

*Legitimizing Blacks in Philosophy**

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In its efforts toward improving diversity, the discipline of philosophy has tended to focus on increasing the number of black philosophers. One crucial issue that has received less attention is the extent to which black philosophers are delegitimized in the discipline because their philosophical contributions challenge the status quo. A systematic problem that bars black philosophers from equal and full participation, this delegitimization precludes the emergence of genuine diversity and reveals the importance of interrogating broader attitudes toward black philosophical contributions. In this essay, I argue for radical systematic changes to disciplinary hallmarks of professionalization such as pedagogy, mentoring, publishing, and hiring practices with the aim of legitimizing black philosophers and their contributions.

Key words: black philosopher; black women in philosophy; blacks in philosophy; race philosophy; racism in philosophy; Africana philosophy

I am an African American woman philosopher. I recently attended a conference during which I responded to a paper about Immanuel Kant, one of my areas of specialization. My response addressed the issue of Kant's racism. I took a seat at the table where I would give my commentary as the audience members began to trickle in. After a few moments, I was approached by a white male philosopher who expressed interest in the forthcoming presentation. Without introducing himself, he asked me, "So, do you do work in this area?" I replied, "Of course." (Working in an area would seem to be a necessary condition for commenting on a paper at a national conference!) He then asked, "Are you writing a dissertation on this topic?" I responded that I had already completed my graduate work.¹ He then proceeded to ask other sorts of questions that made me feel as if I had to defend my *right* to give the paper I had yet to present. In the spirit of bell hooks, I started to "talk back"² to the man by asking him about his interest in the topic. This seemed to catch him off guard. The conversation ended shortly after that, and though I felt proud of myself for defending my dignity, I also felt violated.

The notion of a "black philosopher" is an oxymoron. On the one hand, because of the recent push for diversity in the discipline black philosophers are novelties; yet on the other hand, their race threatens the white male homogeneity that has traditionally characterized the discipline. The foundation of this threat is fear of disciplinary change, a fear that originates from the fact that black philosophers tend to engage in philosophical approaches and methodologies that challenge the status quo. Most black philosophers specialize in Africana philosophy and Race philosophy (Botts et al. 2013: 229, Figure 7),³ areas that are highly politicized and marginalized in academic spaces. In the experience I shared above, I was being vetted because I was a black woman traversing social and intellectual boundaries. Put differently, this experience suggests that because I am in an intellectual space in which race perspectives are generally unwelcome, I am required to demonstrate that I am a *real* philosopher before I speak. The insidious ways in which academic racism is still a part of the experience of black philosophers makes the issue of legitimization crucial to any effort to improve diversity in philosophy. I take the issue of legitimizing black philosophers to be a push toward genuinely including and engaging with their philosophical contributions in areas that are already deemed legitimate by the profession. In my experience, it is not that diversity is unwelcome in the discipline, but rather that black philosophers are systematically delegitimized in it, barred from being able to take full advantage of disciplinary resources. In this

essay, I show that black philosophers tend to experience covert forms of racism in the discipline but that this racism is antithetical to diversity efforts as it is harmful to the scholars personally and professionally.

In recent years, the push for diversity in philosophy in the United States has tended to focus on increasing the number of people of color. This is indeed an important endeavor for at least two reasons: more bodies of color allow for better, more diverse representation; they also increase the potential of hearing more diverse voices in the discipline. However, increasing the number of diverse bodies will solve only part of the problem with legitimizing black philosophers. The effort to recruit blacks to philosophy must be combined with abolishing the notion that blacks cannot and should not engage mainstream branches of the discipline. African American philosopher John McClendon remarks that institutional racism underlies the purported professionalization in the discipline, giving rise to material conditions that support discrimination (*ibid.*: 122).⁴ For example, McClendon observes that prior to the 1970s many black philosophers were educated and/or were faculty at Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), sidelined on the margins of the discipline (*ibid.*). This marginalization of black philosophers extends to the treatment of their discursive contributions. Recounting the reception of his landmark text, *The Racial Contract*, Charles Mills (2012: 50–2) states that the text was not included in any conference discussions or anthologies representative of conventional social and political philosophy, despite the text's bestselling status and worldwide renown.⁵ What can be gathered from these experiences is the recognition that the contributions of black philosophers are routinely and systematically delegitimized. This consensus is one that exemplifies the notion that black philosophers are “welcome” in the discipline so long as they remain within predetermined intellectual boundaries and do not attempt to engage in or change the status quo. Therefore, increasing the number of blacks in the discipline will not ensure their legitimization. Rather, what is needed is a shift in perspective that finds philosophers genuinely valuing the unique approaches and methodologies that a more diverse disciplinary community can provide.

George Yancy has arguably made the largest contribution to the discipline by having edited numerous books wherein philosophers of color in general and black philosophers specifically have shared their experiences.⁶ While Yancy and others have described instances of discursive silencing and institutional racism and sexism, as in the aforementioned essay by African American philosopher McClendon, I am particularly interested in exploring the extent to which philosophy undercuts its own efforts to diversify. This essay is an attempt to point out the contradictory nature of diversity efforts in the discipline; efforts that, on the one hand, celebrate increasing numbers of diverse bodies in philosophy, but, on the other hand, do not create space for black philosophers in the disciplinary mainstream. As one of the latest generation of black philosophers, I understand firsthand that my being in philosophy is celebrated as an achievement, but that it is also the source of fear about my contributions to the discipline.

In this essay, I argue that legitimizing blacks in philosophy will ultimately require a change in perspective about who is permitted to engage in philosophy. In the first of the three sections, I show that the status of blacks in philosophy has not changed over the years, indicating that the profession must address concerns about the extent to which diverse philosophical perspectives are permitted to engage with and challenge mainstream philosophy. In Section II, I argue that several problems result from not only the low numbers of blacks in the discipline but also the lack of legitimacy granted to these perspectives. At their core, these problems are the result of academic racism and the delegitimization of contributions of black philosophers, thereby creating a unique discourse-based problem that impedes the discipline's growth. In the third and final section, I suggest some steps that can be taken to diversify the profession of philosophy that are inspired by my own observations as a black philosopher.

1 The Status of Blacks in Philosophy

In the article, “What is the State of Blacks in Philosophy?” Tina Botts et al. (2014) provide a comprehensive view of blacks in philosophy suggesting both disciplinary and institutional areas of improvement for the increased legitimization of black philosophers. In the survey, completed in May 2013, Botts et al. report that there were 156 blacks employed in philosophy in the United States, and that 141 of them were affiliated with philosophy programs (*ibid.*: Figure 1). This survey also accounts for the distribution of black philosophers at various levels of their academic careers. At the time when the survey was completed, over 20 percent of these affiliated blacks were in Ph.D. programs, and of those remaining, 50 percent were tenured professors, 20 percent were tenure-track professors, and 8 percent were non-tenure track professors (*ibid.*: 229, Figure 2). Given that there are over 7,000 non-retired academic philosophers and nearly 3,500 graduate students (*ibid.*: 236), it is damning to think that black philosophers constitute a meager 1.32 percent of all philosophers in the United States. What is more alarming, though, is that from the earliest count provided in 1990 to the most recent in 2013, the number of blacks in philosophy has increased only marginally. Philosophers Charles Mills and Leonard Harris published their own estimates in 1990,⁷ 1997, and 2012 before Botts’s survey (Harris 1995: 134; Mills 1997: 2; Mills 2012: 46). In these earlier counts, the number of blacks in philosophy is around 1 percent.

Gender is another important factor to consider when evaluating these numbers. Botts et al. (2014: 232, Figure 7) report that there are only 55 black women in philosophy in the United States. This number is not much higher than the 30 black women philosophers identified in 2011 by Kathryn Gines (2011: 429), founder of the Collegium of Black Women in Philosophy.⁸ In March 2016, *The Chronicle of Higher Education* published “Diversifying a Discipline”⁹ highlighting the work that Penn State’s philosophy department had accomplished by graduating five black women with Ph.Ds., all of whom today have jobs in academia. Although this is an important contribution to the discipline, 55 black women constitute only a fraction of those working in philosophy today.

One point that can be gleaned from Botts et al.’s (2014: 229-30, Figure 4) survey is that over 70 percent of tenured or tenure-track black philosophers are the sole black philosophers in their departments. The sense of alienation this inevitably creates only adds to the black philosopher’s burden. Kerry Ann Rockquemore and Tracy Laszloffy (2008: 14), authors of *The Black Academic’s Guide to Winning Tenure—Without Losing Your Soul*, point out that academics of color are made to pay “The Race Tax” whereby they are disproportionately expected to represent diversity on campus, a point that is only exacerbated by the fact that there already tends to be very low numbers of diverse faculty members.¹⁰ The universities where black philosophers learn and work must reconsider practices that make it difficult for black philosophers to succeed. Many universities today have diversity platforms that promote the hiring of more faculty of color. Yet universities too often lack the infrastructure that adjusts to account for the number of extra burdens black academics have. For example, black junior academics have unique struggles when it comes to gaining visibility in the discipline, especially in publishing. More frequent requests for black academics to participate in diversity-related university and departmental activities, as well as the expectation to mentor minoritized students require significant time and energy that make it hard for scholars to publish and remain competitive in the discipline.¹¹ Mentoring is always expected when hiring black faculty, but administrators vastly underestimate the amount of time and effort that it takes to properly mentor students who are systematically disadvantaged and historically underrepresented in academia. Another issue is faculty mentorship for junior faculty. Proper mentorship from senior faculty from within or outside the discipline would help black junior faculty better acclimate to their new jobs and learn new ways to establish work-life balance at their respective universities. Black philosophers at smaller and sometimes poorer universities tend to face higher teaching loads and a lack of funds available for scholarly development.

My last point here offers an area for further exploration and is crucial to concerns about legitimizing black philosophers. Botts et al.'s report shows that most black philosophers specialize in Africana philosophy and Race philosophy (Botts et al. 2014: 229, 232, Figure 7). This information is important for one reason: Gauging the extent to which these areas are reflected in the philosophical milieu is a litmus test for the discipline. The discipline's commitment to diversity can be measured by the number and quality of opportunities that are available to black philosophers to publish at major publishing houses, present at major conferences, and feel comfortable in academic social spaces. However, as I show in the next section, black philosophers consistently recount situations in which their contributions to the discipline have been invalidated. Their experiences support my claim that merely improving the number of blacks in philosophy will not solve concerns about diversity. Rather, increasing the number of blacks in the discipline must be combined with efforts to legitimize their philosophical contributions.

2 The Ghettoization of Black Philosophers

Black philosophers have a paradoxical status: On the one hand, they are valued because they represent diversity in the discipline, but on the other hand, their embodiment as racialized subjects is the reason why their work continues to be delegitimized. One recent example comes from Yancy who received racist threats on his life after writing the blog post, "Dear White America."¹² Yancy recounts the double oppression he felt as a black philosopher in an interview for *The New York Times* in this way:

Not only was I being attacked for my courageous speech; I was being attacked as a *black man*. Yet I was also being attacked as a *black philosopher*. [...] There were some very nasty remarks that were designed to question my status as a philosopher because I'm black. The implication of those messages was that to be black *and* a philosopher was a contradiction, because "niggers" can't be philosophers.¹³

Yancy's emphasis on being both black and a professional philosopher points to the central contradiction that is registered when one sees a black person in philosophy. Seeing black people in general as being incapable of thought, much less in systematic ways, helps propel the idea that blacks cannot be philosophers who can inhabit professional academic spaces where thought is produced and furthered. Yancy's use of the term "nigger" in this context suggests that because he is black, his philosophical contributions are worth less. By pointing out how it feels to be a "nigger" in philosophy, Yancy alludes to a common saying amongst affluent African-Americans: "Regardless of what I have achieved, I will still be called a nigger." For black philosophers, this saying reveals that despite having earned the same credentials as their white colleagues (at historically white universities, mastering historically white canons), blacks are still seen as ineligible to make contributions to philosophy, especially when they use their scholarly voices to speak out against the white status quo. Thus, the main justification for delegitimizing black philosophers' scholarship is because it is seen as marronage, or a show of resistance.

Establishing space for the contributions of black philosophers requires that black philosophers' feel welcomed in spaces that are already deemed legitimate by the discipline. Without this, black philosophical contributions may suffer from what Mills calls "conceptual tokenization":

I want to suggest (if no one else has already done so) the idea of *conceptual* tokenization, where a black perspective is included, but in a ghettoized way that makes no difference to the overall discursive logic of the discipline, or subsection of the discipline, in question: the framing assumptions, dominant

narratives, prototypical scenarios. My fear is that the dramatically increased presence of black bodies and black panels in APA programs, and even black texts in philosophy, may in the end amount to no more than conceptual tokenization.¹⁴

The backlash towards conceptual tokenization stems from the recognition that although black philosophers and their contributions may have increased visibility in the discipline, their actual status is not improved. That is, to say, conceptual tokenization refers to the ways in which black philosophical contributions are overlooked in the mainstream discipline, thereby relegating these contributions to the margins. When including black philosophical perspectives, the goal must be mutual respect for these different approaches to philosophy—approaches that will inevitably cause changes in the discipline but are nonetheless crucial to its diversity. McClendon (2012: 126–27) states that

if the inclusion of African American individuals into various institutions and organizations does not change the balance of power relationship central to white supremacist oppression then the Color Line remains intact despite the occasional appearance that the line had been broken by the entrance of individuals into white academic organizations.

The larger issue is systemic: the routine practice of silencing, suppressing, and marginalizing the voices of black philosophers delegitimizes them. Moreover, given that most black philosophers are interested in race, one can see how the marginalization of race and Africana philosophy can be devastating to establishing the legitimacy of black philosophers because it is inevitable that they will have less places open to their methodologies. Of course, one could argue that marginalized philosophers do have their own conferences and publishing houses in which they can share their work. Examples include conferences such as Philosophy and Africana Traditions and the Collegium of Black Women in Philosophy, and journals such as the *Journal of Critical Philosophy of Race* and *Hypatia*. However, having these spaces does not absolve the mainstream discipline from being more welcoming to perspectives such as race and gender.

One objection that could be raised about my examples is that all the black philosophers I mention (including myself) are interested in Africana philosophy and Race philosophy. Even though this is not unusual, as Botts et al.'s (2014: 229–30, Figure 4) report suggests, one might ask whether steering the interests of black philosophers away from Africana philosophy and Race philosophy would increase their chances of legitimization. The primary issue with this question is that it assumes that black philosophers are either uninterested in engaging with other, more conventional topics (even if their interests intersect with Africana philosophy and Race philosophy) or lack the rational skills to be able to do so successfully. The racist belief that looms in the background of this question asserts that blacks lack the capacity to do good work in mainstream areas of the discipline characterized as being too “hard” or “difficult” for them, whereas race and Africana philosophy are easier since they are philosophies that represent the black philosopher's experience. Yancy (2012: 12) states: “Philosophical academic spaces are, in so many ways, continuous with everyday, politically invested, racially grounded, prejudicial, social spaces. Such normative (white) academic spaces are shot through much of the same racist toxicity that configures black and brown bodies as outside the normative (white) Demos.”¹⁵ The fact that racist stereotypes about blacks and their intellectual ability persists in society and by extension in the discipline leads to the fact that white philosophers, perhaps unintentionally, are suspicious of the authenticity of the philosophical contributions of black philosophers. Such implicit albeit unintentional racism, corroborates a correlating systemic problem which is that the profession does not need to change its assumptions regarding which philosophers and philosophies are legitimate and that it is rather the responsibility of the black philosopher to specialize in areas that are already deemed such. Therefore, new

frameworks must be instituted that directly combat the persistence of racist stereotypes to allow room for the voices of black philosophers whose contributions often do not conform to convention.

3 A Way Forward

The experience I shared at the beginning of this essay is an example of how black philosophers are delegitimized in the discipline. In the eyes of this colleague, as a black woman philosopher, I was out of place. Perhaps another reason for the colleague's shock was that I was not working in an area that most associate with black philosophers. Therefore, I have argued that the discipline must continue to work toward changing the landscape of philosophy to equally include and engage with the contributions of black philosophers. I have focused on black philosophical contributions because while black philosophers are generally celebrated in the discipline for adding to its diversity, they are still covertly marginalized in the discipline by their scholarship. My primary recommendation is that there be more effort to legitimize black philosophers' contributions in all aspects of professional philosophy including conferences, publishing houses, and social spaces. This requires that their contributions be understood as respected, valuable, and viable areas of philosophical inquiry. In closing, I discuss four areas in which I believe more work can be done to legitimize black philosophers in the discipline. While some of these areas are not novel, they are areas that have had the most impact on my and my colleague's careers and thus that may be likely to bring the most benefit to others.

The first area is in undergraduate pedagogy. In teaching undergraduates, it is important to find ways to support their initial interest in and curiosity about the discipline by including course content that challenges and stimulates them. Even more importantly is engaging their philosophical intuitions. Some of these points have already been discussed in the context of recruiting more women into philosophy. Helen Beebee cites a study conducted by Wesley Bulkwater and Stephen Stich entitled "Gender and Philosophical Intuition"¹⁶ which suggests that women pursuing philosophy tend to have their philosophical intuitions dismissed in the classroom. This can lead to feelings of frustration and non-belonging. The practice of treating women's philosophical intuitions as "deviant" is one of the reasons why the percentage of American undergraduate women taking introductory-level philosophy courses drops from 46.2 percent to 29.3 percent as the women move from general to more advanced courses (Beebee 2013: 75).¹⁷ Beebee (*ibid.*: 78) suggests that adopting a less aggressive mode of communication in philosophical discussions and embracing students' different philosophical intuitions may improve the status of women in philosophy. Beebee's, Bulkwater's, and Stich's observations likewise indicate that legitimizing students' voices is important to their remaining in philosophy. The university at which I currently teach is a mid-sized regional university where over 52 percent of our philosophy majors are women. I think that one of the reasons that this is the case is because we offer classes that emphasize diversity. For example, many of our majors hold minors or double-majors in other disciplines related to diversity such as Women's and Gender Studies. Thus, we know that we need to include perspectives in our courses that allow students to see the overlap between philosophy and issues related to diversity. Indeed, in classes with traditional titles, such as the Philosophy of Law, my colleagues often teach Angela Davis and other diverse voices. It is inevitable that our undergraduates will not have the same experience in graduate school that they have had in our program, but their initial positive experience with philosophy will empower them to find and create welcoming spaces in the discipline. My own experience as an undergraduate empowered me to create my own space in philosophy despite the many obstacles I experienced later. I declared philosophy as my major at the end of my first year as an undergraduate and remained the only woman in the major until my junior year. Even though all my philosophy courses were taught by male philosophers of African descent,

I felt empowered to choose philosophy because my professors supported my pursuit of knowledge about Black Feminist philosophy.

Students must also be taught about diversity. This is the responsibility of all philosophers who teach. Many students of color have experienced firsthand the ramifications of living in a racially charged America, and they thus tend to already understand the value of diversity. Many white undergraduates who have an interest in philosophy, however, may not be aware of how being white grants them privilege in studying the discipline. Yancy argues that white students do not understand the feeling of alienation that many philosophers of color experience when in academic spaces. In his classroom, Yancy (2012: 15–6) discusses with students about how being white contributes to the privilege of feeling as if they belong to and can succeed in the discipline insofar as white students have an “epidermal sameness” as traditional philosophers.¹⁸ By calling attention to the fact that philosophers of color often do not feel the same way, Yancy gives his students an opportunity to see academic experiences through eyes other than their own.

I understand how controversial it is to claim that *all* philosophers have the responsibility to teach their students about diversity. Some rebuttals that I have heard come from philosophers who are used to teaching their courses without attention to diversity; who, for various reasons, are generally uncomfortable with teaching diversity; or who feel that the topics they teach cannot accommodate diversity. Recently, a philosopher told me that he preferred not to teach diversity. It certainly is one’s *right* to avoid discussions of diversity in his, her, or their classroom, but it may not be the *right thing to do* for the sake of the discipline. If students see all their professors emphasizing diversity in philosophy, they will be more inclined to see the value of it as they grow in their own careers. It cannot fall to black, women, LGBTQIA, immigrant, and disabled philosophers to teach diversity. However, I do empathize with philosophers’ anxiety about teaching diversity, especially if they are not specialists in a related area. One way to gain support for this is to make use of university, collegial, and professional resources. Some universities have teaching institutes where faculty can learn new pedagogical strategies. Talking with colleagues about what they teach and how they teach can also be helpful. There are also online resources such as the Diversity Reading List in Philosophy which includes readings for such areas as metaphysics.¹⁹

The second area is publishing. Black philosophers must have opportunities to publish with publishing houses, in book series, and in journals that already have prominence in the discipline. The venue in which a philosopher publishes significantly affects his, her, or their career trajectory, meaning that creating inclusive publishing spaces is crucial to legitimizing black philosophers’ work. Mills shares an anecdote from African-American philosopher Leonard Harris that demonstrates the disparities when it comes to publishing. Harris encountered great challenges while trying to find a publisher for his landmark text, *Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-American Philosophy from 1917*.²⁰ Although the book did eventually get published, it was not with a publisher well-known in philosophy.²¹

The third area is mentorship at the graduate level. It is undeniable that graduate studies in philosophy is akin to an apprenticeship. *How* students are mentored during this time is important not only to the students’ professional development, but also to the trajectory of the discipline. Students learn from their mentors what is permissible, from the proper interpretation of a text to how to answer questions at a conference. A student may be less inclined to consider a fresh perspective on a canonical understanding of a figure or topic if he, she, or they did not learn it that way from his, her, or their mentors. The professionalization process can therefore sometimes breed negative, unconscious habits in new generations of philosophers that perpetuate racial prejudice. Done well, however, mentoring graduate students about the value of diversity in the discipline can lead to a dramatic change in which the new generation of professional philosophers will be more open to diverse perspectives.

Graduate-level faculty should encourage students to pursue their interests rather than strong-arming black students into studying Africana philosophy and Race philosophy. In my graduate experience, the support of the faculty was crucial to my pursuing an area of specialization that did not initially include an interest in Race philosophy. One example is that of Penn State, which has the highest number of black philosophers at any academic level.²² Amy Allen, the department chair, states that allowing students of color to pursue their interests is crucial to the department's success, noting: "Not all graduate students of color want to study critical philosophy of race, and not all who study critical philosophy of race are students of color. But there's overlap between these two groups."²³

Finally, it is essential that universities and philosophy departments change their hiring practices. Part of doing this well will most certainly require making hires in specialties that black philosophers tend to be interested in such as Africana philosophy and Race philosophy, but universities cannot assume that hiring in these areas is the only way to attract diverse candidates. Linda Martín Alcoff shares that one time on a hiring committee, some members of the committee questioned the extent to which a woman candidate would be a competent metaphysician²⁴ given that the candidate's work in metaphysics also focused on gender issues. If an underrepresented philosopher has interests in mainstream areas of philosophy; it is assumed that they also specialize in race and that this specialty renders them incapable of making good contributions to the mainstream areas they also claim. Areas such as Race philosophy, Africana philosophy, and Feminist philosophy, despite their official recognition as philosophical areas of inquiry, are still heavily politicized and delegitimized. Therefore, key to changing hiring practices will be to change the attitude toward Africana philosophy and Race philosophy as areas that can exist simultaneously with mainstream interests. One way to combat such a problem is to write job ads that allow for various intersections with race. For example, a black philosopher may specialize in the history of philosophy with some interest in race, but may find it difficult to apply for a history of philosophy position if race is not listed as a permissible intersecting area of interest. Lastly, there must also be a shift in the hiring of *just one* black philosopher or philosopher of color in a department.

My hope is that this essay motivates us to join with other philosophers who are working, tirelessly and largely independently to legitimize black philosophers. Much of the mentoring of minoritized students tends to be handled by a small number of people who support these efforts with their most valuable resource—time—for which they receive no or little recognition and monetary compensation. Despite all the work that it involves, mentoring in general, and especially the mentoring of minoritized students, is not considered a very important benchmark of success in the profession. Some of the unsung heroes include Robert Bernasconi, who has single-handedly recruited and mentored more students of African descent than anyone else for nearly twenty years. Bernasconi's students have landed top faculty positions and are otherwise competitive in the discipline. Howard McGary and Jorge Garcia founded and still organize Rutgers University's Summer Institute for Diversity in Philosophy, which is approaching its twentieth year. Over 400 students have taken part in this program. Kathryn Gines founded and still organizes the Collegium of Black Women in Philosophy Conference, which is approaching its tenth year. These individuals are deeply concerned about the course of diversity in the discipline and use their own resources to change it. With these examples in mind, I hope that we can begin to make more systematic changes in philosophy, thereby building on this very important work.

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- * This article is dedicated to Dr. Matthew Hutcherson.
I would like to thank Robert Bernasconi and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.
- 1 Jacqueline Scott, an African-American woman philosopher, shares a similar experience about being asked whether she was a graduate student after already receiving her Ph.D. See Jacqueline Scott, "Toward a Place Where I Can Bring All of Me: Identity Formation and Philosophy," in *Reframing the Practice of Philosophy, Bodies of Color, Bodies of Knowledge*, ed. George Yancy (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 2012) 158–59.
- 2 b. hooks describes "talking back" as "speaking as an equal to an authority figure. It meant daring to disagree and sometimes it just meant having an opinion. [...] To speak then when one was not spoken to was a courageous act—an act of risk and daring." See bell hooks, *Talking Back, Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black* (Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press, 1989), 5.
- 3 See Tina Botts et al., "What is the State of Blacks in Philosophy," *Critical Philosophy of Race* 2, no. 2, (2014): 224–42.
- 4 John McClendon, "On the Politics of Professional Philosophy: The Plight of the African American Philosopher," in *Reframing the Practice of Philosophy, Bodies of Color, Bodies of Knowledge*, ed. George Yancy, (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 2012).
- 5 See Charles Mills, "Philosophy Raced, Philosophy Erased," in *Reframing the Practice of Philosophy, Bodies of Color, Bodies of Knowledge*, ed. George Yancy, (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 2012).
- 6 See, for example, *African-American Philosophers: 17 Conversations*, ed. George Yancy (New York, NY: Routledge).
- 7 See Leonard Harris, "'Believe it or Not' or the Ku Klux Klan and the American Philosophy Exposed," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 68, no. 5 (1995): 134.
- 8 See Kathryn Gines, "Being a Black Woman Philosopher: Reflections on Founding the Collegium of Black Women Philosophers," *Hypatia* 26, no. 2 (2011): 429–37.
- 9 See Vimal Patel, "Diversifying a Discipline," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, 27 March 2016 <http://chronicle.com/article/Diversifying-a-Discipline/235851> (27 July 2016).
- 10 See Kerry Ann Rockquemore and Tracey Laszloffy, *The Black Academics Guide to Winning Tenure—Without Losing Your Soul* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2008).
- 11 Alternatively, Bill Lawson argues that the very idea of remaining competitive in the discipline according to one's publications is a form of "playa hatin'" in the discipline. Namely, one is a loser in the academy game if they write non-prestigious articles, and, ostensibly, a low number of articles. See Bill Lawson, "Philosophical Playa Hatin' in *Reframing the Practice of Philosophy: Bodies of Color, Bodies of Knowledge*, ed. George Yancy (New York: State University of New York, 2012), 140.
- 11 Botts et al. (2014: 232, Figure 7).
- 12 See George Yancy, "Dear White America," *The New York Times*, 24 December 2015 http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/24/dear-white-america/?_r=0 (27 July 2016).
- 13 See George Yancy, "The Perils of Being a Black Philosopher," *The New York Times*, 18 April 2016 http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/04/18/the-perils-of-being-a-black-philosopher/?_r=0 (27 July 2016).
- 14 Mills (2012: 48).
- 15 See George Yancy, "Inappropriate Philosophical Subjects?" in *Reframing the Practice of Philosophy, Bodies of Color, Bodies of Knowledge*, ed. George Yancy (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 2012).
- 16 See Wesley Bulkwalter and Stephen Stich, "Gender and Philosophical Intuition," in *Experimental Philosophy*, Vol. 2 (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014), 307–46.
- 17 See Helen Beebe, "Women and Deviance in Philosophy," in *Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change?* ed. Katrina Hutchinson and Fiona Jenkins (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013).
- 18 See Yancy (2012).
- 19 See Diversity Reading List in Philosophy <http://diversityreadinglist.org/> (June 10, 2017).

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- ²⁰ See Leonard Harris, *Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-American Philosophy from 1917* (Dubuque, IA: Kendall Hunt Publishing, Company, 1983, 2000).
- ²¹ Mills (2012: 43).
- ²² Botts, et.al. (2011: 229, Figure 4)
- ²³ Patel (2016).
- ²⁴ See Linda Martín Alcoff, “Alien and Alienated,” in *Reframing the Practice of Philosophy, Bodies of Color, Bodies of Knowledge*, ed. George Yancy (New York, NY: SUNY Press, 2012), 35.