 in-depth interviews (64% response rate) and transcription

Project Manager/Interview Supervisor January 2015 – July 2015
Indiana University Bloomington, IN

Project Title: *Constructing the Family*

Principal Investigator: Brian Powell

Responsibilities: Assisted in the revision and development of a survey regarding definitions of family and views of higher education; trained and supervised 30 telephone interviewers performing random-digit-dialing interviews and oversaw the collection of 900 surveys.

Project Manager/Interview Supervisor January 2013 – July 2013
Indiana University Bloomington, IN

Project Title: *Survey of American Policy Attitudes*

Principal Investigator: Clem Brooks

Responsibilities: Trained and supervised telephone interviewers performing random-digit-dialing interviews; oversaw the collection of 1,000 telephone surveys; mentored graduate student Master's projects

Research Assistant May 2012 – June 2012
Indiana University Bloomington, IN

Project Title: *Social Status, Consumption, and Happiness*

Principal Investigator: Arthur S. Alderson

Responsibilities: Conducted random-digit-dialing telephone interviews; recruited participants; entered data

Research Assistant
Indiana University

May 2011 – July 2011
Bloomington, IN

Project Title: Social Support from 'Similar Others'

Principal Investigator: Peggy Thoits

Responsibilities: Conducted 20 in-depth interviews with member volunteers of a cardiac support group; transcribed and verified interviews

Research Assistant
Indiana University

January 2011 – May 2011
Bloomington, IN

Project Title: Marital Assimilation and the Second Generation

Principal Investigator: Patricia McManus

Responsibilities: performed a literature review of qualitative studies on interethnic and intergenerational immigrants' marriages; co-authored a publishable journal article

Research Coordinator
American Academy of Nurse Practitioners

September 2009 – August 2010
Austin, TX

Responsibilities: Planned and facilitated the Nurse Practitioner (NP) Research Agenda Roundtable, which prioritized critical issues to guide research efforts in the NP field; collected survey data from 13,500 practicing NPs and analyzed data for earnings; utilized university websites to collect and analyze data on NP Master's tuition cost

Research Coordinator
Workers Defense Project

July 2008 – August 2009
Austin, TX

Responsibilities: Wrote and published a ground-breaking report that received national media attention and recognition from the U.S. Department of Labor; trained and oversaw 40 students and volunteers to collect primary data from over 300 construction workers and experts in the industry; created survey instrument, in-depth interview guide, and data entry systems

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor
Indiana University

Fall 2012
Bloomington, IN

Introduction to Sociology (Sociology 100).

Responsibilities: Full responsibility for development of course syllabus, lectures, creation of examinations and grading for a class of 70 students

Graduate Assistant
Indiana University

2010; 2012
Bloomington, IN

Introduction to Sociology (Sociology 100) with Tim Hallett. Spring 2012.
Society and the Individual (Sociology 230) with Steve Benard. Fall 2010.

SERVICE

Professional Service

- 2016 Reviewer for *Geoforum*
- 2014 Roundtable Presider, American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, 2014.
Sociological Practice and Public Sociology, Roundtable 3: "Studying the U.S. Population"
- 2013 Reviewer for *Population Research and Policy Review*

Departmental Service, Department of Sociology, Indiana University

- 2016-2017 Undergraduate Honors Student Mentor
- 2015-2016 Graduate Student Association Mentor Award Committee (chair in 2016)
- 2015 Graduate Student Association Brown Bag Presenter on Qualifying Examinations
- 2014 First Year Proseminar Presenter on Choosing a PhD Minor
- 2013 Graduate Student Association Elections Committee
- 2012-2013 Graduate Student Association Secretary
- 2012-2013 Preparing Future Faculty Committee Member
- 2011-2012 Graduate Student Association Public Sociology Co-Chair

Community Service

- 2013-2015 El Centro Comunal Latino, After-school Tutor
- 2012 Mother Hubbard's Cupboard, Community Surveyor
- 2011 Workers Defense Project, Research Advisor

ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIPS

- American Sociological Association
 International Migration Section Membership
 Inequality, Poverty, and Mobility Section Membership
 Public Sociology Section Membership
- Midwest Sociological Society