Internalization of Speech: Pronunciation and Perception of the Word

AKANE SAITO

JSPS-Fellow, Kyushu University, Japan (nekonokuni85@yahoo.co.jp)

There are various philosophers who have discussed the role of language in ancient India. Among them, Bhartṛhari considered the relation between the superficial appearance of speech and its essential nature. In actual life, we pronounce and perceive the word. He held that there must be some link between ideal logic and worldly truth. His focus in the Brahmakāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya, is on the process of communication, the process of the internalization of speech. He differentiates the perspective of the speaker and the hearer, and explains the movement of sounds. The sphoṭa theory addresses both how to pronounce the word and how to perceive it. Traces of his discussion are found in the works of his follower Maṇḍanamiśra in his book, Sphoṭasiddhi.

Keywords: Indian philosophy on language; Bhartṛhari; *Vākyapadīya*; Maṇḍanamiśra; *Sphoṭasiddhi*

1   Introduction

In this paper, I focus on the medium of linguistic communication, which has been discussed in detail in the history of Indian philosophy. We all know that we understand things because they have been told to us linguistically. But which aspect of language exactly is responsible for the communication of a given meaning? The uttered sounds? Their internalized form? An abstract entity evoked by them? Different authors have different answers to this question. The grammarian Patañjali (2 BCE), who commented on the great grammar work of Pāṇini (4 BCE), defined the concept of the word (*śabda*) in his *Mahābhāṣya* (MBh). Bhartṛhari (5 CE), who is probably the most influential philosopher as well as grammarian in medieval times, followed Patañjali and greatly developed the discussions in his *Vākyapadīya* (VP). Bhartṛhari considers phonemes both superfluous, since sounds are enough to convey a meaning, and not sufficient, since they have no connection with a meaning. Instead, he postulates a complex structure, with sounds at first and then *sphoṭa*, which is the nature of the word. His deep investigation on sounds divides sounds in accordance with their attribution: the speaker's speech-organ and the hearer's auditory faculty. The philosopher Maṇḍanamiśra (Maṇḍana) (7–8 CE) is the follower of Bhartṛhari. Maṇḍana has examined in his *Sphoṭasiddhi* (SS) the process of the manifestation of *sphoṭa*, in other words the process of perception of the word, thus relating Bhartṛhari's language theory to the epistemology of the Vedānta school of Indian philosophy. *Sphoṭa* is interpreted by Maṇḍana clearly as that of the word coming from the external world, namely as that which is perceived by the hearer. However, Maṇḍana does not have much to say about the internal aspect, namely the speaker's side, while Bhartṛhari clearly distinguishes the internal (the speaker's) and the external (the hearer's), as we can

see in his distinct use of the terms *nāda* and *dhvani*, which elsewhere are used synonymously to mean sound of any kind. The understanding of meaning, whether as speaker or as hearer, is necessarily related to our consciousness. That is, at some point the word exists in our minds. Nonetheless, there is as yet no clear account of the process of its internalization.

In this paper, I will consider two questions:

1)   what exactly is the difference between the external and the internal aspects of the word for Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana, and

2)   how does the Grammarians' theory of language explain the process of the internalization of speech.[1]

I will proceed as follows: In section 2, I will illustrate the relation between sound and the word, and try to show the basic structure of the word using the Grammarians' discussion as a clue. In section 3, I will focus on Bhartṛhari's *sphoṭa* theory and try to show how he defined sound. Finally, in section 4, I will illustrate how Maṇḍana discussed the manifestation of sphoṭa in his SS and how he followed Bhartṛhari's discussion.

Previous Studies on Sphoṭa

K. A. Subramania Iyer composed a full annotated English translation of the SS in 1966 (Iyer [1966]), published in Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute of Poona. Before this work, he had published an article dealing with the *sphoṭa* theory in the history of Grammar from Pāṇini to Maṇḍana (Iyer [1947]), and this is the basis on which his full translation rests. Among his many significant contributions to the study of the Grammarians' philosophy, of particular importance to this thesis is his multi-volume edition and translation of the VP. He is certainly the foremost pioneer in this recondite field.[2]

As for the relation between *sphoṭa* and sound (*nāda/dhvani*), there is not so much research. Especially the pre-modern Grammarians after Maṇḍana changed the concept of *sphoṭa* slightly and did not discuss it in relation with sounds.[3] However, although they did not discuss the difference between *nāda* and *dhvani*, John Brough (1951) and Iyer (1965) showed us in detail the aspect of sound (*dhvani*) of the word.[4] Especially Brough's criticism about highlighting the mystique of *sphoṭa* is quite accurate.

2   Relation between Sound and the Word: Core of the Word

First of all, we should know how the word and the sound are defined by the ancient Grammarians and differ from each other. There are two meanings of the word *śabda* proposed by Patañjali: "the word" which makes the meaning understood, and "physical sound."[5] These two simple definitions, however, might be misleading. This is because in Patañjali's MBh on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (A) 1.1.70, he says "*sphoṭa* is *śabda*, and sound is the property of *śabda*."[6] Here sound (*dhvani*) is an external phenomenon of *śabda*, and there is an internal aspect to which its sound is subservient, namely *sphoṭa*, that which reveals the sound's "meaning" to the mind. *Sphoṭa* is an unchangeable entity, which is generally related to the meaning (referent). However, since Patañjali said that even the beating of the kettle-drum brings about *sphoṭa*, "the meaning" cannot be taken simply. According to Pāṇini's Grammatical rule, the word's primary referent is related to its own form (*svarūpa*).[7] In the Grammatical system, the word is the signifier and therefore necessarily related to some referent.

Pāṇini stated in the above rule that if it is not yet related to some other object as its meaning, its own word- or sound-form (*śabdasvarūpa*) is the primary referent. Regarding this issue, Haradatta, who is a Grammarian in medieval times (7–8 CE), interpreted the word's own form (*śabdasvarūpa*) as the universal (*sāmānya*: generic concept) of different individual variations of one word.[8] The word *agniḥ* can be pronounced in different ways, namely by different tones, tempos and so on, but it has its own essential form which is the basis of all the variations. Its own word- or sound-form is its most essential 'referent' (*vācya*: meaning to be referred). And, I say it is this (inner and essential) form of the word or sound that is *sphoṭa*. All of the words consist of their own word-form (*svarūpa* = *sāmānya*) and modalities which make them appear differently. Therefore, every word has *sphoṭa* as the core of its existence. The same thing is claimed also by Bhartṛhari using the concept of "the word's generic form" (*śabdākṛti*).[9] Both are not the actual (or superficial) form of the word but that which is perceived as its true nature though decorated by sounds. And accordingly, the previous definitions of *śabda* change slightly:

> [Condition 1] When the linguistic convention of a *śabda* is known,
> [1]   The *śabda* is connected both with its own form (*svarūpa* = *ākṛti* = *sphoṭa*) and with its meaning. Such a *śabda* is equivalent to *pada* or *vākya*, namely "the word."

> [Condition 2] When the linguistic convention of a *śabda* is not known,
> [2]   The *śabda* is connected only with its own form (*svarūpa* = *ākṛti* = *sphoṭa*). Such a *śabda* is merely *dhvani* "sound."

3   *Sphoṭa* Theory of Bhartṛhari

The concept of *sphoṭa* is developed from the idea of *śabda* in the MBh. Although Patañjali himself did not give a clear explanation of *sphoṭa*, Bhartṛhari refined this into an elaborate philosophical theory in the VP. After Patañjali's examination of *śabda*, the Grammarians, including Bhartṛhari, no longer gave any importance to the "phoneme" (*varṇa*). Instead, sound (*dhvani*) was emphasized as the cause of manifestation of the word (*śabda*, more precisely *śabdasvarūpa* = *sphoṭa*), beginning, it seems, with Bhartṛhari.

Accumulation of Sounds: External and Bodily Sounds

Bhartṛhari has differentiated the usage of the terms *dhvani* and *nāda*. According to his explanation in the auto-commentary on I.47, *dhvani* is the external sound which pervades the space (*vyoman*) and is the fundamental cause of the manifestation of *sphoṭa*. On the other hand, *nāda* is the internal form of sound (= bodily resonance) which has been accumulated by the speech-organ. Let us start with the following verse[10]:

> VP I.47 (p. 105, ll.1–2):[11]

> The [conceptual word (=*sphoṭa*)],[12] which has been ascertained (*vitarkita*) by the intellect before [the utterance] and which has been made to reside (*niveśita*) in a particular meaning (=

a word-form is assigned to a particular meaning), is seized (*anugrah*) through sound (*dhvani*) which has been transformed (*vivṛtta*) [into bodily resonance] by the speech organs.

The content of this verse is split into two phases: 1) the process of residence, namely, pervasion (*vyāveśa*) by the word-form of the referent (I.47ab), and 2) the process of pronunciation (I.47cd). And as for the second phase, the process of the actual pronunciation of the word is explained by Bhartṛhari as follows:

Auto-commentary on I.47 (p. 105, l.6–p. 106, l.3):[13]

Regarding "which has been transformed by the speech organs" [in the verse]. Indeed, the reality of the word (*śabdatattva*) which is not characterized by the transformation (*vikriyā*) is transformed according to the external sound (*dhvani*) which is characterized by the transformation. Then when the subtle external sound, which pervades [the ether], is accumulated by the function of the [speech-]organ, it has been transformed as the gross bodily resonance (*nāda*) which is the object of perception just like a cloud compacted [by the wind], [and] the untransformable [word itself] is grasped as if it is transformed by imitating the transformation [into bodily resonance].

Here *dhvani*, if it pervades everywhere, should be also inside our body. In that sense, the translation "external sound" is not precise. Regardless of this danger, I keep translating it as "external sound" in order to differentiate from *sphoṭa* as well as *nāda*. Those subtle, external sounds are developed/transformed into the gross bodily resonances when accumulated by the speech-organ. As we can see from the term "before [the utterance]," this is the explanation of how to pronounce the word. The word is manifested by the subtle, external sounds which have been transformed into the gross, bodily resonances. Subtle, external sounds are pervasive but imperceptible, while gross bodily resonances are perceptible. Pronunciation is the process in which the speech-organ accumulates subtle external sounds and transforms them into the perceptible entities. And because of the sequentiality of bodily resonances, Bhartṛhari explains, we feel that the word is sequential.[14] The bodily resonances appearing inside the speaker manifest *sphoṭa*. That means, in the case of the speaker, that there is a causal relationship between the bodily resonances and *sphoṭa*. And since the bodily resonances have their own sequence, *sphoṭa* is affected by this and appears to be sequential, although in reality it has no sequence. This is because *sphoṭa* is single and fixed (*nitya*).

Classification of External Sounds and Bodily Resonances

Now another question arises: how exactly are *dhvani* and *nāda* different? In the following definitions of Bhartṛhari, we find there are two classifications in both of them, namely primary and secondary.[15]

Classification of External Sounds

External sounds are first defined by Bhartṛhari as subtle particles pervading the ether. How, then, does he think of actual sound, which is also called *dhvani*? In the following passages,

Bhartṛhari proposes two kinds of *dhvani*, both of which are actual sound, distinct from any imperceptible entity: primary, external sound and secondary, external sound.

VP I.75 (p. 140, ll.9–10):[16]

> [The Grammarians] explain (*pracakṣ*) the difference of the mode (*vṛtti*) of *sphoṭa*, whose duration is not differentiated [but] which is subsequent (*anupātin*) to the time [of the pronunciation] of sounds, by means of the distinction of the limiting factor (*upādhi*) of [the intellect which] grasps [*sphoṭa*] (or 'of the different limiting factors that are [sounds by which *sphoṭa*] is grasped').

First of all, we notice that the word *grahaṇa* "grasping" is used here. So we should change our perspective from the speaker to the hearer. And accordingly, *dhvani* is taken as the sound to be perceived, in total contrast to *nāda* which is the sound to be uttered. Just like the bodily resonances affect *sphoṭa* when the speaker pronounces the word, now the external sounds play the same role: they affect *sphoṭa* when the hearer perceives the word.

Auto-commentary on I.76 (p. 142, ll.1–3):[17]

> In the duration of the fixed (*nitya*) things, there is no function of the capacity of time as assistant. As for all these *sphoṭas*, those we call *varṇasphoṭa*, *padasphoṭa*, and *vākyasphoṭa*, in mundane reality they do have a nature that is tracked by the intellect between two limits, prior and posterior. But [in reality] there is no difference between them as to duration, regardless of how large or small they are. They do not have different durations [themselves]. But when we become aware of them, we falsely attribute to them the duration of our perception of them. Regarding "the time of operation as well as that of one's own" [in the verse]: The primary bodily resonance is that of which form of duration is superimposed, due to the non-distinction [between the *dhvani* and the *sphoṭa*], onto the body of the word, and which is the cause of establishing the worldly cognition/expression regarding the distinction of time of short, long, and prolated vowel. On the other hand, the secondary bodily resonance brings about the respective establishment of external time of conditions such as fast.

Each word exists without the delimitation of time or size. We generally feel that the time required to pronounce *gauḥ* is shorter than that required for *devadattaḥ*, but such a difference of size is not of the word's own form but is caused by the primary sound. The primary, external sound is referred to by the Grammarians as the cause of the manifestation of *sphoṭa*. On the other hand, the secondary sound is the cause of the differences in intonation, pitch, accent, or tempo (= *vṛtti*: any kind of modality). We can readily understand that the physical sound or tone that differentiates a word is considered to be secondary. The modality of the secondary sound is the cause of continuous perception (*prabandhanimitta*), and it ensures the continuity of manifestation of *sphoṭa*. This whole discussion, however, is limited to the side of the hearer. After perceiving the word together with the sound, *sphoṭa* becomes manifest in the hearer's mind. But the perception of the word is inevitably influenced by the external sounds, which have been the bodily resonances on the side of the speaker.

Classification of Bodily Resonances

Bodily resonance is also divided into primary (*prākṛtanāda*) and secondary (*vaikṛtanāda*). And we find that the explanation of these two is almost the same as that of the classification of the external sound:

Auto-commentary on I.101 (p. 166, l.3–p. 167, l.2):[18]

> In the duration of the fixed (*nitya*) things, there is no function of the capacity of time as assistant. As for all these *sphoṭas*, those we call *varṇasphoṭa*, *padasphoṭa*, and *vākyasphoṭa*, in mundane reality they do have a nature that is tracked by the intellect between two limits, prior and posterior. But [in reality] there is no difference between them as to duration, regardless of how large or small they are. They do not have different durations [themselves]. But when we become aware of them, we falsely attribute to them the duration of our perception of them. Regarding "the time of operation as well as that of one's own" [in the verse]: The primary bodily resonance is that of which form of duration is superimposed, due to the non-distinction [between the *dhvani* and the *sphoṭa*], onto the body of the word, and which is the cause of establishing the worldly cognition/expression regarding the distinction of time of short, long, and prolated vowel. On the other hand, the secondary bodily resonance brings about the respective establishment of external time of conditions such as fast.

Now, we encounter the problem that the explanations of these two bodily resonances also refer to the state of perception (*upalabdhi*), and if we take this perception as the hearer's perception, *dhvani* and *nāda* would be identical. Therefore, in order to keep logical consistency, this perception is to be taken as that of the speaker. Maybe taking it in this way works: as the deaf person's speaking difficulties show, some aspect of perception is also required for a speaker.

Here, I propose that we can understand *nāda* ('bodily resonance') as the sound on the side of the speaker, while *dhvani* ('external sound') as that on the side of the hearer. This understanding is different from the last I.47: there *dhvani* is the subtle external sound pervading the ether, while *nāda* is the gross bodily resonance transformed from *dhvani*s. Contrast between *dhvani* and *nāda* is on the one hand 'subtle' and 'gross,' and on the other hand 'the hearer's side' and 'the speaker's side.' But a common feature exists between the two. Namely, *nāda* is always related to the body or pronunciation in the speech-organ, and *dhvani* is related to outside the body or perception of the external world. So Bhartṛhari's usages are consistent, even though he introduces hereafter different opinions about the word and sound, some of which take these concepts differently, which certainly means that such definitions of sounds were controversial even in his times.

Manifestation of Sphoṭa

Another question arises: how do we know *sphoṭa*? Or do we really perceive the aspect of *sphoṭa* in the word? Bhartṛhari thought, I surmise, that 1) such a single, indivisible conception is possible only in our awareness, and that 2) it is to be perceived gradually although its form is single. Thus, Bhartṛhari proposes the schema of the manifestation of *sphoṭa* in such a way that the unanalyzable cognition (*anupākhyeyajñāna*) becomes clearer and clearer:

VP I.83–84 (p. 149, ll.4–5, p. 150, ll.2–3):[19]

> In the same way (just as the memory of a vedic verse or a verse in ordinary speech is strengthened by its repetition), through the unanalyzable cognitions that are in conformity with the grasping [of *sphoṭa*], the [word's] own form is ascertained when the word is manifested by the sounds (*dhvani*). In the intellect into which the seeds are imparted by the bodily resonances (*nāda*) and which has reached maturity through repetition, the word (the word in the mind = *sphoṭa*) is ascertained together with the final sound.

Auto-commentary on I.84 (p. 150, l.4–p.151, l.1):[20]

> [Speaker's side:] The seeds, which are instigations (*bhāvanā*), that are called the latent traces (*saṃskāra*) fit for the clear delineation [of the understanding of the word] are deposited [on the hearer's mind], with ever increasing intensity (*yathottarotkarṣeṇa*) by the bodily resonances (*nāda*) illuminating (*avadyut*) the nature of the word. [Hearer's side:] After that, the particular final sound (*dhvani*) causes the clear image of the word's own form (*śabdasvarūpa*) to enter through assimilation (*upagraha = saha*) into the mind which has attained the full maturity (*paripāka*) of the fitness [for the meaning] through the activation of the function (*vṛttilābha*) of the seeds that are instigations [and] the latent traces produced by the delineation.

Different sounds are first specified by individual efforts of the speaker who intends to pronounce a particular word. The initial sound already manifests the unitary cognition in its entirety. At that point, however, it remains quite unclear as well as ambiguous, and is designated as 'unanalyzable cognition' (*anupākhyeyajñāna*). This in turn generates the impressions (*bhāvanā = saṃskāra*) or the seeds, whereby as subsequent sounds are produced, the unanalyzable cognition is made clearer and clearer. As this process is reiterated, the pronunciation of the final sound produces the cognition that embeds the utterly clear image of the word-form (*śabdasvarūpa*), that is, *sphoṭa*. In this way, the form of *sphoṭa* is gradually made clearer by each impression until it is completely manifested.

Bhartṛhari emphasized the close connection between the speaker and the hearer by using the terms *nāda* and *dhvani*. Sounds are derived from the speaker's utterance. They are transferred from the speaker to the hearer. As soon as the hearer perceives the physical sounds uttered by the speaker, the latent traces arise in his intellect. Bhartṛhari's *sphoṭa* theory therefore focuses on the communication which necessarily consists of both sides.

4   Maṇḍanamiśra's *Sphoṭa* Theory

Now let us move to Maṇḍana's *sphoṭa* theory. After Bhartṛhari's establishment of the theory, *sphoṭa* was strictly criticized by the so-called Varṇavādins, who hold phonemes as the fundamental element of the word. The Varṇavādins in the school of Mīmāṃsā accept phonemes (*varṇa*) as the basic individual units of a word (*śabda*), even though they understand that there is no causal relationship between phonemes and the meaning, because the meaning is not understood at the time of pronunciation of each individual phoneme. That means they have to postulate another entity that conveys the meaning. Therefore, they imagine the latent impression as standing between the

phonemes and the understanding. Against this position, Maṇḍana insists that phonemes cannot be the cause of understanding because they have sequence and cannot co-occur. The phonemes cannot convey the meaning singly, nor can they act together. Therefore, the unified meaning cannot arise from them. In the same manner, he empathetically refutes the view that latent impressions can become the cause of the understanding of meaning, either directly or indirectly.

Though most pages of the SS are devoted to the criticism of the *varṇa* theory, in this paper we do not discuss how Maṇḍana responds to Kumārila's objection. In the middle of the SS, when he proposes the process of the manifestation of *sphoṭa*, Maṇḍana explains it following Bhartṛhari's system. Let us have a look at how it is the same as or different from the VP's statement.

SS v.18 (p. 125, ll.2–3):[21]

> Sounds, which are differentiated according to the different efforts [of articulation], illuminate the [single word] one by one (*pratyekam*) in the sequence of unanalysable cognition (*anupākhyeyajñāna*) and its impressions.

Auto-commentary on v.18 (p. 126, l.1–p. 127, l.1):[22]

> To explain, the efforts [of articulation], whose various forms are being directly perceived through the function of the mind which ascertains the effort that produces (*samutthāpaka*) the word, always discriminate (*vyāvṛt*) sounds, by depending on (*āyatamāna*) [the efforts] themselves, as being based on their intrinsic nature. Therefore, different words do not always appear because they are manifested by certain (fixed) bodily resonances (*nāda*).

The verse says that external sounds (*dhvani*), which are differentiated by the efforts of articulation, manifest the word. And in the auto-commentary it is rephrased as follows: the word is revealed by the certain internal resonances (*nāda*) which have been discriminated from the external sounds (*dhvani*) by means of the efforts of articulation. Maṇḍana interprets the word *vivṛtta* in the VP I.47 as *bhinna* and *vyāvṛtta*. Bhartṛhari rephrased it in his auto-commentary as *vikṛiyā* and *prāptavivarta*, and therefore I took *vivṛtta* as meaning the accumulation and transformation as its consequence. However, Maṇḍana's understanding of the VP I.47 is slightly different from that. The word *vyāvṛt* can have the meaning not so distant from what we understand in *vivṛt*. But by adding the prefix *ā-*, this passage suggests Maṇḍana's own idea on the relation between *dhvani* and *nāda*, that the latter is the effect of *exclusion* from the former. At least, the idea of *transformation* from the subtle external sounds into the gross bodily resonances cannot be found in the auto-commentary.

Maṇḍana continues the auto-commentary on v.18 as follows, which is in turn closely related to the VP I.83:

Auto-commentary on v.18 (p. 129, l.3–p. 132, l.1):[23]

> Nor do other bodily resonances (*itaranāda*) become useless, because of the difference of the manifestation. To explain, to the hearer in whose mind specific latent impressions (*bhāvanā*) have not yet arisen, the preceding sounds (*pūrve dhvanayaḥ*) make manifest the apprehensions (*prakhyā*: undifferentiated perceptions), which grasp the unclear (*avyakta*) form [of the word] and [at the same time] sow the seeds that are the impressions conducive (*anuguṇa*) to the

production of a more vivid (*vyaktatara*) discrimination [of the word's form]. As for the final [sound], it produces the extremely clear (*ativyaktatara*) [final] conception, in which the image of the *sphoṭa* seems to be embedded (*viniviṣṭa*) with full clarity assisted by all the seeds that are the latent impressions activated by the vague perceptions caused by the preceding sounds, just as when an expert in jewels is examining a jewel, its true nature (*tattva*) is not distinctly delineated (*anupākhyāta*) when he first perceives it, but passing through an intellect (*buddhi*) to which specific latent impressions have been imparted by that pre-discursive cognition becomes manifest in his final mind (*cetas*). For otherwise clear (*sphuṭa*) manifestation would be impossible, because there would be no difference [in how it appears] before and after.

The hearer first directly perceives particular physical sounds which are uttered by the speaker. Each physical sound generates an impression in the hearer's mind, which helps the perception of the immediate sound. By means of the latent traces generated in the direct perception, the hearer internalizes those sounds as *sphoṭa*. Here, we can see that the first part of the commentary is talking concisely from the perspective of the speaker about the process of the internalization of the external sounds, and then it changes the perspective to that of the hearer. The SS v.18 is in fact a concise summary of the VP I.47 (*karaṇebhyo vivṛttena dhvaninā*: the speaker's perspective) and I.83 (*pratyayair anupākhyeyair grahaṇānuguṇais*: the hearer's perspective). However, this summary may bring about a danger of misunderstanding *dhvani*. For, as we have seen before, the usages of *dhvani* in I.47 and I.83 are slightly different: the former is the subtle sounds pervading the ether, while the latter is the external sounds perceived by the hearer's sense-organ. And as far as I checked, Maṇḍana gave up adopting the idea of the subtle sounds explained in the auto-commentary on I.47. Indeed, in the SS, we realize that Maṇḍana does not talk in such detail about the perspective of the speaker. He refers to the speaker only as the starting point of the whole process of communication, and also when he criticizes the oneness of the speaker, which is one of the conditions of the understanding of meaning held by the Varṇavādins. His interest focuses on how the hearer perceives the word, and not on how the speaker pronounces the word. And this makes a great deal of sense because "the process of understanding the word" is not relevant to the speaker: he already knows what he wants to say and makes the effort to pronounce it, and therefore for him, the existence of *sphoṭa* is evident.

5   Concluding Remarks: Internalization of Speech

The nature of the word is its conceptual form (*svarūpa*). This form, or *sphoṭa*, is the signifier (word) as well as the signified (referent), and is consistent (*nitya = siddha*) as long as one belongs to a particular language community. And consequently, as long as it is called "the word," it must have meaning. Speech is internalized by the speaker at the time of pronunciation, and is transferred by him to the hearer. Focusing on the former, we see the relation between sound (*nāda*) and the place of articulation. Focusing on the latter, on the other hand, the relation between sound (*dhvani*) and the auditory faculty is seen. Both are different processes but sounds are the same. By carefully seeing the usage of *nāda* and *dhvani*, we can find how Bhartṛhari thought of the process of communication, that is, the circulation of sounds from subtle sound pervading in the ether to the actual sound pronounced by the speaker.

The *sphoṭa* theory is the theory of how the word is perceived and understood by the hearer.

Bhartṛhari did not separate this as one independent theory, and therefore *sphoṭa* was related with many different concepts. The fact that Maṇḍana's *sphoṭa* theory does refer even minimally to *nāda* led scholars to the conclusion that both words are synonymous. But his discussion is certainly on the basis of the VP, and I conclude that Bhartṛhari's usages are still alive in the SS.

Akane Saito, is a post-doctoral fellow (PD) at the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). She is currently working on 'Maṇḍanamiśra and His works: the Brahmasiddhi, Vidhiviveka, and Vibhramaviveka.' Her latest publication is: "The Grammarians' Concept of Śabda in Relation to the Theory of Sphoṭa: Aṣṭādhyāyī 1.2.45 and 1.1.70," *South Asian Classical Studies* 10, (2015): 297-335.

---

1   In the following, the upper case in 'Grammar,' 'Grammarian,' and 'Grammatical' has been used to refer to a Pāṇinian orientation.

2   K. A. Subramania Iyer, "The Doctrine of Sphota," *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* 5, (1947): 121–47; *Sphoṭasiddhi of Maṇḍana Miśra (English Translation)* (Pune: Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute, 1966).

3   Joshi (1967) gives us an overview of the development of the *sphoṭa* theory including an analysis of *sphoṭa* given by Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa in 17 CE. The pre-modern Grammarians including Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa are more focused than Bhartṛhari on the linguistic approach. For example, in discussions of meaningful components, the pre-modern Grammarians maintain that it is not the primitive elements or prototypes (*sthānin*) but their substitutes (*ādeśa*) that should be considered to be the meaning-bearing units, against the position of the Naiyāyikas who insist that it is the other way around. Besides, the later Grammarians have several distinct categories of *sphoṭa* which are exhaustively and minutely classified. It is, in the words of Joshi (*ibid.*: 75, ll.7–13), Pāṇinian analysis proceeding from "bottom-'to'-top," which was actually devalued by Bhartṛhari as a mere postulation. See: ed. S. D. Joshi, *The Sphoṭanirṇaya of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa* (Pune: University of Poona, 1967).

4   John Brough, "Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians," *Transactions of the Philological Society* 50 (1951): 27–46; K. A. Subramania Iyer, "Bhartṛhari on Dhvani," *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 46, no.1/4, (1965): 49–65. Brough (1951: 41 l.21–42, l.14), criticizes the tendency to put some mysterious image on the concept of *sphoṭa*.

5   See the MBh Paspaśāhnika (1880: 1, ll.6–13). ed. F. Kielhorn, *The Vyākaraṇa = Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali*, vol. 1 (Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1880).

6   See the MBh on Vārttika 5 on A 1.1.70 (1880: 181, ll.19–24).

7   A 1.1.68: *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā/* 'A linguistic element's own form (*svaṃ rūpam*) is understood to refer to that element (*śabdasya* [*saṃjñā*] '[name] of a speech unit') itself, not to signify the meaning of the item, unless the element in question is a technical term of grammar (*aśabdasaṃjñā*)' (Cardona 1988: 15, ll.1–6). George Cardona, *Pāṇini: His Work and Its Traditions*, vol. 1, Background and Introduction (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988).

8   See the *Padamañjarī* on A 1.1.68 (1985: 239, ll.5–9). ed. Srīnārāyaṇa Misra, *Kāśikāvṛtti of Jayāditya-Vāmana (Along with Commentaries Vivaraṇapañcikā-Nyāsa of Jinendrabuddhi and*

	Padamañjarī of Haradatta Miśra), vol. 1, Ratnabharati Series 5 (Varanasi: Ratna Publications, 1985).
9	See the auto-commentary on the VP I.23 (1966: 52, l.1–53, l.2). ed. K. A. Subramania Iyer, *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Commentaries Vṛtti and Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva*, vol. 1, Deccan College Monograph Series (Pune: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1966). This idea of equating *śabdasvarūpa* and *śabdākṛti* has been proposed by Akamatsu in his two articles, both of which are annotated Japanese translations of Bhartṛhari's other work *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* I.16.26–18.5. Akamatsu focuses on the permanence of the word and, using also the VP, points out that the word's generic form (*śabdākṛti*) is conceptually equivalent to *śabdajāti* and *śabdasvarūpa*. Akihiko Akamatsu (赤松 明彦), "Is the Word Permanent or Produced? − On MBhD I.16.26–18.5 − (1)," in *Suguroshinjō-hakase Koki-kinen Ronbunshū,* ed. Suguroshinjō-hakase Koki-kinen Ronbunshū Kankō-kai (Tokyo: Sankibo-busshorin, 1996), 157–67; "Is the Word Permanent or Produced? — On MBhD I.16.26–18.5 — (2)," *Annual of Philosophy* 55, (1996): 1–31.
10	The translations in the following are my own provisional translations.
11	*vitarkitaḥ purā buddhyā kvacid arthe niveśitaḥ/ karaṇebhyo vivṛttena dhvaninā so 'nugṛhyate//*
12	The subject here is *budhisthaḥ śabdaḥ* in the previous verse, which means 'the word in the mind,' namely *sphoṭa.*
13	*karaṇebhyo vivṛttena iti/ avikriyādharmakaṃ hi śabdatattvaṃ dhvaniṃ vikriyādharmāṇam anu vikriyate/ tac ca sūkṣme vyāpini dhvanau karaṇavyāpāreṇa pracīyamāne sthūlenābhrasaṃghātavad upalabhyena nādātmanā prāptavivartena tadvivartānukāreṇātyantam avivartamānaṃ vivartamānam iva gṛhyate//*
14	VP I.48: *nādasya kramajanmatvān na pūrvo na paraś ca saḥ/ akramaḥ kramarūpeṇa bhedavān iva jāyate//* 'Since the bodily resonance is produced in sequence, the [word in the mind (=*sphoṭa*)], which is neither before nor after and is [itself] non-sequential, becomes as though differentiated in sequential form.'
15	There are several articles dealing with the classification of the external sounds. See Bronkhorst (1999), Kamimura (1974). In fact, Kamimura interprets *sphoṭa* as the initial sound, as purely physical. And it is also true that Bhartṛhari himself refers to such an idea as one of the alternative opinions. Johannes Bronkhorst, "Studies on Bhartṛhari, 8: Prākṛta Dhvani and the Sāṃkhya Tanmātras," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 27, (1999): 23–33. Katsuhiko Kamimura（上村 勝彦）"The Dhvani Theory and the Sphoṭa Theory," *Eastern Studies* 48, (1974): 1–12.
16	*sphoṭasyābhinnakālasya dhvanikālānupātinaḥ/ grahaṇopādhibhedena vṛttibhedaṃ pracakṣate//*
17	*iha dvividho dhvaniḥ prākṛto vaikṛtaś ca/ tatra prākṛto nāma yena vinā sphoṭarūpam anabhivyaktaṃ na paricchidyate/ vaikṛtas tu yenābhivyaktaṃ sphoṭarūpaṃ punaḥ punar avicchedena pracitataraṃ kālam upalabhyate/*
18	*nityānāṃ hi sthitau sahakāriṇyāḥ kālaśakter vyāpāro na vidyate/ loke vyavahāreṇa tu buddhyā* (emended from *buddhayā*) *pūrvāntāparāntayor anugamyamānātmatattvāḥ sthitiṃ prati na bhidyante sarva eva pracitāpacitarūpā varṇapadavākyākhyāḥ sphoṭāḥ/ upalabdhiviṣayatāpattau tu teṣām abhinnakālānām upalabdhisthityabhimānaḥ/ vṛttikālaḥ svakālaś ceti/ nādo hi prākṛtaḥ śabdātmani pratyasyamānasthitirūpo bhedasyāgrahaṇāt* (emended from *-āgrahaṇārtham*) *hrasvadīrghaplutakālabhedavyavahāravyavasthāhetuḥ/ vaikṛtas tu nādo*

<table>
<tr><td></td><td>

bāhyadrutādivṛttikālavyavasthāṃ prakalpayati//

</td></tr>
<tr><td>19</td><td>

pratyayair anupākhyeyair grahaṇānuguṇais tathā/ dhvaniprakāśite śabde svarūpam avadhāryate// nādair āhitabījāyām antyena dhvaninā saha/ āvṛttaparipākāyāṃ buddhau śabdo 'vadhāryate//

</td></tr>
<tr><td>20</td><td>

nādaiḥ   śabdātmānam   avadyotayadbhir   yathottarotkarṣeṇādhīyante vyaktaparicchedānuguṇasaṃskārabhāvanābījāni/   tataś   cāntyo   dhvaniviśeṣaḥ paricchedasaṃskārabhāvanābījavṛttilābhaprāptayogyatāparipākāyāṃ   buddhāv   upagraheṇa śabdasvarūpākāraṃ saṃniveśayati//

</td></tr>
<tr><td>21</td><td>

ed. S. K. Rāmanātha Śastrī, *The Sphoṭasiddhi of Ācārya Maṇḍanamiśra with the Gopālikā of Ṛṣiputra Parameśvara*, Madras University Sanskrit Series, No. 6 (Madras: University of Madras, 1931).

prayatnabhedato bhinnā dhvanayo 'sya prakāśakāḥ/ pratyekam anupākhyeyajñānatadbhāvanākramāt//

</td></tr>
<tr><td>22</td><td>

tathā hi – sarvatra śabdasamutthāpakaprayatnanirūpaṇacittavṛttyādhyakṣam upalabhyamānarūpabhedāḥ prayatnāḥ svātmany āyatamānāḥ svabhāvahetutayā (emended from *svabhāvabhedahetutayā*) *dhvanīn vyāvartayanti, tato niyatanādanibandhanopavyañjanāḥ na sarvatra śabdabhedāḥ prakāśante/* There are numerous interpretations given in the sub-commentary with regard to the words *svātmany āyatamānāḥ svabhāvahetutayā*; but in this paper I translate only in one way.

</td></tr>
<tr><td>23</td><td>

na cetaranādavaiyarthyam, abhivyaktibhedāt/ tathā hi – pūrve dhvanayo 'nupajātabhāvanāviśeṣamanasaḥ pratipattur avyaktarūpopagrāhiṇīr vyaktataraparicchedotpādānuguṇabhāvanābījavāpinīḥ (*vyaktatara-* is emended from *uttaravyakta-*) *prakhyāḥ prādurbhāvayanti, paścimas tu purastanadhvaninibandhanāvyaktaparicchedaprabhāvitasakalabhāvanābījasahakāri sphuṭataraviniviṣṭasphoṭabimbam iva pratyayam ativyaktataram udbhāvayati* (emended from *udbhāvayanti*), *yathā ratnaparīkṣiṇaḥ parīkṣamāṇasya prathamasamadhigamānupākhyātam anupākhyeyarūpapratyayopāhitasaṃskāraviśeṣāyāṃ* (*-pratyayopāhitasaṃskāraviśeṣāyāṃ* is emended from *-pratyayopāhitasaṃskārarūpāhitaviśeṣāyāṃ*) *buddhau krameṇa carame cetasi cakāsti ratnatattvam/ na hy anyathā sphuṭaprakāśa upapadyate pura iva paścād api viśeṣābhāvāt/*

</td></tr>
</table>