The Term "avyapadeśyam" *in Gautama's Definition of Perception: Development through the Commentarial Tradition*

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Of all the cognitive means recognized in Indian philosophical schools, perception is considered the primary. Gautama, the philosopher who authored Nyāyasūtra—the first aphoristic collection of the Nyāya tenets—defines perception as the principal cause of true perceptual cognition, that is, of a cognition generated out of sense-object contact, non-deviating, non-vacillating, and nonverbal. Of these, the adjective "nonverbal"—the translated version of the Sanskrit term "avyapadeśyam"*—ignited a serious debate that was argued for about a millennium. This article tries to trace different interpretations of the term in the classical Nyāya commentarial literature, especially in the writings of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra, and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. It also attempts to show briefly how the contributions of these philosophers in the debate were influenced by the prevalent Indian philosophical scenario.*

Key words: *pramāṇa; pratyakṣa; avyapadeśyam*; *avikalpakam; sūtra; bhāṣya; vārttika; tīkā;* Gautama; Vātsyāyana; Uddyotakara; Vācaspati Miśra; Jayanta Bhaṭṭa; Diṅnāga; Bhartṛhari

Each Indian orthodox philosophical system, besides having the common goal of guiding the deserving ascetic to a state of absolute non-suffering, emphasizes a distinct topic of discussion (*prasthāna*).[1] *Prasthāna*, for the classical Nyāya philosophers, are the sixteen categories (*padārtha*) which, if truly cognized, lead to liberation. The first mentioned category is *pramāṇa,*[2] as it is the reliable mean for arriving at trustworthy cognition *(pramiti*) of objects *(prameya*). The classical Nyāya recognizes four *pramāṇa*-s—perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), and testimony (*śabda*), of which perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the primary *(jyeṣṭha*) as well as the prerequisite (*upajīvya*) of every other cognitive mean. Primacy of perception consists in its being a direct instrument with minimum intervention of the faculties of reason. Two corollaries of this feature are, first, perception is the primary apparatus employed for knowing any object (*prathamapravartaka*), and second, since perceptual cognition is initially uncontradicted by any other cognition arising out of a different cognitive mean (i.e., since perception is *anupasaṅjātavirodhi*), it is considered the strongest cognitive mean[3] which provides supportive basis to all other means by virtue of its nature (*svarūpataḥ*) or effect (*phalataḥ*).[4]

Gautama (between 150–250 CE), the first philosopher to give a systematized version of the Nyāya doctrine in the form of aphorisms (*sūtra*), defines "*pratyakṣa*"[5] in *Nyāyasūtra* 1/1/4 in the following manner:

Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam (NS, 10)

That is, perceptual cognition, which is an awareness resulting out of the contact between sense organs and their respective objects, is nonverbal (though it may be verbalized), non-deviating (that is, not falsifiable), and non-doubting (that is, not vacillating between alternatives); wherefrom such perceptual cognition arises is perception as a cognitive mean or instrument.[6]

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Since an aphorism is supposed to be brief and precise,[7] Gautama does not elaborate on the definition, and it falls to the commentator[8] to bring out his intentions. Vātsyāyana, who flourished sometime between 300 and 400 CE, was the first commentator on *Nyāyasūtra,* and like other first commentators such as Śabara (between 200–300 CE) or Patañjali (approximately 150 BCE), was a "structure-creator" whose explicit aim was "the construction of an organized body of concepts, a weaving of the threads into a single unified cloth of philosophy"(Ganeri 2019: 5).[9] Vātsyāyana explains that the term *"indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam"* depicts the special condition (*viśiṣṭakāraṇam*) from which perceptual cognition arises, and the terms *"avyabhicārī"* and *"vyavasāyātmakam"* are used to exclude illusion and doubt respectively. The meaning of the qualification *"avyapadeśyam,"* however, incited a debate which occupied the Nyāya for almost a millennium, and this paper will try to concentrate on that. The arguments and counterarguments open up new vistas for addressing an important question in the philosophy of language: Is there a moment of pre-language in the act of perception?

To clarify the meaning of the term "*vyapadeśyam*,"[10] Vātsyāyana initially states an objection which can be formulated as follows: every object (*artha*) has a naming word (*nāmadheyaśabda*)[11]; an object is always known along with its naming word because cognition of an object (arising from sense-object contact) is linguistically expressed as "color has been known," "taste has been known," etc. (the expressions in passive voice ensure that there is no subjective inlay)—the terms "color" and "taste" being names of objects which are known[12]; the cognition of the object along with its naming word is (sometimes) valid, for otherwise, it would not have led to successful linguistic behavior[13]; it is logically incoherent to say that cognition is not thus expressed because it is the naming word which helps distinguish one valid cognition from another; therefore, since such linguistic expressions involve naming words, cognition resulting from sense-object contact has word as its content *(viṣaya)*[14] and is verbal (*śābda*).[15] It needs to be stated here that Bhartṛhari—the grammarian who proclaimed that objects are inseparable from words—belonged to 400–550 CE, and therefore the source of Vātsyāyana's objection is obscure.

The objection, Vātsyāyana answers, fails to distinguish between cognition—a private, personal affair (that is, cognition phenomenologically taken)—and its expression in language—done to communicate the cognition to another (that is, reporting of the phenomenologically taken). He substantiates his point by the following logic: names do not feature in cognition of objects if the perceiver is unaware of the relation between a naming word and the object it denotes; cognition of a person who is aware of the word-meaning relation cannot be phenomenologically distinguished from that of a person who is unaware of it; therefore, cognition arising from sense-object contact does not have word as its content. Words play a role only when the cognition of the object is reported, not when the object is perceived. The word "*avyapadeśyam*," therefore, according to Vātsyāyana, is a defining characteristic of perceptual cognition. It prevents application of the definition of perceptual cognition to cognitions which have words as their contents so that the definition does not suffer from the fallacy of over-coverage (*ativyāptidoṣa*). It is clear that Vātsyāyana here does not go beyond determinate cognition to prove his point.

The period 400–550 CE was marked by numerous philosophical activities in India. This is the period when Bhartṛhari (w. 400–500 CE) and Diṅnāga (480–540 CE) flourished. Acquaintance with their thoughts ushered in new perspectives through which Uddyotakara (500–600 CE) addressed issues while writing a *vārttika*[16] on Vātsyāyana's commentary. Before discussing Uddyotakara's take on the word *"avyapadeśyam,"* Diṅnāga's view on perception may be described briefly.

That language involves only concepts and can never reflect the true nature of reality is an idea which permeates the entire Buddhist philosophical literature and is often woven around such

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notions as *prapañca, vikalpa,* and *kalpanā*. Early Buddhist canons, for example, sometimes use the term "*prapañca*" to designate the final stage of the process of sense-perception (that is, the perceptual stage imbued with words). In the *Madhupiṇḍika sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* the Buddha says,

> Dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. With what one has mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions and notions tinged by mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, future and present forms cognizable through the eye.[17]

That is, sense perception consists in the coming together of the three (that is, the eye, the visible form, and the eye-consciousness), together constituting contact. This sensory experience is supposed to supply the ground for that second stage of perceptual awareness which is verbalized or expressed in language through words or concepts. But at this stage, the Buddhist says, there is the inevitable intervention of the faculty of reason, for otherwise, proliferation of concepts and words would not have been possible. Diṅnāga takes up this notion of perception when in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* he says, *"cakṣurvijñānasamaṅgī nīlaṃ vijānāti no tu nīlamiti. arthe'rtha-saṅjñī na tvarthedharma-saṅjñīti"* (PSV*, Pratyakṣapariccheda, Kārikā* 4). According to Mallavādin, the first part of the quotation comes from the *Abhidharmāgama*[18] and literally means, "the immediate awareness in the perceptual process (or the first stage of perceptual process) knows blue, but not '(It is) blue.'" Diṅnāga's definition of perception in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* as *"kalpanāpoḍham"* reflects this preoccupation of the Buddhist with a reality divested of name, word, and universal, for *kalpanā*, Diṅnāga clarifies, is the association of name (*nāman*), genus (*jāti*), etc. [with a thing perceived, which results in verbal designation of the thing].[19] Diṅnāga's definition may hence be understood as almost a "stipulative or prescriptive definition" (Matilal 1986: 316), which claims that the verbal report of proper perceptual cognition is strictly impossible.

It is clear that Diṅnāga distances himself both from Grammarians like Bhartṛhari and the Nyāya philosophers while propagating his theory of perception. A conscious awareness, Bhartṛhari says, always has word as content, as all objects (*vācya artha*) have naming words (*vācāka śabda*) with which they are identical.[20] Nonverbalized awareness (awareness of children or of dumb persons, that is, of persons who do not utter words either for being unaware of the word-meaning relation or for physical incapability) does not prove that words and their objects are separable, because the power of articulating the grasped object in language is always due to "beginningless residual traces of linguistic ability" (*anādi śabdabhāvanā*).[21] A pre-linguistic, nonverbal experience is therefore, for Bhartṛhari, non-cognitive in nature. It also follows that perceptual cognition necessarily is, according to him, linguistically expressible. The Nyāya, on the other hand, until this period at least, were of the view that perceptual cognition, being determinate, is always linguistically expressible though a word and its object are not identical and perceptual cognition can never have word as its content. Diṅnāga completely rejected Bhartṛhari's doctrine of identity of thought and language, as for him, "the object of the sense is the form which is to be cognised (simply) as it is and which is inexpressible."[22] The Nyāya view on perception is, however, for Diṅnāga, partially acceptable. Diṅnāga agrees that words cannot be the contents of perceptual cognition, but at the same time questions the Nyāya conviction that perceptual cognition can only be determinate. Consequently, for him, the inclusion of the term *"avyapadeśyam"* in the Nyāya definition of perception is unnecessary because the qualifier fails to secure it from the fallacy of over-coverage as claimed.[23] It cannot be said that the term is used not to obviate the fallacy but to describe the nature of perceptual cognition. For, in that case, inclusion of

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other predicates (which may as well describe the nature of perceptual cognition) within the definition may be suggested and the definition would suffer from the fallacy of implying too much (*atiprasaṅga*).[24] It remains to be seen, however, how the Nyāya, without admitting word as content of perceptual cognition, are able to prove that determinate perceptual cognition can be linguistically expressed.

In the *Vārttika*, Uddyotakara quotes Diṅnāga's definition of perception and rejects it finally on the ground that thus understood, the word "*pratyakṣa*" designates nothing and perceptual cognition resembles the dream of a dumb person.[25] His argument, briefly, is as follows: given that proper perceptual awareness, for Diṅnāga, is unnameable (*na nāmnābhidhīyate*), not verbally expressible by means of a universal, etc. (*na jātyādibhirvyapadiśyate*), varies according to the nature of its content (*viṣayasvarūpabhedānuvidhāyi)*, is the determining factor (*paricchedakam*), and is self-reflexive (*ātmasaṃvedyam*), the term *"pratyakṣa"* as well as the definition of *"pratyakṣa"* would be vacuous. Vācāspati Miśra, in his commentary to the *Vārttika* explains that the term *"viṣayasvarūpabhedānuvidhāyi"* is used by Uddyotakara to indicate that the validity (*avyabhicāritva*) of a perceptual state is correspondence of that state with its content, the term *"paricchedaka"* says that perception (as *pramāṇa*) is the determinant (*vyavasthāpaka*) of perception (as *pramāṇaphala*), and the term *"ātmasaṃvedyam"* shows that self-reflexivity of perceptual cognition is a proof that it is free from conceptual construction (*kalpanārahita*). In order to elaborate on the implication of the phrases *"na nāmnābhidhīyate"* and *"jātyādibhirvyapadiśyate,"* Vācaspati says, words have been grouped (by Diṅnāga) with reference to the distinction between their objects as follows: an arbitrary word (*yadṛcchā śabda* or proper nouns or naming words) such as *"ḍittha"* always denotes a qualified object (*viśiṣṭa artha*); a genus word (*jāti śabda* or common nouns) such as *"go"* (cow) denotes a universal; a quality word *(guṇa śabda* or adjectives) such as *"śukla"* (white) denotes a quality; an action word *(kriyā śabda* or verbal nouns) such as *"pācaka"* (cook) denotes an action (that is, the word is applicable to someone who performs the act of cooking); and a substance word (*dravya śabda*) such as *"daṇḍī"* (man with the stick) is applicable to a person.[26] Since words do not refer to real objects, each word-application is preceded by conceptual constructions which are therefore five in number. According to Diṅnāga's definition, perceptual cognition should be free from these five kinds of conceptual constructions both in terms of nature (*svarūpataḥ*) and content (*arthataḥ*). The two adjectives stated above serve to signify these characteristics of perceptual cognition. But given this Buddhist stand on perceptual cognition, what would the referent of the term *"pratyakṣa"* be? What again would terms such as "color" or "taste," which generally stand for contents of perceptual cognition, denote? According to Diṅnāga, words arise out of *vikalpa,* and objects (*gocara*) of *vikalpa* are also referents of words. Objects which a *vikalpa* grasps or conceptualizes are of the nature of exclusion of the other (*anya-vyāvṛtti*) and are not existent in the true sense of the term (*avastu*). It follows that an indeterminate cognition or its content (both of which are absolutely real (*paramārthasat*)), can never be the referent of a word or the object of a *vikalpa*.[27] Hence the term *"pratyakṣa"* is non-referring (*avācaka*) and the definition of perception nothing but futile utterance of words (*varṇoccāraṇamātram*). The upshot is that Uddyotakara understood Diṅnāga's definition of perception as being completely nonnegotiable in the sense that it cannot in any way be included within the general Nyāya understanding of perception as determinate cognition. While explaining the significance of the term *"avyapadeśyam,"* however, Uddyotakara says, *"taccendriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānaṃ viṣayanāmadheyabhedenābhidhīyata iti bhāṣyam. tatpratiṣedhārthamāha avyapadeśyamiti"* (NBV, 34). The commentary of Vatsyāyana says that according to the opponents, since cognition arising out of sense-object contact is linguistically expressed with the help of the naming words which qualify the contents of such cognition, it has words as contents and is therefore verbal. The word *"avyapadeśyam"* has been used to negate such view of the opponents.

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Vācaspati Miśra, in *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, a commentary[28] on the *Vārttika*, was the first to state that a nonverbal cognition need not, at the same time, be determinate. Vācaspati Miśra flourished between 850 and 1000 CE; that is, after Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Guru Prabhākara, and Ācārya Dharmakīrti, whose dates were between 600 and 700 CE, and also after Jayarāśi, Yaśomitra, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Śālikanātha, and Śaṅkara, who flourished between 700 and 800 CE. The Indian philosophical scenario was therefore, during this time, painted with diverse strokes, and it is quite likely that the impact had led Vācāspati to deviate considerably from the views of Bhāṣyakāra or Vārttikakāra. Vātsyāyana, in *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, had argued that the adjectives *avyapadeśyam* and *vyavasāyātmakam* indicate defining characteristics of perceptual cognition—the first points out that perceptual cognition never has words as its content and the second is used to exclude perceptual doubt. Vācaspati Miśra, however, argues that the adjective *vyavasāyātmakam* need not be used to exclude perceptual doubt, as dubious cognition, being a form of invalid cognition, is already excluded by the adjective *avyabhicārī*.[29] Rather, the term *"vyavasāyātmakam"* stands for *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* and the word *"avyapadeśyam"* for *avikalpaka pratyakṣa*.[30] Vācaspati Miśra's contention, therefore, is that the two adjectives do not indicate the defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of perception because though it is necessary that perceptual cognition should arise out of sense-object contact and be valid, it is not imperative for it to be both conceptual and nonverbal. In order to explain how the term *"avypadeśyam"* corresponds to *avikalpaka pratyakṣa,* Vācaspati says that the term *"vyapadeśa"* means a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) or characteristic feature (*upalakṣaṇa*) like name or universal; the term *"vyapadeśya"* applies to the qualified (*viśesya*) or that to which the qualifiers are directed—for example, statements like "this is cow," "this is white" are instances of *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* because their contents are related as qualifier-qualified (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*). A cognition whose contents are not thus related or a cognition which knows only the essential nature (*svarūpa*) of its objects and not their mutual relation of qualifier and qualified is *avyapadeśya* or *avikalpaka pratyakṣa*.[31] Thus the time-honored distinction found in the entire Indian philosophy of perception is made by Vācaspati with the help of the word *vikalpa.*

Consequently, Vācaspati disagrees with Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara's interpretation of the word *"avyapadeśyam."* He says that Gautama has used the word not only in order to refute the Grammarian view but also to include non-conceptual perception within the Nyāya purview. By the term *"vyavasāyātmakam,"* again, Gautama refutes the Buddhist view and accepts conceptual or determinate perception as valid. To elaborate, it was seen that both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, while refuting Bhartṛhari's doctrine, had stated that the word *"avyapadeśyam"* has been included in Gautama's definition to prevent its application to verbal cognition, that is, to cognition which has word as its content. This position implies that for them, cognition which arises due to sense-object contact as well as word *(śabda*) is not perceptual but verbal cognition produced out of the verbal cognitive mean (*śabda pramāṇa*). The point has been very clearly mentioned also by Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa and Udayana while they explain Praśastapāda's definition of perception and in that context comment on the term *"avayapadeśyam."* They say that if a person unaware of the relation, for example, between the word "cow" and the object it denotes, has sense contact with a cow, and if at the same time an experienced person tells him "this is a cow," then the cognition the person has should not be perceptual, but verbal.[32] For though the cognition has arisen due to sense-object contact and word, the heard word had played the most significant role (that is, it is the *sādhakatama*) in generating it.[33] In other words, for these philosophers, perceptual cognition should be only due to sense-object contact and not due to words. (This position also implies that for them, verbal cognition can have both sense-object contact and word as its causes.)

Vācaspati Miśra, however, does not accept this view and his argument runs as follows[34]: the initial perceptual cognition has as its content an object characterized by general and particular

Journal of World Philosophies 6 (Summer 2021): 24–37

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properties; this cognition leads to the memory of the state of grasping the relation of the object with its name and consequently the naming word is remembered; it is, however, not the case that this memory (of the word) is essential for generating determinate perceptual cognition of the object, for in that case, one who is unaware of the naming word will not have determinate perceptual cognition of the object in spite of having sense contact with it. In other words, the memory of the grasping state (of the word-meaning relation) plays a part only when the perceiver is aware of the word-meaning relation, and even there its role is restricted to associating the previously seen object with the present one. Vācaspati adds, *"śabdastu sampātāyāto na niveśayatyātmānamindriyaje vikalpe"*—the naming word is eventually *thrown in* and never becomes a content of determinate cognition generated by sense-object contact—it is rather the oneness of the past and present state of the seen object that may be considered as the content of that cognition.[35] Refuting views of his predecessors like Vātsyāyana or Uddyotakara, he says that having a remembered word as cause of determinate cognition does not prevent the cognition of the named object from being perceptual because memory cannot restrict the function of sense-object contact and also because there is absolutely no harm in postulating production of an effect from a combination of causes (*kāraṇasāmagrī*).[36] The role of multiple causes in bringing out a single effect, it may be noted here, has been admitted by all Nyāya philosophers. For otherwise, as Vacaspati reasons, one should have to admit that neither light, attention, nor intervention of self is necessary for the generation of perceptual cognition, even though both agreement (*anvaya*) and difference (*vyatireka*) have conclusively proven those as its causes. Vācaspati thus establishes that determinate perceptual cognition can be due to words and yet not have word as its content. In other words, the word *"avyapadeśyam"* is not used in the definition of perception to prevent the definition from being applicable to cognition that is both due to sense-object contact and words.

It is clear that in order to establish his point Vācaspati makes a distinction between a principal cause and an accompanying cause (*sahakārikāraṇa*). In the case of perceptual cognition, sense-object contact is the principal cause while other causes serve only as accompanying conditions. But this poses a problem: how are we to decide which, among a collection of causes, is principal and therefore plays the key factor in determining the nature of resultant cognition? Vācaspati resolves this difficulty by taking recourse to self-assessment of cognition, that is, to the capability of the cognizor to distinguish between the natures of cognition through the criterion of mental perception (*anuvyavasāya*). In the present case, for example, the said cognition, in spite of being both due to sense-object contact and word, has sense-object contact as its principal cause and is therefore perceptual because the cognizor knows it to be more vivid than a verbal cognition can ever be.[37]

Though more or less contemporary to Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāya philosopher Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's interpretation of Gautama's definition of perception differed remarkably from that of Vācaspati Miśra, Uddyotakara, or Vātsyāyana. Jayanta had commented directly on the aphorisms of Gautama, and while establishing his own views, had discussed and rejected views of other philosophers on inclusion of the term *"avyapasdeśyam"* in Nyāyasūtra 1/1/4. The view initially quoted is that of the "ancient Naiyāyikas," though the position mentioned in this context is neither of Bhāṣyakāra nor of Vārttikakāra.[38] His contention, revealed by way of criticism of this view, also does not quite involve the concerned debate. The next view mentioned by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is that of Praśastapāda or of Udayana as referred to earlier, and Jayanta here, while refuting these views, does not take recourse to mental perception as Vācaspati does. It is unwarranted to rely on popular verdict to decide the nature of cognition, Jayanta asserts, because facts are independent of what commoners think of them.[39] He therefore explains the significance of the term *"avyapadeśyam"* in a completely different manner, and by way of doing so, initially puts forth various opinions regarding the implication of the term, and in the course of analyzing them, gradually brings out his own position.

Journal of World Philosophies 6 (Summer 2021): 24–37

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The first view he mentions says that the term is used to avoid the fallacy of non-application (*asambhava doṣa*) of the definition of perception.[40] Philosophers defending this position say that a definition has no application if the definiendum is nonexistent, and according to some philosophers (who are the opponents here), the definition of perception suffers from this fallacy as there is no cognition which can be termed perceptual. These opponents put forth the following argument in support of their position: cognitions are phenomenologically undistinguishable and differ only in terms of their contents; contents are always objects qualified by denoting words (*śabdaviśeṣitavācyārtha*)[41] and can never be cognized by means of sense-organs, because sense-organs grasp specific objects; for example, in a cognition expressed as "this is cow," eyes fail to know the word "cow" (the qualifier) and ears the object "cow" (the qualified); it is not possible that both the sense-organs are responsible for generating the cognition because it is counterintuitive to suppose that two sense-organs should simultaneously cause a single cognition[42]; the cognition also cannot be included within mental perception[43] because mind can be accepted as an instrumental cause only if there is difficulty accepting other instrumental causes, for otherwise, all cognitions would have been rendered mental; therefore, the cognition mentioned above is a verbal cognition having word as the instrumental cause; though the naming word which the ears had grasped while grasping the word-meaning relation may later be absent, yet word as content of its memory serves as the cause of that cognition, and thus the cognition should be considered verbal. Just as in cases where there is no sense-contact with the object, the uttered word, as object of auditory perception, reveals itself as well as that object (which it stands for), similarly in cases where the object is presented to the senses, the remembered word, as object of memory, reveals itself as well as its object. Hence there is no perceptual cognition and the definition of perception is rendered vacuous.[44] This position is quite akin to Bhartṛhari, who, as stated earlier, considers cognition to be that which always has word as its content. According to this view, therefore, since even a cognition referred to as *pratyakṣa* has as its content a word which qualifies the object, the remembered word is the instrument of such cognition, and the cognition is verbal. Consequently, there is no cognition which can be termed perceptual and the definition of perception is inapplicable. This view of the opponent, the above philosophers (who are the defenders here) say, has been countered by insertion of the term *"avyapyadeśyam"* in the definition. That is, according to these defenders, though determinate cognitions are never perceptual but always verbal, there are cognitions which do not have words as their contents, and the term has been used to include such cases of indeterminate cognition within the purview of perceptual cognition.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argues against both these assertions: first, a determinate cognition of the form "this is a cow," which is supposed to have the denoted cow qualified by the denoting word "cow" (*vācakaviśeṣitavācyārtha*) as its content and which undeniably arises due to sense-object contact, can never be verbal because neither the auditory sense organ (as it remains inactive) nor word (since it is the object of the cognition as well and a single cause cannot be the object (*karma)* and instrument (*karaṇa*) of a single cognitive act[45]) can be postulated as the instrumental cause of such cognition. Moreover, a cognition cannot be verbal unless preceded by awareness of a word-meaning relation (*śaktijñāna*), and in this case, no such awareness can be found, nor can it be explained how this awareness could have been caused. The second issue follows from the first. If determinate cognition is always verbal, then cognition of the form "this is cow," which has the object cow qualified by the word "cow" as content, would have also the denoting word (*vācaka*) "cow" as the denoted (*vācya*). And if it is said that a denoting word denotes the denoted qualified by the denoting word, then even the cognition of the provable property (*sādhya*) qualified by the mark (*hetu/liṅga*) would follow from the cognition of the mark. Moreover, if the defenders maintain that determinate cognition is never perceptual, they would find it impossible to differentiate their view from that of the Buddhists.

Journal of World Philosophies 6 (Summer 2021): 24–37

e-ISSN: 2474-1795 • http://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp • doi: 10.2979/jourworlphil.6.1.03

But a question remains: How can the contents of determinate perceptual cognition differ from that of indeterminate cognition which precedes the former, if the denoting word qualifying the denoted object is not admitted as the content of determinate perceptual cognition?[46] A difference in cognition can be explained only in terms of some difference in their contents.

A standard answer to this objection would be that a difference in cognition is not due to a difference in contents, but to a difference in causes due to which such cognitions arise. But this answer has its shortcomings too. Though a cause (here "cause" means a collection of causes or *kāraṇasāmagrī*) undeniably is responsible for differences between cognitions, yet—since a cause acts only on the cognition, and cognition, at the time of generation, reveals only its content and not itself, and since the distinctiveness of a cognition is revealed at the time of its generation—this device for explaining distinctions between cognitions is ineffectual.[47] There are, however, some Nyāya philosophers who want to revert back to the view that differences in causes are responsible for differences in cognitions. It had seemed that the view that distinction between causes ensures distinction between cognitions would be unacceptable to the Nyāya who never accept the self-revealing nature of cognition. But these philosophers simply bring into notice some other causes of cognition which were overlooked earlier and which are known just at the moment preceding the generation of cognition of a qualified object. Whenever a cow is perceived as "this is cow," they say, the qualifier "cowness" is known beforehand, and this cognition of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇajñāna*) as cause of the cognition of the qualified (*viśiṣṭajñāna or viśiṣṭabuddhi*) serves to distinguish between cognitions. That is, content of determinate perceptual cognition is only the qualified object (*viśeṣyapravaṇāmatiḥ*) and not the qualifier. It follows that cognition of the form "this is cow" does not have as its content the denoted object qualified by the denoting word, and consequently, the said cognition of the object as having the property of being denoted is not verbal, but perceptual. Therefore, the word *"avyapadeśyam"* could not have been inserted to prevent the definition of perception from being inapplicable.[48] It needs to be mentioned here that since this view seems to reflect Jayanta's own position, it is clear that Jayanta's opinion regarding the distinction between determinate and indeterminate perception differs considerably from Vācaspati Miśra or from the later Nyāya philosophers. Jayanta never says that determinate perception has the relation between the qualifier and the qualified as content, nor does he say that indeterminate perception is not susceptible to mental perception (*anuvyavasāya*).

What is then the significance of the word in Gautama's definition of perception?

To express his own view regarding the significance of the word *"avyapadeśyam,"* Jayanta says, the word has been used to prevent the definition from being applied to cognition arising both out of sense-object contact and word (*ubhayajajñānavyavacchedārtham*). Perceptual cognition, as mentioned earlier, can have as content only the essential nature of things and not the object which the thing is related to. The property of being denoted by the naming word (*vācyatā*) which qualifies the object (or the meaning of the word) is therefore not revealed in perceptual cognition and is to be known only through words which reveal the word-meaning relation. Though sense-object contact plays a role here, it is secondary to the uttered word which is primarily responsible for generating the cognition of the denotedness in this case.[49] One can find here a resemblance with Udayana and Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa's view which Vācaspati Miśra has refuted. It also follows that unlike Vācaspati Miśra or the later Nyāya philosophers, for Jayanta the term *"avyapadeśyam"* is applicable to both determinate and indeterminate perceptual cognition as none are, according to him, describable by words.

The controversy regarding the word *avyapadeśyam* subsequently did supply tools to Udayanācārya for his attack on Diṅnāga's theory of *apoha* too. However, we may end this discussion by quoting Jayanta Bhaṭṭa who says

Journal of World Philosophies 6 (Summer 2021): 24–37

e-ISSN: 2474-1795 • http://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp • doi: 10.2979/jourworlphil.6.1.03

> *Ityācāryamatānīha darśitāni yathāgamam/Yadebhyaḥ satyamābhāti sabhyāstadavalambyatām//*(NM*,* 135)—that is, I've presented before you the views of the masters; of these, the thoughts which seem acceptable to you, engage in their studies.

Primary Sources and Abbreviations:

AK *Abhidharmakośa* and *Bhāṣya* of Vasubandhu with the Commentary *Sphuṭārthā* of Yaśomitra, ed. Dvarikadas Sastri (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1987).

AKB *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* as included in AK.

KV *Kīraṇāvalī* of Udayanācārya (Facsimile IV), ed. Narendra Chandra Vedantatirtha (Kolkata: The Asiatic Society, 2002).

MS *Madhyamakaśāstra* of Nāgārjuna with the Commentary *Prasannapadā* by Candrakīrti, ed. Shridhar Tripathi, 2nd ed. (Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute of Post-graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1987).

NBV *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika* of Uddyotakara, ed. Anantalal Thakur (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997).

NM *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, with the commentary *Granthibhaṅga* of Cakradhara, ed. Gaurinath Sastri (Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1982), Volume I.

NS *Gautamīyanyāyadarśana* with *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, ed. Anantalal Thakur (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997).

NSB *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana, as included in NS.

NVT *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra, ed. Anantalal Thakur (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996).

NVTP *Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi* of Udayanācārya, ed. Anantalal Thakur (New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996).

PB *Praśastapādabhāṣyam* (*Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*) of Praśastapāda with the commentary *Nyāyakandalī* by Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa, ed. Durgadhar Jha (Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1997).

PS *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Diṅnāga (Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter I), reconstructed by Ernst Steinkellner, www.oeaw.ac.at/ias/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf (April 2005).

PSV *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* as included in PS.

TS *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntarakṣita with the commentary *Pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla, ed. DvarikadasSastri (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1997).

VP *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari (*Brahmakāṇḍa*) with the commentary *Bhāvapradīpa* of Pt. Suryanarayana Sukla, ed. Pt. Ramagovinda Sukla (Varanasi: The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1961).

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1 The term "*prasthāna*" is derived by adding the suffix *"lyuṭ"* to the verbal root *"sthā"* as prefixed by *"pra."* In his commentary *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā,* Vācaspati Miśra (flourished 960 CE) says

Journal of World Philosophies 6 (Summer 2021): 24–37

e-ISSN: 2474-1795 • http://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp • doi: 10.2979/jourworlphil.6.1.03

"prasthānaṃ vyāpāraḥ" (NVT, 33), and while explaining this comment, Udayanācārya (approximately 1000 CE) in *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaparišuddhi* (NVTP, 73) states that the verbal root *"sthā"* as prefixed by *"pra"* means *"vyāpāraḥ"* or "action." In his subcommentary on Udayana, Vardhamāna Upādhyāya (approximately 1350 CE) elaborates, *"vyāpāro vyutpādanaṃ, tasya dhātvarthatā*, *tadviṣayatvaṃ pratyayārthaḥ,"* that is, the verbal root *"sthā"* here means "the act of determination" and the suffix *"lyuṭ"* stands for "the property of its object"; therefore the word *"prasthāna"* means "object or topic of determination." In its secondary sense, the term denotes the treatise which discusses this particular topic.

2 Indian philosophical schools which refuse to accept the skeptic's position that valid cognition is impossible also admit the role of a cognitive apparatus or cognitive mean (*pramāṇa*) on which cognition depends for its generation and validation. Philosophers belonging to such schools may be referred to, following Bimal Krishna Matilal, as "*pramāṇa* theorists." See Bimal Krishna Matilal, *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986), Part 1, Chapter 1. The word *"pramāṇa"* is a Sanskrit word which is derived by adding the suffix *"lyuṭ"* in the sense of instrumentality to the verbal root *"mā"* as prefixed by *"pra."* The prefix *"pra"* denotes "excellence" and the verbal root *"mā"* stands for "cognition." The etymological meaning of the term *"pramā"* therefore is "excellent or valid cognition" because excellence of a cognition consists in its ability to lead to successful activity (*samarthapravṛttijanakatva*). The suffix *"lyuṭ"* when added to the word *"pramā"* constitutes the word *"pramāṇa,"* and in the above sense of the suffix, the term means "instrument of valid cognition."

3 The general rule is that, except in cases of error, if there is a disagreement between *anupasañjātavirodhī* and *upasanñjātavirodhī*, the former is acceptable and the latter will only be a pseudo-instrument (*pramāṇābhāsa*) leading to invalid cognition. This view, however, is not shared by all Indian philosophical schools.

4 The effect of perception is perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣapramā*). Generation of inferential cognition (*anumitipramā*) depends on perceptual cognition of the universal concomitance (*vyāpti*), the inferential mark (*hetu*), and the inferential subject (*pakṣa*), proving thus the indispensability of the effect of perception for generating the effect of inference. Moreover, since perception, for being of the nature of sense-object contact (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*)[for the classical Nyāya, an instrument (*karaṇa*) is that extraordinary cause (*asādharaṇa kāraṇa*) without which, in spite of the presence of all other causes, the effect does not come into being; since even if all the conditions of perceptual cognition are present, without the presence of sense-object contact perceptual cognition does not arise, sense-object contact is *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* or the instrument of perceptual cognition] is the support on which inference, that is, *parāmarśajñāna* or the cognition of the mark residing in the inferential subject and qualified by the universal concomitance depends, perception as a means is also responsible for the generation of inference. Two points are to be noted here: first, inference or inferential cognition is not essentially directly dependent on perception or perceptual cognition, the dependence may sometimes be indirect; and second, not only inference, all other means of cognition (or the cognition arising there from) depend on perception or perceptual cognition for their generation and authentication, either directly or indirectly.

5 The term *"pratyakṣa,"* for the Nyāya philosophers, denotes the instrument of perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*), perceptual cognition itself (*pratyakṣapramā*), and the object of perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣaviṣaya*). It may be noted here that Gautama maintains the order of the categories perfectly—that is, in the first three aphorisms he states, respectively, the names of the categories, their role in generating liberation, and the name and division of the cognitive means.

6 In order to prove that aphorism 1/1/4 of the *Nyāyasūtra* is intended to be a definition of *pratyakṣapramāṇa*, Vācaspati Miśra suggests insertion of the word *"yataḥ"* (meaning "from which") at the beginning. As the term *"yat"* is always connected with the term *"tat"* (meaning "that"), the definition should be understood as: that from which a cognition resulting out of sense object contact, nonverbal, non-falsifiable, and certain arises is *pratyakṣa* (*pramāṇa*): *"atra ca yata ityadhyāhṛtya*

Journal of World Philosophies 6 (Summer 2021): 24–37

e-ISSN: 2474-1795 • http://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp • doi: 10.2979/jourworlphil.6.1.03

yattadornityābhisambandhāt tat pratyakṣamiti pramāṇavāci pratyakṣapadam yojanīyam" (NVT, 86). Jayanta Bhaṭṭa holds a similar view.

7 An aphorism (*sūtra*) has been traditionally defined as a collection of terms which comprise of few letters, are unambiguous, substantial, non-futile, non-fallacious, and can be interpreted in a number of ways (*svalpākṣaramasandigdhaṃ sāravadviśvatomukham/ astobhamanavadyañca sūtraṃ sūtravido viduḥ//*) (*Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa*, 3/5/1).

8 A commentary (*bhāṣya*) has been traditionally defined as a treatise in which the meaning of each of the terms used in the aphorism is explained and the terms used for the sake of explaining the aphorism are explained as well (*sūtrārtho varṇyate yatra padaiḥ sūtrānusāribhiḥ/ svapadāni ca varṇyante bhāṣyaṃ bhāṣyavido viduḥ//*) (*Parāśaropapuraṇa, Chapter 18*).

9 Jonardon Ganeri, "Introduction," in *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy*, ed. Jonardon Ganeri, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press), 1–12.

10 The term *"vyapadeśa"* has been derived by adding the suffix *"ghañ"* to the verbal root *"diś"* as prefixed by *"vi"* and *"apa"* respectively, and the term *"vyapadeśyam"* has been derived by adding the suffix *"nyat,"* which designates "fitness," to the term *"vyapadeśa."* The particles *"vi"* and *"apa"* signify "distinction" (*viśeṣa)* and "indication" *(nirdeśa*) respectively, and the verb *"diś"* means "to point out." Therefore, the word *"vyapadeśa"* means "distinctive (verbal) indication" or "designation by name" and the word *"vapadesýa"* means "fit for (verbal) indication" or "nameable." *"Avyapadeśyam"* is a negative compound (*nañ samāsa)* which means "not fit for verbal indication" or "unnameable."

11 *"yāvadarthaṃ vai nāmadheyaśabdāḥ"* (NSB, 10). The term *"yāvadartham"* is derived through *avyayībhāva* compound in the sense of *"sākalya"* or "entirety," and the particle *"vai"* signifies "certainty."

12 In *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā,* Vācaspati clarifies that since in a cognition like "this is cow," collocation (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) of the object "cow" and the name "cow" is grasped and since objects related as cause and effect do not appear in awareness as collocated, the relation between object and naming word should be that of identity (*tādātmya*): *"... na copāyatayā sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ghaṭate…tasmāt tairnāmadheyaiḥ saha samānādhikaraṇasyārthasya pratyayo yata iti. tasmāt nāmadheyātmano'rthāḥ"* (NVT, 100–1).

13 "*artha sampratyayācca vyavahāraḥ*" (NSB,10). Vācaspati explains, "*asti hi purovartidravyasāmānādhikaraṇyena rajatapratyayo na caitāvatā śuktī rajatātmikā bhavatītyata āha—**arthasampratyayācca vyavahāraḥ**. tataścāvisaṃvādāt pramāṇaṃ sannāmadheyatādātmyaṃ sādhayatyarthānāmityarthaḥ"* (NVT, 101).

14 Nyāya philosophers being non-representationalists (*nirākāravādin*) often use the term *"artha"* to depict both the object and the content of cognition.

15 The term *"śābda"* here does not mean "cognition which has word as cognitive mean." Rather, it stands for a cognition which has word as its content and is therefore due to words: *"na śabdapramāṇakatayā śābdam, api tu śabde jātaṃ śābdam. śabdaścātra viṣayatvena janako'rthatādātmyāt"* (NVT, 101).

16 A *vārttika* has been traditionally defined as a treatise where the author clarifies issues raised in the preceding treatise, brings up new and relevant topics for discussion and removes any controversies regarding the matter at hand: *ukta-anukta-duruktānāṃ cintā yatra pravarttate/ tadāhu vārttikaṃ nāma vārttikajñāḥ manīṣiṇaḥ//*

17 "The Honey Ball" (*MadhupiṇḍikaSutta*: *Sutta* 18), in *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha (Majjhima Nikāya*), trans. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, Buddhist Publication Society (Kandi: Sri Lanka, 1995), 203. The word "proliferates" is the translated form of the Pāli word *"prapañcayati."*

18 Quoted in AKB on AK 3/30. The *āgama* is there quoted as "*Cakṣurvijñānena nīlaṃ vijānāti no tu nīlam, manovijñānena nīlaṃ vijānāti nīlamiti ca vijānāti*" (AKB, 471). Also quoted in *Prasannapadā* on *Mūlamadhyamakārikā*, *Pratyayaparīkṣā*, *kārikā* 3. The passage from the *āgama* therefore implies that perception as immediate awareness (*sākṣātkārī jñāna*) is free from any conceptual construction.

Journal of World Philosophies 6 (Summer 2021): 24–37

e-ISSN: 2474-1795 • http://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp • doi: 10.2979/jourworlphil.6.1.03

19 *"atha keyaṃ kalpanā nāma. nāmajātyādiyojanā"* (PS and PSV 1/2). Trans. and annotated Masaki Hattori, *Diṅnāga on Perception* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968). It may be mentioned here that Diṅnāga was not the first to describe *pratyakṣa* as free from *kalpanā* or *vikalpa*. Vindhyavāsin, a Sāṃkhya philosopher of the late fourth century who was engaged in an intellectual debate with Buddhamitra (early fourth century), one of the teachers of Vasubandhu (approximately 350–430 CE), defines *"pratyakṣa"* as *"śrotrādi-vṛttiravikalpikā"*—"the functioning of the ear etc. without construction or verbalization." This definition has been regarded by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa to be virtually identical with Diṅnāga's definition. The latter, however, scores over that of Vindhyavāsin because, as Hattori says (1968: 82), Diṅnāga provides a logical basis for this definition by sharply distinguishing between *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmāṇyalakṣaṇa*.

20 *"na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte/ anubiddhamiva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena gamyate//"* (VP, I, 123). It may be mentioned here that the state of complete identity of language and thought is called the *paśyantī* stage of language. At the intermediate stage (called the *madhyamā*), which is the stage immediately preceding the stage of thought being expressed in sound, the speaker understands language and thought as differentiable though they are still one and undifferentiated.

21 *"ādyaḥ karaṇavinyāsaḥ prāṇasyorddhvaṃ samīraṇam/sthānānāmabhighātaśca na vinā śabdabhāvanām//"* (VP, I, 122). The commentary *Bhāvapradīpa* explains that articulation is always preceded by understanding of capability (*karttṛtvāvagati*) and such understanding, in its turn, results from previous utterance of words (*śabdayoni*).

22 Hattori (1968: 27). The *kārikā* and its *vṛtti* are as follows: *dharmiṇo'nekarūpasya nendriyāt sarvathāgatiḥ/ svasaṃvedyaṃ hyanirdeśyaṃ rūpamindriyagocaraḥ// — evaṃ tāvat pañcendriyajaṃ pratyakṣajñānaṃ nirvikalpakam.*"

23 *"indriyārthodbhavenāsti vyapadeśyādisambhavaḥ/"* (*PS,* 1/1/17 ab).

24 *"athāpyavyapadeśyādigrahaṇaṃ tasya jñānasya svabhāvapradarśanāya, tan na, pratyakṣalakṣaṇavācyatvāt tasya cendriyārthasannikarṣeṇa eva siddhatvāt. jñānasvabhāvanirdeśyatve ca guṇatvadravyānārambhakatvaniṣkriyatvākāśādyaviṣayatvasyāpinirdeśyatvādatiprasaṅgaḥ"* (PSV on PS, 1/1/ 17 ab).

25 *"athānena śabdena naiva kiñcidabhidhīyate, kimasya śabdasyoccāraṇasāmarthyaṃ pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhamiti? apratipādakatvānmūkasvapnasadṛśametat"* (NBV, 40).

26 In his *Mahābhaṣya,* Patañjali acknowledges four groups of words: genus word (*jātiśabda*), quality word (*guṇaśabda*), action word (*kriyāśabda*), and arbitrary word (*yadṛcchāśabda*). This subdivision has been grounded on the presence or absence of the property which causes application of the word (*pravṛttinimitta*). Vācaspati Miśra's division of words, however, seems to be grounded on Diṅnāga's division found in PSV on PS, chapter 1, section 1, *kārikā* 3.

27 *"Vikalpayonayo hi śabdāstadgocaramabhiniviśante. yad vikalpā gṛhṇanti, yaccādhyavasyati tadubhayamapyanyavyāvṛttirūpamavastu, tasmānnāvikalpakaṃ jñānaṃ tadgocaraṃ vā paramārthasad gocarayanti vikalpāḥ śabdāścetyayamabhisandhiḥ"* (NVT, 125). Acceptance of only the object of perception as truly existent (*paramāthasat*) is a clear hint that for Diṅnāga words are capable of denoting by means of exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*) only.

28 The term *"ṭīkā"* has been derived from the verbal root *"tīk"* which means "to go." That which helps in entering or penetrating a subject is known as *"ṭīka."* The nature of *ṭīka* has been traditionally explained as follows: *"mūlagranthasyāpratipatti-vipratipatti-anyathāpratipattiḥ nirākaraṇena tatkarturabhipretārthasya śabdāntareṇa vivaraṇam."* A *ṭīka* is narration of the intention of the author of a text through the narrator's own words (that is, the author of a *tika* should not simply repeat words from the original text) by removing any non-understanding, misunderstanding, or objection involving the text. It is clear that any explanation of a text, be it *a bhāṣya*, a *vārttika*, or a *ṭīka* performs five functions, namely*, padaccheda* or resolve the sentences (of the text) into its constituent parts by separating the euphonic combinations (*sandhi*), *padārthokti* or specify the meaning of each of the terms

Journal of World Philosophies 6 (Summer 2021): 24–37

e-ISSN: 2474-1795 • http://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp • doi: 10.2979/jourworlphil.6.1.03

in the sentences, *vigraha* or separate the compound terms *(samasta pada*) into their constituent parts, *vākyayojanā* or show the relation between sentences, and *ākṣepasya samādhānam* or answer the objections put forth by the opponents.

29 "[...] *avyabhicāripadenaiva saṃśayajñāne niraste savikalpakapratyakṣāvarodhārthamupādīyamānaṃ vyavasāyātmakapadaṃ saṃśayajñānapratyakṣatāpākaraṇamanvācinoti"* (NVT, 107). Explaining why doubt is to be included within invalid cognition, Vācaspati says, it complies with the nature of *"mithyājñāna"* described in the NBV (38) as *"atasmiṃstadbhavati."* Moreover, the content of doubt (for example, an object possessing both personhood and stumphood) does not correspond to any real thing and the cognition therefore does not lead to successful activity. The Nyāya philosophers do not consider deceiving (*visaṃvādaka*) cognition as valid (*avyabhicārī).*

30 *"tatrāvikalpikāyāḥ padam avyapadeśyamiti, savikalpikāyāśca vyavasāyātmakamiti"* (NVT, 100). And again: *"vyavasāyātmakapadaṃ sāksātsavikalpakasya vācakam. tathā hi vyavasāyo viniścayo vikalpa itynarthāntaram. sa evātmā rūpaṃ yasya tat savikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam"* (NVT, 107).

31 *"avidyamānaṃ vyapadeśyaṃ yasmiṃstadavyapadeśyaṃ jātyādisvarūpāvagāhi, na tu jātyādīnāṃ mitho viseśaṇaviśeṣyabhāvāvagāhīti yāvat"* (NVT, 100).

32 *"... avyapadeśyaṃ vyapadeśe bhavaṃ vyapadeśyaṃ na vyapadeśyamavyapadeśyaṃ <u>śabdājanyaṃ yad vijñānaṃ jāyate tat pratyakṣampramāṇam….</u>avyutpannasya sannihite'rthe vyāpriyamāṇe cakṣuṣi śabdaśravanāntaraṃ yad gauriti jñānaṃ jāyate, tatrākṣamapi kāraṇam, anyathā rekhoparekhatvādi viśeṣapratityayogāt (NK, 474); also "... <u>avyapadeśyaṃ śabdājanyaṃyat parijñānamjāya tat pratyakṣaṃ pramānam.</u> pramākaraṇaṃ śabdājanyamiti tu na savikalpakavyavacchedārthaṃ, kintu avyutpannasya sannihite'pyarthe vyāprīyamāṇe cakṣuṣi śabdaśruteranantaraṃ yad gauriti tatra jñānaṃ jāyate tatra rekhoparekhādyarthaṃ pratyakṣopayogo'pi śabdasyaiva kāraṇatvāt tadvyavacchedārthamiti draṣṭavyam"* (KV, 544).

33 *"na ca tat pratyakṣam, anantarabhāvinaḥ śabdasyaiva tadutpattau sādhakatamatvādindriyasyāpi tatsahakāritāmātratvāt"* (NK, 475).

34 (NVT, 111–21).

35 *"anena hi piṇḍasya pūrvāparāvasthāvartinīmekātamindriyajavikalpagocaratvena darśayati, na tu śabdaniveśanamapi"* (NVT, 112).

36 *"saṃjñā hi smaryamāṇāpipratyakṣatvaṁ na bādhate/*
saṃjñinaḥ.
kutaḥ?

sā taṭāvasthā na rūpācchādanakṣamā//

nārthendriyavyāpāraṁ vyavadhatte ityarthaḥ.... yato,

na kiñcidekasmekasmāt sāmagryāḥ sarvasambhavaḥ/" (NVT, 112).

37 Vācaspati quotes his teacher in this context, saying: *"tatra gurūpadiṣṭā gāthā paṭhitavyā, śabdajatvena śābdaṃ cet pratyakṣaṃ cākṣajanmataḥ/ spaṣṭagrahaṇarūpatvād yuktamaindriyakaṃ hi tat//iti"* (NVT, 121).

38 *"tatra vṛddhanaiyāyikāstāvadācakṣate, …"* (NM, 121). According to these Naiyāyikas, cognition which is describable by words is *"vyapadeśya."* Therefore, cognition arising out of sense-object contact and expressed mentioning names of objects, that is, cognition expressed as "cognition of color," "cognition of taste," etc. are *"vyapadeśya."* The word *"avyapeśyam"* is used to exclude these kinds of cognition. In other words, for these philosophers, determinate cognition is neither *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*, nor the result of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa.* Clearly, this does not fit into the view propagated by Vātsyāyana or by Uddyotakara.

39 *"na khalu lokasya vyapadeśaikaśaraṇā vastusthitayo bhavanti. loko hi yathāruci vyapadiśati…"* (NM, 122). It needs to be mentioned here that though Vācaspati refers to mental perception of cognition to determine its nature, Jayanta here criticizes the view which admits verbal reporting of such cognition as the key factor in determining the same.

Journal of World Philosophies 6 (Summer 2021): 24–37

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40 *"tasmāt pratyakṣasya lakṣasyāsadbhāvāt kasyedaṃ lakṣaṇamupakrāntamiti asambhavadoṣamāśaṅkyāha sūtrakāraḥ avyapadeśyamiti"* (NM, 124).

41 The opponent here uses terms employed by grammarians like Bhartṛhari.

42 The opponent here is probably taking recourse to the standard Nyāya view also shared by Indian philosophical schools like Mīmāṃsā and Sāṃkhya that simultaneity of cognitions is an impossible phenomenon.

43 This view again rests on the contention of some Indian philosophers that since mind (*manas*) can grasp objects of all external sense organs, it can be the instrumental cause of cognitions such as "this flower has sweet smell."

44 (NM, 123).

45 A common answer would be that word can be the object and instrument of its cognition just as light can be in case of its perceptual cognition. Jayanta finds this answer unacceptable on the following grounds: (a) light is not the object and instrument of a single cognitive act; that is, visual sense organ is the instrument behind perceptual cognition of light, and it sees light independently without the intervention of any other light; (b) since word (as sound) perishes at the third moment after its generation, it is impossible that it should accumulate activity (*vyāpāra*) to be the instrument and at the next moment be the object of its own cognition; (c) word (as sound) is perceived by the ears, it is not to be known by a word and therefore, it is the means, not the object of verbal cognition; (d) in instances where the remembered word causes cognition of objects, the words bring forth memory of objects denoted by them and verbal cognition amounts to cognition of relation between objects, thus remembered words do not feature in it. For detailed discussion see NM, 125–8.

46 Determinate cognition, it is well known, has as its content the contents of indeterminate cognition arranged as qualifier and qualified.

47 *"upāyo buddhāvatiśayamādadhāti na viśaye, viṣayāvagatisamaye ca na buddhiravabhātīti naiyāyikāḥ. tadayamatiśayo yadadhikaraṇaḥ sā na pratibhāsate buddhiḥ, yacca tadānīmāvābhasate viṣayastatrātiśayo nāsti, dṛśyate cātiśayasaṁvedanamiti saṅkaṭaḥ panthāḥ"* (NM, 129–30). It may be noted here that this answer would fail to satisfy the Mīmāṃsakas, who believe that cognition is self-revealing (*svaprakāśaka*).

48 *"tasmād gaurityadijñānaṃ na vācakāvacchinnavācyaviṣayam. ataśca na śābdaṃ tat, api tu suspaṣṭaṃ pratyakṣameva. tasmiṃśca lakṣite sati lakṣaṇavaiyarthyāśaṅkākaraṇābhāvānnāsambhavadoṣanirākaraṇārthamavyapadeśyapadam"* (NM, 132).

49 *"tacchabdavācyatājñaptirvinā samjñopadeśinaḥ/ śabdānneti sa evātra satyapyakṣe prakarṣabhāk//"* (NM, 132).

Journal of World Philosophies 6 (Summer 2021): 24–37

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