

Rethinking World Philosophies from African Philosophy

BENEDETTA LANFRANCHI

University of Bayreuth, Germany (benedettalanfranchi83@gmail.com)

This article argues that if world philosophies are to remain relevant for social emancipation in the present time, they must incorporate critical reflections about the methods and sources of philosophy that were at the center of the African philosophy debates in the 1970s and 1980s. The debates that surrounded the emergence of African philosophy as an academic discipline entailed thorough and innovative methodological reflections on the role of ethnography, language, and genre in philosophical expression. These reflections critically recast the relationship between indigenous traditions and academic texts and between popular and professional philosophical expression, enabling their practitioners to re-think the important questions of what it means to philosophize and who philosophizes. My argument is that these methodological reflections from African philosophy reveal the profound and essential link between methods and content of philosophy and that they must be incorporated as key methodologies for world philosophies to tackle questions of social and political relevance in the present time.

Key words: world philosophies; African philosophy; emancipatory philosophy; Paulin Hountondji; D.A. Masolo; Henry O. Oruka; Antonio Gramsci

1 Introduction

When analyzing the debates around the emergence of African philosophy as an academic discipline that engaged African thinkers in the 1970s and the 1980s,¹ it is possible to discern two equally powerful intellectual movements at play: one that was clearly forcing African philosophy to define itself with respect to “Philosophy” (in the sense of a traditionally Eurocentric and/or Anglo-American discipline, with strictly defined canons that could not easily accommodate African traditions of critical thought), and one that was also inevitably asking “Philosophy” to define (or redefine) itself to Africa. In this article I propose to focus on this second movement—that of philosophy’s re-definition to/for Africa—and to understand its impact beyond African philosophy, as providing two key contributions for the discipline of philosophy generally, which must be incorporated seriously by practitioners of world philosophies. I believe that these two key contributions are: the pathbreaking inclusion of new and different methods and resources of philosophy, which was challenging the dominance of Anglo-American and European canons; and the understanding of philosophy as an emancipatory intellectual and social force, not as an exclusively academic activity. Of the two contributions from African philosophy, the opening of the discipline beyond the western canon has made significant progress over the last fifty years. World philosophies, as a relatively new academic field, tries to develop a different approach to that of its predecessors, namely comparative and intercultural philosophy, which were rooted in unequal—if not often colonial—power relations that did not allow for an understanding of non-western philosophies on their own terms, nor for an equal exchange between different intellectual cultures (Littlejohn 2015).² In 2009, the Argentine-Mexican decolonial-Marxist philosopher Enrique Dussel defined the world dialogue between philosophical traditions as “a new age in the

history of philosophy” characterized by, “[o]ur recognition and acceptance of the meaning, value and history of all regional philosophical traditions of the planet” (Dussel 2009: 499-500).³ The new methodological approach attempted by world philosophies has been seriously committed to inaugurating a new type of philosophical dialogue.⁴ This new type of dialogue has been promoted importantly in the pages of this very journal, as advocated for by Kirloskar-Steinbach, Ramana, and Maffie in their seminal article launching the journal—originally called *Confluence*—which has served as a platform for “doing philosophy together” (Kirloskar-Steinbach, Ramana, and Maffie 2014: 44).⁵

While the academic commitment to world philosophies is in itself a form of philosophical activism—for with its refusal to equate one tradition of thought with humanity’s entire thought horizon, it is strongly oriented towards social inclusion, dialogue, and tolerance—it still seems as though perhaps the second contribution from the African philosophy debate (the understanding of philosophy as a tool for social and political emancipation) needs a re-awakening in our present time. I believe that the scale and the gravity of the multiple global crises we are presently facing in terms of increased inequality,⁶ decline in democracy,⁷ worsening environmental degradation,⁸ and proliferation of war⁹ do call for world philosophies to become socially and politically engaged. I believe that world philosophies are desperately needed in the present historical moment not only to provide critical analysis of our global crises but also to propose virtuous alternatives to these negative forms of planetary cohabitation. World philosophies need to initiate a dialogue on how these global crises are affecting us *together*—albeit in different ways—and what alternatives we can propose *together*, without having to relinquish our plurality, which lives on (among other places) in our many different world philosophies.

This article goes back to the African philosophy debate because African philosophy has a historical advantage in using philosophy to respond to social, political, and economic adversities. The advent of African philosophy as an academic discipline was rooted in a project of/for African emancipation from colonialism. Its focus was, from the start, the *African people* who would benefit from philosophical activity that would help them gain intellectual, epistemological, moral, and economic independence after formal political independence from the colonial powers. Unfortunately, the academic reception of the debate remained focused for years on the question of whether there is such a thing as African philosophy (and if there is, what it is and how it can be defined),¹⁰ thus privileging the more technical, scholarly, and disciplinary aspect of the dispute, which is largely of interest to academic experts. What got lost in this prolonged and taxing interrogation over the existence or not of African philosophy was the original question at the heart of the debate: How could African philosophy assist African peoples in their spiritual and material liberation from colonialism?

What I propose in this article is that world philosophies draw from the African philosophy debate to raise questions of social and political relevance in our present time, as a global project that centers world philosophies as an emancipatory praxis within the social community. This inevitably entails pushing the debate outside of its original—African—terrain and onto a world scale.

I believe that returning to the African philosophy debate today for world philosophies *at large* is a matter of global urgency, given the scale and the gravity of our global crises. The borrowing from African philosophy for world philosophies, however, should not be intended as a dismissal, superseding, or transcending of the terrain in which the debate originated. The original debate concerned the emancipation of the African Continent and of the African peoples, a quest that continues to the present day and in no way is presumed to be “resolved” by the present article’s transposition to a global focus. Rather, by enlarging the focus, an attempt is made at answering the

Fanonian call for a new humanity, the advent of which was strongly dependent on a new thinking as Fanon believed that “we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man [and woman]” (Fanon 2001 [1961]: 255).¹¹ Thinking in terms of a global humanity does not mean sidelining a reflection about *African* humanity/ties, but rather drawing upon African paradigms to inform global thought processes. As mentioned, African philosophy has a historical advantage in providing the type of reflection that is fundamental for philosophy to be practiced as a critical and emancipatory activity. Drawing upon the African philosophy debate here for thinking in a larger world context means striving towards growing the methodological arsenal for working out new concepts, in the hope that the conceptualizations offered by world philosophies may bring into light important aspects and goals for global emancipation.¹²

In this article, I first frame what I believe are the key methodological contributions of the African philosophy debate that lead to a radical rethinking of three key epistemological and disciplinary “relationships.” The relationships I have in mind are between: indigenous and academic philosophy, anthropology and philosophy, and popular and professional philosophies. To these I add a reflection on the genres of philosophy, which formed a marginal aspect of the original debates and constitutes instead a new area of research spearheaded by Alena Rettová in the field of African and Afrophone philosophies.¹³ I analyze some of these ideas from African philosophers comparatively, especially comparing them with the thought of Italian intellectual and activist Antonio Gramsci and other social theorists influenced by his work, who I believe were advancing similar considerations. This comparative reading is intended as the beginning of a world-philosophies methodology that can gather and direct distinct thought processes from different world thinkers towards a common (or shared) understanding of socio-political phenomena. Finally, in the last section of the article I attempt a very rough and initial sketch of some preliminary but important philosophical questions that can be raised in our present time through a world-philosophies approach that seriously incorporates African philosophy’s methodological stance.

2 Indigenous and Academic Philosophy

The Beninois philosopher Paulin Hountondji firmly warned about the risk of presenting African philosophy as “ethnophilosophy”¹⁴. The latter in his view would amount to the glorification of anonymous, oral, and uncritical world views, resulting in a debased version of philosophy reserved for the African Continent. In Hountondji’s opinion, this debased version of philosophy would do a great disservice to the Continent’s quest for emancipation, which had to be claimed from a terrain of *critical thinking*, an activity from which the colonial powers had systematically tried to exclude African peoples, denying them political sovereignty, economic development, and cultural heritage. Some African scholars who actively took part in the ethnophilosophy debate—like Kenyan philosophers Henry Odera Oruka and D.A. Masolo, and Ghanaian philosophers Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye—largely agreed with Hountondji. Though these scholars were seriously involved in researching African epistemologies, all of them were cautious not to glorify or romanticize popular, indigenous, and traditional knowledges at the expense of emancipatory quests. Others—like Koffi Niamkey,¹⁵ Abdou Toure,¹⁶ Olabiyi J. Yai,¹⁷ and Pathe Diagne¹⁸—disagreed with Hountondji and accused him of elitism and Occidentalism.¹⁹

In “Philosophy and Indigenous Knowledge: An African Perspective,” Masolo writes that “Indeed, a look back might now suggest that at least part of the controversy over ethnophilosophy was about how the indigenous was to be represented” (Masolo 2002: 31).²⁰ He then provides his own

definitions of the indigenous as comprising of the everyday and the familiar, together with the dimension of “the historical nature and character of ideas” (Masolo 2002: 22). Masolo’s notion of the indigenous as “the everyday” is particularly relevant for the present discussion as it also makes a link with language, orality, and the notion of different “orders” of philosophy (Oruka²¹)—all of which have a huge bearing on the African search for its own philosophical canon as different from that of the west. In fact, Masolo frames the ethnophilosophy controversy initiated by Hountondji in this respect as follows:

It is my view that Hountondji’s critique of Tempels,²² as sharp and nearly as uncompromising as it was at the time of its first articulation, was driven by an eagerness to underscore the realism of Africans’ everyday experiences, in contrast to what he perceived as ethnophilosophers especially Tempels’s, obsession with staffing Africans’ consciousness with only apparent or pseudo-objects, objects that do not exist, like the so-called “vital forces.” Such emphases, he frequently laments, disconnect Africans’ consciousness from the real (“scientific”) world around them. Clearly, Hountondji felt frustration with a philosophical proposal that sidestepped and almost trivialized African people’s everyday concerns with the world of “real” objects and problems in an attempt to replace it with one that emphasized magicians’ imaginations (Masolo 2002: 30).

Hountondji was critical of separating philosophical themes and content from the everyday lived realities of the people, because in that way not only would philosophy not provide people with useful tools for understanding and transforming their realities but it could actually inhibit this process by making their relationship with their surrounding realities incomprehensible and unattainable. As the relationship with reality takes place through peoples’ consciousness, “staffing Africans’ consciousnesses with [...] objects that do not exist” not only alienates them from their surrounding realities but from themselves, making even their own subjective experiences unintelligible. Instead, being that the indigenous “is the whole realm of what constitutes our consciousness” (Masolo 2002: 31), it must remain at the center of philosophical reflection, constituting a philosophical resource to be critically examined.

For the African intellectuals who partook in the African philosophy debate concerning the Continent’s philosophical identity, it was clear that African philosophy was tasked with repairing the painful alienation that resulted from colonization. For Hountondji in particular, philosophy had to be framed for Africa in a manner that helped the Continent recuperate its indigenous knowledges and knowledge base, to counter its economic, political, and cultural dependence on the former colonizing powers, which was by definition “extroverted.” Hountondji actually favored the concept of endogenous knowledge to both that of indigenous and traditional, because it allows:

[t]o dwell on the origin of a cultural product or value that comes from, or at least is perceived by people as coming from inside their own society, as opposed to imported or “exogenous” products or values—though we should admit, in a sense, that there is no absolute origin at all, and the concept of endogeneity itself should therefore be relativized (Hountondji 1995 6-7).²³

The definition of indigenous—or better yet, endogenous—that we take from the African philosophy debate is thus not strictly culturalist or traditionalist in the sense which could incur the risk of reification. For African philosophers like Paulin Hountondji, D.A. Masolo, Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye, Peter Bodunrin, and Henry Odera Oruka²⁴ who were seriously invested in the African philosophy debate, the indigenous was not to be wielded as trophy against the colonial powers, for this would lead precisely to the type of pitfalls contained in ethnophilosophy, which

would end up glorifying *any* form of indigenous and traditional knowledge, even those that were not useful for Africa's economic development and political freedom. Hountondji always attributed a great risk to an "unconsidered imposition of the word 'philosophy'" (Hountondji 1989: 8)²⁵ on African traditions of thought that would end up giving them "a unanimistic and idealistic interpretation, by emptying them of their real dynamism and complexity, by isolating them from the economic, social and political context which gives them meaning" (Hountondji 1989: 9).

The crucial aspect of the indigenous/academic dialectic as exposed by Hountondji is that *conducting philosophy in isolation/removal from its lived context is precisely what eliminates its emancipatory potential*. The relevance of *context*—of the everyday—for philosophy is an aspect of Hountondji's thought that was taken up rigorously by German anthropologist Kai Kresse in his particular method of research for African philosophy that blended anthropology and philosophy. However, to understand the innovative aspect of Kresse's method—and African philosophy's innovative use of the ethnographic method from anthropology—the conflictual relationship between anthropology and African philosophy must first be contextualized historically.

3 Anthropology and Philosophy

At around the same time that African philosophy began searching for its academic ground, social anthropology was entering its most florid period, with the Association of Social Anthropology (ASA)—founded in 1946 with less than twenty members—counting one hundred and fifty members by 1962 (Asad 1973: 14).²⁶ In his seminal volume *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*, Asad clearly illustrates the historical ties between the development of this branch of the academy and modern colonialism:

It is not a matter of dispute that social anthropology emerged as a distinctive discipline at the beginning of the colonial era, that it became a flourishing academic profession towards its close, or that throughout this period its efforts were devoted to a description and analysis—carried out by Europeans, for a European audience—of non-European societies dominated by European power (Asad: 1973: 14-5).

What is important to keep in mind is that the demarcation of epistemological domains that inform the development of the two disciplines of philosophy and anthropology are clearly reflective of the west's social, economic, and political history, entailing specific class, race, and gender power relations. These start to be felt in the African continent only in its more recent history, particularly after colonization by western countries, which brings these knowledge demarcations and disciplinary domains to the Continent, although also in different forms and with different and new categories of exploited/oppressed/subalterns to those in the west. Despite these important differences, it is however important to identify a common root between Eurocentrism and classism, which are joined by a conception of history that entails "the exclusion of the 'uncivilized' from the realm of history" in favor of privileging "the accounts of events within a narrow [and one here could add: white, male] elite" (Curtin 1981: 58).²⁷ That is why Asad criticized anthropology also for being a *bourgeois* discipline.

Similar critiques about anthropology as a discipline can be found in Italian socialist thought, for example. These debates are not very well known internationally, as they remained circumscribed within the Italian landscape, in what has become known as "antropologia gramsciana"—that is, a

type of anthropological research inspired by the writings of Italian intellectual and activist Antonio Gramsci and spearheaded by Neapolitan historian of religions and ethnographer Ernesto De Martino in the 1940s and 1950s (Cambini and Frosini 2017: 9).²⁸

Like Hountondji and many of the other African philosophers involved in the African philosophy debate, De Martino was also highly critical of British functional anthropology, the distinctive discipline that emerged after World War I through the efforts of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown (Asad 1973: 9) and that he characterized as “deliberately refusing to look at history” and “conceiving the culture of a people as a functional complex determined by the physiology of individuals that make up society” (De Martino 1949: 414; my translation).²⁹ De Martino heavily criticizes functionalist anthropology for its objectivizing portrayals of “subalterns” (which, in his case, were mostly Italian subalterns, and especially the populations of the South of Italy) that kept them trapped in positions of cultural, moral, and economic inferiority. He was also skeptical of western anthropologists’ studies of “native cultures,” which for him were too intimately bound with the political aim of governing indigenous populations through colonial administrators and functionaries and with the help of local chiefs and social institutions.

It is precisely because of anthropology’s “historical links with the colonial system” (Kresse 2007: 17)³⁰ that Hountondji was so adamant in guarding against the risks of ethnophilosophy. He worried for Africa’s intellectual future if it did not manage to establish a clearly distinct terrain of critical thinking separate from anthropology. Ethnographic research by anthropologists was associated with a lack of intellectual agency on the part of African subjects and a re-inscription of subordination with colonial researchers who looked for and attributed meaning to proverbs, myths, folktales, sayings and beliefs, customs, and practices observed among African populations. Contrary to this, a clearly distinct terrain of critical thinking could be African philosophy, through which Africans could reappropriate their subjectivities, critical thoughts, and emancipatory objectives. The terrain had to be that of *African* philosophy and not of “philosophy” because philosophy, too, was plagued by the same Eurocentric, racist, sexist, and thus violent attitude that characterized anthropology. Philosophy as an important critical activity needed to be salvaged for African emancipation, but it had to be re-thought in a more open and inclusive manner, one that could also integrate the world views of those who had been traditionally cast out of philosophizing. In order to include these voices, African philosophy continued to rely heavily on ethnography³¹ in its desire not to betray its distinctive feature as a non-exclusively academic/scholarly/professional activity and to maintain its communally generated and orally transmitted wisdoms and social praxes. Given the undocumented and also unacademic nature of many of these wisdoms and praxes, the only way to relay them was in fact through some kind of ethnographic engagement, by engaging with those who *live* these philosophies.

The problem thus does not seem to be with the ethnographic method per se, but with the specific type of appropriation of the ethnographic method by western academia and particularly by the academic branch of anthropology, a discipline that developed at a particular point of western history whereby oppression along racial, colonial, gender, and class lines intersected in a particular way. The importance and innovation of African philosophy’s use of ethnography is that it manages to do so in a manner that clearly distances itself from anthropology’s unhappy legacy in African studies. This is what Kai Kresse also did in his *Philosophising in Mombasa* (2007) by advancing a new method, which he labeled “anthropology of philosophy” to contextualize philosophy “within human experience of the world”, which “can be learned from language-sensitive ethnographic accounts of cultures and human interactions within them” (Pollack 2022: 138).³² Pollack praises this work precisely for facilitating “a multi-cultural philosophy, one without an ultimately preferred patron” (Pollock 2022: 138).

This type of interrelation by way of “ethnographic accounts” presently thematizes an interesting debate at the heart of the ontological turn within anthropology that could potentially provide a very important bridge with world philosophies. Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro qualifies this moment in anthropology positively as one of “comparative relativism,” signalling to a turn of the discipline towards “field geophilosophy” or “speculative ontography” (de Castro 2011: 129).³³ The ontological turn in anthropology strives for a new type of interrelation that does not want to “*explicate the world of others* but rather to *multiply our world*” by:

actualizing the possible expressions of alien thought and deciding to sustain them as possibilities—neither relinquishing them as the fantasies of others, nor fantasizing about them as leading to the true reality (de Castro 2011: 137; emphasis in original).

What the ontological turn in anthropology is attentive to is “allowing people to specify the conditions under which what they say is the case” (Candea 2011: 149),³⁴ which is a key aspect that enables us to shed light on the fact that many of us (certainly myself) for the most time do not *wholly* feel one thing or another: modern or traditional, individual or communal, magical or rational, scientific or intuitive, spiritual or secular—but constantly enter and exit these different and even contradictory epistemological and ethical domains, also based on whose company we are in or what specific event we are facing.

African philosophy’s important—though troubled—relationship with anthropology arises from African professional philosophers’ desire not to create an academic philosophy that was severed from the “philosophy of the people” from which many of them continued to draw from. But what is a philosophy of the people? Is there such a thing and where can it be found? And how is it distinguished from populism or, in the specifically African case, that “third world folklorism” that Hountondji was so averse to? Perhaps no one in the African philosophy landscape has reflected on this question more than the Kenyan philosopher Henry Odera Oruka, with his division of philosophy into first and second order and his ideas on how these two orders of philosophy relate to the realms of professional and popular worldviews.

4 Popular and Professional Philosophies

Oruka’s two orders of philosophy refer to culture philosophy, on one side, which is practiced by the poets, herbalists, medicine men, musicians, or fortune-tellers whose “explanations or thought do not go beyond the premises and conclusions given by the prevailing culture” (Oruka 1991: 49), and second-order philosophy, which is the critical (mostly individual and mostly written) reflection on those outlooks. For Oruka the differentiation between culture and philosophy proper is thus tied to the thinker’s ability to be self-critical and critical of his/her surroundings and belief systems. In between these two orders of philosophy, Oruka also places a third order that he calls sage philosophy and which he envisioned as a new, important area for African philosophy, one that could avoid the pitfalls of ethnophilosophy without doing away with the important distinction between collective, popular beliefs and critical reasoning. According to Oruka, sage philosophy is made up of:

The expressed thoughts of wise men and women in any given community and is a way of thinking and explaining the world that fluctuates between *popular wisdom* (well-known

communal maxims, aphorisms and general common sense and truths) and *didactic wisdom* (an expounded wisdom and rational thought of some given individuals within a community) (Oruka 1991: 33).

Oruka also distinguishes between different realms of sagacity, with the folk sage featuring as someone who is “well informed and deductive” but ultimately “fails to go beyond the celebrated folk wisdom” therefore remaining at best “a master of popular wisdom” (Oruka 1991: 34). Unlike the folk sage, the philosophical sage is someone who subjects “beliefs that are traditionally taken for granted to independent rational re-examination and who are inclined to accept or reject such beliefs on the authority of reason rather than on the basis of communal or religious consensus” (Oruka 1991: 5-6). What makes one a philosopher for Oruka is the capacity for individual, critical examination of collectively held beliefs, rather than erudition or formal education. Philosophical activity, for Oruka, is the capacity to subject one’s cultural milieu and popular worldviews to the scrutiny of independent, rational inquiry. Though this is not an ability that Oruka reserves for trained scholars or professional academics, still it is not an ability that he believes to belong spontaneously to everyone, as it entails a special type of skill/knowledge/wisdom.

In Oruka’s differentiation between the folk sage and the philosophic sage, the key term of “common sense” comes up, as associated with the folk sages’ popular wisdom. This is a key term that also comes up in western philosophy’s treatment of first level philosophy. German philosopher Immanuel Kant defined *sensus communis* in *The Critique of Judgement* as “a sense common to all,”³⁵ the importance of which was highlighted centuries later by Jewish German/American philosopher Hannah Arendt in her *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*.³⁶ Here Arendt hails the Kant of the *Third Critique* for finally shifting from the terrain of utter subjectivity—that established the realm of knowledge in *The Critique of Pure Reason* and the realm of morality in *The Critique of Pure Practical Reason*—to that of plurality to establish the realm of judgment. For this reason, Arendt finds Kant’s last *Critique* to be the most political of his three critiques—the one that she thinks was meant to be a true critique of political reason (Arendt 1992).³⁷

But while Arendt finds in Kant’s common sense the epistemological and ethical foundations of human plurality, she does not, like Oruka, discuss the many layers that make up common sense, nor does she, like Gramsci, break down the different social relationships that constitute that foundational terrain of human plurality. Much has been written on Gramsci’s complex notion of *senso comune*,³⁸ a concept that is difficult to render in its English translation as explained by Crehan:

The Italian *senso comune* is a far more neutral term than the English common sense. The English term, with its overwhelmingly positive connotations, puts the emphasis, so to speak, on the “sense,” *senso comune* on the held-in-common (*comune*) nature of the beliefs. In the notebooks, Gramsci reflects on the complicated roots of such collective knowledge, its shifting and often contradictory components, the ways it becomes accepted without question—and by whom—and when, and how it changes (Crehan 2016: x).³⁹

According to Gramsci, one of the most significant forms of *senso comune* is popular religion, which in the context of early- and mid-twentieth-century Italy was mainly Catholicism. Marcus Green explains how for Gramsci popular religion contains elements of what can be labelled “high religion” (which are the elements of official Christian doctrine espoused by the church and Catholic intellectuals) and “a mix of folkloristic elements, like superstition, witchcraft and mysticism, which get absorbed by the common sense and form an important element of the masses’ worldview” [my translation].⁴⁰

What is key in Gramsci's analysis is that while he praises the Catholic Church for its ability to keep together the two different spiritual approaches practiced by different social classes—thus impeding the de facto formation of two religions, one for the popular masses and one for the elites, and thus ensuring a very broad base of “the held-in-common”—he condemns the Church for encouraging the poorest sectors of society to take pride in their condition of simplicity and humility, instead of encouraging them to subvert their condition. This subversion for Gramsci can only happen through a *prise de conscience*, which inevitably entails trading in the acritical, superstitious, and magical beliefs of “the held-in-common” of popular religion for a second-order philosophy. For Gramsci, this complex and delicate process is never to be equated with the simple uplifting of common sense to a philosophy of the masses, which is basically what populist politics encourages and which hinders projects of *real* social emancipation by failing to provide “the masses” with critical, intellectual tools through which they may understand socio-economic dynamics and their own presence and roles in those dynamics over time.

The manipulation of “folklore” by the elites was something Hountondji was also extremely critical of. As I have already elaborated elsewhere,⁴¹ Hountondji's differentiation between folklore and philosophy is not driven by an elitist view of philosophy that excludes African traditional philosophies, but precisely by the fear of how African elites will appropriate these traditions for their own ends, leaving the African masses aside in the quest for emancipation. This speaks precisely to Gramsci's notion of the traditional intellectuals' instrumentalization of popular philosophies, which does not aim at more collective and inclusive epistemological orders but instead keeps the two orders of philosophy in a rigid binary, with the majority of the people trapped in common sense and a small elite of erudite scholars who philosophize disregarding the majority of the people's concerns. But:

The bringing into being of new, genuinely counter-hegemonic narratives—a crucial part of any social transformation—has to start with the world inhabited by the mass of the population. And that world is the world of common sense (Crehan 2013: 113).⁴²

The notion that second-level philosophy is associated with a mainly individual and erudite activity, while first-level philosophy dwells in collectively held popular worldviews, does not necessarily have the same history in the African Continent, which, according to Masolo, inevitably leads to a difference in content and style of African philosophical production. This difference for Masolo must be found first and foremost in: “the narrativistic style which has emerged as a sharp contrast to the formalistic style of a significant setting of western philosophy namely its American brand with which some of us have become familiar” (Masolo 2009: 51).⁴³

This generic difference is also what makes the postcolonial attempts at categorizing African philosophy into either Continental or analytic as “indicated by the boundaries and barriers of European language” (Masolo 2009: 59) flawed and awkward. Against these two brands of western philosophy, which for Masolo are both stylistically and epistemologically grounded⁴⁴ in “the monological style of the thinker—as a person who stands alone with his/her mental representation of reality” (Masolo 2009: 60), most African philosophical narratives are:

Set in communal contexts by way of being cast in either narrativistic or dialogical formats or both.

They have characters who are described as drawn together around a symbol of communal significance or authority.

They are set around and discuss succinct theoretical issues which they introduce and explicate by the use of stories and tales.

While the dialogues themselves invariably incorporate either analytical schemes or sometimes lengthy accounts, the narratives help to underscore the idea of the inter-subjective character or communal production of knowledge (Masolo 2009: 61).

For Masolo, African philosophy is thus traditionally an activity and a product of “the held-in-common,” clearly attested by its genres of expression.

5 The Languages and Genres of Philosophy

Interestingly, Masolo’s article leads us straight into the question of genre since he links the distinctive feature (or “axiomatic principle”) of African philosophizing (i.e. the communitarian outlook) to specific poetic indigenous genres, such as village palavers. In answer to the question he himself raises, which is: “how do the narratives remedy the community-individual controversy?” Masolo writes that:

With variation, African philosophers, like the griots of history, have been delivering their subject matter in this customary style, making philosophical deliberation both interactively engaging as it is challenging in its nuances. In addition to style, and more specific to Africans’ practice of the subject, this delivery also introduces another dimension to the “poetics,” namely the view that thinking is a relational process that takes place meaningfully only in a communal context [so that] communitarianism is all over African texts [...] (Masolo 2009: 47).

These pioneering statements on the relationship between narrativistic genres and philosophy are currently being systematically studied by Rettová in the area of African philosophy. Rettová contends that “the development of the field [of African philosophy] is stunted through having adopted the understanding that philosophy can only be expressed in the single genre of non-fictional prose” (Rettová 2021: 204).⁴⁵ This generic prejudice has resulted in the exclusion of non-written texts and of texts that are not called philosophy, which:

In a situation where the majority of African languages do not have a word for “philosophy” and many African cultures do not have a notion of “philosophy” as a distinct intellectual activity, this definition sweepingly eliminates all philosophical expression in such languages (Rettová 2021: 206).

This is a key example of that phenomenon of exogeneity that Hountondji described as creating alienation, for the primary alienation that is apparent in the question of philosophy as an academic discipline practiced on the Continent is its being done so in European languages, which the majority of the Continent’s populations do not speak. To try and curtail the almost exclusive focus on Europhone African philosophical production, Rettová has concentrated instead on Afrophone philosophies, which are “discourses conducted in African languages that fulfil the function of philosophy in given societies, that is, that are the site where philosophical reflection takes place” (Rettová 2007: 38).⁴⁶ Though Rettová has only recently started focusing her attention on the relationship between philosophy and genre, looking deeply at genres as channels of philosophical expression (Rettová 2021), the Afrophone philosophies approach already carried this aspect with it, since it already looked at literatures as “a prominent locus of philosophical discourse in African

cultures” (Rettová 2007: 23). A related question here concerns orality if we are to understand the languages of philosophy also in terms of written and oral philosophies.

Going beyond all of the older approaches to definitions of African philosophy (which focused mainly on endogenous versus exogenous philosophies, orality versus written philosophies, and first and second-order philosophies) Rettová proposes a definition of philosophy that departs from the three central factors of: themes, the author’s intention, and reception.

What is highly interesting and important in Rettová’s approach is the connection of genre to philosophy, a discipline that has been largely unconcerned with genre. One could even say that it has largely assumed genre as not essential to it, with form in this case featuring almost accidentally as that within which thought—abstract, universal, eternal—concretizes itself. It is almost as though the question of genre for philosophy starts to be raised in the era of world philosophies, whereby expanding its reach beyond European languages and beyond the genre of non-fictional prose that dominates in the western canon, philosophy inevitably encounters different types of texts (which include oral texts), produced in a variety of genres and languages (which include oral genres).

I would say, however, that as Africa progressively adopts the capitalist economic model, the study of narrativistic philosophies will increasingly become a *choice*—rather than a generic reality—facing the researcher. What I mean is that while in the 1970s and 1980s African philosophy was dominantly narrative and communal—so that the few academically trained “professional” African philosophers continued drawing from that communal well, for that was their main philosophical resource—African philosophy is by now a fully established academic branch with its academic body of literature, not all of which traces explicit links with village palavers, and some of which maintains purely academic cross-referencing. This materialist approach to the question of the genres of philosophy reveals the fact that in terms of the relationship between popular/oral/communal and professional/written/individual/professional philosophy, African philosophy is increasingly becoming similar to western philosophy and will thus also increasingly face challenge of the traditional intellectual’s alienation from the masses, to say it with Gramsci. This, however, only reinforces my argument towards the importance of returning to the original African philosophy debate to understand what important lessons and warnings we can draw from that debate to face our present situations.

6 The Present

What actual relevance do these questions and debates have today to help us both make sense of our present philosophical moment *and* to make sense of our present philosophically? Is endogeneity in the sense espoused by Hountondji, for example, still relevant for development? Is distinguishing between first- and second-order philosophy still a matter of social and political relevance? Do religion and magic still form the bedrock of popular common sense? Perhaps, as we turn our attention to our contemporary challenges, we discover that it is not even important to try to answer these questions but more so to use them to help illuminate the present—not by simply transposing the questions and challenges of the African philosophy debate unto the present but by drawing on that debate to construct a solid methodology in world philosophies with which to interrogate it.

I attempt here a very rough and initial sketch of what some of the philosophical questions of/to our present may be, which a world philosophies methodology that seriously incorporates the reflection on indigenous and popular philosophies expressed in a variety of languages and genres and their relationship to academic, professional philosophy (also by way of ethnography) may seek to take on systematically. I address mainly the realities of digitalization and populism, which appear to be the two main political, economic, and cultural forces dominating our global present.

1. The proliferation of populist movements, groups, philosophies, and governments over the last twenty years is increasingly a matter of grave concern worldwide, since these forces are proving extremely threatening to a whole set of social groups, especially minorities and women. In the European context alone, populist politicians have taken over power in Italy, Czechia, Hungary, and Poland, and right-wing populist movements are gaining momentum in France, Spain, the United Kingdom with this being accompanied in Hungary and Poland, by “an erosion in the rule of law, and an increase in the persecution of minorities, greater authoritarianism and democratic backsliding” as signaled by the European Commission.⁴⁷ This is not just a European phenomenon but a worldwide tendency, from India to Brazil. Given their prominence in the present time, how do we understand the epistemological claims of these groups philosophically? What is the relationship between populist philosophies and first- and second-order philosophy today, for example? What is the relationship between indigeneity, traditionalism, and contemporary populism—or what Canovan refers to as “new populism” (Canovan 2005: 74)?⁴⁸ Do populist philosophies originate in first- or second-order philosophy or both, and if so, what does this say about the relationship between these two levels? Is it enough to use them together to ensure their mutual correction, or do we also have to critically reflect more on the manner in which these two orders of philosophy can also produce extremely harmful effects through their collaboration?
2. If indeed we are irreversibly entering into the era of the fourth industrial revolution⁴⁹ characterized by digital transformation, what would a philosophical focus on endogeneity unveil in the study of this phenomenon? Is digitalization introducing new forms of alienation? Along what lines? Are these new forms of alienation creating new forms of oppression? How do we apply the categories of exogenous and endogenous to understand the alienating effects of digitalization?
3. What role do new mediums of expressions—such as digital mediums—play in our present understanding of first- and second-order philosophy? Do these knowledge demarcations still make sense across digital communities? Or are new orders being created, which philosophy needs to understand?

Whatever questions we decide to pose to our present, it is my contention that it is crucial that world philosophies do interrogate it and that it do so with a concern for *global* social and political emancipation by universalizing the original question that was at the heart of the African philosophy debate. I suggest drawing on the African philosophy debate because it already provides the necessary methodological tools for offering crucial insights into how to work out the relationship between indigenous, popular, professional, local, national, and trans-national philosophies ensuring their constant and careful mutual tapping into one another, which is the only way to guarantee that what really matters to different people at a specific and particular level (which we gather from first level philosophy) can join wider, newer, and more global horizons of human emancipation than those encountered in everyday habitus and local, socio-cultural spheres of belonging. This is the task of a world philosophies movement that frames second level philosophy as a global emancipatory endeavor.

7 Conclusions

In this article I argue that the African philosophy debate contains methodological reflections that are crucial for world philosophies at large. The African philosophy debate is here framed as laying the grounds for rethinking the discipline of philosophy at a global level and re-posing the questions of what it means to philosophize and who philosophizes. I argue that by asking orthodox, professional philosophy to make more room for more and diverse content, the African philosophy debate was asking philosophy to achieve something for the African people, placing their emancipation at the center of philosophical inquiry.

It is my position in this article that this now become a global endeavor of world philosophies, whereby expanding the category of “the philosophical” to incorporate new and diverse topics by way of a larger variety of resources; the intention is not to apply the category of “philosophy” without rigorous criteria but rather to ensure that a wide array of phenomena continue to get analyzed *philosophically*, because philosophy—intended as an open and inclusive human practice, as framed by African philosophy—is important for social emancipation.

Benedetta Lanfranchi is a postdoc researcher at the University of Bayreuth where she is working on her book project: “Writing and Speaking Freedom in Uganda. Contemporary Politics and Digital Genres,” under a European Research Council Consolidator Grant entitled “Philosophy and Genre: Creating a Textual Basis for African Philosophy.” She obtained her PhD in African Philosophy at SOAS, University of London, in 2016 and worked as a Research Fellow at the Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR) in 2017–2019. She co-edited together with Alena Rettová and Miriam Pahl, *Critical Conversations in African Philosophy. Asixoxe—Let’s Talk!* (London: Routledge, 2022).

- ¹ For a detailed account of these debates, see Benedetta Lanfranchi, “Introduction. African Philosophy from the Things Themselves,” in *Critical Conversations in African Philosophy. Asixoxe – Let’s Talk!* ed. Alena Rettová, Benedetta Lanfranchi, and Miriam Pahl, (London: Routledge, 2022): 1–14.
- ² Ronnie Littlejohn, “Comparative Philosophy” *Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* [online]. 2015. <https://iep.utm.edu/comparative-philosophy/>; Kwasi Wiredu, “How Not to Compare African Traditional Thought with Western Thought,” in *Philosophy and an African Culture*, ed. Kwasi Wiredu, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980): 37–50.
- ³ Enrique Dussel, “A New Age in the History of Philosophy. The World Dialogue between Philosophical Traditions,” *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 35, no. 5 (2009): 449–516.
- ⁴ Cosimo Zene, “World Philosophies in Dialogue: A Shared Wisdom?”, *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies*, no. 2 (2015): 11–32.
- ⁵ Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach, Geeta Ramana and James Maffie, “Introducing *Confluence*: A Thematic Essay,” *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies*, 1, (2014): 7–63.
- ⁶ The World Inequality Report 2022 shows how the top 1% of the world’s population took 38% of all additional wealth accumulated since the mid-1990s, whereas the bottom 50% captured just 2% of it. The wealth of richest individuals on earth has grown at 6 to 9% per year since 1995, whereas average wealth has grown at 3.2% per year. Further, the report shows that since 1995, the share of global wealth possessed by billionaires has risen from 1% to over 3%. (Available at: <https://wir2022.wid.world/www->

- [site/uploads/2022/01/Summary_WorldInequalityReport2022_English.pdf](https://www.wfp.org/publications/world-inequality-report-2022).) Inequality in the global food system is particularly worrying, with *The Global Report on Food Crises 2022* showing a clear incremental trend of food insecurity both in terms of magnitude and severity since 2016. (Available at: <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000138913/download/?ga=2.66647662.1773004097.1666092886-2130528255.1653937069>.)
- 7 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)'s Global State of Democracy 2019 reported that even though "[m]ore than half of the countries in the world (62 per cent, or 97 countries) covered by the GSoD Indices are now democratic (compared to only 26 per cent in 1975), and more than half (57 per cent) of the world's population now lives in some form of democracy, compared to 36 per cent in 1975," the worrying reality is that "[d]emocratic erosion is on the rise. The share of countries experiencing democratic erosion has more than doubled in the past decade compared to the decade before. North America, Europe, and Asia and the Pacific are the regions most affected by democratic erosion, with more than half of countries in these regions falling into this category. This is also the case for under half of democracies in Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean." (Available at: <https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/the-global-state-of-democracy-2019.pdf>.)
- The 2020 Freedom House Nations in Transit Report showed that democracies are in decline in the world, with a total of 18 countries suffering declines in their democracy scores, marking "the 17th consecutive year of overall decline in Nations in Transit leaving the number of countries that are designated as democracies at its lowest point in the history of the report." (Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/NIT_2021_final_042321.pdf.)
- 8 The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) reports that greenhouse gas pollution caused by human activities trapped 49% more heat in the atmosphere in 2021 than they did in 1990 (available at: [https://research.noaa.gov/article/ArtMID/587/ArticleID/2877/Greenhouse-gas-pollution-trapped-49-more-heat-in-2021-than-in-1990-NOAA-finds; last accessed on January 10, 2023](https://research.noaa.gov/article/ArtMID/587/ArticleID/2877/Greenhouse-gas-pollution-trapped-49-more-heat-in-2021-than-in-1990-NOAA-finds;last%20accessed%20on%20January%2010%2C%202023)), while the UN World Meteorological Organization (WMO) reports that in 2021 the ozone hole was larger and deeper than 70% of ozone holes since 1979, reaching a maximum area of 24.8 million km. (Available at [https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=11178; last accessed on January 10, 2023](https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=11178;last%20accessed%20on%20January%2010%2C%202023).)
- 9 The War and Peace entry of Our World in Data War and Peace entry shows that there is a consistent rise in ongoing state-based conflicts, with an especially dramatic rise from 2012 to 2020, from 33 to 56 total world conflicts. (Available at: [https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace; last accessed on January 10, 2023](https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace;last%20accessed%20on%20January%2010%2C%202023).)
- 10 D.A. Masolo, *African Philosophy in Search of Identity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).
- 11 Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (London: Penguin, 2001 [1961]).
- 12 It is increasingly becoming clear that this global emancipation can no longer be conceived of separately from non-human life, especially in the presence of the ecological tragedy we are witnessing where human "destiny" is increasingly bound to that of all non-human life forms.
- 13 Alena Rettová, *Afrophone Philosophies: Reality and Challenge* (Středokluky: Zdenek Susa, 2007).
- 14 Paulin Hountondji, *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983).
- 15 Niamkey Koffi, "Les modes d'existence matérielle de la philosophie et la question de la philosophie africaine," *Koré Revue Ivoirienne de Philosophie et de Culture*, 5, 6, 7, 8 (1997).
- 16 Abdou Toure, "Le marxisme-léninisme comme idéologie. Critiques des trois théoriciens Africains; A.A. Dieng, P. Hountondji et M. Towa," *Sociologue a l'Orsom* (Abidjan, 1980): 17.
- 17 Olabibi Babalola Yai, "Théorie et pratique en philosophies africaine : Misère de la philosophies spéculative (critique de P. Hountondji M. Towa et autres)," *Présence Africaine*, 108, (1978): 70.
- 18 Pathé Diagne, *L'euro philosophie et la pense du négro-africaine, suivi de problématique néo-pharaonique du réel* (Dakar: Sankoré, 1981/1982).
- 19 For a detailed account of these disagreements, see Lanfranchi (2022).

- 20 D.A. Masolo, "Philosophy and Indigenous Knowledge: An African Perspective," *Africa Today* 50, no. 2, (2002): 21–38.
- 21 Henry O. Oruka, ed., *Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy*, (Nairobi: ACT Press, 1991); Henry O. Oruka, ed., *Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990); Henry O. Oruka, *Trends in African Philosophy* (Nairobi: Shirikon Publishers, 1990).
- 22 Placide Tempels was a Belgian missionary who in 1945 published the seminal *La Philosophie Bantu*, considered by many to be the first text in African philosophy, in which he presented his own observations of Baluba customs and beliefs as constituting the Bantu worldview. See, Placide Tempels, *Bantu Philosophy* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1959 [1945]).
- 23 Paulin Hountondji, "Producing Knowledge in Africa Today the Second Bashorun M.K.O. Abiola Distinguished Lecture," *African Studies Review* 38, no. 3, (1995): 1–10.
- 24 I am aware that the cited thinkers are, unfortunately, male. This is because the vast majority of voices that were recorded in these stages of the African philosophy debate were male. The field of African philosophy has since then expanded to include female philosophers, though they still constitute a net minority.
- 25 Paulin Hountondji, "Occidentalism, Elitism: Answers to Two Critiques," *Quest: Philosophical Discussions* 3, no. 2, (1989): 3–30.
- 26 Talal Asad, "Introduction," in *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter*, ed. Talal Asad, (London: Ithaca Press, 1973).
- 27 P.D. Curtin, "Recent Trends in African Historiography and Their Contribution to History in General," in *General History of Africa, Volume I. Methodology and African Prehistory*, ed. J. Ki-Zerbo (Paris, London and Berkeley: UNESCO, Heinmann Publishers and University of California Press, 1981): 54–71.
- 28 Sabrina Tosi Cambini and Fabio Frosini, "Editors' Introduction," *International Gramsci Journal* 2, no. 3: *Gramsci and Anthropology a 'Round Trip'* (2017): 2–26, 9. It is perhaps no surprise that these reflections came so early on in Italian anthropological circles, due to the nature of Italian society where "modern" and "non-modern" cultural elements, magical and rational accounts continue to co-exist with much greater proximity than in most western states where the project of modernity/modernization was much more pervasive and effective. Italy's precarious equilibrium between Catholicism and secularism, capitalism and communism, traditionalism and modernism, and individualism and communalism (and especially familism) provide for fertile and interesting comparative conversations with the challenging themes raised by the African philosophy debate.
- 29 Ernesto De Martino, "Intorno a una storia del mondo popolare," *Società* 5, no. 3, (1949): 411–53.
- 30 Kai Kresse, *Philosophizing in Mombasa* (London: Edinburgh University Press, 2007): 17.
- 31 See for example, Kwame Gyekye, *African Philosophical Thought: the Akan Philosophical Scheme* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995 [1987]); D. A. Masolo, *Self and Community in a Changing World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Kwasi Wiredu *Philosophy and an African Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Two works that contribute importantly to African philosophy themes through ethnographic sources, though not classified as African philosophy texts are, Okot p'Bitek's *Religion of the Central Luo* (Kampala, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam: East African Literature Bureau, 1971) and *African Religions in Western Scholarship* (Kampala, Nairobi, Dar es Salaam: East African Literature Bureau, 1970).
- 32 Brett Pollack, "Philosophizing by Proxy. A Hermeneutic Critique of African Philosophical Literature from the Twin Imaginaries of Collective or Individual Thought, and the Divisibility of Culture and Philosophy," (Rettová, Lanfranchi and Pahl 2022): 121–44.
- 33 Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, "Zeno and the Art of Anthropology," *Common Knowledge* 17, no. 1, (2011): 128–45.
- 34 Matei Candea, "Endo/Exo," *Common Knowledge* 17, no. 1, (2011): 146–50.
- 35 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement* (New York: Hafner, 1951 [1790]), §54.

- ³⁶ Hannah Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).
- ³⁷ Critics have pointed to the fact that Arendt's enthusiastic reading of Kant as a political philosopher overlooks the important detail that Kant's "community of others" remains a virtual one where *sensus communis* functions as a merely ideal norm and thus "completely unworkable for any community of empirical individuals as they consider a specific judgement of taste" (John Hicks, "Sensus Communis: On the Possibility of Dissent in Kant's 'Universal Assent,'" *Diacritics* 40, no. 4, (2012): 106–29, 108). Others have confuted these critiques by emphasizing the fact that: "Arendt is not simply interpreting Kant, but is rather using Kant in order to construct her own theory of judgement" while at the same time conceding that her very unique and original interpretation *does* in fact make it "hard to see where Kant's theory stops and Arendt's begins" (Annelise Degryse, "Sensus Communis as a Foundation for Men as Political Beings: Arendt's Reading of Kant's *Critique of Judgement*," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 37, no. 3, (2011): 345–58, 348).
- ³⁸ See, in particular, publications by Giuseppe Cospito, Fabio Frosini, Marcus Green, Kate Crehan, Cosimo Zene.
- ³⁹ Kate Crehan, *Gramsci's Common sense. Inequality and its Narratives* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2016).
- ⁴⁰ M. Green, "Semplici", <http://dizionario.gramsciproject.org/> (accessed May 24, 2022).
- ⁴¹ Benedetta Lanfranchi, "Does this Mean that there is Philosophy in Everything? A Comparative Reading of Henry Odera Oruka's and Antonio Gramsci's First and Second Order Philosophy," *Rethinking Sage Philosophy*, ed. Kai Kresse and Nyarwath Oriare, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2022).
- ⁴² Kate Crehan, "Living Subalternity: Antonio Gramsci's Concept of Common Sense," in *The Political Philosophies of Antonio Gramsci and B. R. Ambedkar*, ed. Cosimo Zene (London: Routledge, 2013): 103–15.
- ⁴³ D. A. Masolo, "Narrative and Experience of Community as Philosophy of Culture (Community as Method and Principle of Thought)," *Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya (PAK)* 1, no. 1, (2009): 43–68.
- ⁴⁴ One here could ask: which comes first? The chicken or the egg? Are narrative styles reflective of culturally rooted epistemologies or are these reflections of narrative styles? For an excellent book that looks deeply into the interrelations of content and form, see Karin Barber, *An Anthropology of Texts, Persons and Publics. Oral and Written Culture in Africa and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
- ⁴⁵ Alena Rettová, "Philosophy and Genre: African Philosophy in Texts," in *Africa in a Multilateral World Afropolitan Dilemmas*, ed. Albert Kasanda and Mark Hrubec (London: Routledge, 2022): 203–28.
- ⁴⁶ Alena Rettová, *Afrophone Philosophies: Reality and Challenge* (Stredokluky: Zdenek Susa, 2007).
- ⁴⁷ See: <https://cordis.europa.eu/article/id/434333-populism-s-threat-to-democracy-in-the-eu>
- ⁴⁸ Margaret Canovan, *The People* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005).
- ⁴⁹ Klaus Schwab, *The Fourth Industrial Revolution* (New York: Crown Business, 2016).