

Perceptual Judgment Exemplified: Dinnāga, Praśastapāda, and the Grammarians

VICTORIA LYSENKO

Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia (vglyssenko@yandex.ru)

*The article deals with the structure and function of perceptual judgment in the perception theories of the Buddhist Dinnāga (c. 480–540 CE) and the Vaiśeṣika Praśastapāda (c. sixth century CE). I show their indebtedness to the Vyākaraṇa tradition and particularly to Patañjali (second century BCE). Following Shōryū Katsura's idea that the status of perceptual judgment with regard to the Buddhist system of instruments of valid cognition (pramāṇa) was first established by Dharmakīrti (600–660 CE), I argue that Dinnāga's examples in his definition of perception in *Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti* 1,3d could be considered as perceptual judgments in the sense of Charles Peirce ("The first judgement of a person as to what is before his senses"). After the examination of Dinnāga's and Praśastapāda's examples of perceptual judgments, I come to the conclusion that Dinnāga, as a nominalist, sees in them an expression of ordinary linguistic behaviour (lokavyavahāra) shaped by convention and grammatical tradition (Vyākaraṇa), while Praśastapāda, as a realist, seeks to show that perceptual judgments follow the Vaiśeṣika ontological categories. If in Dinnāga's epistemology perceptual judgement remains outside the pramāṇa system (its status is simply not defined), in Praśastapāda's Vaiśeṣika it pertains to the pramāṇa of perception (pratyakṣa).*

Key words: perception; perceptual judgment; Indian epistemology; verbalization; mental construction; conceptualization; pratyakṣa; pramāṇa; Vyākaraṇa; Buddhism; Vaiśeṣika; Patañjali; Dinnāga; Praśastapāda

1 Introduction

The Buddhist epistemological tradition (Dinnāga, Dharmakīrti, and their successors) is known by its attempt to isolate a moment of raw or pure "sensing" prior to "sensing as," which involves mental assessment. The former is distinguished from the latter by its immediacy or by its direct access to the object. Due to this, it is considered to be a reliable instrument of valid cognition or *pramāṇa*. By contrast, "sensing as," since it involves mental construction (*kalpanā*—imagination, verbalization, and conceptualization), is believed to be prone to doubts and errors arising from the activity of the mind. Though both were strictly associated with conventional or relative truth (*samvṛtisat*), the former was credited with superior validity as compared to the latter. One of the reasons for this, I think, may be traced to some soteriological considerations. The suspension of mental constructions, by which the state of liberation (*nirvāṇa*) is characterized, may have been tacitly accepted as a necessary prerequisite for genuine knowledge, even with regard to ordinary cognitive processes. Although the enlightenment of the Buddha is an extraordinary achievement revealing absolute reality (*paramārthasat*), while ordinary direct perception common to all of us is only relative (*samvṛtisat*), it seems possible to assume that the criterion of immediacy, or rather, of the absence of mediation, may have been extended by Buddhist Yogācāra epistemologists from soteriological to everyday experience. Speculatively speaking, if we are endowed with the capacity to perceive things directly without imposing on them our mental constructions, this could also qualify us for the quest for *nirvāṇa*. The idea of the connection between a non-constructing state of mind and, so to say, "normal" mental constructing activity was suggested by Johannes

Bronkhorst. He argues that for certain Nyāya thinkers, “*nirvikalpaka* [...] plays a double role: it can be experienced independently, admittedly only by people who engage in certain mental exercises, and it also underlies ‘normal cognition’” (Bronkhorst 2011: 374).¹

In the final analysis, it is a question of whether Buddhist logic and epistemology are fully free of soteriological commitments or are more or less guided by them. I am not going to dwell on this problem, which should require special attention, except for one point. It was the Russian scholar Theodor Stcherbatsky who opened the discussion thereon with the following statement:

The Buddhists themselves call this their science a doctrine of logical reasons (*hetuvidyā*) or a doctrine of the sources of right knowledge (*pramāṇavidyā*) or, simply, an investigation of right knowledge (*saṃyagiñāryutpādanam*). It is a doctrine of truth and error. In the intention of its promoters the system had apparently no special connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e. as the teaching of a path towards Salvation. It claims to be the natural and general logic of the human understanding (Stcherbatsky 1932: 2).²

This, so to speak, “scientistic” or “secularist” approach was later disputed by many Buddhologists.³

But what remains unknown to the western academic audience is Stcherbatsky’s following remark, which I personally share: “Ecstatic states almost always play a role in the constitution of most Indian philosophical systems. But mysticism as an object of our study does not at all give us the right to transform our knowledge of it into some kind of new mysticism. Indian mysticism has been systematized by the Indians themselves with remarkable subtlety and logical skill, so its study naturally fits into quite rational forms” (Stcherbatsky 1916: IV).⁴

Diñnāga (c. 480–540 CE) in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti* (PSV) was supposed to be one of the first Buddhist thinkers⁵ to shape a radical distinction between two types of cognitive objects: *svalakṣaṇa*, or bare, unique particulars (literally, what characterizes [only] itself—in contemporary philosophy we may call them *qualia*⁶—pertaining to reality), and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, shared or general features, which are nothing more than our mental constructions. To each of them its proper type of cognition is assigned: to *svalakṣaṇa*—*nirvikalpakapratyakṣa*, bare awareness or, rather, sense perception free from mental constructions, to *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*—*savikalpakajñāna*, or cognition with mental constructions including imagination, conceptualization, and verbalization. This distinction is called *pramāṇa-vyavāsthā*, or distinct spheres of operation of the instruments of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). Thus, the object of cognition is believed to be provided by its appropriate instrument of (*pramāṇa*).

This was disputed by the realistic schools of brahmanical philosophy: Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, and Mīmāṃsā. They maintain the independence of the object from the instruments of its cognition and insisted on the applicability to one and the same object of more than one *pramāṇa*. Their doctrine is known under the name of *pramāṇa-saṃplava*, or “overlapping of instruments of valid cognition.” Nevertheless, Diñnāga’s distinction between bare awareness of particulars, or raw sensation, and a subsequent mental construction (*kalpanā*) including verbal report thereon, has been assimilated by them. The alleged gap between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* was bridged by the affirmation that these are the successive stages of cognition of one and the same object, since the latter remained in direct contact with senses. As far as nature and contents of these two types of perception are concerned, they differ from one school to another according to their proper epistemic frameworks.⁷

If in Buddhist epistemology only mere awareness, or perception free from mental construction, or *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*, constitutes a *pramāṇa*, an instrument of valid cognition, in brahmanical schools both *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* are believed to belong to the *pramāṇa* of sense perception (*pratyakṣa*). First, we grasp an object vaguely as something indefinite, then we

identify it, like “this is a pot,” in the *saṃkalpaka pratyakṣa*—judgmental perception. It is the latter that I will in the following call “perceptual judgment.”⁸

Among different definitions of perceptual judgment in western philosophy I have chosen that of Charles S. Peirce: “The perceptual judgement, that is, the first judgement of a person as to what is before his senses” (CP 5: 115). What motivated my choice? His words “before the senses” correspond to the etymological sense of the Sanskrit term *pratyakṣa*, traditionally analyzed as *prati+akṣa*, “before/approached the organ of sense (the eyes).” It also describes a situation in which we are supposed to formulate our perceptual judgments: first of all, we have a private experience of some sense data, as “we feel it” (*qualia*) from the first-person perspective, then we give our verbal account thereon to communicate our experience to others, making it public. We could further compare Peirce’s idea of precept as an object of the preceding stage of perception with Dīṇāga’s *śvalakṣaṇa* but this deserves a separate comparative study.⁹

The first scholar who applied the term “perceptual judgment” to the Buddhist epistemology of perception was Stcherbatsky. He defines a perceptual judgment by referring to sensation:

Empirical perception is that act of cognition which signalizes the presence of an object in the ken and is followed by the construction of an image of that object and by an act of identification of the image with the sensation. Such identification is made in a perceptual judgement of the pattern “this is a cow,” where the element “this” refers to the sensational core incognizable in itself, and the element “cow” to the general conception expressed in a connotative name and identified with the corresponding sensation by an act of imputation [...]. The judgement is thus a mental act uniting sensation with conception with a view to knowledge. For neither sensation alone, as pure sensation, affords any knowledge at all; nor conception alone, i.e., pure imagination, contains any real knowledge. Only the union of these two elements in the judgement of perception is real (Stcherbatsky 1932: 211-12).

Stcherbatsky proves the Buddhists’ awareness of the distinction between raw sensation and perceptual judgment by the famous citation from Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (further on, AKB): “The Buddhist maintains that ‘by pure sensation we really perceive the blue, but we do not know that it is blue’ (*nīlam vijānati, na tu ‘nīlam iti’ vijānati*). As soon as we tell that it is blue, we have already compared it with the non-blue, and this the senses alone cannot achieve. A consistent sensationalism must be speechless” (Stcherbatsky 1932: 180).

In the index to the first volume of his *Buddhist Logic*, Stcherbatsky summarizes his main points on perceptual judgment:

Judgement, perceptual (*adhyavasāya* = *vikalpa* = *niścaya*), a decision of the understanding concerning the identification of a point-instant of external reality with a constructed image or concept, 211; its subject always the element «this», its predicate always a universal, 212, 222; its formula $x = A$, where x is pure sensation and A a concept or image, 212; it establishes «similarity between things absolutely dissimilar», 88; this fact is called «conformity» (*sarūpya*), q.c.; the real judgement is the perceptual judgement; J. as synthesis, 213; as analysis, 219; as a necessary projection of an image into the external world, 221; as name-giving, 214 [...] (Stcherbatsky 1932: 554-55).

Here, the Russian scholar has in mind Dharmakīrti, not Dīṇāga.

In his seminal paper on perceptual judgement, Shōryū Katsura argues that the Buddhist concept of perceptual judgement was first formulated by Dharmakīrti. The latter believed that “a

perceptual judgement could not be a *pramāṇa* since it does not satisfy a criterion of novelty—it gives no new information of its object already cognized by sensation” (Katsura 1993: 67).¹⁰

If we compare Peirce’s and Stcherbatsky’s account of perceptual judgment, we should take notice of one important difference. For Peirce, the “first judgment” escapes our control; at the moment of its arising we cannot be sure whether it is accurate or not. Peirce writes: “[...] perceptual judgement professes to represent something, and thereby does represent something, whether truly or falsely” (CP 7: 630).

Stcherbatsky argues that perceptual judgment is a kind of “volitional act by which I decide that an image must be identified with a point-instant of external reality” (Stcherbatsky 1932: 213). He identifies perceptual judgment with the Buddhist concept of *adhyavasāya*, or *niścaya*—both terms refer to determination.

But if I think, “This is fire,” with regard to a picture or a photo of fire, could it be an ascertained or determined cognition of fire? Katsura disagrees with Stcherbatsky and suggests that Dharmakīrti “seems to distinguish perceptual judgement from *adhyavasāya*” (Katsura 1993: 71). He holds that *adhyavasāya* as ascertainment follows a perceptual judgment if it “stands the test of experience”: “The two main functions of perceptual judgement are to prevent *bhrāntijñāna* from arising and to produce *adhyavasāya* (determination) which induces us to a purposive activity (*pravṛtti*). In this context, the perceptual judgment can be said to play a more significant role in the cognitive process towards a human activity than the initial perception which, being free from conceptual construction, lacks the power of determination” (Katsura 1993: 72). And this is despite the fact that it is the direct perception, and not the perceptual judgment, that is considered as an instrument of valid cognition! The task of combining one with another challenges Dharmakīrti’s epistemology of perception,¹¹ but not Dīnāga’s, because Dīnāga, unlike Dharmakīrti, does not endow perception with infallibility (*abhrānta*), nor does he connect perceptual judgments with determination (*adhyavasāya*).

The aim of the first part of this paper is to show that even if we cannot find a well elaborated concept of perceptual judgment in Dīnāga’s PSV, we come upon some statements in his examples which we could call “perceptual judgments,” in the sense of “the first judgments” exposed above by Charles Peirce. For both thinkers, perceptual judgments lie somehow beyond our control, inasmuch as we do not dispose any information to decide whether they are true or false.

I will focus on the *savikalpaka jñāna*, or cognition with mental constructions, in Dīnāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti* (PSV), which, I think, reveals some syntactic categories that may be helpful in understanding the propositional structure of perceptual judgment, and shows its possible indebtedness to the *pravṛttinimitta*—the four conditions of denotative use and four types of denotative objects exposed by the grammarian Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* (Mbh). Then, after presenting the Vaiśeṣika Praśastapāda’s two-staged (immediate and mediated) concept of perceptual process (the latter is also suggestive of perceptual judgment), I will compare it to Patañjali’s and Dīnāga’s schematizations.

From Dīnāga’s nominalistic point of view, language and its structure pertain to our mental constructions, while both Patañjali and Praśastapāda subscribed to a realistic principle of correspondence between words and things. However, this does not entail much proximity between their views, since, for our Grammarian, words were much more important than things, while for our Philosopher, it is the contrary. Even if, as I have suggested elsewhere, the Vaiśeṣika system of categories is largely indebted to the Grammarian classifications of words and their *pravṛttinimitta*,¹² for Praśastapāda our cognition of the world and its verbal expression are governed not by language but by these categories as ontological modes of reality.

As for the Buddhists, especially Dīnāga, they used the grammatical classifications and discourses in order to show to what extent our view of reality is verbally/conceptually constructed, and in so doing, they, so to speak, “deverbalize” the true reality (*paramārtha*), as well

as relativize language itself as a purely conventional tool for the sake of worldly communication. It is at the level of ordinary communication (*saṃvṛtisatya*) that we can find a striking similarity between Dinnāga's concept-laden construction of perception and convention/language-based explanation of it and the Vaiśeṣika ontology-based genus-species explanation of concept-laden perception.

2 Dinnāga's Definition of Perception and its Relevance to Perceptual Judgment

In his PS I.k.3c-d, Dinnāga defines perception (*pratyakṣam*) as “free from mental constructions” (*kalpanāpodhaṇi*), and mental construction itself (*kalpanā*) as “the association of name (*nāman*), genus (*jāti*) etc. [with a thing perceived, which results in verbal designation of the thing]” (Hattori 1968: 25).¹³

The PS I.k.3d triggered a long discussion not only among Buddhist authors, but also among Buddhologists. Mentioning name and genus one after another as if they were different entities of a seemingly same value may raise a suspicion that Dinnāga considered genus, or universal (*jāti*), as different from name-giving, and thus indirectly allowed the existence of universals, which is inadmissible for the Buddhist.¹⁴

In his *Vṛtti* to PS I.k.3d, Dinnāga refers to some cases of name-giving:

In the case of arbitrary words (*yadr̥cchāśabda*, proper nouns), a thing (*artha*) distinguished by a name (*nāman*) is expressed by a word [such as] ‘*Diṭṭha*.’ In the case of genus-words (*jāti-śabda*, common nouns), a thing distinguished by a genus is expressed by a word [such as] ‘*go*’ (cow). In the case of quality-words (*guṇa-śabda*, adjectives), a thing distinguished by a quality is expressed by a word [such as] ‘*śukla*’ (white). In the case of action-words (*kriyā-śabda*, verbal nouns) a thing distinguished by an action is expressed by a word [such as] ‘*pācaka*’ (one who performs an act of cooking). In the case of substance-words (*dravya-śabda*), a thing distinguished by a substance is expressed by a word [such as] ‘*daṇḍin*’ (a staff-bearer) or ‘*viśānin*’ (horned, a horn-bearer).¹⁵

This list of cases, as we can see, does not coincide with the grammatical classifications of parts of speech, like nouns (*nāma*), verbs (*ākhyāta*), preverbs (*upasarga*), and particles (*nipāta*) as in Yaska's list. *Gauḥ* (go), *pācaka*, *daṇḍin*, *viśānin* are the substantives, only “*śukla*” is an adjective. The cases mentioned by Dinnāga reveal more general logical categories which could be defined as a system of predicates, or specifications, applied to things to be specified, in terms of the *qualifier-qualificand* or specification-specified (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*) relationship. What are these specifications? Are name, genus, quality, action, and substance just names? Kamalaśīla argues that the examples in the *Vṛtti* to PS I.k.3d represent a special case of the application of names (*nāman*).

Perhaps, the most natural way to justify Dinnāga's definition was suggested by Śāntarakṣita after his multiple and sometimes quite artificial attempts to assimilate it to the Buddhist hard nominalism:

1227. The (reverend Dinnāga) who was skilled in logic stated it in this way [i.e., through the employment of separate statements, only] in conformity with the commonality, for to just this extent words follow the conventional path in this [definition of Dinnāga] (Funayama 1992: 82).¹⁶

Hattori was the first scholar to pay special attention to the parallelism between Dinnāga's classification and Patañjali's four *pravṛttinimittas*,¹⁷ “grounds for application” of names. He listed

the properties that justify the application of a given [category of] names to a given [class of] objects (MBh on vt. 1 to *pratyābhārasūtra*). Thus, the category of general terms *jātiśabda* is applied to an object since it possesses a class-property—*jāti* (1); the category of quality-words is applied to an object since it possesses a quality (*guṇa*) (2); the category of action words is applied to an object since it possesses an action (*krīyā*) (3). It is only *yadvchāśabda*, or proper names, which have no “objectively discernible” *pravṛttinimitta*, since they are applied arbitrarily or according to the speaker’s wish (4).

Hattori further remarks that we do not find the term “*dravyaśabda*” in this list, and suggests that Diñnāga’s identifying *visānin* as a *dravya* may be traced back to MBh, p. 1.6 ff. (Hattori 1968: 84). Here we find another essential grammatical classification, presented in a series of alternative suggestive answers to Patañjali’s famous question: What is the word (*śabda*) in the proposition “this is a cow”?¹⁸ In this dialogue, Patañjali exposes four types of things from which he distinguishes the word (*śabda*). He calls a cow an individual thing (*dravya*) specified by a dewlap, tail, hump, hooves, and horns. This is a presumable antecedent to Diñnāga’s example of *dravya* as an object, a stick, *daṇḍa*, by holding of which a brahman is specified as stick-holder, or *daṇḍin*. Further on, Patañjali refers to gesture, movement, and blinking as actions (*krīyā*), and to various colors (white, blue, black, brown, and grey) as qualities (*guṇa*). The general property “which is the same in different things and which is not destroyed when the things in which it resides are destroyed” he defines as a class property (*ākṛti*) that in Diñnāga’s classifications is designated as *jāti*—properties shared by a class of individuals.

Thus, we have the whole set of counterparts to Diñnāga’s *dravya*, *krīyā*, *guṇa*, and *jāti*. Diñnāga’s parallels to grammatical classifications prove, I think, that for him, as for Grammarians,¹⁹ our understanding of phenomenal reality is inseparable from language and linguistic categories.

If we follow the models of the *Vyākaraṇa* tradition, the simple propositions cited above could be represented in the following form: “This is *Diṭṭha*” (*Ayaṃ Diṭṭha*), “This is a cow” (*Ayaṃ gauḥ*), “This is white (*Ayaṃ śukla*),” etc.

In my opinion, the propositions so reconstructed can be called perceptual judgments in the sense of Charles Peirce, regardless of whether Diñnāga, Patañjali, or even Prāśastapāda deliberately formulate a concept of perceptual judgment. The demonstrative “this” (*ayaṃ*), as Stcherbatsky rightly remarks, refers to the logical subject (*viśeṣya*) of the proposition (which is for him an inexpressible “thing in itself”—*svalakṣaṇa*), while “*gauḥ*,” “*śukla*,” “*pacāka*,” etc.—to its predicates (*viśeṣaṇa*). Diñnāga himself uses the terms of qualifier-qualificand relation (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*), which reveals the logical structure of the simplest basic type of proposition, constituting a perceptual judgment.

In his classifications, Diñnāga evidently follows conventional speech behavior (*lokavyavahāra*) and its analysis in the *Vyākaraṇa* tradition, both correlative of conventional truth (*samvṛtisatya*) (Hattori 1968: 84). His own semantic theory of *apoha*, presented in the fifth chapter of PSV, is quite different.²⁰ As for the *Vyākaraṇa* classification categories themselves, they are not loaded with any ontological implications. Hayes aptly remarks “[...] the grammarians take no stand on the question of whether it is reality that determines how we classify words or our classification of words that determines how we classify our experiences of the world” (Hayes 1988: 206).

For the Grammarians’ (the *Śābdikas*), semantic classifications were based on one crucial epistemological principle, according to which all our knowledge is deeply imbued with language. As Bhartṛhari proclaims: “There is no notion (*pratyaya*) in the world which is not followed by word (*śabda*). All cognition appears as if penetrated by word.”²¹ Thus, for the *Śābdikas*, only verbally shaped cognition may constitute *pratyakṣa*. In the final analysis, as Marco Ferrante argues, “If knowledge is always imbued with language, splitting it into perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāṇa*), verbal testimony (*śabda*) and so on, may be practically convenient but it is

ultimately misleading” (Ferrante 2017: 229). Though Diñnāga’s and Bhartṛhari’s approaches to language are not discussed here,²² it is impossible not to mention that the final conclusions both philosophers come to somehow meet in their nominalistic stance, since for both of them the grammatical categories of names, etc. are purely verbal and conceptual (or made by grammarians—for Bhartṛhari).

In his definition of *kalpanā*, Diñnāga, as we have seen, lays himself open to criticism for enumerating universal, substance, etc. as co-productive factors, as if the universals were really existent. In order to save the Master from this kind of charge, Śāntarakṣita divides Diñnāga’s definition into *svamata* and *paramata*, or Diñnāga’s “own point of view,” according to which the association with word, or name-giving, is quite enough to characterize *kalpanā*, and the “opinion of others” who uphold the association with universal, substance, etc.²³

Whether Diñnāga’s definition under discussion (the Vṛtti to the PS I.k.3d) is an “incautious formulation” or not, it gives us a specimen of perceptual judgments in the sense of Charles Pierce. Here, Diñnāga touches on neither its status in the Buddhist understanding of knowledge nor its place in the *pramāṇa* system. It is namely the common usage of perceptual judgment pertaining to the conventional level of truth (*samvṛtisatya*) that he is exemplifying. He resorts to the specification-specified relationship, though, in the final analysis, from the point of view of the ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*), he rejects these kinds of distinctions as provisional, conditional, and potentially misleading.

Another interesting question arises in connection with his examples. What constitutes the subject of our perceptual judgment, or a perceived thing, or an object of perceptual cognition? For Diñnāga it could not be a *svalakṣaṇa*, an object at the moment of pure sensation, since this moment has already elapsed, so it may be only a mental image, or a mentally constructed general feature, that by the same token, is a word referent, according to the conventional truth. For the Grammarians, like Patañjali, word referents may be general features, *ākṛti*, *jāti* (as suggested by the ancient grammarian Vājapyāyana, perhaps the predecessor of Pāṇini, who is traditionally credited with this view) as well as individual things, *dravya*, *vyakti* (as suggested by Vyādi, another ancient grammarian who is said to be Vājapyāyana’s opponent). The Vaiśeṣika case deserves a special study.

3 Praśastapāda on Perceptual Judgment and its Logical Structure

Let us now turn to *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, or PBh [235]. I think that the paramount innovations of Praśastapāda in Vaiśeṣika’s epistemology have been made under Diñnāga’s influence. Besides the introduction into Vaiśeṣika of the *nirvikalpaka-savikalpaka* distinction (though without using the same terminology), one can also take notice of some other Praśastapāda’s “buddhist ideas” that were probably inspired by Diñnāga: (1) knowing through words is not a separate *pramāṇa* but a kind of *anumāna*, (2) the *trairūpya* rule, as well as (3) the division of the logical inference (*anumāna*) into *svārtha* and *parārtha*.²⁴

Praśastapāda introduces the second phase of perception (without calling it *savikalpaka*) as an application to a *viśeṣya* (an object to be specified) of a series of *viśeṣaṇa* (specifications):

From the contact of *ātman* with *manas* in dependence of [such] specifications (*viśeṣaṇa*) [as] (1) ‘universal’ (*sāmānya*), (2) ‘specific’ (*viśeṣa*), (3) ‘substance’ (*dravya*), (4) ‘quality’ (*guṇa*) and (5) ‘motion’ (*karman*) there arises a sense perception [as for instance] existent (*sad*) substance (*dravyam*) earth (*pṛthivī*) horned (*viṣāṇī*) white (*śuklo*) cow (*gaur*) goes (*gacchati*)²⁵ (my translation).

G. Jha's translation follows Śrīdhara's elucidations²⁶:

From the contact of the mind as specified by (1) generalities, (2) specialities, (3) substances, (4) qualities and (action)—there proceeds a directly sensuous knowledge,—in the form of (1) the existing, (2) substance, (3) earthly cow, (4) white and with horns, (5) is moving” (Jha 1982: 391)²⁷. Thus for him ‘*sat*’ or existent, is specified by *sāmānya* (1); *dravya* is specified by *viśeṣa* (2); ‘earthly cow’ is specified by *dravya* (3); ‘*viśāṇī*’ and ‘*śuklo*’ are specified by *guṇa* (4); it is moving (*gacchati*) is specified by *karman*’ (5).

What Praśastapāda conceptualizes as the second phase of perception differs from what he terms *ālōcanamātrā* (mere seeing). This second phase arises from a fourfold contact: contact of (i) *ātman* with (ii) *manas*, *manas* with (iii) senses (*indriya*), and senses with (iv) their appropriate objects (where *manas* is an inner sense). Thus, in contrast with immediate perception, mediated or determinant perception is supposed to proceed from the contact of *ātman* with *manas*, which serves a transmission link between senses and *ātman*, the subject of cognition.

The result of this cognitive act is structured by a series of specifications (*viśeṣaṇa*) corresponding to the Vaiśeṣika categories (*padārtha*), or modes of reality: universal (*sāmānya*), particular (*viśeṣa*), substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), and motion (*karman*).

The example, given by Praśastapāda, raises some issues. Does it constitute a single expression in which the subject (a cow) is specified by a series of predicates, or are we dealing with a series of simple atomic propositions like “[this is] existent [...]”, “[this is] substance,” “[this is] earth,” etc., like in Patañjali’s examples quoted above?

If in Praśastapāda’s example the “*itī*” is placed at the end of the whole sentence, are we supposed to read it as a single proposition? Śrīdhara glosses it in a series of expressions, containing one word (*prthivī*, or *viśāṇī*) or two words, like “existent substance” (*sat dravyam*), “white cow” (*śuklo gauḥ*), grammatically connected by case and gender. Can we see in these examples a certain order of specifications corresponding to an order of words? In that case, which example corresponds to which specification?

If we follow Praśastapāda’s text, we can suppose that it is the word *sat* (existent) which is specified by the universal (*sāmānya*),²⁸ but in Śrīdhara’s version it is the expression “*sat dravyam*.” Other items in the specification list may also receive different interpretations that largely depend on our understanding the grammatical and logical structure of Praśastapāda’s examples. The crucial point is whether we deal with the options concerning one and the same cognitive event, such as “seeing a cow” or with many events constituting it? Unlike Praśastapāda’s, Dinnāga’s and Patañjali’s examples pertain to different objects of different cognitive acts, and all of them were taken from ordinary speech practice (*lokavyavahāra*).

The first thing that comes to mind with regard to Praśastapāda’s example is that it is quite redundant for a *lokavyavahāra*, or common speech. Could we imagine an ordinary person in his right mind who will speak about seeing a cow in such terms as “existent,” “substance,” or “earth?”

I argue that Praśastapāda for apologetic purposes tries to project a network of the Vaiśeṣika categories (*padārtha*) on a perceptive act and its articulation in perceptual judgment. This explains the deviation from the natural language and the choice of the artificial form of his example.

The logical operation governing the whole cognitive process is a predication of *viśeṣaṇa* (specification) to *viśeṣya* (thing specified), both of which had been grasped at the previous stage of mere seeing (*ālōcanamātra* corresponding to *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*), but only in a simple undifferentiated form. These were not only the material things, their attributes and motions, but also the universals. As Praśastapāda says: “In the arising of the cognition of specific universals only an undifferentiated direct grasping [of the proper form of these universals] constitutes the

instrument of valid perception as there is no other instrument because it does not have a form of the result.”²⁹ That means that the cognition of universals at the *savikalpaka* level is caused by their direct grasping at the *nirvikalpaka* level. The *savikalpaka* phase consists in the application of the five *viśeṣana* representing the Vaiśeṣika *padārtha*, or categories, to substances, their attributes and motions, as well as to the universals, inherent in them, all previously grasped by mere seeing.

The only seemingly missing category is *samavāya* (inherence). It could not be either *viśeṣana* or *viśeṣya*, because it is a relation between them! Thus, I think, the *samavāya* is not really missing, since it is the principle which, according to Vaiśeṣika, holds together ontological containers and contained (*āśrayāśrita*) of which the specification-specified relationship (*viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāva*) is a variety, providing a sound ontological as well as logical ground for verbal predication.

On the contrary, Dīnāga's and Patañjali's examples, grammatical in their character, do not aim at any coherent systematic ontological implications.

The Vaiśeṣika categories are believed to be part and parcel of reality, cognizable and expressible in words.³⁰ As I have shown elsewhere (Lyssenko [Lysenko] 2005: 79-90),³¹ the words for categories, from “substances” to “motions,” and their subdivisions refer to their proper universals and to individual objects in which these universals are believed to inhere.³²

Keeping this principle in mind, let us try to identify the sense of referent (*artha*) in Praśastapāda's example. Let us imagine that we try to describe an object that we have just grasped vaguely. How could we proceed if we were Vaiśeṣikas? What could we say about it? Let us suppose that the subject (*viśeṣya*) of the sentence, given as an example, is a particular cow (*vyakti*) and all other words represent its predicates, or specifications (*viśeṣana*), revealing the Vaiśeṣika categories. The *sat* in the example refers to the highest universal (*parasāmānya*) of existence (*sattā*), while all other words seem to refer to its subdivisions, called *sāmānya-viśeṣa*, or the specific universals. Strictly speaking, the *viśeṣa* category includes only the *antyaviśeṣas*—unique particulars that could be compared with the Buddhist *svalakṣaṇas*. Here, the word *viśeṣa* seems to cover all the *viśeṣanas* from “substance” onwards as a series of universals: “*dravyatva*,” “*prthivītva*,” “*viśānatva*,” “*gotva*,” “*karmatva*.”

The Vaiśeṣika idea of cognitive act is inextricably tied with the conceptualization of things through genus-species relationship (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*): first, giving to it a class name, we identify our object as a member of the class, or determine its common features with other objects; further on, we show its distinction from other members of the same class.

Taking in account this principle, I suggest the following reconstruction of Praśastapāda's example: the most general feature we could identify from the Vaiśeṣika point of view is that it has, at least, one common feature with all existent things: “[it (our object—the cow) exists and therefore it is] existent (*sat*).” After that, we can progressively distinguish it from other members of the class of existent things. “[Among existent things it is] a substance (*dravya*)”; “[Among substances it is] earth.” The body of our cow, as well as the bodies of other animals, included humans, are made up of earth atoms, which does not exclude the admixture of the atoms of other great elements.³³ “[Among earthly bodies it has] horns,” “[Among horned bodies it is] a white cow,” “[Among white cows it is] a white cow which] is moving.”

Thus, in a series of perceptual judgments, some specifications (*viśeṣana*) mentioned in order of progression from general (the highest universal—*sattā*) to specific (*viśeṣa*), are attributed to *viśeṣya*, which is an individual thing, designated by the name “cow” (*gauḥ*).

Let us recall that in Dīnāga's and Patañjali's examples, the word “*viśāni*” as something specified by substance (*viśāna*) finds its place under the heading of *dravya*, while the word “*gauḥ*” is placed under the heading of universal (*sāmānya*). In Praśastapāda's example, *dravya* is specified by specific universal (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*), while “horned” is specified by *dravya*, like in Dīnāga's and Patañjali's examples.

I don't see any clear place for the cow in Praśastapāda's example. In Shrīdhara's elucidations, cow is associated with *sat-sad dravyam*. In Jha's translation, it is "earthly cow" that is specified by *dravya*. I think that "cow" is the subject of all these predications and for this reason it may be associated with different specifications.

What conclusion with regard to the relationship between perceptual judgments and perceptions could we draw from the analysis of these three different and, in some respects, even opposite examples, given by Diñnāga, Patañjali, and Praśastapāda?³⁴

What Praśastapāda tends to do in his examples of perceptual judgment is to interpret our raw sensations through the network of the Vaiśeṣika ontological categories. Thus, unlike Patañjali and Diñnāga, Praśastapāda makes use of perceptual judgment to certify the validity of his ontological system. Due to this, as opposed to Diñnāga, he regards perceptual judgment as an instrument of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*).

Abbreviations and Primary Sources

Mbh — *Mahābhāṣya*; *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali*, ed. F. Kielhorn, vols. I, II, III, Bombay, 1880, 1883, 1885.

NB — *Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti with Dharmottara's commentary*, ed. T. Stcherbatsky's Sanskrit Text, With Introduction and Notes, Petrograd 1918, (Bibliotheca Buddhica VII).

NK — *Nyāyakandalī being a commentary on Praśastapādabhāṣya*, with three sub-commentaries, ed. J. S. Jetly and Vasant G. Parikh Vadodara: Oriental Institute, 1991 (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. 174).

CP (1931–1958) — *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, 8 vols., eds. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss (vols 1-6), and Arthur W. Burks (vols 7-8), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-35 (vols 1-6) & 1958 (vols 7-8).

PBh — *Praśastapādabhāṣya. Word Index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya. A Complete Word Index to the Printed Editions of the Praśastapāda*, ed. J. Bronkhorst and Yves Ramseier, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994.

PSV — *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* of Diñnāga, see: (Steinkellner 2005).

TSP — *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Pañjikā, *Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla Pañjikā*, ed. with an Introduction in Sanskrit by Embar Krishnamacharya, vol. 1 Baroda, 1926 (Gaekwad's Oriental Series).

VP — *Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari*, ed. by K. A. Subramania Iyer. *Vākyapadīya with the Commentary of Helarāja, Kāṇḍa III, Part I*, Pune: Deccan College, 1963.

Victoria Lysenko, D.Sc. in Philosophy (Institute of Philosophy, RAS, 1998), Indologist and Buddhistologist, is chief researcher at the Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, where she started to work in 1990. Victoria Lysenko's philosophical concerns focus on Indian and intercultural approaches to the problems of philosophical thinking. She elaborated the concept of atomistic mode of thinking, and on its basis she has proposed a linguistic hypothesis on the origins of atomism in Indian and Western civilizations. During the last 15 years, she has been studying Indian epistemology of perception (*pratyakṣa*) as debated by classical Buddhist and Brahmanic philosophers, and compares them with some contemporary issues in Western philosophy of consciousness. She based this research on her translations into Russian of original Sanskrit texts. For the project of Anthology of Sanskrit epistemological texts on perception she has become a 2019 grantee of The Robert H. N. Ho Family Foundation Program in Buddhist Studies.

Her current academic activity is connected with her attempts to introduce—through intercultural or cross-cultural philosophical discourse—Indian and especially Buddhist philosophy into the curriculum of the contemporary consciousness studies in Russian philosophy and neuroscience. She contributed to the organization and development of the

project “Fundamental Knowledge,” dedicated to the dialogue between His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Russian scientists. See: <https://www.fort-russ.com/2018/05/dalai-lama-meets-top-russian-scientists-to-study-consciousness/>

She was a visiting professor at UGC (Delhi, Benares, Pune), 2005; Jadavpur University, Kolkata, 2006; Ecole des Hautes Etudes, Paris, 2008, 2011; Vilnius 2011. She published seven books in Russian, one in English coauthored with Michel Hulin, and around 300 papers in Russian, English, and French. For her bibliography and some of her papers see: <https://rggu.academia.edu/LysenkoVictoria>.

- ¹ Johannes Bronkhorst, “A Note on Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka Perception,” *Philosophy East & West* 61, no. 2, (2011): 373–79.
- ² Theodor Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, vol. 1 (Leningrad: Bibliotheca Buddhica XXVI, the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1932).
- ³ In his paper dedicated to the discussion of this issue in western and Indian Buddhological studies, Ernst Steinkellner (Steinkellner 2005a: 261) gives an example of the extreme “antiseccularist” approach of Edward Conze: “For a scholar such as Edward Conze, who understands and explains Buddhism with an emphasis on its practical, religious ideas, the phenomenon of a Buddhist tradition of epistemology and logic has the distinct meaning of being a sign of a deplorable distortion and corruption of the basic ideas and values of Buddhism during the last phase of Buddhism in India.” Ernst Steinkellner, “The Spiritual Place of the Epistemological Tradition,” in *Buddhism: Critical Concepts in Religious Studies*, ed. Paul Williams, vol. V. *Yogācāra, the Epistemological Tradition and Tathāgatagarbha* (London, etc.: Routledge, 2005), 259–27.
- ⁴ Theodor Stcherbatsky, *Dharmakīrti. Obosnovanie chuzhoj odushevlennosti s kommentariyami k nemu Vinitadery* (VII–VIII v.). [Tibetskij perevod sochinenij Samtānāntarasiddhi Dharmakīrti i Samtānāntarasiddhitikā Vinītadeva vmeste s tibetskim tolkovaniem, sostavlenным Agvanom Dandar-Lharamboj (Proof of Other Minds with the Commentary of Vinitadeva. Tibetan translation of the *Samtānāntarasiddhi* of Dharmakīrti with *Samtānāntarasiddhitikā* of Vinītadeva, accompanied by the gloss of Dandar Lharamba)] Edition and Preface by F.I. Shcherbatskoi (Petrograd, Bibliotheca Buddhica. Vol. XIX, 1916). (In Russian).
- ⁵ There were some Abhidharmic antecedents to this division, discussed in Robert H. Sharf, “Knowing Blue: Early Buddhist Accounts of Non-Conceptual Sense Perception,” *Philosophy East and West* 68, no. 3, (2018): 826–70.
- ⁶ About interpreting *svalakṣaṇa* as *qualia*, see Victoria Lysenko, “The Problem of Qualia: Perspectives on the Buddhist Theories of Experience,” in *Self, Culture and Consciousness*, ed. S. Menon et al. (Singapore: Springer. Nature, 2017), 16–32.
- ⁷ There are some books dedicated to Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā epistemologies, among the most recent ones: Stephen Phillips, *Epistemology in Classical India: The Knowledge Sources of the Nyāya School* (New York: Routledge, 2012); John Taber, *A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology: Kumārila on Perception, The “Determination of Perception” Chapter of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s Śloka-vārttika, Translation and Commentary* (Routledge: Hindu Studies Series, 2005).
- ⁸ Discussions concerning the problem of *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* went on through the whole classical period of Indian philosophy and have left their traces in many texts. This field of study has been thoroughly investigated by many outstanding scholars like S.C. Vidyabhushana, T. Stcherbatsky, E. Frauwallner, B.K. Matilal, M. Hattori, E. Steinkellner, T. Vetter, J.N. Mohanty, and further generations of Indologists and Buddhologists: J. Bronkhorst, A. Chakrabarti, M. Chadha, Ch. Coseru, S. Phillips, E. Franco, V. Eltschinger, B. Kellner, Jonardan Ganeri, and many others.
- ⁹ Here, I will confine myself just to one quote, rich, in my opinion, with possible parallels. Peirce (1958) describes his precept in the following way: it “[...] does not stand for anything. It obtrudes itself upon my gaze; but not as a deputy for anything else, not ‘as’ anything. It simply knocks at

- the portal of my soul and stands there in the doorway” (CP, 7: 619). On comparisons between Pragmatism and Buddhism see Richard Hayes, “Did Buddhism Anticipate Pragmatism?” *ARC: The Journal of the Faculty of Religious Studies* 23, (1995): 75–88.
- 10 Shoryu Katsura, “On Perceptual Judgement,” in *Studies on Buddhism in Honour of Professor A. K. Warder*, eds. N. Wagle & F. Watanabe (Toronto: University of Toronto Centre for South Asian Studies, 1993), 66–75.
- 11 The problem is well formulated and studied by Jeson Woo (Woo 2018: 33): “Insomuch as perception is free from conceptual construction, perception lacks the nature of determining its object. How, then, does it fulfill the criterion of *pramāṇa*, especially in terms of guiding the perceiver through to a successful action? That is, the moment of an object perishes immediately after it is grasped by perception; the object-moment no longer exists precisely at the moment one tries to obtain it. Therefore, perception in isolation would not be *pramāṇa* unless it is supplemented by ascertainment (*niścaya*), a process which judges/identifies its object in the form of ‘this is something.’” Jeson Woo, “Dharmakīrti and His Commentators on the Process of Perceptual Activities,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 47, no. 1, (2019): 31–48.
- 12 See Victoria Lyssenko, “Le principe de correspondance: la version de Praśastapāda,” *Catégories de langue et catégories de pensée en Inde et en Occident* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005), 79–90.
- 13 Hattori’s translation in Masaaki Hattori, *Diñnāga, On Perception, Being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Diñnāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya*. From the Sanskrit Fragments and the Tibetan versions, translated and annotated by Masaaki Hattori (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968). The Sanskrit text reads: *pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham* (Steinkellner 2005: 2). See: Ernst Steinkellner, *Diñnāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Chapter 1: “A hypothetical reconstruction of the Sanskrit text with the help of the two Tibetan translations on the basis of the hitherto known Sanskrit fragments and the linguistic materials gained from Jinendrabuddhi’s *Ṭikā*” (2005), retrieved March 30, 2019, last visited March 15, 2019, http://www.ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf.
- 14 Eli Franco (Franco 1984: 389) argues that some Buddhists accepted universals and that they derived their view from the wrong interpretation of this very passage. He believes that “their interpretation of PS(I) I, 3d had a considerable weight at that time, and that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla were strongly influenced by these commentators, using some of their ideas in their own interpretation of Diñnāga.” Eli Franco, “On the Interpretation of Pramāṇasamuccaya (Vṛtti) I, 3d,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 12, (1984): 389–400.
- 15 This is Hattori’s translation (Hattori 1968: 25). The Sanskrit text reconstructed by Ernst Steinkellner reads: *nāmajātyādīyojanā yadr̥cchāśabdeṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate dīṭha iti. jātiśabdeṣu jātyā gaur iti. guṇāśabdeṣu guṇena śukla iti. kriyāśabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka iti. dravyāśabdeṣu dravyeṇa daṇḍī viśāṇīti* (Steinkellner 2005: 2).
- 16 Toru Funayama, “A Study of Kalpanāpodha: A Translation of the Tattvasaṃgraha vv.1212–1263 by Śāntarakṣita and the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā by Kamalaśīla on the Definition of Direct Perception,” *Zinbun: Annals of the Institute for Research in Humanities*, 27 (1992): 33–128.
- 17 Diñnāga’s “classification of *śabda* seems to have been adopted from the Vaiyākaraṇas, who classify *śabda* into four categories; cf. MBh, p. 19.20–21 (ad Pan, I, i, 2, Vārt. 1): *catuṣṭayī śabdānām pravṛttiḥ, jāti-śabdā guṇa-śabdāḥ kriyā-śabdā yadr̥cchā-śabdāḥ caturthāḥ*.” See Hattori (1968): 83–4.
- 18 The Sanskrit text reads: *atha gaur ity atra kaḥ śabdah? kim yat tat sāsnā-lāṅgūlakakuda-khura-viśāny-ārtha-rūpam sa śabdah? nety āha, dravyaḥ nāma tat. yat tarhi tad iṅgitam ceṣṭitam nimiṣitam sa śabdah? nety āha, kriyā nāma sā. yat tarhi tac chuklo nīlaḥ kṛṣṇaḥ kapilaḥ kapota iti sa śabdah? nety āha, guṇ nāma saḥ. yat tarhi tad bhinneṣvabhinnam chinneṣvacchinnaṁ sāmānya-bhūtam sa śabdah? nety āha, ākṛtiḥ nāma sā* (Mbh 1.1 ll. 8–12).
- 19 Grammar (Vyākaraṇa) is considered one of the most important scientific achievements of Indian civilization. The discovery of the grammatical treatise of Pāṇini (fl. fourth century BCE) *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (“Eight Chapters,” the oldest linguistic and grammar text of Sanskrit surviving in its entirety) in nineteenth-century Europe marked the beginnings of comparative linguistics and, further on, of phonetics, phonology, and generative grammar. In India, the Pāṇini grammar

became a subject of different interpretations, triggering the original linguistic philosophy, the most prominent representatives of which were Patañjali (second century BCE) and Bhartṛhari (fifth century CE). The study of grammar was included into the curriculum of Indian philosophers and therefore its influence on their thinking may be assumed. In my D.Litt. dissertation, I tried to show this taking as an example the grammatical categories and their role in the shaping of ontological categories of the Vaiśeṣika school. See Victoria Lysenko, *Diskretnoye i kontinualnoye v istorii indiyaskoy mysli: lingvisticheskaya traditsiya i vaysheṣika* (Discontinuity and Continuity in the History of Indian Thought: Linguistic tradition and Vaiśeṣika), D.Litt. thesis, Institute of Philosophy, Moscow (1998) (in Russian).

20 For its translation into English and study see Richard Hayes, *Diñnāga on the Interpretation of Signs* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 252-308.

21 VP 1.131 reads: *na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād rte / anuviddham iva jñānam sarvaṁ śabdena bhāsate*.

22 For a profound study thereon see chapter III “Diñnāga against Bhartṛhari” in Radhika Herzberger, *Bhartṛhari and the Buddhists. An Essay in the Development of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought* (Dordrecht: Springer, Studies of Classical India, 1986).

23 TS 1220-1223. The problems created by Diñnāga's definition are discussed by Hattori (1968: 84-5); Franco (1984: 389-400), Funayama (1992: 33-128), and others.

24 For the analysis of these and some other similarities between Praśastapāda's and Buddhist doctrines, see Victoria Lysenko, “Buddhist Motives in Some Doctrines of Praśastapāda,” in *Vācaspativaibhavam: A Volume in Felicitation of Professor Vacaspati Upadhyaya* (Delhi etc.: D.K. Printworld, 2011), 1223–33.

25 The Sanskrit text reads: *sāmānyaviśeṣadravyaguṇakarmaviśeṣaṇāpekṣād ātmamanahsannikarṣāt pratyakṣam utpadyate, sad dravyam pṛthivī viśāṇī śuklo gaur gacchātīti* (PBh [234]).

26 In my translation: “In order to refute the opinions of them (the Buddhists) [the author] says that *savikalpaka* has also a character of sense perception (*pratyakṣata*): ‘[...] universal (*sāmānya*) etc.’ Universal, specific, substance, quality, motions are the specifications. The contact of *ātman* with *manas* depends on them. From this follows that ‘existent substance’ is specified by universal, ‘earth’ is specified by specification of earthness (*pṛthivīva*), ‘horned’ is specified by substance (*dravya*), ‘white cow’ is specified by quality (*guṇa*); ‘goes’ is specified by motion, [all these instances] are [instances of] sense perception.”

The Sanskrit text reads: *teṣāṁ [saugatānām] matam nirākurvan savikalpakasyāpi pratyakṣatām āha sāmānyaviśeṣadravyaguṇakarma-viśeṣaṇāpekṣād ātmamanasoḥ sannikarṣād iti / sāmānyam ca viśeṣaś ca dravyam ca guṇaś ca karma ca sāmānyaviśeṣa-dravyaguṇakarmāṇi, sāmānyaviśeṣadravyaguṇa-karmāṇy eva viśeṣaṇāni sāmānyaviśeṣadravyaguṇakarmaviśeṣaṇāni, tāny apekṣate ya ātmamanahsannikarṣaḥ, tasmāt sad dravyam iti sāmānyaviśiṣṭam, pṛthivī pṛthivīva viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭam, viśāṇīti dravyaviśiṣṭam, śuklo gaur iti guṇaviśiṣṭam, gacchātīti karmaviśiṣṭam pratyakṣam syāt* (NK 1991: 190).

27 Ganganatha Jha, *Padārthadharmaśamgraha of Praśastapāda*, transl. into English. (Delhi-Varanasi, 1982, reprint of Pandit, 1903-1915).

28 In fact, it is a subdivision of the *sāmānya* category, defined by the Vaiśeṣika as *sattā*, universal of existence, or *parasāmānya*, “highest universal.”

29 The Sanskrit text reads: *sāmānyaviśeṣajñānotpattav avibhaktam ālocanamātram pratyakṣam pramāṇam asmin nānyat pramāṇāntaram asti aphalarūpatvāt* (PBh [244]).

30 Let us recall Praśastapāda's three characteristics of *padārthas*, namely, “exists-ness” (*astitva*), “cognizability” (*jñeyatva*), and “nameability” (*abhidheyatva*) (PBh [11]).

31 Victoria Lyssenko, “Le principe de correspondance: la version de Praśastapāda,” in *Catègories de langue et catègories de pensée en Inde et en Occident* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2005), 79-90.

32 For example, in Praśastapāda's definitions of *mahābhūtas*: *pṛthivītvābhisambandhāt pṛthivī*, “earth [is called ‘earth’] because it is connected with earthness” (PBh [27]); or *āptvābhisambandhāt āpaḥ*, “water [is called ‘water’] because it is connected with waterness” (PBh [34]).

-
- ³³ For more about body composition see Victoria Lysenko, “The Human Body Composition in Statics and Dynamics: Āyurveda and the Philosophical schools of Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 32, no. 1, (2004): 31–56.
- ³⁴ The perceptual judgments exemplified by Diñnāga and Praśastapāda may also be compared to Wittgenstein’s elementary propositions about “atomic facts.”