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## The rivalry revisited

### THE SOURCES OF DISCORD

What animates the Indo-Pakistani conflict? The question is far from trivial. This rivalry, which originated almost immediately after British colonial withdrawal from and the partition of the British Indian Empire in 1947, has proven to be remarkably durable.<sup>1</sup> It has resulted in four wars (1947–48, 1965, 1971 and 1999) and multiple crises.<sup>2</sup> The structural origins of this conflict have been explored at length elsewhere.<sup>3</sup>

This book, focused on Indo-Pakistani relations between 1999 and 2009, will attempt to answer a critical question: does the *security dilemma* (the *spiral model*) or the *deterrence model* best describe this relationship?<sup>4</sup> This attempt to squarely place the rivalry in the

1 For a particularly thoughtful account of the process of partition and the drawing of the Indo-Pakistani border see Lucy P. Chester, *Borders and Conflict in South Asia: The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of the Punjab* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).

2 Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

3 For an Indian perspective on the British transfer of power see V.P. Menon, *The Transfer of Power in India* (New Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 1997); for a Pakistani perspective see Chaudhry Mohammed Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1983).

4 For a clear discussion of these two models see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 81.

context of central propositions from the security studies literature is a fundamentally novel endeavor.

The novelty of this approach is twofold. First, despite the persistence of this rivalry over six decades, the literature on the subject is scant.<sup>5</sup> What little does exist is either descriptive or historical in orientation and there have been few attempts to examine the rivalry through theoretical foci.<sup>6</sup> Second, this lack of scholarly attention to the sources of discord is puzzling, as the two states have been incipient nuclear-armed rivals for well over two decades and became overt nuclear weapons states in 1998. Furthermore, one of the two rivals, India, has long had aspirations to emerge as a great power. Indeed, according to some scholars, it has already achieved great power status.<sup>7</sup>

Some recent literature, mostly focused on Pakistan, while not explicitly alluding to the concept of the *security dilemma*, has nevertheless suggested that the sheer structural differences between the two states at the time of their emergence from the detritus of the British colonial empire in South Asia, led the weaker state, Pakistan, to fear its behemoth neighbor. To varying degrees, these works suggest that misgivings about India precipitated Pakistan's anxieties and set the stage for the rivalry.<sup>8</sup> Before turning to a discussion of

5 See for example Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, *Indo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1955* (Amsterdam: De Brug Djambatan, 1958); Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations* (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1967); Russell Brines, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict* (New York: Pall Mall, 1968).

6 For an attempt at theorizing about the conflict see T.V. Paul (ed.), *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); for a critique thereof see Sumit Ganguly, "War, Nuclear Weapons and Crisis Stability in South Asia," *Security Studies* 17, no. 1 (2008): 164-184.

7 Manjeet S. Pardesi, "Is India a Great Power? Understanding Great Power Status in Contemporary International Relations," *Asian Security* 11, no. 1 (2015): 1-30.

8 See for example, Ayesha Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); also see Aqil Shah, *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). It should be noted that Shah's argument, in some significant degree, differs from that of Jalal. Whereas Jalal suggests that India's size and initial intransigence set off Pakistan's fears, Shah argues that the Pakistani military establishment helped stoke those fears for its own parochial interests. An important exception to these analyses, and whose argument comports with mine, is C. Christine Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Fair's argument

the *security dilemma* and *deterrence models* and their applicability to the Indo-Pakistani conflict it appears necessary to provide a brief account of the evolution of the rivalry.

The rivalry, from the outset, became structured within the territorial dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Briefly stated, the problem of the Kashmir dispute can be traced to the process of British colonial disengagement from the subcontinent. At the time of independence and partition there were two classes of states in British India. These were the states of British India and the so-called princely states. The latter had enjoyed nominal independence as long as they recognized the British Crown as the paramount power in South Asia and deferred to the British on matters of defense, foreign affairs and communications. Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy, had decreed that the princely states had to join either India or Pakistan based upon their demographic composition and their geographic location.<sup>9</sup> Kashmir posed a unique problem because it was a Muslim-majority state but with a Hindu monarch and abutted both India and Pakistan.<sup>10</sup> In the

is that Pakistan is not a security seeking state but a "greedy state." She traces the roots of Pakistan's behavior to its national ideology.

9 It is necessary at this juncture to state quite forthrightly that a controversy exists about the drawing of the borders at the time of independence and partition. A noted British historian, Alastair Lamb, has alleged that Lord Mountbatten influenced Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the London barrister who was entrusted with the task of delineating the boundaries of the two nascent states in drawing the partition line to ensure that a portion of Kashmir actually touched India. Lamb's allegation holds that the territory ceded to India was not a Muslim-majority region and therefore should not have been granted to India. Furthermore, Lamb claims that the Instrument of Accession, under the aegis of which Kashmir went to India, was signed after Indian troops had already landed in Srinagar. The first claim, on the basis of a careful examination of the demographic features of the border at the time of independence, can actually be refuted. The second remains a matter of debate and conjecture. For the purposes of this analysis the critical issue of the fairness of the drawing of the borders is deemed uncontroversial. For a response to Lamb, see Prem Shankar Jha, *Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003).

10 For the origins of the controversy see Alastair Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy* (Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1991). For a superb rejoinder to Lamb based upon a careful sifting of demographic data see Shereen Ilahi, "The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Fate of Kashmir," *India Review* 2, no. 1 (January 2003): 77-102.

event, Maharaja Hari Singh, the monarch of Kashmir, chose not to accede to either state.<sup>11</sup>

As Hari Singh vacillated, Pakistan embarked upon a military strategy to wrest the state from India. It involved sending in Pakistani troops disguised as and mingled with local tribesmen to help foment a revolt against Hari Singh's rule.<sup>12</sup> As the Pakistan-aided rebels advanced toward Srinagar, the summer capital of his state, Maharaja Hari Singh, in panic, appealed to India for assistance. Prime Minister Nehru agreed to provide assistance but only if two conditions were met. The maharaja would have to accede to India and in the absence of a referendum to ascertain the wishes of the Kashmiri population, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the leader of the principal, secular, popular party within the state would have to grant his imprimatur to the process.<sup>13</sup> Only when Abdullah gave his consent did Nehru permit Indian military forces to be flown into the state to stop the Pakistani-assisted tribal advance.<sup>14</sup>

The Indian military contingent managed to stop the Pakistani military onslaught but not before one-third of the state fell to the invaders.<sup>15</sup> On the advice of Lord Mountbatten the case was referred

11 His reasons were fairly straightforward. He did not wish to join Pakistan because as the ruler of a Muslim-majority state, who was not known for his benevolence toward his Muslim subjects, he feared that he would not fare well in a state that had been created as the homeland for the Muslims of South Asia. He also did not wish to join India because he knew that a socialist-leaning prime minister, Nehru, would strip him of most of his vast privileges. His fears, thereby, were hardly unfounded. For details see Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, *Jammu and Kashmir* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968); the obverse of this problem, up to a point, obtained in the princely state of Hyderabad where the Nizam, a Muslim ruler, presided over a Hindu-majority population. The difference, of course, lay in that Hyderabad did not share a border with Pakistan and was completely landlocked.

12 The particulars of Pakistan's military strategy can be found in Akbar Khan, *Raiders in Kashmir* (Lahore: National Book Foundation, 1975).

13 On Abdullah's imprimatur see Leo E. Rose and Richard Sisson, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh* (Oakland: University of California Press, 1991); on Abdullah's popularity in the state see Ian Copeland, "The Abdullah Factor: Kashmiri Muslims and the Crisis of 1947," in D.A. Low (ed.), *The Political Inheritance of Pakistan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

14 Lionel Protip Sen, *Slender Was the Thread* (New Delhi: Orient-Longmans, 1969).

15 The most dispassionate account of the Pakistani invasion and India's response can be found in Andrew Whitehead, *A Mission in Kashmir* (New York: Penguin, 2008).

to the United Nations on January 1, 1948 under the aegis of Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter, which deals with matters pertaining to breaches of international peace and security. Following much discussion and the passage of multiple resolutions, the United Nations called for a ceasefire on January 1, 1949. This ceasefire was codified in the creation of a Ceasefire Line (CFL) that reflected the disposition of troops at the time.<sup>16</sup>

Subsequently, the issue quickly became embroiled in the politics of the Cold War. The Western powers, most notably the United Kingdom and subsequently the United States, did not deal dispassionately with the subject but instead allowed their geopolitical interests in Pakistan to shape their policies.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, the United Nations did pass two critical resolutions, which enjoined Pakistan to withdraw its troops, asked India to create conditions conducive to holding a plebiscite and then to conduct a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the Kashmiri population. As is well known, Pakistan refused to comply with the initial step and India, in turn, failed to follow through on the subsequent expectations. The matter followed a desultory course in the United Nations for almost two decades. Eventually, in the 1960s the UN lost interest in the subject.

In the aftermath of the disastrous Sino-Indian border war of 1962, India desperately sought military assistance from both the United States and the United Kingdom. Aware of India's strategic vulnerability, the two powers played a critical role in inducing bilateral discussions between India and Pakistan. These discussions stemmed from the Harriman/Sandys Mission, which had brought Averell Harriman, a US Assistant Secretary of State, and Duncan Sandys, a British Member of Parliament and Commonwealth Secretary to India. They successfully persuaded Prime Minister Nehru to hold talks with Pakistan with a view toward seeking a resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Faced with a looming military threat from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and dependent on both diplomatic and military support from both powers, Nehru had reluctantly agreed to hold talks. Between December 1962 and May 1963 a set of bilateral talks were held in a number of different locations

16 For details see Ganguly, 2001, pp. 16-19.

17 Chandrasekhar Dasgupta, *War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947-1948* (New Delhi: Sage, 2002).

in India and Pakistan. Despite much Anglo-American pressure on India to reach an accord favorable to Pakistan, Nehru's otherwise beleaguered regime refused to give ground.<sup>18</sup>

Indeed the failure of multilateral negotiations and these bilateral talks played vital roles in precipitating the second Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1965.<sup>19</sup> This war ended in a military stalemate. Following its outbreak the United States imposed an arms embargo on both states irritating both parties in the process. The impact on Pakistan, however, was considerably greater as the vast majority of its equipment was of American origin. In the aftermath of the war, the United States evinced little interest in the problem. The Soviet Union, sensing an opportunity to expand its influence in South Asia, stepped into the breach. To that end it invited Nehru's successor, Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan, to the Central Asian city of Tashkent to broker a postwar accord. Under the terms of the Tashkent Agreement the two sides agreed to return to the *status quo ante* and to abjure from the use of force to settle the Kashmir dispute.

A third war took place between India and Pakistan in 1971. This conflict, however, did not have its origins in the Kashmir dispute. Instead it can be traced to the exigencies of Pakistani domestic politics. In the wake of Pakistan's first free and fair election in December 1970, the Awami League, an East Pakistan-based political party led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, won an overwhelming victory in the province. In West Pakistan, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) swept the polls. Given this bifurcated electoral verdict the two sides needed to reach a power-sharing agreement. As negotiations ensued it became increasingly apparent that the PPP (and its military backers) had little or no interest in arriving at an accord that would involve a genuinely equitable arrangement.<sup>20</sup> Indeed by March 1971 the two parties found themselves in a virtual deadlock. Of course, the military, which had little or

18 For details see Rudra Chaudhuri, *Forged in Crisis: India and the United States Since 1947* (London: Christopher Hurst and Company, 2014), pp. 126-148.

19 On the origins of the 1965 war see Sumit Ganguly, "Deterrence Failure Revisited: The Indo-Pakistani Conflict of 1965," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 13, no. 4 (December 1990): 77-93.

20 Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

no interest whatsoever in any power-sharing arrangement, abandoned the negotiations at the behest of the president and a coterie of senior generals.<sup>21</sup>

Meanwhile, the supporters of the Awami League in East Pakistan ramped up their demands and sought to extract an unprecedented degree of autonomy from the West. Their stance was hardly unreasonable given that since independence the West had, for all practical purposes, dominated the politics and economics of the country.<sup>22</sup>

As the impasse persisted, the Pakistani military embarked on a crackdown on East Pakistan's attentive public on March 26, 1971, especially in the capital city of Dacca (now Dhaka). Over the course of the week the Pakistan Army killed over one hundred thousand civilians.<sup>23</sup> Faced with this repression several million East Pakistanis fled the country and sought refuge in various Indian border states. By May of 1971, the refugee influx had reached nearly ten million.<sup>24</sup>

Faced with this refugee burden, India's policy-makers quickly concluded that they could ill-afford to absorb them into India's already turgid population. Though they went through the motions of seeking a diplomatic solution to the ongoing crisis, they started to formulate a contingency plan for the invasion of East Pakistan designed to break off the province from the West. Over the course of the next several months, even as some diplomatic activity ensued, India's security forces and intelligence services started to train, equip and support an indigenous Bengali insurgency movement, the Mukti Bahini (literally "liberation force"). Pakistani authorities protested India's covert involvement in the politics of East Pakistan but India's support did not flag. Unable to quell the internal rebellion, which was gathering steam thanks to India's efforts, the Pakistani Air Force struck at India's northern bases on December 6, 1971. This attack, which proved to be mostly

21 On this point, which challenges the conventional wisdom that the talks had broken down, see Jalal, 2014, p. 172.

22 Rose and Sisson, 1991.

23 The best treatment of this tragedy can be found in Gary J. Bass, *The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger and a Forgotten Genocide* (New York: Knopf, 2013).

24 Robert Jackson, *South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan, Bangla Desh* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975).

unsuccessful, nevertheless provided India with the formal *casus belli* to invade East Pakistan.<sup>25</sup>

#### THE LONG PEACE AND ITS END

After the third Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1971, the region had seen a period of unprecedented, if cold, peace. In considerable part, this long peace in South Asia stemmed from Pakistan's decisive defeat in the 1971 war and the concomitant asymmetry in Indian and Pakistani military capabilities. Furthermore, the Pakistan Army, thanks to the military debacle in East Pakistan, had been mostly discredited, giving a civilian regime some control over the security establishment. Consequently, apart from some tensions in the wake of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan when an arms transfer and military nexus was renewed between the United States and Pakistan, the Kashmir issue remained dormant until December 1989.

The only exception was a crisis that took place in 1987. This stemmed from India's attempt to respond to Pakistan's involvement in an indigenous insurgency that was wracking the state of Punjab. The origins of the Punjab insurgency have been discussed at length elsewhere.<sup>26</sup> In the mid-1980s, Pakistan had become deeply embroiled in the insurgency and was providing the insurgents with sanctuary, training and material support.<sup>27</sup> Given that Punjab is located in the Indian heartland, its policy-makers decided that a strong dissuasive message should be sent to Pakistan.

As circumstances would have it, the Indian Army was under the leadership of a flamboyant, US-trained officer, General Krishnaswami Sundarji. General Sundarji was keen on modernizing the Indian military and wanted to pursue a more assertive military doctrine. He was interested in testing an indigenously developed system of radars and telecommunication equipment. To that end, he

25 Much of this is discussed in Srinath Raghavan, *1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

26 On the Punjab insurgency see Gurharpal Singh, *Ethnic Conflict in India: A Case Study of Punjab* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000).

27 Hamish Telford "Counter-Insurgency in India: Observations from Punjab and Kashmir," *The Journal of Conflict Studies* 21, no. 1 (2001): 1-27.

sought and received permission to carry out a very substantial military exercise, code-named Brasstacks, in the Rajasthan desert bordering Pakistan. The sheer length of the exercise, spanning several months, its extraordinary size, involving close to 150,000 soldiers and its east-west axis provoked Pakistani anxieties.<sup>28</sup> (Most military exercises, in the past, had been held along a north-south axis to avoid conveying any impression that the exercise was a prelude to a possible war.)

Not surprisingly, Pakistan chose not to return some key units to its peacetime stations following the termination of its own winter military exercises "Sledgehammer" and "Flying Horse." Instead, it placed them at some strategic salients along the Indo-Pakistani border. These Pakistani military moves, in turn, led to serious misgivings in New Delhi and generated fears of a possible war. Such fears were not entirely unfounded, given the deeply disturbed situation within the Punjab and the links between some of the Punjabi separatist groups and Pakistan's intelligence agencies. As tensions mounted, US and Soviet diplomats (and intelligence specialists), who had followed the emergence of this spiral, used their good offices to intercede in both Islamabad and New Delhi in attempts to defuse the situation.

As the crisis drew to a close, one of the principal architects of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadir Khan, gave an interview to a noted Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayar, in which he asserted that Pakistan was well within reach of fashioning a nuclear weapon. It is not wholly clear if Khan's revelation constituted a deliberate attempt at nuclear signaling. However, Indian authorities did take this disclosure seriously and boosted their own covert nuclear weapons program.<sup>29</sup> Though the crisis did not escalate into a war thanks to timely superpower intercession, it reinforced in New Delhi existing misgivings about Pakistani military regimes and of General Zia-ul-Haq, the Pakistani military dictator, in particular.

28 Steven R. Weisman, "On India's Border, A Huge Mock War," *New York Times*, March 6, 1987.

29 Much of this discussion about the Brasstacks crisis has been derived from Kanti Bajpai, P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen and Sumit Ganguly, *Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and the Management of Crisis in South Asia* (New Delhi: Manohar Books, 1995).

General Zia, of course, perished in a mysterious plane crash in the summer of 1988. His abrupt death led the Pakistani military to return to the barracks. Their decision not to cling on to power stemmed from US pressures as well as a realization that the populace had tired of military rule. Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of the Pakistani president, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who General Zia had sent to the gallows, assumed office in an election that was deemed to be free and fair. Shortly thereafter she evinced a willingness to start discussions with India to try and improve relations. These efforts, quite apart from the ingrained hostility of the security establishment, quickly proved to be abortive.

In December 1989, an indigenous, ethno-religious insurgency erupted in the Indian-controlled portion of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. The internal dimensions of this crisis, like that in the Punjab, also stemmed primarily from various shortcomings in India's federal order. The incipient peace process that Bhutto, along with her Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, had initiated was now placed in jeopardy.<sup>30</sup> The abrupt onset of the rebellion in Indian-controlled Kashmir effectively ended these nascent discussions.

Shortly thereafter the insurgency threatened to spin out of control as Indian authorities proved wholly incapable of coping with it. Within the year of the outbreak of the insurgency, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI-D) worked assiduously to transform it from a grassroots uprising into a well-orchestrated, religiously inspired and externally supported extortion racket.<sup>31</sup> The Indian state initially responded in a ham-fisted fashion to quell the insurgents. Its initial approach was to use extensive force against the insurgents. Ironically, this strategy produced perverse results. It had the effect of further inflaming the sentiments of the local population and widened the scope of the insurgency.

30 On the origins of the insurgency see Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

31 For the role of the ISI-D see Arif Jamal, *Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir* (New York: Melville House, 2009) and Praveen Swami, *India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004* (London: Routledge, 2007).

Indeed in 1990 India quickly found itself embroiled in yet another crisis with Pakistan. This crisis had its origins in India's inability to restore a modicum of order to the Kashmir valley, the principal locus of the insurgency. As Indian authorities sought to contain the insurgency they warned Pakistan that continued infiltration into Kashmir could lead to a conflict with India. Pakistani authorities, in turn, turned up their rhetoric threatening a war with India. In the United States, intelligence officials warned that the escalating rhetoric (as well as some critical troop movements) made the situation in the subcontinent quite fraught, with the possibility of an inadvertent conflict. In May 1990, the then deputy National Security Adviser, Robert Gates, accompanied by Richard Haas, the Senior Director for South Asia and the Middle East on the United States National Security Council, traveled to both New Delhi and Islamabad in an attempt to defuse the crisis. In New Delhi, Gates counseled restraint on India. In Islamabad he delivered a different message. Not only did he suggest that the Pakistanis end their support for the insurgents but also warned that in every war game scenario that the United States had developed, Pakistan emerged as the loser.<sup>32</sup> Though Pakistani infiltration did not come to an end, the crisis was effectively defused.

On the Indian side, faced with widespread domestic and external criticism of its harsh methods, New Delhi changed its tactics and within a few years managed to restore a modicum of order, if not law, in the state.<sup>33</sup> Meanwhile, despite changes in regime within Pakistan, the fundamental commitment to the use of proxy terrorist forces in Kashmir continued apace, thereby keeping relations with India on the boil.

Against this backdrop of ongoing tensions, considerable international concern was focused on the subcontinent in the wake of

32 For details see Devin T. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," *International Security* 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995): 79-114; also see Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty, *Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises Under the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006); and P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, *Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

33 On the evolution of India's Counter-insurgency tactics see Sumit Ganguly and David P. Fidler (eds.), *India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned* (London: Routledge, 2009).

the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998.<sup>34</sup> The United States, along with much of the international community, expressed considerable dismay and anger over the nuclear tests.<sup>35</sup> Not surprisingly, both sides faced a raft of bilateral and multilateral sanctions. The United States, in particular, mounted a major diplomatic effort to try and persuade both states to roll back their nuclear weapons programs. In the end, however, this proved to be a futile endeavor.

Their mutual and overt acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1998 deepened a debate, which had begun in the late 1980s, about whether or not the region is more or less likely to witness full-scale conflict. Some have argued that the nuclear deterrence may well prevent the outbreak of a major conflict. Others argue that the possibility of war is greater because Pakistan, a revisionist state, believes that it can now provoke India, a status quo power, with impunity, because of its nuclear shield. In fact, the fourth Indo-Pakistani conflict in 1999 in the region of Kargil only helped sharpen the contours of the debate. Those who argued the case for "strategic pessimism" believed that escalation had been narrowly averted through a set of idiosyncratic circumstances. On the other hand, those who believed in the robustness of nuclear deterrence held that full-scale war did not ensue precisely because of the mutual possession of nuclear weapons.<sup>36</sup>

This debate has yet to yield a clear-cut answer. However, before one seeks a definitive answer to that question it may be useful to ascertain what underlying factors drive this relationship of hostility. Can the sources of hostility be traced simply to structural conditions? Namely, is this relationship merely a *security dilemma*?<sup>37</sup>

34 On the origins of the nuclear tests see Sumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Sources and Prospects of India's Nuclear Weapons Program," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 148-177; on Pakistan's motivations see Samina Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 178-204.

35 A good account of the US response can be gleaned from Strobe Talbott, *Democracy, Diplomacy and the Bomb* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2006).

36 Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, *India, Pakistan and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

37 For the classic statement of the concept of the *security dilemma* see John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (January 1950): 157-180; for re-statements and refinements see

Pared to the bone, this concept holds that in an anarchic international system a state cannot be certain that another's acquisition of military capabilities is purely defensive. Since intentions can change, the same weaponry can be used for offensive purposes. Consequently, a state must respond to the other's choices. In turn, its decisions provoke the anxieties of the other, thereby contributing to a spiral of hostility.

On the other hand, the security dilemma may explain little when one state is not reconciled to the status quo but actually wishes to bring about territorial changes. Under these circumstances one party amounts to a revisionist state and the other might be considered a status quo power. Consequently, steps that the status quo power undertakes to assuage the apparent misgivings of the revisionist power may accomplish little. On the contrary, such conciliatory gestures may actually be construed as signs of weakness and embolden the revisionist state. Furthermore, in the Indo-Pakistani case, psychological dynamics affecting decision-making have repeatedly skewed Pakistani assessments of Indian capability and resolve. These have involved various cognitive and affective biases leading to questionable and contradictory evaluations of India's will and capability.<sup>38</sup>

Given Pakistan's relentless efforts to alter the territorial status quo it needs to be carefully underscored that the central argument of this book is that it is indeed a revisionist power. It is not, as several scholars have argued, fears of Indian malfeasance that drive Pakistan's insecurities. Specific events and choices, on particular occasions, may have provoked Pakistani concerns. However, there is little or no question that Pakistan remains unalterably committed to changing the territorial status quo regardless of Indian behavior.

#### COMPETING AND ANTAGONISTIC NATIONAL VISIONS

What explains the apparently unyielding positions of the two antagonists to the Kashmir dispute? Suffice to say that it is rooted

Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (January 1976): 167-214; also see Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler (eds.), *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

38 On this subject see Ganguly, 1990; also see Altaf Gauhar, "Four Wars, One Assumption," *The Nation*, September 5, 1999.

in competing visions of state construction in South Asia. India, which was based upon the principle of secular, civic nationalism, finds itself at odds with Pakistan, which was founded on the basis of religious nationalism.<sup>39</sup>

Any discussion of the Indo-Pakistani discord must take into account certain structural differences between the two polities. Shortly after the partition of the British Indian Empire and the creation of the independent states of India and Pakistan, the political trajectories of the two states diverged dramatically. Within three years of its independence, India managed to forge a secular and democratic constitution and succeeded in holding national elections two years thereafter.<sup>40</sup> Pakistan, on the other hand, failed to draft a constitution until nine years after its independence. Jinnah's early demise in 1948 and the assassination of his handpicked successor, Liaquat Ali Khan, in 1951 further deteriorated the situation. The absence of these two key individuals in the country's nascent political order certainly did little to help the process of political and ideological consolidation. Following a period of political turmoil this constitutional experiment drew to a close in 1958 with the first military coup.<sup>41</sup> Military rule in Pakistan would then last until 1969. Indeed the vast majority of Pakistan's independent history the country has been under authoritarian military rule.<sup>42</sup>

The origins of the different political pathways of these two states have been discussed elsewhere. Suffice it to state that they can be traced to the ideology, organization and political strategies of the two nationalist movements.<sup>43</sup> The Indian nationalist movement, despite its elitist origins, managed under the leadership of Mohandas Gandhi

39 On Pakistani nationalism see Hafeez Malik, *Muslim Nationalism in India and Pakistan* (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1963); on the origins of Indian nationalism see Ramachandra Guha, *India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy* (New York: Ecco, 2007); also see Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994).

40 Granville Austin, *The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999).

41 Allen McGrath, *The Destruction of Pakistan's Democracy* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996).

42 Sumit Ganguly, "Pakistan's Never-Ending Story: Why the October Coup Was No Surprise," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 2 (March/April 2000): 2-9.

43 See the excellent treatment in Maya Tudor, *The Promise of Power: The Origins of Authoritarianism in Pakistan and Democracy in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

to develop a mass political base in the 1930s, succeeded in promoting internal democracy, allowed internal debate within its ranks and fashioned a blueprint for governance long before independence.

The Pakistani nationalist movement, however, failed to promote internal democracy, remained woven around the charismatic personality of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and drew its support primarily from the landed gentry of the United Provinces (later Uttar Pradesh in independent India) of British India. Furthermore, it should be underscored that Jinnah, unlike his Indian counterpart, Jawaharlal Nehru, who sought electoral legitimacy, chose to govern the Pakistani polity as an unelected Governor-General. Additionally, some authoritarian tendencies emerged in the early days of the Pakistani polity. Almost immediately after independence, Jinnah had dismissed a non-League government in the North West Frontier Province on the most tenuous legal grounds.<sup>44</sup> Finally, as early as 1951, Pakistan faced its first coup attempt in what came to be known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case.<sup>45</sup>

Indian nationalists, shortly after independence, were able to draw of their past background of debate, discussion and argument to quickly fashion a working democratic polity.<sup>46</sup> Their Pakistani counterparts, on the contrary, found themselves overwhelmed with the tasks of state construction, the maintenance of political order, and felt compelled to turn to the military to quell civil disturbances. They also quickly became bogged down in the question of the role of Islam in public life. That issue, of course, still has not been resolved and continues to dog the Pakistani polity.

The emergent internal political arrangements of the two states also produced markedly different patterns of civil-military relations. In Pakistan, the military quickly emerged as *primus inter pares*.<sup>47</sup> Long after the restoration of democracy, albeit for varying lengths of time, democratic civilian authority has not been consolidated in

44 Khalid bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1947-1948* (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1960).

45 Hasan Zaheer, *The Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951: The First Coup Attempt in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998).

46 The best statement of these two contrasting nationalist movements can be found in Paul R. Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

47 Sayeed, 1960.

the country.<sup>48</sup> The military dominance of the Pakistani polity quite early in the day led to a fundamental distortion of the state's social and economic priorities. According to a knowledgeable source, even before the first coup, the military had managed to divert as much as 70 percent of all government expenditures to meeting national security objectives.<sup>49</sup> That said, India did have the distinct advantage of inheriting most of the military infrastructure of British India.

The military in India, in marked contrast, has been quite subservient to political authority.<sup>50</sup> Even during the brief state of emergency in the late 1970s when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi suspended civil liberties, the military played no role in the political affairs of the state.<sup>51</sup> On occasion, the highest echelons of the military have expressed particular reservations about policies. However, there is no evidence that they have actually contemplated, let alone plotted, a military takeover.

These differing patterns of politico-military relations have had significant consequences for national security and foreign policy decision-making in the two countries. Apart from a small handful of instances, the Indian military has played little or no role whatsoever in the formulation of India's foreign and security policies. Instead, on a number of occasions, senior military staff have been either reprimanded or entirely removed from their commands because they had, in the eyes of the civilian leadership, breached certain norms of civil-military relations. In Pakistan matters have worked in reverse. The military has challenged, supported and dismissed governments as and when they have deemed necessary. Indeed thanks to their dominance they have made the issue of national security the dominant concern of the Pakistani state.<sup>52</sup> Their conception of national security has involved a form of gross inflation of the putative

48 For the best discussion of civil-military relations in Pakistan see Shah, 2014.

49 Shah, 2014, p. 48.

50 Sumit Ganguly, "From the Defense of the Nation to Aid to the Civil: The Army in Contemporary India," *Journal of Asian and African Affairs* 26 (1991): 1-12; for an idiosyncratic account that takes a contrary view see Srinath Raghavan, "Soldiers, Statesmen, and India's Security Policy," *India Review* 11, no. 2 (April-June 2012): 116-133.

51 On this matter see Stephen P. Cohen, "The Military," in Henry Hart (ed.), *Indira Gandhi's India: A Political System Reappraised* (Boulder: Westview, 1976).

52 T.V. Paul, *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

security threat from India. More to the point, it has been fixated on the disputed status of Kashmir.

#### PROPOSITIONS ABOUT WAR AND PEACE

Before turning to a theoretical discussion it may be useful to enumerate some general propositions that can be gleaned about the Indo-Pakistani conflict. The first three wars between the two warring states were remarkable for at least six compelling reasons.

First, the common British heritage of the two postcolonial armies profoundly shaped their battle tactics and strategies. Having been trained in the same military establishments prior to independence and partition they relied on World War II, vintage operational plans. Consequently, they used mostly set-piece battle tactics, especially in the 1965 war.<sup>53</sup> Even the highly successful Indian military offensive in the 1971 war in East Pakistan amounted to a "blitzkrieg" strategy derived from the German experience of World War II.<sup>54</sup>

Second, thanks to past professional links it was possible for the higher echelons of the military on both sides to reach informal agreements on the use of force. For example, during the 1965 war, an informal agreement between Air Marshal Asghar Khan of the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) and Air Marshal Arjan Singh of the Indian Air Force (IAF) ensured that population centers in both countries were not bombed at will.<sup>55</sup> It is far from clear that such informal arrangements can be reached in future conflicts. The ties that had once existed amongst senior commanders could not be sustained long after the independence of the two states.

Third, both sides have mostly adhered to the expectations of international law in general and the Geneva Conventions in particular in dealing with their prisoners of war.<sup>56</sup> Even after the 1971 war, despite the seething anger of the ravaged East Pakistani

53 Edgar O'Ballance, "The 1965 War in Retrospect," *Defence Journal* 7 (1978): 15-19.

54 John Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

55 See Air-Marshall Asghar Khan, *The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979).

56 In the wake of the Kargil War of 1999, however, some allegations of torture and summary executions of Indian prisoners of war were reported in the Indian press. The veracity of these claims remains subject to debate. For a

population, India did not permit the mistreatment of Pakistani prisoners of war. Instead 93,000 of them were repatriated to Pakistan after further negotiations following the signing of the Shimla Accord between President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1972.<sup>57</sup>

Fourth, despite the stakes involved, all of these conflicts saw remarkable strategic restraint on the part of both sides. Neither party brought significant amounts of firepower to bear in any of the conflicts. As a consequence, casualties were kept quite limited.<sup>58</sup> Even during the Kargil War of 1999 neither country utilized the considerable firepower that they possessed. Of course, it could be argued that mutual restraint in Kargil could have stemmed from one or a combination of three possible sources. It could be attributed to the mutual possession of nuclear weapons and the concomitant fears of escalation. It could have stemmed from prompt American intervention in this crisis, which sought to tamp down tensions. And finally, it could be traced to the desire of Indian decision-makers to seize the high moral ground and not widen the scope of the conflict.

Fifth, it remains to be seen how future wars will evolve between these two overt, nuclear-armed powers. In the Kargil War, India deliberately circumscribed the scope of the conflict despite significant domestic pressures, the presence of substantial military capabilities and the existence of a jingoistic government. It is, however, a matter of debate if the mutual possession of nuclear weapons had created permissive conditions for the war or whether their existence actually limited the scope of the conflict once it ensued.<sup>59</sup>

Sixth and finally, as at least one scholar has argued, the acquisition of particular military capabilities and the pursuit of specific nuclear postures may render the region more war-prone. This argument challenges the fundamental assumptions of *existential deterrence*, and holds that specific configurations of nuclear forces can

detailed accusation see Sunil Nanda, Azhar Abbas, Imtiaz Gul and Ramananda Sengupta, "Raising the Pitch," *Outlook*, June 21, 1999. Available at: [www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?207650](http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?207650).

57 A.G. Noorani, "Search for New Relationships in the Indian Subcontinent," *The World Today* 31, no. 6 (June 1975): 240-248.

58 Ganguly, 2001. 59 Ganguly and Kapur, 2010.

either contribute to greater instability or stability in a particular regional security context.<sup>60</sup>

#### THE ARGUMENT

The origins of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry have been discussed at length elsewhere.<sup>61</sup> This analysis, however, hopes to examine the rivalry using a set of propositions derived from the literature on strategic studies. They are the *deterrence* and *spiral models*.<sup>62</sup> A *deterrence model* would assume that one of the two states involved in an adversarial relationship harbors hostile or malign intentions toward the other and that a war can only be fended off through the adoption of appropriate military strategies that would raise the costs of aggressive behavior. A *spiral model*, however, would argue that the relationship stems from the workings of a *security dilemma*. Accordingly, suitable reassurances on the part of one state should assuage the legitimate security concerns of the other. The concept of the security dilemma has been the subject of much contestation and debate since its inception.<sup>63</sup>

The original concept that had its provenance in the work of Herbert Butterfield was fraught with contradictions, as recent scholarship has demonstrated. Specifically, Butterfield's view of the *security dilemma*, rooted in the flaws of human nature, sat uneasily with the unintended consequences of state behavior. Indeed, as Shiping Tang correctly argues, it was not until John Herz and Robert Jervis sought to build upon the original concept that this issue was forthrightly addressed. Further elaborations and clarifications of this concept have followed and this analysis will rely on two recent such attempts.<sup>64</sup>

60 Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

61 Ganguly, 2001.

62 For the initial discussion of these two models see Jervis, 1976.

63 For an attempt to refine the concept see Charles L. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); for an earlier discussion that had highlighted the role of predatory or revisionist states see Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (1996): 90-121.

64 Shiping Tang, *A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); also see Booth and Wheeler, 2007.

Tang's work, in particular, is of considerable significance as he has attempted to locate the concept in a larger stream of literature of international politics. Key propositions derived from his careful re-formulation of the concept and the theory it is embedded in can be tested in the context of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry. Pared to the bone, Tang argues that the *security dilemma* has three critical components. First, the condition of anarchy contributes to uncertainty, fear and the need for self-help. Second, it requires a lack of malign intentions on the part of either state. Third, and finally, it calls for the accumulation of power (including some offensive capabilities).<sup>65</sup>

Since Tang's work quite specifically stresses the unintentional dimension, we can usefully juxtapose his conception of the *security dilemma* with elements of Charles Glaser's recent work on the same subject.<sup>66</sup> Glaser, both earlier, and in his most recent contribution, has highlighted the existence of what he refers to as "greedy states." Glaser describes them as follows:

A state can also have nonsecurity motives for expansion, which can include the desire to increase its wealth, territory, or prestige, and to spread its political ideology or religion, when these are not required to preserve the state's security. I use the term "greed" to refer to these nonsecurity motives.<sup>67</sup>

Pakistan, this analysis will show, is a "greedy" state. Its desire for expansion does not stem from guaranteeing its own security. Instead it can be traced to its commitment to incorporate the state of Jammu and Kashmir, a piece of territory that its policy-makers (and supporters) believe that India unfairly seized at the time of partition and by virtue of its Muslim-majority status should have been ceded to Pakistan.<sup>68</sup> This irredentist claim to Kashmir has remained a constant in Pakistan's foreign and security policy. What has varied is simply the intensity with which Pakistan's foreign and security policy establishments have pursued this goal. Ironically, it can

65 Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis," *Security Studies* 18, no. 3 (2009): 587-623.

66 For critiques and assessments of Glaser's re-statement see the symposium, Robert Jervis, "Dilemmas about Security Dilemmas," *Security Studies* 20, no. 3 (July-September 2011): 416-489.

67 Glaser, 2010, p. 36.

68 Sir William Barton, "Pakistan's Claim to Kashmir," *Foreign Affairs* 28 (January 1950): 279-308.

be argued that the relentless pursuit of this objective has ill-served Pakistan's own security interests.

What then might be suitable evidence that supports the proposition that Pakistan is not a security-seeking state and what might undermine such an assertion? If Pakistan had been a genuine security-seeking state, and if the *spiral model* was applicable in this context, it would not have initiated the 1947-8 war. At the time of partition and independence the Pakistani state was in considerable institutional disarray and it lacked suitable military resources to make substantial headway against India and yet its leaders chose to undertake the war.<sup>69</sup> One argument holds that the Pakistani leadership initiated the conflict because it feared that India could cut off water supplies to the nascent state as many of the rivers that flow into Pakistan have their origins in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

However, as at least one Pakistani scholar has shown, Pakistan's successful seizure of a segment of the state in the first war effectively addressed this concern.<sup>70</sup> Having accomplished this critical goal a security-seeking state should have been sated. That, of course, did not prove to be the case. Instead Pakistan again initiated a war with India in an attempt to capture the entire state in 1965.

Further evidence for the *deterrence model* can be derived from the long peace in South Asia between 1972 and 1989. During this time span, thanks to Indian military preponderance and a politically quiescent period in the Indian-controlled segment of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan chose not to initiate any conflicts with India. It was only after December 1989, when the indigenous insurgency in the state erupted, that Pakistani policy-makers chose to exploit India's self-inflicted wound. In the absence of the rebellion it is hard to envisage that Pakistan would have chosen to initiate a proxy war against India. Indeed, earlier in the 1980s it had also chosen to exacerbate another insurgency in the Punjab, which also had domestic roots.<sup>71</sup>

69 H.V. Hodson, *The Great Divide: Britain, India and Pakistan* (New York: Random House, 1969).

70 Shah, 2014, p. 40. 71 Telford, 2001.

## ADDRESSING SOME CAVEATS

It is not the purpose of this analysis to pass judgment on the normative basis of Pakistan's claim to Kashmir. Instead Pakistan is seen as a revisionist state simply on the basis that it is intent on re-ordering the territorial arrangements that were reached at the time of British colonial withdrawal from the subcontinent. To Pakistani policy-makers, the status of Kashmir remains the "unfinished business of partition."<sup>72</sup> The roots of this revisionism can be traced to the very ideological basis of the Pakistani state. It was created as the putative homeland of the Muslims of South Asia to escape Hindu domination.<sup>73</sup> Consequently, since Jammu and Kashmir is a Muslim-majority state that abuts Pakistan, it must be merged with Pakistan.

Despite a common religious heritage, East Pakistan broke away (with Indian assistance) from its western counterpart owing to linguistic and economic discrimination.<sup>74</sup> Even Pakistan's break-up in 1971 did not end this claim. In the aftermath of the collapse of the country its policy-makers adopted a different stance to the Kashmir question. In considerable part they arrived at this position because of a realization that they lacked the conventional military means to change the territorial status quo.

Accordingly, they focused their public statements on questions of human rights within Kashmir and the right to Kashmiri self-determination. Pakistan's actions, however, certainly belied both of these claims. First, many of the terrorist organizations that the ISI-D spawned and supported evinced scant, if any regard, for human rights. Instead they were notable for their utterly vicious actions and behavior.<sup>75</sup> Second, in a related vein, it needs to be underscored that Pakistan actively undermined pro-independence organizations within Kashmir, such as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front,

72 For a discussion see C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly, "Lives on the Line," *The Washington Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (Summer 2013): 173-184.

73 S.M. Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies* (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1975).

74 For two recent accounts of the 1971 crisis see Bass, 2013. Also see Raghavan, 2013.

75 On this subject see the accounts in Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, *The Meadow: Kashmir 1995 - Where the Terror Began* (London: HarperPress, 2012).

an avowedly secular party seeking self-determination. Instead its support went to those who had an explicitly pro-Pakistani agenda and did not even profess to speak for the Kashmiris.<sup>76</sup>

India, on the other hand, has never sought to pursue territorial aggrandizement. Even after it decisively defeated Pakistan in 1971 it did not seek to augment any territory in either battle sector. It withdrew its forces from the eastern sector, where it had helped create the new state of Bangladesh, with remarkable dispatch. Earlier, in the 1965 war, when it had seized the strategic Haji Pir Pass in Kashmir, despite the advice of the Indian military, Indian policy-makers chose to return it to Pakistan.<sup>77</sup>

The only instance of Indian territorial acquisition is the case of the Siachen Glacier dispute. In this case, when confronted with evidence of Pakistan-sponsored mountaineering expeditions, Indian policy-makers mounted a pre-emptive operation to establish a military outpost on the glacier in 1984. What had prompted India to mount an expensive and difficult military operation to seize the glacier? According to most accounts it can be traced to increasing information that Pakistan had been sponsoring expeditions to the glacier and that a number of international publications had been depicting the glacier as Pakistani territory.<sup>78</sup> The other background factor that may have also influenced Indian strategic calculations was the construction of the Karakorum Highway linking Pakistan's Northern Areas with China's Xinjiang Province. Even though this project had started shortly after the 1965 Indo-Pakistani conflict it was only completed in 1978. New Delhi had repeatedly protested the building of this road link as it passed through disputed territory but to little avail.<sup>79</sup>

In an attempt to prevent Pakistan from establishing a legal claim to the glacier, Indian policy-makers, on the advice of some Indian

76 For the ISI's support for pro-Pakistani entities see Arif Jamal, *Call For Transnational Jihad: Lashkar-e-Taiba, 1985-2014* (Portland: Avantgarde Books, 2014), pp. 71-84.

77 Brines, 1968.

78 P.L. Bholia, "Indo-Pakistan Control March Over Siachen Glacier," *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs* 1, no. 1 (Summer 1988): 28-48.

79 For further details see Robert Wirsing, "The Siachen Glacier Dispute: The Strategic Dimension," *Strategic Studies* 12 (Autumn 1988): 38-54.

military personnel, chose to launch an operation that enabled them to establish a presence on the glacier. This effort, "Operation Meghdoot," proved successful and India thereafter established a more permanent presence on the glacier.<sup>80</sup> Pakistan subsequently undertook action of its own – "Operation Abadeel" – to try and dislodge the Indian forces.<sup>81</sup>

Since then attempts to demilitarize the glacier have proven mostly fruitless despite multiple rounds of negotiations. The failure to bring about demilitarization stems from two sources. First, the Indian military which, after the expenditure of considerable amounts of blood and treasure, remains loath to cede the glacier. Indeed there is some evidence that it has actually blocked attempts to reach an accord.<sup>82</sup> Second, it also involves the Pakistani military's unwillingness to demarcate the actual ground position line (AGPL) for fear that any such agreement would necessarily privilege India which holds the physical high ground. It should, however, be stated that the basis of the dispute must be traced to divergent interpretations of the extension of the 1949 Karachi Agreement and the subsequent Shimla Agreement, which extended what came to be known as the Line of Control (LoC; replacing the CFL) to the glacier.<sup>83</sup>

It is also necessary to address some other questionable charges, which Pakistani policy-makers often invoke. In this context it is important to forthrightly reject the oft-repeated assertion that India, despite its stated abhorrence of the use of force, resorted to arms against the Portuguese in Goa in 1960. From a strictly factual standpoint this claim is correct. However, the facts are far from self-evident and deserve a brief discussion. Prime Minister Nehru had

80 For details see Harish Kapadia, *Siachen Glacier: The Battle of Roses* (New Delhi: Rupa, 2010).

81 For a Pakistani perspective on the Siachen issue see Omer Farooq Zain, "Siachen Glacier Conflict: Discordant in Pakistan-India Reconciliation," *Pakistan Horizon* 59, no. 2 (April 2006): 73–82; also see Aarish U. Khan, "Siachen Glacier: Getting Past the Deadlock," *Spotlight on Regional Affairs* 31, no. 5 (May 2012): 1–25.

82 Steven I. Wilkinson, *Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy Since Independence* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), p. 225.

83 For an Indian view see Lieutenant-General V.R. Raghavan, *Siachen: Conflict Without End* (New Delhi: Viking, 2002); for a Pakistani perspective see Javed Hussain, "The Fight for Siachen," *The Express Tribune*, April 22, 2012.

negotiated in good faith with the Salazar regime in attempts to persuade the Portuguese to give up their colonial appendage in Western India. However, the Portuguese proved to be utterly intransigent. Faced with growing criticism from several of his African nationalist compatriots about his inability to dislodge the Portuguese from Goa through diplomatic persuasion, Nehru reluctantly ordered the Indian Army to oust them.<sup>84</sup> India's actions were quite consistent with the needs of a postcolonial state that had to end the enclaves of colonial power on its territory. The criticisms that were leveled against India were both anachronistic and polemical.

Two other matters also need to be addressed directly. The first involves India's decision to absorb the Himalayan state of Sikkim into its domain in 1975. Some, including a prominent Indian commentator, have indeed argued that this amounted to an annexation.<sup>85</sup> Yet the fact remains that the vast majority of the small Himalayan state's population had little or no use for the feudal reign of the traditional ruler, the Chogyal, and voted to join India. Subsequently, the state has not seen any popular unrest, has an elected parliament and enjoys representation in the Indian national legislature in New Delhi.

The other case, of course, involved India's use of force to induce the Nizam of Hyderabad to accede to India in the aftermath of independence and partition. The Nizam, who was widely unpopular amongst his predominantly Hindu subjects, had entertained hopes of joining Pakistan even though his realm did not abut any segment of Pakistan's territory. When the Nizam adopted an intransigent stance to integration with India and allowed paramilitary organizations within the state to repress his Hindu population, Prime Minister Nehru ordered the Indian Army to enter his realm and coerce him to accede to India.<sup>86</sup>

Pakistani interlocutors, however, continue to dwell on both the Goa and the Sikkim episodes (even though neither of them

84 Arthur G. Rubinoff, *India's Use of Force in Goa* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1971).

85 Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, *Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim* (Delhi: Westland, 1984).

86 Mohammed Hyder, *October Coup: A Memoir of the Struggle for Hyderabad* (New Delhi: Roli Books, 2012).

have any bearing on Pakistan or the Kashmir dispute) as well as the Hyderabad episode, as evidence of India's expansionist proclivities.

#### CENTRAL PROPOSITIONS

Four key propositions undergird the analysis that follows in this book. First, the two states have significantly divergent conceptions of regional security. Specifically, in the aftermath of the 1971 war, Indian and Pakistani decision-makers reached markedly different conclusions about regional security. In Pakistan there was little or no introspection about the choices that led up to the crisis and the subsequent collapse of the country.<sup>87</sup> Instead a widespread myth about Indian perfidy came to dominate all political discussions and analyses of the 1971 war. Accordingly, Pakistani decision-makers, and especially the military establishment, argued that given India's willingness to dismember the Pakistani state the country now faced an existential threat from India. Consequently, hostility toward India became unremitting, thereby sustaining and deepening the existing sources of discord.

In India, on the other hand, the victory simply demonstrated the hollowness of the ideological basis of the Pakistani state. Religion alone had failed to serve as a force to provide for the unity of Pakistan. This issue was of vital importance because, for all practical purposes, it undermined Pakistan's irredentist claim to Kashmir.<sup>88</sup> Simultaneously, even from a material standpoint, Pakistan ceased to be as great a threat as before because of its diminished capabilities.<sup>89</sup>

Second, in a related vein these beliefs came to be shared quite widely across the political spectrum in both states. For Pakistani policy-makers the defeat in 1971 was a matter to be avenged at any available chance. Consequently, when internal tensions arose

87 For the most thoughtful discussion of the break-up of Pakistan see Hasan Zaheer, *The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

88 For a trenchant statement of this subject see Pran Nath Chopra, *India's Second Liberation* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974).

89 This perception, however, would prove to be short-lived given Pakistan's subsequent acquisition of a nuclear arsenal, its forging of a strategic partnership with the PRC and its adoption of an asymmetric war strategy.

in the Indian Punjab in the early 1980s and in Kashmir in the late 1980s, they lost no opportunity to foment further discord.<sup>90</sup> Pakistani meddling in these two indigenous insurgencies, in turn led Indian decision-makers to see the adversary as implacable especially since Pakistan had no moral, let alone legal, basis to interfere in the domestic politics of Punjab.

Third, as a consequence of the first two factors, Pakistani decision-makers sought to forge a military doctrine that would enable them to cope with India's more substantial conventional capabilities.<sup>91</sup> To that end, given India's fraught relationship with the PRC, they made their country a vital strategic asset for the PRC in South Asia, simultaneously embarked on a clandestine nuclear weapons program and revived their use of asymmetric capabilities.<sup>92</sup> The growth of the Sino-Pakistani strategic nexus and Pakistan's active pursuit of a clandestine nuclear weapons program, in turn precipitated a nuclear rivalry with India. The use of asymmetric capabilities in conjunction with their nuclear arsenal created a dilemma for India because a conventional Indian military retaliation could result in nuclear escalation.<sup>93</sup>

Fourth, Pakistani decision-makers have learnt how to deftly manipulate this fear. To that end they have precipitated more than one crisis in the hope that great powers, most notably the United States, will step in to ward off the possibility of escalation. This strategy has been designed to keep the pressure on India on the unresolved Kashmir question. More recently, thanks to a host of terrorist organizations that Pakistan has helped spawn, nurture and support, it has been able to pursue a wider asymmetric war strategy against India. The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) led attack on Bombay (Mumbai) in November 2008 was emblematic of this new strategy designed to bleed India with a "war of a thousand cuts."

90 On Pakistani involvement in the Kashmir insurgency see Ganguly, 1997.

91 For a careful analysis of the limits of India's conventional advantages see Walter C. Ladwig III, "Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia," *Journal of Strategic Studies* (May 2015): 1-4.

92 On Pakistan's use of asymmetric warfare see Swami, 2007.

93 For a forceful statement of this argument see S. Paul Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). Kapur, however, quite mistakenly argues that Pakistan adopted this strategy as it acquired a nuclear arsenal.

## A TROUBLED DECADE

Since the Kargil conflict of 1999, despite periodic tensions and the onset of at least two crises in 2001–2 and 2008, war did not erupt between the two adversaries. However, the efforts at peacemaking and conflict resolution, which have included unilateral Indian concessions, have also not been especially fruitful. Consequently, this decade can be carefully examined to test the propositions discussed earlier.

During this time span Pakistan had a democratic government twice, witnessed a military coup in October 1999 and also saw the end of the military regime in August 2008. In India, the period saw the alternation of democratic governments from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), to the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA). Ironically, according to multiple sources, both Indian and Pakistani, the two sides came close to reaching a rapprochement during the long period of military rule in Pakistan. However, the ouster of General Musharraf left New Delhi with no viable negotiating partner. Discussions with the civilian regime of President Asif Ali Zardari had continued even after his ouster. However, the horrific terrorist attack on Bombay (Mumbai) in November 2008 effectively brought the talks to a close.

Though Prime Minister Manmohan Singh held back a military response to the terrorist attack, the prospects of a meaningful dialogue were seriously undermined. Public opinion in India became dramatically inflamed in the wake of the attacks and significantly limited the prime minister's room for political maneuver. Consequently, while there were multiple attempts at renewing the discussions, for example on the sidelines of multilateral forums, these attempts did not make much headway.<sup>94</sup> Indeed it was not until February 2010 that the two sides agreed to renew the dialogue.<sup>95</sup>

A closer examination of the historical record suggests that Pakistan had long pursued this asymmetric war strategy. It simply revived and escalated it as circumstances proved more propitious; also see Vipin Narang, "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Security," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10): 38–78.

94 Neil MacFarquhar, "India and Pakistan Fail to Restart Negotiations," *New York Times*, September 27, 2009.

95 Lydia Polgreen, "India Offers to Renew Talks with Pakistan," *New York Times*, February 4, 2010.

## ENSUING CONSEQUENCES

If the relationship was indeed a *security dilemma* then presumably it could be ameliorated. They could, at the outset, forswear any statements that might suggest a desire for territorial aggrandizement. One or both states could undertake measures that sought to reassure the other that its capabilities are strictly for defensive ends. They could also avoid such deployments that could be construed as being especially threatening or destabilizing.<sup>96</sup>

Indeed, the evidence does suggest that on a number of occasions India has sought to reassure Pakistan. As mentioned earlier in this chapter it returned the strategic Haji Pir Pass to Pakistan after the 1965 war. Earlier it had referred the Kutch dispute to the International Court of Justice and accepted the court's verdict even though the final judgment had proven favorable to Pakistan. Even after the outbreak of the Kashmir insurgency, after it had managed to establish a modicum of order in the portion of the state under its control, it chose to withdraw at least two divisions of Indian troops from forward deployments.<sup>97</sup>

None of these efforts, however, has elicited any meaningful cooperative responses from Pakistan. The military-dominated state, instead, has remained fixated on its central goal, namely, to pry Kashmir from the Indian Union, whether through conventional or asymmetric warfare.<sup>98</sup> Nor, for that matter, has its overall hostility toward India diminished.

## ORGANIZATION

The rest of this book will demonstrate that the Pakistani military's fixation with India mostly explains the persistence of this adversarial relationship. In the absence of a significant internal transformation of extant political arrangements of the Pakistani polity, it appears unlikely that any accommodation can be reached between these two long-standing rivals.

96 For a theoretical discussion see Jervis, 1976, pp. 167–214.

97 Amy Waldman, "India to Reduce Its Troop Strength in Kashmir," *New York Times*, November 12, 2004.

98 Fair, 2014.

Alternatively, the capabilities of the two states may diverge so dramatically that despite Pakistan's unwillingness to abandon its commitment to wrest the Indian-controlled portion of Kashmir through force, its efforts to this end will become increasingly meaningless. Under those circumstances the rivalry, for all practical purposes, would cease to matter.

The book is divided into six other chapters. Chapter 2 focuses on sources and outcomes of the Kargil War of 1999. Chapter 3 provides an account of the key developments in the Indian-controlled portion of the state of Kashmir during the decade under examination. Chapter 4 examines the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 and the onset of the 2001-2 crisis. Chapter 5 traces the origins of the "composite dialogue" and its eventual collapse. In Chapter 6 there is an examination of how the locus of the rivalry has now extended into Afghanistan. The final chapter, Chapter 7, discusses the policy implications that flow from the analysis of the developments of the decade.

## 2

### Kargil and after

#### THE KARGIL WAR AND AFTER

In the early hours of May 5, 1999, an Indian Army patrol from the 121st Brigade was sent out on a routine reconnaissance mission in the Kaksar region along the LoC in Kashmir. This area, in turn, is located within the region of Kargil, a particularly forbidding and unforgiving stretch of territory located within the district of Ladakh in the Indian-controlled portion of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The mountainous peaks in this region range from 16,000 to 18,000 feet.

When the patrol failed to return, the commanders of the brigade enhanced their reconnaissance of the area. To their shock and dismay they discovered that there were about 100 intruders along various mountain peaks near Kargil. Initially they concluded that they possessed sufficient capabilities to dislodge the infiltrators. However, by mid-May they had dramatically altered their initial estimate when they concluded that as many as 800 intruders were in the area. Worse still, toward the end of the month they concluded that as many as 70 positions across the LoC had been breached.<sup>1</sup>

Over the next several months India's armed forces had to mount a substantial air and ground counteroffensive to dislodge the invaders. In fact, this was the first occasion on which the IAF carried out

1 Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).