communities accept some limits to self-determination but tend to draw the line at foreign domination. The interests of the islanders—and of Britain—might have pointed to an expenses-paid move to a new and probably more comfortable home, but if they did not wish to move nor be governed by a military junta with a poor record on human rights, how can a value be put on their liberation? Would the principle have been any different if instead of 1,800 inhabitants there had been 180 or 1,800,000?

Chapter 6

War and Conflict between India and Pakistan: Revisiting the Pacifying Power of Democracy

Šumit Ganguly

At the end of the Cold War, South Asia remains one of the most conflict-ridden regions of the world. In addition to the various insurgencies and civil wars that have wracked the subcontinent, the two major powers in South Asia, India and Pakistan, have fought three wars: in 1947–48, 1965, and 1971. More recently, in 1987 and 1990, India and Pakistan have teetered on the brink of war, and border skirmishes are common. The central dispute in the region, the Indo-Pakistani conflict over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, continues to animate national elites and mass populations in both states. Since 1989, India has been suppressing an insurgency in Kashmir—an insurgency that, despite formal denials from Islamabad, Pakistan has been aiding since at least early 1990. While Pakistan's involvement in the uprising has renewed Indo-Pakistani tensions, it is unlikely that either side will deliberately precipitate a fourth war in the region; nevertheless, another war could ensue from a spiral of hostility and mutual misperception, such as occurred in 1987 and 1990.[1]

The author thanks Traci Nagle and Jack Snyder for comments on a draft of this chapter. Any errors of fact or interpretation are necessarily mine.

1. In 1987 and in 1990, processes of brinkmanship and misperception almost led to full-scale conflict. On the 1987 crisis, see Kanti P. Bajpai, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, P.R. Chari, Stephen P. Cohen, and Šumit Ganguly, *Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and the Management of Crisis in South Asia* (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995). On the 1990 crisis, see Devin Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 80–114.

Contrary to popular belief, the Indo-Pakistani relationship has not been bereft of cooperation.[2] Yet the enduring conflict-ridden state of Indo-Pakistani relations raises questions for the proposition that democratic states do not fight other democracies.[3] Is this hypothesis supported in the South Asian context? Given the long history of conflict between the two states since their creation, realist explanations focusing on the balance of power and external threat should account well for Indo-Pakistani relations. Consequently, the Indo-Pakistani case is a "hard test" for the democratic peace hypothesis—support for this hypothesis within the South Asian context would greatly increase our confidence in the dyadic version of the democratic peace argument.

This chapter, which aims to determine whether the democratic peace accounts for war and peace outcomes in South Asia, is divided into six sections. The first provides the definition of democracy, and discusses the nature of democracy in the South Asian context. The next three sections focus on the three Indo-Pakistani conflicts, and analyze their implications for the democratic peace proposition. The fifth section discusses the crises of 1987 and 1990 and attempts to explain why they did not culminate in full-scale war. The sixth and final section evaluates the likelihood of future conflict between India and Pakistan, and examines whether a democratic peace exists in South Asia.

What Is Democracy?

Conceptions and definitions of democracy vary widely.[4] Democratic institutions alone do not make a democracy; new democracies (and

2. For background on the wars and conflicts as well as the moments of cooperation between India and Pakistan, see Šumit Ganguly, "Conflict and Crisis in South and Southwest Asia," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996); Šumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia: The Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1971* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994); and Šumit Ganguly, "Discord and Collaboration in Indo-Pakistani Relations," in Kanti Bajpai and H.P. Shukul, eds., *International Politics and International Society: Essays for A.P. Rana* (New Delhi: Sage, 1995). No clear-cut generalizations obtain about the international, regional, and domestic contexts that proved conducive to Indo-Pakistani cooperation.

3. For a survey and assessment of the literature on this subject, see James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Thesis* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995).

4. See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989).

countries where periods of democracy are punctuated by periods of authoritarian rule) are not fully democratic.

For the purposes of this chapter, a state is a democracy if it holds free and fair elections; provides (and attempts to implement) constitutional guarantees for the protection of religious, linguistic, and ethnic minorities; adheres to the due process of law for all citizens; and has an independent judiciary and a free press. In South Asia, where every state is polyethnic, constitutional protections for minorities take on special significance. Even well-established democracies in the region—India and Sri Lanka, for example—have fallen short on this score. In India, the 1996 electoral successes of a jingoistic Hindu party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), pose a significant threat to India's secular policies and concomitantly to the status of Muslims, India's largest religious minority.

The relationship between democracy and the process of democratization also needs to be addressed.[5] At least two states in South Asia, Pakistan and Bangladesh, have experienced intermittent periods of military and authoritarian rule. Neither of these states can be considered consolidated democracies; at best, they are states on the path to democratization. Pakistan saw the end of an eleven-year period of military rule in 1989. Since then, Pakistan has successfully held free and fair national elections, but the country fails to meet many of the other criteria that would qualify it as a consolidated democracy. Civil liberties are severely constrained. The press, while largely free, is not bound by appropriate norms of probity and fairness. Minority rights are largely honored in the breach.

Since India can be considered a democracy, fluctuations in Pakistan's regime type allow us to test both the monadic and dyadic versions of the democratic peace theory. Indeed, although India underwent a brief period of authoritarian rule between 1976–77, it has been a democracy for most of the years since its founding in 1947.

The Legacy of Partition in 1947

In 1947, on August 14 and 15 respectively, India and Pakistan emerged as self-governing dominions from the detritus of the British Indian empire. The transfer of power from Britain to these two emergent states was quite sanguinary. After nearly two hundred years of imperial conquest and consolidation, Britain left the continent in

5. For an early treatment of the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, see Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2 (April 1970).

haste and made inadequate efforts to maintain order during the transfer of power.[6] The first war between India and Pakistan, in 1947–48, stemmed directly from the ill-managed process of colonial withdrawal from the subcontinent.

Under British rule, two classes of states had existed on the subcontinent. One group of states was under the direct tutelage of the British Crown. A second group, the so-called princely states, were notionally independent as long as they accepted the "paramountcy" of the British Crown. The monarchs of the princely states had control over all matters save defense, foreign affairs, and communications. As the time of the transfer of power approached in 1947, Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last viceroy, declared that paramountcy would lapse and that the monarchs would have to accede to either India or Pakistan, basing their decisions on the demographic composition and geographic location of their states. Independence was not an option.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir posed a peculiar problem. Its monarch, Maharaja Hari Singh, was a Hindu, but his population was predominantly Muslim. In addition, Kashmir abutted both incipient states—India and Pakistan. Despite Lord Mountbatten's injunction, the maharaja vacillated on the question of accession, hoping to gain independence.

In October 1947, a tribal rebellion broke out in Poonch, in the western reaches of Kashmir. The rebels, who found support from the newly created government of Pakistan, made quick work of the maharaja's forces. Toward the end of October, the rebel forces approached Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir. In a panic, the maharaja appealed to the Indian government in New Delhi for military assistance. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru agreed to provide military assistance only after two conditions were met. First, the maharaja had to join India and sign the Instrument of Accession. Second, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the leader of the popular Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, had to grant his imprimatur to the Instrument of Accession. Only after both conditions were met did Nehru send Indian troops to Kashmir.[7]

6. For a useful account, see Leonard Mosley, *The Last Days of the British Raj* (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1961).

7. The origins of the tribal rebellion, Pakistan's support for the rebels, and Kashmir's accession to India are all subjects of some contention. For a discussion of the origins of the rebellion, see H.V. Hodson, *The Great Divide* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). The most explicit account of Pakistan's complicity in aiding and abetting the tribal rebellion is Akbar Khan, *Raiders in Kashmir* (Karachi: Pak Publishers, 1970). For a critique of Kashmir's accession to India, see Alistair Lamb, *The Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir, 1947* (Hertingfordbury, U.K.: Roxford Books, 1994). For a defense of Kashmir's accession to India, see Prem Shankar Jha, *Kashmir, 1947: Rival Versions of History* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996).

Nehru's insistence on ascertaining Sheikh Abdullah's views about accession is important. Under the terms of the Indian Independence Act, it was clearly the maharaja's legal prerogative to accede to India. But Nehru, a staunch democrat, was also acutely concerned about the legitimacy of Kashmir's accession.[8] Nehru deemed that Abdullah's views were critical in conferring a degree of legitimacy to the Instrument of Accession due to his stature in the politics of Kashmir.[9]

THE ONSET OF WAR

After the Instrument of Accession was signed on October 27, 1947, an Indian infantry brigade was airlifted into Srinagar, and it quickly stopped the tribal advance. In early November, the Indians counterattacked and broke through the tribal defenses. But after this early success, the Indian Army suffered an important setback in December. On January 1, 1948, at the instance of Lord Mountbatten, Prime Minister Nehru of India referred the dispute to the United Nations Security Council. As Indian and Pakistani representatives debated the merits of their respective positions in the Security Council, the war in Kashmir proceeded apace.

In the spring of 1948, India mounted another offensive to regain some lost ground. Soon thereafter, Pakistani Army units entered the fray. Later in the year, as the Indian Army maintained its offensive, the Pakistani Army brought in a parachute brigade, two field artillery regiments, and a medium artillery battery west of Jammu. These troop deployments enabled Pakistan to threaten the tenuous Indian lines of communication, which ran from Amritsar in Punjab to Pathankot, Jammu, and to Poonch in Kashmir. For the remainder of 1948, the war followed a desultory course, with neither side making any further territorial gains.[10]

8. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, *War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

9. In 1952, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir, and Jawaharlal Nehru concluded the Delhi Agreement, which reaffirmed Kashmir's accession to and special status in the Indian Union. Specifically, the Delhi Agreement codified that India's role in Kashmir would be confined to defense, foreign affairs, and communications.

10. Much of this discussion has been drawn from Šumit Ganguly, "Wars Without End: The Indo-Pakistani Conflict," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, No. 541 (September 1995), pp. 167–178.

On January 1, 1949, the United Nations declared a cease-fire, which brought the hostilities to a close. When the hostilities ended, Pakistan controlled about one-third of the state (which they called "Azad Kashmir"—literally, "Free Kashmir") and India two-thirds. A UN observer group (the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) took up positions along both sides of the cease-fire line.

A FAILURE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY?

At a superficial level the 1947–48 war would seem to challenge the basic premise of the dyadic version of the democratic peace theory; notionally, both India and Pakistan were democratic states when the war started. But a closer examination of the evidence suggests otherwise. Certainly, some democratic structures were in place when India and Pakistan obtained their independence from Great Britain. For example, both India and Pakistan had inherited the British colonial legislative, judicial, and administrative institutions. These institutions had been created during the early part of the twentieth century under the pressure of nationalist movements in British India. The last of these legislative directives, the Government of India Act of 1935, had created a strong executive and a weak legislature. Under the aegis of this act, two elections, in 1937 and 1946, had been held in the states of British India. However, many of the other attributes normally associated with a democratic state were lacking. For example, owing to the imperatives of colonial control, laws governing press freedoms and peaceful assembly were still severely restrictive.

This limited conception of democracy that the British colonial authorities had grudgingly conceded was the common heritage of the two nationalist movements. Beyond this shared legacy, sharp organizational and ideological differences characterized the Indian and Pakistani nationalist movements.[11] The Indian nationalist movement had started out with a reformist agenda and with an anglicized, upper-middle-class political base. Under the influence of Mohandas Gandhi in the 1920s and 1930s, this movement transformed itself into a largely secular, democratic, and mass-based political party that sought to represent the interests of all Indians. The Pakistani nationalist movement, in marked contrast, had both a limited geographical and organizational base. It was primarily confined to the United

11. Paul Brass, *Language, Religion and Politics in North India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).

Provinces in northern India and revolved around the personality of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League. The organizational structure of the League remained elitist and it failed to create a mass political base. In the aftermath of independence, these ideological and organization differences had profound consequences for nation-building and helped shape the political institutions that emerged in the two states.[12]

In 1947–48, executive power was highly concentrated in both states. However, despite his towering stature, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru faced important informal and formal constraints on the exercise of executive authority. The Indian National Congress, the party that had brought India independence, was a highly institutionalized organization. The norms of consultation and consensus-building were of considerable importance.[13] The governor-general of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who was the principal architect of Pakistani nationalism, faced far fewer constraints on his actions. Jinnah's stature in the Pakistani nationalist movement was *primus inter pares*.[14] Furthermore, the organizational structure of the Muslim League was markedly different from that of the Indian National Congress. Unlike the Congress Party, the League lacked internal democracy, and best represented the corporate interests of the Muslim landed gentry of northern India. Indeed, many in the upper echelons of the League were actually contemptuous of democracy. The following quotation is illustrative of their sentiments about the rough-and-tumble character of democratic politics:

> They [illiterate peasants] elect crooks and scalawags who promise the moon. The scalawags make a mess of everything, and then I have to clean up the mess. Democracy requires education, tradition, and breeding, and pride in your ability to do something well.[15]

12. A military coup brought democracy to an end in Pakistan in 1958. Apart from a brief period of authoritarian rule in 1976–77, democracy has thrived in India. See Leo E. Rose, "Pakistan: Experiments with Democracy," and "India: Democratic Becoming and Combined Development," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989).

13. On this point, see Rajni Kothari, *Politics in India* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).

14. Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857–1948* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1968). Also see Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

15. Minister of Interior Iskander Mirza, as quoted in Khalid Bin Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 76.

In contrast to the Pakistani political elite, the Indian political leadership, which had already internalized many of the norms of democratic conduct, evinced a willingness to resolve the dispute over Kashmir through peaceful, multilateral means. Accordingly, it was India that referred the case to the UN Security Council.

In short, the outcome of the 1947–48 crisis appears consistent with the predictions of the monadic version of the democratic peace theory. First, in contrast to the Pakistani political leadership, the Indian political elite had internalized many of the norms of democratic conduct and were amenable to settling the dispute over Kashmir through peaceful, multilateral means. Pakistan showed no such willingness. Accordingly, it was India that referred the case to the UN Security Council. Second, democratic India saw war as an option of last resort. Finally, Pakistan's lack of democratic constraints on decision making made it easier for decision makers to resort to war. It is at least plausible to argue that had democratic structures and norms been in place, Pakistani leaders might have been more willing to explore strategies other than war. Nevertheless, while the outcome of this crisis is consistent with the predictions that the dyadic argument makes for democratic-nondemocratic interactions, this does not mean that Pakistan's regime type drove India's decision making process. The onset of war had little to do with the particular regime types of the two states. The real roots of the war can be traced to the process of colonial disengagement and the quest for territorial aggrandizement.

The Second War over Kashmir in 1965

The second Kashmir war, which took place in August and September 1965, also started without a formal declaration of war. In this instance, international, regional, and domestic politics combined to propel the two adversaries into a second war.[16]

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

Internationally, the UN mediation process that was started after the 1947–48 war had proved unfruitful. Initially, Prime Minister Nehru had expressed a willingness to settle the Kashmir dispute on the basis

16. For a detailed discussion of the forces that contributed to the 1965 war, see Šumit Ganguly, "Deterrence Failure Revisited: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (December 1990), pp. 77–93.

of a plebiscite, as had been suggested in the UN Security Council Resolution of April 21, 1948.[17] But India soon moved away from this position for two compelling reasons. First, Pakistan proved unwilling to abide by the first component of the resolution, which called for Pakistan to withdraw its troops and the Azad Kashmir rebel forces. Second, after 1954 and the emergence of a U.S.-Pakistani military alliance, Indian domestic politics significantly reduced Nehru's room for maneuver.[18] Eventually, the unwillingness of the two parties to implement the UN resolutions led the United Nations to lose interest in the Kashmir dispute.

THE REGIONAL DIMENSION

At a regional level, a second conflict had important repercussions for the Indo-Pakistani conflict. In October 1962, after the failure of border negotiations, the People's Republic of China (PRC) attacked India. The Indian forces, which were thinly deployed along India's Himalayan borders, proved a weak match for the ferocious Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Within two weeks, the PLA forces had routed the Indian troops and had seized some 14,000 square miles of territory claimed by India. Compounding India's humiliating defeat, the PLA forces declared a unilateral cease-fire.[19]

After this military debacle, India sought to rebuild its forces, and it appealed to both the United States and the United Kingdom for military assistance. Both states came to India's assistance, but with important conditions. Among other matters, they urged India to start negotiations with Pakistan to settle the Kashmir dispute.[20] Grudgingly, Prime Minister Nehru agreed to hold bilateral discussions with Pakistan, and six rounds of talks were held between December 1962 and May 1963. The talks quickly became deadlocked, however, and failed to produce an agreement.[21]

17. Ishtiaq Ahmed, *State, Nation and Ethnicity in Contemporary South Asia* (London: Pinter, 1996), p. 143.

18. On this point, see Escott Reid, *Envoy to Nehru* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981). Reid was the Canadian high commissioner to India during the 1950s.

19. Steven Hoffmann, *India and the China Crisis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

20. Dennis Kux, *Estranged Democracies* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994).

21. Denis Wright, *India-Pakistan Relations, 1962–1969* (New Delhi: Sterling, 1989).

Meanwhile, India's defense modernization plans proceeded apace. Plans were drawn up for the creation of a forty-five-squadron air force with modern, supersonic aircraft; the raising of the service ceiling of the Indian Army to one million; the creation of ten new mountain divisions equipped for high-altitude warfare; and the modernization and expansion of the Indian Navy.[22] While the military expansion was driven by the newly perceived Chinese military threat and India's resulting vulnerability, it created a security dilemma for Pakistan.[23] Some Pakistani analysts believed that India's increased military strength could threaten Pakistan's very survival, and the Pakistani elite also realized that its ability to wrest Kashmir from India through force would soon erode.

THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION

Finally, domestic politics within India and Pakistan played an important role in precipitating the second Indo-Pakistani conflict.

In 1963, in an attempt to further integrate Kashmir into the Indian Union, the Indian central government introduced legislation in Parliament to begin eroding Kashmir's special status (that is, its local control over all areas save, defense, communications, and foreign affairs). Understandably, Pakistan feared that its legal claim on Kashmir was being undermined, and protested vehemently in bilateral and multilateral fora. India nevertheless went ahead with its plans.

India's efforts to integrate Kashmir suffered a brief setback in December 1963, after a holy relic—reputedly a hair of the Prophet Mohammed, was stolen from from the Hazratbal mosque in Srinagar. Anti-Indian riots and demonstrations swept through the Kashmir Valley until the relic was recovered. The Pakistani leadership of President Mohammed Ayub Khan construed this display of anti-Indian sentiment as Kashmiri interest in integration with Pakistan.

In early 1965, President Ayub Khan, who had assumed power in a military coup in 1958, was faced with the beginnings of a challenge

22. Raju G.C. Thomas, *The Defence of India* (Delhi: Macmillan, 1968).

23. The concept of a "security dilemma" is discussed in John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, No. 2 (January 1950). The "security dilemma" stems from the anarchic features of the international system. The international arena is deemed to be anarchic in that it lacks a supreme authority to enforce order. As a consequence of this anarchic structure, each state is ultimately responsible for its own security. In this milieu, the acquisition of military power by one state for defensive purposes may be construed as being threatening by an adversary.

to his stature in the Pakistani polity. His attempt to partially democratize his regime through the creation of the "Basic Democracies" system, an elaborate mechanism of indirect representation, had revealed the limits of his public support. Even though he had handsomely defeated his only presidential opponent, Fatima Jinnah, in West Pakistan, his margin of victory in East Pakistan was considerably smaller.[24] Furthermore, a charismatic young politician from the province of Sindh, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, was assuming greater prominence in Pakistani politics.

Faced with the decline of international interest in Kashmir, India's steady integration of Kashmir, and incipient challenges to his position within Pakistan, Ayub Khan needed a dramatic event to bolster his regime's sagging fortunes. A war with India over the issue of Kashmir was seen as a way to help revive the Kashmir issue at an international level and also to generate popular support for his regime.[25] Accordingly, Ayub Khan tested India's battle-readiness with a series of incursions along a poorly delineated border in the marshes of the Rann of Kutch in the western Indian state of Gujarat between January and April 1965. The Indian response was less than vigorous. The Indian military, under the command of General J.N. Chaudhuri, realized that the terrain favored the aggressor. Moreover, the new Indian prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, agreed with Chaudhuri's assessment that the Rann of Kutch had little economic, political, or military significance. After a series of border skirmishes between Indian and Pakistani troops, at the instance of the British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, India agreed to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice.

The Pakistani leadership construed this Indian willingness to settle the dispute through international arbitration as a sign of Indian pusillanimity. This fundamentally flawed inference was reinforced by the Pakistani leadership's reliance on colonial notion that Muslim

24. For a description and analysis of the Basic Democracies system, see Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1971).

25. For a discussion of the propensity of authoritarian regimes to resort to "diversionary wars," see Jack S. Levy and Lily I. Vakili, "Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes: Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., *The Internationalization of Communal Strife* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 118–146. For a thorough discussion of the relationship between weak institutional structures and internal and external conflict see Michael E. Brown, "Introduction," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, pp. 1–31.

soldiers were better fighters than Hindu soldiers.[26] Finally, Foreign Minister Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, in particular, believed that Indian Prime Minister Shastri, who lacked Nehru's charismatic hold over India's masses, would prove inadequate to the task of governing his fractious, polyethnic, and socioeconomically divided country.[27]

THE ONSET OF WAR

Having convinced themselves of India's lack of military and political resolve, the Pakistani military and civilian elites conceived of a bold plan to seize Kashmir. This strategy, formulated by Major General Akhtar Husain Malik, Foreign Minister Bhutto, and Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed, was known as "Operation Gibraltar." Their strategy involved infiltrating regular Pakistani troops disguised as local tribesmen across the Cease Fire Line (CFL) into the Kashmir Valley throughout the summer of 1965. These troops were expected to mingle with the Kashmiris and help foment a rebellion; taking advantage of the turmoil within the valley, the Pakistani Army would then attack and seize a substantial body of territory in a short, sharp incursion. Finally, the Pakistani political leadership would appeal to the international community as India attempted to counterattack and dislodge the Pakistani forces.

This strategy went awry from the outset. Far from welcoming the Pakistanis as potential liberators, the Kashmiris reported them to the local authorities. Once the Indian Army was apprised of this infiltration, it quickly moved to seal the porous border. Despite the loss of strategic surprise, Pakistan went ahead with its plan. Unable to stop the infiltration, the Indian forces attacked across the CFL, launching a strike into Azad Kashmir on August 15, 1965. Over the course of the next two weeks the fighting intensified. The Pakistani forces successfully counterattacked on September 1, dealing the Indian forces heavy losses. On September 5, the Pakistani forces captured the village of Jaurian, fourteen miles inside Indian territory. From this strategic location they could easily proceed to the town of Akhnur, from which they would be able to seal off Jammu and Kashmir from the rest of India.

To relieve pressure on Akhnur, the Indian forces resorted to a contingency plan: horizontal escalation. They attacked in the neighboring state of Punjab near the Pakistani city of Lahore. The Indian

26. The concept of "martial races" is discussed in Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

27. Dilip Mukherjee, *Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto* (Delhi: Vikas, 1972).

threat to Lahore led to a further escalation of the conflict, including a pitched tank battle in the Sialkot sector of Punjab. By mid-September the war was reaching a stalemate, and the UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution on September 20 calling for a cessation of hostilities. The government of India accepted the cease-fire resolution on September 21, and the government of Pakistan did the same on September 22.

The United States, one of the few countries that had significant influence in both New Delhi and Islamabad, showed scant interest in brokering a post-bellum agreement. U.S. abstention permitted the Soviet Union to step into the breach, and Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin invited the warring parties to the Central Asian city of Tashkent to negotiate an end to the dispute. The Tashkent Agreement of 1966 between Mohammed Ayub Khan and Lal Bahadur Shastri succeeded only in restoring the *status quo ante*. In the interests of securing peace, India made substantial concessions, including returning the strategic Haji Pir pass to Pakistan over the objections of the Indian military.

CRITIQUE OR CONFIRMATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY?

At the time of the 1965 war, only India could be properly called a democracy. It had a written constitution that guaranteed a range of procedural and substantive rights, including the freedom of expression, assembly, movement, and religion, as well as due process. It also provided for the protection of private property.[28] The Indian judiciary was independent, and the country had a lively and contentious press. Significantly, the nation had held three national elections on the basis of universal adult franchise. In the first general election, held in 1952, 60 percent of the eligible electorate voted.[29] All three of India's elections to date are widely considered to have been both free and fair. Vigorous parliamentary debates took place regularly, on a range of subjects. Finally, after Nehru's death in 1964, political succession had adhered to constitutional procedures.

However, there was some abridgement of democratic procedures. In the aftermath of the 1962 border war with China, a constitutionally sanctioned "state of external emergency" had been declared. Under the terms of the emergency, the government had invoked the

28. Granville Austin, *The Indian Constitution: The Cornerstone of a Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).

29. Francine R. Frankel, *India's Political Economy, 1947–1977: The Gradual Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 93.

Defence of India Rules (DIR), which harked back to the days of British colonialism. The DIR enabled the government to limit the rights of habeas corpus. Yet these measures were clearly seen as temporary measures designed to cope with an exigent situation, and not as a failure of democracy.

The Pakistani polity in 1965, on the other hand, was far from democratic. Pakistan's first constitution, which had been promulgated in 1956, had been suspended following Ayub Khan's military coup in October 1958. Between 1958 and 1962, Pakistan remained under martial law. During this period, Ayub Khan held the positions of president and chief martial law administrator. The civilian bureaucracy offered no resistance, and, in fact, worked closely with the military authorities.

In June 1962, Ayub Khan instituted a new constitution that granted extensive powers to the executive and created a weak and ineffectual legislature, and also created the Basic Democracies system. Among other matters, the constitution permitted the president to declare a state of emergency if the country faced either internal disturbances or an external threat. Both the judicial and legislative branches were subordinated to the executive. For example, neither the courts nor the unicameral assembly had the authority to question the president's decision to proclaim a state of emergency. Furthermore, once a state of emergency was declared, the president could assume virtually dictatorial powers.[30] Such a state of emergency came into force when Pakistan went to war with India in September 1965.

Some analysts of the democratic peace contend that democratizing states, which are characterized by weak institutional structures and manipulative elites, may be more war-prone than states in which democratic procedures and norms are well entrenched.[31] Did the limited opening up of the Pakistani political order under the Basic Democracies system contribute to war? Not really. Ayub Khan's Basic Democracies system did not genuinely broaden political participation. Press freedoms were still sharply curbed. The civilian bureaucracy was complicit, the judiciary was pliant, and the national legislature was weak. The narrow political elite could act with

30. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan* (New Delhi: Konark, 1988), pp. 112–114.

31. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5–38.

impunity in matters relating to national security.[32] Once Foreign Minister Bhutto had successfully convinced Ayub to make war, few institutional or popular checks could constrain the undertaking of military action. Had such institutional or normative constraints existed, they might have prevented Bhutto or Ayub Khan from whipping up popular passions around the rancorous memories of the partition of the subcontinent and the unresolved status of Kashmir.

The evidence from this case shows limited support for the dyadic version of the democratic peace, which asserts that because of domestic weaknesses, democracies will often become the targets of attack by nondemocracies. India's willingness to negotiate an end to the Rann of Kutch dispute clearly emboldened the Ayub Khan regime and thereby contributed to Pakistan's decision to go to war. The examination of this case also provides some support for the monadic version of the democratic peace. India, as the democratic state, did not escalate the Kutch conflict and evinced a willingness to settle the dispute through negotiation.

Yet this case may suffer from overdetermination. While Pakistan's nondemocratic features undoubtedly contributed to its war-proneness, an equally compelling balance-of-power explanation can be constructed. Ayub and his advisers feared that the international community was losing interest in the Kashmir dispute. Moreover, India's rearmament program in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war would soon have given India conventional superiority, which would have foreclosed the possibility of Pakistan's wresting Kashmir away through force. In sum, while Pakistan's belligerence is consistent with the predictions of the dyadic version of the democratic peace theory, competing realist arguments can equally account for the war decision.

When Democracies Turn Belligerent: The 1971 War

The origins of the 1971 war were markedly different from those of the two previous Indo-Pakistani conflicts.[33] It arose from profound internal political developments within Pakistan, not territorial disputes and international power struggles.

32. One important measure of the significance attached to national security issues was the Pakistani defense budget. In 1964–65, the budget amounted to 46.07 percent of Pakistan's total expenditures. The following year it rose to 53.67 percent. Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, p. 125.

33. The two best accounts of the 1971 war are Robert Jackson, *South Asian Crisis* (New York: Praeger, 1975); and Sisson and Rose, *War and Secession*.

The failure to resolve the Kashmir problem proved costly for President Ayub Khan. Many in the armed forces blamed him for their lackluster performance against India.[34] Furthermore, the failure to resolve the Kashmir dispute through war generated popular disaffection with the regime. This disenchantment was also rooted in the regime's failure to promote social justice and economic equity. Pakistan had grown at an extraordinarily rapid rate during Ayub Khan's rule, but the benefits of this growth had been highly concentrated.[35]

Ayub's troubles worsened when Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, the principal architect of the 1965 war plans against India, resigned from the foreign ministry in 1966 and created his own political party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), in November 1967.

In early 1968, Ayub Khan's health started to fail. Against the backdrop of an ailing dictator and rising popular discontent, Bhutto started a public campaign against the regime and held rallies throughout West Pakistan. On March 25, 1969, in poor health and faced with a rising tide of disaffection against his regime, Ayub Khan resigned. The chief of staff of the Pakistani Army, General Yahya Khan, assumed office.

DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST PAKISTAN

Discontent against the western wing of the country had long existed in East Pakistan.[36] Among other matters, the predominantly Bengali-speaking population in East Pakistan had long resented the imposition of Urdu as the national language. Furthermore, the bulk of the government's industrial investment went to West Pakistan; East Pakistan's economy remained dependent on the production of primary commodities, especially jute, rice, and tea.

East Pakistani resentment grew after the 1965 war. East Pakistan had been left largely undefended during the war. The Ayub Khan regime had argued that "the defense of the East lay in the West"; in other words, if India militarily threatened East Pakistan, the Pakistani forces would mount attacks against Kashmir and Punjab, thereby drawing the Indians away from the east. Although India had conducted only limited military operations in East Pakistan, the Bengali population there realized that their security depended to a large extent on India's sufferance.

34. Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, p. 148.

35. In a public speech in Karachi in 1968, Mahbub ul Haq, the military regime's chief economist, disclosed that some twenty-two industrial families controlled the bulk of the productive resources in Pakistan. See Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986), p. 60.

36. See J. Lee Auspitz, Stephen A. Marglin, and Gustav F. Papanek, "History of Economic and Political Domination of East Pakistan," in *The Bangla Desh Papers* (Lahore: Vanguard, n.d.). Also see Raonaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

These grievances against the West Pakistani regime contributed to an incipient East Pakistani demand for regional autonomy. This demand coalesced around the Awami League, a regional political party led by a charismatic Bengali politician, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. Faced with rising pressures for democratization, General Yahya Khan decided to hold nationwide elections in December 1970; the Awami League won 160 out of a possible 162 seats in East Pakistan, and Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto's PPP won 81 out of a possible 138 seats in West Pakistan. Having won a sweeping mandate in East Pakistan, the Awami League made it clear that it wished to implement its election manifesto, which included a "Six-Point Program" for the autonomy of East Pakistan.[37] The military regime saw these demands as verging on secession and fought the Awami League's demands to form a government in Islamabad. Negotiations between the military regime, Bhutto, and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman quickly became deadlocked.[38] By early March 1971, the Awami League tired of the temporizing tactics of the West Pakistanis and started to publicly air secessionist sentiments.

Faced with growing public disturbances in East Pakistan, the Pakistani military started "Operation Searchlight" on March 25, 1971.[39] This military operation involved a systematic massacre of students, university professors, journalists, lawyers, and other members of the Bengali intelligentsia, primarily in the East Pakistani city of Dacca (now Dhaka). Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and a number of other Awami League leaders were promptly arrested and whisked away to prison in West Pakistan.

37. For a discussion of the Six-Point Program, see Herbert Feldman, *The End and the Beginning* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1975).

38. For details of these negotiations, see Sisson and Rose, *War and Secession.*

39. For a detailed description of "Operation Searchlight," see Anthony Mascarhenas, *The Rape of Bangla Desh* (Delhi: Vikas, 1971).

THE ROAD TO WAR

The military pogrom against the Bengalis sent a dramatic exodus of refugees into the neighboring Indian state of West Bengal. The influx of refugees reached its peak in May 1971; the total number of refugees reached nearly ten million.[40] Faced with this extraordinarily large influx of refugees, the government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi initially sought two forms of external assistance and intervention. It appealed to the major powers and international aid organizations to relieve the financial costs of the refugee burden. The international community was quite responsive to the refugee burden. However, the major powers, and the United States in particular, showed scant interest in India's other request: placing pressure on Pakistan to move toward a political solution to its civil crisis.[41]

Faced with the unresponsiveness of the global community, by midsummer of 1971 the government in New Delhi decided that it was easier to resort to war than to absorb another several million people into the politically volatile state of West Bengal. Accordingly, Indira Gandhi and her closest political advisers fashioned a politico-military strategy that would both assure a return of the refugees to East Pakistan and also lead to the creation of a new state on the subcontinent, thus greatly weakening Pakistan.[42] To this end, in August 1971, Indira Gandhi signed a treaty of "peace, friendship, and cooperation" with the Soviet Union; Article Nine made it incumbent on each party to come to the other's assistance in the event of a threat to national security.[43] The treaty virtually guaranteed the support of a veto-wielding power in the Security Council to block any possible censure of India's actions in East Pakistan.

40. Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia*, p. 97.

41. The paucity of U.S. interest in exerting pressure on Pakistan to reach a political settlement deserves comment. The United States had used the military regime of General Yahya Khan as a conduit for Henry Kissinger's secret talks with the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, President Richard Nixon had a personal animus against Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. For a discussion and critique of the U.S. role in this crisis, see Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977). For an alternative formulation, see Sisson and Rose, *War and Secession*.

42. A good discussion of the politics of this decision can be found in Pran Chopra, *India's Second Liberation* (Delhi: Vikas, 1973).

43. Within India, Indira Gandhi was widely criticized for signing this treaty with the Soviet Union. Her critics contended that she had compromised nonalignment. For an analysis of the treaty, see Robert Horn, *Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and Influence* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

In October 1971, Indira Gandhi toured a number of Western capitals to apprise them of the refugee burden and India's security concerns, as well as to exhaust all possible diplomatic initiatives before making war on Pakistan. Simultaneously, she gave a free hand to the Indian military to make preparations for a major land offensive in East Pakistan. Along with the Indian military, India's principal counterintelligence and espionage organization, the Research and Analysis Wing, started to recruit, organize, and train Bangladeshi insurgents. These insurgents, known as the Mukti Bahini (literally, "freedom force") started to harry the West Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. Pakistan repeatedly protested India's support for the Mukti Bahini. Unable to deter the Indian support, the Pakistani Air Force attacked India's northern airfields on December 3, 1971. The Indian Air Force retaliated the next day, penetrating deep into Pakistani territory. During the course of the next two weeks (the entire duration of the war), the Indian Air Force maintained complete air superiority. On December 17, 1971, Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora, the senior Indian commander in the eastern sector, obtained an unconditional surrender from his Pakistani counterpart, Major General A.A.K. Niazi. The third Indo-Pakistani conflict had come to a close.

INDIA: SHREWD INITIATOR OR HAPLESS VICTIM?

Which state initiated the 1971 war? The question is far from trivial, and has important implications for an assessment of the democratic peace theory. In a strict sense, Pakistan can be held responsible for *starting* the war: it was the Pakistani air attack on India's northern airfields on December 3, 1971, that formally began the war. Furthermore, it was Pakistan's repression of its population that led to the exodus of refugees into India in late March 1971. Nevertheless, India's persistent support for the Mukti Bahini was vitally important in provoking the conflict. Thus, it would seem that contrary to the claims of the monadic democratic peace argument—which asserts that democracies will pursue war only as a last resort, and only after all alternative methods of conflict resolution are exhausted—India, after a certain stage of the crisis, was looking for a war. Below I discuss further the implications of the case for the monadic peace argument.

In 1971, with some limitations, democratic institutions had taken firm root in India. The country had twice witnessed the peaceful transfer of power at its highest levels. The Indian military was under firm civilian control. Elections were openly contested. The political

spectrum included parties of a range of political persuasions. The Indian press, both English-language and vernacular, was free and feisty. With marked exceptions, civil liberties were largely respected. One exception was in the state of West Bengal, where civil liberties had come under siege after a violent Maoist urban guerilla movement, the Naxalites, had unleashed a campaign of mayhem and terror. In an attempt to suppress the Naxalites, the state authorities had resorted to many extra-judicial measures. Nevertheless, on balance, India could be characterized as a democratic state.

Why did India choose to become involved in Pakistan's internal conflict? Two interrelated factors prompted India to intervene, but only one of these had anything to do with the adversary's domestic regime type; on the contrary, the first factor was strategic. K. Subrahmanyam, a prominent Indian bureaucrat and strategist, made the initial case for military intervention. In a closed-door session, he contended that unless India intervened in East Pakistan, several million predominantly Muslim refugees would have to be absorbed into India, which could give rise to communal tensions in eastern India. Furthermore, Subrahmanyam contended that China was unlikely to intervene, given its low stakes in the issue.[44] Finally, although Subrahmanyam did not explicitly spell it out, most Indian decision makers saw a military intervention in East Pakistan as an opportunity to fundamentally weaken their principal adversary.

Yet, the decision to intervene cannot be explained solely in strategic terms. India's democratic status, at least in part, influenced its decision to intervene. As Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stated in parliament:

> Something new has happened in East Bengal—a democratic election in which an entire people had spoken with almost one voice. We had welcomed this, not because we had wanted to interfere in another country's affairs *but because the values for which the victorious Awami League stood were our values . . . for which we have always stood and for which we have always spoken out.*[45]

What were these shared values to which Indira Gandhi alluded? She was drawing attention to the Awami League's democratic, secular, and socialist agenda. Although it was not always able to realize

44. K. Subrahmanyam, *Bangla Desh and India's Security* (Dehra Dun: Palit and Dutt, 1972).

45. Indira Gandhi, *India and Bangla Desh* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), pp. 9–10. Emphasis added.

them in practice, India too espoused these principles. Presumably, a democratic neighbor would be easier to deal with and would create fewer conflicts of interest than the religiously based military regime based in Islamabad.

A prominent Anglo-Indian member of the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian Parliament), Dr. Frank Anthony, echoed Gandhi's sentiments in discussing the Pakistani repression of the Awami League:

> It is a challenge to our whole polity—challenge not only to the form, but to the content of our political way of life, *to our secular motive* to which we are passionately committed and indeed, to the whole concept of the integration of the people of a secular society.[46]

No doubt the defense of secular principles played an important role in India's decision to become involved in the civil war in East Pakistan. However, while political ideology—support for democracy and democratization—can account for India's decision to use force, it only provides a piece of the puzzle: India also had important strategic reasons to go to war. Furthermore, contrary to the democratic peace theory's assertion that opposing political ideologies of democracy and nondemocracy drive war outcomes, in this case the norms that mattered were only partly related to the *political* organization of the polity.

PAKISTAN: DEMOCRATIZATION AND WAR-PRONENESS?

Pakistan's political orientation in 1971 was far more complex than India's. Martial law had been eased in January 1970. A directive issued in March 1970 (the Legal Framework Order) had further lifted curbs on political activity.[47] Indeed, the December 1970 elections were widely considered to be the only free and fair election that Pakistan had held since its independence in 1947.

But these political and institutional changes within Pakistan did not make it a democracy.[48] Pakistan lacked both democratic structures

46. Frank Anthony, as quoted in *Lok Sabha Debates, May 25, 1971* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1971), p. 239. Emphasis added.

47. G.W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), p. 94.

48. The definition of a democracy can vitally influence the extent to which the democratic peace theory is vindicated or refuted. For more on how definitions of democracy have changed over time, see John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87–125.

and democratic norms. In 1970–71, the military was in charge of the Pakistani polity, despite emerging challenges. If the military had not sought to thwart the outcomes of the democratic election, Pakistan might have started down the path toward democracy. The norm of fair, honest, and open contestation, so vital to a democratic polity, simply did not exist in Pakistan. In effect, Yahya Khan's decision to start opening up the political system unleashed forces that neither he nor unscrupulous politicians such as Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto were prepared to countenance. The initial demands of the Awami League were not secessionist, but focused on regional autonomy. Only after the explicit unwillingness of Bhutto to share power with the League in Islamabad did the demands take on a secessionist hue. The military crackdown in Dacca, of course, created an unbridgeable rift between the two parties.

Pakistan's fitful efforts to move toward a democratic polity and the onset of the 1971 war do seem to confirm, at least partially, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder's hypothesis about the war-proneness of democratizing states. They argue that groups that are threatened by social change and democratization often take an inflexible view of their interests. This was precisely the case with the Pakistani military and civilian oligarchies. Yahya Khan's opening of the political system enabled the Awami League to put forward and press for its "Six-Point Program" for regional autonomy. If Sheikh Mujibur Rehman had been able to implement all the components of that program, the corporate interests of the Pakistani military would have been threatened.[49] More to the point, the military was opposed to democratization and genuine power-sharing within Pakistan. The Awami League, given its ideological abhorrence of the Pakistani military and its numerical majority in parliament, would have insisted on a transformation of the political order within Pakistan. Consequently, it was no surprise that the military, as well as Bhutto, thwarted the demands of the Awami League and ultimately plunged the country into a brutal civil war to protect their entrenched privileges. The Indian intervention in East Pakistan was a consequence of the refugee burden that the military crackdown and the subsequent civil war in East Pakistan had spawned.[50]

49. Mansfield and Snyder argue that groups that are threatened by social change and democratization often take an inflexible view of their interests. This was precisely the case with the Pakistani military and civilian oligarchs. See Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," p. 27.

50. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, *War and Secession*, p. 149.

NOT QUITE THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

India's decision to resort to war had little to do with Pakistan's nondemocratic status. However, proponents of the monadic version of the democratic peace argument may find some support from this case.[51] According to that theory, democracies do not promptly resort to war against authoritarian adversaries even when limited opportunities present themselves. Initially, Indian decision makers had hoped that the Pakistani leadership would see reason and negotiate with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and the Awami League. They did not seek militarily to exploit Pakistan's domestic turmoil. They confined their efforts to expressions of concern about Pakistan's domestic developments.

The Indian position changed quite dramatically after the military crackdown in East Pakistan and the flight of millions of refugees into India. Faced with the extraordinary refugee onus, Indian decision makers concluded that a political solution to the East Pakistan crisis was all but impossible. Within two months of the military crackdown in March 1971, sensing a unique opportunity to deliver a *coup de main* against its principal adversary, India chose war. In the ultimate analysis, then, the decision to go to war stemmed from strategic imperatives; India could ill afford to absorb the refugees into the politically sensitive state of West Bengal without significant and adverse social, political, and economic consequences.

The "Long Peace" in South Asia: 1972–97

In 1972, President Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi met at the hill resort of Simla in northern India to discuss a settlement to the 1971 war.[52] In Simla, the two sides agreed to abjure the use of force to settle outstanding disputes.[53] Despite crises in 1987 and 1990, full-scale war has not broken out between India and Pakistan since 1972. What explains this "long peace" in South Asia? Several factors are at work, and they must be carefully disaggregated.

51. For a discussion of the monadic version of the democratic peace argument, see Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict*, pp. 16–21. Also see Miriam Fendius Elman's introduction to this volume.

52. Bhutto assumed the presidency on December 20, 1971, three days after Pakistan's military defeat.

53. For an analysis of the Simla Agreement, see Thomas P. Thornton and Imtiaz Bokhari, *The 1972 Simla Agreement: An Asymmetrical Negotiation* (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1988).

PAKISTAN: BREAKDOWN, DICTATORSHIP, AND TRANSITION

On April 12, 1973, Prime Minister Bhutto gave the country a new constitution, which, unlike its 1962 predecessor, emphasized the powers of the prime minister over those of the president. It also created a bicameral legislature and declared Islam to be the state religion of Pakistan. However, Bhutto disregarded the constitutional provisions that guaranteed nondiscriminatory treatment of opposition regional governments. In February 1974, he dismissed the opposition government of the province of Baluchistan on the grounds that it had encouraged its people to challenge central authority; this act led the government of the Northwest Frontier Province to resign in protest. In May of the same year, Bhutto passed an amendment to the constitution that gave the executive the authority to declare illegal any political party that acted in a manner detrimental to the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan. This power was to be exercised with the approval of the Supreme Court. It was successfully used to ban the National Awami Party.[54] Despite the extraordinary powers that he came to wield under the constitution and the strength of the PPP, Bhutto resorted to various forms of electoral malfeasance in the elections of March 1977.[55] Widespread disturbances broke out in the wake of this compromised election.

With rising disorder in Pakistan, General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, the chief of army staff, organized and implemented a successful coup against President Bhutto's regime on July 5, 1977. He promptly declared martial law, took over as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, suspended the 1973 Constitution, and dissolved the federal and provincial cabinets.[56] In 1979, General Zia-ul-Haq sent the deposed president to the gallows on the grounds that he had orchestrated the murder of a political opponent. With minor modifications, the military regime of Zia remained in place until his death in a mysterious plane crash on August 17, 1988.[57]

Following Zia's death, Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, became prime minister in an open election. Nevertheless, the military remains one of the principal institutions within the Pakistani state apparatus, alongside the office of the president and

54. Burki, *Pakistan: A Nation in the Making*, pp. 71–73.

55. Marvin Weinbaum, "The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 17, No. 7 (July 1977), pp. 559–618.

56. Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, p. 225.

57. Martial law was formally lifted on December 30, 1985.

the permanent civilian bureaucracy. Under the Eighth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, which was passed by a supine National Assembly in 1985, during the period of military rule, the president of Pakistan possesses sweeping powers, which include that of dismissing the prime minister. On March 31, 1997, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, in a bold and unprecedented step, introduced legislation to abolish significant sections of the Eighth Amendment to the Pakistani Constitution. Specifically, under the terms of the new legislation, the Thirteenth Amendment, which passed on April 1, the president's power to dismiss elected governments was severely curtailed. The prime minister also won back the right to appoint the three military service chiefs. Sharif was able to pass this legislation because he commanded an overwhelming majority in both houses of parliament. Even the opposition did not stand in his way because they too stood to gain from this new law.[58]

INDIA: FITFUL DEEPENING OF DEMOCRACY

After she inflicted a humiliating defeat on India's longstanding and principal adversary, Indira Gandhi won an overwhelming electoral victory in 1972. Despite this extraordinary mandate, she presided over the deinstitutionalization of Indian politics during the 1970s and early 1980s. She increasingly resorted to populist appeals and plebiscitary electoral tactics. While these measures exacted an important toll on institution-building, her populist slogans and policies succeeded in mobilizing large sections of the Indian populace.[59]

India underwent a brief period of authoritarian rule between 1976 and 1977, under Indira Gandhi. This episode was precipitated when a defeated political opponent successfully moved a lower court judgment against Gandhi for a series of minor electioneering offenses. With opposition parties publicly clamoring for her immediate resignation, Gandhi obtained a stay order from a higher court, declared a state of internal emergency, and then used her parliamentary majority to retroactively alter the law under which she had been prosecuted. During this span of authoritarian rule, civil liberties were suspended, the judiciary silenced, the press muzzled, and political

58. Mohammed Waseem, "Pakistan's Lingering Crisis of Dyarchy," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 32, No. 7 (July 1992), pp. 617–634; Ahmed Rashid, "Clipped Wings," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 10, 1997, p. 18.

59. Lloyd I. Rudolph and Suzanne Hoeber Rudolph, *In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

activity sharply curtailed. When Gandhi finally called an election in 1977 to legitimize her rule, the Indian electorate promptly threw her out of office. The new coalition government of Prime Minister Morarji Desai moved to restore press freedoms and civil liberties.

Since 1977, despite India's widespread political instability, the democratic process has expanded and deepened.[60] Political participation, particularly by India's poor, lower castes and minorities, has dramatically increased. One of the most striking indicators of the increased inclusiveness of Indian democracy is the composition of the eleventh Lok Sabha. For example, the percentage of legislators from the so-called backward castes rose from 13 percent in 1971 to 23.3 percent in 1996. The number of legislators from rural, agrarian backgrounds increased from 33.2 percent in 1971 to 51.8 percent in 1996.[61] As an institution, Parliament has become far more representative of the country.

Political mobilization and participation have come at a price. India's political institutions have eroded to varying degrees. Parliamentary norms are routinely flouted, most political parties lack ideological coherence; elections are increasingly plebiscitary exercises; and the probity of key institutions, such as the civil service, has markedly declined. In the wake of the 1996 general election, which brought a minority coalition government to power, hopes for some reform of India's compromised institutions were raised. However, the decline of other countervailing institutions during the 1980s produced an extremely powerful executive that is largely free from legislative scrutiny. The decline of bureaucratic norms and routines, which started as early as the 1970s, has also enabled the office of the prime minister to exercise overweening power. These forms of institutional decline have eroded the usual constraints on democratic control over foreign and security policy issues.

THE "BRASSTACKS" CRISIS OF 1987

Relations between India and Pakistan deteriorated after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although India was distressed by the Soviet

60. In the eleventh general election in 1996, some 590 million people were eligible to vote; candidates from 500 recognized parties participated; and the overall turnout was around 64 percent. See "India's Epic Election," *New York Times*, April 30, 1996, p. A20; and "India Spurns the Congress Party," *New York Times*, May 11, 1996, p. A18.

61. Harinder Baweja, "Changing Face of Parliament," *India Today*, July 15, 1996, pp. 25–36.

entry into Afghanistan, it was unwilling to criticize publicly the Soviet decision, for fear of jeopardizing the carefully constructed Indo-Soviet arms transfer and security relationship.[62] Pakistan, which was by now seen as a vital conduit of weaponry to the Afghan resistance, initially rebuffed U.S. President Jimmy Carter's offer of $400 million in economic and military assistance. In 1981, the Reagan administration, which dubbed Pakistan a "front-line state," provided a five-year package of military and economic assistance worth $3.2 billion. This package included F-16 fighter aircraft and military hardware. India reacted to this U.S. military assistance with considerable vigor, obtaining the latest-generation Soviet MiG-29 aircraft to offset the Pakistani acquisition. As an incipient arms race developed on the subcontinent, the political relationship between New Delhi and Islamabad plummeted. Matters worsened when Pakistan was implicated in supplying weaponry to the Sikh insurgency in Punjab. Although that insurgency had indigenous roots, Pakistani involvement raised the level of violence.[63]

Even though Pakistan faced a live border with Afghanistan, it sought to exploit India's troubles in Punjab. India's exasperation with Pakistan's continued assistance to the Sikh insurgents coincided with profound organizational changes that were taking place in the Indian Army. General Krishnaswami Sundarji, the Indian Army's flamboyant chief of staff, wanted to induct two new infantry formations and a mechanized brigade into the army. He was also interested in testing Plan AREN, an indigenously developed and produced communications grid, and a C^3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) system. This military exercise, code-named "Brasstacks," was the largest of its kind in India's independent history.[64]

The scale and long duration of this military exercise, held in the Rajasthan desert, was clearly designed in part to convey a message to the Pakistani military leadership that India could exert military pressure on Pakistan at will, despite the problems in Punjab. To the shock of India's decision makers, as the exercise drew to a close in December 1987, Pakistan, which was also holding its winter military exercises "Saf-e-Shikan" and "Flying Horse," moved its forces to the

62. Horn, *Soviet-Indian Relations.*

63. See Raju G.C. Thomas, *Democracy, Security, and Development in India* (New York: St. Martin's, 1996).

64. Bajpai et al., *Brasstacks and Beyond*, p. 29.

strategic Shakargarh bulge in Punjab. More distressingly, in early January 1988, Pakistan's Army Reserve South forces crossed the Lodhran bridge on the Sutlej River. From this position they were within striking distance of a number of key towns in Indian Punjab, including the city of Amritsar.

The possible intent of these troop movements caused considerable alarm in New Delhi and generated a flurry of diplomatic activity. The minister of state for external affairs, Natwar Singh, met with the Pakistani ambassador, Humayun Khan, to convey India's concerns about the Pakistani troop movements. Simultaneously, the Indian minister for external affairs, Narayan Dutt Tiwari, met with the Soviet ambassador Vassily Rykov, while the Indian minister of state for defense, Arun Singh, conducted a parallel meeting with the U.S. ambassador, John Gunther Dean. On the other side of the border, the Pakistani minister for foreign affairs, Zain Noorani, contacted the Indian ambassador to Islamabad, S.K. Singh, to convey Pakistan's interest in lowering the rising level of tension along the Indo-Pakistani border in Punjab.

The crisis began to defuse shortly after January 25, 1988, when India agreed to hold talks with Pakistan. On January 26, Pakistani spokesmen announced that Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar would meet with his Indian counterpart, Alfred Gonsalves, to defuse the border tensions. By February 4, both sides had agreed to a phased withdrawal of their own troops from the border regions.

Analysts of South Asian regional security studies debate whether there was a nuclear dimension to this crisis. Although this debate is far from settled, one fact is certain. Abdul Qadir Khan, widely known as the "father" of Pakistan's quest to obtain a nuclear weapon, gave an interview to a prominent Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayar, on January 28. In this interview he asserted that Pakistan had enriched uranium to weapons-grade quality. This interview was published in the London *Observer* on March 1, 1988. Khan could not have granted this interview without the prior knowledge and permission of the Pakistani military. Yet, if his interview was intended as a nuclear signal, it was poorly timed. The "Brasstacks" crisis had all but blown over. Quite possibly, it was a signal to India that in the future it would have to take account of the possibility that Pakistan had nuclear weapons before engaging in coercive behavior.[65]

65. Much of this discussion is drawn from Šumit Ganguly, "Arms Control in South Asia: History and Prospects," *Defense Analysis*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1996), pp. 65–75.

THE 1990 CRISIS

In early 1990, a second crisis punctuated Indo-Pakistani relations. Some scholars have argued that this crisis definitely had a nuclear component.[66] In December 1989, the insurgency in Kashmir had peaked.[67] Indian decision makers had sufficient evidence that Pakistan was systematically organizing, training, and arming various Kashmiri insurgent groups, but they were unable to stop the infiltration of insurgents across the porous Line of Control. Some analysts argue that key Indian decision makers decided to draw up plans for striking deep into Azad Kashmir to destroy training camps. Pakistani intelligence picked up signs of increased Indian troop movements in Kashmir. Because Pakistan's conventional capabilities were markedly inferior to India's, decision makers reportedly placed key squadrons of the Pakistani Air Force on alert and armed them with nuclear weapons.[68]

U.S. intelligence agencies apparently picked up evidence of the Indian and Pakistani moves. Fearing that escalating tensions could culminate in full-scale war, President George Bush dispatched his deputy national security adviser, Robert Gates, and Richard Haass, the senior staff member of the National Security Council with responsibility for the Near East and South Asia, to Islamabad and New Delhi. The principal aim of the U.S. mission to the South Asian capitals was to counsel restraint. In Islamabad, Gates informed the government that the Pentagon had simulated every imaginable scenario, and that in every one of them Pakistan was defeated. Consequently, if Pakistan wished to avoid war, it should cease support to the Kashmiri insurgents. In New Delhi, Gates counseled Indian leaders not to carry out strikes into Azad Kashmir. He contended that such strikes would inevitably provoke full-scale war with Pakistan. The impact of the Gates-Haass mission is difficult to assess. In any event,

66. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia."

67. As with the insurgency in the Punjab, the origins of the Kashmiri insurgency are indigenous; however, it has been greatly exacerbated by Pakistani involvement. For a discussion of the origins of the insurgency, see Šumit Ganguly, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional Decay," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 76–107.

68. It is impossible to state with any certainty whether Pakistan armed its aircraft with nuclear weapons. The most alarmist account is Seymour Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," *New Yorker*, March 29, 1993, pp. 56–73. For a more balanced account, see Mitchell Reiss, *Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995).

war was averted. The insurgency in Kashmir continues, however, and Pakistani support to the insurgents has not stopped.

A DEMOCRATIC PEACE IN SOUTH ASIA?

Several features of this "long peace" in South Asia require comment. First, despite changes in regime type in both India and Pakistan, peace, meaning the absence of full-scale war, has been uninterrupted since 1971. For example, during India's period of authoritarian rule in 1976–77, its behavior toward democratic Pakistan was not especially belligerent. Nor did its behavior change substantially when the tables were turned in 1978. Thus, the evidence does not readily support either the monadic or dyadic versions of the democratic peace theory.

Second, despite India's uninterrupted democratic record since 1977, it is ironic that it steadily moved toward the Soviet Union (until around 1990) and against the United States during much of this period. Ideology had little to do with this foreign policy shift. Few in the Indian foreign policy elite had much affinity for the Soviet Union. India's willingness to align with the Soviet Union stemmed from straightforward balance-of-power considerations: the Soviet interest in containing China coincided with Indian misgivings about growing Sino-U.S. strategic cooperation.

Third, India and Pakistan were both democratic states after 1989, but their relations since then have been marked by continuing acrimony, border clashes, and at least one major crisis. This situation challenges Michael Doyle's expectation that substantial democratization within a dyad should lead to reduced levels of conflict.[69]

In effect, the "long peace" in South Asia is deceptive. India and Pakistan came perilously close to war on two occasions. And since 1989, India has been harshly suppressing a rebellion in the Kashmir Valley.[70] Close to 20,000 individuals have been killed in this conflict since its outset. The possibility of war, though small, continues to stalk the region. "Peace," therefore, is a contestable description for the current situation in the region.

But what explains the lack of a full-scale war since 1971? The period between 1972 and 1987 does not require a great deal of explanation; India possessed overwhelming conventional superiority over Pakistan. After witnessing India's assistance in the breakup of Pakistan in 1971, no Pakistani leader could seriously contemplate another war with India. Furthermore, after 1979 it became even harder for Pakistan to start a war with India due to the Soviet presence along the Afghan-Pakistani border. This Soviet presence imposed constraints on a military adventure against India. Even after Pakistan acquired substantial quantities of weaponry from the United States, the military balance still favored India.

Apart from its intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, India has been a status quo power in the region. After the Simla Agreement was concluded with Pakistan, most Indian leaders believed that the Kashmir problem had been resolved. Apart from a handful of unrequited members of India's jingoistic Bharatiya Janata Party, few leaders seriously contemplated seizing the remainder of Kashmir from Pakistan. Consequently, India had little interest in starting a war with Pakistan during this period.

What factors, then, explain the "near miss" of 1987? At the time, Pakistan was a military dictatorship and India a democratic state. Yet India initiated the exercise that set off the escalatory spiral. Why did India behave in this bellicose fashion? First, as argued earlier, there was Pakistani provocation, in that Pakistan was aiding the Sikh insurgents. Second, and more importantly, despite the existence of democratic institutions in India, the realms of defense and foreign policy making remained an elite preserve. Public and even ministerial expertise in these areas is still woefully limited. Consequently, senior bureaucrats and military planners have considerable leeway in making decisions, and public scrutiny and analysis of decision making is idiosyncratic and often poorly informed. Third, decision making, particularly in areas pertaining to foreign and defense policy, had become highly centralized under Rajiv Gandhi. The prime minister's secretariat, which had grown in power under Indira Gandhi's rule, had become the locus of much decision making. Consequently, General Sundarji, an ambitious and articulate military officer, could easily sway a neophyte prime minister and a coterie of bureaucrats. Only after "Brasstacks" provoked a vigorous Pakistani reaction and the Indian government held a press conference did the Indian press start to question the wisdom of the military exercise.[71]

69. Michael W. Doyle, "Michael Doyle on the Democratic Peace—Again," in Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 364–373.

70. The harsh methods that India has adopted to quell the Kashmir insurgency are certainly corrosive to democratic values. Nevertheless, Indian democracy remains robust.

71. Bajpai et al., *Brasstacks and Beyond*, pp. 167–168.

The 1990 crisis poses more of a conundrum. Pakistan had made a fitful transition to democracy in 1989 after the death of General Zia-ul-Haq in 1988. In India, in the 1989 ninth general election, the ruling Congress (I) Party was defeated. A coalition government led by Vishwanath Pratap Singh had recently assumed power in New Delhi when the insurgency abruptly erupted in Kashmir. Notionally, both states had democratic governments.

Yet democratic institutions had not been consolidated within Pakistan. Both structurally and normatively, Pakistan was far from being a full-fledged democracy. The prime minister served at the sufferance of the military and the president.[72] The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization, the principal military entity responsible for funneling weaponry to the Afghan insurgents, had become a virtual "state within a state." The principal opposition party, the Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad, which was led by Punjabi industrialist Mian Nawaz Sharif, was largely a creation of the Pakistani Army and the ISI.

Furthermore, societal forces vitiated democratic norms in Pakistan. For example, newfound press freedom generated considerable reckless reporting on India.[73] When the Kashmiri insurgency erupted, Benazir Bhutto quickly adopted a belligerent posture toward India in an attempt to outflank her opponents and critics. For example, in a National Assembly session she called for a *jihad* (holy war) against India.[74]

Did the presence of democratic institutions in both states enable them to avoid escalation and war? The evidence points to the contrary. The Pakistani civilian leadership was particularly truculent once the insurgency started in Kashmir. Evidence exists that the ISI quickly became involved in supporting the insurgents.[75] In India, an

72. Waseem, "Pakistan's Lingering Crisis of Dyarchy," p. 630.

73. See *FBIS Media Guide: Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1996).

74. Madhu Jain, "Pakistan: Raising the Stakes," *India Today*, February 28, 1996, pp. 19–23. Also see Shekhar Gupta, "'Jehad' for Kashmiris," *India Today*, May 31, 1990, pp. 14–15. It may well be asked why it was not popular to adopt a more conciliatory posture toward India now that Pakistan had made a transition to democratic rule. The answer is simple. During more than a decade of military and authoritarian rule, the Pakistani public had been fed a steady diet of vicious anti-Indian propaganda, creating a large reservoir of distrust of and hatred toward India. A weak prime minister could ill-afford to resist the temptation to stir this cauldron of anti-Indian sentiment.

75. Anthony Davis, "The Conflict in Kashmir," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1995), pp. 41–46.

untested coalition government, surprised by the abrupt outbreak of widespread disaffection in Kashmir, responded in a ham-handed fashion. Thus, the presence of democratic governments in both states had little to do with the avoidance of war; on the contrary, democratic political processes in both states pushed toward increasing conflict. In all likelihood war was avoided because of the existence of nuclear weapons on both sides.[76] India and Pakistan pulled away from the brink because they feared nuclear escalation.

A Future Unlike the Past?

The foregoing analysis of war and conflict in South Asia does not entirely support either the dyadic or monadic version of the democratic peace theory. However, advocates of the democratic peace proposition could contend that the hypothesis has not been adequately tested in the region. Today, despite limitations, India is a successfully consolidated democracy. Even jingoistic political leaders in India will now face important constraints on their behavior. Many political institutions that atrophied during the 1980s are showing renewed health and vigor.[77]

Pakistan has only just embarked on the long road toward democratic consolidation, despite two peaceful transfers of power in the 1990s. Although the road is strewn with many obstacles that will not be easy to remove, it is unlikely that Pakistan will initiate a war with India in the foreseeable future. The acquisition of crude nuclear capabilities by India and Pakistan appears to have brought some degree of stability to the region, and despite widespread international (and especially U.S.) pressure, neither country is about to renounce its nuclear weapons program.[78] Furthermore, no Indian government will permit India's substantial conventional superiority over Pakistan to erode. India's pace of economic growth, which has picked up considerably since economic reforms were initiated in 1991, is sufficient to sustain the necessary defense outlays.

76. See Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia." The Gates-Haass mission may have reinforced the caution induced by the existence of nuclear weapons on both sides.

77. Peter Waldman, "India's Supreme Court Makes Rule of Law a Way of Governing," *Wall Street Journal*, May 6, 1996, p. A8.

78. Stephen P. Cohen, "1990: South Asia's Useful Nuclear Crisis," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Chicago, Illinois, February 6–7, 1992.

Since these factors can deter war even in the absence of strong democratic constraints and norms, a more compelling test of the democratic peace proposition will have to be deferred to a time when both India and Pakistan are robust, mature democracies and face a compelling security crisis.

Chapter 7

Israel's Invasion of Lebanon, 1982: Regime Change and War Decisions

Miriam Fendius Elman

In the social sciences, definitions can make or break a theory. For example, the way researchers define democracy and war determines how many international conflicts can be coded as democratic wars and as disconfirming evidence for the democratic peace theory; that is, analyses based on select definitions of democracy and war can make the democratic peace theory appear more robust than it really is.[1] Consider Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Proponents of the democratic peace theory tend to give this case short shrift: James Lee Ray does not include it in his list of alleged wars between democracies; Bruce Russett points out parenthetically that Lebanon was not democratic at the time.[2] Nevertheless, critics of the democratic peace theory count the case as an instance of warring democracies. For example, David Spiro claims that the case should not be excluded even though Lebanon's government was "in shambles," and the armies of Syria and

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1. David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 51, 54–55.

2. James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), pp. 86–87; and Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 18. Proponents might also exclude the case on the grounds that Lebanon was a failed state, much less a democracy, and because Israel's prime target was not Lebanon but Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).