

LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

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HANS WOLFF

Hans Wolff was born on April 6, 1920 in Mainz, Germany. In 1934 his family went to Spain where he remained until 1937 when he immigrated to the United States. He attended Queens College, New York from 1939-1941 and then transferred to Indiana University. From 1942-1946 he served with the Military Intelligence Corps. After the war he returned to Indiana and in 1946 obtained the B.A. magna cum laude in Linguistics. In 1947 he was awarded the M.A. in Linguistics and in 1949 a double doctorate in Anthropology and Linguistics (one of the first to be given by that department). In 1949 he was appointed to the faculty of the University of Puerto Rico where he taught for eleven years. His early work was in Amerindian languages, especially in Siouan studies, and in the teaching of English as a second language. While still at the University of Puerto Rico, he was invited in 1953 to visit Nigeria as a UNESCO expert on orthographies. He spent a year in Nigeria, and from that time his interest in Africa and African languages grew. He published widely on the languages and language problems of Nigeria and at the time of his death was one of the leading authorities on Yoruba. In 1960 he accepted an appointment at Michigan State University in the African Studies Center where he taught for three years. While at Michigan State he helped to found and to edit the Journal of African Languages. He also assisted in the early development of the West African Language Conference and for several years served as Chairman of the African Linguistics Committee of the African Studies Association. At the time of his death in September 1967, he was Professor of Linguistics at Northwestern University.

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Introduction

Southern Africa is the most developed region in Africa; it is also deeply integrated into the world capitalist system. The pace and pattern of development in the region have been set by the Republic of South Africa. The industrial and mining complex, which was established in the Republic in the nineteenth century and was developed and diversified in the first half of this century, has provided the impetus for economic growth in the region. But South Africa's mining and industrial complex has relied on foreign capital and technology from the United States, Western Europe and Japan for successive stages of its expansion. Such reliance has created a South African capitalism that is dependent upon outside support. This dependent capitalism has in turn fostered its own periphery in Rhodesia, Namibia and the Bantustans, the white-ruled semicolonies, and in some independent African states on which South Africa depends for labor and markets for its expanding manufactures. It is within this periphery that wars of national liberation are now being waged.

Because Southern Africa is more economically developed than other parts of Africa, and because that development is tied to Western capitalistic systems, the attempts of liberation movements to change the political status quo by transferring power to representatives of the majority Africans are bound to arouse deep passions. They impinge on is-

sues that are fundamental to the West and to the world at large. International attention to this region has increased as liberation movements have taken over power in Mozambique and Angola and are now challenging the ruling elites in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Namibia. In the last two years Southern Africa has become a substantive problem on the agenda of major world powers, both capitalist and socialist.

Liberation: A Nationalist or Class Struggle?

Stated simply and briefly, the problem in Southern Africa is one of the liberation of some twenty-three million indigenous people residing in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. But there is little agreement among the contending forces within them as to what liberation means or should mean. There are currently three competing and contradictory views of liberation. The South African and Rhodesian governments advocate separate territorial development of Africans through the glorified Bantustan system and are totally opposed to the aims of African nationalism. A second widely held view is that of the African nationalist movements which are similar to those that won independence in most African colonies in the 1960's and are supported by various groups throughout Africa. Finally, the most liberating and revolutionary process is that experienced by Angola and Mozambique. These three positions are not easily reconciled because, in the final analysis, they raise questions that are basic to one's view of the state and of society.

Hamza Alavi has accurately described the main features of the postcolonial state in Africa and Asia.¹ Although each

colonial situation has its own specific and peculiar features, he has observed three general characteristics: the strength of the administrative bureaucracy and the military; the continuing presence of the former metropolitan colonial power through already established commercial and trade links; and the function of the politicians as mediators between the metropolitan and indigenous bourgeoisies and as protectors of the existing social order. Ultimately these three factors result in manipulation or suppression of the demands and aspirations of the workers and peasants. Alavi warns that neither the national bourgeoisie nor any other class in the postcolonial state is strong enough to control the bureaucratic military oligarchy left by the colonial system:

The central proposition which I wish to emphasize is that the state in the postcolonial society is not the instrument of a single class. It is relatively autonomous and it mediates between the competing interests of the three propertied classes, namely the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed classes; while at the same time acting on behalf of them all to preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded, namely the institution of private property and the capitalist mode as the dominant mode of production.²

But there are no strongly articulated indigenous bourgeoisie or landed class in most African states. Therefore, if we accept Alavi's theses, it is the mediation of African ruling

groups on behalf of the metropolitan bourgeoisie that we must examine closely. The reliance on foreign aid and investment, foreign markets, and foreign technology has continued and vastly increased in independent African states. The works by Samir Amin in West Africa and by Colin Leys, Justinian Rweyemamu, Clive Thomas, and Dan Nabudere in Eastern Africa have clearly shown a pattern of continued and even accelerated dependency.³ These writers demonstrate that the attainment of political independence did not end the exploitation continued through the economic and commercial institutions established during the colonial period. Thus capitalism, both local and international, continues to thrive. The inability of African peasants and workers to challenge or change capitalism as the dominant mode of production in independent African states has contributed to their continuing dependency and underdevelopment and has established a weak rearmbase for the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. Most of the ruling elites in independent African states share a common interest with imperialism in maintaining the existing social order in Africa as a whole and in Southern Africa in particular. We will produce more evidence below to support this statement.

Although the nationalist movements that brought independence to most African states in the 1960's failed or refused to challenge the basic tenets of capitalism, they did play a positive role in asserting the national question. They aroused and directed the masses towards the attainment of nationhood and independence for peoples who has been subjected to colonialism and domination for several centuries. The cli-

max of this movement was the signing of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter in Addis Ababa in May, 1963, which rightly stressed the need to end colonialism on every inch of African soil.

It is essential to see clearly both the positive aspects and the possible limitations of African nationalism as a liberating force. Some super-Marxists argue that the nationalist struggles for Zimbabwe, Namibia, or Azania (currently called South Africa) are ultimately counterrevolutionary, that they will lead to the kind of neocolonial situation described above in which capitalism remains unchallenged. They would contend that the struggle must be seen only in the context of an international class confrontation between the worker peasant class on one side and the property-owning national bourgeoisie on the other. To accept this proposition, however, is to be overly simplistic. Karl Marx supported Irish nationalism, and Lenin criticized Rosa Luxemburg's position on Polish nationalism. Lenin also publicly supported Joseph Stalin's pamphlet on the national question. These writers saw the national question as an integral part of the class question. Both questions are legitimate and must be posed simultaneously. A people cannot be colonized and be free from exploitation and oppression at the same time.

Patriotic African nationalists like Nkrumah and Nasser were right to assert the national question at the time they did. Our quarrel is that they did so without relating it historically to the class question and the owner-

ship of the means of production. However, the class question is now being raised in Southern Africa, where it constitutes the core of the general political crisis in the area.

South Africa: A Classic Nationalist/Class Situation

The Republic of South Africa is the heart of the subimperial regional system of Southern Africa. Its capitalistic system is dependent on Europe and America for fresh capital and technology that operate mostly in partnership with local capital. South Africa also looks to local, vital labor supplies within Southern Africa to maintain these industries. As Harold Wolpe and Martin Leggasick have pointed out, the apartheid system is literally a system to preserve a "permanent reserve Army of labourers" for the growing processing industries of South Africa.

The economic base of South Africa has changed from traditional mining and agriculture to that of a growing manufacturing industry; manufacturing and processing now account for forty percent of the gross national product. Since this evolution requires a stable labor force, it has liberalized the political system to the extent that South African industrialists are calling for recognition of trade unions, removal of job reservations, and ending of petty apartheid. Furthermore, the industrialists who want marketing outlets for their manufactured goods have pressed the South African government to begin a dialogue with black African states -- what Vorster calls detente. This policy aims to create a Southern African common market and a free trade area beyond the Zambezi that would be dominated by South African manu-

facturers. Both English and Afrikaans-speaking industrialists in South Africa have joined in this drive to the north, and South Africa now has trade and aid relationships with about ten African states. In the political field, detente points out common interests between the national bourgeoisie of South Africa and the bourgeoisie in independent African states, especially in such areas as sharing technology and utilizing much-needed food and oil. Agreements have succeeded in Zaire and to a limited extent in Zambia.

But within South Africa itself the African liberation movements must stop regarding the "white workers" as potential allies with whom they can build bonds of solidarity. That utopian view has no validity because the white workers have been co-opted into the white ruling class. They know that the wage differential between a white and a black worker was 13:1 in 1960 and 14:1 in 1970. The gap continues to widen because racist white trade unionists have committed the government to a policy of wage differentials and maintaining the size of the gap. If black workers get a wage increase as a result of a strike, the white workers immediately demand a corresponding increase in wages to prevent the gap from narrowing. The white workers know that the inflated wages they receive and the high standard of living they enjoy is creamed off from the surplus produced by underpaying the black workers whom they supervise. Therefore, the white workers in South Africa form a privileged class that has effectively joined the ruling national bourgeoisie. A few individuals among workers or intellectuals may join and support the lib-

eration movement, but their support will never be class-wide. The Congress Alliance, for example, associated whites and Indians with the African National Congress (ANC). After the Morogoro Conference of 1969, the ANC decided to accept non-black members, and one of the white members of the former South African Communist Party, Joe Slovo, became a member of the national executive of the ANC. But it is important to remember that the participation of individual, committed whites in the liberation struggle does not indicate a whole class will participate. South Africa is both a racist and a capitalist society with a white ruling class and a black ruled class. The correlation between race and class is nearly perfect, although some subclasses of the ruling class are more important than others.

The Soweto and Langa uprisings in June 1976 were only the visible tip of a fully fledged struggle between the white bourgeoisie and the black working class in South Africa -- a class struggle in the classical sense of the concept. The young students who burned down their schools and the workers who refused to go to work represent advanced elements of a proletarian class that has been developing in South Africa for many years. The peasantry has declined sharply over the years as successive government measures undermined their traditional and self-sufficient mode of production. Deprived of adequate land and cattle, they could hardly be expected to survive. Several government commissions, including the authoritative Tomlinson Commission on the implementation of separate development have argued that the areas set aside for

the Bantustans in South Africa are not capable of maintaining their present population, let alone the increasing population of the future. It should be stressed that this process of proletarianization of the peasantry, part of deliberate government attempts to increase the labor supply, has been going on steadily throughout Southern Africa, most notably in South Africa itself, but also in Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola. Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland are almost client states of South Africa.

As in most countries of the world, the earnings of black workers in South Africa have fallen in real terms because of the combination of inflation and unemployment. The impact of this inflation/unemployment cycle has been much greater on the poorly paid black workers than on their white counterparts. It was the combination of deteriorating economic conditions and extensive politicization by the liberation movement that raised worker consciousness to high levels in both Namibia and South Africa and in a way prepared the ground for the incidents in Soweto and Langa in 1976.

The Nature of Imperialism in Southern Africa

The factor that really lit the fuse in Southern Africa was the internationalization of the Angolan conflict through the decisive participation of the Soviet Union and Cuba in the MPLA victory over the rival movements of UNITA and FLNA. MPLA had used Russian weaponry and Cuban military training for many years; indeed, MPLA was one of the so-called authentic⁴ liberation movements Russia had supported since 1967. Cuba had invited these authentic movements to

the Tricontinental Congress in February 1966 and offered them military training. Springing from a core of African intellectuals who were members of the Communist Party of Portugal, MPLA utilized and expanded relations with Cuba and Russia. Throughout the long liberation struggle, MPLA steadily defined its goals and ideology as Marxist-Leninist. Thus by the time the civil war broke out the political culture within the movement made Russian and Cuban aid both inevitable and the only acceptable option.

A very important consequence of the Angolan civil war was the defeat of South Africa at the hands of nonwhite Angolan and Cuban fighters. This defeat destroyed the myth that South African forces were invincible. Supporters of the South African regime among academics in Britain and the U.S. as well as African counterrevolutionaries like President Kamuzu Banda of Malawi had joined the chorus proclaiming the military might of South Africa. And yet, in the same way the Vietnamese and Cambodians defeated the U.S. in Indo-China, the quantitative military power of South Africa can be matched by guerrillas in Zimbabwe and Namibia. The defeat of South Africa in Angola also meant the defeat of a type of indigenous bourgeoisie characteristic of UNITA and FLNA that would have preserved capitalism and enhanced the influence of the metropolitan bourgeoisie of Portugal and South Africa in particular and of Western Europe and North America in general. It was no surprise that Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State, took calculated steps to deradicalize the liberation movements and diffuse the situations in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

The imperialist U.S. strategy for Southern Africa encouraged explicit recognition of and support for South Africa. Kissinger's visit to South Africa in 1976 (the first ever made by a U.S. Secretary of State to South Africa) and the military and financial agreements between the two countries over gold and oil that made the Geneva conference on Rhodesia possible are examples of such explicit recognition. The U.S. also accepted South African hegemony over the Bantustans and the neighboring states of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, and Zimbabwe even if the last two states fall under controlled black rule. Finally, the U.S. supported strengthening the neocolonial ties among the frontline states so as to weaken the rearbase for liberation movements. The only sacrificial lamb for this strategy is Ian Smith. His Rhodesian regime must go in order to secure South Africa and at the same time strengthen neocolonialism on its borders.

More importantly, the Angolan struggle unmasked the nature of imperialism itself in Southern Africa. It was no coincidence that South Africa, the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, and Japan found themselves on the same side. Indeed, if the U.S. Congress had authorized the funds requested by the State Department, there might have been a massive Western military presence in Angola. In fact the entry of South African troops into Angola to occupy the Cunene Dams -- a move only lightly condemned in the Western press -- and their thrust almost to Luanda, was based on the premise they maintain that Western powers would be sending reinforcements. It was the entry of Cuban troops that pro-

voked the strongest protests from Western powers.

Multinational corporations and Western governments had heavy financial interests in the Angolan economy, especially in its oil and minerals. Zaire, Zambia, Angola, Namibia, and South Africa together constitute the richest mineral and natural resource area on the continent. The multinational companies and governments of Western Europe and North America want to keep these resources for themselves.

To these factors must be added the strategic interests of the U.S. and NATO powers. The latter has been authorized to operate south of the Tropic of Cancer in the southern Atlantic and the Indian Oceans, in order to protect the trading and shipping routes around the Cape of Good Hope. The United States, France and Britain have established new military bases in the Indian Ocean, supposedly to preserve their hegemony there in the face of an increasing naval presence of the Soviet Union. After the visit to Africa of then-U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, in 1976 the U.S. started arming pro-Western regimes such as Kenya and Zaire. At the same time, France and Italy are sending massive amounts of technology and armaments to Southern Africa. French and Italian companies are licensed to produce a wide range of weapons in South Africa in collaboration with the South African-sponsored Armaments Development Corporation. The United States is reportedly sending enriched uranium to South Africa and France and West Germany are assisting it in building a nuclear capability.

In addition to the economic, military, and strategic interests of the West in Southern Africa, one should not forget or underestimate the human element: what Smith calls "kith and kin." People in Western Europe feel emotionally and culturally close to the white settlers in Africa, a situation that European governments cannot ignore. A strong streak of racism also runs through most Western countries, especially Britain. Among other factors, an outburst of racial ill feelings against nonwhite immigrants in Britain in the 1960's prevented Harold Wilson's government from taking any serious action against the Smith regime in Rhodesia.

For these reasons, when the chips are down, I believe the West will be on the side of the white settler governments of Southern Africa, supporting them either directly or indirectly through puppet African regimes.

Namibia and the Rise of Worker/Student Consciousness

The social and economic conditions of Namibian workers are worse than those of South Africans. Namibia is exploited perhaps more than any other South African country both by South African and international -- especially American and German -- capital. The country's major economic activity -- mining -- is completely controlled by Germany, Britain, the United States and South Africa, and its second major economic activity -- fishing -- is owned and managed by nine South African companies. Most of Namibia itself is a desert where a few herdsmen eke out a miserable existence. Anxious to guarantee a continued labor supply to the foreign owned mining, fishing, and agricultural companies in Namibia,

the South African government has instituted a system of contract labor that forces or induces Namibians to leave their traditional villages and work for very low wages. The surplus capital generated by such cheap contract labor is the major factor that makes Namibian, South African, and Rhodesian mines highly profitable and competitive. The use of the migrant or contract laborer is the single most important and distinctive feature of Southern African socioeconomic life. Since the beginning of this century, workers have been moved hundreds of miles from neighboring states to South African gold mines and farms. Labor recruitment continues even to this day in such a radical, anti-imperialist country as Mozambique. An estimated one million migrant workers work in South Africa alone. Because of the rigid system of apartheid, much of the black labor force already living in South Africa is itself migrant, drawn from the reserves now given the modern name Bantustan. The Bantustans are nothing more than reserve labor armies for the South African industrial system. The white regime can draw upon these armies when it likes and then throw the workers back into the Bantustans to fend for themselves when they are no longer needed. The situation relieves industry of such built-in labor costs as insurance, pensions, old-age benefits, and adequate social amenities.

In the 1970's two other significant developments have swelled the ranks of these migrant workers. The first is the population explosion. In Zimbabwe, for example, the annual percentage of population increase reached four per-

cent in 1972 and continues to rise. Since 1972, the number of babies born to the 6.5 million Africans in the country each year has equalled the entire white population of 270,000 persons. In 1971 Smith called for at least one baby from each white family, but the birthrate in that beleaguered society has continued to fall. The second development of major political importance is the number of blacks who are completing primary and secondary schooling and are pouring into a job market that has neither jobs nor even the barest social amenities to offer them. The number of educated job seekers is growing each year, and it is this large body of unemployed workers and youth who brought about the great Namibian general strike of 1972 and the Soweto and Langa uprisings in South Africa in 1976.

Studies indicate that the majority of participants involved in liberation struggles throughout Southern Africa are migrant workers and students. Migrant workers are those who have had some work experience on white-owned farms or in the cities and thus have experienced exploitation but at the same time have kept their roots in the traditional economy. These persons who oscillate between the city and the village, dependent on both for their existence over a long period of time are the backbone of the wars of liberation. This oscillation is an integral part of the colonial capitalist system that has developed in Southern Africa. Over the years, it has undermined the peasant economy and established the migrant workers as a reserve army of labor.

Student participation in the liberation struggle is a

comparatively new phenomenon of the 1970's. But, as school dropouts have swelled the ranks of the unemployed, those in school have seen little point in continuing their studies.

The general strike of Namibian workers in 1972 was markedly different from previous activities because of the intensity of the organization and the secrecy observed. The workers were organized into factory-based cells apparently by SWAPO, which revealed plans for the strike to the OAU Liberation Committee in 1971. There was evidence of a strong organization in the segregated residential areas of Windhoek, especially after the strike had started. While workers officially went out on strike to demand higher wages and an end to the iniquitous system of contract labor, the message was really a political one. It was in fact a demand for national independence and an end to the direct colonialism of South Africa. At long last, the message from Dar-es-Salaam- and Lusaka-based liberation movements was reaching the people by radio, printed literature, and trained political organisers and fighters.

Unlike the general strike attempts of the 1960's, the 1972 Namibian strike had clear objectives. Motivation was maintained by a string of tightly organised factory-based cells and reinforced by ten-house units in the segregated residential areas. For the first time in the history of the labor movement in Namibia and South Africa, foreign migrants and indigenous workers joined hands to stop work for a common cause. The strikers refused to identify their leaders and insisted on negotiating as a group. The police

thus could not arrest the leaders as a prelude to breaking the strike. What was significant about the strike besides the intensity of its organization was the heightened level of consciousness among South African and Namibian black workers. This formed the basis for the uprisings of Soweto and Langa in 1976. In Soweto, for example, the African Student Movement and the Parents Association organized the protests into tightly knit house-based units.

As the 1972 strike had indicated, SWAPO has managed to organize both an internal and an external organization in Namibia. SWAPO spokesmen insist that theirs is not a political party but a broad movement encompassing all strata of society. Only ultimately when Namibia is free and independent do they hope to form a political party as FRELIMO has in Mozambique. Ideologically, SWAPO is right to insist on a broad movement at the present stage. The revolution is going through a national democratic phase, encompassing all social groups and classes in society that are opposed to the common enemy of the Namibian people. Thus unity on a broad front at this stage is essential. In Namibia, a number of significant social groups have remained outside SWAPO, although there was an attempt at unity under the shortlived Namibian Peoples Convention. SWAPO has encountered difficulty because its leadership has not been entirely progressive or committed to a socialist revolution. To prevent a revolution from being derailed by conservative forces, Chairman Mao Tse Tung stressed that leadership in a broad movement must remain in the hands of ideologically advanced

elements. This has not been the case with SWAPO.

In spite of this limitation, which has caused considerable tension within SWAPO, the movement has carried the ideology of revolutionary change to the masses of Namibia. In the journal Namibia Today and in petitions to the U.N. Council of Namibia, SWAPO has exposed the oppressive nature of the South African regime. More importantly, by recruiting and infiltrating guerrillas into Namibia under very difficult conditions, it has mobilized the people and raised their level of consciousness. SWAPO believes, as did Che Guevara, that armed struggle is itself a vast school for teaching the people about their rights, teaching the leaders of the movements about their duties, and instructing all the people about their new nation and the system. When bombs drop and kill people, individuals examine the broken pieces, see that the bomb was made in Germany, France, America, or South Africa, and in that way identify the enemy. When needed medicines, food, and weapons arrive from Dar-es-Salaam, Luanda, or Maputo the friend has identified himself.

Liberation Strategy of the Frontline States

The diplomatic work of the OAU in Southern Africa has been undertaken by the five frontline states -- Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola. The OAU's Liberation Committee is headquartered in Dar-es-Salaam and all except Botswana maintain offices and camps for liberation movements. Among other things, the frontline states have made a big effort to unite the liberation movements of

Zimbabwe and also tried to promote the Geneva constitutional conference. As a result of this involvement, the frontline states have been caught in the imperialist network and face contradictions within their own societies.

All the frontline states have faced severe economic problems in the last three years, brought about in part by the severe drought of 1973-74, the rising prices, oil inflation, and the need to import large quantities of food. Zaire is saddled with a huge national debt; Zambia was hit by the sharp drop in the price of copper, difficulties of transporting goods in and out of the country on the Benguela Railways (and the Tan-Zam railway to Dar-es-Salaam after the Rhodesian border was closed in 1973), and continuing poor agricultural yields. Because of these economic difficulties, Zaire and Zambia accepted South African loans and aid, as well as increased American aid. For this reason, perhaps, the policies of these two governments were heavily influenced by the South African position throughout the Angolan crisis. Although Tanzania and Botswana had similar economic problems and also have received increased American aid, they refused South African aid and their position on Angola has been firmly anti-imperialist.

The liberation strategy of the frontline states stems directly from the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969⁵, which clearly states that "we would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than to kill." Armed struggle is supported only if the main strategy of constitutional negotiations is denied "by the actions of those at present in

power in Southern Africa...." Even in the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration of 1974, armed struggle is endorsed as a tactic in Zimbabwe and Namibia, but not in South Africa. For the latter, the Declaration states:

Africa's responsibility is clear. We must ostracise, and urge the rest of the world to ostracise the South African regime as at present organized. Africa must maintain the economic, political, and cultural boycott of South Africa. The OAU and the UN must work in concert for the extension of the boycott.

Although it is known that these boycotts have never been really effective in dealing with a network of international capitalism and multilateral imperialism, support for liberation movements of South Africa is mentioned only in passing in the declaration after the boycott strategy has been discussed.

Angola provided the litmus test for the Lusaka Manifesto strategy. The intervention of South Africa clearly showed that it wanted to surround itself with Bantustans or regimes that would willingly accept its hegemony. That is precisely the purpose behind the Turnhalle talks going on in Namibia and the thrust of South Africa's interest in Zimbabwe. Smith's cantankerous behavior at Geneva, followed by his move to set up a puppet organization of traditional chiefs which will negotiate an "internal settlement" with him, has had the full backing of South Africa. The forty South African heli-

copters withdrawn from Zimbabwe before the Geneva Conference and oil cuts have all been restored and are now being used to attack ZANU guerrilla camps in Mozambique. As already stressed, the white minority regimes will not transfer power peacefully if such a transfer threatens their vital interests or changes their social order.

The experience in Angola also showed that Africa's preoccupation with unity among liberation movements is counterproductive. A national government made up of the three liberation movements of Angola just could not work. Unity between a socialist oriented party and any puppet movement financed by C.I.A. would have no basis for success. Unity can only be achieved between movements that share similar ideologies and common objectives.

Post-Liberation Angola and Mozambique

The most important feature of the independence of both Angola and Mozambique is that the movements that came into power had developed their own administrative apparatus and military establishments. They did not take over the powerful bureaucratic and military machinery that had been developed by the departing colonial power and used against the interests of the people. Rather, they removed the entire Portuguese administrative apparatus, root and branch, and moved their own into position. Whole files were burned, offices were turned into schools, and most of the top Portuguese personnel, white or black, were summarily dismissed or arrested. The FRELIMO or MPLA militants who took over the management of the vital state institutions had no knowledge

of or use for Portuguese methods of operation. After all, bureaucratic structures reflect the attitudes of their architects as much as do established cultural practices.

The management and control of a liberation movement generally encompasses most of the functions of a government -- treasury, foreign affairs, information, security and intelligence, defense, education and social services -- the departments of most liberation movements correspond to those of a state. The work becomes complex and extended when an area is liberated, because this immediately involves exporting and importing of food, currency control, settling of disputes in court, and provision for social services. Thus movements that anticipate such work frequently establish bases and obtain experience in exercising power long before they are called upon to form the government. This process of organizing, establishing, and exercising that power in exile is extremely important for effective liberation.

It is instructive to study the way FRELIMO established its first administration. It divided Mozambique into two parts: the provinces north of the Sabi River that were liberated during the war and where FRELIMO politico military institutions were already operating, and those in the south, which had none. In the north, FRELIMO merely strengthened the administrative apparatus it had established during the war. The southern provinces were administered quite differently: the Portuguese administration was completely removed, and new "dynamisation groups" were established in factories, farms, and villages to educate the people both about the

evils of Portuguese colonialism and the principles of the now socioeconomic order that FRELIMO planned to establish. Mental decolonization was given as much priority as were structural and institutional changes.

In Mozambique and Angola, power was exercised by radical elements within both the movements and the state. These elements were irrevocably opposed to colonialism on clearly formulated ideological grounds. They had led the migrant workers and peasants in the war and sustained resistance efforts over many difficult years when no one entertained any hope of success. When the petty bourgeoisie in Southern Africa was seeking accommodation and acceptance by the white settlers, these radical elements correctly defined the problem and adopted an ideological opposition to these policies based on the broad principles laid down by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. The application of these principles to the African situation was articulated eloquently by Amilcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau and was put into practice by Damora Machel of Mozambique and Augustino Neto of Angola. The national congress, organized by FRELIMO in February 1977 to launch a new party, had as its theme the "building of a vanguard party on the basis of scientific socialism." MPLA plans a similar congress later in the year. Since coming to power both FRELIMO and, to a lesser extent, MPLA have taken steps to control their national economies. They are endeavoring to go beyond mere nationalization by creating socioeconomic institutions in which committees of trained and disciplined workers take over full control of factories and

cooperatives. More importantly, they have accepted the reality that transformation of a system from colonial capitalism to socialism must entail temporary but serious disruption of the national economy and sometimes critical shortages of essential commodities.

The new rulers of Mozambique and Angola have had no use for the metropolitan bourgeoisie with whom they fought a long and bitter guerrilla war. Portuguese businessmen are anxious to continue dealing with the former colonies, although their main effort is to move Portugal into the European Economic Community and strengthen their bargaining power there. By 1976 trade figures between Portugal on the one hand and Mozambique and Angola on the other had dropped to fifty percent and sixty-five percent, respectively of 1973 figures. In the context of Southern Africa, it is necessary to point out that both FRELIMO and MPLA have maintained non-racial policies over the years. Both Neto and Machel have stressed their opposition to the capitalist, colonial settler system of government and not to individual whites. Those white settlers who accept the new social order can remain in these countries permanently.

The new rulers of Mozambique and Angola also do not deal with the indigenous petty bourgeoisie that was present under Portuguese colonialism. These people did not participate in the liberation war; in some instances, in fact, they were used as agents for the PIDE, the notorious Portuguese International Police. When the petty bourgeois elements within GUMO in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola tried to form

a coalition with local settlers after the coup in Portugal, they easily routed and have been distrusted ever since.

One of the fundamental mistakes made by leaders of new states that emerged in the 1960's was to try to absorb the military and security apparatus used by the departing colonial powers. Within the first decade of independence, most of the new post-liberation machinery in these countries had been removed and the older stronger military apparatus dominated the government. The military takeovers generally took place when the politicians tried to change the existing social order. The most publicized case is that of Uganda, where President Milton Obote's charter for the common man was foiled by an illiterate murderer, Amin, who had studied his trade of abduction and killing in the colonial army in Kenya.

The People's War in Zimbabwe

In Zimbabwe for many years, the educated black elite was preoccupied with the politics of what was called racial partnership, a euphemism for white supremacy. Even when that policy was buried with the Central African Federation in 1960, there remained a lingering hope among these blacks that Britain would somehow intervene, even though all statements and actions pointed to the contrary. A study of plans for launching of the guerrilla war in April 1966, for example, shows clearly that blacks assumed that Britain would see this event as a breakdown in law and order, one of the conditions Britain had defined as warranting military intervention.

The failures of the first skirmishes of guerrilla warfare in 1966-68 led the movement, embodied by ZANU and ZAPU, to a fundamental reappraisal of its strategy and tactics in 1969-70. Shorn of any illusions that economic sanctions could succeed or that the toothless British bulldog would intervene, they then conceived a strategy of protracted war, beginning with the political education of the peasants and workers in the projected areas of operation. This strategy immediately brought the movement closer to the people, increased the number of recruits, and baffled the Rhodesian security forces. In 1972, when ZANU started an intense war of resistance in northeastern Rhodesia, Smith complained to his parliament that the government was now dealing with a new and dangerous type of guerrilla who did not carry a gun but masqueraded as a peasant; this new guerrilla, warned Smith, took every opportunity to pollute the minds of the peasants against the government and Europeans. ZANU's and ZAPU's protracted war strategy paid off until it was interrupted by South Africa's attempts at detente and by the political upheaval within the ZANU organization that led to the death of ZANU's National Chairman, Herbert Chitepo and several other persons. The tragedy was a bitter lesson on how now to handle contradictions within and outside the movement. Like Edouardo Mondlane in Mozambique, Chitepo's leadership in ZANU had made a complete break with past nationalist trends. Chitepo committed the organization to independence through armed struggle. By the time armed struggle began in 1976, recruits from Zimbabwe

had flooded the ZANU camps. With the intensification of the war, the number of refugees and freedom-fighters has increased and now stands at about 70,000 people, the largest number of refugees and fighters that any liberation movement has had to handle at any one time in Southern Africa. There are reports of students leaving schools half empty and of workers abandoning jobs to join the freedom-fighters. In March 1977, the Tanzanian newspaper The Daily News reported that ZANU now controls semiliberated areas covering about a third of the country. The Zimbabwe liberation war can now be described as a people's war. As in Namibia, all the factors for revolution have been there for decades: land hunger, contract labor, unemployment for school dropouts. Repressive measures have increased in scale and brutalization of the peasant population has been started.

Again, the critical ingredient that turned the skirmishes of 1966 into a people's war ten years later appears to be the articulation of a strong socialist and revolutionary ideology. The leadership of ZANU (especially the military cadres who were trained in socialist countries) were exposed to radical literature and were forced by the brutality and exploitation of the system in Zimbabwe to think more clearly about alternative systems and solutions. Hence, they began to articulate socialist principles based on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. This socialist ideology was stated clearly by ZIPA, the Zimbabwe Peoples' Army. Machingura, ZIPA's publicity secretary, has stated that their aim is to establish a proletarian party in Zimbabwe that could destroy all colonial

capitalist structures, disengage the country from imperialist connections, and build a self-reliant national economy.⁷ Not only was this ideology stated, but it has been demonstrated at work and on the battlefields. ZIPA has now been integrated into ZANU. While there are still some purely nationalist and conservative tendencies in ZANU, the progressive element that articulates socialist policies appears to dominate, certainly so among the leaders. If this trend continues, Zimbabwe peasants and workers can look forward to a genuine and meaningful independence in the future.

But that independence must still be won. The most significant section of the white settler society in Rhodesia today is its comparatively few white farmers. Studies made in Dar-es-Salaam show that although these farmers are the ones who bear the brunt of most of the guerrilla fighting, they remain the most reluctant to change. The continued intransigence of the 6,000 Rhodesian tobacco farmers helps to explain the behavior of Ian Smith. European plantation farming was set up in Rhodesia with large subsidies and loans from the government, was supported over a century by harsh, legislative control of labor, and was protected by armed forces, who kept Africans off the land that was taken away from them. No black Rhodesian government, even a neo-colonial one, would back up white farmers to this extent. It would give most of the land back to the Africans, leading to an immediate collapse of the European plantations as economic and political units. The intransigence of Smith in talks since the unilateral declaration of independence can thus be explained by the considerable influence these 6,000

farmers have on the ruling Rhodesian Front. Although the front is a coalition of white farmers and white-collar workers, a few wealthy farmers like Bill Lilford finance the Rhodesian Front and therefore have a heavy influence on policy. Most of the members of the South African and Rhodesian cabinets are farmers or have landed interest. Industrialists, who would prefer a neocolonial solution inside these countries so they can continue their international association, have no great influence on domestic policy.

If this analysis is correct, the task is not to increase the dialogue with South African industrialists, as U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young suggested in a recent press interview in Africa magazine, but rather to break the resistance of the white farmers. As far as I know, there is no communication between these men and the representatives of Western governments or even the frontline African states that are all so anxious to achieve a constitutional settlement. I would predict that even if Smith returned to a Geneva conference in the near future, there would be no transfer of power until the backbone of the farmers has been broken. The only people who can do this are the guerrillas.

Not surprisingly, the most difficult point in the 1976 Geneva conference discussions of the structure of the proposed Zimbabwe interim government was control of the armed forces, the police, and related bureaucracies and agencies. The Smith regime insisted on complete white settler control during the two-year interim period and retention of the basic structures of power even after independence. Ian

Smith stated that these forces would guarantee peace and stability long after the white European parliament had been phased out. He said that under this scheme he would convene a meeting of parliament at the end of the interim period to approve the form final independence would take. If parliament did not approve of the performance of the African ministers at that point the whites could resume power. The four African delegations at the conference unanimously agreed that political power should be transferred to the African majority, but two of the moderate delegations -- Bishop Abel Muzorewa's ANC and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole's faction of ZANU -- were not opposed to white control of the existing armed forces. They argued that once blacks had political power in their hands, they could change the makeup of the armed forces by the simple process of appointment and dismissal, promotion and demotion. Only the Patriotic Front delegation, led by Robert Mugabe of ZANU and Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU, insisted on the demobilization of the entire Rhodesian armed forces, the disarming of all white settlers, and the disbanding of the police and security forces, so that they could be replaced by ZIPA guerrilla forces. The much-discussed "British presence" was intended to help achieve this limited objective, not to recolonize Zimbabwe.

The willingness of the moderate delegations to accommodate at least part of the Rhodesian armed forces is not surprising because these groups do not have guerrilla forces to put in place of the existing machinery. On the other hand, a leader of a movement with thousands of

guerrillas could not enter a government without them and still remain their leader.

The real issue in Zimbabwe as well as in Namibia today is no longer majority rule but neocolonialism versus liberation, that is continued foreign domination versus true liberation. The Turnhalle talks in Windhoek and the Geneva conference on Zimbabwe are attempts to produce neocolonial solutions and to defeat the aims of true liberators. So the political crisis is an ideological one. Indeed, if FRELIMO-type governments were established in Zimbabwe and Namibia, the pressures on South Africa would become insurmountable, and the ruling national bourgeoisies in countries like Zaire and Malawi would lose control over their populations and would be replaced by more radical elements. The emergence of radical governments in Southern Africa would generate a trend throughout the whole continent that would sweep away the all-too-many reactionary and neocolonial regimes that have mushroomed everywhere. Such a phenomenon also would change the complexion of the OAU itself. It could create a political environment that was hostile to capitalism and international imperialism. Three contending schools of thought about the situation can best be described by what they do not want: Smith and Vorster do not want nationalists, but prefer traditional chiefs; America and Britain and most OAU states do not want African socialists, but prefer the nationalists whom they know to be defenders and guarantors of capitalism; finally, Russia, China and the socialist world, and a few African states do not want a neocolonial

establishment but a socialist liberated Southern Africa.

Exiled Movements as Ideological Catalysts

The institutions of contract and migrant labor are part and parcel of the system of apartheid in Southern Africa and have been in existence for several decades. The population explosion and the high number of educated job seekers also are old problems, although they may be more acute in the 1970's. These factors cannot have created the new situation that is now attracting so much international attention. The new catalyst is the ideology of the liberation movements that has now reached the masses in Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. It is the fuel that has been added to the smouldering heap of injustices and brutalities that has been accumulating for more than a century. It is absolutely necessary to stress the key role of liberation movements in the current situation, because many American and British scholars who have written about Southern Africa in the last fifteen years have labeled these movements in exile as irrelevant and out of touch. Kenneth Grundy described them as heads without bodies and predicted that they would never achieve their aims. Herbert Adams even went to the extreme of pointing to leaders of the puppet Bantustans in South Africa as new legitimate leaders of the African people. The U.S. State Department, in the now famous Tar Baby Memorandum, argued that the liberation movements could never win by force. A number of liberal writers on South Africa such as Leo Kuper, Pierre Van Der Berghe, Leonard Thompson, and others did not

believe the exile movements had a decisive role to play once they left their home base. Even a group of eminent South African, British, and American scholars, who met at Yale University in 1975 to review the changed situation after the collapse of the Portuguese empire, still failed to understand the critical ideological input of the exiled movements. If this paper can place the contribution of these exiled movements into proper perspective, my purpose in accepting the invitation to speak here will have been achieved.

The Problem of Unity

I have left until the end the vexing question of unity. In discussing African unity, I must return to the positive role that has been played by those in exile. The liberation struggle in Southern Africa is the one issue that has kept the OAU states united. It is an issue that does not affect most OAU member states directly; therefore, they can pronounce judgment on it without threatening themselves. It is also an issue of colonialism and foreign intervention, the two issues that the OAU was established to fight, and on which every member agrees. Most crisis-ridden OAU meetings explode into applause when delegates discuss Southern Africa, even though they may differ fundamentally on support for the armed struggle or the conduct of the Liberation Committee in Dar-es-Salaam. Even distinguished visitors who happen to disagree with their hosts can always cover up by declaring common objectives on the liberation of Southern Africa.

In Zimbabwe, the very wide gap between ZANU and ZAPU, created when they were banned as political parties in 1964, has been narrowed as they have discovered common ground in the battlefields. Such common ground struck in the bedrock of ideology is the solution to the problem of unity. Thus the 1975 formation of ZIPA -- a combination of ZANU and ZAPU cadres -- represented more of a step forward than did the unity accord of December 1974. The unity accord brought together four political groups -- ZAPU, ZANU, ANC, and FROLIZI -- with diverse political ideologies, different methods of struggling, and sharply conflicting personalities. The accord managed to present these four diverse groups as one delegation at the sham constitutional conference on a South African train over the Zambezi River in September 1975, but the unity disintegrated soon afterwards. With the exception of FROLIZI, all the groups are back where they were before the Lusaka Accord. And yet, the ZIPA union has grown. The Patriotic Front, formed before the Geneva Conference in 1976 as a political equivalent of ZIPA, survived the conference and continues to hold but only as a loose diplomatic alliance. Whether the Patriotic Front lasts or not, the point that should be stressed again is that meaningful unity can only be achieved by those movements that have a common ideological perspective. It is futile to try and unite progressive movements that want change and reactionary ones that want to defend the status quo.

Conclusions

In the 1970's, liberation movements in exile have been challenged by internally based, constitutionally organized parties such as the Black People's Convention in South Africa, the African National Council of Zimbabwe, and the Namibian People's Convention. As would be expected, the colonialist forces have tended to favor these comparatively moderate organizations. The ANC of Zimbabwe is one extreme example of this phenomenon, because it even obtained the recognition of the OAU at the expense of the exile movements. In spite of this development, ZANU and ZAPU have retained their firm hold on the minds of the people in Zimbabwe, and it now appears that the Patriotic Front will ultimately supersede the ANC. In South Africa, large numbers of students who came from Soweto have joined the organizations of their parents, the ANC or PAC, rather than the BPC or the South African Students' Organization (SASO). In Namibia, the Turnhalle Conference talks have gathered together an impressive array of neocolonial social forces in the society. But the Turnhalle Conference talks will not produce even the neocolonial solution they are seeking unless SWAPO is brought into the picture.

Finally, let me stress that the present political crisis is an ideological one in all its dimensions, both domestic and international. It cannot and will not be resolved easily at hurriedly called constitutional conferences in Geneva, at the Victoria Falls Bridge, or even at the well planned Turnhalle talks. The social forces that are locked

into continuing battle are both evenly matched and as yet unwilling to compromise and bridge the seemingly wide gap between what is being demanded and what can be supplied. Agreement on words like "majority rule" and "peaceful settlement" conceal wide differences between the forces of change and reaction. Given the configuration of social forces at work, real peace and settlement in Southern Africa still lies far ahead and out of reach.

NOTES

1. See Hamza Alavi's article, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," in New Left Review, No. 74, July-August 1972.
2. Ibid., p. 62.
3. Samir Amin, Neo-Colonialism in West Africa (Harmondsworth: Penguin African Library, 1973). Abdullah Bujra and Nathan Shamuyarira, eds., Imperialism and Revolution in Southern Africa (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1977); Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya (London: Heinemann, 1975); Justinian F. Rweyemamu, Underdevelopment and Industrialisation in Tanzania (Nairobi: OUP, 1973); Clive Y. Thomas, Dependence and Transformation (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); Dan Nabudere, The Political Economy of Imperialism (London: Penguin, 1977); also see his critique of Issa Shivji's Class Struggles in Tanzania, and Mahmood Mamdani's Politics of Class Formation in Uganda in UTAFITI, vol. II, No. 1, 1977.
4. In the 1960's, the Soviet Union designated one liberation movement in each of the six countries under colonial or minority white rule in Africa as authentic. These were the ANC in South Africa, FRELIMO in Mozambique, MPLA in Angola, PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, ZAPU in Zimbabwe, and SWAPO in Namibia. At a conference of these so-called authentic movements at Khartoum in 1969, the Russians promised and gave substantial military and financial aid to the groups through the All-African Peoples' Solidarity Committee (AAPSO), headquartered in Cairo. These movements then received double aid from both the OAU Liberation Committee and AAPSO. AAPSO judges "authenticity" on the basis of a movement's mass support, representativeness, and its revolutionary ideology. Unlike the OAU, AAPSO selects only one movement in each country. Richard Gibson: African Liberation Movements, OUP, 1972, discusses the Khartoum meeting of AAPSO.
5. The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, 5th Summit Conference of East and Central African States, Lusaka, Zambia, April 14-16, 1969. Also read Dear Mr. Vorster ..., details of exchanges between President Kaunda of Zambia and Mr. Vorster, published by the Zambian Information Services, Lusaka, April 22, 1971; and my collection of Documents and Speeches on the OAU Strategy for Liberation Southern Africa in 1975, mimeographed, Department of Political Science, University of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.
6. The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, op.cit.,

paragraph 20. Or see paragraph 21 of the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration of 1974.

7. Machingura's interview "Face to Face," in Sunday News, Dar-es-Salaam.