

PROPHETS AND PROFITS: GENDERED AND GENERATIONAL VISIONS OF WEALTH AND  
VALUE IN SENEGALESE MURID HOUSEHOLDS

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*Summary*<sup>1</sup>

This paper analyzes the disjuncture between the projected prosperity of male migrant traders of the Murid Sufi order, and their actual ability to maintain the social relations that engender wealth. I focus on an exchange of bridewealth that ultimately resulted in a collapsed marriage, to show how households are made and unmade across time and space by diasporic practices. I aim to show how two decades of neoliberal reform in Senegal have had unintended consequences for the prospects of social production. The movement of male traders into transnational trade networks to shore up a stagnant local economy and to reproduce the social and moral order has unanticipated consequences for women's authority. Women claim male earnings not only to run the household, but also to finance family ceremonies—baptisms, marriages and funerals—and the social payments that accompany these occasions. Women also seek commodities obtained through male trade to exchange in life-cycle rituals. For women, foreign commodities, rather than undermining the production of blood ties are the very means of making those ties a social fact. In Murid families, the rejuvenation of domestic rituals through access to male earnings abroad sets in motion the production of women headed households and ultimately lineages.

*Introduction*

She gave the appearance of wearing a cargo of splendid merchandise.  
—Willa Cather, *The Song of the Lark*

The Murid village of Tuba, located in the groundnut basin of Senegal, boasts a remarkable number of half-built, vacant villas. These homes, and the wealth they symbolize, are the outcome of prosperous transnational circuits of economic exchange organized by disciples of the Murid Sufi order (*tariqa*). These yet to be inhabited dwellings and the incomplete neighborhoods they form are constructed through the remittances of overseas itinerant traders and factory workers in locales as disparate as New York, Paris, Turin, Jeddah and Hong Kong. These itinerant traders and waged workers view homes as a form of social value that is both the outcome and the inspiration for their sojourns abroad. In devoting their wages to the development of the city of Tuba—its central mosque and the homes radiating out from this sacred center—disciples realize the blessings (*baraka*) of the saintly

founder of the Muridiyya, Amadou Bamba (ca 1851-1927), who promised prosperity in this world and salvation in the next to all who aspire to his path of divine union. Tuba incorporates diasporic people and locations into its center.<sup>2</sup> Aspiring homebuilders lay the foundation of their dwellings on the land in and around Tuba not only to stake a claim to the land in this rapidly growing village metropolis, but also to generate an eternal spiritual connection to the land.<sup>3</sup> The construction of these homes, even if only partial, thus places the transnational trader at the crossroads of heaven and earth, where profits meet prophets and prayers meet prosperity.

In this paper, I analyze gendered and generational stakes in transnational networks of commodity exchange organized by the Muridiyya and manifold ideas of home, both a physical space and an ideal place, generated by this African Muslim diasporic community. As a physical space, the home is a sign of male wealth and prosperity. Junior men build these homes with the aim of inhabiting them as elders in the future. As an ideal place, the home is a form of value because of the relations it houses. A home is made and kinship ties are produced through hospitality, feasting and gift-giving during family ceremonies such as marriages, baptisms and funerals, all of which take place in the home. Through these events, junior women aspire to establish themselves as *grandes dames* within their networks of kin and community.

This paper zooms in on Murid households to argue that male transnational commodity circuits are driven not only by young men's hopes for salvation, but also by women's domestic practices. Although commodity circuits are organized and often controlled by the Murid religious hierarchy, trading is ultimately a family business and families depend on fostering ties of reciprocity and obligation among kin and neighbors to obtain capital, credit, and a client base for their trading ventures. Though the home can be viewed as a constrictive space in which women's domestic labor sustains male productive efforts abroad, the Senegalese household is also a node in women's circuits

of exchange. These exchanges include family ceremonies, rotating credit unions, and trading, and as such are the arena in which women implicitly reconfigure relations of gender and generation within their communities. And thus, women's domestic practices, are both informed by and seek to reform gendered and generational ideas of home, homemaking and family, and consequently are the site of some of the most creative and conflictual endeavors. As feminist critiques of kinship theory have shown, (Collier and Yanagisaka 1987), the domestic sphere is also a space of critical social, economic and political practice (see for example, Comaroff and Comaroff 1992).

The home is a site of conflict; male investment in the concrete building blocks of homes, inheritable and not easily circulated, clashes with women's conspicuous consumption during family ceremonies (baptisms, marriages and funerals). While overseas exchange seems like a purely male endeavor, women are drawn into commodity circuits, and are even the driving force behind male migration. In contrast to men, women carry their wealth on their bodies—in the form of cloth, cosmetics, wigs and other accessories obtained from male trade networks—and ostentatiously display their affluence by making large cash prestations during marriages, baptisms and funerals. Junior women both celebrate and challenge elder women's largesse with highly sexualized dances that are statements about idealized forms of social and biological production. However, while women are sometimes said to draw value away from the household, on another level, men and women are equally interested in the production of blood relations. Foreign commodities and cash, rather than undermining the production of blood ties, are important social media that Murids, and especially Wolof, use to develop social relations.

Men's cash remittances have rejuvenated domestic rituals over the last ten years. These family rituals (baptisms, marriages and funerals) were once important to male lineage heads for the powerful alliances they created among families, but in the absence of males these ceremonies are now important

venues for women to display and exchange their wealth. Access to cash through male remittances enables women to achieve an intense circulation of money through the staging of family ceremonies, which are accompanied by ritualized exchanges. Through these domestic exchanges women create a public persona of prestige, the foundation of the creditworthiness that is essential to the success of Murid family businesses. Such wealthy displays underlie senior women's claims to the status of head of household, by which I mean the individual who has a right to and who budgets income earned by the members of the household. Moreover, in the absence of young men and given the material marginality of senior males, elder women wield increasing power over the lineage through their central role in contracting marriages and managing the distribution of bridewealth.

Through an ethnographic case of an exchange of bridewealth, which failed to result in a marriage, I analyze how the rights and obligations entailed in these social payments have changed. In addition, this marriage demonstrates the different stakes that each family member has in its success and ultimately in a globalizing economy. I look at how and why older and younger generations are vying for these payments and the kinds of evidence (kinship relations, national law, Islam) they employ in staking their claim to the bridewealth. Though the desires of the young bride-to-be played a large part in the breakdown of the marriage process, her reasoning also reveals her vulnerability as a junior woman in the changing social landscape characterized by economic hardship and male migration. Moreover, though elder women seem to be in a key position to augment their autonomy given their control over bridewealth transactions, what does it really mean to be head of a household whose wealth no longer lies in the agricultural land that surrounds it, but in the labor of adolescent males abroad? Moreover, what does it mean to be an ascending male? Thus, as youth scramble to garner cash and commodities to meet escalating bridewealth demands from elder female kin who control the domestic sphere, their marriages are delayed and young women continue to reside in their

mothers' homes, their own entry into social adulthood postponed. Meanwhile, the absence of male kin from their homes is prolonged by the demand for their remittances in ritual and domestic spheres, which keeps them tied to their overseas lives while elder placeholders occupy their homes. Consequently social reproduction is delayed as the tensions between men and women, young and old mount, these relations are no longer worked into alliances, but rather become disarticulated.

The Senegalese landscape is littered with half-built villas, which are iconic of half built families. Senegalese homes contain many relations (and are incredibly overcrowded) but often with the wrong kinds of relations: unmarried daughters and out of work sons. Domesticity provides a crucial site for the analysis of the workings of economic liberalization in the contemporary historical moment. The volume and velocity of money transfers, merchant goods and the prosperity projected by feasting and gift-giving are at odds with household stories about contracting marriages with absent husbands, and baptisms with unwed mothers. Moreover, these stories are themselves critical narratives of the neoliberal moment and the possibilities the contemporary historical moment offers for social production. Recent shifts in the nature of social production relate to several transformative factors: structural adjustment programs, devaluation of the currency, the declining political and economic significance of the nation-state and the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies, including the privatization of state functions, by the newly elected President, Abdoulaye Wade, an economic liberal.

The fundamental feature of economic liberalization in Senegal is that it has the capacity to transfer responsibility for the material and moral well being of citizens from the state to local communities, kinship units, and households. However, these local institutions lack the moral and material resources to sustain the well being of its individual members. Though neoliberalism, with its rationalizing effects on the market, is billed as having a liberating effect on communities by cutting

through various economic, political and social hierarchies, young Senegalese women are more trapped in the home than ever by virtue of the impossibility of a marriage that would augment their personal autonomy by providing them with their own home and the means to establish themselves as “big women” in their community through their trading and ritual activities. Young Senegalese men turn to transnational trade networks in search of prosperity and in the interest of embarking on a spiritual journey; the call of the shaykh speaking to their sense of alienation and their desire to acquire the means to achieve adult masculinity. Moreover, as male kin experience the stigma of race and immigrant class in Europe and America they strive to build homes and produce families in Senegal which they struggle to support through their remittances keeping them tied to their overseas lives.

For female elders, Murid commodity circuits are crucial for the goods they bring into the home. For those households lacking ties to transnational trade networks, remark on the escalating discontinuity between their incomes and those of the neighbors benefiting from the remittances of kin. As a result, increased poverty has gone hand in hand with a noticeable rise in the number of “middle class” households. Yet, these newly “middle class” households are no more able to pull off large feasts by virtue of their access to cash remittances largely due to the prolonged absence of male kin and the resultant ad hoc nature of conjugal relations. Trading families are, on the whole, better off than most Senegalese families because they can tap into overseas markets and diversify their investments. And yet the uninhabited and largely unfinished villas characterizing the landscape in and around Tuba speak both to the projected prosperity of a globalizing economy and to the subsequent foreclosure of an array of intended social projects. The unfinished villas and the incomplete neighborhoods they form are iconic of the incomplete and often failed processes of social production that exist in a dialectical relation to global economic processes.

### *Murid Households in Historical Perspective*

Through the prism of the household and its domestic activities we can explore the relationship between the transnational expansion of this Sufi sect and the biological and social production of persons, the family and the spiritual community. My principle focus is to show how migration and uneven economic conditions relate to the shifting composition of the household, lineage and community structures. I aim to show how, historically, the acquisition of wealth by individual junior males either through laboring on the Murid communes in the early twentieth century in exchange for land or by participating in Murid trade networks in the latter half of the century, has resulted in shifts in relations of autonomy and dependence along the axis of age and gender. It was central control over land in the early part of the twentieth century that enabled senior males to exercise power and authority over younger males and women. Thus, I argue that changing relations of gender and generation drive the production of material wealth in different directions at different historical moments and thus processes of production and exchange are deeply embedded in the social organization of the household. As Jean and John L. Comaroff suggest (1992:294), the “domestic and the dominant social order are mutually constitutive.” What goes on in these Murid homes in particular, and in any domestic world in general, shapes the very nature of those larger processes.

I aim to situate more recent transformations in social relations within a historical perspective by discussing the formation of Murid agricultural communes through migration at the turn of the twentieth century and the transformation of the Murid community from agricultural cash crop production in the colonial era to trading in the post-colonial state. In so doing, I hope to situation more recent migratory movements to a longer history of migration in the region.

At the turn of the twentieth century, young men often left their fathers’ households to participate in the expansion of Islam across West Africa.<sup>4</sup> In Murid Wolof families, sons were

released from their fathers' authority and their demand on their labor (Copans 1972, Rocheteau 1975) to cultivate Islam in new lands. Through migration young men acquired the material resources through which they would establish new households and achieve social adulthood. Furthermore, families would often resolve inner feuds by separating quarreling kin and those who were destitute departed, frequently in response to a shaykh's call, to save face for the lineage. Travel has been richly symbolic as a means of obtaining knowledge of this world, the inner self, and ultimately the divine.

A social crisis accompanied French conquest of the Wolof kingdoms in the late nineteenth century, which destabilized the material basis of social production. In the upheavals surrounding the breakdown of the Wolof monarchy, young men lacked the means to contract marriages, such as slaves, and the land to build up households. Because West Africa was more cut off from the Muslim world than ever before during the colonial period due to the efforts of colonial authorities to co-opt religious leaders, the forms of Islam that emerged were more locally contextualized such as the Sufi congregations, which emphasize spiritual rather than intellectual knowledge enabling them to become mass movements (Hunwick 1997:31). Lacking an international outlook and these movements were remarkable for the degree to which they spoke to very localized concerns. During the period of upheaval wrought by disintegrating Wolof monarchies, Muslim reform movements and encroaching French presence paired with shifts in production away from the trade in slaves to colonial capitalism (Monteil 1969, Copans 1988) and disciples began to coalesce around the ascetic Muslim scholar Amadou Bamba (ca 1851-1927) whom they regarded as a locus of Divine grace.<sup>5</sup> During his life, Bamba demonstrate qualities of sainthood (*waliyat*) and developed considerable spiritual authority.<sup>6</sup>

From this crisis emerged a new form of community based not on the authority of Wolof elders, but rather that of Muslim shaykhs. The historical literature on Islam in West African communities tends to focus on these shaykhs and their organization of economic production to



understand their mass appeal.<sup>7</sup> French colonial ethnographies (Marty 1917) and studies of conversion to Islam in West Africa (Hiskett 1984) have relied on textual exegesis (Dumont 1968), biographies of men of God (*wali*) (Creevey 1979, Norris 1990, O'Fahey 1990) and a commitment to the charismatic basis of their leadership (Cruise-O'Brien 1975) to explain the emergence of Muslim social movements. I suggest here that widespread conversion to Islam and the new community created by adepts resulted from the purposeful activity of devotees to create a viable spiritual, affective and productive community in the midst of disintegrating Wolof monarchies, encroaching French rule, and a rising smallpox epidemic in 1903.<sup>8</sup>

In Muslim societies across Sudanic Africa, scholars survived on the alms of the community. Although alms were usually made in cash or kind, shaykhs of the Tijani and Qadiriyya order in Senegal accepted labor in their fields in exchange for these lessons. Bamba not only accepted labor in exchange for Koranic lessons, he organized new settlements of faithful willing to labor in return for his spiritual guidance. Bamba promulgated a practical form of Sufism in which the masses could participate. Disciples brought their wealth and the value of their labor, and offered it to the shaykh. The fortune that Bamba amassed from these adepts' alms, signifying their submission to his path of divine union, fascinated French colonialists, who produced extensive ethnographic reports detailing these exchanges between Murid shaykhs and their disciples<sup>9</sup> fearing that he would use his wealth to stockpile munitions for a rebellion.<sup>10 11</sup>

Bamba lived simply and ascetically, distributing his wealth to the impoverished disciples and family members who sought his assistance (S. Mbacke 1995). Through this system of exchange of offerings, mutual aid and blessings, Bamba attracted disciples cast out of productive sectors of Wolof society such as casted slaves (cf. Martin Klein) whose absence of kin ties impeded their attempts to reproduce themselves through the production of their households.<sup>12</sup> Many were *navetannes*, seasonal

agricultural workers who resided in family compounds receiving their keep in exchange for their labor. Because they did not have access to their own plots to cultivate they were ordinarily not in a position to contract marriages (Copans et al. 1972). Warriors (*ceddo*), their position waning with the strength of the Wolof kings, also turned to Bamba for his protection as did peasant farmers seeking to escape the oppressive practices of the Wolof aristocracy (Cruise O'Brien 1975:101) and the youth, seeking to escape harsh economic conditions and heavy kinship obligations.<sup>13</sup> New forms of productive community offered in the person of Bamba appealed to converts who diverted their wealth from Wolof elders as they sought in him blessings of prosperity.

Murid disciples cultivated their shaykh's fields in the rainy season and in the dry season they worked in the markets and sought alms.<sup>14</sup> Murid communes offered a means through which young males could acquire independent plots and cultivate cash crops for bridewealth exchange. As the community continued to grow, new communes were established in more distant areas. Representatives of the shaykh, the *diewrigne*, organized farming in distant areas, and one day a week was reserved for cultivating the shaykh's fields. The colonial government shifted away from its policy of suppressing Murid expansion and granted expansive tracts of land used by Peul herders to the Murid clergy in exchange for their efforts to clear and cultivate the terrain with groundnuts (Cruise O'Brien 1975). As cash crop agriculture in the form of groundnuts replaced subsistence agriculture, households began to depend more on goods bought in the market for the maintenance of the household and the ritual cycle. French colonialists offered compensation in cash and cloth to those who cleared the land. As men cultivated cash crops, women began to trade along the railway line; buying groundnuts and selling imported commodities such as cloth and tea (Cruise O'Brien 1975:47). As many pioneers lacked ties to kin in the surrounding villages and material means to contract marriages, social solidarity was cultivated through the shaykh and thus corporate activity centered

upon plowing of his fields rather than exchange among kin. New converts resided on communally cultivated land but after ten years of service, each adept received his own plot in a process that eventually formed the core of Murid villages headed by Bamba's sons, who continued to collect a fee for their role in allocating new land and recruiting disciples.

By the 1960s, when the *équipe de ORSTOM* conducted surveys and oral histories in the groundnut basin, the division of labor continued to follow the lines of gender in the first order and generation in the second order.<sup>15</sup> The male head of the household (*boroom diel*) managed the cultivation of the millet fields collectively and allocated individual parcels of cash crops in particular to male youth who put their produce towards bridewealth. That young men both sought to display the qualities of obedience and assistance towards their elders by plowing their fathers' fields and that they also sought to achieve economic independence by cultivating their own fields reveals a fundamental tension inherent in the system of production between senior and junior males. The organization of labor based on generational submission (*surga*) placed the youth in the same position as seasonal workers (*navetanes*) who resided within the compound receiving their maintenance in return for their labor in the collective fields. The maintenance of course, never allowed a surplus that could be put towards bridewealth. Furthermore, classed based and generational tensions were exacerbated by the position of sons via their mothers; the first wife's children could hold the children of successive wives in the position of *surga*. In this period families resolved these conflicts by encouraging sons to pioneer new lands, often in the name of Bamba. These youth migrated thus not only aiming to submit to the Muridiyya, but aiming to become heads of households and lineages through the economic autonomy that discipleship brought them.

Junior men could only break out of the position of *surga* by becoming the head of household, which would either be granted by the male elder who would maintain his position as head of the

lineage, or which could be achieved through migration and return. However, a young man could only become head of the household through the matrimonial process, which would afford the head of the lineage new alliances and new economic and political possibilities. I emphasize here however, following Copans (1972), that the sons do not ascend to head of the household through marriage, but rather, that they arrive at the point of marriage through the granting of their status of head of the household by their elders. It is quite impossible for the son to become head of the household while residing in the same physical space as his father. Thus there must be the material possibility of two separate homes.

Following a period of devastating famines in the Sahel in the early 1970s (due to a prolonged period of monocropping, drought and locust plagues) and the given the decreasing price groundnuts could bring on the world market, Murid youth turned to their dry season trading into full time activity. They began to migrate to the urban areas of Thies, Dakar and eventually Paris. In these new locales Murids continued to congregate once a week in circles (*da'ira*) during which they would recite the litanies of the order and contribute offerings of cash to the spiritual hierarchy (Creevey 1979, Cruise-O'Brien 1988).

Today, Murids control the importation of commodities such as cloth, cosmetic products, and housewares. The formation of prayer circles and the collection of cash offerings continue in diasporic locations.<sup>16</sup> Being plugged into Sufi circuits of production and exchange resonates with a growing consensus among a generation of youth that have been disconnected from socially productive activities in Senegal including the rituals and life cycle events through which adult masculinity is attained. Locked out of circuits of production and exchange, youth are alienated in a world that appears to them to be increasingly spun of highly commoditized and monetized ritual prestations which are beyond their reach. Murid shaykhs have embraced the youth whose idleness and lack of

productivity are seen as a threat to moral order. It is not merely the appeal of its theology, that is, the role of religion in affirming transitional social space, that draws in young aspirants, but the sheer velocity of things, money and commodities that flow through the hands of the order's adherents. The acquisition of these things through commodity circuits opens up paths of social production as these items are exchanged in baptismal, marriage and funerary rituals through which one produces oneself as an adult.

Young men have turned to the Muridiyya seeking an interstitial space in which to defer demands upon their productive resources made by elders and/or wives. Participating in the religious life of the brotherhood buys the young man time during which he can hope to save the resources that would enable him to attain adult masculinity in Senegalese society, such as stable forms of employment, the means to make bridewealth payments, and other social prestations involving cash—the means through which the system of family relations is produced and the socialization of human beings takes place.

For male disciples, the central value transforming activity that that they participate in historically is the cultivation of the shaykh's fields in exchange for blessings, thus transforming the economic value of their labor into social value. Today, male disciples turn their wealth towards the sacred development of Tuba through home construction and village social projects as well as through offerings to their shaykhs. Their overseas remittances are not merely intended to build homes, but to tie adepts to a spiritual path and a social community. Disciples are motivated in their commercial activity by these forms of consciousness and value. For Murid disciples, the spiritual community of Tuba as iconized in its central mosque, clinics and schools is a form of social value. The motivation and the outcome of disciples' transnational labor lies in the multi-layered connections of prophets and profits in the Muridiyya consisting of a circuit of blessings into which disciples enter through their

relations with shaykhs: blessings that are both spiritual and material at once: for through them disciples gain access not merely to salvation and eternal prosperity but also to the this-worldly wealth whereby they are able to create themselves as social adults and construct their households in the absence of viable local and national economies. And a circuit of sacred development by which shaykhs convert their disciples' offerings into the material forms of the spiritual metropolis Tuba: a feat of economic and architectural development that aims to realize the vision of the order's founding saint during his exile under French colonial rule.

A disciple sustains a relationship with his shaykh and participates in the life of the Muridiyya through the recitation of litanies, Koranic study and most significantly for overseas disciples, through cash offerings (*addiya*). These cash offerings signify the person in particular moments of their circulation. The person who accumulates money in and of itself has no value (*njerin*). To create value, money must circulate, visibly, and when given over to the shaykh for labor his fields as during the colonial era, this cash begins to generate value. Through the act of giving without the expectation of a return, the disciple constitutes himself as a recipient of blessings, or *baraka*, the paramount value within the Muridiyya. The act of the offering to the Murid shaykh is a self-motivated and self-transforming act whereby a disciple submits (*diebelou*) to a shaykh to transform himself into a recipient of *baraka*. Although *baraka* is a product of the disciples agentive activity in the world in so far as he desires to make himself a recipient of it, he views his prosperity not as the product of his own activity, but as a manifestation of the divine legacy of Bamba. The abstract value of *baraka* is given form through signs of prosperity—land, homes and communal institutions, the things that house particular social relations. These homes are a never completed process of restoring the community to its whole, of incorporating all of the diasporic activities into the sum of the city of Tuba.

*The Marriage of Musa and Bintu*

With what intense desire she wants her home.  
—William Cowper

It is now commonly recognized that two decades of structural adjustment programs and other austere economic measures have adversely affected the Senegalese state, but what is less well understood is the consequences for the social production of persons, households and communities. In the previous section I discussed the family politics of Muslim conversion and the relationship between the changing composition of Murid households and the transformation of the community from agriculture to trade. In this section I present an ethnographic case in which I discuss the politics of bridewealth distribution among three families to illustrate the impact of emergent transnational trading networks on the production and reproduction of Murid households in the present. I analyze a bridewealth transaction that took place over at least a year leading up to a marriage ceremony in autumn 1999 between a Murid disciple trading between Italy and Senegal and a merchant family in Dakar that ultimately failed. I zoom in on the details of this particular marriage because the collapsed alliance illustrates anxiety over the changing nature of social relations. Bridewealth payments have become important as objects in and for themselves, which are subject to multiple claims, and which are often diverted for other ends. As Senegalese households become more cash dependent not only for material needs and desires, but for social payments as well, they are increasingly burdened with social and retail debt and hence come to rely on receiving social payments, such as bridewealth, to cover their financial obligations and quotidian needs. The fact that these social payments are more widely criticized for burdening households with increasing financial hardship, rather than being seen as a positive social obligation that ties households together over generations is a fundamental feature of the neoliberal moment.

Bridewealth payments do not merely reflect a hierarchical structure of household relations based on gender and generation; they are the very process through which these relations are constituted (cf J. L. Comaroff 1980; Goody 1958). Thus they provide an ideal arena in which to look at the shifting basis of power and authority between men and women, young and old. Ideally, young men assume the position of head of household through bridewealth exchanges while simultaneously constituting his father as head of the lineage. Both the nuclear and the extended family are produced through the matrimonial process, which necessitates a series of monetary transactions and counter actions between the families that will increase in value over time. Participants are brought into relationship to one another as full social beings bearing a particular kin relation to one another that is recognized through the exchange.

The elders of three households arranged Musa and Bintu's marriage. Musa and Bintu are related on the maternal and on the paternal side, and thus have multiple ties of relatedness to each other. The preferred mode of Wolof marriage is cross cousin marriage in the maternal line; that is, a young male should marry the daughter of his mother's brother (A. B. Diop 1985). However in the case of Musa and Bintu, relatives in both households staked competing claims to the bridewealth payments (cf J. L. Comaroff 1980). Because these payments would be made over many years these were important claims for the financial prospects of the household members. Bintu's parents were deeply impoverished residents of a Murid village. They could no longer count on the agricultural output of their land and relied on the marriage of their daughters for their future income. When she was a young girl her family sent her to live with her Aunt Sokna in a "quartier populaire" on the periphery of Dakar. Her Aunt Sokna had married into the household of a strong Tijani adept as the first wife. Though Musa's parents had also worked as farmers in a Murid village, they now inhabited a ville in a wealthy Dakar suburb populated by "les émigrés" which Musa had built with his brother.



The members of the three families not only fought over the distribution of the bridewealth, and the practicality of returning it when the marriage failed, but they also questioned the value of bridewealth as a social practice and institution. On the one hand, bridewealth payments place disparate households in relation to each other across space and over time. For elder women, bridewealth payments are part of a social system based on mutual obligation and responsibility. But for junior males bridewealth imposes a financial burden. This tension reflects a larger conflict between notions of the person, society and history, which is rooted in the colonial moment and the spread of Islam in this region and continuing debates about individuation and responsibility to locality. Both Muslim and French colonial authorities codified these social payments as early as 1946 in an attempt to limit them.<sup>17</sup> These social payments (including payments to respective kin, the mosque and the griots (*gewel*), have since been capped in the *Code de la famille*. In fact, Musa himself had invoked these enactments in his defense.

Musa and Bintu had known each other since youth and had a desire to be wed since adolescence. But when the time came for Musa to marry, he looked beyond Bintu to her older cousin and daughter of her mother's sister, Awa. Raised in the same household, Bintu and Awa were affectively sisters. Following the marriage (*takk*) of her older cousin, Awa, Bintu was moved to her Aunt Sokna's home in Dakar, which boasted three sons overseas in Paris, Milan and New York as second-generation traders. In this household she assumed the obligations of a niece cooking, cleaning and performing other domestic chores for this household. Although she participated in the social and religious life of the family, she was not educated as her foster siblings and her aunt and uncle limited her outings to the markets of the highly populated urban neighborhood near their home.

When Bintu reached 23 years of age Musa returned to Senegal. Musa had been living in Milan with Awa, where he was involved in trade with other Murids. He was in the process of constructing a

villa in Dakar and though his parents and his brother's wives inhabited this home, (his brother also lived in Italy where he worked in a glass factory) he wanted a second wife who would make a home for him in Dakar and manage his social and business relations in his absence. Musa intended to take Bintu as his second wife and thus he greeted Bintu's uncle and aunt with two kilos of kola nuts. This opening exchange of kola nuts called the greeting (*nuyoo*) foretold his intentions of becoming engaged (*ngoro*) to Bintu. Bintu's aunt and uncle accepted the kola nuts and in so doing, the offer of marriage.

Bintu's conflicted feelings about Musa's offer of marriage points to her vulnerability in this changing system of social relations. Bintu made it clear that she did not love Musa by sneering, "he's ugly" (*dafa new*) to all who inquired of her feelings. Though others remarked on the unusual circumstances of the marriage, Awa and Bintu, though cousins, being raised in the same home conflicted with the Islamic prohibition against marrying two sisters to the same man. Not only had Musa jilted her for her older cousin Awa, but in so doing, he was relegating Bintu to the status of second wife. Though she did not say how she felt about a polygamous union, she did not want to be Awa's junior wife or to have her future children subject to the generational authority of Awa and her children. Additionally, as the most junior woman in the household already populated by Musa's older brother's wives and in-laws, she would shoulder the burden of domestic labor; she would be responsible for food preparation, cleaning and caring for the children. These responsibilities meant that she would not be able to engage in her own market activity or to attend family rituals much less entertain guests in her home.

Musa attempted to sway Bintu's mind by bringing her a bedroom set and various housewares from Italy. She began to consider the fact that Musa was a prosperous trader in Italy and that, if not over time, at least in the immediate present marriage to him would change her condition entirely. She could escape the control of her relations and achieve a small piece of autonomy living on a

comfortable income. In her aunt and uncle's home she slept on a foam mat on the parlor floor with the young children and grandchildren. Marriage held the promise of her own room in a spacious villa and a European style kitchen and bathroom.

After Musa exchanged kola nuts with Bintu's aunt and uncle, who agreed to the marriage, he sent a gift of cash and a gold necklace and bracelet to Bintu. Bintu accepted these offerings and thus became Musa's fiancée. Older generations have called this gift the *ndaqfar*, meaning the gift that chases away other suitors (A.B. Diop 1985:103). This term then, seems to suggest the importance of this gift in defining the suitor's relation to other males of his age group. This gift is to be accepted by the bride in the presence of her mother who acknowledges the bride's obligation to her suitor. However, Bintu and her agemates scoffed at such a notion and instead called this exchange the *may gu jekk*, or the first gift. Unlike the notion of *ndaqfar*, Bintu expected that this was only the *first* gift and that there would be others that would follow. Moreover, her use of the term first gift suggests an emphasis on the thing itself as a kind of value that can be diverted. In fact, it is increasingly common for young women to accept such overtures without fulfilling the obligation to marry. It is said that men cannot really count on being married until the wife enters his house (A.B. Diop 1985:104). The increasing use of this term by junior women signals a significant change in the nature of social relations. It suggests that the first gift is not in itself a symbol of acceptance and obligation but rather a competitive bid for the potential marriage, which may or may not ever actually take place.

Almost a year after Musa greeted his prospective in-laws with kola nuts he offered the bridewealth payment (*le dot/maye*) to the aunt who would function as the "mother" of her foster child, Bintu. Musa gave the aunt cash, a radio and a gold wristwatch.<sup>18</sup> Aunt Sokna accepted this gift and proceeded to manage the distribution of sum herself among the various households who held a claim to the bridewealth payment. The aunt called the members of her neighborhood ritual association

(*mbotaye*) to her home and they collectively appraised the value of the offerings and planned for the grand event. Bintu herself however had a legal right to the sum though the introduction of *alali-farata* in Islam. *Alali-farata* demands that the payment be made to the bride directly rather than the mother to prevent families from relying on bridewealth as a means of alliance and to enable the autonomous action of women (A.B. Diop 1985:94). But Bintu never exercised her right to the bridewealth because she still resisted the idea of the marriage.

After Musa returned to Italy, the elders began making preparations for the big occasion. Aunt Sokna telephoned her sons overseas to inform them of the modifications and improvements that she wanted to make in the house to accommodate the guests properly, and she demanded contributions from each of her sons. She used the bridewealth payment to purchase a cow, which would be slaughtered on the first day of ceremony, to prepare the bride's trousseau and to invest in her *mbotaye*, the neighborhood women's association that would help finance the event and prepare the feast. With the bridewealth in hand, Aunt Sokna purchased bowls, hung new curtains, and sent new bed linens off to her tailor. The poured cement courtyard was transformed from a space of household work to a receiving area with broken ceramic tiles, which were laid in a mosaic pattern.

Not all of the household members agreed to the use of the bridewealth and to the extent of the household preparations. The oldest daughter refused to contribute money to the wedding preparations and argued that she needed the funds to pay school fees for her three daughters. Her siblings invoked her failed marriages, especially her most recent loss of the trading fortune she amassed in the Ivory Coast to her last husband, a Murid shaykh. She was roundly criticized for returning to the already overcrowded family home with her children, impoverished and unwilling to contribute to the household expenditures. She was told that she had no value (*njerin*) to the family circle. In her defense, the oldest daughter contested her obligation to the fostered daughter.

The distribution of the bridewealth payment among the various households exacerbated an already latent conflict between Bintu and the senior women. During these wedding preparations, Bintu ran away to her parents home in the village and three times maternal and paternal kin brought her back, first her aunt, then her great aunt and finally the a male cousin. Following her third flight, Bintu's aunt, great aunt, mother and mother's brother (*nijaay*) met to discuss what should be done with respect to the bridewealth. The elder women and the maternal uncle admitted that the bridewealth could not really be returned as the parties concerned had already consumed it. In addition to the modifications that had been made to the maternal home, the aunt had already skimmed from the payment to pay her share for her rotating credit union (*natt*) and her neighborhood ritual association (*mbotaye*) intending to use her payout to finance the ritual. She had also made appropriate exchanges with the groom's family. She bought cloth for two *boubous* and many bowls for the paternal mother in whose home the bride would reside.

The great aunt and the birthmother's brother (*nijaay*) forced Bintu to accept the marriage. Though the Aunt sympathized with Bintu, she could not return the bridewealth because it was no longer in her hands. She was already deep in debt preparing for the *fête*. None of the aunt's other children had successfully married by this point and the mother was eager to move fully into her own elderhood through the marriage of this foster daughter. They told the bride that because she had initially consented to the marriage by accepting the *first gift*, she could not go back on her word.

Bintu began to slowly accommodate herself to the idea of marrying Musa as her two elder female cousins took her to a cloth market to choose her trousseau. At first, she refused to choose any cloth and wrinkled her nose at the pieces chosen by her older cousins. Her cousins assigned her one *grand boubou*, a peach satin skirt with a layer of peach lace embroidered elaborately and sewn with crystal beads to be worn over the top, for her reception with her age mates. Another aunt, a trader in

France, sent the cloth for her other two *grand boubous*, which would be worn at the *fêtes* at her aunt's home and the following day at her husband's home. Bintu's three *boubous* were a modest number; Murid commerçant brides change their clothes as many as five times during a single gathering. In addition, Bintu's cousins bought five *complets*, or wax cloth fitted dresses with skirts, for her to wear during her first week in her new home.

Arguments about the appropriate distribution of the bridewealth were implicit in the event itself. For example, the cousins intended to have Bintu's *grand boubou* sewn by an elite tailor who was known for her cutting edge fashions. However Aunt Sokna refused to release the bridewealth for the seamstress arguing that the dress would be too ostentatious. The second oldest daughter (the oldest daughter is divorced) flew into a rage arguing that if the bride did not have the highest quality couture with a unique design it would reflect poorly on her as she was standing with the bride for the event. Unmarried and over thirty years old, she relied entirely on such occasions for her value to the family to be realized, thus her stake in the ensuring that the marriage proceeded.

Caught up in the planning for the event, the tremendously unhappy Bintu consented to the final two stages of the marriage while her husband remained in Italy. While Bintu was preoccupied with visits to the tailor, the salon and the photographer, female kin gathered at her aunt's house in the morning for *lakk*, a yogurt and millet porridge and the slaughtering of the cow. In the evening she gathered with her age mates for a Western style reception during which she would receive gifts of housewares and cash. That night she entered her husband's home in an elaborate ritual. In the morning there would be *lakk* at her husband's home, a *sabar*, and exchanges of food, including meat, and cash between her age mates and her female elders.

Though Musa intended to build a home in Tuba, he had not yet begun construction, and therefore Bintu was moved into her mother-in-law's home. In her mother-in-law's home she was

obligated to show elaborate forms of deference and symbolic submission. She performed the housework and waited on her mother. She refrained from speaking too loudly, too much and too aggressively. She gave her money and occasional offerings of cloth and other forms of material assistance required of a good daughter-in-law to avoid the wrath of mother-in-law jealous of her son's new wife who could potentially be the prime consumer of his income, displacing the elder. New brides are cautious in revealing their husband's gifts and pass goods along to their mothers-in-law to ward off any suspicion that the latter is being overlooked. Through these exchanges, the bride is incorporated into the structure of the household. Once married, the Bintu spent her days in her mother-in-law's household caring for the offspring of the extended family, though she had no children of her own, and performing other quotidian household chores freeing female elders in the home for ritual work.

By the time that Musa returned to Senegal several months later to consummate his marriage, Bintu had fled again. Musa went to her parents home himself endeavoring to woo her back. After three days he finally convinced her to return to Dakar with him, not to his parents' home, but to a large hotel for the weekend. She consented and three days later he left her in his parents' home and relayed her virtue to the extended family. He remained in Dakar for the duration of Ramadan during which she cooked elaborate dishes—fried chicken and lamb and okra stew—for her in-laws, as a “good wife” should. Towards the close of the observance Musa and Bintu made their official visit to the home of her uncle. Bintu's aunt received them in her room but she did not offer the usual forms of hospitality such as a special plate of chicken or large bottles of Coke. Finally, her oldest daughter sent a child to buy four small bottles of soda. The drinks were consumed rapidly and the newlyweds set off for home. After their departure Bintu's aunt exclaimed, “He is too cheap. He did not even offer to

purchase a soda. He just returned from Italy and what did he bring me, the mother of his bride?  
Nothing. Cheap.”

Musa himself had been caught between two sets of generational expectations. Bintu desired her own home, as he had provided for his first wife. Musa’s parents expected that he would bring a wife into their home that would care for them in his absence. Bintu’s Aunt Sokna expected that the bridewealth was intended to initiate a series of exchanges that would tie the two households together and enable each set of elders to profit from the trade of the commerçant son. The elders, eager to constitute themselves as such through the receipt of his payments, were angered that he contracted the marriage without due attention to the exchanges that would be necessary to sustain the alliance.

Musa himself expected that Bintu would adjust to his absence, as did many Murid women raised in commerçant families. But her sense of abandonment and disappointment was quite strong and shortly after the new year she left the arrangement all together. His wife neither benefited from his remittances nor received her own home and felt less autonomous in the home of her mother in law than in the home of her uncle and thus fled as she saw her own prospects for adulthood collapse. Though she thought that through marriage her status would change completely, the fact that she was not in her own home directly under the control of her in-laws, led her to flee. If her husband had been the head of the household (*boorom genyo*), then she would have had socially sanctioned means of asserting her desires (such as *mokk pojji*). Her situation was worsened by the fact that Musa, like many Murid traders overseas, pooled his remittances with others and made one transfer of money to keep the fees down. Bintu and her mother-in-law fought over the amount of the remittance that they deserve based on their relationship to Musa. In many cases, female kin ask their husbands and sons to send the remittances secretly and thus a good deal of suspicion arises between female kin who monitor each other’s purchases and social payments and worry that their own lack of money conveys a lack of



value. Musa intended to build up his own household in Dakar and later down the line, Tuba, of which he would be head. In his absence, he brought his parents into his home to occupy the land and to supervise Bintu in his absence. As a consequence, Musa found himself remitting his income to his parents (primarily his mother) who, no longer producers themselves, were consumers of his remitted income and social payments for life cycle rituals through which the household is constituted. By virtue of their occupancy in the home and Musa's prolonged absence, Bintu was subject to the control not of her husband as head of the household, but of her mother-in-law as an elder place holder for him and as the de facto head of the household. The control that this female elder exercised over Bintu and over the household budget was the central reason for demise of the alliance and the forestalling of the younger generations bid for adulthood.

Musa, eager to assert himself as the head of the household and to have his prosperity reflected in his two wives, rushed into a marriage in which he did not actually have the material means to meet future demands for exchange. For a newer generation of traders, it seems as though the lucrative era of transnational trade is coming to a close as economic liberalization opens up markets that were previously only accessible to a small class of elite commerçants with close ties to the political leaders who had a hand in the national economy. Nonetheless, young traders struggle to provide their households with much needed and much desired cash, their remittances expressing their loyalty to their wives. For those who rarely see their husbands' remittances, divorce, though desperately desired, is impossible under the roof of the in-laws who depend on their labor.

### *Dwellings, Domesticity and Value*

Musa and Bintu's failed attempt at marriage speaks to the way in which the appearance of wealth produced by large feasts and generous prestations is at odds with the actual ability of

household members to maintain the social relations that engender wealth. Their failed marriage also speaks to the gendered and generational projects that are emerging out of a globalizing economy that draws young male workers abroad. For Musa the marriage was an important part of making his claim to be the head of the household. However, the presence of his parents in his place and the material impossibility of a second home forestalled his intentions. For Bintu, marriage failed to fulfill her desires for personal, social and material autonomy. The household was subject to Musa's and his mother's incompatible designs demonstrating the gendered evaluations of wealth and value in Senegalese Murid households.

Though men may build the home, building the household is a process ultimately controlled by elder women through their system of ritual exchanges. The construction and production of these households enables the exploitation of the male disciples whose willful activity brings them into being and who count on them to reflect their prosperity to the community. In this way, the concrete activity of male traders overseas fosters the creation of social hierarchies that drive production, in particular the authority of elder women. Because these elder women control the means of production, those in the nuclear family are obligated to produce for them in addition to producing enough to reproduce themselves.

Large feasts and ostentatious social prestations are made possible by access to cash earned by males labor abroad. Though Musa and Bintu's marriage alliance eventually collapsed, the wedding feast was sufficiently sumptuous to enable Bintu's Aunt, Sokna, to create ties of reciprocity and obligation among her guests. Thus, the marriage itself brings into relief one of the ways in which male cash remittances have altered the basis of women's power and authority over younger men and women, and to a lesser extent, elder males. Moreover, elder women have the option of not allocating

any money to junior women in the household, especially daughter in law's, and senior men, by concealing their receipt of cash remittances.

In particular, it is the nature of the remittance as a monthly lump sum of cash, rather than daily market money, that enables women to make large expenditures. In general a remittance of cash from afar affords women far more opportunities for diverting sums of money intended for specific purposes by males. Women often invest a portion of male remittances into rotating credit unions and ritual associations through which they finance local trading activities, the purchase of housewares, and family ceremonies. With these remittances, female elders not only finance life cycle rituals, but also acquire the clothing and the coiffure that indexes their prosperity and draws newcomers into their networks of exchange. Clad in the cargo of their male kin, female elders participate in exchange contests driven by ostentatious displays of wealth and conspicuous consumption. For women, value is action, the capacity to move money through commercial and ritual circuits and to achieve social, economic and biological production.

During these *fêtes* women enhance their role as powerful women in the lineage and in the community through ostentatious displays of multiple changes of clothing, or *sansi*,<sup>19</sup> and offerings of food, drink and cash. Commodities are important only in so far as they index the depth of one's networks of exchange. Murid trader disciples provide not only the cash to their respective female kin for these events, but their trading activities provide the prime commodities of beauty, cosmetic products produced by Black American companies—hair extensions, wigs, skin lightening cream, powder and hair straightening balm—as well as cloth, evening handbags and shoes. For this cosmopolitan society, the most sought after products to accentuate personal beauty come from afar—Nouakchott, Abidjan, Jeddah, and Chicago.

The private and the domestic are subjects of intense political debate in Senegal as the state and the Muslim clergy attempt to reform the particularly Wolof practice of hefty and highly competitive ritualized exchanges between female kin. Remittances have utterly changed the class status of households and neighborhoods, and have given new life the domestic sphere of life cycle rituals and exchange among female elders. Knowledge of these remittances means that these commercial families are vulnerable to new claims on their prosperity. Strapped for cash, elder women face the immense social labor of putting off demands on their revenue while maintaining good relations with kin and community through transactions in the domestic sphere. They shoulder the burden of maintaining the family's good name to ensure their financial solvency, and of promoting the family business by judiciously extending credit and accepting debt not only for their commerce, but also for massive social prestations in the domestic sphere.

The crisis of the family in Senegal today stems from the delaying of marriage by Senegalese youth who lack the material means to contract them (Antoine et al 1995). By delaying marriage they not only suspend their own entry into adulthood, but also foreclose opportunities for their parents to become elders. Senegalese youth express alarm at their inability to garner the resources for material subsistence; at the lack of employment and opportunities made available to them. They are also anxious about the dissolution of recognized forms of social value, the inability to put together households, to participate in the social life of the community and to realize adult masculinity.

That these intended rural villas remain unfinished and uninhabited speaks to the precarious position of these youth in a political present marked by global economic liberalization. Neo-liberal policies, structural adjustment, devaluation and other austere measures have young Senegalese scrambling to garner dissipating supplies of cash for events such as baptisms, marriages, and funerals, events through which they make themselves. These vacant villas convey the predicament of a cohort

of Senegalese youth, lacking the resources to complete the construction of their own households. Their adolescence is prolonged by elder placeholders, who—no longer able to depend on the slim agricultural output of the land in the regions surrounding Tuba—claim the remitted earnings of the youth to bolster their own power and authority achieved by financing ritual obligations, effectively effacing the labor of the youth.

Through a discussion of Bintu and Musa's failed marriage, the different stakes that family members have in the globalizing process are foregrounded. I take this failed marriage and the incomplete homes in and around Tuba seriously as a sign of failed social reproduction. This crisis in the material basis of social reproduction is a by-product of neo-liberal economic policies. Though commerce reinvigorates women's exchanges in the domestic sphere, as men become involved in transnational trade networks they aim to build homes outside of the interests of elders who once granted the land that made male adulthood possible. Consequently, young men aim to build households without the help of women's ritual activities and thus tensions mount in the disjuncture between gendered social projects. Senior women argue that relations of production once based on gender and generation are now driven by men's money and commodity exchange, not women's socially productive activities through which the commodity value of money is transformed into social value.

In this paper I have argued that domestic rituals drive the production of women headed households and ultimately lineages. Though young male traders take advantage of overseas commodity networks to extract themselves from lineage obligations, the incorporation of their cash remittances in the domestic sphere serves to reformulate the relations of gender and generation that drive social production. In the transition from male-headed to female-headed households, young women have not benefited. The domestic and moneymaking labor of unmarried adult daughters and

married daughters-in-law supports the ritual activity of elder women. Presently, the domestic order in Senegal is marked by a malignant form of domestic ritual where social payments are escalating out of control, but with no real productive outcome, households are not being produced in a way that would allow for the simultaneous production of its socially complete members. To the extent that the production of persons is embodied in the value form of the house, the scattering of homes in progress on the Senegalese landscape speaks well to the prospects for processes of social production.

Tuba is a metropole of intended social projects, half built cinder block villas in the making, the skeleton of an Islamic university, a hospital and numerous other social projects dependent on overseas remittances. Inhabiting this desert community are half-formed families marked by the absence of a generation of male youth and the presence of their remittances. The Murid circuit of blessings and prosperity remain central to all, not immediately because they offer the promise of eternal prosperity, but because they enable access to the forms of trade and production through which that prosperity is crafted in the present world. Murid households are one of the principal forms of value that motivate Murid practice at the intersection Tuba creates between sacred and secular realms of experience. The metamorphosis of the village of Tuba into the second largest city in Senegal is a product of the purposeful activity of the disciples who see reflected in it the forms of value that are both the outcome of and the motivation for their offerings. These transformations of cash into ritualized exchange not only index domestic and spiritual worlds; they are the very means of their constitution and the authority of those who rule over them.

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The names and places have been either changed or omitted to respect the privacy of the individuals who explained the details of this marriage to me as it unfolded.

<sup>2</sup> For further development of the symbolic significance of Tuba see Eric Ross 1995.

<sup>3</sup> Disciples claim that the land in Tuba is free. In some cases Murid shayks distribute land to their disciples creating neighborhoods of faithful. Often disciples build the skeleton of a home on the land around Tuba to stake a land claim only to have the home raised by the government who claims that these disciples are squatting on government owned land.

<sup>4</sup> The first great Murid migration took place between 1904 and 1920 to the arrondissements of Darou Mousty, Kael and N'Dame. The second major Murid migration occurred between 1930 and 1950 towards the area of Kaffrine.

<sup>5</sup> Bamba was a student of the Qu'ranic sciences studying with his maternal uncles. Local qadis recognized that he was a master scholar. Cheikh Sidya, a Mauritanian linked to the Kunta of Timbuktu, initiated Bamba into the Qadiriyya *tariqa*.

<sup>6</sup> Bamba's biography, *Les Bienfaits de l'éternel*, written in Arabic by Serigne Bachir Mbacke and translated into French by Khadim Mbacke, adjudicates his status as a saint (*wali*) by drawing out his genealogical ties and establishing his inheritance of the litanies (*wird*) and sufficient baraka, or spiritual grace.

<sup>7</sup> For example, on the relationship between Murid disciples and their shayks see the work of Donal Cruise-O'Brien and Christian Coulon. Jean Copans has also written on the relationship between Murid religious thought and the organization of economic production as does Abdoulaye Wade and Cheikh Tidjane Sy. Momar Coumba Diop has written extensively about the relationship between spiritual and economic life as well as on the movement of Murid disciples into urban spaces as well as overseas and the organization of Murid prayer circles in these new areas.

<sup>8</sup> Gouvernement General de l'AOF 1904: 4

<sup>9</sup> ANS 13G/69 1912-13

<sup>10</sup> ANS 10 D1/12, 1918

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<sup>11</sup> The theme of resistance has been taken up by a number of scholars, most notably by David Robinson.

<sup>12</sup> ANS 13G/67 1906-17

<sup>13</sup> ANS 10D1/15 1912, ANS 10 D1/15 1911

<sup>14</sup> ANS 10 D1/15 1911

<sup>15</sup> In general, Wolof residence (*keur*) is patrilocal (a new bride leaves her mother's home in her father's compound to reside with her new husband in his lineage's compound) and within the patrilineal line, political hierarchy follows the order of birth and generation.

<sup>16</sup> See B. A. Buggenhagen, "Body into Soul, Soul into Spirit: The Commodification of Religious Value in Da'ira Tuba-Chicago." Masters Thesis, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, 1998.

<sup>17</sup> ANS 23 G/12, 17

<sup>18</sup> Historically, this offering would be made in the form of livestock, ankle chains, bracelets, gold and even slaves, see A.B. Diop.

<sup>19</sup> See for example, Deborah Heath.