Introduction

Michael E. Brown and Šumit Ganguly

Ethnic problems are widespread in contemporary world affairs. They are troublesome at best; politically, economically, and socially disruptive as a general rule; and horrifyingly violent at worst. In this book, we seek to advance understanding of ethnic problems by analyzing government policies with respect to ethnic groups, ethnic issues, and ethnic conflicts in Asia and the Pacific. Our contention is that government policies almost always have a significant impact on the course and trajectory of ethnic relations in the country in question. Through neglect, by accident, and by design, they can push countries in the direction of instability, conflict, and inequity, on the one hand, or stability, harmony, and justice, on the other. However, the extent to which and the ways in which government policies can affect ethnic dynamics have not received much focused attention in research and scholarship on the subject, and government policies have not been examined from a broad comparative perspective.

We do three main things. First, we trace the evolution of government policies with respect to ethnic problems in sixteen countries in Asia and the Pacific: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, China, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Vanuatu, and the Federated States of Micronesia. Our aim is to identify the main policy initiatives that have been undertaken, determine the ways in which policies have changed over time, and analyze the impact these policies have had on ethnic relations in the country in question. Second, we assess these policies. We try to determine how governments have fared in promoting peace, order, and stability, on the one hand, and political, economic, and social justice, on the other. We hope to identify the kinds of policies that were most effective, and the conditions under which they were effective, in promoting both peace and justice. Third, drawing on this descriptive and analytic foundation, we develop a set of general lessons and policy recommendations. The prob-

lem of managing ethnic relations will be a formidable policy challenge for most governments for the foreseeable future. We hope to develop some concrete advice for those who will have to formulate and implement government policies in this extremely sensitive and important area.

There are three reasons why this study focuses on government policies and ethnic relations in Asia and the Pacific, as opposed to some other part of the world. First, Asia is of great and growing importance in global affairs. It contains close to half of the world's population, and is home to several major powers. Asia is also the most economically dynamic part of the world, having experienced tremendous rates of economic growth in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. It is important for people both inside and outside the region to understand the forces—the dynamics of ethnic relations being among the most powerful—that are shaping the region.

Second, Asia and the Pacific are extremely interesting from an analytical standpoint. The countries in the region have different kinds of ethnic settings; they have pursued different kinds of broad policies; they have launched different kinds of policy initiatives in specific policy areas; and they have experienced an array of political, economic, and social outcomes. Some governments, for example, have embraced unicultural visions, while others have favored multicultural visions. Some governments have favored policies based on coercion, while others have favored inducement. Some countries have experienced violent conflict and civil war, while others have remained comparatively peaceful. The region as a whole therefore provides rich material for a comparative analysis of government policies with respect to ethnic relations. The fact that Asia and the Pacific are undergoing rapid economic and social change and corresponding ethnic tensions—problems with which other parts of the world might well have to contend—makes this region even more valuable from an analytical standpoint.

Third, government policies with respect to ethnic relations in Asia and the Pacific have not been studied from a broad comparative perspective. Most studies of ethnic issues in the region are case studies of problems in individual countries. They are often rich in detail, but they do not focus on the same sets of issues and they do not, therefore, provide a strong foundation for comparative analysis. Most comparative studies of the region examine broader political or economic issues. The few that focus on ethnic questions do not concentrate on the roles governments have played in shaping ethnic relations in the region.[1] This book will

1. For studies of ethnic problems in individual countries in Asia and the Pacific, see the sources listed in the bibliography found at the end of this volume. The few studies that take a comparative perspective on ethnic issues in the region include Ralph

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The Importance of Ethnic Problems

Almost every country faces ethnic problems of one kind or another. Estimates of the number of ethnic groups in the world vary widely, depending on whether the researchers making the estimates are interested in simple ethno-linguistic distinctiveness or political salience. Those who are interested in the former estimate that there are between 3,000 and 9,000 ethnic communities in the world.[2] Those who are interested in the latter find that at least 200 groups merit attention.[3] At least 160—roughly ninety percent—of the more than 180 states in the international system are ethnically heterogeneous in the sense that minorities constitute more than five percent of the total population.[4] At least seventy-five percent of all states contain politically significant minority groups, and at least half have to contend with self-determination movements.[5]

Premdas, S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, and Alan B. Anderson, eds., *Secessionist Movements in Comparative Perspective* (London: Pinter, 1990); K.M. de Silva and R.J. May, eds., *The Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict* (London: Pinter, 1991); K.M. de Silva and S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe, eds., *Peace Accords and Ethnic Conflict* (London: Pinter, 1993); David Brown, *The State and Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia* (London: Routledge, 1994); R.H. Barnes, Andrew Gray, and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., *Indigenous Peoples of Asia* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Association of Asian Studies, 1995); Stanley J. Tambiah, *Leveling Crowds: Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

2. See James Minahan, *Nations Without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. xvi; Bernard Nietschmann, "The Third World War," *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 1987), pp. 1–16.

3. One wide-ranging study estimates that 233 minority groups have either experienced systematic discriminatory treatment or have taken political action in support of collective interests; see Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993), pp. 5–11. Another survey identifies 210 groups that have mobilized in pursuit of political self-determination; see Minahan, *Nations Without States*, pp. xvi–xvii.

4. See David Welsh, "Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 45.

5. For politically salient groups in the world's 127 largest states, see Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, pp. 10–11. Gurr finds that almost seventy-five percent of these 127 states have politically salient minorities, even though he excludes groups that have fewer than 100,000 members or that constitute less than one percent of the total population of the country in question. For details on 210 self-determination movements in 91 states, see

Even in countries where ethnic minorities are minuscule in demographic terms and unassertive in pursuing political self-determination, ethnic problems have important social, economic, and political ramifications. In New Zealand, for example, Pacific Islanders constitute only five percent of the total population, but they pose difficult policy problems even though the country's citizenry is comparatively tolerant of ethnic diversity. Pacific Islanders, as well as New Zealand's larger, indigenous Maori population, tend to suffer from low income and education levels, high unemployment and incarceration levels, and more than their share of housing and health problems. The fact that these problems have persisted over time is a source of understandable concern both in policy circles in Wellington and in the general public.[6]

In countries where ethnic groups are politically active, ethnic issues are even more complicated and potentially volatile. Groups that are discriminated against socially, economically, and politically often form political organizations and make efforts to seek redress through established political channels. This almost inevitably leads to at least nonviolent conflict because political and economic gains for some usually involve losses for others. The formation of political parties along ethnic lines can be particularly divisive and polarizing. This has proven to be problematic in Canada, Czechoslovakia, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and the United Kingdom, to cite just a few examples.[7] Even when ethnic conflicts remain nonviolent, they can interfere with a country's political and economic development, and undermine civil society.

A critical threshold is reached when ethnic minorities decide that the best way to seek social, economic, and political justice is through self-government and regional autonomy arrangements. This is almost always seen by central authorities and ethnic majorities as the first step onto a slippery slope that may lead to secessionism and the disintegration of the state. Moves to acquire more autonomy are therefore almost always resisted energetically by these authorities and majorities. In Burma, for example, both civilian and military leaders have opposed regional auton-

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Minahan, *Nations Without States*, especially pp. 651–668. Another survey that admits to being less than comprehensive finds self-determination movements in some 70 countries; see Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer with Patricia L. Small, *Self-Determination in the New World Order* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 123–162.

6. See Andrew Sharp's chapter on New Zealand in this volume.

7. For a fuller discussion of the complicated interrelationship between ethnicity and party politics, see Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), chaps. 7–10.

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omy arrangements on the grounds that starting down this path would probably lead to the disintegration of the state. Leaders in Indonesia have held the same position ever since the country became independent. In these as in many other cases, genuine concerns about maintaining the territorial integrity of the state are reinforced by more parochial political and economic interests: central authorities in highly centralized states are generally keen to maintain their dominant political positions and to keep receiving the economic and financial benefits that flow from running the show. As noted above, conflict over self-government and regional autonomy is a widespread problem: at least 210 groups in 91 countries seek more regional autonomy or self-determination. In Asia alone, this is an acute political problem in, for example, Burma, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka.

In some cases, groups manage to resolve their differences without resorting to violence. In Belgium, Dutch-speaking Flemish and French-speaking Walloons have instituted regional autonomy arrangements without bloodshed. Czechoslovakia successfully implemented a "velvet divorce" in January 1993. In Asia, Thailand has experienced little sustained ethnic violence. In the Pacific, New Zealand has been, literally, an island of ethnic tranquility compared to what has transpired in other parts of the world.

Sadly, ethnic conflicts often become violent. In the 1990s alone, ethnic groups have engaged in open warfare in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Burma, Burundi, Croatia, Georgia, India, Liberia, Moldova, Russia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zaire. Ethnic conflicts simmer in countless other locations—Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Estonia, Fiji, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Lebanon, Macedonia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Serbia, Slovakia, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom, for example. Ethnic wars often produce high levels of death and destruction because they frequently involve direct, deliberate attacks on civilian populations. The numbers of people killed, wounded, or displaced in such conflicts are often counted in ten and hundreds of thousands, and in some cases in millions.[8] In the worst cases—Bosnia and Rwanda—genocide is carried out against specific ethnic groups.

Long-term trends are worrying. The most comprehensive statistical analysis of the issue concludes that all forms of communal conflict have increased markedly since the 1950s: nonviolent protest has more than

8. For an overview of major internal conflicts as of late 1995, see Michael E. Brown, "Introduction," in Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 4–7.

doubled; violent protest has increased fourfold; and open rebellion has increased almost fourfold. Since the 1950s, over one hundred minority groups have engaged in some form of rebellion.[9] One should note that, at the same time, the incidence of inter-state war has plummeted compared to previous historical eras. No great power wars have taken place since 1945. Western Europe, North America, and South America have experienced only one inter-state war, over the Falkland Islands. Only 30 of the 164 wars fought since 1945—eighteen percent of the total—were classic inter-state wars.[10] In 1990, only one of the 31 major armed conflicts then under way was an inter-state war.[11] In 1995, none of the 35 major armed conflicts then in progress was fundamentally inter-state in character. Internal conflict is the most pervasive form of armed conflict in the international system today; most of these conflicts have important ethnic dimensions; and it appears that this state of affairs will continue into the future.

Ethnic conflicts—in both their nonviolent and violent manifestations—often have important regional and international implications. Ethnic conflicts can send large numbers of refugees fleeing across international borders into neighboring states. Ethnic conflicts can also create economic and military problems for neighboring states. Trade can be disrupted, and neighboring states can be used as supply conduits and bases of operations. In the worst case, instability and conflict can spread from one state to another. This often happens when ethnic groups straddle formal borders, as they frequently do. In addition to being the passive victims of ethnic turmoil, neighboring states often take active steps to intervene in nearby conflicts—in some cases for defensive reasons, in some cases to protect ethnic brethren, and in some cases for opportunistic reasons.[12] Distant international powers and international organizations often become engaged in ethnic conflicts as well—for humanitarian reasons, to restore regional stability, to maintain principles of international law and order, or for narrower interest-based reasons.

9. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, pp. 98–100.

10. Kalevi J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 21–25. For more discussion, see John Mueller, *Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

11. A major armed conflict is one in which at least one thousand people have been killed. This is a widely used definition.

12. For more discussion of the regional dimensions and implications of ethnic and internal conflicts, see Michael E. Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," in Brown, *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, pp. 590–600.

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For all of these reasons, it is important to understand the dynamics of ethnic relations, the causes of ethnic conflicts, the processes by which ethnic conflicts become violent, and what well-meaning leaders and governments can do about these problems.

The Importance of Government Policy

Ethnic relations in any given country can be influenced by a wide range of factors. At the domestic level, these include demographic patterns and trends, pre-colonial and colonial legacies, economic factors and developments, the political agendas and aspirations of individual ethnic groups, governmental neglect, and governmental policy initiatives (which are not always framed with the well-being of society as a whole in mind). At the regional level, ethnic problems can be influenced by cross-border ethnic complications and the actions of neighboring states, which are often unhelpful. At the international level, developments in the economic arena and the actions of international powers and international organizations can influence the course of events.

Government policies, therefore, constitute only one part of the overall equation—although they constitute an important part of it. One way to frame this issue is, first, to distinguish between factors that are internal and external to the country in question, and second, to distinguish between elite-level and mass-level factors.[13] Therefore, four main sets of factors need to be taken into account in the analysis of ethnic relations and ethnic conflicts, and they can be depicted in a two-by-two matrix. (See Table 1.)

First, there is no doubt that ethnic relations are influenced to a very great degree by domestic, mass-level factors. These factors include the ethnic composition and geographic distribution of ethnic communities in the country in question, pre-colonial and colonial legacies that affect

Table 1. Influences on Ethnic Relations.

	Internal	External
Elite-level	Domestic Elites and Government Policies	Regional and International Actors
Mass-level	Domestic Factors and Developments	Regional Factors and Developments

13. This draws on and is adapted from ibid., pp. 572–590.

relations between and among ethnic groups, and group histories more generally. A very large body of scholarship—representing, one could argue, the dominant approach to the study of ethnic relations and attendant political problems—focuses on other factors that operate domestically and at a mass level: intra-state security concerns, economic problems, the impact of modernization on societal relations, and patterns of social and cultural discrimination.

Some scholars focus on the security concerns that develop when states become weak and individual ethnic groups within these states feel compelled to provide for their own defense.[14] The problem is that, in taking steps to defend themselves, groups often threaten the security of others. This can lead these other groups to take steps that diminish the security of the first group. This spiral of escalation is known as the security dilemma. Other scholars give great weight to the economic problems that most states experience at one time or another, and the impact these economic problems can have on intra-state and inter-group tensions.[15] Unemployment, inflation, and resource competitions, especially for land, contribute to societal tensions and frustrations, and can provide the breeding ground for conflict. Discriminatory economic systems, which often discriminate along ethnic lines, can also generate feelings of resentment and levels of frustration that can lead to violence.[16] Many scholars have pointed to economic development and modernization as sources of domestic political turmoil.[17] The process of modernization, the advent of

14. See Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Brown, *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, pp. 103–124; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 41–75; Milton J. Esman, *Ethnic Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 244–245.

15. For a general discussion and several case studies, see S.W.R. de A. Samarasinghe and Reed Coughlan, eds., *Economic Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict* (London: Pinter, 1991). For a detailed discussion of the economic roots of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, see Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), especially chap. 3. For a discussion of the economic sources of turmoil in the developing world, see Sandy Gordon, "Resources and Instability in South Asia," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 66–87.

16. For an overview of Marx on the economic roots of domestic violence, see James B. Rule, *Theories of Civil Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), chap. 2; A.S. Cohan, *Theories of Revolution* (New York: Wiley, 1975), chaps. 4–5.

17. See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968); Samuel P. Huntington, "Civil Violence and the Process of Development," in *Civil Violence and the International System*, Adelphi Paper No. 83 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1971), pp. 1–15; Ted

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18. For details and discussion, see B
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19. See, for example, John A. Vasqu
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industrialization, and the introduction of new technologies, it is said, bring about a wide variety of profound social changes: migration and urbanization disrupt existing family and social systems and undermine traditional political institutions; better education, higher literacy rates, and improved access to growing mass media raise awareness of where different groups stand in society. At a minimum, this places strains on existing social systems. It also raises economic and political expectations, and can lead to mounting frustration when these expectations are not met. Entrenched patterns of social and cultural discrimination constitute another set of factors that operate to a very great degree at a mass level.

A second set of factors, supported by a large but less voluminous body of scholarship, emphasizes the importance of mass-level factors that originate beyond the borders of the country in question. Journalists and policymakers often talk about conflicts "spilling over" from one place to another or spreading "like wildfire."[18] In thinking about how conflicts spread from one place to another, they often rely on crude analogies to floods, fires, diseases, and other forces of nature. Scholars often get caught up in this kind of thinking as well. Indeed, there is a sizable scholarly literature that frames this problem as a "contagion" problem.[19] One can bring more analytical precision to this discussion by identifying specific problems and mass-level mechanisms that can lead conflicts to spread from one place to another. These include the economic, political, and security problems generated by large flows of refugees; the economic problems that develop when cross-border patterns of economic activity

Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); Walker Conner, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?" *World Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (April 1972), pp. 319–355; Walker Conner, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). For an overview of this literature, see Saul Newman, "Does Modernization Breed Ethnic Conflict?" *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 451–478. For critiques of this approach, see Rod Aya, "Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Contrasting Models of Collective Violence," *Theory and Society*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (July 1979), pp. 1–38; Charles Tilly, "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?" *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (April 1973), pp. 425–447.

18. For details and discussion, see Brown, "Introduction," *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, pp. 23–26.

19. See, for example, John A. Vasquez, "Factors Related to the Contagion and Diffusion of International Violence," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *The Internationalization of Communal Strife* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 149–172; Ralph R. Premdas, "The Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict: Some Theoretical Explorations," in de Silva and May, *The Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict*, p. 10; Gurr, *Minorities at Risk*, pp. 132–135. For an excellent overview of this literature, see Stuart Hill and Donald Rothchild, "The Contagion of Political Conflict in Africa and the World," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 716–735.

are disrupted; the military problems that emerge when the territory of neighboring states is used for sanctuary or resupply; and the instability problems that can be transmitted from one country to another when ethnic groups straddle international borders.

A third set of factors is also regional and international in character, but operates at the elite level and features the discrete decisions and actions taken by neighboring states and other international actors. Neighboring states often involve themselves in the domestic ethnic conflicts of others, but there are only a few studies that analyze the ways in which this comes about.[20] In some cases, the motivations of neighboring states are comparatively benign, and their actions can be framed as either humanitarian or defensive interventions. In many cases, however, neighboring states launch protective interventions designed to aid ethnic brethren or opportunistic interventions designed to exploit internal turmoil elsewhere. Neighboring states often support insurgents involved in hostilities against regional rivals, hoping to keep rivals preoccupied with internal affairs and weaken them over time. Examples of this abound, including Pakistan's support of Kashmiri rebels in India and India's support of insurgents in the Pakistani province of Sindh. Russia has taken advantage of ethnic turmoil in post-Soviet Azerbaijan and Georgia to advance its position in the Caucasus. In the most extreme cases, neighboring states take advantage of momentary weaknesses caused by internal turmoil to launch invasions of rivals. Examples include the Syrian invasion of Jordan during the latter's civil war in 1970.[21]

The fourth and final set of factors that influences ethnic relations operates domestically at the elite level and includes the decisions, actions, and policies of political elites and governments. Some scholars and analysts have examined the roles played by domestic elites and inter-group

20. See James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964); Karl W. Deutsch, "External Involvement in Internal War," in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 100–110; Hedley Bull, "Civil Violence and International Order," in *Civil Violence and the International System,* Adelphi Paper No. 83 (London: IISS, 1971), pp. 27–36; Evan Luard, *The International Regulation of Civil Wars* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1972); Alexis Heraclides, "Secessionist Minorities and External Involvement," *International Organization,* Vol. 44, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 341–378; James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Midlarsky, *The Internationalization of Communal Strife;* de Silva and May, *The Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict;* Brown, *Ethnic Conflict and International Security.* An attempt to examine this issue in a systematic way can be found in Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," pp. 590–600.

21. For more discussion, see Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," pp. 590–600.

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22. See Human Rights Watch, *S*
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politics in the evolution of ethnic conflicts.[22] Considerable attention has been paid, in particular, to the impact of nationalist ideologies and political institutions, which are generally shaped by domestic elites, on ethnic problems.[23] However, little attention has been focused on government policies per se—the main focus of this book.

We believe that government policies merit investigation for three reasons. First, they almost always have a significant impact on the course and trajectory of ethnic relations in the country in question. A few examples will suffice for the moment. India is a country of extraordinary ethnic diversity, a country that could have fallen apart in the decades since it came out from under colonial rule in 1947. There is a good case to be made that it has stayed together because of its commitment to democratic and secular principles, and because the central government in New Delhi has undertaken a number of constructive policy initiatives. Specifically, the government's flexible language policies and its willingness to reorganize the country's state system on more than one occasion have

22. See Human Rights Watch, *Slaughter Among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); V.P. Gagnon, Jr., "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security,* Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 130–166; Warren Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe* (New York: Times Books, 1996); Mark Thompson, *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina* (London: Article 19; International Centre Against Censorship, 1994); Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict.*

23. On nationalistic ideologies, see Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State," in Brown, *Ethnic Conflict and International Security,* pp. 79–101; Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," *International Security,* Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 5–40; E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,* 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991); Paul R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1991); Human Rights Watch, *Slaughter Among Neighbors;* Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict." On institutional problems and institutional solutions to ethnic problems, see Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977); Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict,* chaps. 7–13; Donald L. Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," *Journal of Democracy,* Vol. 4, No. 4 (October 1993), pp. 18–38; Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict and World Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), chap. 5; James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989); James Q. Wilson, *Political Organizations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993).

served the country well.[24] Since the late 1800s, successive governments in Thailand have successfully forged a national identity while avoiding the intolerant, militant nationalism that has exacerbated ethnic relations in many countries. As a result, Thailand has experienced little sustained ethnic violence in recent decades.[25] Sri Lanka, however, is a country with a strong democratic tradition that should have been able to avoid descending into civil war. However, a series of misguided, ethnically biased policies with respect to citizenship, language, religion, education, and government employment alienated the country's Tamil minority and pushed the country's main ethnic groups into a violent confrontation. Ironically and tragically, the government's 1995 offer to give Tamils more regional autonomy probably would have prevented the war from breaking out in the first place if this offer had been made in the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s. By the 1990s, however, parts of the Tamil community had become radicalized and unwilling to settle for anything other than complete political independence.[26]

Second, if scholars are going to develop a grand unified theory of the dynamics of ethnic relations and the causes of ethnic conflicts, they will have to take government policies into account. They constitute an important part of the broader analytical equation. However, because government policies with respect to ethnic relations have not been studied in a focused, systematic manner from a broad comparative perspective, little relevant data has been compiled and an analytical framework for thinking about these issues has not been developed. There are, in short, important gaps in the scholarly literature on this subject from both descriptive and analytical standpoints—problems that we hope to address over the course of this study.

Third, of all the factors that influence ethnic relations and ethnic conflicts, government policies are comparatively manipulable. Ethnic demography and geography, for example, usually change at a glacial pace. Ethnic histories and group attitudes also change slowly. Broad economic developments and modernization processes are difficult to control with precision. Government policies are not infinitely flexible, but they are comparatively elastic. If one hopes that scholarly study of the dynamics of ethnic relations will ultimately lead to a theory of the causes of ethnic conflict and a strategy for conflict prevention, conflict management, and conflict resolution, then it makes sense to pay particular attention to

24. See Kanti Bajpai's chapter on India in this volume.

25. See Charles Keyes's chapter on Thailand in this volume.

26. See Amita Shastri's chapter on Sri Lanka in this volume.

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A Framework for Analysis

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government policies. This is an area where academic research could generate considerable leverage over important real-world problems.

A Framework for Analysis

Since the focus of this book is on government policies with respect to ethnic relations, we should start by defining we mean by "government policies," "ethnic groups," and "policy success."

We define "government policies" broadly to include federal (national), provincial (state), and local policies. In addition to examining the formal decisions and actions of duly constituted governing bodies, we will consider informal practices as well as patterns of neglect: non-decisions and inaction can also influence ethnic problems, and therefore merit attention. However, we will limit our focus to the decisions and actions (along with the non-decisions and inactions) of governments constituted in the countries in question. The activities of corporations (local, national, or multinational), nongovernmental organizations, regional and international powers, and international organizations are also important matters, but they are beyond the scope of this book.

Since we think there will be value in looking at a wide range of inter-communal relations, we will employ a broad definition of ethnicity. For our purposes, an "ethnic group" is a human population that has a name and thinks of itself as a group; possesses a common ancestry, historical ties, and historical memories; and shares a culture, which can be based on a combination of race, language, religion, laws, customs, institutions, dress, music, crafts, and food.[27] In this book, ethnic groups will include both majority and minority communities, groups based on both linguistic and religious identifications, indigenous peoples, settlers, and, in some cases, immigrants and migrant workers. Calling indigenous peoples "ethnic groups" will be at odds with the terms of discourse in Australia and New Zealand, for example, but we think there is a good case to be made for including these peoples in our discussion. We will not examine groups defined primarily by shared ideological agendas (communist parties, for example) or economic agendas (labor unions). Obviously, ethnic markers vary from country to country, so groups will have to be categorized on a country-by-country basis.[28]

Finally, since we seek to distinguish successful policies from their less

27. This definition is derived from Anthony D. Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism," in Brown, *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, pp. 27–41.

28. There is no simple or perfect solution to the problem of defining ethnicity and categorizing specific groups and individuals. Many people have mixed ethnic backgrounds and multiple ethnic identities. New Zealand, for example, has a large number

successful counterparts, we need to have a clear sense of what we mean by "success" and "failure." For the purposes of this book, success will be defined in terms of the promotion of peaceful intra-state ethnic relations, order, and stability, *and* the promotion of political, economic, and social justice.[29] The latter will be defined in terms of fair treatment under the law and equal access to the political, economic, and social levers of power in a country. Creating equal access might involve, in the short term, affirmative action programs that create temporary inequalities designed to eliminate structural inequalities. The challenge for governments, of course, is to promote stability and justice at the same time. Authoritarian governments are often effective at maintaining political order, at least in the short term, but their methods leave much to be desired and they often do not get good grades on the "justice" dimension.

Our framework for analyzing government policies has three main elements: policy settings, policy parameters, and policy areas. (See Table 2.)

POLICY SETTINGS

The starting point for analyzing government policies has to be a consideration of policy settings—the arrays of ethnic problems and challenges with which governments have to contend. Policies, after all, are not formulated or implemented in vacuums. Different governments have to contend with different kinds of ethnic problems and challenges; these problems change over time, both in response to whatever governments do and do not do, and in response to other domestic, regional, and international developments. Drawing on our earlier discussion of the factors that can influence ethnic relations and ethnic conflicts, we will organize our discussion of policy settings by looking at five clusters of factors: demographic patterns and ethnic geography; pre-colonial and colonial legacies; group histories, fears, and goals; economic factors and trends; and regional and international influences.

Although the new governments of countries that are coming out from

of people with mixed Maori-Pakeha backgrounds. In India, people are identified by both religious and linguistic markers.

29. Peace, order, and stability are easy to measure. Political, economic, and social justice is not, and is highly subjective. One group might see a particular policy as fair and just, while another might see things quite differently. Which group is right? Since policies will usually favor some groups at the expense of others, this will generally be a problem for those who seek to evaluate policy initiatives. In addition, what one sees as "just" depends to a very great degree on one's political, economic, and social values. Whereas a scholar from the United States might place great value on individual rights and multi-party political processes, some Asian leaders place more value on political order and economic development and prosperity.

Table 2. A Framework for Ana

Policy Settings
Demographic Patterns and Ethnic G
Pre-colonial and Colonial Legacies
Group Histories, Fears, and Goals
Economic Factors and Trends
Regional and International Influence
Policy Parameters
Policy Goals
Policy Instruments
Policy Patterns
Policy Problems
Policy Areas
Political Structures and Institutions
Citizenship Policies
Civil and Minority Rights Policies
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POLICY PARAMETERS

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Table 2. A Framework for Analysis.

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Political Structures and Institutions
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Civil and Minority Rights Policies
Policies on Religion and Religious Groups
Language Policies
Education Policies
Economic Policies

under colonial rule are in effect presented with sets of ethnic problems, these settings begin to change immediately in response to what governments do and do not do and in response to other internal and external developments. One should not think of either settings or policies as static. Indeed, one has to look at the interactions between the two over time: settings influence policies, which in turn influence group fears and political agendas, for example, and so on. Among the most important processes to analyze are the ways in which the agendas of ethnic groups become radicalized over time. In many countries, groups that once had apolitical goals have come to adopt political agendas and to favor political autonomy and self-government as the solutions to their problems. In addition, as goals have become more ambitious and contentious, groups have often become more willing to use violent means to realize their ends. Why and how do group goals change? Under what conditions do groups resort to violence? What are the critical thresholds in the process of radicalization? What can well-meaning governments and outside powers do about these problems? We hope to shed some light on these questions.

POLICY PARAMETERS

With these situational factors in mind, we turn to the broad parameters that frame government policies and we discuss some basic policy prob-

lems. Four sets of issues will be examined in this context: policy goals, policy instruments, policy patterns, and generic policy problems.

National governments generally have the overarching goal of maintaining the political unity and territorial integrity of their countries. However, different governments have different visions of how ethnic relations in their countries should be structured. Some governments are obsessed with maintaining political unity in and the territorial integrity of their states, and they engage in vigorous efforts to create single national identities, to suppress other ethnic identities, and to squash ethnic movements. These governments, one could say, have unicultural visions of their countries. Many governments have unicultural visions, but for more parochial reasons. Many governments are run by one or more ethnic groups who want to stay in power, which means keeping other groups out of power; want and need to maintain the support of their ethnic constituents; and do not care about or want to help other ethnic groups or minorities.[30] Many governments have ethnic affiliations and constituencies that strongly shape their policy agendas; these governments are not ethnically neutral "policy machines." Other governments, however, are either more tolerant of ethnic diversity or more resigned to diversity as a fact of life in their countries. Some go far to preserve cultural and ethnic diversity. Some are aware of and sensitive to ethnic problems, and are interested in making good-faith efforts to promote political, economic, and social justice. One could say that such governments have multicultural visions of their countries. In this study, we hope to develop a better understanding of the origins of ethnic visions and goals, the reasons why they change over time, and the ways governments seek to balance the need for a national identity and the realities of ethnic diversity.

This leads to the issue of governmental actions, and the instruments they utilize to translate ethnic visions into reality. What policy instruments do governments rely on most frequently and with greatest success? Drawing on the foregoing, we will try to identify notable policy patterns in the sixteen countries under investigation in this book. What combinations of goals and instruments have been most common? How have policies evolved over time? Which policies were most successful from the narrow perspective of the governments concerned and more broadly in terms of peace and justice? Under what conditions were policies most successful?

Three broad sets of policy problems also merit attention: timing problems, implementation problems, and political dilemmas. Governments are often slow to respo
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POLICY AREAS

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ments are often slow to respond to ethnic problems, acting only when they have to respond to emerging crises. This, however, is when problems are intense and comparatively intractable. To what extent are governments inclined to neglect ethnic problems? Why are governments often slow to get off the mark? Why do they miss windows of opportunity? When governments do launch policy initiatives, what kinds of implementation problems are most common and most pernicious? When and how have policies had unintended or unforeseen consequences? What implementation problems are distinctive to ethnic issues? Finally, we will analyze the kinds of political dilemmas that complicate governmental action in the ethnic arena.

POLICY AREAS

With this general framework in mind, we analyze government policies in several specific policy areas: political structures and institutions; citizenship policies; minority rights policies; policies on religion and religious groups; language policies; education policies; and economic policies. In this study, we will try to identify the policy initiatives and programs that have had the most impact—good or bad—on ethnic relations and problems, and to account for these policy successes and failures, both of which can be instructive. Because policies that work well in one place at one particular point in time do not necessarily work well under other conditions, we will endeavor to identify the conditions under which policies succeeded and failed in terms of the criteria outlined above.

Case Selection

To be comprehensive, a comparative study of ethnic issues in Asia and the Pacific would have to examine over sixty countries and territories. Such a study would be unwieldy at best and analytically muddled at worst. In order to make this enterprise both more manageable and analytically sharper, cases were selected for inclusion on the following bases.

First, we only included countries with demographically significant ethnic minorities. Our rationale is straightforward: it is unlikely that one could draw general lessons from countries with minuscule ethnic minorities that would be applicable to countries with more complex ethnographic pictures. Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Kiribati, Palau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Western Samoa, the Marshall Islands, and the Solomon Islands were excluded for this reason.

Second, we only included politically independent entities. Again, our rationale is straightforward: independent countries have control over government policies—our main concern—in ways that colonies and

territories do not. American Samoa, the Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, Macao, New Caledonia, Niue, the Northern Marianas, Tokelau, and Wallis and Futuna are colonies or territories of other powers, and were excluded for this reason.

Third, in the interest of making this exercise manageable, we excluded the countries of West Asia (also known as the Middle East). We excluded the six Central Asian states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—because they became independent under extraordinary circumstances and because they face a wide range of unique political and economic problems. Mongolia, which came out from under the Soviet umbrella around the same time, albeit under different circumstances, was excluded for this reason as well. Afghanistan, which was occupied by the Soviet Union until 1989, has since fragmented as a political entity and was therefore left out of this investigation.

Our focus in broad regional terms, therefore, is South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Asia-Pacific. Significantly, the sixteen countries that are examined in this study—India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, China, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and the Federated States of Micronesia—are representative of the region as a whole.[31] More importantly, they have the rich variation in ethnic settings, policies, and outcomes that we need to conduct a wide-ranging comparative analysis of these issues. The comparative advantage of this book is comparative analysis: books devoted to just one country or a single conflict will inevitably be able to provide more historical and descriptive detail than one will find in this volume. The contributors to this book, however, will focus on a common set of questions and issues, and thereby provide an empirical and analytical foundation for the development of generalizations and policy recommendations that, we trust, will cut across individual countries and regions.

Organization of the Book

This book is divided into four main parts. The first three parts contain the case studies that provide the empirical foundation for the study as a whole. They are organized along regional lines, and they examine South

31. In the end, difficult decisions had to be made about what countries to include, given the practical constraints that studies of this kind inevitably operate under. Good arguments could be made for including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Taiwan, and Vietnam in this book.

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SOUTH ASIA

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Asia, Southeast and East Asia, and Australia and the Asia-Pacific in turn. They focus on developments that have taken place since 1945 or, as appropriate, the attainment of political independence. The fourth and final part of the book draws on the foregoing, looks at government policies with respect to ethnic issues from a broad comparative perspective, and develops some analytical generalizations and policy recommendations.

SOUTH ASIA

The first part of the book focuses on South Asia, analyzing government management and mismanagement of ethnic relations in India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

INDIA. According to Kanti Bajpai, India's democratic political order, despite its many shortcomings, has been critical to the management of ethnic relations within its multiethnic society. India's extraordinary ethnic diversity—encompassing divisions of language, religion, caste, tribe, and region—has posed significant challenges to nation-building. To cope with these challenges, the Indian state has relied on three main instruments: first, a political order based on liberal constitutionalism and secularism; second, power-sharing arrangements based on group rights and the devolution of authority to lower levels of government; and third, the use of force and coercion when the first two instruments have failed. Policies based on power-sharing and devolution have proved to be the most successful in containing ethnic discord and violence. The use of force and coercion has had some success in wearing down militant adversaries and bringing them to the bargaining table, particularly in Punjab and the northeast. However, these strategies, along with the centralizing propensities of a number of Indian governments, have also intensified ethnic alienation, for example, in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Increased reliance on coercive strategies has contributed to spirals of retribution and violence. Bajpai concludes that Indian governments have a mixed record in their management of the country's ethnic problems.

PAKISTAN. Pakistan was created as a homeland for Indian Muslims from the detritus of the British Indian empire. The populations of Pakistan, though predominantly Muslim, were nevertheless ethnically heterogenous in terms of language, regional affiliation, and cultural identity. As Samina Ahmed argues, a single ethnic community, the Punjabis, came to dominate the country's civil-military bureaucracies, and the new state failed to develop viable representative institutions. Most peripheral ethnic communities therefore came to perceive the state as a partisan ethnic

actor. Compounding these problems, the country's leaders neglected compelling ethnic problems and adopted strategies that transformed ethnic competition into violent conflict. In 1971, Pakistan disintegrated as a consequence of these policy failures. The majority Bengali population of East Pakistan, with assistance from India, successfully seceded from Pakistan and created the new state of Bangladesh. The ruling elite in Islamabad has since continued to ignore and mismanage the country's many ethnic problems—for example, by denying regional autonomy to ethnic groups and by pursuing cultural and educational policies that have excluded various ethnic minorities. Ahmed contends that the Pakistani government's chronic inability to address these ethnic issues in a constructive and effective fashion threatens the stability and integrity of the Pakistani state.

SRI LANKA. Even though Sri Lanka obtained its independence from Great Britain without bloodshed, it ultimately plunged into a cauldron of ethnic violence. According to Amita Shastri, the roots of ethnic violence in Sri Lanka can be traced directly to the central government's failure to accommodate the legitimate demands of its Tamil minority. After independence, the country's Sinhalese leaders adopted a centralized system of government that denied minorities regional autonomy. In addition, Sinhalese politicians, despite their commitment to a democratic state, increasingly came to conceive of democracy in majoritarian terms. "Up-country" Tamils, in particular, faced systematic political and economic discrimination, leading over half to leave for India. Subsequent policies, especially the Official Language Act of 1956, further discriminated against Tamils and other ethnic minorities. In 1972, Sri Lanka adopted a new constitution that further centralized power, subordinated the judiciary to the legislature, and granted official status to the Sinhala language and Buddhism, the religion of the Sinhalese people. The 1977 elections, which were based on the 1972 constitution, resulted in a sweeping victory for the Sinhalese-dominated United National Party. This electoral outcome further marginalized the Tamil community. Seeing little constitutional recourse to redress their grievances, segments of the Tamil community resorted to violence. The Sri Lankan state responded with increasingly repressive measures. As a consequence of these measures, the country descended into a brutal civil war in the 1980s. Although the government has tried since 1994 to resolve the conflict—even offering regional autonomy arrangements to Tamil communities—these overtures have been rejected by Tamil militants who will now settle for nothing less than an independent state. One of the tragedies of the Sri Lankan story is that, if

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SOUTHEAST AND EAST ASIA

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the government had been willing to adopt accommodative policies in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, war almost certainly would not have broken out.

SOUTHEAST AND EAST ASIA

The second part of the book analyzes developments in Southeast and East Asia. The track records of government policies in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and China are examined.

BURMA. Ethnic policies in Burma have failed under both civilian and military rulers since the country became independent in 1948.[32] Josef Silverstein explains that the roots of these policy failures can be traced to pre-colonial and colonial times. The Burman kings did not develop many clear-cut policies toward ethnic minorities. Some groups, such as the Mon and Arakanese, were assimilated in an unplanned fashion, while others—the Karen, Shan, Kachin, and Chin, in particular—retained very distinct identities. Weak rulers at the center often faced secessionist demands. The British further complicated the situation by pursuing a "divide and rule" policy that intensified ethnic distinctions and by opening Burma to foreign immigration, especially from India. Independent Burma's first constitution did not go far enough to address the country's underlying ethnic problems; by creating a political system that was federal in theory but centralized in practice, it did not satisfy the demands of some groups—the Karen, most notably—for political autonomy. Although the country's preeminent nationalist leader, Aung San, sought to promote an inclusive vision of Burman nationalism, Burma's citizenship laws were changed in 1948, making it harder for Indians to obtain citizenship. The country's Chinese community was also discriminated against. Following a military coup in 1962, Burma's new rulers formally scrapped the federal system and aggressively promoted both political centralization and cultural assimilation. The military junta has since developed a divide-and-conquer policy of its own, negotiating cease-fires with some minorities while escalating attacks on those who will not capitulate. Although a National Convention was convened in 1993 to write a new constitution, Silverstein believes that Burma's ethnic problems will not be resolved until

32. In June 1989, Burma's military leaders changed the country's name to the "Union of Myanmar" in an effort to rally nationalist sentiments and to deflect domestic and international attention from their sustained attacks on the principles of democratic governance, internationally recognized human rights standards, and democratic and ethnic dissidents. We decline to endorse the junta's action. In this book, we will refer to the country they rule as "Burma."

dictatorial rule is replaced by rule of law, political rights are respected, and a federal political system is instituted.

THAILAND. Charles Keyes shows that, for over one hundred years, Thailand's governments have pursued a policy of ethnic inclusiveness that has enabled the country to submerge ethnic differences and limit ethnic conflict. In the nineteenth century Siam included a range of indigenous peoples as well as a large immigrant population, only some of whom had been assimilated into the Tai linguistic family. Ethnic diversity, however, was not seen as a political problem by the Siamese monarchy until the late nineteenth century, when European colonial rule was extended into Burma, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Siam's rulers correctly feared that Europeans would attempt to exploit the country's cultural diversity and try to dismember it. The country's leaders consequently embarked on a concerted effort to forge a nation-state. To this end, they promulgated three principles of Thai nationalism: an emphasis on the Thai language, an adherence to Buddhism, and loyalty to the monarchy. A military coup in 1932 brought the absolute monarchy to an end, and the new leadership sought to fashion a national identity that was based more on the Thai language and history than the monarchy. Even so, Keyes demonstrates that, over the course of the twentieth century, the country's rulers have advanced a comparatively tolerant form of nationalism: one could "become" Thai if one learned the Thai language and professed loyalty to the Thai state. Significantly, King Bhumipol took steps in the 1970s to broaden the definition of Thai nationalism to accommodate citizens who were not Buddhist. This helped to reduce the alienation of Thai Muslims, many of whom live in regions that border Malaysia. In short, Thailand's experience demonstrates that cultural differences do not have to lead to violence. Governments can successfully strike a balance between the need to develop a national identity and the need to respect cultural diversity.

MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE. In this chapter Šumit Ganguly demonstrates that, in Malaysia and Singapore as in other parts of Asia and the Pacific, British imperial rule created some ethnic problems and compounded others. Influxes of Indian and Chinese laborers created new and more complex ethnic realities, and the latter were encouraged by the British to pursue commercial activities, which they did with considerable success. Malay commoners were deemed by the British to be unsuitable for the task of administering the country. As a result, when Malaysia obtained its independence in 1957, the ethnically dominant Malays found themselves to be economically and socially disadvantaged. Malay resentment against the country's other communities, most notably the Chinese, culminated in ethnic violence in 1969. In
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in ethnic violence in 1969. In the wake of the 1969 riots, the Malay elite embarked on an ambitious affirmative action program designed to redress the grievances of the majority population. A political and economic strategy based on restrictions on personal freedoms, market-oriented economic policies, and redistributive measures has since enabled Malaysia to maintain ethnic peace—albeit at a cost in terms of political liberty.

Singapore, which obtained its independence from Great Britain in 1959, notionally embraces democratic standards; however, it too has relied on harsh, authoritarian methods to maintain ethnic peace and public order. Unlike Malaysia, which openly espouses the cause of ethnic Malays, Singapore professes to be a multiracial meritocracy. However, in practice, the country's Chinese community has dominated Singapore's political and economic life. Ethnic conflict in Malaysia and Singapore has been dampened by infringements placed on political liberties and by the economic booms these countries have fortuitously experienced. Whether these patterns of stability can be sustained in the future is uncertain.

INDONESIA. Indonesia (the former Dutch East Indies) was founded in 1945 by nationalists of varying ethnic backgrounds. Formal independence came in 1949 after a four-year struggle with the Dutch. Indonesia has become a country of nearly two hundred million people spread across a four-thousand-mile archipelago. As R. William Liddle explains, it is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, with significant cleavages along cultural/regional, religious, and racial lines. Since President Suharto assumed power and imposed authoritarian rule in 1966, coercion has been the main instrument used by the government to cope with the country's ethnic diversity and to maintain political order, although persuasion, exchange, and cooptation have been part of the policy equation as well. Because it is worried about holding the country together as well as holding onto power, Suharto's government is deeply attached to centralized political arrangements. However, this has exacerbated tensions between the Javanese, who constitute the largest ethnic group in the country, and other groups. The government's attachment to centralization has also exacerbated relations with ethnic groups in Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya, in particular; these groups seek more autonomy and have suffered under often brutal crackdowns. Indonesia is entering a difficult period, as the central leadership ages and popular demands for political liberty and regional autonomy grow. However, as Liddle observes, there are few signs that the country's leadership is willing to embrace the gradual democratization and devolution of power that is needed.

THE PHILIPPINES. Apart from the significant problems posed by the Moro minority, R.J. May argues, ethnicity has not played a significant role in Philippine politics. The Chinese minority has been assimilated, and tribal groups have been marginalized. Under Spanish rule, ethnic Chinese were encouraged to immigrate, but they also faced widespread discrimination and periodic repression. The conditions of the Chinese improved somewhat under U.S. rule in the first part of the twentieth century. After World War II and independence, however, immigration was eliminated and attempts to integrate the Chinese community were stepped up. Assimilation of the Chinese community has since become virtually complete.

The United States also sought to improve the conditions of the tribal Filipinos though the creation of "special provinces" and the expansion of English-language education. Under President Ferdinand Marcos, the plight of tribal peoples worsened considerably in the 1960s and 1970s. Ranchers, loggers, and miners expropriated their lands and counterinsurgency operations were launched to quell any expression of discontent. Some positive changes took place under President Corazon Aquino in the late 1980s. In particular, efforts were made to draft a new constitution that promised to promote the cultural rights of indigenous communities.

However, as May relates, the Moro problem, which has its roots in the Spanish colonization of the Philippines in the sixteenth century, has persisted over time. For three centuries the Spaniards carried out military campaigns against these Muslim islanders and created an ethnic hierarchy which consigned them to the very bottom of the social and political ladder. Harsh efforts were also made to subdue the Moros during the period of U.S. colonial rule. In the post-colonial period, the Moros continued to resist efforts at assimilation and sought to fend off encroachments on their ancestral lands, particularly during the Marcos era. The Aquino administration entered into peace talks with the Moro National Liberation Front and made some effort to satisfy Moro demands for regional autonomy. However, a turning point in the relationship between Manila and the Moros was not reached until 1996, when President Fidel Ramos signed an agreement that provided for real autonomy in Muslim areas. Whether this bold step will bring the Moro rebellion to an end remains to be seen.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. In this chapter, June Teufel Dreyer holds that, under Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist government's policies towards the country's ethnic minorities alternated between half-hearted accommodation and aggressive assimilation. According to Dreyer, in the initial aftermath of the 1949 revolution, Beijing's policies towards minority areas were largely accommodationist—the notable ex-

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ceptions being government policies towards Tibet and Xinjiang. A significant policy shift took place in the late 1950s, when the anti-rightist campaign and the Great Leap Forward pushed policy in the direction of economic collectivization and cultural assimilation. The rebellions that ensued in Tibet and Xinjiang led the government to ease off and acknowledge the "special characteristics" of minorities in the early 1960s, but relations between Beijing and minority areas deteriorated dramatically as the decade unfolded. The Cultural Revolution of 1966–68 featured a brutal campaign to destroy minority cultures and customs: broadcasting and publishing in minority languages all but ceased; traditional customs and practices were virtually banned; and many religious sites were obliterated. Some accommodative steps were taken by the government in the early 1970s, but much damage to inter-ethnic relations had already been done.

Although the government's policies during the Mao era varied in some respects, one element of continuity was the government's desire to create strong ties between central institutions and areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. A profound reversal occurred under Deng Xiaoping, whose emphasis on promoting economic growth created powerful centrifugal forces: minority areas were opened up to foreign investment, trade, and tourism, and borders became more porous. These forces were especially strong in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia. By the early 1990s, the government had started to adopt a harder line in response to ethnic protests. As China moves into the post-Deng era, the country's rulers face a seemingly intractable policy dilemma: accommodationist policies may lead to secessionist demands, but assimilationist crackdowns will almost certainly lead to violent backlashes and perhaps open rebellions.

AUSTRALIA AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

The third part of the book examines the evolution of government policies with respect to ethnic relations in Australia and the Asia-Pacific region. It contains case studies of policy development in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and the Federated States of Micronesia.

AUSTRALIA. Christine Fletcher argues that Australia is distinctive in the Asia-Pacific region by virtue of its ancient indigenous population, its large immigrant population, and its federal form of government. For over two centuries since the formal British occupation of Australia in 1788, Fletcher notes, the Aboriginal peoples of the continent have suffered in a multitude of ways. The principal policy that successive Australian governments pursued toward indigenous peoples was assimilation; with this in

mind Aboriginal families were broken up, children were taken away, laws on association and movement were enacted, and Aboriginal lands were seized. Significantly, Aboriginal rights were not mentioned in any of the state constitutions or Australia's commonwealth constitution. Indeed, until the late 1960s, Aboriginal peoples were not considered citizens under the Australian constitution, and governments were prohibited by the constitution from counting Aborigines in censuses. In addition, between 1901 and 1969, governments adhered to the "White Australia" policy, designed to keep non-white immigrants from coming to Australia. Since 1969, Australia has adopted non-discriminatory immigration policies.

Starting in the late 1960s, state and commonwealth governments began to take steps to redress the conditions of the Aboriginal population. Specifically, following a national referendum, Aborigines were counted in the Australian national census, and the commonwealth government was given the authority to enter the jurisdiction of states and make laws pertaining to the Aboriginal population. Legislation passed in the 1970s expanded the rights of Aboriginal peoples. Further positive developments emerged in the 1980s with the reorganization of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs. Since 1992, in the wake of a High Court judgment, Aborigines have gained further legal rights with respect to land claims. Despite these developments, Fletcher contends that the cultural distance between the settler communities and Aboriginal peoples remains great. Consequently, even well-meaning policies have not produced the intended results. If this fundamental problem is to be addressed, real political power will have to devolve to members of indigenous communities.

NEW ZEALAND. In many and perhaps most respects, as Andrew Sharp explains, New Zealand constitutes a success story as far as government policies and ethnic relations are concerned. Significantly, the country has not experienced significant levels of ethnic violence in decades. In addition, New Zealand's record with respect to civil and political rights is exemplary. Its system of legal protections is both broad and deep, and its political system allows the full participation of all. However, there are areas of contention in the policy arena, and there is room for improvement in policy terms. The Treaty of Waitangi, which was signed in 1840 and which has since provided the legal framework for relations between European settlers and their descendants (Pakeha) and Maori, has been interpreted in different ways by the two communities. The government has offered financial settlements to many Maori communities in the 1980s and 1990s, but those who have received settlements have not always been those in the greatest need. On the whole, Maori and Pacific Islander communities suffer from relativ
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communities suffer from relatively high levels of unemployment, economic problems, educational problems, health problems, and housing problems. Although this situation has improved since the 1940s, more needs to be done. Sharp concludes that governments can and should do more about these economic and social inequities and to provide more reparative justice. In all probability, however, disputes about these matters will continue to unfold in a non-violent fashion in the political, legal, and bureaucratic arenas.

FIJI, PAPUA NEW GUINEA, VANUATU, AND THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA. In the book's final case study, Stephen Levine examines government policies in the four largest, multiethnic, politically independent entities in the Pacific: Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and the Federated States of Micronesia. He notes that these four states face formidable common problems: they are newly independent; they have limited political and economic infrastructures; and they face challenges—albeit challenges of different kinds—to national unity. Since these states are still very much works in progress, their prospects are uncertain.

Fiji, which came out from under British colonial rule in 1970, has had to contend with imperial legacies found elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific. In Fiji as in Sri Lanka, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, and elsewhere, British rule led to an influx of Indian laborers, which in turn led to a changed demographic picture and ethnic complications. Since Indians now constitute close to half of Fiji's total population, ethnic tensions have been severe indeed in this case. In 1987, the Fijian military, which was and is dominated by ethnic Fijians, staged a coup and seized control of the government to prevent an Indian-led cabinet from coming to power. A new constitution was subsequently drawn up and put into place in 1990. It included provisions that would preserve and strengthen the position of traditional leadership and therefore indigenous peoples; it was designed, in short, to keep Indians from forming a government. Steps have also been taken to prevent Indian and European encroachment on Fijian lands. Since the Fijian and Indian populations are intermingled to a significant degree, regional autonomy and federal solutions to the country's ethnic problems are not an option. Violent confrontations cannot be ruled out for the future.

Papua New Guinea, which became independent in 1975, is larger and far more populous than any other Pacific Island state. Moreover, it contains an astonishing amount of ethnic diversity—over one thousand distinct ethnic groups. Not surprisingly, therefore, many of Papua New Guinea's problems stem from efforts to forge a national identity. These efforts have encountered considerable difficulties due to the existence of

arbitrary colonial boundaries and the country's lack of a common history. The Papua New Guinea constitution recognizes the multiethnic character of the state and grants equal rights and privileges to all of the country's ethnic groups. Nevertheless, Papua New Guinea has experienced ethnic violence. Specifically, the peoples of the island of Bougainville did not wish to be incorporated into Papua New Guinea. Misgivings over copper mining, control over land, and the fair distribution of resources led to an insurgency. Levine believes that the bloodiness of the conflict in Bougainville will probably discourage people from resorting to violence elsewhere in Papua New Guinea, but the future of the country is uncertain. The central government is weak, provincial governments have been controversial, and many economic and social issues are still on the policy agenda.

The islands of Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides) were jointly administered by France and Great Britain from 1906 until 1980. Significantly, the diverse communities in this multi-island state had never been grouped together politically until Europeans came along. When independence came in 1980, the peoples of Santo and several other islands sought to secede from the fledgling entity; this revolt was put down with the assistance of Papua New Guinea, which had reasons of its own for discouraging secessionism in the region. Vanuatu has not experienced any subsequent secessionist problems or significant ethnic violence, but like many new multiethnic entities it has struggled with the problem of forging a national identity. Its liberal language laws, multilingual educational system, and strong village governments ensure that cultural differences will persevere and that the tension between national unity and ethnic diversity will persist.

The political development of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), which became independent in 1986 and joined the United Nations only in 1990, is still very much in flux. The FSM is one of four entities that emerged from the U.S.-governed Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands in the 1970s and 1980s—the others being the Marianas, the Marshalls, and Palau, all of which are comparatively well-endowed in terms of natural resources. The FSM exists in its current form, therefore, only because three other island groups went their separate ways and because its four main remaining islands—Chuuk, Pohnpei, Yap, and Kosrae—were bracketed together by outside agencies. The peoples of these four main islands have distinct ethnic identities and are separated by vast tracts of water. Inevitably, therefore, the FSM faces tremendous challenges in its efforts to build a sense of national identity. It has sought to strike a balance between national and local aspirations by implementing federal arrangements; it is the only true federation in the Pacific. Each of the FSM's four states has

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considerable autonomy; the federal government is quite weak. Levine believes that this federation could fragment, as many colonial creations do, and that this would not necessarily be a tragic outcome as far as the peoples of these islands are concerned.

GENERALIZATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the book's concluding chapter, Michael Brown draws on this empirical and analytical foundation, develops a series of generalizations about government policies and ethnic relations, and puts forward a set of policy recommendations.