# Concerning Justice and Music Education

By

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Abstract

In this paper, I explore matters concerning justice and music education. I briefly sketch responses to five interrelated questions: Why should music educators be interested in justice? What is meant by the term social justice and how is it distinguished from justice of other kinds? How do liberal views of humanity, particularly the preciousness of people and living things, serve as a basis for justice, broadly construed? What are the means and ends of re-mediating injustice? How can music educators act on behalf of justice? And I make the case for a comparative view of justice broadly construed and offer several practical steps in working against injustice and towards justice in and on behalf of music education.

In this article, I explore matters concerning justice and music education. I briefly sketch responses to five interrelated questions: Why should music educators be interested in justice? What is meant by the term social justice and how is it distinguished from justice of other kinds? How do liberal views of humanity, particularly the preciousness of people and living things, serve as a basis for justice, broadly construed? What are the means and ends of re-mediating injustice? How can music educators act on behalf of justice? And I make the case for a comparative view of justice broadly construed and offer several practical steps in working against injustice and towards justice in and on behalf of music education.

*Why should music educators be interested in justice?*

Practically speaking, music teaching in schools requires acknowledging the presence of societal, cultural, institutional, and psychological barriers to learning music for those who have the physical capacities to learn music and are interested in it. Among these, are matters of language, age, gender and sexual orientation, social class, ethnicity, race, color, physical characteristics such as size, weight, height, and dexterity, personality characteristics such as introversion, independence, sensitivity, and anxiety, intelligence, wealth, geographic location, culture and country of origin, and family background including religious and political affiliation and orientation to education. In the United States, it would not be surprising if children whose first language is not English are at a disadvantage in school and have fewer opportunities for music education than Anglophones because more time must be spent in acquiring basic linguistic and computational competencies among other things. Since music education is generally construed for school-age children, especially those in elementary and middle or junior high

school, adults and the elderly and the very young may be bypassed.[1] Gender stereotyping of instruments is common and instrumental education privileges those who can afford private lessons or the purchase of instruments or whose family backgrounds are supportive of musical study.[2] There are comparatively few minority music teachers in schools, colleges, and universities and the MENC–The National Association for Music Education is a pervasively white, predominantly female, and middle class organization with few people of color in attendance at its conventions.[3] Physical characteristics are often limiting factors in the choice of instruments and in performing ensembles, and physical dexterity and good psychomotor coordination are valued. The association of instruments with particular personality types is also common, making it more difficult for those whose personalities do not "fit" the particular instrument to succeed.[4] Those with intelligences below the normal range are too often regarded as uneducable and are, instead, the focus of musical therapy intended to improve their quality of life but not necessarily their intellectual competence.[5] Participating in extra-curricula activities is often dependent on having the resources to afford the fees and costs of ensemble trips and uniforms. Stereotypical expectations of countries of origin are also prejudicial, leading teachers to expect more of students from some countries and less of those from others. Suburban, urban, and rural environments in particular parts of the country also predispose to widely different public expenditures on education and music education, and musical experiences in publicly and privately supported schools.[6] Familial arrangements can be prejudicial to music education where home life is violent and unstable, and the parent or guardian is disinterested in music. Religious and political affiliations (or those of family members) can allow or encourage certain musical experiences, preclude others, and affect the support or otherwise that students receive.[7] Even though many people are musical and would choose to learn music if they could, these and other

forces limit learning or make it difficult or impossible for some people.

These issues affect such things as the choice of musical heritage(s) and the nature and quality of repertoire to be taught and learned; involvement and interest of students in formal musical study, particularly attitudes, prejudices, motivations to learn and practice, and choice of instrument to be studied; breadth, depth and quality of opportunities for private and group musical instruction, especially advanced musical instruction in such things as performance, composition, improvisation, listening, and musical production; music teacher attitudes, biases, and differing expectations of students' musical achievement; disparate music teacher qualifications, expertise, and quality of musical instruction; and, in publicly supported schools in the United States, avoiding music with explicit religious and political associations and sanitized curricula intended to be inoffensive and not to unsettle or surprise. Further, these musical implications directly affect the nature of the musical traditions practiced, limit the influence of esoteric or marginalized musical traditions out of the public eye (and ear), and impact those who practice, teach, and learn music by transmitting unjust systems from one generation to the next.

These musical inequities are also symptomatic of wider societal and cultural problems. In her book, *Dialectic of Freedom*, Maxine Greene demonstrates by reference to literary examples that the project of American freedom remains incomplete and examples of injustice still abound in the United States.[8] Injustices of race, class, and gender among other examples of societal oppression mean that some people are unable individually and collectively to pursue the lives they might wish to lead. Barriers stand in their way that prevent them from even imagining how things might be different except within communities in which freedom is prized. Such societal and cultural realities spill into educational systems and constrict the public spaces where imaginative and transformative thought and action might take hold. For Greene, freedom and

justice are integrally interrelated, if not always realized as fully as might be hoped. Injustice constitutes the practical and theoretical dilemma of being prevented from realizing one's potential, dreams, aspirations, and hopes. It is the situation of being unable to think and do what might be thought natural by more privileged others who have a sense of birthright or entitlement not enjoyed by those who are less fortunate.[9] There is also the reality of being treated differently as a result of capricious factors out of one's control, namely, accidents of birth and social standing. And the struggle for freedom is a central work of schooling and a matter of dismantling, if possible, capriciousness and injustice in the private and public spheres.

Paulo Freire also implicates social class, economic discrimination, and political power as important elements of injustice and sees the central project of education as a struggle against oppression and injustice, against the tyranny of entitlement on the part of favored few over the powerlessness of the oppressed majority.[10] He argues that it is necessary to become conscientized, that is, alert to injustice that is taken-for-granted and largely invisible and moved to practical action in struggling against it and for personal and collective liberty. Contra "banking education" or what Israel Scheffler would term "impression," in which the teacher's work is to "deposit" knowledge in the student,[11] Freire conceives of an education that liberates, empowers, and activates learners to struggle for justice and freedom. Again, justice and freedom are intertwined, mutual values and educational means and ends, and the task of education is necessarily political, economic, and subversive of all of the agencies by which injustice is perpetrated. Like Greene's analysis, Freire conducts his against the backdrop and on the presumption of prevailing injustice rather than justice; since injustice is more the norm than the exception, in his view, liberatory education is predicated on the assumption of a struggle *against* injustice as much as *for* justice. And the unmasking and destruction of endemic and systemic

injustice is as much the work of undoing evil as it is of building something better.

Martha Nussbaum goes further to link justice to matters of nationality, disability, and species membership.[12] Her notion of the rights of all living things to flourish challenges notions of justice as having to do exclusively with humanity and widens its purview to include other species such as animals, birds, fish, flowers, trees, and other elements of the natural world. The rights of trees to thrive, so eloquently depicted in J. R. R. Tolkien's *Lord of the Rings* trilogy,[13] are compelling elements of such a radically reconstructed conception of justice. Notions of disability, whether mental and or physical, challenge normative constructions of humanity, physicality, and rationality, and concern the whole array of human existence not just a part of it. Like Seyla Benhabib who views justice through the lenses of political affiliation, nationality, ethnicity, and race,[14] Nussbaum's attention to nationality as a "frontier" of justice opens the claims of justice to those who, as Benhabib observes, may otherwise be regarded as having "no right to have rights" to justice,[15] among other things. Both Nussbaum and Benhabib insist on a cosmopolitan view of justice that goes beyond the narrow confines of a particular nation state and their ideas imply that the work of education should have a correspondingly broad objective of cultivating and ensuring the civility that permits dialogue and enables concerted and informed action in a global context.

Although these and other writers might see the educational project as a struggle for freedom and justice, a critic could say that music is one area of human existence in which people can express their felt life with relative impunity. For example, an African slave on an American plantation could embed coded messages and political statements in spirituals and songs as subversive acts of which the master and his family were oblivious.[16] True, slaves might be less free to use their drums, but they could invent body rhythms as a substitute and direct their

energies into song rather than instrumental music.[17] Teaching their children this music largely by rote and employing call and response chant as traditional means to cultivate learning might be seen from this perspective to be liberating rather than oppressive. Today's urban youth likewise develop musical ways of expressing themselves, even in a world that they see as hostile and or in which they are marginalized.[18] Our critic might suggest that the fact that these young people teach themselves songs and learn to play instruments informally should be seen as liberating in that they are able to express themselves and music constitutes a means whereby they sometimes find a means to escape the poverty and ennui in which they are trapped.

This critic may have a point; music can constitute a means of liberation and a vehicle for struggle for justice and against injustice. Still, things are not this simple. Notice the subtle, and not-so-subtle means by which musical expression is "redirected" or "constrained" by other powerful people. Fear of the power of African drumming traditions that moves leaders of Christian churches to ban the use of drums in religious worship limits expression just as it repudiates the identity of those whose indigenous music this is or was. Similarly, urban youth may pick up musical knowledge informally as they also pick up other knowledge (some of which is subversive to the establishment culture). Without access to quality schools and instruction, private instruction or expensive instruments, the support of parents or guardians at home to develop a wide musical taste, and jobs that pay a living wage, they may be limited to a narrow range of musical and personal expression by virtue of political, economic, and educational forces beyond their control. What seems superficially to be innocuous or even liberating, turns out to be restrictive, patronizing, paternalistic, repressive, marginalizing, and even oppressive. As such, John Dewey might consider such situations to be miseducative when they stunt, limit, and even thwart individual and collective growth and development.[19] Although the slave's and the

urban youth's impulses generate various forms of musical expression, nevertheless, too often, they may not be sufficiently respected, taken advantage of, or developed broadly and richly. The slave is not free to leave the master any more than the urban youth may be able to escape the ghetto; both are limited by circumstances beyond their power to control and their music making and taking is likewise constrained in important ways.

Moreover, the critic's suggestion that music education should be about music rather than justice among other things slips too easily into the proposition that music is divorced from the rest of life. Regarding music as independent from other things is unrealistic in neglecting the long traditions of music making and taking in which quite the opposite is the case; music is intimately linked with ritual, myth, rite, painting, dance, drama, religion, among a range of activities in which it has a special place. Even in the Western classical concert hall in which musical sound is reified, Christopher Small notes the importance of "musicking" as rituals where composers, performers, and listeners come together in designated spaces and at particular times to create and construct musical meanings.[20] His picture of the concert hall foyer, stage, and audience gathered in the hall is very much one of "embodied" sound in which music relates to other things for a particular group of people. This concert might have a different flavor or ambience than a more intimate gathering of musicians in the more informal and intimate chamber concert settings he might prefer. Nevertheless, this ritual is profoundly musical, educational, class-based, social, economic, political, and personal. Even to appear at this concert hall, perform or attend this concert, musicians and audience need to be attired and act appropriately, and those without the means or knowledge of the appropriate decorum would not feel comfortable were they to be present. So it is impossible, practically speaking, to divorce music from these other things.

Notice that the ground of the question has shifted from "Why should music educators be interested in justice?" to "Why should music educators *not* be interested in justice?" The burden now moves to music educators to show cause why we should not be concerned with matters of justice. Music is interconnected with other aspects of life, education is concerned with the array of aspects of human life and culture, and music education is interconnected with other aspects of education. Construing aspects of justice as the legitimate purview of education and even its *raison d'etre*, as do Greene, Freire, Nussbaum, and Benhabib, suggests that music educators likewise need to have an interest in justice. Indeed, it is impossible to escape this interest if one agrees with the Deweyan proposition that music and the other arts are integrally interconnected with the rest of lived life.[21]

The claims of justice among other values as rights and prerogatives to which music educators, as educators more generally, should be committed only strengthen the case that justice is an imperative, that is, music educators *ought* to be concerned with matters of justice among other things. This is so since justice is grounded in a recognition of the claims of particular ethical and moral values and the laws, regulations, and rules that govern these obligations. For example, Marja Heimonen articulates legal conceptions of rights to music education.[22] She notes that the United Nations Charter of Children's Rights, to which the United States is not a signatory, expressly declares the rights of all children, irrespective of their social, cultural, economic, political, religious or linguistic background, to know the music that is a part of their cultural heritage. Drawing on legal philosophy, Heimonen constructs conceptions of justice that lie in rights and prerogatives to music education as outlined and defended in laws, regulations, procedures, and the like. State-mandated requirements for school music curricula and the delivery of music education fall within these legally defined expectations. Other writers such as

R. S. Peters and David Carr appeal to classical notions of justice, to the Aristotelian virtues, or virtue ethics as means of defending desired qualities or ideals by which society is governed and individuals conduct their lives in education.[23] Construing justice as an ethical imperative requires the conduct of schooling in ways that evidence its practical working out, and Carr reflects on the implications of ethical imperatives for music education and education generally.[24]

*What is meant by the term social justice and how is it distinguished from justice of other kinds?*

The differing views of and approaches to justice already noted bring into focus tensions between different conceptions of justice. Some matters concern the individual or self, others refer to the group or society, and still others pertain to the phenomenal world more broadly. Since music education is a social and human activity, it is particularly important to unpack aspects of justice that are construed socially while not neglecting those that refer to individuals and the phenomenal world.

In discussing freedom, Greene makes an important distinction between hedonistic desires for self expression (and Dewey would add, self-exposure), thought and behavior, and the implications on others of one's freedom to think and act.[25] Where people dwell, work, and socialize in groups, the actions of one person affect the lives of others. Dewey notes that the public appoints certain persons to act on its behalf for the purpose of accomplishing things that cannot be achieved individually but require concerted action of a group.[26] And Greene, as Dewey, also sees the problem of freedom as a dialectic between the individual and the social.[27]

This tension is also evident in justice. The symbiosis between the individual living thing and other living things requires attention to the one and the many, and the individual, society,

and natural world. In the process of formulating and applying general principles, policies, and laws, it is possible to overlook the special circumstances of particular situations or the differences of the one from the many that require special treatment, nuance, and, as William Shakespeare observed, the quality of "mercy." [28] Exercising mercy, as Friedrich Schiller aptly puts it, requires thinking "of [people] as they ought to be, when called upon to influence them" and thinking "of them as they are, when tempted to act on their behalf."[29] It is remembering that people do not always act in the way they should (or we wish they would); they sometimes break the laws, regulations, and rules that have been developed with their good in mind. Some travel on the highway in excess of the speed limit, fail to buckle their seat belts or drink alcohol just before they drive as the law forbids, fail to declare all the income earned on their income taxes if they can avoid doing so, pay their bills late or forget to pay their bills, and in a host of ways, even if they intend to be good, they sometimes err. Mercy is the quality of forgiveness that allows wrongs to go unpunished or punished more gently than would be the case if the rules were to be applied strictly, narrowly, stringently, or by the letter of the law. Judges, teachers, and other guardians of the public interest are counted on to exercise mercy and act humanely as well as treat people equitably, without special favor, and carry out justice dispassionately according to particular rules, regulations, and laws. And the work of finding means to fulfill the public interest and execute justice in regard to each individual's circumstances is an ongoing process.

Thinking about justice requires conceptions that are both attuned to the self situated in the midst of others as does Benhabib, or of each living thing in relation to others as does Nussbaum, and notions of justice that are embedded in reason, virtue, and law as do Heimonen, Carr, and Peters. These differences in emphasis on self and group are evident in the differing ways in which Enlightenment thought played out in southern and northern Europe. In southern Europe,

the claims of the individual were stressed and in northern Europe, the social or collective aspects were emphasized. In Italy, for example, Baldasare Castiglione's *Book of the Courtier*, underscored the individual ideas and practices evident in an educated man and women;[30] in Bohemia, for example, John Amos Comenius's writings established the basis for a system of public education.[31]

Rather than an *either/or* approach to framing justice in one way or another, I prefer a broad conception that includes individual, social, and physical concerns. This stance presupposes that the individual, social, and physical worlds are interconnected rather than discrete, mutually exclusive, or independent. Notwithstanding the tensions between self and others, individual and society, and humanity and the rest of the natural world, approaching different conceptions of justice pluralistically by excavating beneath them allows one to discover their commonalities and propose symptoms of justice broadly construed.

Regarding justice pluralistically has important implications for social justice in music education. The adjective "social" suggests that this is a different sort of justice than individual justice or any other species of justice for that matter. Why would one speak of social justice if one did not want to distinguish it from something else? What would that something else be? If one is referring to social justice, I suppose one must be thinking, especially, of the interests of groups of people, namely, those who are systemically prejudiced, discriminated against, marginalized, and excluded in various ways from others in society. For these people, at least, justice would seem to be a special concern. For those in positions of power or authority, justice might not be such a compelling consideration since they have a sense of entitlement and are able to do all that they wish to do with impunity and ease (provided their actions are lawful). So, it seems that the term "social justice" is a loaded term in the affirmative action sense of something

needing to be re-mediated for certain groups of people.

I am sure, however, that one would not want to exclude from consideration those individuals who may be more-or-less represented by the collectivities of which they are or are seen to be a part but who also wish to voice their interests in justice individually. Benhabib emphasizes the rights for each person to choose those organizations with whom to affiliate and how to be ascribed.[32] A gay man may wish to be considered as the individual he is rather than as a member of a stereotypical minority, just as a woman with a debilitating illness who is now wheelchair-bound may insist on being thought of as a person with quite specific needs, interests, and abilities, and not fully represented by the majority of "disabled" or more euphemistically, "differently-abled" people. As individuals partly shaped by our societies and cultures, we are not independent of these collectivities any more than groups are independent of the individuals who comprise them. Still, the notion of social justice may be turn out to be limiting and exclusive in bypassing individual interests and perspectives in favor of emphasizing social considerations or the groups to which these individuals belong. It may also be ideological in its assumption that certain groups are regularly and systematically discriminated against and particular things need to be done about this state of affairs. And it may fail to take into account the claims of justice for members of other species and in the wider natural world to which the word "social" may not apply.

Now, discrimination is a social and systemic matter and something needs to be done about it. It may be appropriate to invoke a term such as "social justice" and, I suppose, its opposite "social injustice" to describe such matters. Still, although I am in sympathy with much of the project of what is called "social justice," it seems too narrow a construction of justice and too prone to the criticism that it is activist and ideological in particular directions rather than also

reflective and critical of thought and practice in ways that leave open the prospect of various solutions. I seek a broader view of justice that challenges the status quo, and if possible, transforms it. In so doing, I cannot relinquish appealing to notions of justice that are individual, social, and transcend humanity, and I wish to critique dispassionately the present situation in music education and beyond, and offer ways in which injustices of all sorts might be remedied. Rather than argue against the purposes and projects of "social justice," my concern is with the term itself, and the possibilities of its confining our conversation about justice and preventing our seeing things sufficiently broadly and complexly. I notice that adjectives can sometimes limit a concept that might have greater power were it construed more ambiguously. The virtue of ambiguity lies in its appeal to imagination and its unfettered freedom to arrive at different places and see different things. And I would like to preserve that ambiguity for justice.

Notice the temptation to slip into a dichotomous view of justice; either it is present or it is not and injustice obtains. In this view, injustice turns out to be all that is not justice, that is, it is defined negatively. Defining injustice this way would constitutes a similar philosophical mistake to Susanne Langer's definition of feeling as all that is not "speakable" thought.[33] A more nuanced view would suggest that justice and injustice might be mapped as polar opposites in which there may turn out to be differing kinds and degrees of justice and injustice–a project that lies outside this paper. Such a conceptualization would view justice and injustice comparatively as theoretical types not necessarily evident in pure form in the phenomenal world. Carefully distinguishing them requires a systematic comparison so that in every respect, along a profile of characteristics or symptoms, they are construed as opposites. So, just as we cannot think of justice alone without the possibility of mercy or freedom, we cannot think of justice alone without the prospect of injustice. Justice is thus seen comparatively with other things rather than

in isolation as a single and self-sufficient entity. And if this is the case, it may be that the boundaries of justice of whatever sort are fuzzy as one thing melds into or relates to another.

*How do liberal views of humanity, particularly the preciousness of people and living things serve as a basis for justice broadly construed?*

All of our writers take a liberal view of, and begin with assumptions about, the value of human life and dignity as a basis for ethical action and/or social policies, laws, and regulations. Nussbaum extends the limits of justice to advance an even broader notion of the value of life in all its forms and the corresponding claims for justice in the natural world. Taken together, these humane and inclusive approaches constitute a defensible basis for a broad if also complex view of justice.

In his *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*, Isaiah Berlin draws on Immanuel Kant's classic summary of human nature to note that practically nothing about people is straight or true.[34] Each of us has quirks, oddities, limitations, flaws of character, habits, attitudes, beliefs, and practices that "cut across the grain" of what we might wish to think, do, and be. In the face of this longstanding recognition of human foible and even evil, it is particularly important to underscore the value or what Raymond Gaita calls the "preciousness" of people.[35] For Gaita, this assertion of the value of all human life, no matter how unlovely, irritating, or hostile to one's particular personal and cultural proclivities is the basis of a broad view of justice. In his view, the Aboriginal peoples of Australia are precious even though their indigenous cultures pose a threat to Caucasian world views and practices; the restitution of Aboriginal lands, sacred places, livelihoods, and dignity seized from or lost to them and expressions of remorse at what was done

to them by powerful White people are compelling elements in reconciling Australia's indigenous and more recent immigrant populations. In Gaita's view, only when people are regarded as fully human beings can they expect to have justice and arriving at such a place requires admitting past evils and redressing the grievances that they have spawned. For Nussbaum, this concept of preciousness extends further, to plants, animals, fish, birds, and other aspects of the phenomenal world. There are the claims of restitution of an environment raped for economic gain, of resources squandered, and land trashed. The Gaia Hypothesis supposes an earth comprised of an integrally interrelated system in which all aspects are valuable parts of the whole.[36] Each aspect is of great value and functions in ways that affect other aspects. The wild turkeys and coyotes that run free on the Cape where I write have a place in this ecosystem even though they may annoy and even pose a danger to the humans who share their habitat. Expanding the horizon of value, preciousness, and esteemed worth obligates one to the whole of the natural world. Where these living things have been wantonly destroyed or damaged, Nussbaum posits, one is obligated to make restitution for what one (or one's ancestors) have done and, going forward, as Nel Nodding argues, care for the environment as well as for the those who live in it.[37]

The claims of freedom of thought and action on the part of groups or individuals who wish to affiliate with or opt out of societal institutions suggest, to Benhabib, that it may be important in multicultural societies for various constituent groups to be governed or legislated differently. Within the frame of laws intended to ensure that justice is widely applied, people may appeal to different judicial institutions , each of which has its own system.[38] In the United States, for example, the religious, military personnel, and civilians may seek justice within canon, military, and civil and criminal law and each institution recognizes the powers of the others, notwithstanding that the claims of justice are primary in all these institutions. Likewise,

in Canada, Napoleonic and Common Law legal traditions exist side-by-side, and each is appealed to by different constituencies. Porosity and multiple systems in which justice is sought and rendered likewise play out in the immigration and emigration between nation states. Porous borders permit people to enter or leave nation states at will and justice, and for Benhabib, this reality requires some such freedom. For example, liberal democracies in the West have historically sheltered refugees fleeing from other places. The plight of more-or-less permanent populations of those without "the right to have rights" in nation states, for example, "undocumented workers" in the United States or large immigrant populations of "guest workers" in European countries, is especially troubling because, since these people do not have "the right to have rights," they do not have the freedom to affiliate and disassociate that, in Benhabib's view, is a cornerstone of liberal democracies. And as a matter of public policy, humane societies predicated on the value or preciousness of all living things necessarily require this porosity and these freedoms.

Justice also requires the exercise of choice and personal responsibility (and in the case of the very young, by their guardians.) Israel Scheffler reconstructs human potential in three ways.[39] First, there is the capacity or physical possibility of doing such-and-such in which there are no physical impediments that prevent one from doing it. Scheffler cites John who wishes to play the piano and has the potential to be a pianist in the sense that he has the physical capacity to play the instrument. Second, there is the predictive notion of potential implying that there is an opportunity to develop in such-and-such ways and social and other institutional barriers do not prevent one from doing what one is physically able to do. That is, John has the opportunity and is not otherwise constrained from becoming a pianist. Third, the individual's decision to do such-and-such is a crucial consideration in potential. That is, John wishes and commits to learn

the piano. Seen through the lens of this trio of notions of potential, justice needs to take into account the capacities, opportunities or constraints, and decisions in regard to human potential. Regarding human potential, the claims of justice require that all those who have the capacity and are physically able, and who choose to do so (or their guardians choose on their behalf), should have the opportunity to do such-and-such.

Postmodern thought has highlighted the institutionalized societal structures that militate against justice. Contra Scheffler's argument that individual choice is an important element of construing and realizing human potential, we are now aware of systemic problems that thwart individual choice, render it specious or superficial, apparent rather than real, and sometimes prevent it altogether. Some people make poor, uninformed, and unwise choices. Predicating justice on human choice also prefers humans over other living things and envisages a physical world reliant upon (if also sometimes catastrophic in its impact on) people. Worse, Freire argues, oppressive ideas and practices are internalized by those who suffer oppression rendering them apt to act like their oppressors.[40] It seems impossible to escape from a vicious cycle that militates against justice, prefers some persons and interests over others, invalidates the claims to justice of some, and acts flagrantly, preferentially, capriciously, and vindictively against certain persons and interests. Nor can one count on democratic political arrangements to secure justice because minority perspectives may be lost to the power of the majority or a minority may manipulate an uncritical and ignorant majority towards inhumane ends and then silence and oppress them. What appears superficially to be democratic may mask sinister and darker realities that are inimical to justice.

Still, I want to rescue Scheffler's notion of choice as a crucial ingredient in the struggle towards justice and against injustice. Notwithstanding the difficulties that lie in the way of

exercising real choices, it seems that the liberal views espoused by such writers as Benhabib, Carr, Freire, Gaita, Heimonen, Nussbaum, Peters, and Scheffler carry the imperative of choice as a means of determining how to think and act, even in the face of pervasive oppression. Here, intelligence provides a means of taking stock of situations and acting responsibly to follow the most appropriate and effective courses of action. Notwithstanding the differing constructions of justice, whether in aspiring to act virtuously, within the frames of laws, regulations, and authorized means, or beyond to subvert the status quo, all these writers underscore the importance of reasoned choices. Such a humane view sees the development of intelligence as a central work of education. That choices are often limited or more apparent than real does not defeat the importance of choice itself; rather, it alerts one to the ways in which choices can be manipulated by powerful people and clarifies the importance of education as a means of developing the dispositions to choose wisely, uncover specious or false choices or those that are more apparent than real, and work with others to secure the power to make real choices.

*What are the means and ends of re-mediating injustice?*

The pluralities of differing specific notions of justice or means whereby it is carried out suggest commensurate views of injustice and imply that the ways in which injustices are re-mediated are likewise various and problematic. Taking a pluralistic stance to justice and injustice complicates the task of re-mediation since it is possible that alleviating one's own injustice may bring about another's injustice. For example, laws intended to remove discrimination on the part of one group of people may cause another group to be or believe themselves to be discriminated against. White male students denied admission to colleges may claim that regulations intended to ensure a more diverse student population including people of

color and women discriminate against them when they are denied admission even though their academic credentials are better than those of other students who are admitted. "Reverse discrimination" cases brought by those who in the past might have enjoyed privileges because of the exclusion of different others reveal the difficulty of crafting legislation and regulations and developing public policy in ways that are equitable and dispassionate while also redressing past injustices.

How is the struggle for justice to be undertaken? One might hope, with Dewey, that those charged by the public to act in its interest would do so dispassionately, without bias, and in the interests of the public they serve.[41] That they do not always act this way but perpetuate inhumane and unjust systems that stand against the value of people and things in the natural world suggests that the struggle against institutionalized injustice may never be complete. Freire proposes a cellular, bottom-up, dialogical, and communitarian view in which change happens by dint of people becoming aware of injustice and acting collectively to correct it.[42] As individuals form communities, these groups then put concerted pressure on the architects and agents of injustice and thereby liberate the world. Greene, and Parker Palmer likewise envisage communities in which dialogical education transforms hearts and minds into action towards a more humane space and time.[43] Will this be enough? I worry that Freire may underestimate the power of the "image of the oppressor" even when participating in liberatory education of the sort he has in mind. Teachers may subvert his intention and patronize their students, thinking to bring them knowledge even as they aver their commitments to conscientization. The collective force of the growing numbers and power of these pedagogical cells may be insufficient to overcome a powerful establishment. Those involved in the quest for liberation may be seduced by oppressive ideas and practices as means of attaining their ends. Rather, top-down as well as

bottom-up movements towards change may be needed, confining dramatic changes to those political moments in which both are possible. A case in point is the Civil Rights movement in the United States that required both a grass roots movement and powerful people in important positions of trust, legally, religiously, and politically who were convicted that change was necessary.

Since dialogue, alone may not remedy injustice, laws and regulations are needed as part of public policy, and making and altering these rules requires legislation and jurisprudence. Freire's cellular model of communitarian engagement and dialogue may enlighten and motivate towards change but it does not compel those who may be in the greatest need of the engagement and dialogue to participate nor does it provide the means of dismantling systemic structures and bringing about necessary changes in public policy. It constitutes an important part in the process but not a sufficient part. Benhabib and Nussbaum grasp the importance of political and legal action that, to some extent, compels all members of society to recognize the claims of justice and the heritage of injustice. In liberal democracies, these claims are discussed and contested and are subject to change over time. As I write, the rights of gays to marry in the state of Massachusetts–presently a legal right–are contested by those in the United States who do not believe that marriage should extend beyond a man and a woman and Congress contemplates a constitutional amendment to ban marriage by gay people. Recognizing other gender types such as intersexed and transgendered people raises the question of what counts as a man and a woman and whether these others are to be accorded the self-same rights. Although these important questions concerning justice in respect to human sexuality and the right to marry are the subject of discussion and policy making in various of the Western democracies, discussion cannot suffice, and political and legal action is ultimately required to remedy injustice, however

construed.

Beyond enacting policies, laws, and regulations and ensuring that they are carried out faithfully, fairly, and compassionately, remedying injustice(s) requires transforming values and practices. In *Transforming Music Education*, I unpack the ambiguous and dialectical quality of the word "transformation." Rather than traverse this ground again, it suffices to note that the various ways in which transformation can be construed require systemic and pervasive change. What is at stake is a change in beliefs, values, and attitudes. Whereas fashions may come and go with rapidity, beliefs, values, and attitudes are more deeply rooted and resistant to change. Practically speaking, then, remedying injustice(s) is often an arduous, incremental, and long-term process. And the fact that substantive educational changes rely on deeply-rooted changes in beliefs, values, and attitudes that are resistant to change means that educational changes often seem glacial and systemic changes occur over decades and even centuries.

Practically speaking, complicating the various sorts or degrees of justice and injustice suggests that one often works particularistically and incrementally toward more justice or less injustice of a particular sort. In education, for example, one might point to modest gains that more-or-less represent improvements in a situation and these sometimes seem to be "baby steps" in the directions in which one hopes the system will eventually move. In my own working lifetime, I have often been conscious of laboring somewhere in this middle ground, often having to live with less-than-desirable changes in directions that I see to be good, resisting changes to which I am opposed, and sometimes being unsure about the best path to follow. It seems that I am not always fully conscious of the changes that have occurred over my lifetime. I think, for example, of the impact of changes in computing and electronic communications over the past decades and am conscious of gradually adapting to them. Although I typed my doctoral

dissertation in multiple carbon copies on a typewriter for which a single error meant the need to retype the entire page, I can now write at my laptop, make changes easily, and achieve a clean printed result all along the way. Where once I might speak into a telephone attached to a wall, I can use my cell phone in all sorts of places. From my present vantage point, it is difficult to gauge how dramatic these changes have been because they have happened gradually. My mother felt obliged to keep house and not work outside of the home until her children were grown; she spent all of her life in service of my father and in order to advance his interests. I have never known this compulsion, especially since I escaped these cloying and gendered roles in the Australia of my youth and came to North America as an immigrant and my own person. An individual looking back at this time from another time in the future might wonder at our ability to cope in the face of such dramatic change. Yet, the fact that these technological, scientific, and social changes have taken place gradually has allowed people to cope and even thrive. And although we may be conscious of tackling issues of justice and injustice incrementally, it is comforting to realize that people gradually adapt, and this seems to be the nature of educational movements throughout history.

*How can music educators act on behalf of justice?*

In the light of the foregoing analysis, what can music educators do to promote justice and alleviate injustice within and without music education? It is worth noting that the beginnings of school music in the United States are linked to the development of systems of public education.[44] Common schools were designed to ensure that all children of school age had at least a certain minimum level of education irrespective of their background. From the beginning, publicly supported schools were often schools for the poor and working class since the upper classes had

the wealth to afford a privileged education for their young. Even now, the vast majority of American children are educated in public schools. This association between music education and public education has engendered a strong sense of universalism in music education thought and practice in order to reach as many young people as possible. Still, disparate public schools, some well served and others not, affect significantly what music teachers can accomplish. And the national standards for music education recognize the often significant disparities between minimal, adequate, and outstanding music programs.[45]

I wish that music educators would collectively engage with matters of justice and injustice that go beyond music classrooms and deal with wider societal issues of religious, familial, political, and economic injustices that are evident in disparities between public and private schools, the privileged few and the many for whom public schools are the only route to general education, and those public schools that are well supported and those that are not. Disparities in public education and in some of America's schools are, in Jonathan Kozol's words, its "shame."[46] Conditions in some schools approach those of developing nations rather than a post-industrial nation that prides itself on its democracy and its commitment to education. Yet, instead of mounting public and political campaigns to re-mediate such schools, music educators and policy leaders are too often collectively silent when these "failing" schools are "punished" by the removal of federal funds and opportunities for artistic, cultural, and athletic enrichment. Instead of assisting teachers in struggling music education programs, the MENC–The National Association for Music Education focuses on rewarding and recognizing successful music teachers and mandates that all teachers meet certain standards without also providing them the means to enable them to do this. Such a move is not only discouraging to those teachers who are not doing well but plays into the hands of policy makers who window-dress public education

with measures of so-called accountability rather than genuinely helping those who labor without the help and resources they need. The sanitization of music curricula in order to be as inoffensive as possible to the most people (particularly those in Texas, California, Florida, New York and other heavily populated states) is yet another way in which music instruction is rendered innocuous and unthreatening to powerful policy makers and the public-at-large. The injustices that abound in music education and in public education generally are swept under the carpet by music educators who should work for justice and unmask and remedy injustice. And the silence is deafening.

Five actionable steps can be taken towards re-mediating injustice and achieving greater justice. These steps illustrate the sorts of things that music educators can do practically, individually, and collectively. They are not normative since there may be better ways to tackle issues of justice and injustice but I present them with a view to opening a dialogue about the most effective ways in which music educators can work against injustice and towards justice.

First, the research enterprise in music education needs to be seriously rethought with a view to dealing directly with practical realities of music teaching and learning. Status and policy studies are urgently needed to help clarify and document what is actually happening in schools and all the other places in which music education is conducted and provide important sources of data that can be helpful to music teachers and policy makers. Too many research studies in music education are vacuous, trivial, or remote from the practitioners who are in most need of them. The fact that so many studies are incomprehensible to music teachers, perceived to be of little practical use to them, and therefore largely ignored by many teachers should be a source of concern to researchers. It is tempting to lay the blame for this state-of-affairs on teachers for having insufficient intellectual interest in or grasp of research or on those who prepare them for

failing to provide a knowledge of how to read research. Yet, too often, research in music education is conducted with a view to obtaining psychological, philosophical, historical, sociological, or other understandings at the expense of amassing information that would also be of practical use to music teachers. Regrettably, status and other descriptive studies seem to be less valued than scientific studies that are regarded as more academically "respectable." Devaluing the importance of practical research in favor of more academically "respectable" if also esoteric studies is unfortunate and fails to provide the assistance that would be invaluable to music educators in making the case against prevalent injustices. In the present political environment, it is especially important to be able to document one's assertions, and research is needed in gathering and analyzing the data needed to make strong empirical cases. For example, an important status study of academic women in music conducted under the auspices of the College Music Society in 1989 that revealed important and evident gender disparities has yet to be followed up.[47] Since status studies quickly "date," follow-up status studies are needed to provide important up-to-date descriptive information and monitor the degree to which progress in remedying disparities by gender is presently being made. And in valuing practice as well as theory, status and descriptive studies would provide an important service to music education.

Second, concerted political action is required that, in our time at least, requires large scale and long term planning and masterful execution to effect successfully. To do this necessitates bringing together all of the stakeholders in music education and developing plans that go beyond the borders of the MENC to include state and local entities where, in the United States, authority for education principally resides. This means strengthening state and local organizations for music education, reconstituting the role of MENC as a coordinating mechanism, and substantially changing its powers and organizational structures. As Marie McCarthy notes,[48] the

MENC has become an advocacy body and this is an important task in an environment in which the federal government has sometimes usurped state and local prerogatives in education through such legislation as *No Child Left Behind*.[49] Legal challenges to this act mounted in states such as Connecticut will doubtless pare down this intrusion and hold the federal government more accountable.[50] Still, there is value in having a national organization for music education located near Washington. Thinking politically means beginning the process by cleaning our own house of music education. The organization of the MENC needs fundamental change. Inordinate power rests with the present Executive Director and a revolving door of short-term elective officers in and out of the organization rewards loyalty over serious self-criticism. Under the present arrangements, it is difficult to effect change in the organization or to genuinely reflect the wishes of the constituent and related organizations. The result is to fragment organizations concerned with various aspects of music education as each group in turn, dissatisfied with the MENC's response to its interests, forms an independent entity. The American Band Directors Association, the American Choral Directors Association, the International Jazz Educators Association, and the Texas Music Educators Association are cases in point–all crucially interested in music education yet dissatisfied with the MENC's performance in relation to what they do. Rather than fragmenting into multiple organizations, the sort of political action needed today requires concerted and unified action. And it will take statesmanship to tackle this state of affairs and reorganize music education in ways that are more responsive to those who do its work and effective politically in undertaking the needed large-scale projects in our time.

Third, political action regarding music education needs to be effected through strong leadership especially at the state and local levels. In the 19th century, music education was built by strong music supervisors at the local level who by virtue of their authority were empowered to

effect change. These people have all but disappeared. A recent count turned up about 140 members of the National Association of Music Supervisors and the MENC could not provide a ready listing of state supervisors of music and the arts.[51] In some states, no music educator at the state level is directly responsible for music education and empowered to ensure that music instruction is conducted at an appropriate level or that state-mandated requirements for music instruction are met satisfactorily. State music education associations and stakeholders in music education need to take a much more aggressive stance in insisting and ensuring that such state and local leaders of music education are appointed so that music education is available equitably in their jurisdictions. And rather than being extensions of the MENC, these state organizations need to be empowered politically at the center of the enterprise.

Fourth, serious attention needs to be given to creating a musical climate in every state and local jurisdiction that is conducive to music education. Rather than the present uneven quality of musical offerings, it is important to find ways to ensure a broad quality music education that overcomes the host of barriers to music teaching and learning. Doing this requires the profession to tackle and lobby against discriminatory public laws such as *No Child Left Behind* that penalize schools largely filled with disadvantaged children, and national standards and testing movements that set expectations but fail to provide the means to attain them. Rather than capitulating to the political and educational fads of the day, music educators need to insist on humane approaches to music education, mount political campaigns to contest their merits, and resist the efforts of those who would dismantle public education as well as music education. We have been altogether too complacent as a profession in going along with those who mouth smooth sayings concerning publicly supported education but whose actions reveal an inhumanity and lack of caring for those less fortunate than themselves.

Fifth, in embracing the claims of humanity and redressing systemic oppression, music educators need to spell out unequivocally the ideals for which we stand and make practical plans that reflect them. I have begun an analysis of these ideals in a project entitled *Music Education and the Republic*. The nuanced view of human potential and justice outlined above suggests that we think dialectically, synergistically (as Bennett Reimer suggests), in terms of peaceful coexistence (as Randall Allsup notes), and in terms of cosmopolitan views of music and education (as Charlene Morton advocates).[52] Doing this suggests that our plans will doubtless be provisional, subject to change as situations change even as our underlying commitments to particular values remain steadfast over the long term. Making plans is difficult as we attempt to reconcile, at least for practical purposes, top-down and bottom-up thinking and action, a grasp of the one and the many, and concerns for individual and social justice and justice that applies to the natural world more broadly. Rather than avoiding the study of musics at home that remind us so starkly of the inequities here and preferring to study musics from afar that seem less threatening and more impersonal, we need to face our own shortcomings in this country and give them musical voice critically as well as affirmatively. In this respect, Paul Woodford's plea for critical thinking is not destructive but hopes to create a better world.[53] And in making our plans, it is also important to think broadly and seamlessly about music education from its most elementary to advanced levels and across the institutions that offer music education, and work collaboratively to effect change.

In sum, it is necessary that music educators re-mediate injustice and seek justice. I have pointed out that this is a complex matter theoretically and practically. Justice is rooted in valuing humanity and other things as well, envisaged individually, socially, and with reference to the natural world, and requires not only dialogical processes but the institution of laws, regulations,

and rules that limit injustice. In citing examples of injustice in music education and of action steps that music educators can undertake contra injustice and in order to advance the interests of justice, it is clear that a conversation on justice in music education cannot suffice and action is called for in the phenomenal world. And in these efforts, we join the host of music teachers throughout history who have struggled on behalf of justice and against injustice to provide students with opportunities to know the musics of the cultures to which they and others are heirs.

Notes

1. I make this point in Estelle R. Jorgensen, *In Search of Music Education* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), pp. x, xi.

2. I discuss issues relating to gender and music education in Estelle R. Jorgensen, *Transforming Music Education* (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2003) , pp. 20-25, 155-156, notes 6 and 7.

3. On the ideal of "whiteness" in music education, see, for example, Julia Eklund Koza, "Listening for Whiteness," *Philosophy of Music Education Review,* in press; Ruth Gustafson, *A Temperance Army: The Fabrication of the Ideal Child in Music Education*, 2006, unpublished manuscript available from the author; Ruth Gustafson, "Merry Throngs and Street Gangs: The Fabrication of Whiteness and the Worthy Citizen in Early Vocal Instruction and Music Appreciation, 1830--1930," Doctoral Dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 2005.

4. See, for example, Anthony E. Kemp, *The Musical Temperament: Psychology and Personality of Musicians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

5. A notable exception to this approach is evident in Elizabeth Bauer, "What Is An Appropriate Approach to Piano Instruction for Students with Down Syndrome?," Doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, 2003.

6. Jonathan Kozol documents the plight of inner city schools in his book, *The Shame of the Nation: The Restoration of Apartheid Schooling in America* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2005).

7. Studies of Muslim religious beliefs and music education include: J. M. [Mark] Halstead, "Muslim Attitudes to Music in Schools," *British Journal of Music Education* 11 (2) (1994): 143-56; Diana Harris, "A Report on the Situation Regarding Teaching Music to Muslims in an Inner-city School," *British Journal of Music Education* 19 (March 2002): 49-60; Emma Whale, "Call to Players (Muslim Community and the Music Education Available)," *Music Teacher* 83 (April 2004): 38-9; Diana Harris, "20th ISME Research Seminar: Egypt and Turkey: Music Education in Two Predominantly Muslim Countries (Implications for Teaching Muslims in UK Schools)," *Bulletin of the Council for Research in Music Education* 161-162 (Summer-Fall 2004): 117-23.

8. Maxine Greene, *The Dialectic of Freedom* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1988).

9. Greene, *Dialectic of Imagination*, 17, writes: "When people lack attachments, when there is no possibility of coming together in a plurality or a community, when they have not tapped their imaginations, they may think of *breaking* free, but they will be unlikely to think of breaking through the structures of their world and creating something new."

10. See, for example, Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, new revised 20th-anniversary edition, transl., Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum, 1993), his *Pedagogy of the City*, transl., Donaldo Macedo (New York: Continuum, 1993), his *Pedagogy of Hope: Reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, transl., Robert R. Barr (New York: Continuum, 1994), and his *Pedagogy of the Heart*, transl., Donaldo Macedo and Alexandre Oliveira (New York: Continuum, 1997).

11. Israel Scheffler, *Reason and Teaching* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), 68-71.

12. Martha C. Nussbaum, *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership* Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006).

13. J. R. R. Tolkien, *The Fellowship of the Ring*, Unwin Books edition (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), his *The Two Towers*, Unwin Books edition (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), and his *The Return of the King*, Unwin Books edition (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974).

14. Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 1992), her *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), and her edited collection, *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

15. On those who have no rights to have rights see Seyla Benhabib, *Transformations of Citizenship: Dilemmas of the Nation State in the Era of Globalization: Two Lectures* (Amsterdam: Koninklijke van Gorcum, 2001).

16. On the political and social interpretations of folk spirituals, that Portia Maultsby (personal communication, October 1, 2006) notes were called "slave songs and spirituals in the literature of the era," see Miles Mark Fisher, *Negro Slave Songs in the United States* ([1953]; repr., New York: Citadel Press, 1969); Lawrence W. Levine, *Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977) and his "African American Music as Resistance," in *African American Music: An Introduction*, eds., Mellonee V. Burnim and Portia K. Maultsby (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 587-598. Maultsby (personal communication, October 1, 2006) notes that "because whites of the period interpreted the songs of slaves as 'barbaric,' 'wild and senseless in matter,' 'meaningless' and 'nonsensical' scholars concluded that the missionaries, slaveholders, European visitors, etc. were not aware of the cultural and socio-political meaning folk spirituals held among slaves." I am indebted to Portia Maultsby for bringing these references to my attention. For performances of folk spirituals connected with the Underground Railroad, see *The Long Road to Freedom: An Anthology of Black Music*, Sound recording, (New York: Buddha Records, Distributed by BMG), 5 sound discs, Disk 3, in particular, "Wonderful Councillor," "Follow the Drinking Gourd," "Steal Away to Jesus," "There's a Meetin' Here Tonight," and Many Thousan' Gone."

17. On "outlawing the use of 'drums and other loud instruments' because of the communication

function of these instruments, which," as Portia Maultsby (personal communication, October 1, 2006) notes, were used in planning and executing insurrections in the South," see Eileen Southern, *The Music of Black Americans*, 3rd edn. (New York NY: Norton, c. 1997), p. 172; Dena J. Polacheck Epstein, *Sinful Tunes and Spirituals: Black Folk Music to the Civil War* (Urbana, Chicago IL: University of Illinois Press, c. 2003); Dena J. Epstein, "Secular Folk Music," in *African American Music: An Introduction*, eds., Mellonee V. Burnim and Portia K. Maultsby (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 35-50. Maultsby (personal communication, October 1, 2006) notes that "Bodily movement often accompanied music-making when instruments were used. After they were abandoned, hand clapping and foot stamping became more pronounced and [rhythms] more complex, assuming the rhythmic patterns and structures of instruments." I am indebted to Portia Maultsby for bringing these references to my attention.

18. On music and identity, see Börje Stålhammar, ed., *Music and Human Beings–Music and Identity* (Örebro, Sweden: Universitetsbiblioteketm 2006) M. A. Neal, *What the Music Said: Black Popular Music and Black Public Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1999); A. Bennett, *Popular Music and Youth Culture: Music Identity and Place* (Basingstoke: Macmillan; N.Y.: St. Martin`s Press, 2000); Martin Clayton, Trevor Herbert, and Richard Middleton, eds., *The Cultural Study of Music: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2003), passim.

19. John Dewey, *Experience and Education* ([1938]; repr., New York: Collier Books, 1963), 51, distinguishes between non-educative and mis-educative and educative experience.

20. Christopher Small, *Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening* (Hanover and London: Wesleyan University Press, 1998).

21. See John Dewey, *Art as Experience* ([1934]; repr., New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1980).

22. Marja Heimonen, "Music Education and Law: Regulation as an Instrument," *Philosophy of Music Education Review* 11 (2) (Fall 2003): 170-184, her "Justifying the Right to Music Education," *Philosophy of Music Education Review*, in press, and her "Music Education as One Aspect of Cultural and Welfare Rights," unpublished essay, available from the author at mheimone@siba.fi.

23. R. S. Peters, *Authority, Responsibility and Education*, rev. ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Paul S. Eriksson, 1973); David Carr, *Educating the Virtues: An Essay on the Philosophical Psychology of Moral Development and Education* (London; New York: Routledge, 1991); David Carr, *Professionalism and Ethics in Teaching* (London; New York: Routledge, 2000).

24. David Carr, "The Significance of Music for the Promotion of Moral and Spiritual Virtue," *Philosophy of Music Education Review*, in press.

25. See Greene, *Dialectic of Freedom*, chap. 1, for example, p. 1; Dewey, *Art as Experience*, p. 62.

26. John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (Denver: Henry Holt, 1927), especially chap. 1.

27. Greene, *Dialectic of Freedom*, passim.

28. On mercy, see William Shakespeare, *The Merchant of Venice*, Act 4 scene 1.

29. Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters*, ed., and transl., Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 60, 61.

30. On music, see Baldesar Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*, transl., George Bull (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 94-96, 215.

31. On music and education, see John Amos Comenius, *The Great Didactic*, transl., M. W. Keatinge (London: A. and C. Black, 1923) excerpted among other of his writings in *Music Education: Source Readings from Ancient Greece to Today*, 2nd edn. (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), 35-37.

32. Benhabib, *Claims of Culture*, p. 19, lays out three conditions for her "universalist deliberative democracy model": *"egalitarian reciprocity*," "*voluntary self-ascription*," and "*freedom of exit and association*."

33. Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art*, 3rd edn. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 87.

34. Isaiah Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas*, ed., Henry Hardy ((Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), quoting Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht," (1794), *Kant's gesammelte Schriften* vol. 8 (Berlin, 1912), p. 23.

35. Raymond Gaita, *A Common Humanity: Thinking about Love and Truth and Justice* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. xxii, xxiii, and *passim*.

36. For an earlier discussion of this hypothesis, see Jorgensen, *In Search of Music Education*, 3.

37. Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1984), chap. 7.

38. Although Benhabib hopes for a universal legal system that ensures justice for all, these cultural and societal pluralities are in the midst of being contested. Adherents of particular beliefs and practices hold to them recognizing that their approaches do not have an exclusive hold on truth but need to be seen alongside others. Benhabib's pluralistic approach to "institutions, associations, and movements in civil society" in her deliberative democracy flies in the face of fundamentalist movements based on the assumption of the one true way, see

Benhabib, *Claims of Culture*, pp. 138-39, 184, 186.

39. Israel Scheffler, *In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Education* (New York and London: Routledge, 1991), chap. 2.

40. Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, chap. 1.

41. Dewey, *Public and its Problems*, *passim*.

42. For his theory of revolutionary action, see Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, chap. 4.

43. Greene, *Dialectic of Freedom*; especially chaps. 4 and 5; Parker Palmer, *The Courage to Teach: Exploring the Inner Landscape of a Teacher's Life* (San Francisco CA: Jossey-Bass, 1998), especially chaps. 5 and 6.

44. I note this connection, for example, in Estelle R. Jorgensen, "Justifying Music Instruction in American Public Schools: An Historical Perspective," *Bulletin of the Council for Research in Music Education*, No. 120 (Spring 1994): 17-31. Reprinted, *Arts Education Policy Review*.

45. See the *National Standards for Arts Education: What Every Young American Should Know and Be Able to do in the Arts* (Reston VA: Music Educators National Conference, 1994) http://www.menc.org/publication/books/standards.htm, accessed September 6, 2006.

46. Kozol, *Shame of the Nation*.

47. The Committee on the Status of Women (1984-1986), *Women's Studies/Women's Status*, CMS Report Number 5 (Boulder CO: College Music Society, 1988).

48. Marie McCarthy, Paper to MENC, April 2006.

49.On the *No Child Left Behind* act (NCLB), see the U.S. Department of Education website, http://www.ed.gov/nclb/landing.jhtml, accessed September 6, 2006.

50. On the legal challenges to NCLB, see the National Education Association website at http://www.nea.org/newsreleases/2006/nr060403.html, accessed September 6, 2006.

51. See the National Council of Supervisors of Music Education website at http://www.menc.org/ncsme/, accessed September 6, 2006.

52. On synergy, see Bennett Reimer, *A Philosophy of Music Education: Advancing the Vision*, 3rd edn. (Upper Saddle River NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2003); on peaceful coexistence, see Randall E. Allsup, "A Response to Estelle R. Jorgensen, 'Four Philosophical Models of the Relation between Theory and Practice,'" *Philosophy of Music Education Review* 13 (1) (Spring 2005): 104-108; on cosmopolitanism, see Charlene Morton, "Response to Bennett Reimer, 'Once More

With Feeling: Reconciling Discrepant Accounts of Musical Affect,'" *Philosophy of Music Education Review* 12 (1) (Spring 2004): 60-59.

53. Paul G. Woodford, *Democracy and Music Education: Liberalism, Ethics, and the Politics of Practice* (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2005).