Philosophical Issues in Curriculum

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What is meant by the word "curriculum"?[1] Conceptual problems abound where clarification is lacking and it is not surprising to see the curriculum field described as "moribund" and "fraudulent."[2] In addressing this question, rather than attempt an exhaustive survey of this terrain and drawing on representative literature along the way I sketch a conceptual map of ways of thinking about curriculum generically.[3] My objective is to show that the concept of curriculum needs to be clarified, describe ways in which it can be envisaged, and suggest that such clarification can result in sharpening the focus of music teaching and learning research and practice.

The outline of images that follows is not intended to be exhaustive but provides a framework for and exemplifies a useful approach to conceptualizing curriculum that can be expanded on or modified in subsequent research in music education. I move beyond William Schubert's trilogy of historical curricular paradigms—the theoretical, practical, and reconceptualist—to formulate my own list of "images" of curriculum described with reference to examples from music education. These images are curriculum as instructional content, system, process, realm of meaning, and discourse. Each curricular image contributes to our understanding, yet is limited or flawed in one way or another. None suffices as the ultimate, only, or best way of conceiving of curriculum. I conclude this chapter with brief remarks on the implications of this analysis for research and practice in music teaching and learning.[4]

Conceptualizing Curriculum

The word "curriculum" is used variously as noun, verb ("currere"), adjective ("curricular"), in the singular or plural ("curriculum" or "curricula"), in the abstract or phenomenal sense (as "anticipated" or "resultant" curriculum,

respectively), descriptively and prescriptively, and literally and figuratively. So first one has to be clear in which particular sense the word is being used in this given instance.[5] For example, does it refer to the doing of curriculum as a practical process or activity or to an "essence" or product somehow separate from the practitioner? Is this notion of curriculum contingent on some other conception be it "content" as in the phrase "curricular content," "evaluation" as in the phrase "curricular evaluation," or "instruction" as in the phrase "curricular instruction"? Is it construed as a conceptually independent entity or variable, where content, instruction, curriculum, and evaluation are conceived to be mutually exclusive?

When one concept is dependent on another in order for the distinction to be made, if differences between the concepts have not been clearly articulated in the first place, they dissolve when the analysis is pressed backward. Even when a clean theoretical distinction can be made between what curriculum is and what it is not, distinctions are sometimes difficult to maintain because of the practical interrelatedness of aspects of education. Take, for example, the words "curriculum and instruction," which often are spoken more or less in the same breath because of their interconnectedness in educational thought and practice. If one is going to get to the bottom of curriculum and instruction, it will be necessary to clarify the differences between them and determine the specific respects in which curriculum differs from instruction, evaluation, or any of the other attributes with which it is often associated by educators. Even though Ralph Tyler dodges this conceptual problem in his foray into curricular and instructional theory, his analysis has not prompted a subsequent and concerted philosophical attempt to clarify exactly where curriculum ends and instruction begins or vice versa.[6]

Ambiguity arises when curriculum is viewed as a "weak syndrome" in which one concept overlaps, gradually

melds, or phases into another between two theoretically extreme positions.[7] Assuming that curriculum is a weak syndrome seems justified, practically speaking, because the various elements of education—curriculum, instruction, evaluation, teaching, learning, and administration—seem interconnected to those involved in its work. Allowing for fuzzy boundaries and ambiguity may be desirable, because it presumes and fosters intuitive and imaginative thought. However, one of the purposes of philosophical analysis is to examine and clarify concepts, observe important discontinuities, and make fine distinctions where possible. If the achievements of a particular study are to be clearly shown, the philosopher and empirical researcher of curriculum are duty bound to clarify the specific nature of the object under study. Suppose curriculum and instruction are considered to be weak syndromes, that is, it is difficult to say exactly where curriculum ends and instruction begins, or vice versa, and a researcher studies a particular curriculum. It is fair to ask if she or he has clarified the concept sufficiently or distinguished between curriculum and instruction so that the reader may conclude with reasonable confidence that this is indeed a study of curriculum and not instruction or something else. In the absence of this distinction, a reader may be unsure what specific entity is under study, because the characteristic differences have not been clearly drawn. For example, suppose one analyzes three empirical studies relating to the general area of curriculum and instruction with the object of comparing them. If one study seems to focus on curriculum, another seems to apply to instruction, and still another seems to concern both curriculum and instruction, the validity of these studies may be questioned because their specific objects are unclear. Although some ambiguity is likely, practically speaking, the researcher still needs to carefully distinguish between the things under study insofar as possible.

Curriculum is grounded on philosophical assumptions about the purposes and methods of education. As such, it relates fundamentally to educational values and is justified philosophically rather than verified or refuted scientifically (Scheffler, 1973). Many music curricula focus on instructional approaches and frameworks that are often presented with little justification, or justified on experiential and practical rather than systematic and logical grounds. For example, the National Standards for Arts Education (modeled on earlier formulations such as The School Music Program [1974, 1986]) are justified briefly with reference to "commonplaces." Among those that are justified more extensively, one thinks of Émile Jaques-Dalcroze's defense of "rhythmique gymnastique" (later termed "eurhythmics") (1976), Percy Scholes's defense of music appreciation (1935), Bennett Reimer's defense of comprehensive arts programs and aesthetic education (1978), Thomas Regelski's defense of an action learning approach to the secondary school general music curriculum (1981), and Patricia Shehan Campbell's (1991), Susan Wolf's (1996), and Therese Volk's (1998) defenses of multicultural approaches to music education.

Music teachers sometimes disagree strongly about the underlying values of music instruction, for example, the appropriate role of popular music in the school music curriculum, specific objectives or methods of musical instruction, or various aesthetics and their associated values. In such cases, there may be a tendency to think that value difficulties will dissipate if one can draw music and curriculum sufficiently broadly or inclusively. If there is room for many points of view, one does not have to negotiate values in tension if not outright conflict but can simply sidestep them by choosing those with which one agrees. This view is flawed, because greater inclusiveness renders a curriculum even more problematic than one that is narrow. In the case of the broader curriculum, many more things can conflict, blunt, prevent, and undermine other aspects, and many more possibilities need to be considered in coming to a decision about what to do in practice. Discussing and taking into account the many differences and conflicts in value systems becomes even more crucial in building a solid foundation for a broader curriculum than in a narrower one. Rather than solving the problem of what values are to underlie it and how these are to be negotiated, a broader curriculum makes the work of music education even more difficult to justify and practice.

Seeing that it straddles the theoretical and phenomenal worlds of philosophical assumption and practical realization, curriculum is inherently dialectical, in the sense of some conceptions, elements or aspects being in tension or conflict with others.[8] As a practical entity, it expresses the philosophical assumptions of its maker(s) much as an art work expresses the ideas and feelings of its creator(s) and performer(s). It refers both to the shape of things hoped for and those that come to pass. Embodying the assumptions that comprise it, practically speaking, one cannot separate the curriculum from the assumptions that ground it any more than one might separate the work of art from its meanings to composer, performer, and listener alike. Tying together theory and practice is also more problematical than is commonly supposed, because the worlds of practice and theory are discontinuous. Although they overlap, there is not a one-to-one correspondence between them (Scheffler, 1973). As a result, a theory can be realized in several different practices just as a practice may follow from any one of several different assumptive sets.[9] So an investigator needs take into account this dialectic between theory and practice—two elements in tension with each other and for which there is no easy solution. For example, the desired or intended curriculum is distinct from yet interrelated with the actual or resultant curriculum (Jorgensen, 1988). A nest of other dialectics also emerges, including the dynamic and static qualities of curriculum, its processual and

product orientation, claims on intellect and feeling, subjective and objective qualities, descriptive and normative properties, and conservative and transformative purposes. And these dialectics reinforce an already ambiguous construct, thereby complicating and problematizing the idea/practice of curriculum.

Another and also interrelated matter is the level of generality at which the notion of curriculum is cast. The descriptor "curriculum" is typically used at various levels of integrative analysis or causation. It may be construed psychologically, institutionally, culturally, or historically, to depict a particular lesson, course of study, program, or a generalization covering an array of instances that more or less exemplify certain characteristic features.[10] For example, one might describe a Suzuki curriculum with regard to a particular lesson or segment of lesson taught by a particular exponent, an overall course of study for this student devised by this teacher, or a generalization of what different exponents of the approach tend to do over an extended period of time. On this continuum between micro- and macro-level conceptions or increasing levels of generalization, one might plot instances of curriculum. It is therefore important for the researcher to specify where this particular instance of curriculum falls within the range of levels of generality in order to avoid the fallacy of equating conceptions of curriculum at differing levels of generality. And, for this reason, it may be important to make some distinctions between the terms curriculum, program, and lesson plan.

With these preliminary points in mind, what are some of the images of curriculum, and what are their respective contributions and detractions? After sketching each of the images in turn and showing that all have something to offer and are limited in one way or another, I suggest that they are all in dialectic or tension one with another. In order to ground the analysis, each image is illustrated by several music curricula. This approach is challenging for at least four reasons. First, there are notable differences among the ideas of proponents of each image and a danger in reductionistic thinking, that is, ascribing greater coherence in the viewpoint than is warranted. Second, there is the inherent ambiguity of theory and practice and a danger of confusing the two. For this reason, only some of the prominent features of each image are sketched, and it should not be assumed that writers cited in regard to particular points would agree with every aspect described. Third, the examples associated with each image are intended only to suggest prominent aspects or emphases in curricula as I see them, and may invoke other images as well. Images may intersect and overlap. Seeing that each image potentially spawns an array of different interpretations and music curricula supports the already observed ambiguity of theory and practice and serves to caution against reductive thinking that would underestimate the

variety and diversity of curricula associated with a particular curricular image. And, fourth, it is important to be wary of drawing too simplistic a conclusion that the more images invoked in any particular curriculum the better, there is no "middle way" that avoids extreme positions, or the ideal solution is simply to combine uncritically this image with that. On the contrary, some curricula may draw mainly from one or a few images, and can do so with integrity, and it is not always easy to find the appropriate overlaps, correspondences, and continuities between multiple images. Rather, my point is to show that all of the following curricular images are provocative and helpful, flawed and limited in one way or another. And they should not be foreclosed prematurely without considering how they illumine a particular set of circumstances.

Curriculum as Instructional Content

Traditionally, curriculum refers to the subject matter or content of instruction, that is, what is taught by teachers, or the raison d'être and focus of the student and teacher pedagogical interaction. This is the notion of curriculum generally employed in state and professional guidelines concerning what should be taught, published course catalogs and descriptions, and the like. Here, the teacher's function is to transmit the wisdom of the past, that is, those beliefs, values, mores, and practices valued personally or by the institution responsible for education. Content, in this view, can be systematically described in terms of particular ideas and practices and one can distinguish between the body of knowledge to be communicated and the means whereby it is transmitted to others; or, the content of a subject is regarded as distinct from the manner of its presentation. Not only is the focus on instructional content contingent on the notion of instruction but there is the additional implicit assumption that subject matter is something "out there," objectified and separate from the human experience of it. As such, it can be rationalized as a logical system of tightly articulated abstract propositions or concepts that are or should be taught and learned and it can be generalized to describe courses or programs of study.

The notion of instruction is particularly interesting. Vernon Howard (1992) is at pains to distinguish between instructions given by teachers that are often specific, procedural, and technical, and instruction signifying more generally what the teacher seeks to pass on to the student. In contrast to Howard's notion of instruction having primarily to do with what teachers do, my own view of instruction is more dialectical and interactive in that it necessitates an interaction between teacher and student in situations where knowledge is being transmitted and transformed (Jorgensen, 1980). Such an interactive definition

enables me to more clearly distinguish the terms *teaching* and *learning* from instruction, and to apply the term *instruction* in a more systematic and rigorous way. Instruction is inherently ambiguous, however, because music teaching and learning are also informal in that they occur in situations that are not explicitly or intentionally pedagogical but are serendipitous and happen within the frameworks and rituals of ordinary life. This being the case, it is often difficult in practice to define the limits of instruction as that which is formal or intentionally pedagogical.

Of course, purposeful instruction enables the communication of certain knowledge that is procedural as well as propositional,[11] and curriculum conceived as the subject matter of instruction focuses on that knowledge. As it goes to the heart of what goes on in the instructional process, such a focus prompts the teacher and student to defend the nature of the subject matter, in this case, music and its specific claims in general and professional music education. Regarding musical subject matter within the social context of music instruction enables one to see it contextually, situated with regard to particular assumptions about musical beliefs and practices. This wisdom is forged within communities that David Elliott (1995) describes as "music practices," I (1997a) denote as "spheres of musical validity," and Christopher Small (1998) describes as social rituals, each of which is understood in terms of a particular aesthetic perspective.[12] The differing aesthetic systems underlying or accompanying these musics help to explain why various beliefs are held and the particular meanings that musics have for their exponents and publics. Allowing an overlap between aims and methods of music education,[13] where the subject matter and method of or approach to its presentation are construed as a weak syndrome, blurs the lines between curriculum and instruction. It also enables curriculum to be conceived dynamically in terms of the sorts of dialectics already alluded to.

On the other side of the coin, it is tempting to view curriculum conceived as content or subject matter as a static body of knowledge, periodically updated when educational reform occurs or students do poorly on standardized tests. In this view, the curriculum becomes the object of study and the subject (student or teacher) is distanced (even alienated) from it. This view presumes that certain knowledge is universally acknowledged as worthy of study, privileged, and tested through time. Not only is this wisdom fixed but it presents a stock of knowledge independent of the knower. As such, it polarizes the knower and the known, the subject and the experience of it—a state of affairs that constitutes a false dichotomy. It takes insufficient account of the powerful cultural, social, and psychological forces in the construction of knowledge. As well, seeing that the subject is articulated rationally, logical thought is privileged over intuition, imagination, and feeling, implying yet another false dichotomy between

intellect and emotion. In its emphasis on formal and didactic instruction over the informal and serendipitous activities that typically comprise a part of the educational program construed broadly, it downplays the latter as peripheral to the purposes and ends of music education. This artificial separation of curriculum as instructional content from assessment, teaching, learning, instruction, and administration fails to emphasize sufficiently that curriculum is at best a weak syndrome. The precise distinctions between these elements are impossible to sustain in the phenomenal world. It is difficult to separate the subject matter from the manner of its presentation, especially since the medium constitutes the message (at least in part). Also, in taking this view, one is apt to be speaking about an inherently ambiguous content or subject matter in which the articulation proceeds more or less contemporaneously at different levels of generality. One may refer either to the broad program of educational studies, a particular subject taken for credit, or a particular aspect of that subject. All these concepts qualify as descriptions of the content although stated more or less specifically and abstractly. There is also the difficulty that the subject matter tends to be conceived theoretically and abstractly in terms of concepts to be learned rather than practically in terms of the activities that learners undertake. This difficulty seems unavoidable especially seeing that, when used in this way, the notion of curriculum seems to refer more to normative questions relating to the desired ends of its study rather than to descriptive matters having to do with what actually happens in the instructional process and how those ends are achieved.

While the notion of curriculum as subject matter offers important advantages, it is also flawed. It clearly does not suffice as the only useful image of curriculum because it fails to take sufficient account of the interrelatedness and dynamic quality of the various aspects of education and the inherent ambiguity between educational aims and methods. And it does not encompass sufficiently the complex process whereby subject matter and learner meet and are engaged, the dialectics and dilemmas this process presents for teacher and student alike, the learner's construction of knowledge, and the social context in which this process takes place.[14]

Curriculum as System

Tyler set out his basic curricular and instructional principles as a quartet of questions—"What educational purposes should the school seek to attain?" "How can learning experiences be selected which are likely to be useful in attaining these objectives?" "How can these educational experiences be effectively organized?" and "How can we determine whether these purposes are being attained?"

Since then, it has become fashionable to employ systems theory as a way of depicting the "flow" of activities from the formulation of objectives to the design of educational experiences that meet these objectives, the organization of instruction around these objectives, and the assessment of the process and each of its elements.[15] Even though Tyler sets forth his questions in a less systemic manner than some of his followers, his questions also can be asked within the context of a closed system that flows from one element to the other or from one question set to the next. The logical appeal of Tyler's rationale also fits nicely with economic metaphors of education that emphasize values such as efficiency, control, least resistance to learning, optimization of flow, achievement of predicted results, assessment and documentation of results, and evaluation of each system element to improve and ensure its efficient functioning. In this view, curriculum becomes one of the elements in the educational system in which precise movements from one element to the next can be predicted and represented graphically in a flow chart.

The production process that constitutes the metaphor for this view of curriculum assumes a closed system in which one stage in the process leads logically and inexorably to the next, where the learner does not come upon the next stage until the one before it or on which it is contingent is satisfied or complete. The manufacturer is able to predict which elements are required in production with a high degree of certainty, rationalize the production process, achieve economies of scale, and more or less guarantee that the objectives can and will be met. Curriculum is therefore interpreted as a means of production whereby the objectives to be attained are clearly articulated in advance and the outcomes are assessed objectively. The flow process masks the mechanistic assumptions required in order to make the system work and complete. It also hides the closed nature of the process, which is systematically articulated and inherently rational. This curricular image is exemplified in competency-based music education approaches and their variants.[16]

Among the potential contributions of this view, because the various system elements are clarified, specific distinctions can be made between and among such things as curriculum, instruction, and assessment, and the dynamic "flow" of the process can be represented. In a world in which economic and production considerations predominate, this conceptualization of curriculum has a wide appeal to business people and the public at large. It emphasizes educational accountability, particularly the importance of analyzing educational objectives and rationalizing education as an efficient system. Its systematic standardization and predictability appeal in an age in which mass production promises economies of scale. The prospect of verifiability and refutation makes it particularly appealing to those who wish to study it. And its commitment to observable outcomes, behaviors, and dispositions resonates with practitioners who are then in a position to demonstrate the effectiveness of their own particular contributions to the process. In a world in which reason and logic prevail, a systemic view of curriculum offers the ultimate rationalization for instruction and a way to see curriculum as a discrete element in a unified system in which all of the parts are conceptually independent.

This view of curriculum is also problematic. The metaphor of the closed system cannot account fully for the inherently open educational system of which curriculum forms a part. In practice, all educational outcomes cannot be specified in advance of the instruction. Some are found to be flawed while the system is in operation. And teachers do not always move logically but also intuitively, sometimes quite unsure what they should do or what the ends will turn out to be. One of the points of Howard's analysis of arts teaching is to show that teachers (like artists) both know and do not know what they are up to.[17] The ends they think might be achieved at the outset of instruction seem to change along the way as ends become means to yet other ends.[18] As they go along, teachers may change their minds or adjust their objectives and methods to fit particular students' experiences. All of this activity, commonly understood by practicing teachers, suggests that the assumptions required to justify a closed system such as the production metaphor implies simply do not hold in the phenomenal world. The distinctions between the system elements inevitably turn out to be theoretical generalizations, abstract even fictional accounts of practical realities. And the system takes little account of the nonrational or irrational elements of education that play an important role in educational experience. A purely mechanistic and technical approach to teaching is required, and there is no room for serendipity, coalescence, and chaos—features important in new views of science.[19] Seeing that the system's actors—students, teachers, administrators, and others— are presumably devoid of feeling presupposes a false dichotomy between reason and emotion as elements of cognition and is unrealistic when compared with ordinary human experience. And where emotion, passion, surprise, and humanity are excluded from the system and where there is no room for free will on the part of learners and their teachers, a sense of alienation, disconnectedness, and dehumanization results.

Curriculum as Process

A related though arguably less mechanistic metaphor is that of curriculum as process. Among the early champions of this view, Jerome Bruner (1963) posits that organizing themes underlie the subject matter and serve as its logical and conceptual structure or framework. These themes can

be examined at progressively higher levels of sophistication and complexity. The result is a dynamic process from the most elementary or necessary first principles of a subject to its highest levels. Beliefs and practices that constitute the subject matter are organized conceptually and introduced systematically as ways of thinking and acting. In Bruner's earlier thinking, such an approach yielded a spiral curriculum, applied in music in examples such as the Manhattanville Music Curriculum Project, June Boyce-Tillman's and Keith Swanwick's curricular spiral, and, in different vein, Boyce-Tillman's work on a holistic approach to music education and music education for purposes of healing (2000a, 2000b). Unlike the metaphor of curriculum as system—oriented toward the creation of particular educational products or achievement of specific results—the end of education is the undergoing of the educational process as teacher and student interact around and in the midst of the subject matter. In this view, education is conceived primarily as a journey or pilgrimage to a destination where the traveling to that place is as important as arriving at it (Yob, 1989). The learner is in the process of becoming, and the curriculum describes that journey. In his more recent writing, Bruner focuses on the process whereby the learner makes meaning within a cultural context (1986, 1990, 1996). The learner intuitively, imaginatively, emotionally, and logically grasps the subject's articulated and organizing structures as unified wholes. The subject matter is not independent or separate from the learner as an objective reality but is engaged, known, and experienced by the learner subjectively. This stance presumes that when thinking of content and its meaning, it is essential to focus on the constructive quality of knowledge and on the interaction between the learner and that to be learned, and to see knowledge and meaning-making as inherently social and psychological processes. One never escapes a dynamic sense of becoming as one gradually comes to know the subject more intimately. And qualities of movement, fluidity, or process constitute a focus and principal characteristic of curriculum.

The emphasis on the process whereby humans make meaning and the structures that organize knowledge focuses attention on the essentially human qualities of learning, the necessary interconnectedness of logical structure with individual personality and perception, and the frames of society and culture in which people live and that partly shape the ways they think and feel. In more recent writing, Bruner has moved away from the spiral curriculum (with its presumption of causal linearity and the contingency of one level on another), toward a looser, less hierarchical, and more complex view of the interrelationships, coincidences, correspondences, and interconnections that typify human life and to which the spiral cannot do justice. Focusing on the organizing structures of the subject matter also reveals the interrelationships among all of its constit-

uent elements, and evidences the application of reason to education. Recognizing the contingency of learning on the person's readiness to learn also highlights the role of sensory perceptions and intellectual processes in the ways in which learner and subject matter come together. The dynamic nature of this process of becoming suggests that curriculum is not a static object but a fluid movement from one point to another that mirrors common experience. And taking into account the meaning-making by the learner highlights the fact that a curriculum does not consist of objective subject matter distinct from the learner's understanding of it but is subjectively known, experienced, and constructed by each learner at progressively more sophisticated levels of understanding.

By contrast, reason remains primary, because it is the learner's responsibility to come to the subject and gradually master it. And the hierarchy of ever "higher," abstract, and more valued understandings reflecting the progressive development of human reason privileges mind over heart, and logical thought over intuition. The idea of building a curriculum on the progressive and rational organization of the subject matter is challenged by Dewey, who urges quite a different stance—starting with the learner's psychological constructs and perspectives and gradually moving toward an emphasis on the logical organization of subject matter at advanced levels of instruction (Dewey, 1956). In the theory of music education curriculum, if not its practice, curriculum is designed principally with reference to the rational development of musical concepts rather than in terms of the particular mind-sets and perspectives of students' musical development. Witness the appeal to national standards and concepts that fit them in recently published basal series (Beethoven et al., 2000; Bond et al., 2000). Such musical curricula remain profoundly conceptual notwithstanding Bruner's acknowledgment of the many different ways humans make meaning in their lives and the cultural constructions that reflect and reinforce these ways of meaning-making. Following developmental models and strategies also invites a prescriptive and technical approach to music instruction that overlooks the emotional and physical selves of learners. It also fails to take into account the sense of discovery and individual differences among and between students and teachers or the role of imagination and creative thoughts and acts suggesting divergent rather than convergent educational ends. Through the process of coming to know the discipline of music education (or any other subject), one eventually comes to see it objectified, distanced from personal reality and the subjective self, and thereby alienated from oneself and others. Such a curriculum focuses on the individual learner rather than the educational community of which she is a part, and the deemphasis on educational ends fails to shoulder public responsibility for one's actions and accountability for one's efforts. Thus, while seemingly more humane and less

mechanistic than the system approach, curriculum as process masks an undercurrent of forces that threaten to undermine humanity while also avoiding accountability. Seeing that educational process and product are distinct and understanding how something is made do not necessarily explain what has been created or vice versa (Scheffler, 1991). One without the other cannot suffice. Both process and product are essential for a broad grasp of the subject in question.

Curriculum as Realm of Meaning

Philip Phenix (1986) is among the curriculum thinkers to mine philosophical writing about symbol systems and their role in meaning-making by Ernst Cassirer (1944) and Susanne Langer (1957a). Phenix notes the centrality of symbolic thinking in human meaning-making and offers a provisional classification of different sorts of symbol systems as a basis for organizing a general education curriculum.[20] Allowing the prospect of various sorts of symbol systems suggests that there are also corresponding realms of meaning-making, each with its own perspectives, practices, and publics, all of which should be included in the curriculum. For Phenix, the general education curriculum ought to comprise all of the following realms of meaning—symbolics (language and mathematics), empirics (science, biology, psychology, and social science), aesthetics (music, visual arts, dance, and literature), synnoetics (or personal knowledge), ethics (moral knowledge), and synoptics (history, religion, and philosophy), and no general education is complete without the study of them all. To understand a realm of meaning, one needs to come to know its underlying symbolic system, not only what it is but how it works and how to do it or go on in it. That is, one needs to acquire propositional and procedural knowledge about it. To accomplish these ends, one requires an intimate and deep understanding of a realm of meaning. Rather than learners being distanced from the subject matter, they need to dig into it deeply in order to understand how it works practically as well as theoretically. In this vein, Eisner and Reimer are among those to posit the value of the arts as modes of knowing distinct from the sciences. Goodman proposes a theory of art that articulates some of the differences among the various realms of meaning. And drawing on Langer's work regarding the various sorts of symbols and ways of symbolic transformation that humans employ, Gardner proposes discrete human intelligences, all of which, presumably, should be developed in general education.

Construed as realms of meaning, symbol systems are explored and learners come to know about them, how they function, and their role in organizing and communicating human thought and practice. They may also employ them expressively. Seeing that these symbol systems are cultural as well as biological or psychological constructs opens the door to thinking about curriculum as a social and cultural construct. In this view, symbolic transformation is mediated and driven by, as it also impacts, individual thought and action (Bruner, 1990, 1996). And music educators need to write the stories of and construct philosophies that emerge from within their own cultural and political milieus. Making arguments for the legitimate place of various realms of meaning in general education also raises the question of which realms will be emphasized and how the claims of each will be adjudicated. The idea that including various realms of meaning constitutes a good can be applied specifically within a particular subject such as music so that composing, performing, and listening are characterized as distinct if also interrelated musical perspectives or realms of meaning. This idea also can be applied to the different musical systems evident throughout the world, each of which might be considered a theoretically distinct realm of meaning. Among examples of this approach to music curriculum, one thinks of the Comprehensive Musicianship Program and its successors, comprehensive arts programs such as the "Education for Aesthetic Awareness" program led by Bennett Reimer, and world music curricula urged by such writers as Campbell, Philomena Brennan, Mary Hookey, Volk, and Mary Goetze.[21]

Among its insights, this view of curriculum recognizes many differences in the ways in which people know the world and the variety of systems or realms of meaning-making that they invent and commonly practice. One realm cannot be judged according to the rules for another. Each of the symbol systems in which these various realms are based has its own distinctive attributes. Moreover, symbols mediate between the knower and known. Even within the arts, Langer and others in her train show that while the arts share commonalities, they also exhibit notable differences, so one art cannot substitute for another because each is a distinctive way of knowing.[22] This, in spite of Langer's point that in times past the arts were once more unified than they now are. Eisner, by contrast, is more inclined to group the arts together for the sorts of common attributes that they share and to view the arts in contrast to the sciences among other subjects studied in school.[23] The ideal, in this view, is a curriculum that represents the sum of all the important realms of meaning-making on the grounds that if one realm is lacking, the entire education suffers by its exclusion. Fewer writers are willing to go further to determine the specific criteria for inclusion and the relative importance of each realm. Instead, it is generally assumed that education ought by definition to be comprehensive of human culture, all the realms of meaning can and should be studied in school, and all are good and

important. Herbert Read is one of the few to accord the arts primacy in the school curriculum as the "unifying principle" in general education, invert the traditional curriculum, and organize all the school subjects into departments of art.[24]

By contrast, the notion of a realm of meaning is ambiguous. It can be applied at various levels of generality across general education and human culture to groups of subjects that share common characteristics such as the arts or the sciences, to a particular art, and within an art to the many ways in which it is made and taken around the world. The assumption that each of these realms is equally important, efficacious, and good eventually expands and clutters the traditional school curriculum with a multitude of goods. In this case, more seems better than less, comprehensiveness is regarded as a virtue even at the expense of superficiality, and the difficult questions concerning how one practically evaluates a multiplicity of goods or balances often conflicting ends is sidestepped. Aside from the tensions, discontinuities, and conflicts between things that may have merit when taken alone, or those things that may not be defensible, teachers need to make judgments about what things to omit or downplay and which to include or emphasize. Things that may seem to constitute a good when taken alone may turn out not to be so when judged in the light of the whole. Teachers have to decide what not to include as much as what to include, what to treat in passing as much as what to emphasize among these realms of meaning. So the claim that each realm is of equal although different value to the others and that all are required in general education is unrealistic and impractical. It does not provide a basis for making the difficult practical decisions, especially when realms and value systems conflict and time—among other resources—is limited. And in its focus on belief and meaning-making, curriculum as realm of meaning focuses on the intellectual dimensions of education rather than on its more holistic or person-centered imperatives and practices.

Curriculum as the Practical Application of Reason

Israel Scheffler (1973), Paul Hirst (1974; Hirst & Peters, 1970), R. S. Peters (1967), and Robin Barrow (1984) are among those who regard curriculum as applied philosophy, where ideas and concepts analyzed logically are applied within the phenomenal world to educational practice. The assumptions that undergird practice are articulated, amplified, and organized through philosophical analysis, deconstructed or analyzed into their constituent elements, constructed or reconstructed within a coherent and consistent whole, and defended logically (Scheffler, 1973). As such,

curriculum is simply the outworking in practice of thoughts, desires, and beliefs about what ought to take place in education. It is therefore incumbent on teachers to explain and defend their assumptions about what ought to be before going the further step of deciding how these imperatives can be realized practically. One cannot fully understand curriculum in its practical manifestation without grasping the underlying assumptions that drive the practice. When curriculum is regarded as inherently philosophical, having to do with the working out in practice of value judgments, it is appropriately defended with regard to underlying philosophical assumptions that constitute moral, logical, and aesthetic or artistic imperatives. In this view, curriculum is closer to philosophy than to science and should be studied accordingly. Seeing curriculum as the application of philosophy assumes that a study of the practical instance provides insight into the philosophical assumptions that presumably undergird it and are exemplified by or expressed in it. However, the evident discontinuity between the worlds of theory and practice makes the process of translating ideas into practice or attributing practices to particular ideas that give rise to them somewhat problematic. As such, curriculum is situated between the worlds of theory and practice and exemplifies the tension or dialectic between them. In music education, the Mountain Lake group commits to working out in practice the "curricular commonplaces" derived directly from Schwab's work.[25] Others include the music education as aesthetic education view exemplified in the *Silver Burdett Music* basal series, Carlotta Parr's philosophical principles as a basis for educating music teachers as "reflective practitioners" that remain to be elaborated practically, Doreen Rao's *Choral Music Experience* program presaged in her doctoral dissertation, Thomas Regelski's "action learning" approach to general music, and Christoph Richter's musical workshop approach drawn from the philosophies of Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Karl Ehrenforth.[26]

This view of curriculum has much to recommend it. Its emphasis on an articulated structure of assumptions focuses on the sources rather than results of action, and goes beneath a superficial view of practical characteristics to explain why and how these beliefs and practices are created, fostered, and sustained. Not only does it establish a rational basis for practical endeavor in its appeal to logical, ethical, and aesthetic rules, but also it recognizes the tension in every curriculum between the theoretical and phenomenal worlds, the desirable and the possible. In emphasizing justification more than refutation, it defends particular beliefs and practices, links intellectual and practical endeavor, and avoids a narrow focus on knowledge as an intellectual construct on the one hand and as a practice on the other. Its focus on values as central to the curriculum provides the means to logically examine their re-

spective merits and offers a way to adjudicate conflicting educational claims. And in drawing on philosophical rules and insights, it offers a means of thinking critically about what teachers and students do in the course of musical instruction.

By contrast, this very logical and rational view of curriculum may take insufficient account of the emotional and irrational aspects of music teaching and learning. Other fields besides philosophy—for example, sociology, critical theory, psychology, anthropology, ethnology, and history— also offer perspectives that complement and conflict with those of philosophy. Basing curriculum on philosophical insights alone may provide too narrow a basis for practice. Given that music education is an interdisciplinary enterprise, various fields of study afford important and differing insights on its work, and regarding curriculum as applied philosophy may not take sufficient account of these other perspectives. Ambiguity arises because curriculum is situated between philosophical assumption on the one hand and practice on the other. Practically speaking, philosophical ideas are often realized differently than philosophers intend or in varying degree, and there is considerable leakage between assumption and application.[27] Difficult questions remain, such as "How accurately and to what extent should a philosophy be applied in the phenomenal world before it can count as curriculum in the sense of applied philosophy?"

Curriculum as Discourse

The most radical view of curriculum during the past quarter-century is offered by William Pinar and his colleagues drawing on the work of other "reconceptualists" including Michael Apple, Maxine Greene, Dwayne Huebner, and Herbert Kliebard, to name a few.[28] The notion of discourse draws on postmodern ideas in education and the social sciences about the frames of reference in which individuals and institutions construct realities that encompass ways of conceptualizing and talking about ideas and the variety of practices that exemplify, flow from, and reinforce them. For Pinar and his colleagues (1995), curriculum as text is alternatively historical, political, racial, gendered, post-structuralist, de-constructed, postmodern, autobiographical, biographical, aesthetic, theological, institutionalized, and international. Whether regarding politics, gender, postmodernism, aesthetics, social psychoanalysis, or identities, these writers criticize traditional curriculum ideas and practices. They suggest alternatives that are more inclusive, affirm diverse perspectives and peoples, and reconstitute educational purposes and procedures in ways that are more inclusive, egalitarian, and pluralistic.[29] They all seek to subvert the establishment's traditional beliefs and practices.

The purpose of curriculum in this view is to unmask and deconstruct practice and transform it through becoming aware or "wide awake" about what is happening,[30] and working for change toward a better world. Curriculum is therefore avowedly ideological. It challenges students to act to change the present state of affairs and construct new identities. This transformative vision of curriculum is praxial in the liberatory sense articulated by Paulo Freire, Maxine Greene, Henry Giroux, Ira Shor, bell hooks, and Thomas Popkewitz, among others, of signifying the theory-practice that criticizes traditional ideas and practices and struggles toward a more humane world.[31] This explicitly subversive emphasis is shown in its commitment to unmask and unseat dogma and transform practice rather than simply transmit traditions from one generation to the next. And the notion of curriculum as "text" suggests that a situation is examined systematically, systemically, and specifically with the benefit of particular perspectives that assist the learning community in clarifying what would otherwise be hidden from view, be they perspectives of gender, race, sexuality, politics, postmodern thought, theology, or aesthetics. Among the music and arts curricula to take this tack are those advocated by Murray Schafer, Claire Detels, and members of the Mayday Group.[32]

This view of curriculum as an exercise in transforming tradition contributes important insights. It actively engages, challenges, criticizes, and supplants past ideas and practices, and attends directly to the dialectic between thought and action. Also, it necessitates teachers and students being actively involved in the educational enterprise, thinking critically about the things that they are teaching and learning, and working to improve the human situation. There is a commitment to explicit ideologies that replace those of the past and take account of the imperative of different value judgments as a basis for building curriculum. And insights from fields beyond philosophy broaden the conceptual basis on which the curriculum is built and focus not only on the explanation of philosophical premises but also on the articulation and derivation of its practices. The workings of political and other social processes within educational institutions internationally is of as much interest as the theoretical ideas they exemplify. This is not so much a matter of digging beneath the practice to see the underlying philosophy as on focusing on the practice itself, seeking to understand it, asking how it should be changed in the future, and attempting to change it. In understanding the particularities as well as commonalities among and between practices, it reveals the many ways in which humans are alike and different from each other and the importance of the things they do together and alone in helping to shape and contextualize knowledge and experience. And in the multiplicity of discourses and perspectives on curriculum, this image reveals the multifaceted na-

ture of knowledge and the partiality, incompleteness, even fallibility of any one perspective as the best or only way to understand self, world, and whatever lies beyond.

Still, the emphasis on practice may pay insufficient attention to the dialectic between philosophy and practice, and the ideas that give rise to practices. In focusing on the many specific differences among people, one may too quickly dismiss or fail to grasp sufficiently the many commonalities that they share.[33] Subversion also risks the loss of tradition, especially if the criticisms mounted of it are unwarranted or ill considered. Seeing that unexpected consequences follow from actions, it is possible that one's present perceptions and understandings may turn out in the long run to have been misguided, because one sees the present differently than with the benefit of historical perspective. The avowedly ideological purposes of curriculum in exposing evil and righting past wrongs also raise the central question of whose purposes are to prevail in education and how conflicting purposes are to be adjudicated. Having displaced philosophical reflection to the borders of the curriculum to be replaced by insights from other fields, there also is the possibility of espousing unwarranted assumptions and failing to expose error sufficiently—tasks that philosophers typically fulfill. And once one moves beyond philosophical thought to embrace an ideology, there is the risk that in becoming more committed to and less critical of an idea, one may become doctrinaire and refuse to brook criticism of this ideology or curriculum. From the perspective of an adherent of, or believer in, an ideology and for whom it is truth, challenging the ideology reveals one's ignorance of truth or commits heresy. When ideologues are uncritical of their own beliefs, it becomes very difficult to dialogue with them without meeting strong resistance or ridicule. They may see the blind spots in others but they cannot see their own.

Conclusion

In sum, notions of curriculum as content of instruction, system, process, realm of meaning, application of reason, and discourse all offer important insights and are flawed or limited in one way or another. No one suffices as the best or only image. Rather, they are like actors playing on a stage, the one or other coming to the fore when the role demands.[34] They may all be useful for different purposes and yet they are all problematic.

Clarifying the particular sense in which the word curriculum is being used, whether as a reference to the subject matter of instruction, the systemic and processual qualities of curriculum, the particular perspectives or lenses through which ideas and practices are studied, or the imperatives for curricular transformation, discloses and elucidates the positions of observer and participant. It also offers a

sounder basis on which to interpret curricular research and practice than in the absence of these images. The likelihood of partial and fallible understanding requires caution in constructing, interpreting, and evaluating curriculum theoretically and practically. And the presence of dialectics between these images suggests the possibility of tension and conflict between them, focuses on confronting apparent paradoxes as a central educational concern, and raises sometimes difficult theoretical and practical questions for the music teacher who draws on one or another image as the need arises.[35]

I see this "both/and" dialectical view of multiple images of curriculum as inevitable and useful. Mapping the images of curriculum enables researchers of music teaching and learning to more rigorously situate the concepts of curriculum they invoke, sharpen and better defend the focus of their research, and thereby improve the validity of curriculum studies in music education. And it facilitates teachers reflecting systematically on their purposes of and plans for music instruction, about what and how they and their students should and will study. This approach suggests that teachers should not prematurely foreclose their options but think through and reflect on the merits and detractions of each image for their particular situations before, in the midst of, and after instruction.[36]

In such a view, no one curricular image when taken alone suffices or is without its detractions. Images may overlap with others, for example, curriculum as realm of meaning and practical application of reason exemplified in the case of Reimer's approach to music education as aesthetic education. The resulting dialectics suggest that the work of music teaching and learning takes place in the "eye of paradox."[37] Teachers are faced with deciding how to bring together those aspects they see as overlapping, and reconciling those aspects that are in tension, conflict, or logically incompatible. Such an approach requires critical thinking on the part of teachers and their students. One never seems to arrive at a perfect practical solution, and there is no "high road" for all time. Far from being a debilitating result, such a situation requires imaginative and critical thought and practical skill on the part of teacher and student. It offers the prospect of mutuality, whereby aspects of each image may be combined or melded with others. And in allowing for and respecting differences, tensions, and even conflicts between images, and invoking imaginative and critical thought in negotiating between them, this dialectical approach opens up the possibility of many ways to teach and learn music with integrity.

NOTES

1. I am indebted to Mary J. Reichling, Iris M. Yob, Richard J. Colwell, Peter Webster, Nancy Whitaker, anonymous reviewers, and doctoral students in my curriculum in music

class at Indiana University—Dennis Ballard, Elizabeth Bauer, Brenda Graham, Eva Kwan, and Anne Sinclair—for comments on this essay.

2. Schwab (1978); Degenhardt (1989). Degenhardt may overstate the case and overlook the work of curricular reconceptualists and writers such as Henry Giroux and Ira Shor who have tackled some of these value-related issues from the field of cultural studies or the margins of education. See, for example, William Pinar (1975); Giroux (1983, 1992, 2000); Shor (1992). However, Martha C. Nussbaum's (1997) critique of the postmodern defense of educational plurality and diversity, especially regarding identity politics, suggests the need to revisit the theoretical underpinnings of curriculum—especially its underlying values—in a philosophically rigorous way. For example, Shor's sketch of values in dialogical education in his *Empowering Education* requires further philosophical analysis and criticism.

3. For more exhaustive and comparative surveys of the literature in curriculum, see Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, and Taubman (1995), especially pp. 869–1034.

4. Schubert (1986), 169–187. This approach is similar to that regarding organizations in Morgan (1986).

5. This ambiguity is noted in Barrow and Milburn (1986). On the narrative mode in curriculum, see Doll (1993), pp. 168–169. On curriculum as metaphor, see Kliebard (1992), pp. 202–216.

6. Ralph W. Tyler's *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction* (1949) is regarded as one of the foundational studies in American curricular theory.

7. On the ambiguity of art and craft, see Howard (1982), pp. 17–19. A weak syndrome suggests that there is overlap between things being compared, and ambiguity between or leakage from one to another. In comparing art and craft, for example, Howard points to notions of "arty craft" and "crafty art" that lie between the theoretical archetypes of art and craft.

8. Specific notions of dialectics vary from one writer to another. For example, while John Dewey (1916) is more sanguine about the possibility of resolving dialectics in synthesis, other later educational writers, for example, Paulo Freire (1993) and Maxine Greene (1988), see the situation as more complex. Discontinuities, tensions, conflicts, and logical incompatibilities may arise that make it difficult if not inappropriate to achieve synthesis. The practical dilemmas of dealing with dialectics may render music teaching paradoxical. For a discussion of my notion of dialectics, see Jorgensen (1997a, 1997b); Yob (1996); Bogdan (1998); Jorgensen (in press b).

9. Even if Israel Scheffler is right that the disparity between the two may not be as wide as Joseph Schwab would have us believe, both writers concur that a disjunction still persists; see Schwab (1970, 1971).

10. On "integrative levels of analysis" see Taylor (1975).

11. For a discussion of propositional and procedural knowledge in the context of education in music and the arts, see Howard (1982, 1992).

12. David J. Elliott (1995); Jorgensen (1997a); Christopher Small (1998). Elliott (pp. 29–33) argues against an "aesthetic concept" of music and music education referring

specifically to notions of "music-as-object, aesthetic experience, and aesthetic perception" that underpin his view of Bennett Reimer's notion of "music education as aesthetic education" (p. 29). Here, I use the word "aesthetic" in its broader, philosophical reference to characteristic philosophical perspectives and expectations that refer to and undergird practices that constitute what we call, in the West, musical traditions.

13. Koopman (1997) faults music educators for failing to distinguish sufficiently between aims and methods. In reply, I argue that they overlap, practically speaking; see Jorgensen (in press a).

14. Dewey (1956) points to the dialectic between the student and the subject matter of instruction in his *The Child and the Curriculum*, originally published in 1902. Also, see Bergman and Luckmann (1990).

15. Tyler (1949), 1. For an early systems approach to curriculum, see Johnson (1967), pp. 127–140, especially Figure 1, "A model showing curriculum as an output of one system and an input of another" (133).

16. One such approach is that of Yarbrough and Madsen (1980). See Jorgensen (1988), p. 95, on "intended" and "resultant" curriculum.

17. See Howard (1982), ch. 5, on the nature of artistic foresight.

18. The interrelatedness of ends as means to yet other ends is integral to Dewey's theory of experience (1963), particularly chs. 2, 3.

19. On cognitive emotions, see Scheffler (1991), pp. 3–17. On chaos theory, see Gleick (1987); Kiel and Elliott (1996). On the potential of chaos theory for music education philosophy, see Yob (2000).

20. His ideas are reinforced in the writings of Nelson Goodman, Vernon Howard, Howard Gardner, Elliot Eisner, and, in music education, Bennett Reimer; see Goodman (1976); Howard (1982); Gardner (1983); Eisner (1985, 1994); Reimer (1989).

21. In the case of these examples, there is a wide variety in the sophistication of the philosophical bases for curricula. Too often, influential music teachers have not devoted the same attention to the defense of their curricular assumptions as they have to creating, buttressing, and illustrating their practical plans and materials. Among the better defended curricula, the Contemporary Music Project for Creativity in Music Education (CMP) recommended tenets for comprehensive musicianship. For a description of the historical events surrounding this project and a sketch of its recommendations and uses see Michael L. Mark (1996), pp. 28–34, 161–166. On aesthetic education, see Reimer (1978). An example of the work undertaken under the aegis of the CMP is found in Warren Benson (1967). The thought behind this project is illustrated in the anthology of writings prepared by the CMP (1971). And on world music curricula, see Campbell (1991), Philomena S. Brennan (1992), pp. 221–225, one of several practical approaches to multicultural music curricula in the same issue: Mary Hookey (1994); Volk (1998); Mary Goetze (2000).

22. Langer (1957), pp. 13, 14, suggests that despite these

differences between the arts there is a fundamental "unity" between them or a point at which all dissimilarities disappear.

23. Although Eisner (1994) emphasizes the sensory basis of artistic cognition, he acknowledges the various forms of artistic representation. His point is to demonstrate the contributions of the arts to cognition within general education rather than highlight specific differences between them.

24. Read (1958, 1966). Read's approach resonates with that of Nelson Goodman (1984), pp. 168–172, where the arts rather than sciences are preeminent in university education.

25. Hookey (1999) builds on Schwab's curricular commonplaces to develop her own list of five commonplaces: people, processes, perspectives, musics, and contexts.

26. For an application of Bennett Reimer's philosophy, see *Silver Burdett Music* (1981). Along with coauthors Elizabeth Crook, David W. Walker, Mary E. Hoffman, and Albert McNeil, Reimer designed a conceptual framework based on the activities of perceiving and reacting, producing, conceptualizing, analyzing, evaluating, and integrative learning toward realizing the stated objectives of perceiving, reacting, producing, conceptualizing, analyzing, evaluating, and valuing. Doreen Rao (1987–1991) outlines principles of choral music education that are exemplified in Doreen Rao with Lori-Anne Dolloff and Sandra Prodan (1993). N. Carlotta Parr (1999) outlines principles of teacher education drawn from the ideas of Jerome Bruner, Vernon Howard, and Maxine Greene that she believes should be implemented in preservice and in-service teacher education programs. Also, see Doreen Rao (1988). Thomas A. Regelski outlines principles for a praxial music curriculum, including an emphasis on the doing of music through practical (or practicum) experiences in his as yet unpublished essay, "Implications of Aesthetic vs. Praxial Philosophies of Music for Curriculum Theory in Music Education," and in his book in progress, *Musicianship Laboratory: An Action Learning Approach to Intermediate and Middle School General Music*. Christoph Richter's ideas are available in English in his essay, "The Didactic Interpretation of Music" (1996), pp. 33–49, and his forthcoming essay, "Musical Workshop-Activity as an Aspect of Hermeneutic Understanding and as a Way of Didactic Interpretation of Music" (in press).

27. Estelle R. Jorgensen, "What are the roles of philosophy in music education?" (in press b).

28. These authors are represented in Pinar (1975) and Pinar et al. (1995).

29. See Apple (2000) on politics and curriculum; Grumet (1988) and bell hooks (1994) on gender and curriculum; Doll (1993) on postmodernism and curriculum; Eisner (1994) on aesthetics and curriculum; Kincheloe and Pinar (1991) on social-psychoanalysis and curriculum; and Pinar (1998) on identities and curriculum.

30. In her notion of what it is to be "wide awake," Greene (1978), ch. 11, draws on Schutz (1967). For a discussion of Greene's notion of the importance of becoming "wide awake," see Parr (1996), pp. 125–132.

31. Carr (2001) draws on Aristotelian notions of praxis in examining jazz. Regelski (1998) sketches the Aristotelian

roots of praxis from the perspective of a critical pedagogy. Notions of music education espoused by Allsup (in press), and Jorgensen, *Renewing Education Through Music*, unpublished monograph available from the author, jorgense@indiana.edu are avowedly liberatory. A radically democratic and liberatory view of education is evident in Freire (1993); Greene (1988); Giroux (1993, 1996, 1997, 2000); Shor (1992); hooks (1994); Thomas S. Popkewitz (1998).

32. Schafer (1988); Detels (1999). For example, the May Day group of music educators has committed to particular "regulative ideals," and is devoted to unmasking the errors of traditional practice, articulating and forging a new plan, raising support for it, and eventually implementing it institutionally. One of the founders of the May Day group, Regelski, criticizes the status quo and urges change in music education belief and practice in his essay "Scientism in Experimental Music Research" (1996), pp. 3–19, and his paper "Sociology of Knowledge, Critical Theory and 'Methodolatry' in Music Education" (1995). Interestingly, two decades ago, Reimer (1978), p. 66, saw The Cleveland Area Project for the Arts in the Schools, "Education for Aesthetic Awareness," which he led for several years, as seeking "nothing less than a *transformation of arts education* [italics mine] from the traditional music and visual arts offerings found in most schools to total arts programs embodying the most advanced thinking about what aesthetic education might be and how major changes can take place in schooling." While his views are now considered as a foil for self-described praxialists Elliott and Regelski, nevertheless Reimer attempted to implement an ambitious program that he saw as a transformative vision of music education for his time.

33. Nussbaum (1997), p. 138, notes the importance in academic education of noticing these "common human problems."

34. Yob (1997) coined this metaphor in her response to Jorgensen (1997b). Such a dialectical approach while giving rise to problems and paradoxes, as Bogdan observes (1998), is worth pursuing because it is true to the nature of teaching. Others who concur with this dialectical view of teaching include Greene (1988); Palmer (1998).

35. For example, an eclectic music curriculum is proposed in Carder (c. 1990), notwithstanding that the philosophical assumptions and curricular images upon which these approaches draw differ in sometimes significant and conflicting ways.

36. Of particular interest to the education of artists is the notion of "reflection-in-action" described in Schön (1987).

37. Bogdan (1998), p. 73. This view resonates with Palmer's focus on recapturing the "hidden wholeness" beneath the dialectics and paradoxes of teaching. See Palmer (1998), ch. 3.

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