Mabogo Percy More's Concept of the Problem of the Oppressed-Oppressor and Intraracial Sexism[1]

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South African philosopher Mabogo Percy More has devoted more than four decades of his work to the problem of "being-black-in-an-antiblack-world." This article interrogates the extent to which More homogenizes the contingencies of black[2] existence and black embodiment, as I feel black existentialists do; or subsumes the phenomenology of the lived experience of blackness under a "black universalist" account that does not give an adequate account of the gendered embodied experiences with antiblack racism. By "contingency" I mean More's concept of the contingency of existence, where he claims that human existence is without necessity, nor is it justified; and so people resort to attempting to justify their existence and to find meaning by trying to assume the status of God or superiority in relation to others. More argues that contingency is the source of antiblack racism, as white people attempt to justify their existence by dehumanizing black people. I claim that contingency does not only play out in the interracial domain, but is also one of the sources of intraracial sexism within the black community. My interrogation aims to extend the reach of More's work by giving an existential-phenomenological account of "being-black-and-female-in-an-antiblack-antifemale-world." To this end, I focus on two contingencies—the contingencies of biological sex and the contingency of physical strength—that More discusses in his sole article on intraracial sexism, "Black Attitudes: A Call for Personhood" (1981). I argue that within the black intraracial domain, these two contingencies are ascribed meaning that creates a binary, which elevates black men to superior status, while reducing black women to the inferior.

Key words: intraracial sexism; antiblack racism; antiblack sexism; South African apartheid; existential phenomenology; masculinities; Mabogo Percy More

1   Introduction

Mabogo Percy More's work grapples with the problem of "_being-black-in-an-antiblack-world_" (More 2017: 43, 2019: 111, 2021: 264).[3] More's theorizing lies at the convergence of Africana Existential Philosophy, Continental European Existentialism, Black Existentialism and Black Consciousness philosophy. My study interrogates a prevalent problem in the primary canon of the existential traditions within which More's work is situated—the paucity of discourse on female embodiment and gendered existence, particularly black female existential-phenomenology and embodiment. In his book _Sartre on Contingency: Antiblack Racism and Embodiment_ (2021: 61-88), More explicitly lays out Jean-Paul

Sartre's phenomenological ontology and distinguishes it from the other existentialists based on its utility for theorizing and conceptualizing antiblack racism. More advocates this approach by stating that "if phenomenology's main concern qua philosophy of lived experience (*le vacue*) deals with issues of immediacy, consciousness, environment, and embodiment, then existential phenomenology is a useful perspective from which to examine the phenomenon of race and the problem of racism" (More 2021: 62). I aim to demonstrate that the same methodology can be employed with respect to antiblack-racist sexism and intraracial sexism in the black community. In terms of how I utilize the term "contingency," I adopt and cite More's definition and explanation of the term as follows:

> If existence is contingent, then human existence is equally contingent. But the reality of human existence is that it is an embodied consciousness, "consciousness in the flesh." It is by being bodily or incarnated that consciousness is thrown in and situated in the world. Without bodily being, human existence is impossible […]. What then is the relation between this ontological fact of double contingency and the existential problematic of antiblack racism? From the fact of our contingency I then establish […] the relation between the Sartrean ontological perspective of double contingency and racism by advancing the claim that racism originates from the category of double contingency. At the realm of existence, racism is one of the many responses we adopt in the face of the contingency of our existence, the meaninglessness of our lives. Faced with the fact that our existence is without foundation, absolutely unjustified, lacking in unconditional necessity and gripped by the experience of nausea, we then, in various ways of bad faith, seek to be our own foundation, to have our existence justified and to exist by right such that we assume the status of God (More 2021: 260-61).

Contingency plays out in a number of ways, due to being-in-the-world as an embodied consciousness. First, because of the spatial relation between my body and that of the Other, it is contingent that I should be in a particular body and that the body be here. Secondly, consciousness must be consciousness of necessity, in the flesh in a particular situation. Thirdly, that I should be in this particular body, as embodied consciousness, is contingent. However, what is not contingent is that I should be an embodied consciousness. A double contingency is introduced here: the contingency of existence and the contingency of the body (More 2021: 108). This is how More forges a relation between this ontological fact of double contingency and the existential problematic of racism.

In terms of how contingency of existence informs antiblack racism, More explains that, according to Lewis R. Gordon, racism is a consequence of the fact of contingency. One race attempts to justify its necessity by presuming its superiority above other races. Furthermore, the purported superior race considers itself to be in closer proximity to godliness (being-in-itself) and in this way they become "human gods" who require the other races to justify their existence (Gordon 1995: 383 in More 2021: 121).

More finds it imperative to clarify the term "contingency" by distinguishing its ordinary usage from the Sartrean sense. He offers the examples of terms such as "contingency plans" and "contingency measures" that usually apply to emergency interventions and explains that in philosophy, contingency means something else. For example, in logic and analytical philosophy it refers to the distinction between contingent statements that are considered to be true, factual or empirical, whereas necessary statements are *a priori* or true because of their very form. However, his concern is with ontological and metaphysical interpretations of contingency (More 2021: 90). I also define the concept of contingency,

or the contingent, according to Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* (1956)[4], and quote him at length in order to establish how he situates it within the history and context of enquiries into the notion of Being:[5]

> Being apprehends itself as not being its own foundation, and this apprehension is at the basis of every cogito. In this connection it is to be noted that it reveals itself immediately to the reflective cogito of Descartes. When Descartes wants to profit from this revelation, he apprehends himself as an imperfect being "since he doubts." But in this imperfect being, he establishes the presence of the idea of perfection. He apprehends then a cleavage between the type of being which he can conceive and the being which he is. It is this cleavage or lack of being which is at the origin of the second proof of the existence of God. In fact if we get rid of the scholastic terminology, what remains of this proof? The very clear indication that the being which possesses in itself the idea of perfection [cannot] be its own foundation, for if it were, it would have produced itself in conformance with that idea. In other words, a being which would be its own foundation could not suffer the slightest discrepancy between what it is and what it conceives, for it would produce itself in conformance with its comprehension of being and could conceive only of what it is. But this apprehension of being as a lack of being in the face of being is first a comprehension on the part of the cogito of its own contingency. I think, therefore I am. What am I? A being which is not its own foundation, which qua being, could be other than it is to the extent that it does not account for its being. This is that first intuition of our own contingency which Heidegger gives as the first motivation for the passage from the un-authentic to the authentic (Sartre 1956: 79-80).

The salient points that I draw out from Sartre's definition of contingency are that it is distinct from Descartes' famous cogito declaration (I think therefore I am) and that the implication is that Being is also plagued by doubt. Sartre reaches the conclusion that Being cannot be its own foundation because there is a cleavage between perfect Being and actual Being, and this lack is the result of the contingency of Being. What is significant for my study in this definition is this deduction that Sartre makes: "A being which is not its own foundation, which qua being, could be other than it is to the extent that it does not account for its [Being]" (Sartre 1956: 80). This is the most important aspect of the concept of contingency for my purposes because in the lack captured by the notion of contingency lies the possibilities for making meaning of existence. More offers another definition of contingency that issues from the context of Sartre's that I have cited above. He elaborates that:

> [W]hat is contingent happens to be the case but could have been otherwise. In a somewhat different sense, contingency includes the chance happening or the accidental. What happens by chance or is accidental is that which is but could have been otherwise. The contingent, therefore, lacks necessity, justification, or rational or logical explanation because whatever we are is not always what we have to be. However, in the face of such contingency—in the face of our incompleteness, our unjustifiability—we seek fulfilment, completeness, necessity or justification. We thus desire to be as complete as God is omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient and self-justifying. This desire constitutes human reality as the desire to be God, which Sartre calls the 'original project' (More 2017: 263).

From the above quote, it is clear that More thinks that the nature of contingency is that what happens is accidental or per chance. Additionally, in the foreword of More's book, *Sartre on Contingency: Antiblack Racism and Embodiment* (2021), T Storm Heter, LaRose T. Parris, and Devin Zane Shaw explain that

More gives weight to historical situation, as he draws out lessons about the human condition, what Sartre calls a "concrete universal," through his conceptualization of contingency and antiblack racism (More 2021: x).

More argues that contingency is the source of antiblack racism, as white people attempt to justify their existence by dehumanizing black people. By the term "source," I mean the origins or cause of the problem, which is effectively the bad faith that is at the root of the phenomenon. I employ More's conception of it as follows: "I contend that Sartre's ontological theory of contingency functions as a source of antiblack racism which in its manifold manifestations requires the assumption of bad faith as an escape mechanism" (More 2021: 44). In turn, "bad faith," according to More arises when humans are faced with the double contingency of existence and contingency of the body—the fact that their existence is neither necessary, nor justified (More 2021: 260). This realization causes an existential crisis as the individual is confronted with a sense of meaninglessness and scrambles to find some sense of meaning. This desperation results in them conceptualizing myths, ideas and theories that can somehow justify their existence. So, More argues that white supremacy arises from such a crisis where white people compare themselves to black people and conclude that they have a right to exist, while the Black "Other" does not (More 2021: 260).

I claim that contingency does not only play out in the interracial domain, but is also one of the sources of intraracial sexism within the black community. My interrogation is linked to More's focus on being-black-in-an-antiblack-world; however, my article aims to extend the reach of his work by giving an existential-phenomenological account of "being-black-and-female-in-an-antiblack-antifemale-world." To this end, I focus on two contingencies—the contingencies of biological sex and physical strength—that More discusses in his sole article on intraracial sexism, "Black Attitudes: A Call for Personhood" (1981). I argue that within the black intraracial domain, these two contingencies are ascribed meanings that create a binary that attributes superior status to black men, while inferiorizing black women. These contingencies are relevant to intraracial sexism because they help to explain why black people who protest against dehumanization and discrimination against them by white people, can still end up discriminating against others within their own race. More's and my focus is on discrimination of black people by white people because of the prevalence of this form of antiblack racism globally, which has produced a Manichean world. More cites Fanon to explain the mechanics of this world:

> In short, the apartheid world is a Manichean world, 'a motionless Manicheaistic world' of the good white person and the evil black person, in which 'the native is hemmed in' (1968: 51, 52). Apartheid then, for Fanon, is to be understood as 'simply one form of the division into compartments of the colonial world' (1968: 52), a paradigmatic case of the logic of colonial antagonism, an existential prohibition fixed in space, coercive segregation and a relation of social closure (More 2017: 31).

My contribution to the discourse offers a more comprehensive account of the mechanisms of antiblack racism that is gendered and demonstrates that even among themselves, black people experience intense conflict due to their search for meaning and justification. The reason I find that More's account has to be supplemented, is because he has published only one article on intraracial sexism within the context of antiblack racism, so far. I agree with much of his account of "being-black-in-an-antiblack-world"; however, I find that an additional account of "being-black-and-female-in-an-antiblack-antifemale-world" would address the gendered dimensions of antiblack racism.

To conduct my critique of More's work, firstly, I will draw from Simone de Beauvoir and her seminal book *The Second Sex* (2009 [1949])[6] on female existence, embodiment and phenomenology, pertaining to differences in biological attributes and physical strength between females and males. More himself cites her repeatedly throughout his work and according to his memoirs, he has taught several feminism courses focusing on the text (More 2019: 99). In addition, I employ the black feminist theoretical framework advanced by Kathryn Sophia Belle (formerly Kathryn Gines), when she advocates for a Black Feminist Philosophy. I engage her critiques from her book chapter, "Sartre, Beauvoir, and the Race/Gender Analogy: A Case for Black Feminist Philosophy" (2010)[7]; her article "Comparative and Competing Frameworks of Oppression in Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*" (2014)[8]; and her response in "Commentaries on Kathryn T. Gines 'Comparative and Competing Frameworks of Oppression in Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*'" (2016)[9].

Belle insists, in this respect that, "[t]he discipline of philosophy leaves much to be desired when it comes to black feminism" (Gines 2010: 35). Her contention is that white feminism is making strides to be included in Continental philosophy towards cultivating a feminist philosophy, and that black male philosophers are also leaving an imprint on Continental philosophy while engaging in critical philosophy of race (Gines 2010: 35). However, the latter do so while excluding the (black) woman question and as such, there is a gap left where a "critical" philosophy of black feminism is required (Gines 2010: 35). Specifically, she finds that there is a "conspicuous lack of a black feminist account of the intersectionality of race and gender in what I call the 'race/gender analogy'" employed by some existentialists such as Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre (Gines 2010: 35). According to Belle, the race/gender analogy uses racial oppression as an analogy for gender oppression, but it has two main shortcomings (Gines 2010: 36). Firstly, she argues that "it usually emphasizes black men and white women while ignoring the situation of women of color" and it "often codes race as black man and gender as white woman" (Gines 2010: 36). The second shortcoming is that the analogy is "frequently exploited to support members of groups and their causes even when those groups are often themselves participating in or complicit with some form of antiblack racism" (Gines 2010: 36). This is the rationale for my enquiry into intraracial sexism, where I argue that black men are at times also complicit in the discrimination and oppression of black women. In light of Belle's objections to the use of the analogy in (black) existentialism, she proposes that a more "theoretically nuanced articulation of black women's intersectionality" should be offered (Gines 2010: 46). This approach would address the problem of "framing racial oppression as exclusively male or gender oppression as primarily white," because "a black feminist analysis would have introduced the drawbacks and advantages of race and gender intersectionality into their philosophical frameworks" (Gines 2010: 44). While I adopt Belle's (Gines's) intersectionality framework, in my study I address not only the intersection of race and gender, but also the lived experience of black females in the context of South Africa.

To center this experience, I draw on the works of South African feminist, Pumla Dineo Gqola, in order to engage More in a context-specific discussion of intraracial sexism. Whereas Gqola works as a professor of literature, her work is philosophical in its engagement with ontology, embodiment and lived experience, as well as the political implications that ensue from these themes. I focus on Gqola's books *Rape: A South African Nightmare* (2015)[10], and *Female Fear Factory* (2021).[11] In addition, she is a scholar of Black Consciousness[12] literature, political theory and philosophy, which is where her work and More's converge. More also acknowledges Gqola's book *Reflecting Rogue: Inside the Mind of a Feminist*

(2017)[13], as one of the texts that helped him to reconfigure his identity as a black philosopher (More 2019: xi).

Furthermore, I engage possible objections to my account of the existential-phenomenology of black female difference and the problem of "being-black-and-female-in-an-antiblack-antifemale-world," by outlining arguments pertaining to "being-black-and-*male*-in-an-antiblack-antimale-world." To this end, I focus on the critiques of African American philosopher, Tommy J. Curry in his book, *The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood* (2017)[14], where I attempt to initiate productive dialogue between black feminism and Black Male Studies (which Curry distinguishes from Black Masculinity Studies). I also engage South African psychologist and black masculinities scholar, Kopano Ratele, from his books *Why Men Hurt Women and Other Reflections on Love, Violence and Masculinity* (2022)[15] and *Liberating Masculinities* (2016).[16] He is also a scholar of Black Consciousness philosophy, theory and activism.

Given Belle's call for an intersectional[17] framework towards developing a black feminist philosophy, I heed this call in my methodology. Belle's approach points us towards numerous texts written by black feminist scholars over the past few decades[18], that "offer insights and resources that should be drawn upon in the expansion of the philosophy canon and the development of a black feminist philosophy" (Gines 2010: 46-7). The black feminism canon includes the works of Kimberlé Crenshaw, Patricia Hill Collins, bell hooks, among many others. The most influential export of African-American feminism is the theory of "intersectionality," a term that was coined by Crenshaw and has since been appropriated and re-interpreted by women worldwide who identify as black feminists, and has also been widely used in social and political theory and science. In her highly cited work "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color" (1991) [19] Crenshaw sets out the theory as follows:

> In an earlier article, I used the concept of intersectionality to denote the various ways in which race and gender interact to shape the multiple dimensions of Black women's employment experiences [Crenshaw 1989: 139]. My objective there was to illustrate that many of the experiences Black women face are not subsumed within the traditional boundaries of race or gender discrimination as these boundaries are currently understood, and that the intersection of racism and sexism factors into Black women's lives in ways that cannot be captured wholly by looking at the women, race or gender dimensions of those experiences separately (Crenshaw 1991: 2).

However, I will draw my methodological resources, in terms of intersectionality, predominantly from the works of Gqola, because my focus is on the South African context. As such, my analysis of black females[20] will explore their intersectional lived experience to arrive at an existential-phenomenological account of their difference from black males. So, while More draws his methodology substantially from Sartre's phenomenological ontology, I follow Belle's approach as I extend the reach of More's work into the domain of antiblack-racist sexism and intraracial sexism.

The debate on homogenization of lived experience of black people within the phenomenological approach is vast, so in the interests of delineating the scope of my study, my interest is in the lived experiences of black people in an "antiblack racist world," particularly in South Africa. However, I draw from African Americans, Belle and Curry, who originate from the United States because More

argues that both South Africa and the USA are "antiblack worlds," meaning that there are some commonalities between the two countries and contexts. More explains his conception of an "antiblack world" as follows: "I am born a black man in an antiblack apartheid society and thus find my existence, by virtue of my identity or blackness, plagued by constraints, restrictions, and a host of apartheid legal machinery" (More 2019: 53). In the context of South Africa, he is arguing here that the political, social, and economic system of apartheid that promulgated a racial hierarchy, white supremacy, and antiblack racism was (and still is) to the detriment of black people. Furthermore, the exposure he gained while studying in the USA caused him to conclude that the USA is also an antiblack world. Of his experiences in both countries, he says: "In such a world, I, for example, as a black philosopher, primordially and for the most part, perceive the world and the world perceives me through the contingent fact and historical narrative of my skin color: my blackness" (More 2019: 109). Thus the *politics of Being* that More grapples with, take place in geo-political spaces that evidence pervasive antiblack racism.

The common thread running through More's work is the pervasive problem of antiblack racism and its connection to embodiment. This problem is an ontological problematic in his view because it is about how "Being," as a theme of the field of ontology is defined and understood. He declares in his article titled "Black Consciousness Movement's Ontology: The Politics of Being": "My contention here is that the interest in the concept of 'being' shown by Black Consciousness adherents was born not only of struggle, but also of the politics of 'being,' that is, the politics of Black being in an antiblack world" (More 2012: 24).[21] In More's concept of the *politics of Being*, he makes the theoretical connection between two categories of philosophy that many scholars, particularly in the analytical tradition, argue should be separated—ontology and ethics, or ontology and politics (More 2017: 77-8). He frames this as the logical question of the "is-ought gap," also known as the fact/value problem, popularized by David Hume, which questions whether it is permissible to deduce value conclusions or imperatives from purely factual premises and thus formulate ethical precepts. This is a vast debate that cannot be fully accommodated in this article; however, I approach it from More's position. He argues that Africana and Black Consciousness philosophy do not accept "Hume's guillotine" because what logically "is" can lead to what politically "ought to be." For example, this means that once Black Consciousness adherents find that their being is diminished, where they are dehumanized in the ontological realm, they necessarily politicize this problem and through political advocacy seek redress. This is how ontology and politics become linked. This is significant because leaving everything as is, will maintain an unfavorable status quo for black people in an antiblack world. For example, in apartheid South Africa, black people were considered sub-human and outside the realm of ethical consideration. Therefore, they were segregated and relegated to homelands to prevent them from integrating with white people and those who were employed in urban cities had to carry passes, otherwise they were arrested and deported to homelands. All this transpired in their native land where they could occupy only thirteen percent of it, and this is how South Africa became a Manichean world.

Nompumelelo Zinhle Manzini, in her review article, "Memoirs of a Black (Male) South African Philosopher" (2020)[22] offers a criticism of More's memoirs aimed at making a black feminist intervention. She notes More's failure to engage the "gender question" and the lived experiences of black women with antiblack racism and apartheid in South Africa. Manzini's fundamental concern is that his book *Looking through Philosophy in Black* (2019), is intended to give an account of how black South African philosophers navigated the discipline during and post-apartheid, and to share the unique challenges they faced. However, in doing so, it seems to either erase or ignore black African female

experiences. She criticizes More based on a single piece of work, but when one reads the rest of his work (More 1981, 2017, 2019, 2021) it becomes apparent that More is not completely silent on the "woman question." It is significant to highlight that More has not been altogether silent on this question, within the context of the black community. In fact, early in his career, he wrote a solitary article (1981) on intraracial sexism, where he criticizes black men for their "hypocritical" demand for freedom from white supremacy and racism, while they continue to practice male supremacy and sexism against black women. He attributes this phenomenon to the problem of a "detotalised-totality-detotalising," or in other words, the "problem of the oppressed-oppressor" (More 1981: 20). He argues that the foundation of such male supremacy is the questionable assumption of *male biological or physical superiority*, which is generalized to also include *mental and emotional strength* (More 1981: 20). The questionable assumptions that More mentions pertain to the meanings that are given to contingencies, in particular, the contingencies of biological sex and physical strength. Here, it is assumed that males are superior to females and thus, women have to submit and be subordinated to men.

More's solo article (1981) on intraracial sexism provides me with critical purchase to bridge his comprehensive framework on *antiblack racism* with my interest in *intraracial sexism*. More poses two questions in the article that are pertinent to black female existence and embodiment, and that also provide the rationale for me to undertake the topic of the current study. So, the following questions in the article (More 1981), and the brief answers he offers for them, provide me with a departure for my discursive study:

    1   How are Black women conceived of in our culture—especially by black males? A: Black men conceive of Black women as inferior purely on biological reasons of physical strength and weakness (More 1981: 20).

    2   What conception do Black women in turn have of themselves? A: Black women cannot be absolved from blame because they display an attitude that denies their moral, social and intellectual equality with men (More 1981: 21).

In combination, these questions deal with both the ontological and political dimensions of black female existence and lived experience. Despite showing that More does indeed give attention to these dimensions of black female existence (*contra* Manzini 2020), I argue that More provides an inadequate theoretical account of the sources and consequences of the problem of black male supremacy, not only in the article, but in the rest of his work too. As a result, I aim to pick up from where he left off four decades ago, by drawing from his work and supplementing it with critiques from relevant and appropriate feminist literature. In the rest of his work, he tends to address it mostly when he employs a race-sex or race-gender analogy of oppression, as articulated by Belle (2010). So, he does not engage the lived experience of black women in detail and simply mentions the correlations between racial and sexist discrimination. I intend to offer a more comprehensive account of *being-black-and-female-in-an-antiblack-antifemale-world*. In light of this gap that I have identified in More's work, my article also aims to extend the reach of his work by giving an existential-phenomenological account of the lived experience of black women under antiblack racism and intraracial sexism. In the first section, I define and discuss the concept of the "oppressed-oppressor" according to More and the other theorists I mentioned above. In the second section on the contingency of biological sex I discuss the first part of my hyphenated phrase "being-black-and-female." The third section on the contingency of physical strength is devoted to the latter part of the phrase—"in-an-antiblack-antifemale-world."

2   The Problem of the Oppressed-Oppressor

The main link between More's work and my study is the theme of embodiment, based on his argument that both racism and sexism are predicated on "bodily-being-in-the-world" (More 2021: 193). He argues further that from an existential-phenomenological point of view, sexism and racism present the same kind of problem, which is the problem of the binary that claims some people are superior and others are inferior, except that racial groups can exist independently of one another and survive, whereas females and males cannot. More argues that one of the drivers of racism is the naturalist argument which de Beauvoir and Gqola name the "biology is destiny" argument,[23] in the case of the subordination of females (More 2012: 27). However, he recognizes that whereas racism may be rooted in the hatred of the Other and in the belief that they are sub-human or animal, de Beauvoir argues that males nonetheless consider females as the eternal human "Other"—as their mother, sister, wife, daughter, and so forth (More 2012: 27). Thus, I explore the paradox of this biological bond between the sexes that engenders both mutual interdependence and alienating conflict.

In the previously mentioned paper from early in his career, (1981), More discusses the phenomenon of the problem of a "detotalised-totality-detotalising," or in other words, the "problem of the oppressed-oppressor" (More 1981: 20). Put another way, he explores what he refers to as the "ridiculous inconsistency" of a paradox that arises when a person who is discriminated against, resists discrimination towards them, but then indulges in discrimination (More 1981: 20). He refers to this as *internal discrimination* among black people, which I refer to as *intraracial sexism*. Specifically, he explores this paradigm among black educated men who display this attitude or behavior towards black women, which is passed on from generation to generation. According to More, it manifests as common sensical or a conventional understanding of gender roles where, on the one hand, women are assigned domestic functions such as bearing and rearing children, cooking for their families, and other important, but devalued tasks, while men are allocated responsibilities in public life and national affairs. This supposed "common-sense" approach is, according to More, deeply embedded in cultural values (he is referring specifically to those of South Africans), despite being based on fallacies.

The overarching fallacy that More identifies is that the black man conceives of himself as more superior than the black woman "founded on the doubtful and questionable assumption of male biological or physical superiority," which is "generalised to include even mental and emotional strength" (More 1981: 20). He argues that what is questionable about these assumptions—biological and physical superiority—is that not all men are stronger than all women, notwithstanding that some men are physically stronger than some women (More 1981: 20). Here More is emphasizing the deduction that the contingencies of biological and physical strength imply male superiority is actually a questionable assumption. In other words, the contingency is true but the deduction of superiority is questionable.

The first question that More asks in the article is, how are black women perceived by black men in the context of South African culture. His argues that black men perceive black women as inferior based on the contingencies of biological and physical strength and weakness. This distinction between

physical strength and weakness further leads to the assumption that the physically stronger are thus superior. He goes on to argue that Black men are guilty of committing the fallacy of hasty generalization (More 1981: 20). In discussing the consequences of this position, he argues that language betrays underlying male attitudes about females, for example when pet names used by men for women allude to the status of animals ("chick," "bitch" and so forth), or to playthings ("doll"), or to immature beings ("baby") (More 1981: 20). The insinuations embedded in these words are that women are animalistic and like chicks they go on to becoming hens who lay eggs (reproduction); also, women are mindless objects (dolls), demonstrating no intelligence or independence (More 1981: 20-1). This practice reflects an attitude of intellectual superiority among men. More argues that this is yet another fallacy because some women have demonstrated intellectual superiority to many men. However, male supremacists usually dismiss this evidence as an exception to the rule because it threatens their male egos and more significantly, it questions their beliefs and premises. In this respect, More asserts that:

> Criticism, instead of being an invitation to self-examination and growth, becomes a simple threat—a threat to habit and cultural values. The reaction is to discount criticism and cling to the 'finality' of one's present being (More 1981: 21).

As such, when black men cling to this purported superiority, they ignore evidence that black women are in fact not inferior and this evidences a sexist, paternalistic attitude towards black women. The thrust of More's thesis on the prevalence of internal discrimination among the genders[24] in the black community, which I refer to as intraracial sexism, is captured by the following three questions that he poses:

> Does it make sense for Black men to demand equality and the removal of discriminatory laws when they practice discrimination themselves? Would it not constitute the grossest contradiction that I should want to capture freedom and deny it at the same time? Is freedom from oppression good for some and bad for others? (More 1981: 21).

The importance of these questions is located in More's subsequent argument about contingency. He asserts that:

> [M]ale sex discrimination is basically a denial of this capacity, of a woman's inalienable right to be a human being, a person, simply because of a contingency, her sex. Similarly, racism is a denial of a person's right to be a human being simply because of a contingency—the colour of *his* skin. In short, *sexism and racism are evil precisely because they are based on biological contingencies* (More 1981: 21, emphasis added).

Essentially, More criticizes black men for their "hypocritical" demand for freedom from white supremacy and racism, while they continue to practice male supremacy and sexism against black women. For him, it is grossly irrational for black men to, on the one hand, demand freedom, while on the other, to have a disrespect for freedom. The freedom that should be conferred to both black men and women requires that they be "conceived as independent, autonomous, rational and moral human beings" (More 1981: 21). These four characteristics, in More's view, constitute personhood. What is interesting in the passage above is that when More speaks about the contingency of sex he uses the feminine pronoun and when he speaks about the contingency of skin color (race), he uses the

masculine pronoun. This seems to demonstrate the norm of using the masculine to represent all genders when referring to antiblack racism, which can be problematic. It is for this reason that it is imperative to retrieve the female/woman in discourse about race—otherwise it is only the male experience that will be documented. Also, More's use of the feminine when speaking about male sex discrimination (sexism) implies that sexism is only experienced by females, which is also problematic, as I will demonstrate later in my discussion of Ratele's and Curry's counterarguments.

More declares that space constraints do not allow him to offer a detailed analysis of the second question: "What conception do black women in turn have of themselves?" (More 1981: 20). Briefly, he argues that women are also complicit in their discrimination because they tend to deny their social, intellectual and moral equality with men. He ends the article by conveying to black women that a submissive attitude encourages exploitation and spreads misery, and this requires them to stand up for their rights. Ironically, the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), led by Steve Biko that More highlights as a pre-eminent vehicle for fighting antiblack racism was also accused of perpetuating female submissiveness by the women in its leadership, according to Gqola. She challenges the subordination and exclusion of women by the BCM and by extension black masculine liberatory praxis due to patriarchy, sexism and hypermasculinity (Gqola 2001).[25] She explains that the majority of the women in the Black Consciousness Movement occupied the required submissive and nurturing roles, which undermined the struggle of black women (Gqola 2001: 147). The overarching problem with the Black Consciousness Movement, says Gqola is that it represents a "Black male consciousness" that does not accommodate the voice of Black women (Gqola 2001: 142). The consequence is that black women are subordinated to black male terms, they are alienated from the Black Consciousness discourse and their experiences are not politicized. As such, black women are excluded from naming and describing their particular sites of oppression (Gqola 2001: 147).

In my study, I engage both More's questions in more detail to distinguish between his account of antiblack racism and mine of antiblack-racist sexism. From the above discussion it might appear that More does not criticize assumptions that persons who are physically or psychologically stronger are superior, but instead criticizes the induction or hasty generalization that men are superior to women, even though some women are physically and psychologically stronger than some men. This could raise the question: Why aren't physical and psychological strength also contingent characteristics of personhood? For example, in a gender inclusive society, where there is no binary distinction between males and females, where the physically and psychologically strong dominate the physically and psychologically weak, could this society also be "evil?" Even though this argument has merit, More speaks about "culture," which feminists engage as the concept of socialization that entrenches the male-superiority-female-inferiority binary. As such, the contingencies of biological and physical strength on their own have no meaning, but in the context of culture and socialization, the fact that males are generally stronger than females has led to the assumption that the former are actually superior.

Regarding a black-masculinities intervention in defining the problem of the oppressed-oppressor, South African psychologist, Kopano Ratele one of the few male scholars in South Africa who advocates feminist theory, asks two questions in his book *Why Men Hurt Women and Other Reflections on Love, Violence and Masculinity* (2022), that directly correlate with my enquiry into the problems of the oppressed-oppressor and internal discrimination in the black community:

> Why, I would later wonder—as I have done so many times—do forms of domination persist within spaces precisely aimed at challenging domination? and, Why is there sexism in the very struggle against colonial, patriarchal oppression? Why is there violence among those who have been violated? (Ratele 2022: 110)

These questions bring white supremacy and black male supremacy under the same lens through the analytical tool of domination.[26] More refers to domination by black men against black women as internal discrimination, which is more an attitude than a pattern of behavior. Whereas Gqola focuses on the manifest and systemic behavior of domination that ensues from the attitude. I quote Ratele at length below as he examines this phenomenon:

> I have been inclined to believe, wrongly as it turns out, that it should be evident to most victims of white racism that sexism is not a remedy for racism but rather its kin. I have also wanted to believe that individual men who injure women and other men would realise that they are not contributing toward overcoming the capitalist, racist and gendered humiliation they have suffered at the hands of exploitative, supremacist and patriarchal structures. The assumption that those who have been hurt are supposed to comprehend the effects of violence, and thus should almost instinctively recoil from violating others, is what creates disappointment when we cannot help men swiftly transform their gender practices. A great feat of economically, racially and sexually violent structures is precisely to predispose their victims to hurt each other. Ironically, the violent behaviour of the (formerly) oppressed toward each other may sometimes follow the same lines as the violence of the (former) oppressor: the formerly colonised become neocolonialists, those who were abused become abusers (Ratele 2022: 111-12).

Ratele goes on to name what is effectively at the core of this displacement—hurt. He highlights that "individuals repair themselves when they arrive at a psychosocial and sociopolitical place where they are enabled to recognise that, however much they have suffered, the hurt they experienced will not be palliated by making others suffer" (Ratele 2022: 112). Regarding the notion that hurt is at the core of displacement, Ratele observes that there is a rationale for *intraracial* sexual harassment and violence. Although he argues that this not a justification, for why (black) people struggle with displaced hurt and anger. He adds that they respond, not by directing their rage at the unfair structures of the oppressors.

Tommy J. Curry, an African American philosopher and scholar of Black Male Studies holds a different position on this problem of the oppressed-oppressor. While Ratele takes a largely adoptive approach to feminism, Curry is highly critical of black feminism, as I will demonstrate below. Unlike Ratele, who is a self-proclaimed (male) feminism scholar, Curry is very critical of feminist theory, concepts and the overall lens that is used in this field when it comes to analyzing and theorizing black men. Thus, I employ Curry's work as the main critique of my study of the existential-phenomenology of black female difference. I consider his work to counter More's thesis of the problem of the oppressed-oppressor, and my adoption of it, in my claim that black women experience the contingencies of existence, the body, biological sex and physical strength in ways that disadvantage them and make them vulnerable to black men. I begin with a succinct quote from Curry's book *The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood* (2017), that establishes his own thesis and thus explains how it is distinguished from mine:

Rooted in an idealist calculus, Black men are conceptualized as empowered by their male identity such that any asymmetry between intraracial groups, where Black men, for example, are more visible or more represented than Black women, is attributed to patriarchy. This book aims for a closer interdisciplinary examination of this gender(ed) claim. Using history, sociology, and a range of social science findings, this book argues that Black men and boys are, in fact, disadvantaged because of their maleness. Taking the Black male experience seriously shows that what is now called gender is cumulative, not causal, and while certain problems may accumulate around male or female bodies, they are not isolated to those bodies or their histories. Hence, instead of being protected by patriarchy, Black men and boys are revealed to be its greatest victims under closer examination (Curry 2017: 8).

Although Curry's book adopts historical, sociological and empirical lenses to examine black maleness, he undertakes it as a philosophical exploration of the oppression of the black male "that aims to synthesize the multiple findings and research concerning his condition across disciplines" (Curry 2017: 9). So, Curry adopts an approach that creates "a theory and operational paradigm by which we can understand the intellectual, historical, and sexual diversity of Black men," and engages the "conditions that dictate the formation of Black male sexualities and the historical vulnerabilities that obscure our viewing of them as actual realities of Black manhood" (Curry 2017: 9). Therefore, I consider Curry's work to be helpful in the interrogation of the existential-phenomenology of blackness, black maleness, and black femaleness.

3   Contingency of Biological Sex

In the ensuing discussion, I focus on the first part of my hyphenated phrase—"being-black-and-female" and how that interfaces with the contingency of biological sex, in terms of the meanings conferred upon it in culture and socialization. De Beauvoir explicitly acknowledges the biological and physiological differences between men (males) and women (females) that not only inform sexual differentiation, but also the consequences of such differentiation. Most fundamental are the differences in body structure and hormones. The major conclusion de Beauvoir reaches about female sexual difference as a result, is that:

> She is the most deeply alienated of all the female mammals, and she is the one that refuses this alienation the most violently; in no other is the subordination of the organism to the reproductive function more imperious nor accepted with greater difficulty. Crises of puberty and of the menopause, monthly "curse," long and often troubled pregnancy, illnesses, and accidents are characteristic of the human female: her destiny appears even more fraught the more she rebels against it by affirming herself as an individual. The male, by comparison, is infinitely more privileged: his genital life does not thwart his personal existence; it unfolds seamlessly, without crises and generally without accident (de Beauvoir 2009: 66).

De Beauvoir discusses this biological differentiation of the female and how it alienates her throughout most of her life, from her own body. This is in contrast to the male body that does not endure this series of invasive biological functions. De Beauvoir explains the biological differences further by

highlighting that even though men and women live equally long on average, women are often "sick and indisposed" because of the "essential element of woman's situation" (de Beauvoir 2009: 66). This is a significant fact because the body is a means to grasp the world. However, equally important is that de Beauvoir rejects the conclusion that these biological facts form a fixed destiny for the woman, nor do they establish a sexual hierarchy that relegates her to being the subjugated Other. Her argument in this respect is that the human is unlike other animals who may display static qualities because humanity is constantly in the making. There cannot be mathematical comparisons nor physiological parallelism with other animals that directly define functional abilities.

De Beauvoir argues that one of the fundamental differences between how men and women experience the contingency of existence, is that men define the sexes and their relations and roles based on sexual activity. She rejects this view, arguing that sexual activity is not necessarily implied in a human being's nature. She cites Merleau-Ponty who argues that notions of necessity and contingency have to be revised in the case of human existence. In other words, attributing sexual difference to sexual activity, would be a claim that the latter is a necessary condition and essence for existence as a particular sex. De Beauvoir adds that contingency means that, "presence in the world vigorously implies the positing of a body that is both a thing of the world and a point of view on this world: but this body need not possess this or that particular structure" (de Beauvoir 2009: 44). What she is clarifying here is that the contingency of existence requires embodiment, but it is not necessarily that it be a particular form. Essentially, I note from the ensuing discussions that human beings are embodied existence. However, it is only after they come into existence that they can make meaning and justifications for their particular existence. This also implies that the meanings that they make are guided by their point of view of the world, and do not come prescribed by their sex, among other elements of facticity.

According to More, Sartre uses the term "facticity" to denote the various factual attributes of a person who exists in the world (More 2017: 2). Sartre situates the notion of facticity in the realm of the body and argues that "it is a permanent structure of my being and the permanent condition of possibility for my consciousness as consciousness of the world and as a transcendent project toward my future" (Sartre 1956: 328). In other words, facticity is a necessity for being-in-the-world. Sartre briefly outlines the aspects that inform the constitution and definition of facticity. In this respect he asserts that:

> My birth as it conditions the way in which objects are revealed to me […]; my race as it is indicated by the Other's attitude with regard to me (these attitudes are revealed as scornful or admiring, as trusting or distrusting); my class as it is disclosed by the revelation of the social community to which I belong inasmuch as the places which I frequent refer to it; my nationality; my physiological structure as instruments imply it by the very way in which they are revealed as resistant or docile and by their very coefficient of adversity; my character; my past, as everything which I have experienced is indicated as my point of view on the world by the world itself: all this in so far as I surpass it in the synthetic unity of my being-in-the-world is my body as the necessary condition of the existence of a world and as the contingent realization of this condition (Sartre 1956: 328).

I note that in the passage above, Sartre maintains that physiological structure can be revealed as docile or resistant as well as the coefficient of adversity. As such, all these facts have to be surpassed when one is in the world. It then becomes clear that the existence of sexes (or even a spectrum of sexes)

does not imply relations of superiority and inferiority. This hierarchy is socially constructed—after existence is established.

Ratele argues that black men who participate in antiblack-racist sexism lack pedagogical and conceptual registers to deal with their frustration. Instead, they ignore the pro-feminist masculine consciousness that can provide the tools for surmounting this phenomenon (Ratele 2022: 112). This pro-feminist consciousness is not necessarily the only way to resolve the displaced hurt that leads to sexism; however, it facilitates an understanding of the lived experience of black women under intraracial sexism and offers conceptual tools for avoiding or preventing it. However, Ratele critiques non-feminist research and pedagogy, arguing that it tends to overlook the fact that (black) men are also gendered and that as a result, they are also vulnerable to gender-related harm (Ratele 2022: 113). In other words, males can also be victims of antiblack-racist sexism as well as intraracial sexism. Ratele offers the example of the consequences of this male-directed sexism as follows: "men are disproportionately represented as victims of war, homicide and other forms of grave physical assault" and "are not impervious to other crimes such as human trafficking and rape," and as a result, they do not benefit from interventions in the way women do (Ratele 2022: 113).

Stephanie Rivera Berruz (2016) brings attention to a further consideration regarding the status of the black male in the framework that is critiqued by Belle in "Comparative and Competing Frameworks of Oppression in Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex" (2014). For my purposes, I apply her argument to the question on male vulnerability in an antiblack world. She argues that while Belle highlights the structure of the race-gender analogy as foregrounding the black male in the category of race, while the black female is erased, she does not contrast the plight of the black male in comparison to that of the white female (Berruz 2016: 3).[27] Berruz argues that this comparison requires further analysis in and of itself. As such, her position is that:

> Although she [Belle] notes that this is not a trivial comparison, the comparative [gist] requires more critical attention. Black maleness continues to be confined by its social status of Black Death, which finds articulation in images of the black male as dangerous and criminal. Moreover, the status of danger and criminality is historically linked to enslavement. In drawing a comparison between the black male slave and the white woman, Beauvoir is also setting up a comparative structure that necessitates the occlusion of the relationship between white women and black male slaves. For instance, there are no conceptual tools available from the comparative structure to explore the rape of enslaved black men by white women, which to date remains a topic that is underexplored because the discourse on rape rests on gendered lines that thwarts the possibilities of thinking of black men as victims of rape. So this is not just a problematic comparison, it is a comparison that perpetuates a specific relationship of power between white women and black men and that needs to be noted (Berruz 2016: 3).

The passage above focuses on Belle's comparative framework; however, there is more to be said about the competing framework of oppression between black males and white females. In this respect, Berruz highlights that Belle implies that the status of maleness already confers privilege, meaning that "the gender identity of male bodies cannot be read as anything other than dominating" and that "we must view all masculinities as privileged, a claim that in contemporary contexts is difficult to maintain given the routine and repetitive status of black male death in our society" (Berruz 2016: 3). Even though Belle acknowledges the "routine and repetitive status of black male death in our society," she

is adamant that there is comparative inattention to the deaths of black girls and women, and this speaks to the status of privilege that black men have (Gines 2016: 2). Essentially, she argues that there are myriad ways in which black social and civil death, as well as epistemic violence and death impact upon both black males and females (Gines 2016: 2).

Whereas Ratele and Curry both agree that black males are treated as disposal and are at risk of harm and death, they differ in terms of what drives this threat to black men and how it should be addressed. Curry argues that:

> The pervasiveness of misandric myths about Black men has allowed stereotypes and antipathies to be internalized throughout the society without question. Within the consciousness of individuals, internalized vulnerability exists as an almost intuitive knowledge of the fungibility of Black males in society, so that the social or personal relation or contact an individual has with a Black male offers a level of power over that Black male body. Since Black males can never be victims, other individuals—even other Blacks and minorities—have the power to abuse, exploit, or rape them without fear of sanction. In other words, the dehumanization of Black men and boys generally by society gives individuals explicit permission to dehumanize them, as well. In this sense, perpetrators of violence against Black males are not guilty of any crimes at all. They are simply participating in the subjugation of nonhuman things that have no moral status or empathy in the larger society, especially in the case of personal or intimate partner violence (Curry 2017: 117).

Ratele finds that research is scarce in areas that analyze how men can be simultaneously dominant, insecure and loveless, while engaging the "contradictory male experiences of socioeconomic conditions at the juncture of dominance and subjugation" (Ratele 2022: 114). The traumas, feelings, struggle to survive and experience with violence that men experience are not situated, as they are not placed at the center of these issues. Without this situated understanding of their lived experience, the result is they receive no empathy and struggle to attain meaningfulness, worth and recognition in their lives. Consequently, there is a tug of war, so to speak, where:

> Many men are unimpressed by feminism, and much of feminism has tended not to be impressed by the trauma experienced by men. In other words, on the one hand, some feminists have been largely blind to, sometimes even unmoved by, the painful lived realities of men; and, on the other hand, most men have not been very enthusiastic about joining the feminist movement (Ratele 2022: 114).

From Ratele's perspective, one is able to sum up the situation and lived experience of black men that includes rape, assault, maltreatment by parents, unemployment, lack of rehabilitation for those who are violent, lack of recognition that many grew up in abusive homes, violent neighborhoods, an uncaring society and thus an ongoing battle with victimization and vulnerability (Ratele 2022: 114). Ratele raises a very interesting perspective that both challenges and enhances my central thesis that Black existential scholars such as More tend to homogenize the contingencies of black existence and embodiment. Ratele insists that black males are just as gendered as black females, and as such, they also fall prey to intraracial sexism. In other words, when one considers my argument that an inadequate account is provided of the gendered experience that black females have with antiblack racism, Ratele counters that the gendered experience of black males within the same context, is also ignored.

Therefore, the consequences of the contingency of biological sex are experienced by males and females (and other genders) and so, when considering the problem of the oppressed-oppressor, this is not necessarily a unidirectional phenomenon of oppressed-female and oppressor-male. So, when More contends that *"sexism and racism are evil precisely because they are based on biological contingencies"* (More 1981: 21, emphasis added), Ratele adds that it is not only black females who are oppressed on the basis of biological and sexual contingencies; this could be a bidirectional or even multidirectional phenomenon. In light of both More's and Ratele's positions, I would conclude that an interrogation of the homogenization of black lived experience reveals that sex and gender are indeed crucial analytical tools for providing a more comprehensive account. However, by raising this gendered dimension, we would need to interrogate how it applies to both females and males (and other genders). I now turn to a discussion of the contingency of physical strength and how it contributes to the problem of the oppressed-oppressor.

4   Contingency of Physical Strength

This section is devoted to the latter part of my hyphenated phrase, which is: "in-an-antiblack-antifemale-world." As such, I discuss the situation of black females and their encounters with various forms of coercion, harassment, abuse and violence due to how the contingency of physical strength is culturally understood and used for socialization. More argues that the foundation of male supremacy lies in the assumption that males have inherent biological or physical superiority, as well as mental and emotional strength. In this section, I focus on the notion of physical strength and how it has an impact on the lived experience of black females because of its contribution to the problem of the oppressed-oppressor. I find that adult men are generally stronger than adult women due to fundamental biological differences. In this regard, de Beauvoir offers a helpful account of the major biological differences between males (men) and females (women). She does not deny the contingency of physical strength and its consequences. She readily acknowledges that generally, a woman is physically weaker than a man owing to less muscular strength and lesser respiratory capacity, also that she cannot lift heavier weights than him, neither can she run faster, among other physiological differences. Despite these facts, she argues that on their own, they do not determine the meaning of physical strength. She argues further that if humanity is defined from existence, then "biology becomes an abstract science," because it is only "when the physiological given (muscular inferiority) takes on meaning, this meaning immediately becomes dependent on a whole context" (de Beauvoir 2009: 68). So, "'weakness' is weakness only in light of the aims man sets for himself, the instruments at his disposal, and the laws he imposes" (de Beauvoir 2009: 68). It is only when the use of full body force is required, where the custom values violence and muscular energy to grasp the world and dominate, that the differences in physical strength will establish a hierarchy. As such, existential, economic and moral values become necessary to define "the notion of weakness" (de Beauvoir 2009: 68). Truth, in this respect is constituted by how nature is expressed through action. How women and men are defined is a transitory element that derives from the collectivity and not the individual person, and individual possibilities depend on the economic and social situation (de Beauvoir 2009: 69-70). Essentially, she is arguing that only if physical strength is valued in a society, then a hierarchy becomes established between those who are physically strong and those who are weaker.

Gqola helps to explain the contingency of physical strength and the consequences that ensue from it, which have a direct impact on the existential-phenomenology of black females. She states that in her book *Rape: A South African Nightmare* (2015, she coined the concepts of the "Female Fear Factory" (FFF) and the "manufacture of fear" that she used interchangeably to explain the product (fear) and its production (the factory). Subsequently she wrote another book *Female Fear Factory* (2021) that is devoted to the phenomenon. Her main argument is that the FFF is necessary for patriarchal control and she explains its mechanizations as follows:

> Fear is fostered through exaggerated visual performance, audible cues, and other coded signs; all of which are repeated until the target audiences have mastered the form of communication and have started to take fear for granted, as something that is inevitable. This fear colours decisions about movement, aspiration, desire and other aspects of life in an automatic manner once fluency is achieved. In other words, fluency in the register of the Female Fear Factory shapes areas of life that appear unlinked to violence and control (Gqola 2021: 21-22).

Gqola explains that women have become fluent in the language of the FFF, which entails "exposure through repetition of messages, warning, inducements, symbolic lessons and explicit statements" (Gqola 2021: 73). Repeated exposure acclimatizes a woman with the environment and makes it easier for them to decipher it. As such, the woman "is able to read, decode messages quickly and effortlessly, not for individual attention but as a smooth process of communication" (Gqola 2021: 73). She says that one way to surmount the FFF is by "unlearning the fluency" or "making fluency in the Female Fear Factory strange." This does not entail understanding it less but to rather put the fluency to different use (Gqola 2021: 84). As such, she says it is "to retain the mastery but to interrupt our participation in it, to refuse to occupy the roles prescribed under it, that we know how to take up in seamless ways" (Gqola 2021: 84-5).

In light of Gqola's explanation of the FFF and how it is established as a means to perpetuate patriarchal control, it becomes apparent that there is a measure of complicity among all parties in antiblack racism and intraracial sexism. This is my contention and it raises More's assertion about how women are also complicit in sustaining notions of their inferiority and inequality to men. However, Gqola argues that black females are coerced, subordinated and dominated through the manufacture of fear, whereas More insists that they take accountability for their complicity on the moral, social and intellectual inequality that they experience. However, my view is that the contingency of physical strength plays a crucial role in how the FFF is maintained. I have already mentioned earlier how de Beauvoir argues that weakness is only defined as inferior in a society that values strength and condones physical violence as a result. As such, it could be argued that the meaning of superiority that is conferred upon the contingency of physical strength is a cultural consequence, not a biologically given cause. This is what More refers to as a questionable assumption. The exceptions do not cancel the rule that most men tend to be physically stronger than most women and as such, through physical force, males are better positioned to enforce compliance (should they wish to) from physically weaker females (and males).

A tragic combination of the contingency of biological sex and the contingency of physical strength is evidenced through the rape of females—girl children and women (as well as boys and adult males, to a lesser degree). Gqola's groundbreaking book*, Rape: A South African Nightmare* (2015) tackles both the historical and contemporary manifestations of this scourge. Even though she focuses on the South

African rape crisis, she highlights that this form of violence against females is a global epidemic. For purposes of this article, I focus on the use and abuse of male physical strength to perpetrate this violence on the bodies of females, because as discussed at above, females tend to be weaker than males. The contingency of this biological and physiological difference among the sexes lies in the fact that these characteristics are not necessary and they could have been otherwise, which means that their meanings can become something other than what they presently are. Contingency, according to More and other existentialists like de Beauvoir, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty is a timeless truth and does not pertain to personhood. However, the meanings attributed to various contingencies such as those of the body, biology and physiology are produced in culture and conveyed through socialization. As such, the contingency of physical strength contingently produces the assumption of male superiority. Therefore, there is a patriarchal dividend that relies on this difference between females and males and so I explain how the dual contingencies play out through rape. Gqola offers the following succinct definition of rape that is helpful to anchor my ensuing discussion:

> Rape is not a South African invention. Nor is it distasteful sex. It is sexualised violence, a global phenomenon that exists across vast periods in human history. Rape has survived as long as it has because it works to keep patriarchy intact. […] Rape is the communication of patriarchal power, reigning in, enforcing submission and punishing defiance. It is an extreme act of aggression and of power, always gendered and enacted against the feminine. The feminine may not always be embodied in a woman's body; it may be enacted against a child of any gender, a man who is considered inappropriately masculine and any gender nonconforming people. Rape has also been central to the spread of white supremacy, and to the way race and racism have organised the world over the last four hundred years (Gqola 2015: 21).

From this passage I identify a number of features of rape that Gqola highlights. It is sexual violence and not merely inappropriate or distasteful sex. It is a tool/weapon of patriarchal power that utilizes aggression to entrench the coercion and domination of females. Here Gqola is highlighting the systemic manifestation of dominating behavior that ensues from More's notion of internal discrimination. She argues that it targets not only women, but also children and other gender non-conforming individuals. Finally, and significant for my article, it is also a weapon of white supremacy and antiblack racism.

Ratele is convinced that the root of this phenomenon of coercive masculinity can be found in notions and beliefs about what constitutes manhood:

> The violence in our society, which means within us, within the self, is usually linked to the hegemonic understanding of what it means to be a man. Violence is a tool men use to reproduce their dominant manhood. But what they deploy far more often than violent behaviour is its *unarticulated threat*, which is present in the tacit right some men believe they have to dominate other people. Being a man of power, they believe, means being entitled to control others. The threat and the actuality of violence are ingrained in the currently culturally ascendant form of masculinity (Ratele 2022: 169, emphasis added).

Ratele is also raising the mechanisms of the manufacture of fear in the FFF that Gqola speaks of by raising the notion of "unarticulated threat." This means that even though many males are not violent, the threat of violence due to their physical strength and dominance looms because of centuries-old

evidence of violent masculinities, and lived experience with violent masculinities. In light of Ratele's view that hegemonic masculinity encourages violence as a tool that men should use to reproduce their dominant masculinity, he is of the opinion that in order to address this problem there needs to be an analysis of "how we might work with men and boys toward a pro-feminist consciousness and practice. By pro-feminist consciousness and practice, I mean a sociopolitical awareness in men and boys that supports women's feminist struggles, and the behaviours that go with such awareness" (Ratele 2022: 109). This is one way to resolve displaced hurt. He goes on to explain the process he undertakes towards trying to instill a different consciousness:

> What underpins my engagement with men is an evolving critical consciousness that incorporates anti-racism, feminism, situatedness and an awareness of the interpenetration of psychical processes and social facts. My concern with masculinities is also shaped by the ideal that men can grasp the fact that harmonious, egalitarian, caring and just gender relations are good for society, positive for interpersonal relationships, and life-enhancing for individual men and women. Of course, not every man or woman or group values things like equality and just gender relations. In fact, sometimes the majority in a group can value inequality and discrimination, apartheid being a great example of just such a situation (Ratele 2022: 112).

Ratele is explaining two scenarios that require critical consciousness. Firstly, it is in the intraracial domain, where he argues that men should be taught to "embrace harmonious, egalitarian, caring and just gender relations." Secondly, he speaks of the interracial domain and references apartheid, which is an antiblack world that requires the same critical consciousness in order to advance harmony. Effectively, Ratele is reconciling and uniting mine and More's arguments against an *antiblack world* and *antiblack-antifemale world* by promoting harmony, equality and care in both contexts. As such, he is advancing a reconciliatory view.

In antithesis to black feminist theory as a proposed solution to intraracial sexism in the black community, Curry develops his own theory of Black Male Studies that is contrasted with what he refers to as "black masculinity as buck studies" (Curry 2017: 10). He argues that black feminism developed what he calls a "mimetic thesis," which is the idea that black males seek to emulate and realize themselves as patriarchs, much like white men. This thesis holds that black males seek to emulate and ultimately realize themselves as patriarchs next to white men, has been a central feature of Black feminist thought since the penning of Michele Wallace's *The Black Macho* and the *Myth of the Superwoman* in the late 1970s (Curry 2017: 10). However, he disputes this mimetic thesis by demonstrating that black men have an entirely different lived experience to white men which includes the sociological phenomena of the "lack of Black fathers, their lack of power in America, their lack of employment, their lack of manhood", which marks them as incomplete, demonstrates their definitional-ontological failures, while evading the proof that their subordinated male subordinated status and existence evidences a different register of sexuality (Curry 2017: 11). In other words, while they and their white counterparts are male, their experience with maleness has different ontological and socio-political and economic implications.

One major difference between white and black males is their access to power. Curry is not convinced that black males aspire to patriarchal power over women in the way that their white counterparts do. In this respect, he argues that "[t]he lure of white patriarchy is a common trope used to explain the mimetic urge of Black males, but why do we find no assumption of this imitative character in Black

feminist accounts of Black womanhood?" (Curry 2017: 12). Here, Curry is questioning the complicity between males and females in the ambit of patriarchy and finds it strange that there is a binary distinction that makes black men mimetically inclined towards patriarchy, while black women are not. This is incongruent for him given the historical situation of black people:

> Black men and women have been subjected to the same cultural, ethnological, and anthropological theories rooted in racial evolution, yet only Black males are thought to have internalized these historical views to such an extent that their sociological realities have been transformed into Black masculine ontology (Curry 2017: 12).

Curry advances the theory of Black Male Studies, which is distinct from that of feminist-driven black masculinity studies. He considers this new field as a negation of the taxonomies that are used to describe black male existence and the force that black male "Being" has on the world around him (Curry 2017: 225). For him the current disciplinary theories about black male life are not applicable. This is because the black male not only poses a problem for gender categories, he also "exposes the erroneous, analogous reasoning behind the constant misapplication and misapprehension of anti-Black violence and liberatory responses to it" because he "is a bridge between the reality of the world and failure of theory/thought/reason to capture the world due to its own obsession, as he "is a break in the presumption of progress, whether political or philosophical" (Curry 2017: 225-26).

Ratele attributes the prevalence of violence in the black community to hegemonic masculinity, whereas Curry counters that misandric myths are also to blame for the "fungibility of Black males in society," which gives all other groups "explicit permission to dehumanize them." Curry insists that black men receive no empathy from society, and in personal and intimate spaces they are particularly vulnerable to violence. Curry, as such, is claiming that conversely to Gqola's accusation of patriarchy perpetuating the mechanisms of female fear and Ratele imploring black men to surmount hegemonic masculinity and patriarchy, Curry is arguing that patriarchy is not the cause of the problem as believed in gender theory. In this respect he argues that:

> Gender theories asserting that masculinity is synonymous with patriarchy obfuscate attempts to theoretically engage Black manhood and boyhood as it exists in the world, outside the presumed relation of white gender(ed) domination and racism. Despite poststructural and intersectional gender theories that claim to recognize the difference between Black men and boys' material actualities and (white) patriarchy, Black men and boys remain confined to biological fixations that make their sexual designation synonymous with their gendered aspiration for power over others. We have arrived at a time of theory in which Black males are thought to be privileged even as they are the overwhelming victims of various systems and bodies in society (Curry 2017: 205).

Contrary to Belle's argument about the patriarchal privilege of black men as discussed above, Curry draws attention to the irony of considering black men as privileged due to their biology which supposedly confers upon them patriarchal privileges. As such, he is dismissing More's concern about internal discrimination that undergirds the problem of the oppressed-oppressor, and Gqola's view that this is a systemic tool/weapon of patriarchal power. Curry insists that this is defective gender theory because it does not examine the real lived experience of "Black manhood and boyhood." To demonstrate some of the defects, he asks the following questions that imply the ways in which black

men are stereotyped: "What is it that essentially ties Black manhood—its aspirations, ideals, and perceptions—to random statements or jokes made by Black males to sexism and misogyny?" (Curry 2017: 13-14); "What makes an individual's comments come to be understood as the historical consciousness of most, if not all, Black males?"; and "How does one Black man's thoughts in the 1960s come to represent the consciousness of them all, or even a majority of them, throughout time?" (Curry 2017: 14). He goes on to explain that because of the lack of rigorous study, as well as empirical and non-fictive exploration of the black male's particular historical consciousness, disciplines and theorists erase the "specific ontogeny of Black manhood throughout the centuries" and instead, they rely on the male sexual designation "to serve as the foundation of his historical and contemporary psychology" (Curry 2017: 25-6). This is an important objection to my argument about the contingencies of biological sex and physical strength being the source of the oppression that black women experience at the hands of black men. Here Curry counters my argument by insisting that there is a constructed bias that is prejudiced against the black man at an ontological and consciousness level. As a result, black men are "[o]verdetermined by the essentialism tying the biological marker of male to that which is patriarchal," and consequently, "current theories of gender assert that Black males exist in a world of false consciousness that obstructs their ability to understand their position within patriarchal structures" (Curry 2017: 41). Effectively, Curry's argument that counters my existential-phenomenology of black female difference is that there is a problem with a view that:

> The ontology of Black masculinity is thought of as pure negativity, so thinking that uses such a concept demands that the thinker externalize any positive or desirable characteristics of Black males as their rejection of masculinity rather than as the substance of a Black masculinity itself. Since we define Black masculinity as condemnable, anything that we find worthwhile does not belong to the actualization of something in Black males; instead, it is something they embrace as outside themselves. In this way, progressive pro-woman Black masculinities are thought to originate in thinking that problematizes Black masculinity, not the awareness and thought of Black males' consciousness about the world surrounding them (Curry 2017: 205).

What Curry finds striking about how black men have had false consciousness attributed to them, is that they and black women have experienced the antiblack world alongside each other, and yet black women are considered to have more gender awareness and consciousness than black men do (Curry 2017: 24). Gqola, however points out that not all masculinities are assertions of violence or sexual violence because male identity and manhood do not imply hypermasculinity. Essentially the problem is that boys are taught from a young age to conflate strength with emotional hardness, to be violent and to bring the bodies of females under their control as part of asserting their manhood (Gqola 2015: 68). This is a cultural and social consequence of the meaning conferred upon the contingency of physical strength. In turn, females are socialized to evade or accept what Gqola refers to as the female fear factory. Together, this socialization of males and females entrenches the problem of the oppressed-oppressor with the fallacious assumption of male superiority based on the contingency of physical strength playing a crucial role in its maintenance. Even though strong people of all genders might have the capacity to inflict physical harm upon those who are weaker than them, the norm is that this threat of harm could be more likely realized if the perpetrator is male, according to Gqola and de Beauvoir. However, as discussed in the critiques by Ratele and Curry, this threat of harm is just as real for males.

In his book, *Liberating Masculinities* (2016), Ratele articulates an interesting dialectical relationship between black female fear and the fear of black males. I conclude with Ratele's description of the paradox created by the liberation from racial oppression in South Africa. This drives the problem of internal discrimination and the problem of the oppressed-oppressor. He gives the following background:

> The apparently unhappy effect of freedom, democracy and equality is that they do not only liberate men from the shackles of racialised oppression. As the author implies, the right to vote, equality before the law and political participation have complicated men's social and intimate lives. What is implied is that South Africans do not only have the right to racial equality, but also gender freedom and sexual orientation, and rights and freedoms entail the idea that heterosexual men can no longer rule over their families simply because they are men and heterosexual; children are allowed to lay charges against their parents and gay marriage and abortion are legalised. The very liberation that offered black people and other oppressed groups a chance to restore their rights to life, to vote, to dignity, to equality, free speech and other freedoms seems to have brought some subjects a sense of confusion, despair and powerlessness (Ratele 2016: 6-7).

I agree with Ratele that there is a current state of confusion, despair and powerlessness in the black community in South Africa. Some of the reasons that I attribute this to is the diluting of male supremacy, as articulated by More; the challenging of the Female Fear Factory, as conceptualized by Gqola; the rise of black feminism that confronts intraracial sexism, and the unintended consequence of villainizing black men, according to Curry.

5   Conclusion

In this article, I endeavored to provide a black feminist existentialist account of the *politics of Being* by drawing on, critiquing and supplementing More's work on his concept of the problem of the oppressed-oppressor and intraracial sexism. I conducted a study of the phenomenology of Black/African female embodied difference, to address two questions that More poses in his article titled, "Black Attitudes: A Call for Personhood" (1981), where he examines the phenomenon of the problem of a "detotalised-totality-detotalising" (More 1981: 20). I engaged the two questions that he poses in the article. The first one is about how black men conceive of black women in the context of South African culture. His response is that they are considered inferior because of assumptions about biological and physical strength. With the second question he asks how black women in turn conceive of themselves. His response is that they are complicit in also conceiving of themselves as unequal.

To address the questions, I discussed More's concept of the "oppressed-oppressor," where he contends that male sex discrimination denies the woman's inalienable right to be a human being, a person, simply because of a contingency, her sex and that this is similar to racism, which denies a person's right to be a human being simply because of the contingency of the colour of their skin. Consequently, he asserts that "sexism and racism are evil precisely because they are based on biological contingencies" (More 1981: 21).

In my discussions I address two specific contingencies that I argued are sources of black male supremacy, based on More's thesis—the contingency of biological sex, the contingency of physical strength and their theoretical implications of the psychological, social, cultural, religious, economic and political consequences of this gendered Being. I argued that in light of both More's, Ratele's and Gqola's positions, an interrogation of the homogenization of black lived experience reveals that sex and gender are indeed crucial analytical tools for providing a more comprehensive account of intraracial sexism and antiblack-racist sexism. In the section on the contingency of biological sex, I outlined de Beauvoir's description of the fundamental biological differences between females and males. This informed discussion of the first part of my hyphenated phrase—"being-black-and-female," where I discussed the existential-phenomenology of black women in this respect. My enquiry into the gendered dimension of antiblack racism, reveals that both females and males (and other genders) are vulnerable to oppression based on their biological sex. The critiques by Ratele and Curry demonstrated that males are also gendered and susceptible to gender-related harm.

Pertaining to the contingency of physical strength, I discussed the second part of my hyphenated phrase—"in-an-antiblack-antifemale-world." I demonstrated how Gqola's concept of the Female Fear Factory (FFF) plays out in society in a way that socializes males to perpetuate patriarchy that is enforced through violent masculinities; and how females comply with and are complicit in the maintenance of the FFF. However, I highlight that this complicity is in large part due to the threat of physical violence, through for example physical and sexual assault, which amounts to coercion. Effectively, this socialization of males and females entrenches the problem of the oppressed-oppressor with the contingency of physical strength playing a crucial role in its maintenance because of how it is conferred the meaning of male superiority. I also engaged the critiques of Ratele about non-feminist theoretical frameworks not being of utility to black males; and Curry's criticism of black feminist theory and how it villainizes the black man.

So, I undertook the task of extending the reach of More's work from the domain of antiblack racism to the domain of intraracial sexism, to demonstrate the operation and consequences of the two contingencies that I identified. I endeavored to provide a black feminist existentialist account of the *politics of Being* by drawing on, critiquing and supplementing More's work—which is a project that has not been attempted in the literature to date.

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[1]   Race is relevant to this article because the primary theorist that I engage wrote an article, "Black Attitudes: A Call for Personhood" (1981) about "internal discrimination" related to gender among black people. The concept "oppressed-oppressor" derives from this article and speaks to intraracial sexism. As such, this article is delineated to sexism and male supremacy in the black community. See Mabogo Percy More, "Black Attitudes: A Call for Personhood," *Turflux University of the North* (1981), 20-1.

2   More uses the lowercase "black" when speaking specifically to the racial term as used in racialist societies, reserving "Black" for an affirmation of the agency and humanness of Black people. I will adopt the same practice throughout this article.

3   Mabogo Percy More, *Biko: Philosophy, Identity and Liberation* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2017), *Looking Through Philosophy in Black* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), *Sartre on Contingency: Antiblack Racism and Embodiment* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021).

4   Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956).

5   When the term "Being" is written in the capitalized form, it refers to ontological "Being" as a concept, rather than the factual state of something as it is. Throughout this article, I use it whenever I discuss ontological "Being."

6   Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. H.M. Parshley (New York: Vintage Books, 2009).

7   Kathryn Sophia Belle, "Sartre, Beauvoir, and the Race/Gender Analogy: A Case for Black Feminist Philosophy," in *Convergences: Black Feminism and Continental Philosophy*, ed. Maria Guadalupe Davidson, Kathryn Sophia Belle, and Donna-Dale L. Marcano (New York: State University of New York Press, 2010), 35-51.

8   Kathryn T. Gines, "Comparative and Competing Frameworks of Oppression in Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*," *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, 1-2 (2014): 251-73.

9   Kathryn T. Gines, "Commentaries on Kathryn T. Gines 'Comparative and Competing Frameworks of Oppression in Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*'," *Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy* 12, no. 1 (2016): 1-5.

10   Pumla Dineo Gqola, *Rape: A South African Nightmare* (Johannesburg: MF Books, 2015).

11   Pumla Dineo Gqola, *Female Fear Factory* (La Verge: Melinda Ferguson Books, 2021).

12   More defines the Black Consciousness Movement and philosophy by briefly outlining its origins and history as follows: "Black Consciousness as black political thought is part of a long line of black activism and philosophical tradition dating back to the advent of African slavery, anti-black racism and colonialism in Africa and the modern world […]. Documented evidence of it stretches from the nineteenth century with Martin Robson Delany's (1812–85) resistance of white paternalism, through to Frederick Douglass (1818–95), who inspired the Bikoan thesis that 'freedom is something that can only be taken, not given'; Du Bois (1868–1963) with his concept of 'double consciousness'; Marcus Garvey (1887–1940) and his Africanist views; Anna Julia Cooper (1858–1964) with her concept of black self-worth and agency; Alain Locke (1886–1954) during the Harlem Renaissance with its protest literature against American racism; into the Negritude of Césaire (1913– 2008) and Senghor (1906– 2001) and its emphasis on Negro pride and self-affirmation; the Pan Africanism of George Padmore (1903–1959) and Kwame Nkrumah (1909–1972); Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe (1924–1978) with his emphasis on unity and solidarity; the African socialism and self-reliance of Julius Nyerere (1922–1999); Kenneth Kaunda's (b. 1924) propagation of African humanism; to Frantz Fanon's (1925–1961) anti-racism, anti-colonialism and actionality; Malcolm X's (1925–1965) black nationalism; the Black Power movement of Kwame Ture (aka Stokely Carmichael 1941–1998) and its call for black solidarity; and finally the black theology of James H. Cone (b.1938)" (More 2014: 176-77).

13   Pumla Dineo Ggola, *Reflecting Rogue: Inside the Mind of a Feminist* (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2017).

14   Tommy J. Curry, *The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2017).

15   Kopano Ratele, *Why Men Hurt Women and Other Reflections on Love, Violence and Masculinity* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2022).

16   Kopano Ratele, *Liberating Masculinities* (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2016).

[17]   Whereas Belle mentions the scholars in the following endnote whose works can be drawn from towards a feminist philosophy, the term "intersectionality" that is used was popularized by the feminist legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw, who also drew from feminist scholars including Sojourner Truth, the Combahee River Collective, Barbara Smith, and Patricia Hill Collins, among others.

[18]   bell hooks' *Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism* (1981) and *Feminist Theory from Margin to Center* (1984); Angela Davis' *Woman, Race, and Class* (1983); Alice Walker's *In Search of Our Mother's Gardens* (1983); Audre Lorde's *Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches by Audre Lorde* (1984); Paula Giddings' *When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and Sex in America* (1984); Hazel Carby's *Reconstruction Womanhood: The Emergence of the Afro-American Woman Novelist* (1987); and Patricia Hill Collins' *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment* (1990).

[19]   Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color," *Stanford Law Review* 43, no. 6 (1991): 1241-99.

[20]   My use of the terms female and male, as opposed to woman/women and man/men is based on the view that the contingency of biological sex arises from the female/male binary which includes girls and boys, and thus the problem of the oppressed-oppressor affects both adults and children. Gqola and Curry use these terms. However, the terms woman/women and man/men are used interchangeably when citing scholars who prefer to use the adult terms. Belle and Crenshaw use these terms.

[21]   Mabogo Percy More, "Black Consciousness Movement's Ontology: The Politics of Being," *Philosophia Africana* 14, no 1 (2012): 23-40.

[22]   Nompumelelo Zinhle Manzini, "Memoirs of a Black (Male) South African Philosopher," *Journal of World Philosophies* 5, no 1 (2020): 270-72.

[23]   Gqola argues that this argument relies on constructing two different genders that are distinguished by biological chromosomes (Gqola 2021: 50). She notes that feminists of various persuasions have challenged the logic that "biology is destiny" or "anatomy as biology" which seeks to entrench the binary of male superiority and female inferiority, and which is upheld through patriarchal control and violence (Gqola 2021: 50-1).

[24]   More speaks about only two genders, which are heterosexual males and females. I also focus on these two genders while recognizing that gender is a spectrum of several identities and orientations.

[25]   Pumla Dineo Gqola, "Contradictory Locations: Blackwomen and the Discourse of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) in South Africa," *Meridians* 2, no. 1 (2001): 130-52.

[26]   Related to the element of domination, de Beauvoir questions why it is that women submit to men. She argues that unlike the usual dynamic where a majority would dominate the minority, the global population is constituted of more or less the same number of women and men. She surmises that in many cases a historical event subordinated weaker groups to those who were stronger, like slavery and colonial conquests. As such, for many of them there was a past when they were independent, had their own cultures, traditions and religions (de Beauvoir 2009: 27). These examples that she makes are meant to demonstrate that women have never (or for as long as history has been recorded) had such independence and have always co-existed with men. This implies that the strength/weakness binary has existed for as long as societies have. My study attempts to give an answer to why women do indeed submit to male-constructed conditions that dominate and alienate them. I argue that the contingencies of biological sex and physical strength combine to disadvantage females in a world that confers male superiority based on these contingencies.

[27]   Stephanie Rivera Berruz, "Commentaries on Kathryn T. Gines 'Comparative and Competing Frameworks of Oppression in Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*'," *Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy* 12, no. 1 (2016): 2-3.