

Marx and Haiti: Note on a Blank Space

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This paper addresses the silence about the Haitian revolution in the oeuvre of Karl Marx. He, who regarded revolutions as “locomotives of world history,” ignored the history of the revolution in Haiti and remained silent about its protagonists. In a brief approach to this paradox, I argue that the main reason for this blank space (in the ambiguous meaning of the term) was Marx’s deficient analysis of contemporary racism. This is made clear in relation to 1) his acceptance of the biological meaning of race, 2) his involvement in two main racisms of the time, antisemitism and colonial racism, and 3) his differentiation and (de)gradation of historical subjects. The consequences were dramatic not because of Marx’s involvement in the racist zeitgeist but insofar as his learning process with regard to the relevance of anti-colonial movements and his awareness of negative societalization as well as its significance were not reflected in a theory of racism. This was to prove a debacle for subsequent attempts at a Marxist analysis of racism and has had effects that are still evident today.

Key words: racism; racial ideology; antisemitism; “white trash”; Karl Marx; Frederick Engels; early socialism; labor movement; Haitian Revolution

In December 1831, the *Journal des Débats* printed an article on the uprising of the “Canuts,” the silk weavers of Lyon. The author, Saint-Marc Girardin, compared them to barbarians and used a dramatic equation to depict the situation: “Every manufacturer lives in his factory like the planters in the colonies, one against hundred, and the revolt in Lyon is a sort of Saint-Domingue insurrection.”¹

Later, Karl Marx would write about these events that “the town proletariat at Lyons sounded the tocsin of revolution.”² He was well acquainted with Girardin, whom he called “that old Orleanist.”³ But he did not notice Girardin’s comparison of the insurrection in Lyon to the revolution in Haiti. This may have been caused by his unawareness of this special text. Most certainly, however, it was due to the fact that the Haitian revolution was a blank space in Marx’s theoretical thinking.

Surprisingly, Michel-Rolph Trouillot did not place him in his *Silencing the Past*, nor was Susan Buck-Morss on the scene to absolve him of this suspicion (after he was already absent from her “Hegel and Haiti”).⁴ Robert Stam and Ella Shohat erased the blank space as ingenuously as unsatisfactorily. They emphasized that “the historical and philosophical importance of the Haitian Revolution has been silenced,” included Marxist authors in this dictum, and noted: “Eric Hobsbawm’s Marxist classic *The Age of Revolution* [...] virtually ignores Haiti.”

But Marx himself is not a part of this perspective. The authors refer instead to Kevin Anderson’s study. It highlights Marx’s learning process concerning the historic importance of social struggles outside Europe. This reference leads to the proposition that Marx “saw the fight against racism as crucial in the creation of a strong labor movement.”⁵ In this way, the question of Marx’s attitude towards the revolution in Haiti is suppressed—and, much more momentously, that of his relation to contemporary racism is curtailed by substituting a euphemism for critical discussion.⁶

This striking silence (from Marx concerning Haiti and from the vast majority of his followers regarding his attitude to race) has a common matrix: racism. In the first case, it was part of a prejudiced worldview, while in the succeeding cases, it was partly ignored, partly treated as a side contradiction, and above all, not pursued in the works of Marx himself. Hitherto, the racisms of Marx (and Engels) have been pre-eminently treated denunciatively or affirmatively from distortive perspectives.⁷ The existing exceptions are doubly undertheorized insofar as their critiques either retreat to speculating about the impact of a dubious zeitgeist or originate from questioning based on a one-dimensional concept of racism.⁸

Against this backdrop, I first clarify that Marx's silence about the revolution in Haiti was not caused by a purported lack of information but by a reluctance to take this revolution seriously. He and his contemporaries were well-informed about the events in the Caribbean. Newspapers and literature addressed the topic extensively as a veritable *Engagement in St. Domingo*. Only philosophy remained silent, and Marx joined this cartel of wordlessness. I then show that Marx took an emancipatory stance in all questions of social inequality and inequity. But in this special case, his position was embedded in contemporary race ideas and therefore not free from racist undertones. This position found expression, inter alia, in the dubious thesis *A Negro is a Negro* (which was nevertheless often quoted positively afterwards). Subsequently, I enlarge upon this topic by relating it to two important varieties of racism: antisemitism and colonial racism. For this, I adduce the example of a vicious diatribe, in which Marx used the phrase *The Jewish Nigger Lassalle*. I will clarify that this was not a momentary everyday slur but an utterance of the racist stereotypes he shared with many of his contemporaries. This was a major reason why reflections on a critique of racism do not appear in Marx's oeuvre. Even the passage with the most critical potential in this direction is corrupt (though this is regularly kept secret in later affirmative quotations). By comparing English and Irish laborers to *Poor Whites and Black Slaves*, it clandestinely differentiates the process of social inclusion and exclusion: neither the victims nor the perpetrators of racism are on the same level.

1 Engagement in St. Domingo

The German public discussed the revolution in Haiti from its very beginning.⁹ During this time, the ideological temperature of the discourse changed with the events in Haiti and France. As long as the continental and the colonial revolution revolved around the question of freedom, it was enthusiastically approved. The public response changed when bourgeois observers believed that the radical wings of the revolutionaries went too far in their claims for social justice and autonomy.¹⁰

These observers neither fell silent nor spoke with one voice, however. In 1830, the liberal historian and politician Karl von Rotteck wrote: "As much as we know of the Negro state in Hayti it seems to be more free and happy than a Swiss republic."¹¹ This, however, was a rather intoxicated romanticism reminiscent of the stereotype of the "noble savage." The lemma "Haiti" in the *Staats-Lexikon* edited by Rotteck shows this unmistakably. Here, the author claims that the "happy" conditions of the island are achieved through the dominating of the "negroes" by "mulattoes," because "the black race [...] does not appear to be competent to constitute a nation." This should not imply that they were "degraded [...] on the stepladder of organisms." They would just be "different," equipped with "the gentle, childlike character of simple primitive people" and thus possibly happier than the "whites."¹²

The most efficacious Germanophone novella is far from such ambivalence: in *Die Verlobung in St. Domingo* by Heinrich von Kleist (which should be translated as "Engagement in St. Domingo" to elucidate its encroaching ideological construction of otherness through an ambiguous term),¹³ Kleist undertook a "binary racialization" of the conflict, which in its

complexity was definitely seen as an example par excellence of the intersection of race, class, and nation.¹⁴ But Kleist turned it into a pure race story in which black and white were irreconcilably opposed.

This tendency is also present in the voluminous novel *Toussaint* by Theodor Mügge. At the time of its writing, the author belonged to the Young Hegelian milieu, mingled with the circle of “The Free” (of which Engels was a member and which Marx treated with reserve). Despite sympathizing with the novel’s hero, Mügge used dehumanizing utterances to characterize the revolutionaries. In a mix of distance and approval, they were exposed as “laboring animals” or as “apelike.”¹⁵

Most certainly, Marx was aware of another connotation of Toussaint Louverture and Haiti through Arnold Ruge’s book on Paris.¹⁶ For a short time, Marx and Ruge were friends and, in 1844, jointly published the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*. Their subsequent discord was far-reaching, and Marx even made plans to include a chapter against Ruge in the *German Ideology*. It was written by Moses Hess (with some advice from Marx). This text explicitly mentions Ruge’s book and particularly the chapter on Victor Schoelcher.¹⁷ But it does not address the chapter’s argumentation with a single word.

Ruge refers to Schoelcher¹⁸ as “a veritable human personality,” one of the “notabilities of the social-democratic party” and “an authority in view of the issue of slavery” and Haiti. His deliberations do not exclude a sort of patronizing benevolence when he (with Schoelcher’s words) ascribes to the black population of Haiti a “naiveté of common sense” and a confidingness “like children.” But he also emphasizes Schoelcher’s belief that their “civilization will be encouraged even without the Europeans since the real Negroes took over governance instead of the Mulattos.” Ruge mentions Dutty Bukman, Jean François Papillon, Georges Biassou, Toussaint Louverture, and the numerous upheavals up to the “last revolutions of 1844 and 1845” and states that “the black proletarians” of Haiti, who had to fight for their freedom over a long period, will eventually achieve “an uplift of the Negroes under their own power.”

After relocating to London, Marx collaborated with the Chartist Ernest Jones, among others. Marx was impressed by Jones’s anti-colonial and international orientation, which supported his own disengagement with a Eurocentric perception of history. Jones had integrated Haiti into his long poem “The New World” by prominently mentioning Vincent Ogé and Toussaint Louverture. It was published in the newly founded journal *Notes to the People*. Marx explicitly welcomed the publication of the periodical and offered his cooperation.¹⁹

The protagonists of the revolution in Haiti enter the scene in canto six of Jones’s poem, in which an African invasion punishes Europe for the crimes of colonialism. This literary action is not always executed without racist overtones.²⁰ But as Ogé (member of the gens de couleur libre, plantation owner, exploiter of slaves, and insurgent) and Louverture (born as a slave and raised on a plantation, freed in his early thirties, successful commander, and famous leader of the revolution) are mentioned together,²¹ the poem implicitly points to the coincidence of autonomy and the correlation of the categories class and race in contemporary consciousness.²²

For Marx, “Toussaint Louverture” is, as Matthieu Renault has put it politely, a word only said once—“un hapax dans son œuvre.”²³ And even then, it appears in comparison and in suspicious company. In *The Class Struggles in France*, Marx wrote that, at the end of 1848, “Bonaparte still hid his longing to signify Napoleon, for Soulouque did not yet play Toussaint-Louverture.”²⁴ The first part of this comparison will again surface later, related to the entire entourage of Louis Bonaparte, “a noisy, disreputable, rapacious bohème that crawls into braided coats with the same grotesque dignity as the high dignitaries of Soulouque.”²⁵

This text begins with one of Marx’s often quoted phrases: “Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.” It is precisely to epitomize this farce that Marx resorts to Faustin Soulouque, who was president (from 1847 to 1849) and

emperor of Haiti (from 1849 to 1859).²⁶ His reign was ridiculed in Europe, and he was travestied into a farcical figure. But this humor was tainted with racism. German discourse proclaimed that Solouque tried to ape Napoleon “in pygmy-like madness.”²⁷ Some highly esteemed artists took this figuratively. In one of Honoré Daumier’s lithographs for *Le Charivari*, Soulouque is sitting in a tree. Half-naked and physiognomically simianized, this dehumanization is further emphasized by two monkeys sitting to his left and right. Another lithograph shows Soulouque in a coconut palm.²⁸

Marx was content to reference the contemporary discourse on Soulouque as a clownish and ludicrous figure. This sarcasm was so dear to him that he also employed it to ridicule other persons. “Bolivar is a veritable Soulouque,” he wrote to Engels, who later returned to the comparison of Louis Bonaparte and his “real original,” “the *Negro King Soulouque of Haiti.”²⁹

Beyond that, “Haiti” appeared in Marx and Engels in another “comical” context, as the two called Max Stirner’s imagination of world history. In their critique, Haiti is mentioned only en passant, when Stirner is blamed “that he imagines that the insurgent Negroes of Haiti and the fugitive Negroes of all the colonies wanted to free not themselves, but ‘man.’”³⁰ Simultaneously, the word “Negro” meanders en masse through *The German Ideology*, whereas it is only used twice by Stirner.³¹

Marx and Engels show in a detailed critique that Stirner followed Hegel, but they proceed tendentiously. Despite his choice of words, Stirner was not interested in that part of Africa Hegel called the “proper Africa” and the “domicile of the Negros.” He explicitly referred only to Egypt and Northern Africa, parts that Hegel believed should be “drawn over” to Europe. By contrast, Marx and Engels quote exactly those remarks by Hegel that do not exist in Stirner’s text and include a drastic denigration of the black race.³² This is accompanied by the import of the N-word, which is also absent in Stirner but is used excessively in *The German Ideology*.

There may have been several reasons for this. But it is important to note that at this time, and in their understanding, Marx and Engels were engaged in the critique of three representations of the bourgeois mind: idealistic philosophy, petit bourgeois socialism, and capitalist economies. As for race science (which was considered to be “scientific” for far more than a hundred years, established at universities, carried out by internationally accepted scientists, and discussed in well-deemed journals), they did not adopt a comparably skeptical position. They knew that its outcome was ideologically tinted, but they did not assume that it was fundamentally inverted.

As Erik van Ree has shown, the concept of race was already present in *The German Ideology*.³³ The axiomatic remarks on historiography mandate that “[a]ll historical writing must set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of men.” Elements of “these bases” are “the actual physical nature of man” and the surrounding “natural conditions.” The manuscript contains a comment that has been crossed out but not scrapped: “These conditions determine [...] the original, spontaneous organisation of men, especially racial differences.”³⁴ That Marx and Engels considered the race concept to be valid is evident from another passage of the text. Here, they declare (with a Lamarckist perspective) that “naturally evolved differences within the species, such as racial differences, [...] can and must be abolished in the course of historical development.”³⁵

This fundamental attitude toward race theory did not change in the further development of Marx’s (and Engels’s) thinking. In 1857, in the draft of an introduction to the principles of political economy, Marx notes: “The starting point is of course determinateness by nature; subjectively and objectively. Tribes, races, etc.”³⁶ Even in the *Capital*, “inborn racial characteristics” are still present.³⁷ And as late as 1894 Engels declares: “We see economic conditions as that which, in the final analysis, determines historical development. But *race is itself an economic factor.”³⁸

2 “A Negro is a Negro”

Amongst the reasons for Marx's silence on the Haitian Revolution is undoubtedly his sharing in everyday racist prejudices. He participated in the race thinking of the time. This applies to several contemporaneous racisms, particularly to antisemitism and colonial racism. The latter is characteristically expressed in Marx's refusal to apply his insight in the socio-historical constitution of social characters to the race question.

In the economic *Manuscripts* of 1857–58, Marx emphasized that “[s]ociety” consists of “relationships” in which its “individuals stand to one another.” This sociological view is illustrated by the example of slavery: “To be a slave and to be a citizen are social determinations.” A “[h]uman being [...] as such is not a slave; he is a slave in and through society.”³⁹ But already in 1849, he had argued in “Wage Labor and Capital”: “A Negro is a Negro. He only becomes a slave in certain relations.”⁴⁰ Later, this statement was incorporated without comment into the first volume of the *Capital*.⁴¹

The positive reading that such remarks “condensed” a good deal of “Marxian theory” is as flawed as it is uncritical and disguises the problem contained in Marx's statement, as does the claim that “Marx was [...] deconstructing the concept of ‘Negro.’”⁴² In a context where the category “ökonomische Charaktermaske” (economic character mask) is used to understand “that the characters who appear on the economic stage are but the personifications of the economic relations that exist between them,”⁴³ the exact opposite is true. While “wageworkers” and “capitalists” and likewise “slaves” and “slaveholders” are seen as social categories, this is not the case with persons called “Negroes.” Instead, Marx uses the word in the context in which it was placed by modern race theory.⁴⁴

The context is unequivocal: “What is a Negro slave? A man of the black race. The one explanation is as good as the other. A Negro is a Negro. He only becomes a slave in certain relations. A cotton-spinning jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. It becomes capital only in certain relations. [...] In production, men enter into relation not only with nature.”⁴⁵

The passage does not solve the race question; instead, it cements it. A “Negro” is a “man of the black race” like a “jenny is a machine for spinning cotton.” Marx recognizes only one dimension of the racism at issue: slavery is not natural. But he does not realize the other racist dimension of his deliberation: for him, race theory is valid and being a “Negro” is a natural quality, not a social relation.

This is all the more true since the comparison between the “Negro” and the “jenny” emerged from Marx's reasoning that material production is always more than the production of goods. This condensed into a lucid statement: “Does a worker in a cotton factory produce merely cotton textiles? No, he produces capital. He produces values which serve afresh to command his labour”—that is, he reproduces the fundamental class relations of capitalist society. The fact that Marx never asked this question concerning the social foundations of intra-capitalist slavery (hence, in this context, regarding the cotton plantations of the southern states of the USA in relation to the cotton industry in England) is further evidence for his uncritical use of the N-word.

He should have known better. Firstly, the word “Neger” (“Negro”) was quite new in the German language; in addition, Marx was an illustrative example of the corresponding linguistic change himself; and, furthermore, his erstwhile philosophical hero and later thorn in his side left no doubt concerning the ideological abysses of the category. To make matters worse, Marx got a son-in-law in respect of whom he failed to prove the coherence of his supposed tautology.

Concerning the word “Neger,” the relevant dictionary of the Grimm Brothers registers: “the Black, the Moor, from French *négre* (lat. *niger*), adopted only in the 18th century.”⁴⁶ The word “Moor,” which had been used for hundreds of years to designate Africans north and south

of the Sahara, was overwritten by the loanword “Negro.” This change in terminology was not impartial. The dictionary clarified this by referencing Kant: “the Negroes of Africa are not naturally gifted by any feeling beyond the scope of foolishness. Kant.” The founder of critical philosophy was quoted as an early example of using the word and giving a disparaging meaning to it.

The transition from “Moor” to “Negro” took place over the course of several decades and was promoted by the development of race theory. In the German discourse, there is an almost symbolic point of reference that allows a no less symbolic chronology of the replacement. In 1784, Samuel Thomas Soemmering, a contemporary of Kant (who called him a “philosophical dissectionist”) and friend of Georg Forster (who involved Kant in a discussion about race), published a study, “On the Somatic Difference of the Moor from the European.” In it, he purported that “the brain of the Moor was smaller than that of the European” and that “the Moors would border on the ape species far nearer than we Europeans.”⁴⁷ After engendering harsh criticism from, amongst others, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (who would later become famous as the source of the self-designation of whites as “Caucasians”), Soemmering published an enlarged edition only one year later entitled, “On the Somatic Difference of the Negro from the European,” without, however, changing his argument.

In Marx’s time (who was nicknamed “Moor” due to his dark complexion), “Moor” was separated from the new word “Negro” but was still applied to black Africans. It was part of an exotic and orientalized discourse, whereas the N-word dominated the scientific ambitions of race theory as well as the ordinary disparagements of everyday racism. Lexica tried to distinguish between the meanings of the words. The *Brockhaus* (later Germany’s most famous encyclopedia) pointed out, in 1798, that the “Negroes (Blacks) [...] differ very much from the Moors” and, in 1835, referred to the “Moorish or Moors of the African northern shore [...] who are no Negroes.”⁴⁸

This conviction was shared by the master thinker of the *weltgeist*. For Hegel, the north of Africa was a “splendid stretch of the earth” which must be “moved over to Europe.” The “proper Africa” south of the Sahara, however, was populated by “Negroes,” representing “the natural human being” in its “entire savagery.” In “this character,” Hegel decided, “nothing reminiscent of humanity is to be found.” He lived in a region where the “day of consciousness” had not yet enlightened “the dark night being as black as the colour of its inhabitants,” who were fetishists and practiced cannibalism.⁴⁹

Hence, the N-word did not just denote a dark-skinned person, but someone who remained incomplete in the development of humanity, existed in the darkness of ignorance, and vegetated without history. The category was always more than a description of outward appearances and was neither innocent nor naïve. This is why a kind of familial semantic experimental laboratory was opened when Marx’s daughter Laura fell in love with and married Paul Lafargue. According to Franz Mehring, prominent social democrat and early biographer of Marx, Lafargue had “Negro blood in his veins” that effected “a certain obstinacy,” which sometimes caused Marx to get excited about his “Nigger skull” in a “tone of good-humoured banter.”⁵⁰ In fact, this “humor” was corrupted by the impact of contemporary race thinking.

Marx’s ambivalence on this issue found expression in a letter to Laura and Paul. Here, he mocked Arthur de Gobineau, who had written a book “for the purpose to prove [...] that ‘la race blanche’ is a God amongst the other human races.” He even adumbrated an idea for a critical approach to this topic by annotating (in brackets) that “to such people it is always a source of satisfaction to have somebody they think themselves entitled to mépriser,” that is, to despise. But he did not elaborate on this idea, although he did en passant mention that he was engaged in the “Irish Question” (where he phrased a comparison which is, until today, passed off as an approach to a Marxist theory of racism). Instead, he switched to the remark that even Gobineau, “despite his spite against the ‘race noire’” had no choice to acknowledge that “le

nègre” was the source of art and that “all artistic production of the white nations [...] depend on their mixture avec ‘le sang noir.’” In the same breath, Marx inquired about the health of his grandson and commented: “The poor dear little fellow must have suffered severely from the cold so adverse to ‘la nature mélanienne,’” his nature characterized by the melanin of his skin, in other words, by his “race.”⁵¹

In a brief passage, Marx linked his grandson’s supposed associated melanin to the racist ideology of Gobineau, rejected the white supremacism of the latter, and stressed the alleged artistic vocation of the black race. This chain of connotations was triggered by the one-sixteenth of “black blood” imagined in a child’s veins. It was derived from the one-eighth black heritage in Lafargue’s ancestry.

One of Lafargue’s grandmothers was a mulatta from Saint Domingue, who married a Frenchman and, after the beginning of the black insurrection, had fled to Cuba, where Lafargue’s father was born. One of his grandfathers was a French Jew, who had fled from Haiti to Jamaica during the revolution, where he lived together with a Caribe Indian, who gave birth to Lafargue’s mother. Lafargue himself was proud that “the blood of three oppressed races ran in [his] veins” and that he was an “international[ist] of blood before [he] was one of ideology.”

So in his search for sobriquets, Marx had a lot of options. He could have just welcomed Lafargue as another “Moor” with regard to the latter’s complexion and descent. Or he could have used (in percentage order and according to contemporary ethnic and racial codes) three-quarters of whiteness, three-eighths of Haitianess, one-quarter of redness, one-quarter of Jewishness, or one-eighth of blackness. He drew on the latter, relating it not to the black revolution in Haiti but to the scope of race theory and racial slurs. Marx labelled Lafargue “African,” “Creole,” “negrillo,” “nigger,” and “gorilla.”⁵²

And indeed: this “black man” was not a slave (in Cuba, Lafargue’s father had been a slaveholder in fact). Neither was he just a “Negro.” The expression was used according to the prevailing logic of contamination that identified blackness even in a great dilution. In addition, it also made use of the stigmatizing dimension that was inseparable from the category “Negro.” Simianization was only one part of its options—even if, as a joke by Engels hauntingly demonstrated, it was deemed particularly comical.

When Lafargue ran for a seat in the arrondissement “Jardin des Plantes,” Engels wrote to his wife Laura: “My congratulations to Paul le candidat du Jardin des Plantes—et des animaux. Being, in his quality as a nigger, a degree nearer to the rest of the animal kingdom than the rest of us, he is undoubtedly the most appropriate representative of that district.”⁵³ The fact that the botanical garden of Paris also enclosed the zoo apparently provoked a cascade of associations for Engels, who seemed to have been profoundly convinced of its jocularly. Thus, the “gorilla” of his old comrade-in-arms had found an adequate place for his political ambitions.

3 “The Jewish Nigger Lassalle”

By the mid-nineteenth century, racially based racism was a fully developed social relation. Its corresponding worldview comprised a scientific theory of ranked races, an image of a progressively developing humanity led by its “white” representatives, and an everyday consciousness leavened with the yeasts of self-assurance, chosenness, supremacy, and hubris. Moreover, with a persistent ideological virulence, it was the successor to older racisms. Together, they formed a ramified mycelium of pejorative disdain for others, serving as an instrument for the upgrading of one’s own. The enormous cohesion of this ideological complex is manifested in the involvement of master thinkers in its construction and the inability of critical spirits to read its social character.

Even Marx, a profound and passionate critic of ideological perfidies, was heavily enmeshed in different modes of racist indignities. Two important ones, antisemitism and colonial racism, appear in a letter Marx wrote after a visit by Ferdinand Lassalle had utterly exasperated him. “The Jewish nigger Lassalle,” Marx noted, “is descended from the negroes who accompanied Moses’ flight from Egypt (unless his mother or paternal grandmother interbred with a nigger).” This would become manifest somatically (by “the shape of his head and the way his hair grows”) and mentally (by “the sheer gluttony and wanton lechery” and “[t]he fellow’s importunity” that is “niggerlike”).⁵⁴

However interpreted, these remarks are indubitably shaped by a mixture of the two prevailing European racisms conjoined by fantasies of cultural or sexual blending.⁵⁵ Concerning Lassalle, Marx did not only make ample use of almost all disparaging ascriptions from the stock of antisemitism; in this particular case, he also combined and intensified them by linking them to race theory and, in the process, heightened his linguistic offense by proceeding from one version of the N-word to a more pejorative one.

In Marxist (and other) debates about such tropes, many discussants routinely resort to the caveat of contemporary ideological noise that did not affect Marx’s principal attitudes.⁵⁶ Others suspect a shortcoming. Accordingly, “Marx’s numerous anti-Jewish invectives, voiced in his private correspondence, are of lesser significance than his ignorance of the importance of the Jewish question.”⁵⁷ What such readings fail to see is that the problem is more serious. Marx’s blatant conflation of different vilifications indicates the absence of a theoretical concept of racism. This applies to racial as well as antisemitic insinuations.

The latter accompanied Marx almost all his life. He expressed them, and was victimized by them. Principally, they influenced the social and ideological climate of the time. This holds true for the different countries in which Marx lived and cultivated extensive contacts. Moreover, antisemitism was not only a right-wing tendency but also a cross-class attitude. It was a part of the various socialist ideas and movements in Germany, France, and England.⁵⁸ Marx (and Engels) came into close contact with some of its most vigorous manifestations. This pertains to early socialism (especially in France), to the General German Workers’ Association after the death of Lassalle, and to political antisemitism (in France and Germany).

In the beginning, the so-called Jewish question was treated by Marx in a philosophical context. The analysis of this early writing usually follows distinct directions. Anti-Marxist authors detect an offensive example of antisemitism, non-Marxist authors indulge in to-and-fro hopscotch contests, and Marxist authors find no antisemitism at all. Classing Marx’s arguments with “the philosophical battle of radical enlightenment,” Enzo Traverso even concludes that, “[f]ar from being anti-Semitic, this approach was rooted in the tradition started two centuries earlier by Spinoza.”⁵⁹

But Marx established a direct relation of Jewry and monetary economy, turned the “real Jew” into a representative of “self-interest” and “haggling,” and declared the Jewish idolization of money to be “the supreme practical expression of human self-estrangement.” His reasoning, which semantically fluctuates between “Jew” and “Judaism,” resulted in the necessity of an “emancipation of mankind from Judaism.”⁶⁰

This wording has been interpreted as “phantasmagoria of vanishing” as well as the judaizing construction of a “Judaism of society.”⁶¹ That these deliberations bear traces of antisemitic aversion became blatantly obvious in the preservation of anti-Jewish side-blows in Marx’s later writings. They appear in the first thesis on Feuerbach as the “dirty-Jewish form of appearance” of “practice.” And in the first volume of *Capital*, they are still present as “money, inwardly circumcised Jews.”⁶²

In “The Jewish Question,” Marx developed his thoughts on the general Jewishness of capitalist economy in a controversy with Bruno Bauer, a mastermind of the Young Hegelians. In contrast to Bauer, who opposed the emancipation of the Jews, Marx was an unreserved

supporter of this policy. Moreover, he soon shifted from a religiously connoted to a socio-economic critique of capitalism. But this is not the crucial point regarding the racism issue. Both Marx and Engels, who were attentive observers of the political development in Germany, never criticized Bauer's deepened antisemitism in retrospect.

After Bauer's death, Engels wrote a positive obituary for Bauer without even noting the latter's blatant antisemitism.⁶³ The text was published in 1882 in *Der Sozialdemokrat*, the journal of the *Socialist Workers' Party*. At this time, political antisemitism in Germany was already quite developed. The "Antisemitic Petition" had provoked a fierce public debate and caused anti-Jewish turmoil, including the arson of a synagogue. And the court chaplain, Adolf Stoecker, had already taken a swing towards antisemitic propaganda with his *Christian Social Party*. A theory of antisemitic racism was sorely needed but was by no means in sight.

The same blind spot was evident in the argument by Marx (and Engels) on early socialism, especially concerning Charles Fourier and Alphonse de Toussenel. The first was intensively discussed, the other used as a source of information. In either case, despite the obvious antisemitism of both authors, the "Jewish question" was no topic of reflection.

Fourier warned against "des légions de Juifs, tous parasites, marchands, usuriers" and overall looked at the Jews as "une race toute improductive." This economic dimension was accompanied by older insinuations, for example, in the rhetorical question whether "les Juifs [...] ne sont-ils pas la lèpre et la perte du Corps social?"⁶⁴ Toussenel simultaneously judaized capitalism and ethnicized the Jews. For him, they were "le peuple de Satan" and a "[r]ace [...] toujours prête à retourner au culte du veau d'or." He declared, "que pas un juif n'a fait œuvre utile de ses mains, depuis le commencement du monde." Because "le juif" was said to be "roi par le capital," it was out of question that "[l]e juif règne et gouverne en France."

As Toussenel stated that "[j]uif, usurier, trafiquant, sont pour moi synonymes," he could use the term "Jew" for "tout parasite improductif, vivant de la substance et du travail d'autrui." This was the deliberate demagogic core of his antisemitic tirade: "Les travailleurs qui s'exténuent et meurent à la peine, sur les trois quarts de la superficie du globe, travaillent pour enrichir quelques milliers de nababs fainéants de Juda, d'Amsterdam et de Londres."⁶⁵ This was already the pivotal argument of all political antisemitism to come.

Marx used Toussenel's book in preparation for his articles on *The Class Struggles in France*.⁶⁶ But even though he did not use the antisemitic dimension of this source of information, the judaization of financial capital appeared at least in the margins of his argumentation. However, in his extensive discussion of conflicts of class interests and coalitions of class factions, Marx ignored Toussenel's antisemitism and its social demagoguery.⁶⁷

Eventually, the only explicit discussion of antisemitism emerged in the context of the German labor movement and ended in a theoretical disaster. Its analytical center was Engels's analysis of Eugen Dühring, to which Marx contributed extensive notes.⁶⁸ Dühring had already revealed his antisemitism when Engels started writing his critique. But Engels more or less ignored this dimension of Dühring's worldview. This did not change after the publication of Dühring's *The Jewish Question as a Racial, Moral and Cultural Question*. Here, the author frankly pointed out the connection between classism and racism.

According to this, the Jews had "travestied and judaized the socialist ideas" by "meddling in the social question" and, by this, sowed the seeds of "class hatred" to be able "to come to power more easily in the split society." But this plot would be doomed to failure: "They have evoked class consciousness until such time as race consciousness now starts up from its previous sleep to show the Jews that there is another and major antagonism as the one between labourer and bourgeois."⁶⁹

This threat was phrased in an atmosphere characterized by growing political antisemitism featuring the slogan: "The social question is essentially a Jewish question." It was framed by Otto Glagau, who shortly afterwards became chief editor of the *State Socialist*, the paper of the *Central*

Union for Social Reform that then merged with the *Christian Social Party*, which had been founded as *Christian Social Workers Party* by Adolf Stoecker.⁷⁰

Neither Marx nor Engels (nor some of the leading German social democrats who commented on the topic of antisemitism) conceived of the meaning and importance of this form of racism for the ideological social integration of different classes by the invention and propagation of a common enemy. Engels's last words on this problem were a theoretical fiasco. Still in the second and third edition of his *Anti-Dühring* (in 1885 and 1894), he contented himself with characterizing "hatred of the Jews" as an "ostelbische Eigenschaft," a feature "specific to the region east of the Elbe," that is, the land of the Prussian country gentry, and, therefore, nothing but a "prejudice against the Jews, inherited from the bigotry of the Middle Ages."⁷¹

This was also the tenor of an often-quoted definition, published 1890 in the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*. In it, Engels declared that "anti-Semitism betokens a retarded culture" related to the "lesser nobility" of the "Junkers" and concluded: "Hence anti-Semitism is merely the reaction of declining medieval strata against a modern society" and as such "a degenerate form of feudal socialism."⁷²

In actual fact, Engels (and Marx) were confronted with antisemitism during their whole intellectual life, and they were witnesses of its classist orientation and social demagoguery from early socialism to the "German socialism" à la Dühring. But in this matter, their sense for ideology criticism fell short. It would, therefore, have been astonishing if they had acted differently in the case of race theory—especially when considering their approach to the race question and racist jokes or slurs, like the ones applied to Lafargue or Lassalle. In both cases, prejudices impeded a critical examination of the racism issue.

When Marx attacked Lassalle for his inappropriate behaviour, political bigotry, and suspected avarice, he could have used expressions from the vocabulary of moral or political arguments. But he ethnicized and racialized his character and, instead, brought up the "big three" of social discrimination as a twofold othering of Lassalle and as a metamorphosis of a mode of behavior into a twofold genealogical stain. This was not only a mobilization of racist knowledge during a transitory tantrum but also the infuriated expression of lack in an engagement with two of the main contemporary racisms.

4 "Poor Whites" and "Black Slaves"

In a treatise on race and class, Alex Callinicos mentions "the Haitian Revolution and other slave risings" at the beginning of his text and invokes the "great rebellions of black people" since "the Haitian Revolution" at the end.⁷³ The text itself is motivated by the author's critique of a sort of "black Marxism" that originates from the idea of a Eurocentric narrowness of classical Marxism.⁷⁴

Against such deviation, and based on a constricted concept of racism, he claims that "Marx grasped the way" to its analysis and "sketch[ed] out the outline of a materialist explanation of racism."⁷⁵ But his handling of the respective quotation shows that he treated it altogether uncritically and in this way shared the white noise that historically interfered with positions of the labor movement, its Marxist wings, and even the social theory of Marx (and Engels) included. Consequently, the mention of "Haiti" proves to be a mere feint instead of a central topic of analysis and a part of a Marxist theory of racism as well as of revolution.

Keeanga-Yamahatta Taylor relies on the same source without any critical objections when she ascertains that "Marx understood the dynamics of racism in a modern sense" and developed "a Marxist theory of how racism operated in contemporary society."⁷⁶ Marx's quotation in question rests on the relation between English and Irish workers. Its starting point is the division of the "working class" into "hostile camps," "English proletarians and Irish proletarians." The

core content of the argument consists of a comparison that cannot be reproduced undisputedly but requires a critical interpretation:

The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who forces down the standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker, he feels himself to be a member of the ruling nation and, therefore, makes himself a tool of his aristocrats and capitalists against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself. He harbours religious, social and national prejudice against him. His attitude toward him is roughly that of the poor whites to the niggers in the former slave states of the American Union.⁷⁷

The problem with this statement is that it did not function as a focal point for theoretical reflections on racism—despite its frequent presentation as a self-explaining argumentation.⁷⁸ There is a reason for this that contradicts all attempts to pass it off as the nucleus of a Marxist theory of racism without discussion: the two sides of the comparison do not add up to an equation. Rather (and despite Marx's epithet "roughly"), one has "English proletarians" / "Irish proletarians" \neq "poor whites" / "niggers."

This was not a comparison but a confrontation of class ("proletarians") and race ("Whites" and "Blacks"). An indicator in this direction is the pejorative use of the N-word. As often, Marx writes quite economically, using parts of his texts several times in different contexts. In this case, a variant of the disputable passage surfaced in a comparatively formal document. Mike Cole, for instance, who relates to Taylor and her reference to Marx, at the same time uses another version of her quote (unsurprisingly without any critical reflections):⁷⁹ "The average English worker hates the Irish worker [...]. He feels national and religious antipathies for him. He regards him somewhat like the poor whites of the Southern States of North America regarded black slaves."⁸⁰

In this official letter to the Committee of the Social-Democratic Worker's Party in Germany, Marx uses a distinctly more moderate phrasing. At the same time, his contraction of blackness and slavery, as well as his use of the past tense, indicates that he was not aware of the theoretical potential of his example. Anti-black racism in the USA did not dissipate with the end of the Civil War. And it was not only directed against members of the lower classes but levelled at racially discriminated others as an undifferentiated mass that encompassed the descendants of former slaves and of free people of different social status.

Instead of thinking in this direction, Marx (and Engels) even twice followed a racist path, concerning the "black slaves" as well as the "poor whites." Therefore, it is not only implausible but also obscuring when, in the broader context of this quote, Kevin Anderson assumes that Marx was "examining the possibility of a new form of revolutionary subjectivity": "the potential for an alliance between poor Whites and enslaved Blacks."⁸¹ Rather, Marx's inequation shows a massive imbalance.

Its main reason is the fact that there are working-class-related proletarians ("Irish" and "British") on the one side and declassed, racialized groups ("black slaves" and "poor whites") on the other side. The former are understood as potentially revolutionary subjects of a coming proletarian revolution, the latter are treated as social scum and backward representatives of a subaltern race as well as of an obsolete mode of production. Instead of transferring an idea of racist discrimination from the American to the British scene, the comparison subverts its own potential and blames the English workers, who ostensibly treat their Irish class comrades as if they were "niggers," for behaving like lumpen.

Being likened to the "poor whites" of the antebellum South was not a compliment but an accusation. Marx and Engels knew that the poor whites were viewed as "white trash"⁸² by the rich planters, and they did not value them much differently. For them, the "poor whites" were not respectable members of the working class. Engels was convinced that the "mean whites will

gradually die out” because “nothing more will become of this race.”⁸³ Marx compared the “condition” of the “poor whites” to “that of the Roman plebeians,” and Engels drew a bizarre comparison in this context: “When, in the decline of the Roman Republic, the free Italian peasants were expropriated from their farms, they formed a *class of ‘lumpen whites’ (‘poor whites’, ‘white trash’)* similar to that of the Southern Slave States.” The “slaves” and the **“lumpen freemen” were called “two classes equally unfit for self-emancipation.”⁸⁴

In doing so, he could relate to an opinion formulated with Marx early on, viz. that “the plebeians, standing between freemen and slaves, never came to more than a lumpenproletariat.”⁸⁵ And even in the *Communist Manifesto*, the “lumpenproletariat” of the capitalist society, named the “dangerous class” in the English translation, is labelled “social scum” and rated as a “passively rotting mass” that has to be “sharply differentiated from the industrial proletariat” because, as Marx stated in the *Class Struggles in France*, it was not a “working class” but “living on the crumbs of society.”⁸⁶

The “poor whites” in Marx’s comparison are (unlike the Irish “proletarians”) not part of the laboring classes but “lumpen whites,” not part of a revolutionary subject but a “passive” mass of useless people without any perspective of “self-emancipation.” Phrased in a terminology semantically meandering between class and race, they are a degraded social substratum and a dying race.⁸⁷

Their only social anchor is their “whiteness,” which allows them to distinguish themselves not only against “black slaves” but also against all social categories of people labelled black. Instead of theorizing this correlation, Marx and Engels disparaged them as lumpen, treated them as a social residuum, and thus provided a starting point for socialist eugenics.⁸⁸

The black Americans did not fare better. Their origin might have been, as Marx excerpted from Lewis Morgan, “Africa,” an “ethnic chaos of savagery [and] barbarism”; or “the common negro type” was, as he adopted from Pierre Trémaux, “only a degeneration of a far higher one.”⁸⁹ In any case, there was a cultural difference between Africans and Europeans, as could be seen, for example, in Jamaica, where “the main stock of Negroes [...] always consisted in freshly imported barbarians.” In contrast, “the present generation of Negroes in America is a native product, more or less Yankeeified, English speaking, etc., and hence capable of being emancipated.”⁹⁰

This provision surfaced again when Marx drafted the address with which, after the Civil War, the *International Working Men’s Association* congratulated Abraham Lincoln for the successful “struggle for the rescue of an enchained race.” Here, he classified the Civil War as a conflict “to decide whether the virgin soil of immense tracts should be wedded to the labour of the emigrant, or prostituted by the tramp of the slave-driver.”⁹¹ The black Americans were “capable of being emancipated,” but, as an “enchained race,” they were not seen as subjects of this process. The “virgin soil” (obviously ownerless, even in defiance of the contemporary Indian Wars) was either defiled by slave owners or cultivated by migrant peasants (both of them almost exclusively from a European background).

Though Marx’s (and Engels’s) view of the Irish was not free from racist admixtures, they were willing to accept the Irish workers as comrades of the English proletarians. In this respect, the English laborers, by refusing their Irish fellows solidarity, behaved deludedly and irresponsibly—just as if they were social trash. In reverse, the Irish workers were even attested a “more passionate and revolutionary character” than that of the English.⁹²

The assertion that “Marx is [...] explicitly linking racist ideology and practice, anti-Irish racism here compared to anti-black” is mere wishful thinking.⁹³ The Irish proletarians differ markedly from the black slaves in Marx’s comparison. As for Haiti, this is even more emphasized. On the eve of revolution, the black slaves there were predominantly not a “native product” (as in the United States) but “freshly imported barbarians” (as in Jamaica): “[b]y 1789, two-thirds of the roughly half a million slaves in Saint Domingue were African-born.”⁹⁴

This did not prevent them from enforcing “[t]he Haitian Revolution, the first successful workers’ revolt in modern history.”⁹⁵ But Marx did not concede to them what he stressed concerning the “class struggles in France”—that the “popular masses” developed a “new feature” of revolutionary struggles because “the people, after the first rise, have not disarmed themselves” but “have taken the actual management of their Revolution into their own hands.”⁹⁶

An echo of this shortcoming also reverberates in one of Marx’s sentences that is rarely missing when the topic “Marx, Marxism, and racism” is discussed: “Labour cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded.”⁹⁷ In addition to its emancipatory intention, the sentence is characterized by two problems, one semantic and one contextual.

Regarding its semantics, there is a diathetic difference. White skin and black skin are situated in distinct positions, the one designated to emancipate itself, the other to no longer be branded by others. Apart from that, the common citation method withholds the context and disregards the historic circumstances. But even a cursory glance of these circumstances reveals that, at the Baltimore conference highlighted in the same breath, the race question was not even part of the agenda. Instead, the only labor periodical “to champion the cause of unity of black and white labor” “charged the delegates with ‘colorphobia.’”⁹⁸ Viewed in this light, “slavery” clandestinely changes its color in Marx’s deliberations without provoking his critical analytical potential.

For Marx, the historical context was not unknown. But he did not discuss it—just as he never discussed the self-liberation of the Haitian revolutionaries. Instead, the fog of racism with its enlightened concept of Europe’s civilizing mission (which had partly replaced and partly absorbed the colonial proclamation of Europe’s missionary mission) deterred Marx from integrating the Haitian Revolution in his critical reflections. In this way, it disappeared from the revolutionary theory of Marx (and Engels as well as, for a long time, Marxism).

The reason was not a lack of information. Like Saint-Marc Girardin in 1831 or Arnold Ruge in 1846, Carl Theodor Schuster, a founding member of the *Bund der Geächteten* (League of Outlaws), in 1835, compared the situation of the wageworkers in Europe with that of the slaves in Haiti. They had inflamed “the fire mark of the social revolution” and, after the revolts of the workers in Lyon and Bristol, a storm was brewing in Europe, too.⁹⁹

In the works of Marx (and Engels), however, “[t]he significance of the French Revolution is appreciated; the significance of the Haitian Revolution [...] is not,” as Charles Mills condensed the issue.¹⁰⁰ The reason for this is obvious. Marx, as Robin Blackburn phrased it, “did sometimes take note of slave resistance and slave revolt, but he did not study the Haitian example and tended to believe that slaves needed external deliverance.”¹⁰¹ He forgot to add that this belief was rooted in racism.

5 Coda and Codetta

Marx was a theorist of emancipation by revolution. He never supported any policy of oppression or disregard for rights. Rather, he demanded and backed struggles and uprising for the liberation from exploitation, domination, and inequity. And, in many cases, he did not cling to the zeitgeist. Instead, he claimed to have put critique back on its feet (against the philosophical zeitgeist), deciphered the secret of the form of value (against the economical zeitgeist), or stated the necessity of a proletarian revolution (against the political zeitgeist).

But even though he did this thinking during the heyday of modern European racism, was affected by it firsthand as a converted Jew and through a son-in-law of a multi-racial Caribbean origin, and, furthermore, repeatedly came close to the impact of racist societalization in his political experience and theoretical reflections, he never developed a basis for a theory of racism. The reason for this blank space in his social theory was not only his uncritical participation in

racist insinuations and tropes. Primarily, this attitude was due to his deficient examination of two of the main contemporary racist ideologies: antisemitism and race theory.

Concerning the one, Marx and Engels classed it as an outdated way of thinking about an obsolete social system. Concerning the other, they rejected its legitimizing dimension but did not query its scientific validity. In both cases, they did not feel obliged to turn something from its head onto its feet or to decipher an interior mystery of an external reified social form.

Marx neither realized that “a negro” was not a natural but a social category, nor did he even make a move to deconstruct this category. Instead, he connected it with imaginings from the fund of race theory. In doing so, he did not ascribe to Blacks a fundamentally inferior position within the framework of human races. But he did attribute to them a backward status in the course of social development. For this reason, they were not taken into account as historical subjects (at least in their “African version”).

This is the main reason for the obfuscation of the Haitian Revolution in the reflections of Marx (and Engels). They knew that it had happened, but they did not believe that it was of historical and theoretical significance. The impact of this lack of understanding manifested in a familial sideshow. In the veins of his son-in-law, Marx did not suppose the blood of Haitian revolutionaries but of African Blacks (and did not even shy away from simianizing ascriptions).

Such attitudes also shaped a comparison that could have constituted a starting point for a critique of racism but was not recognized in its contextual relevance. Instead, Marx’s deliberations on the relationship between English and Irish workers, as well as on poor Whites and enslaved Blacks, incorporated unreflective and pejorative ideas.

That Marx was not aware of the potential scope of his comparison is clearly evidenced by the fact that he did not use it for an analysis of antisemitism. He did not understand the fundamentally integrative relevance of racist societalization but only lightly touched its surface when he accused the English proletarians of a corrupt consciousness that is otherwise found in social lumpen, who are anyhow incapable of a proper class struggle.

Regarding antisemitism in Germany, he did not even make comparable considerations but underestimated and misinterpreted it. Moreover, Marx used its patterns of discrimination in his personal interactions. That he, at the extreme, even combined antisemitic and antiblack vilifications was not a private faux pas. On the contrary, it should be considered a failure to understand the relevance of the racist dimensions of societalization.¹⁰²

Despite racism being a pivotal medium of social cohesion in class societies (and notwithstanding that this function carries great weight in capitalism because of its legally free underclass), Marx did not deal with it. This had lasting impacts on the handling of racism within the wing of the labor movement that was based on Marxist ideas and not least on the Marxist theory itself. Even if we assume the existence of various Marxisms, their exponents either viewed racism as a subordinate problem or did not bring the debate on the relationship between class and race to a consensual conclusion; in addition, they did not bring the analysis of two of the main racisms of modernity, antisemitism and colonial racism, to a common denominator.

It is undeniable that W. E. B. Du Bois already formulated his insight in racism as negative societalization at the beginning of the twentieth century as “attempts to make the slums of white society in all cases and under all circumstances the superior of any colored group.”¹⁰³ But although he later substantiated this assertion with a comprehensive study of *Black Reconstruction* (including some outcomes of his reading of Marx), he never expanded these deliberations towards a general theory of racism (including antisemitism and other forms of racist exclusion not based on color racism).

Early analyses of antisemitism were comparatively one-sided and limited. Franz Neumann (then a co-operator at the *Institute of Social Research* exiled at Columbia University in New York) declared that “racial theory was as much a foundation for imperialist expansion as it was a spurious solution of class antagonisms” and concluded that “racism and Anti-Semitism are

substitutes for the class struggle.”¹⁰⁴ He merged two of the central contemporary racist patterns and connected the structures of class and race. But this had no theoretical consequences and resulted in the characterization of German fascism as “proletarian racism.”

In the mid-twentieth century, Frantz Fanon pointed to the affinity of antisemitism and colonial racism and the constitution of racism as negative societalization. As for the former, he insisted on the fact that, in principle, “[c]olonial racism is no different from any other racism” and referred to a philosophy professor who “was universally right” when warning: “Whenever you hear anyone abuse the Jews, pay attention, because he is taking about you.”¹⁰⁵ Seen from this perspective, “anti-Jewish prejudice is no different from anti-Negro prejudice.”¹⁰⁶ Regarding the latter, he made it clear that the colonial situation was not characterized by the “antagonistic forces” of “working class and bourgeois capitalism” but by the “undifferentiated character” of “foreign domination” due to which every foreigner “is in the status of an oppressor.” Without any illusion, he criticized “doctrinal position” according to which “[i]n a colonial country [...] there is a community of interests between the colonized people and the working class of the colonist country.” It would be disproved by the “history of the wars of liberation.”¹⁰⁷ But Fanon never expanded on both deliberations towards a general theory of racism.

The list of examples like these is long and extends to discussions in the most recent past and in the present. By and large, Marxist contributions to racism analysis did not treat race-related and antisemitic racism together¹⁰⁸ and did not develop a common basis for dealing with the class-race problem.¹⁰⁹ Until today, neither are the different forms and specific variations of racism integratively conceptualized nor are class-specific and racist differentiations adequately interconnected and theorized. This is not least because the debate suffers from a blind spot that occludes tracing the problems back to the analytical shortcomings of Marx (and Engels) in relation to the fully developed anti-Black and antisemitic (and other) racisms of their day.

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¹ Saint-Marc Girardin, “France,” *Journal des Débats*, 8 Décembre, (1831): 1 f., 1 (“Chaque fabricant vit dans sa fabrique comme les planteurs des colonies au milieu de leurs esclaves, un contre cent: et la sédition de Lyon est une espèce d’insurrection de Saint-Domingue”). In Saint-Marc Girardin, *Souvenirs et réflexions politiques d’un journaliste* (Paris: Lévy Frères, 1859), this text is incorporated in the chapter “Les Barbares,” 142–64, in particular, 144–51.

² Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1 (MECW 35), 59. In the following, I will use the standard English edition, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Collected Works (MECW)*, 50 vols. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975–2005). When translated terms are inaccurate or misleading, I will refer to the German edition MEW: Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Werke (MEW)*, ed. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Institut für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung and Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, 44 + 3 vols. (Berlin: Dietz, 1956–2018). In addition, or in case of doubt, I will refer to the MEGA: Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Gesamtausgabe (MEGA)*, ed. Institutes of Marxism-Leninism Berlin and Moscow, Internationale Marx-Engels-Stiftung Amsterdam (Berlin: Dietz, Akademie and de Gruyter, 1975 ff., still incomplete).

³ Karl Marx, *The Russian Humbug. Gladstone’s Failure. Sir Charles Wood’s East Indian Reforms* (MECW 12: 115–24), 117; see Julian Saporì, “Saint-Marc Girardin, portrait d’un notable du XIX^e siècle,” *Mémoires de la fédération des sociétés d’histoire et d’archéologie de l’Aisne* 45, 2000: 37–78, and Philip

- Spencer, “‘Barbarian Assault’: The Fortunes of a Phrase,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 16, no. 2 (1955): 232–9.
- 4 Cf. Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995); Susan Buck-Morss, “Hegel and Haiti,” *Critical Inquiry* 26, no. 4 (2000): 821–65.
- 5 Robert Stam, Ella Shohat, *Race in Translation: Culture Wars around the Postcolonial Atlantic* (New York etc.: New York University Press, 2012), 19 (silenced, Hobsbawm), 64 (fight against racism).
- 6 This applies to Anderson himself, by the way, in whose text “Haiti” only emerges in the index but not as a problem—see Kevin B. Anderson, *Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies* (Chicago etc.: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 69, 71, 99.
- 7 As deterrent examples see i.a. Carlos Moore, *Were Marx and Engels White Racists? The Prolet-Aryan Outlook of Marx and Engels* (Chicago: Institute of Positive Education, 1972) and Nathaniel Weyl, *Karl Marx: Racist* (New York: Arlington House, 1979) on the one side and on the other side Tom Jeannot, “Marx, Capitalism, and Race,” *Radical Philosophy Today* 5, (2007): 69–92.
- 8 See, for instance, Diane Paul, “‘In the Interest of Civilization’: Marxist Views of Race and Culture in the Nineteenth Century,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 42, no. 1 (1981): 115–38 (as an early example) or Erik van Ree, “Marx and Engels’s Theory of History: Making Sense of the Race Factor,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 24, no. 1 (2019): 54–73 (as a recent approach). The former ends up with the trivial diagnosis that “Marx and Engels [...] were simply no better or worse than most of their contemporaries” (Paul 139); the latter shows the various uses Marx and Engels made of the category race, but his reflections are based on a curtailed understanding of racism (van Ree 57).
- 9 Cf. Karin Schüller, “From Liberalism to Racism: German Historians, Journalists, and the Haitian Revolution from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries,” in *The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World*, ed. David P. Geggus (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), 23–43.
- 10 Cf. Susanne Zantop, *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770–1870* (Durham etc.: Duke University Press, 1997), 141 ff.
- 11 ed. Carl von Rotteck, “Das Jahr 1828,” in *Allgemeine politische Annalen, Neueste Folge*, vol. 1 (München etc.: Cotta’sche Buchhandlung, 1830), 48–70, 69. This positive evaluation might have been shaped by the development of the German-Caribbean trade relations. Caspar Engels, an uncle of Friedrich Engels, made good money as a member of the “Rhenish-Westphalian Company” in the trade with the new state of Haiti. The latter was viewed by German politicians and businessmen as a “gate to the West Indies and Middle America” (Michael Zeuske, “Die vergessene Revolution: Haiti und Deutschland in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Aspekte deutscher Politik und Ökonomie in Westindien,” *Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas* 28, (1991): 285–326, 313).
- 12 Friedrich Bülow, “Haiti,” in *Staats-Lexikon oder Encyclopädie der Staatswissenschaften*, ed. Carl von Rotteck, Carl Welcker, vol. 7 (Altona: Hammerich, 1839), 314–23, 322.
- 13 Cf. Heinrich von Kleist, “Die Verlobung in St. Domingo,” in id., *Erzählungen, Zweiter Teil* (Berlin: Realschulbuchhandlung, 1811), 1–85; see ed. Reinhard Blänker, *Heinrich von Kleists Novelle ‘Die Verlobung in St. Domingo’: Literatur und Politik im globalen Kontext um 1800* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2012). The novel has turned out to be a rich source for adaptations, especially in German literature; see Herbert Uerlings, *Poetiken der Interkulturalität: Haiti bei Kleist, Seghers, Müller, Buch und Fichte* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1997). But there are also two operas; see Winfried Zillig, *Die Verlobung in St. Domingo* (1957); Werner Egk, *Die Verlobung in St. Domingo* (1963); cf. Christoph Schmitz, “Negerrevolution auf der Opernbühne: Winfried Zilligs und Werner Egks Vertonungen von Kleists Die Verlobung in St. Domingo,” in *Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas* 28, (1991): 407–25. The story has even reached Australia with a stage play by Mudrooroo; see ed. Gerhard Fischer, *The Mudrooroo/Müller Project: A Theatrical Casebook* (Kensington: New South Wales University Press, 1993).

- ¹⁴ Cf. Hansjörg Bay, “‘Als die Schwarzen die Weißen ermordeten’: Nachbeben einer Erschütterung des europäischen Diskurses in Kleists ‘Verlobung in St. Domingo,’” in *Kleist Jahrbuch 1998* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1998): 80–108, 87.
- ¹⁵ Theodor Mügge, *Toussaint: Ein Roman*, 4 vols. (Stuttgart: Hoffmann’sche Verlags-Buchhandlung, 1840), vol. 1, 13 (laboring animals), 290 (apelike); cf. Marie Biloa Onana, *Der Sklavenaufstand von Haiti: Ethnische Differenz und Humanitätsideale in der Literatur des 19. Jahrhunderts* (Cologne etc.: Böhlau, 2010). For Mügge’s affiliation to “The Free,” see Martina Thom, *Dr. Karl Marx: Das Werden der neuen Weltanschauung, 1835–1843* (Berlin: Dietz, 1986), 45; Marx mentions Mügge in a letter, cf. Karl Marx, *Letter to Friedrich Engels, 10 May 1861* (MECW 41: 285–9), 287.
- ¹⁶ Cf. Arnold Ruge, *Zwei Jahre in Paris: Studien und Erinnerungen*, Erster Teil (Leipzig: Jurany 1846—thanks to Lars Lambrecht and Michael Heinrich for their pointers to Ruge). For the following quotes from this book, see 161 (human personality, etc.), 189 (naiveté, children), 178 (without Europeans), 188 (last revolutions, black proletarians, uplift). For Ruge and Marx, see Warren Breckman, *Marx, The Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory* (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1998), esp. 221 ff.
- ¹⁷ See Moses Hess with the collaboration of Karl Marx, “Dottore Graziano’s Werke: Zwei Jahre in Paris, Studien und Erinnerungen von A. Ruge,” in Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Deutsche Ideologie*, Manuskripte und Drucke (MEGA I/5: 647–667), 658; on Hess see Shlomo Na’aman, *Emanzipation und Messianismus. Leben und Werk des Moses Hess* (Frankfurt etc.: Campus, 1982).
- ¹⁸ On Schoelcher, see Anne Girollet, *Victor Schoelcher abolitionniste et républicain: Approche juridique et politique de l’œuvre d’un fondateur de la République* (Paris: Karthala, 2000). During his stay in Paris, Marx came in personal contact with Schoelcher (cf. Martin Hundt, “Noch einmal über die ‘Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,’” in *Marx-Engels Jahrbuch 2004* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2005), 118–41, 135). Later, the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* (124, 24 October 1848, 4) would mention the “famous slave friend Schoelcher,” but Marx never discussed his abolitionist attitude.
- ¹⁹ Ernest Jones: “The New World: A Democratic Poem [etc.],” *Notes to the People* 1, no. 1, (London: Pavey 1851), 1–15 (for “Ogé” and “L’Ouverture,” see 13); cf. Thierry Drapeau, “Look at our Colonial Struggles’: Ernest Jones and the Anti-Colonialist Challenge to Marx’s Conception of History,” *Critical Sociology* 45, no. 7–8 (2017): 1195–208.
- ²⁰ Cf. Simon Rennie, *The Poetry of Ernest Jones: Myth, Song, and the ‘Mighty Mind’* (Cambridge etc.: Legenda, 2016), 154–6.
- ²¹ Cf. John D. Garrigus, “Vincent Ogé Jeune (1757–91): Social Class and Free Colored Mobilization on the Eve of the Haitian Revolution,” *The Americas* 68, no. 1 (2011), 33–62; for an early and relatively unprejudiced white view of Louverture, see Marcus Rainsford, *An Historical Account of the Black Empire of Hayti: Comprehending a View of the Principal Transactions in the Revolution of Saint Domingo; with its Ancient and Modern State* (London: Albion Press, 1805), 240 ff. The book has been immediately translated into German; see id., *Geschichte der Insel Hayti oder St. Domingo: Besonders des auf derselben errichteten Negerreiches* (Hamburg: Schmidt, 1806). For a contemporary black perspective on Louverture see the chapter “Toussaint L’Ouverture” in William Wells Brown, *The Black Man: His Antecedents, his Genius, and his Achievements*, 2nd ed. (New York etc.: Hamilton, 1863), 92–105, which closes with a remarkable comparison of Louverture and Washington: “Toussaint’s government made liberty its watchword, incorporated it in its constitution, abolished the slave trade, and made freedom universal amongst the people. Washington’s government incorporated slavery and the slave trade, and enacted laws by which chains were fastened upon the limbs of millions of people” (105).
- ²² Likewise, a reaction could have occurred (but did not) when Alphonse de Lamartine praised Toussaint Louverture. He was a liberal French author and politician, who once was a candidate to be asked for contributions to the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, edited by Karl Marx and Arnold Ruge. Later, Marx would characterize Lamartine as “this poetic socialist”—Karl Marx, *Lamartine and Communism* (MECW 6: 404–405), 404—and as “the spokesman of the February Revolution, [who] according to both his position and his views, belonged to the bourgeoisie”—Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France* (MECW 10: 45–145), 53. Lamartine, who was a large landowner, also

- operated a salon frequented by leftists and represented liberal and humanitarian ideas, abolitionism included (even though flanked by the idea of Europe's "mission civilisatrice"). In 1850, Lamartine published an epic poem on Haiti—cf. Alphonse de Lamartine, *Toussaint Louverture: Poème dramatique* (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1850) which was immediately translated into German and somewhat later into English—cf. id., *Toussaint Louverture: Dramatisches Gedicht* (Stuttgart: Rieger'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1850) and id., *Toussaint Louverture: A Dramatic Poem* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1875).
- 23 Matthieu Renault, "Répétition et revolution: Marx chez les Jacobins noirs," *Période* 21, (May 2018) [<http://revueperiode.net/repetition-et-revolution-marx-chez-les-jacobins-noirs/>].
- 24 Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France*, 83.
- 25 Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (MECW 11: 99–197), 196; for the following quote see *ibid.*, 103.
- 26 Cf. Murdo J. MacLeod, "The Soulouque Regime in Haiti, 1847–1859: A Reevaluation," *Caribbean Studies* 10, no. 3 (1970), 35–48.
- 27 Leopold Contzen, "Haiti und seine Racenkämpfe," in *Jahresbericht über die Realschule 1. Ordnung zu Köln für das Schuljahr 1862–1863* (Köln: Bachem, 1863), 1–30, 28.
- 28 Cf. Elizabeth C. Childs, *Daumier and Exotism: Satirizing the French and the Foreign* (New York etc.: Peter Lang, 2004), 111 ff.; for the lithographs see <http://bir.brandeis.edu/handle/10192/3577> and <http://bir.brandeis.edu/handle/10192/3576>. The cynicism of history implies that another famous caricaturist, Amédée de Noé, who called himself Cham, was the grandson of the former owner of Toussaint Louverture. He sketched a whole picture story on Soulouque and his court, making extensive use of iconographic simianization; see Cham: *Soulouque et sa cour* (Paris: Charivari, 1850) (<https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b52506995s/f10.item>). At the same time, Faustin Soulouque tried to positively influence the white eye with an album of lithographs composed after daguerreotypes of his coronation; see *Album Impérial d'Haïti* (New York: Lacombe, 1852) and Karen Salt, *The Unfinished Revolution: Haiti, Black Sovereignty and Power in the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic World* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2019), 129 ff.
- 29 Karl Marx, *Letter to Friedrich Engels*, 14 February 1858 (MECW 40: 265–6), 266 and Friedrich Engels, *[Georg Weerth]* (MECW 26: 108–111), 109 f. (the English translation reads *"black King," in the German original Engels wrote "Negerkönig," literally *"Negro King"—see Friedrich Engels: *[Georg Weerth, der erste und bedeutendste Dichter des deutschen Proletariats]* (MEW 21: 5–8), 7.
- 30 Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (MECW 5: 19–539), 308 f.
- 31 Max Stirner, *Der Einzige und sein Eigentum* (Leipzig: Otto Wiegand, 1845), 87 f., uses the word as part of the composites "Negerhaftigkeit" (literally: negro-ness) and "negerhafte[s] Weltalter" (literally: negro-ish ages).
- 32 Cf. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, 169. The authors use the edition Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (1837), (Werke, vol. 9) ed. Eduard Gans (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1837); for the above-noted quotes see *ibid.*, 88 f. (Africa, domicile) und 90 (drawn over).
- 33 Cf. Erik van Ree (2019).
- 34 Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, 31.
- 35 *Ibid.*, 425.
- 36 Karl Marx, *Economic manuscripts of 1857–58* (MECW 28), 46.
- 37 Karl Marx: *Capital*, vol. 3 (MECW 37), 780.
- 38 Friedrich Engels, *Letter to W. Borgius*, 25 January 1894 (MECW 50: 264–67), 265. The English translation writes *"human race," but this is a distortion of the original meaning. Engels writes only "Rasse" (*"race") without any adjunct, in other words, he does not mean "humanity" but "race" as an influencing factor, see Friedrich Engels, *Brief an W. Borgius*, 25 January 1894 (MEW 39: 205–7), 206.
- 39 Karl Marx, *Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58*, 195.

- 40 Karl Marx, *Wage Labour and Capital*, 211.
- 41 Cf. Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, 753.
- 42 Tom Jeannot (2007: 86 (theory)) and August H. Nimtz, Jr., *Marx, Toqueville, and Race in America: The 'Absolute Democracy' or 'Defiled Republic'* (Lanham etc.: Lexington Books, 2003), 52 (deconstructing).
- 43 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, 95. Marx's metaphor "economic character mask" is substituted in the translation by "character on the economic stage" (see Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, vol. 1 (MEW 23), 200).
- 44 Cf. Wulf D. Hund, *Negative Vergesellschaftung. Dimensionen der Rassismusanalyse*, 2nd exp. ed. (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2014), 133 f.
- 45 Karl Marx, *Wage Labour and Capital*, p. 211; for the following quote see *ibid.*, p. 214.
- 46 Jacob Grimm, Wilhelm Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, vol. 7, ed. Matthias von Lexer (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1889), col. 520 ("der schwarze, der mohr, aus franz. nègre (lat. niger), erst im 18. jahrh. entlehnt"; "die neger von Afrika haben von der natur kein gefühl, welches über das läppische stiege. Kant"); for "Moor," see *ibid.*, vol. 6, ed. Moritz Heyne (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1885), col. 2472 f.
- 47 Cf. Samuel Thomas Soemmering, *Über die körperliche Verschiedenheit des Mohren vom Europäer* (Mainz: n.p., 1784), 24 (brain), 5 (apes); *id.*: *Über die körperliche Verschiedenheit des Negers vom Europäer* (Frankfurt: Varrentrapp und Wenner, 1785).
- 48 *Conversationslexikon mit vorzüglicher Rücksicht auf die gegenwärtigen Zeiten*, part 3 (Leipzig: Leupold, 1798), 234; *Allgemeine deutsche Real-Enzyklopädie für die gebildeten Stände*, 8th ed., vol. 7 (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1835), 742 f.; see Malte Hinrichsen, Wulf D. Hund, "Metamorphosen des Mohren: Rassistische Sprache und historischer Wandel," in *Sprache – Macht – Rassismus*, ed. Gudrun Hentges, Kristina Nottbohm, Mechthild M. Jansen, Jamila Adamou (Berlin: Metropol, 2014), 69–96.
- 49 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, ed. Eduard Gans, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1840), 89 f. (splendid stretch, Europe), 88 (proper Africa), 90 (Negroes etc.), 89 (day, night), 91 (fetishism), 93 (cannibalism).
- 50 Franz Mehring, *Karl Marx: The Story of His Life* (London: Lane, 1936), 381 (1st German ed. 1918).
- 51 Karl Marx, *Letter to Laura and Paul Lafargue*, 5 March 1870 (MECW 43: 446–50), 446, 449.
- 52 Leslie Derfler, *Paul Lafargue and the Founding of French Marxism, 1842–1882* (Cambridge, Mass. etc.: Harvard University Press, 1991), 44, 46. The author rates this "no signs of real prejudice" but "affectionate and joking terms [...] seen as a source of amusement" (46). For the previous quotes see *ibid.*, 13 f. (genealogy), 14 (statements of Lafargue on races and internationalism).
- 53 Friedrich Engels, *Letter to Laura Lafargue*, 26 April 1887 (MECW 48: 52–4), 52 f. For the significance of simianization in the arsenal of racism, see the essays in Wulf D. Hund, Charles W. Mills, Silvia Sebastiani (eds.), *Simianization. Apes, Gender, Class, and Race* (Münster etc.: Lit 2015).
- 54 Karl Marx, *Letter to Friedrich Engels*, 30 July 1862 (MECW 41: 388–91), 389 f.
- 55 Cf. Wulf D. Hund, "Der 'jüdische Nigger' Lassalle: Marginalie zu einem Brief von Karl Marx," *Sozial.Geschichte Online* 24, (2018): 11–38.
- 56 Cf., for instance, Richard T. Peterson, "Marx, Race, and the Political Problem of Identity," in *Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy*, ed. Andrew Valls (Ithaca etc.: Cornell University Press, 2005), 235–54, esp. 239, 243.
- 57 Mario Kessler, *On Anti-Semitism and Socialism: Selected Essays* (Berlin: trafo, 2005), 23.
- 58 Cf. William I. Brustein, Louisa Roberts, *The Socialism of Fools? Leftist Origins of Modern Anti-Semitism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
- 59 Enzo Traverso, *The Jewish Question: History of a Marxist Debate* (Leiden etc.: Brill, 2019), 18.
- 60 Karl Marx, *On the Jewish Question* (MECW 4: 146–74), 169 f.; the English translation writes *huckstering, whereas Marx speaks of "Schacher," *haggling—Karl Marx, *Zur Judenfrage* (MEW 1: 347–77), 372.

- ⁶¹ Micha Brumlik, *Deutscher Geist und Judenhaß: Das Verhältnis des philosophischen Idealismus zum Judentum* (München: Luchterhand, 2000), 304 (vanishing); David Nirenberg, *Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition* (New York etc: Norton, 2013), 439.
- ⁶² Karl Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach* (MECW 5: 3–5), 3 (dirty-Jewish); id.: *Capital*, vol. 1, 165 (circumcised).
- ⁶³ Cf. Friedrich Engels, *Bruno Bauer and Early Christianity* (MECW 24: 427–35). For Bauer’s antisemitism, see esp. Bruno Bauer, *Das Judentum in der Fremde* (Berlin: Heinike, 1863). Bauer insists on the “uniqueness of the Jewish race” because “body and soul of the Jews are completely different from ours” (8)—not least, because the Jewish body had similarities with the “negro” so much that it was warrantable to call the Jew “a white negro” (10). Afterwards, Bauer recites a long list of traditional and modern antisemitic stereotypes. They include a stigmatization of the Jews as perilous parasites: “The Jew, who rallies round misery and crime to take advantage of both, is for the society, what a bug is for the warrior on the battlefield, sitting down on his open wound and boring into it with its proboscis” (52).
- ⁶⁴ Charles Fourier, *Le nouveau Monde industriel et sociétaire* (etc.) (Paris: Bossange / Ainé, 1829), 499 (parasites), 500 (race improductive) and id.: “Question de morale et politique commerciale,” in id., *Publication des Manuscrits de Charles Fourier*, vol. 3 (Paris: Librairie Phalanstérienne, 1856), 33–7, 35 (lèpre); cf. Edmund Silberner, “Charles Fourier and the Jewish Question,” *Jewish Social Studies* 8, no. 4 (1946): 245–66.
- ⁶⁵ Alphonse Toussenel, *Les juifs, rois de l’époque: Histoire de la féodalité financière* (Paris: de Gonet, 1847), iii (Satan), ii (veau d’or), 122 (œuvre utile), 9 (roi), 5 (règne), i (usurier, parasite), v (travailleurs); cf. Robert S. Wistrich, “Radical Antisemitism in France and Germany (1840–1880),” *Modern Judaism* 15, no. 2 (1995): 109–35.
- ⁶⁶ Cf. Hans-Peter Jaek, *Genesis und Notwendigkeit. Studien zur Marxschen Methodik der historischen Erklärung (1845/46 bis 1859)* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1988), 61 ff. Toussenel’s book was a part of Marx’s library—cf. [Karl Marx], *Katalog der Bibliothek von Karl Marx*, zusammengestellt von Roland Daniels mit Vermerken von Karl Marx (MEGA IV/5: 295–306 and 496–572), 298.
- ⁶⁷ Cf. Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France*, 51. Marx not only mentions the title of Toussenel’s book, but also speaks of “Börsenjuden” (“bourse Jews”) in this context—Karl Marx, *Die Klassenkämpfe in Frankreich* (MEW 7: 9–107), 15. The English translation plays this down by translating it as “Bourse jobbers.”
- ⁶⁸ Cf. Friedrich Engels, *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (‘Anti-Dühring’) (MEW 20: 1–303); for Marx’s comments see Karl Marx: *(Vorarbeiten zum zweiten Abschnitt des ‘Anti-Dühring’)* (MEGA I/27: 131–216); cf. Mario Kessler, “Engels’ Position on Anti-Semitism in the Context of Contemporary Socialist Discussions,” *Science & Society* 62, no. 1 (1998): 127–44.
- ⁶⁹ Eugen Dühring, *Die Judenfrage als Racen-, Sitten- und Culturfrage: Mit einer weltgeschichtlichen Antwort* (Karlsruhe etc.: Reuther, 1881), 82; cf. Jeanette Jakubowski, “Eugen Dühring: Antisemit, Antifeminist und Rassist,” in *Historische Rassismusforschung: Ideologien, Täter, Opfer*, ed. Barbara Danckwort, Thorsten Querg, Claudia Schöningh (Hamburg: Argument, 1995), 70–90.
- ⁷⁰ Cf. Wulf D. Hund, “Negative Societalisation: Racism and the Constitution of Race,” in *Wages of Whiteness and Racist Symbolic Capital*, ed. Wulf D. Hund, Jeremy Krikler, David Roediger (Münster etc.: Lit, 2010), 57–96, 81 f.; the quote is from Otto Glagau, *Deutsches Handwerk und historisches Bürgertum*, 6th ed. (Osnabrück: Wehberg, 1879), 80.
- ⁷¹ Friedrich Engels, *Herrn Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science* (‘Anti-Dühring’) (MECW 25: 1–309), 103 f.; id.: *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (‘Anti-Dühring’), 104; the following expression “German socialism” is from page 7 of the English edition.
- ⁷² Friedrich Engels, *On Anti-Semitism* (From a Private Letter to Vienna) (MECW 27: 50–2), 50 f.
- ⁷³ Alex Callinicos, *Race and Class* (London etc.: Bookmarks, 1993), 14, 69 f. This attitude of criticizing the critics of Marx without criticizing Marx himself is still present in Ken Olende,

- “Marx and Race: A Eurocentric Analysis?,” *International Socialism*, 162, (2019) (<http://isj.org.uk/marx-and-race/>).
- 74 Cf. Cedric J. Robinson, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*. With a New Preface by the Author (Chapel Hill etc.: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
- 75 Alex Callinicos (1993), 34 f.
- 76 Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, “Race, Class and Marxism,” *SocialistWorker.org*, 4 January 2011 (<https://socialistworker.org/2011/01/04/race-class-and-marxism>).
- 77 Karl Marx, *Letter to Sigfrid Meyer and August Vogt*, 9. April 1870 (MECW 43: 471–6), 474 f.; the quote continues with an argument which accentuates ideological manipulation: “This antagonism is kept artificially alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the ruling class. This antagonism is the secret of the English working class’s impotence, despite its organisation. It is the secret of the maintenance of power by the capitalist class. And the latter is fully aware of it” (475).
- 78 Cf. e.g., Melvin M. Leiman, *Political Economy of Racism* (London etc.: Pluto Press, 1993), 146 or ed. Phil Gasper, *Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: The Communist Manifesto, a Road Map to History’s Most Important Political Document* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2005), 164. Lucia Pradella, “Imperialism and Capitalist Development in Marx’s Capital,” *Historical Materialism* 21, no. 2 (2013): 117–47 steals the show by conjuring away the comparison with the ellipses trick and, in this way, avoids the discussion of the N-word and the racist shoals of the quote. Hence, she can uncloudedly conclude that, “[i]n this text, Marx identifies one of the main goals of institutional racism” (136).
- 79 Cf. Mike Cole, *Racism: A Critical Analysis* (London: Pluto Press, 2016), 7 and 22.
- 80 Karl Marx, *Confidential Communication* (MECW 21: 112–24), 120.
- 81 Kevin B. Anderson, “Marx’s Intertwining of Race and Class during the Civil War in the United States,” *Journal of Classical Sociology* 17, no. 1 (2017): 28–40, 36.
- 82 Cf. Friedrich Engels, *Letter to Karl Marx*, 23 May 1862 (MECW 41: 365–8), 367; Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *The Situation in the American Theatre of War* (MECW 19: 204–8), 207 f.; Karl Marx, *Letter to Friedrich Engels*, 10 September 1862 (MECW 41: 415–6), 416. For the historical and ideological background, see Nancy Isenberg, *White Trash: The 400-Year Untold History of Class in America* (New York: Viking, 2016).
- 83 Friedrich Engels, *Letter to Karl Marx*, 15 July 1865 (MECW 42: 167–9), 167.
- 84 Karl Marx, *The North American Civil War*, (MECW 19: 32–42), 40 (plebeians); Friedrich Engels, *The Labor Movement in America*, (MECW 26: 434–42), 437 (lumpen). The English translation mentions only the “poor whites,” procuring that later interpretations will not come across the affiliation of this comparison with the “lumpenproletariat”; the German version reads: **“Klasse von ‘verlumpten Weißen’* (‘poor whites,’ ‘white trash’)* and ***“verlumpten Freien”*—Friedrich Engels, *Die Arbeiterbewegung in Amerika*, (MEW 21: 335–43), 337. As the example of the insurrectionists of Jones county showed, members of the so-called “white trash” were indeed ready to and capable of “self-emancipation”—Victoria E. Bynum, *The Free State of Jones: Mississippi’s Longest Civil War* (Chapel Hill etc.: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).
- 85 Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Die Deutsche Ideologie*, (MEW 3: 9–530), 23 (lumpen proletariat). This passage is missing in the English translation of *The German Ideology*, 33. For a critical edition of the manuscripts cf. Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Deutsche Ideologie* (MEGA), 107 and 979.
- 86 Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (MECW 6: 477–517), 494 (dangerous class, scum, rotting mass); Karl Marx: *The Class Struggles in France*, 62 (sharply differentiated, crumbs).
- 87 “Lumpenproletarier” and Jews were not the only whites racistly discriminated against by Marx and Engels—see e.g., France Klopčič, “Friedrich Engels und Karl Marx über die »geschichtslosen« slawischen Nationen 1847–1895,” in *Internationale Tagung der Historiker der Arbeiterbewegung, Sonderkonferenz 1983: Marxismus und Geschichtswissenschaft*, ed. Brigitte Galanda (Wien: Europaverlag, 1984), 217–49; Roman Rosdolsky, “Friedrich Engels und das Problem der

- ‘geschichtslosen’ Völker: Die Nationalitätenfrage in der Revolution 1848-1849 im Lichte der ‘Neuen Rheinischen Zeitung,’” *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 4, (1964): 87–282 (initially 1929).
- 88 Cf. Jean-Claude Bourdin, “Marx et le lumpenprolétariat,” *Actuel Marx* 54, (2013): 39–55; Robert L. Bussard, “The ‘Dangerous Class’ of Marx and Engels: The Rise of the Idea of the Lumpenproletariat,” *History of European Ideas* 8, no. 6 (1987): 675–92; Michael Schwartz, “‘Proletarier’ und ‘Lumpen’: Sozialistische Ursprünge eugenischen Denkens,” *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 42, no. 4 (1994): 537–70; Peter Stallybrass, “Marx and Heterogeneity: Thinking the Lumpenproletariat,” *Representations* 31, (1990): 69–95; Nicholas Thoburn, “Difference in Marx: The Lumpenproletariat and the Proletarian Unnamable,” *Economy and Society* 31, no. 3 (2002): 434–60; see also Sören Niemann-Findeisen, *Weeding the Garden: Die Eugenik-Rezeption der frühen Fabian-Society* (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2004) and Michael Schwartz, *Sozialistische Eugenik: Eugenische Sozialtechnologien in Debatten und Politik der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1890–1933* (Bonn: Dietz, 1995).
- 89 Karl Marx, “(Excerpts from Lewis H. Morgan, Ancient Society),” in *The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx*, ed. Lawrence Krader, 2nd ed. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1974), 94–241, 98 (chaos); Karl Marx, *Letter to Friedrich Engels*, 7 August 1866 (MECW 42: 303–5), 305 (common negro type); cf. Stefan Kalming, Andreas Nowak, “Viewing Africa with Marx. Remarks on Marx’s Fragmented Engagement with the African Continent,” *Science and Society* 81, no. 3 (2017): 331–47, and John S. Wilson, Gareth J. Nelson, “Trémaux on species: A theory of allopatric specification (and punctuated equilibrium) before Wagner,” *History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences* 30, no. 2, (2008): 179–205.
- 90 Karl Marx: *Letter to Friedrich Engels*, 14 June 1853 (MECW 39: 344–8), 346.
- 91 Karl Marx: *To Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America* (MECW 20: 19–21), 19.
- 92 Karl Marx, *Letter to Sigfrid Meyer and August Vogt*, 9 April 1870 (MECW 43: 471–6), 474. Cf. Chandana Mathur, Dermont Dix, “The Irish Question in Karl Marx’s and Friedrich Engels’s Writings on Capitalism and Empire,” in *Social Thought on Ireland in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Séamas Ó Síocháin (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2009), 97–107; Jürgen Herres, “Marx und Engels über Irland: Ein Überblick. Artikel, Briefe, Manuskripte und Schriften,” in *Marx-Engels-Jahrbuch 2011* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012), 12–27; Aidan Beatty, “Marx and Engels, Ireland, and the Racial History of Capitalism,” *Journal of Modern History* 91, no. 4, (2019): 815–47.
- 93 Tom Jeannot (2007), 87.
- 94 Carolyn E. Fick, *The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 25.
- 95 Peter Linebaugh, Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), 319.
- 96 Karl Marx, *First Draft of the Civil War in France* (MECW 22: 437–514), 498.
- 97 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, 305; the contextualized sentence (emphasized here through italics) reads: “In the United States of North America, every independent movement of the workers was paralysed so long as slavery disfigured a part of the Republic. *Labour cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded.* But out of the death of slavery a new life at once arose. The first fruit of the Civil War was the eight hours’ agitation [...]. The General Congress of labour at Baltimore (August 16th, 1866) declared: ‘The first and great necessity of the present, to free the labour of this country from capitalistic slavery, is the passing of a law by which eight hours shall be the normal working-day in all States of the American Union.’”
- 98 Philip S. Foner, “A Labor Voice for Black Equality: The Boston Daily Evening Voice, 1864–1867,” *Science and Society* 38, no. 3 (1974): 304–25, 304 (to champion); Philip S. Foner, *Organized Labor and the Black Worker, 1619–1973* (New York: International Publisher’s, 1976), 20 (colorphobia).
- 99 Quoted from Raphael Hörmann, *Writing the Revolution: German and English Radical Literature, 1819–1848/49* (Münster: Lit, 2011), 193. For Schuster see George D. H. Cole, *Socialist Thought: The*

- Forerunners, 1789–1850* (A History of Socialist Thought, vol. 1) (London: Macmillan & Co, 1953), 228 f; later, Schuster was accused to be a secret agent of Metternich—cf. Ernst Schraepfer, *Handwerkerbünde und Arbeitervereine 1830–1853: Die politische Tätigkeit deutscher Sozialisten von Wilhelm Weitling bis Karl Marx* (Berlin etc.: de Gruyter, 1972), 63 f.
- 100 Charles W. Mills, *From Class to Race: Essays in White Marxism and Black Radicalism* (Lanham etc.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 151.
- 101 Robin Blackburn, *Marx and Lincoln: An Unfinished Revolution* (London etc.: Verso, 2011), 57.
- 102 The same applies to the question of “Marx and Haiti.” I confine myself to the German example. The most exhaustive Marxist anthology on “Revolutions of Modernity” has no chapter on the revolution of Haiti—see Manfred Kossok (ed.), *Revolutionen der Neuzeit 1500–1917* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1982). The only “Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism” has a lemma “Haitian Revolution” that mentions neither the name Marx nor any quote from his work—see Sibylle Fischer, “Haitianische Revolution,” in *Historisch-Kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus*, vol. 5, ed. Wolfgang Fritz Haug (Hamburg: Argument-Verlag, 2001) 1121–30. In Karin Schüller, “From Liberalism to Racism: German Historians, Journalists, and the Haitian Revolution from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries,” in *The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World*, ed. David P. Geggus (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), 23–43, the author sees no need to discuss the striking absence of the topic in Marx’s deliberations on revolutions. This is not to say that relevant studies on the Haitian Revolution are missing in the international Marxist discussion—with C. L. Robert James, *Black Jacobins. Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution*, rev. ed. (New York: Vintage, 1963; 1st ed. 1938) leading the way (for the dimensions and impact of this work see Charles Forsdick, Christian Høgsbjerg (eds.), *The Black Jacobins Reader* (Durham etc.: Duke University Press, 2017). But neither James nor subsequent authors debate the “blank space” concerning this topic in the oeuvre of Marx (and Engels), nor do they discuss their insufficient analysis of racism as the background of this peculiar silence.
- 103 W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, “Evolution of the Race Problem,” in *Proceedings of the National Negro Conference 1909* (New York: s. n., s. d.), 142–58, 153; for the following see id.: *Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880*, with an introduction by David Levering Lewis (Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press, 2007; 1st ed. 1935).
- 104 Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (New York etc.: Oxford University Press, 1944), 103 (racial theory), 125 (racism); the following quote is from *ibid.*, 190.
- 105 Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, with Forewords by Ziauddin Sardar and Homi K. Bhabha, new ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2008; 1st ed. 1952), 65 (colonial racism), 92 (Jews); cf. Bryan Cheyette, “Frantz Fanon and the Black-Jewish Imaginary,” in *Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks: New Interdisciplinary Essays*, ed. Max Silverman (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 74–99.
- 106 Frantz Fanon, “Racism and Culture,” in id., *Toward the African Revolution: Political Essays* (New York: Grove Press, 1988), 29–44, 41.
- 107 Frantz Fanon, “French Intellectuals and Democrats and the Algerian Revolution,” in id., *Toward the African Revolution: Political Essays* (New York: Grove Press, 1988), 76–90, 81 (oppressor), 82 (working class, liberation); cf. Peter Hudis, *Frantz Fanon: Philosopher of the Barricades* (London: Pluto Press, 2015).
- 108 The subtitle of Glynis Cousin, Robert Fine, “A Common Cause: Reconnecting the Study of Racism and Antisemitism,” *European Societies* 14, no. 2 (2012): 166–85 is a euphemism—there has never been such a connection. Instead, pertinent contributions like David Camfield, “Elements of a Historical-Materialist Theory of Racism,” *Historical Materialism* 24, no. 1 (2016): 31–70, exclusively refer to the topic race without simultaneously discussing antisemitism. Furthermore, they argue without a critical examination of Marx or even attest to him that he was an early critic of antisemitism and race ideology.

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- ¹⁰⁹ Just have a look at the discussion in David Roediger: “The Retreat from Race and Class,” *Monthly Review* 58, no. 3 (2006): 40–51 (reprinted in id., *Class, Race, and Marxism* (London etc.: Verso, 2017), 33–46) or, as a case study, at Satnam Virdee, *Racism, ‘Racial Formation’ and the Class Struggle: A Study of ‘Race’ and the Organised Labour in England* (Doctoral Thesis: University of Warwick, Department of Sociology, 2000).