Pessimism and Assumptive Logics

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Victor Peterson II

Abstract




This essay discusses a core tenet of pessimism, Afropessimism, in particular. Pessimism claims to be a metatheory analyzing the assumptive logics of the system it critiques. Afropessimists hold that a logical treatment of pessimism is unwarranted because pessimism does not employ a logical treatment of its object. We’ll discuss Afropessimism and, by extension, pessimism, in general, on their own terms as metatheory. We’ll see that a metatheory indirectly follows the logic its object follows directly. From this, a metatheory must hold an assumptive logic of its own, even if superficially disavowed. Consequently, we’ll arrive at a puzzling result when, in this particular case, the metatheory’s claims empty its object of its content, hence the pessimism.




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How to Cite
Peterson II, V. (2023). Pessimism and Assumptive Logics. Journal of World Philosophies, 7(2). Retrieved from https://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp/article/view/5882
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