

Translation of Tanabe Hajime's "The Limit of Logicism in Epistemology: A Critique of the Marburg and Freiburg Schools"

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This article provides the first English translation of Tanabe's early essay, "The Limit of Logicism in Epistemology: A Critique of the Marburg and Freiburg Schools" (1914). The key notion that the young Tanabe seeks to define in relation to his detailed analyses of contemporary Neo-Kantian epistemology is the notion of "pure experience" presented in Nishida's philosophy. The general theory of epistemology shared among the thinkers from these two prominent schools of philosophy in early 20th century Germany aimed to eliminate the empirical residues in Kant's theory of knowledge while opposing naïve empiricism and the uncritical methodology of positive science. Their "logicistic" approach, according to Tanabe, seems to contradict Nishida's notion of pure experience, for it cannot allow any vestige of empiricism in its systematic framework, which is specifically designed to ground scientific knowledge. Yet given that the Neo-Kantian configuration of epistemology does not create the object of knowledge, it must face sensation or representational content as its limiting instance. Thus, to ground a Neo-Kantian theory of knowledge while taking account of this limit of logicism involves explaining their understanding of the unity of subject and object in human knowing. For this, Tanabe argues, recourse to Nishida's notion of pure experience is indispensable.

Key words: Neo-Kantianism; Epistemology; Hermann Cohen; Heinrich Rickert; Paul Natorp; Ernst Cassirer; Theodor Lipps; Marburg School; Freiburg School; Nishida Kitarō; Kyoto School; Pure Experience; Early Works of Tanabe Hajime

Introduction to the Translation

"The Limit of Logicism in Epistemology: A Critique of the Marburg and Freiburg Schools" (1914) is the third publication in Tanabe Hajime's philosophical career.¹ As is the case with the first of his early essays, "On Thetic Judgment" (1910), the young philosopher goes after one of the key notions in Nishida's philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century, namely, the notion of pure experience (*junsui keiken* 純粹経験).² With acute analysis of passages found in the works of the Neo-Kantian philosophers (including Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, Ernst Cassirer, and Heinrich Rickert), Tanabe shows that their general theory of epistemology, despite some notable differences among their articulations of it, aims at eliminating the empirical residues in Kant's theory of knowledge while maintaining its critical stance toward naïve empiricism and the uncritical methodology of positive science. Their "logicistic" approach to the foundation of knowledge, according to Tanabe, seems to contradict Nishida's notion of pure experience at the outset, for it cannot allow any remainder of empiricism in its systematic framework of thinking—the philosophical framework designed specifically to ground scientific knowledge only through the activity of thinking.

Unlike Hegel's dialectical thinking, however, the Neo-Kantian configuration of epistemology (whether it refers to Cohen's infinitesimal generation of knowledge, or Cassirer's functional concepts to which experiences are variables, or Rickert's re-appropriation of knowledge beyond the bounds of scientific knowing) does not create the object of knowledge. Hence, it must face sensations or representational content, which "direct" the knowing subject in its formation of knowledge, as its limit concept. To ground Neo-Kantian epistemology in relation to this limit of logicism means to explain the unity of subject and object in their interpretation(s) of knowledge and for this purpose, Tanabe argues, we need Nishida's notion of pure experience. To make this point explicit in his essay, the young philosopher sets forth the characteristics of the epistemological theories developed by the two schools of Neo-Kantian philosophers and then shows that they do not contradict the standpoint of pure experience but rather presuppose it in their background.

The main thesis of this essay of Tanabe was not entirely original in the Japanese field of academia. Three years prior to its publication, Nishida himself published a similar train of thought in his essay "On the Claims of Pure Logicians in Epistemology" (「認識論に於ける純論理派の主張に就て」 (1911), later included in his second book, *Thought and Experience* (*Shisaku to keiken* 『思索と経験』).³ What is striking in Tanabe's analysis of the Neo-Kantian epistemology vis-à-vis pure experience is that it is much more thematically coherent as a whole in comparison with Nishida's articulation of the same point and also that it reads much more like an ordinary academic writing in a western sense of the word (at least at that time in history). Nishida's peculiar way of writing has been a great challenge to the contemporary translators of Japanese philosophical texts into western languages. His sentences sometimes jump from one point to another, quickly generalizing ideas (supposedly) provided by thinkers he mentions with few or no references. There are many (in)famous detours in Nishida's writings that guide us to a series of remarkable reflections and allow us to participate in his great insight, but, they also often put the minds of his readers under enormous stress and thereby generate doubts concerning the greatness of his thought.

Tanabe's early essay gives much more detailed references to the original texts of the western thinkers and these references clearly support his reading of their works. This scholarly precision alone is already a great plus for those of us trying to understand where we can place the notion of pure experience (or any other ideas of the Kyoto School philosophers for that matter) in relation to the western philosophical theories available at the time of its origination. Each of the six sections in Tanabe's essay, moreover, has a specific and clear point that logically leads to the following section and eventually to the conclusion that the notion of pure experience serves as the foundation of neo-Kantian epistemology, the same conclusion that Nishida was trying to affirm in a manner peculiar to his own way of writing in "On the Claims of Pure Logicians in Epistemology." Though "The Limit of Logicism in Epistemology" may not count as an original contribution to the history of philosophy, it certainly demonstrates a great degree of clarity and soundness as it systematically lays out the significance of Nishida's philosophical notion in the world philosophical context.⁴

It is important to note that in comparison with Tanabe's earlier writing on the same topic, "On Thetic Judgment," this third essay shows he has made considerable progress both as a scholar of European philosophy and as a critical commentator of his fellow intellectuals in Japan. It also confirms that Nishida's philosophy, despite its limited accessibility to the world audience at the time of its publication, was indeed contributing to the field of philosophy both in the east and the west. In other words, what Tanabe is doing with this article is the kind of work that comparative and intercultural philosophers should be doing in contemporary academia, that is, to provide clear analyses of different philosophical viewpoints and search for meaningful interrelations between them. His precise analyses of the Marburg and Freiburg Schools'

epistemological theories as well as of early Nishidian Philosophy in this article already exhibit his talent as a comparative thinker. It is not difficult to anticipate that he would join the circle of the brilliant minds at the Kyoto University within five years of publication of this article and eventually make his own contribution to the field of philosophy in the 1930s.

There have been an increasing number of scholarly works in the field of western philosophy that have revisited the significance of neo-Kantian philosophy.⁵ None of them deal extensively with the impact of the Neo-Kantian thinkers on non-western thinkers (let alone the great promise of the latter for our understanding of, and insight into, the works of the former). But this steady increase of scholarly attentiveness to late 19th and early 20th century German philosophy could also bring about that the works of Kyoto School philosophers, which often cite and extensively reflect on the German Neo-Kantians, will come to seem much more intelligible to today's philosophical readers. Neo-Kantian philosophy played a significant role in the establishment of the Kyoto School philosophy: and just as it is important to understand Kant and Hegel in order to evaluate the original significance of Nishida's and Tanabe's philosophy, we should not neglect the works of the abovementioned thinkers from the Marburg and Freiburg Schools. In line with the present movement of academic philosophy and the historical significance of the Neo-Kantian and Kyoto School Philosophy, therefore, I hope that this short translation of Tanabe's early essay will serve as a small catalyst for many specialists of Japanese philosophy to think about the impact of neo-Kantian philosophy on the Kyoto School as well as for many scholars of the Neo-Kantian philosophy to think about the great influence that what they strive to understand has brought on to the polyvocal sphere of non-western philosophies.

Notes on the Translation

The parenthetical citations of the author are modified in accordance with the style sheet of *Journal of World Philosophies* and indicated in footnotes. The translators' notes are placed in brackets. References to secondary sources are kept as identical as possible with the ones that were available for Tanabe at the time of the publication of this text but there are a few cases in which this method of referencing does not apply (due to the editorial revision of the original references to the updated version at the time of publishing the *THZ*). Additional references to recent translations of these texts are provided when they are available. The Japanese language, moreover, permits more repetitions, omissions, and sentences in the passive voice than we can tolerate in modern English. Also, Tanabe's sentences often run on at great length (with a series of relative clauses). So, for the ease of reading his text in English, the translator has converted passive constructions into the active voice (unless it changes the meaning or the subtleties of expressions) and inserted more paragraph-breaks to demonstrate clearly the sequence of the arguments presented in the original text.⁶

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The Limit of Logicism in Epistemology: A Critique of the Marburg and Freiburg Schools

TANABE HAJIME

Preface

Logicism, which today's main schools of epistemology regard as their intellectual foundation, has its source in Kant's critical theory. Kant realized that psychological analysis pursued by British empiricists was incapable of resolving the fundamental problems of knowledge and, as a result, he created the "transcendental method." The empirical method regards knowledge as an activity of the individual mind. It examines the generation of ideas and investigates the laws of their associations. This psychologistic method is not sufficient for understanding the problem of truth or the question of value. Both true and false thought, insofar as they are activities of mind, are simply governed by the law of psychological necessity and, because of that, there is no differentiation of value between them. In order to establish a distinction of value between true and false, and to discuss the establishment of knowledge as the truth, we must acknowledge the truth that grants the value of truth to these mental contents. The "transcendental method" is precisely a way to clarify this principle. In thus clearly distinguishing fact and value, and in setting up over against the empirical and psychological method that solves factual problems (*quid facti*), the transcendental and logical method solves the problem of the right (*quid juris*) to affirm value, as opposed to the empirical method. The creation of this logical method demonstrates Kant's great insight. It is quite clear today that the logicists who have inherited his philosophy understand correctly the problem of epistemology as opposed to those who adopt the standpoints of positivism or empiricism.

However, can logicism exhaustively explain all problems of epistemology? Kant organized his critical system by secretly preserving the remains of psychologism and dogmatic metaphysics, which he himself has sought to eliminate in his critical theory. But do those who today seek to perfect logicism by removing these inconsistencies encounter any limit to their logical idealism? Furthermore, empirical psychologism cannot of course constitute the valid method of epistemology, but in a certain sense may not empiricism have a capacity to supplement logicism from outside its limit without incurring contradiction?

In this article, I will think about these problems to demonstrate that the standpoint of logicism meets an unsurpassable limit; that, to deal with the problem of epistemology by advancing to a valid method that can be used to fully understand it without making any compromises, one must have recourse to an empirical method beyond the limit of logicism; and also that such an empirical method will prove capable of harmoniously supporting logicism rather than falling victim to the unwarranted psychologism that logicists strive to eliminate. For the purpose of demonstrating these points in this article, I shall take Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp from the Marburg School and Heinrich Rickert from the Freiburg School as representatives of contemporary logicism, and critically expound each of their theories.

Certainly, with respect to these complex problems, my immature understanding may contain many errors, and the passages that my logic traces may suffer from unclarity and even fall victim to dogmatism. Despite this, I have decided to publish this article because I would like to compose my thought with the best of my intellectual ability and receive constructive criticisms from many experts to correct my errors and misunderstandings, for I believe that this will greatly aid my future research.

1

The Kant of the Marburg School is not the historical Kant. The historical Kant, setting transcendental logic and transcendental sensibility in contrast, distinguished understanding and sensibility, thought and intuition. He acknowledged sensation as a given quantity over against the categories as a priori forms of understanding, and he made the “thing in itself” the foundation of sensation. The characteristics of the Marburg school, however, lie in the fact that they have eliminated the empirical and realistic Kant—the Kant that Alois Riehl took as the textual source of his philosophical thinking—and have rather focused on his idealism, thereby purifying logicism by erasing any psychologistic ways of thinking that Kant’s works had retained.

According to these thinkers, nothing exists prior to thinking. To admit sensation as a given quantity prior to thinking is to stand on the psychological standpoint and thus to deviate from the purely logical way of thinking. It must even be called a form of dogmatism, suggesting that the “thing in itself” exists apart from the subject and its thought-determinations. Also, it is a mistake for Kant to acknowledge intuition as a faculty of knowing apart from thinking, determine its forms (i.e., time and space) as the forms of intuition that unify the given sensation, and then claim that this unity is not a concept based on thinking. Since time and space are nothing but a priori forms of thinking (i.e., categories), they cannot exist independently of thinking. If that is the case, then what kind of thing is this thinking? It is an infinitely continuous and productive process. The founder of the Marburg school, Cohen, defines the nature of thinking through the mathematical concept of the differentials. According to him, the concept of differentials (which Newton advocates from the side of mechanics and Leibniz from the side of mathematical analysis) has a more than mathematical and mechanical significance; it constitutes the fundamental principle of thinking.

Now if we take a function $y=f(x)$ where x is an independent variable and y is a dependent variable, determine a certain variation of the value x as Δx and the variation of the value y that corresponds to this change as Δy , then $\frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x}$ is coefficient of the finite difference between the two variables. Thus, if we infinitely decrease Δx , Δy will at the same time infinitely decrease, and thereby, $[\frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x}] \Delta y / \Delta x$ will come infinitely closer to a certain limit $\frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x}$. This $\frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x}$ is a differential coefficient and is also called a “derivative” in the sense that it is derived from the primitive function and yet represents a completely different, new function. What significance does this derivative have in relation to the primitive function? It expresses the law of change in relation to the primitive. Consider a geometrical example: the equation $y = f(x)$ expresses a curve in a plane. If that is the case, then what does the $\frac{\Delta y}{\Delta x}$ represent? It shows the direction of the tangent that goes through a given point on the curve. Then we can think of it as determining the direction of the curve with regard to the tangent point. We can think of the derivative, which expresses this direction of the tangent, as indicating the law that determines variations of the primitive. Additionally, since the derivative as a single function expresses the direction of the tangent at a given point (x, y) of the curve, we can think that the very curve is generated through the movement of a point made in accordance with this law. Furthermore, this point is not the limit as is conventionally thought but constitutes the starting point of the line. Nay, it is not only the starting point. Since the line is generated from the point, the point comprises the source (*Ursprung*) that has the productive principle in itself. If we express this in general terms, Δx is the source of x and the differential becomes the foundation of a finite quantity. The true nature of thinking is precisely this continuous process that productively develops in accordance with its own law through this kind of infinitely small source; and this process generates nature.

Since the source cannot receive anything from any instance but itself, nothing exists as given materials in relation to thinking. The fact that Kant maintained sensibility over against understanding and acknowledged sensation as the matter of thinking stems from his failure to

recognize the differential principle of thinking. If he had reflected that the true nature of thinking lies in production out of infinite smallness, he would not have made this mistake. Thinking is not a synthetic process of unifying the given manifold but generates the manifold itself.

The unity in this case is not *ben* (ἐν) but *monas* (μονάς). The manifold matter of thinking is not the raw material of psychological consciousness but only the content of thinking. In this sense, the content does not exist prior to activity but is generated through the activity of thinking. Or more precisely the activity itself is the content.⁷ Since thinking in this manner is the activity that creates the manifold of contents from its source and simultaneously unifies them, we can say that judgment as the basic activity of thinking gives the “preservation of unity in distinction and the preservation of the distinction in unity.”⁸ Thus, Cohen further argues,

if the unity is not supposed to merely float in activity but to be established in one thing, we can think of preservation as “standing reserve” (*Bestand*). And this “standing reserve” (*Bestand*) is thought as that which resists the floating activity, the thing becomes the object. This is accomplished only in the unity of the object.⁹

Consequently, “The unity of the judgment is the creation of the unity of object in the unity of knowledge.”¹⁰ Therefore, the object is not given in relation to knowledge but is precisely the content of thinking that is unified and established as that which resists the activity of the very thinking. The content that thinking produces simultaneously becomes the object, objectivity, and being. What we call “being” (*Sein*) is the name given to the content of thinking insofar as it exists (*bestehen*) in thinking. Thinking and being are ultimately one.

In this manner, since thinking essentially furnishes an infinite process in which it develops itself in accordance with the principle of continuity, what it determinately constitutes as object can never become complete. There is no end to the process of its receiving new determinate constitutions alongside the infinite advancement of thinking. Being only represents a stop in the middle [of this process] and all is a flux. This object becomes the “eternal problem,” X, in relation to the infinite process of thinking.¹¹ In thinking in this manner, the so-called experience that we normally regard as an activity of acquiring the object prior to thinking is actually not the activity that gives the object prior to thinking, but the process of thinking itself that seeks to constitutively determine the object, which continues to be this “eternal problem.” Natorp explains that in this sense “we call our knowledge of the object, which is a process that constantly advances and yet never becomes complete, ‘experience.’”¹² The judgment of formal logic, which is the first stage of thinking, and the judgment of mathematics, which is the second stage of thinking, do not directly relate to the determination of the object. Through these two stages, the third stage, i.e., judgments of mathematical natural science, directly aims at the determination of an object. The first two stages indirectly relate to this determination through the third stage. Thus, experience must be the process of thinking pertaining to the mathematical natural science.

If experience is the process of thinking that constitutively determines the object in this manner, then it becomes obvious why the sensation that Kant acknowledged as the matter of experience cannot be a given quantity independent of thinking. Experience cannot look for materials outside itself as the process of productive thinking. If one adopts the standpoint of logicism, it becomes impossible to regard sensation as an independent element of knowledge. Sensation does not essentially have any definite content in itself but only a subjective content that has an irrational identity/difference in accord with the law of consciousness; hence, it cannot be known in itself. In order for it to be known as a content of science, it must first become a content of thought. In other words, sensation needs to be objectified through the differential movement of thinking and the continuity of its quantitative relations. This provides sensation as

the object of psychophysics.¹³ This is why sensation is not the given *datum* for thinking but the problem that thinking must solve by itself.

This process of thinking that continues to construct the object must be entirely distinguished from a temporal activity of thinking practiced by a single individual. The latter is the object of psychology and not the object of logic. Thinking as the object of logic is thinking as the method of science. It possesses an inseparable relation of its activity and its content; and such thinking, which is identical with being, is the process that establishes science. So, in science, the process is simultaneously the result. As Cohen puts it, the “production (*Erzeugung*) is itself the product” (*Erzeugnis*).¹⁴ The method of the mathematical natural sciences, which represents the immediate unfolding of the fundamental principle as the essence of thinking, constitute “nature” based on the differential concept of mathematics; and this method is precisely the object of transcendental logic. Number, time, space, movement, substance, causation, etc., are all the fundamental forms of judgment (i.e., categories) that accompany thinking when it, as the process of natural science, constitutively determines the object. These categories are a priori in the sense that they are the conditions for the possibility of experience, but we must strictly distinguish the transcendental validity of these categories from the transcendental fact of their discovery. Are the latter, namely the categories, concepts innate in consciousness? Do they exist in consciousness as germs? These questions are the problems of developmental psychology and have nothing to do with logic. What it calls “consciousness” indicates a psychological state of an individual and by no means the object of logic, namely the process of science itself. Consciousness in logic represents nothing but thinking which takes the object-consciousness, i.e., the content of what it generates through itself, as its object. There is nothing that we can call “being” apart from this “thinking.” Being means the being of scientific thinking. Only thinking can generate what is acknowledged to be. Thinking constructs the foundation of being and this foundation is precisely the idea. The idea as that which we achieve through pure thinking signifies the true being or the true content of knowledge.¹⁵ The object of logic as the study of *logos* lies precisely in this idea.

2

What draws our attention in the description of the Marburg School’s standpoint in the previous section is this: while following in Kant’s tracks, they have eliminated the elements of realism and reinforced idealism, amplifying the rationalistic tendency of his philosophy while reducing its empirical elements to the bare minimum. If we resume these two characteristics in one point, we may speak of a distinctive panlogism of productive thinking. Thinking follows its own principle and produces all contents from the “source” without presupposing any kind of given quantity, and thereby, its product is nature (i.e., natural science). This school’s basic claim is that epistemology should be able to logically trace the developmental stages of thinking as science and explain knowledge in accordance with categories that emerge from this process [of thinking]. Obviously, this claim shares the tendency of the rationalism that since Parmenides has made thinking and being identical. Furthermore, it is easy to see how strongly it echoes the majestic panlogism of modernity, i.e., Hegel’s philosophy. Indeed, Cohen’s pure logic—insofar as it begins with the most fundamental concept, subsequently proceeds to derivative concepts through a strictly logical process, and organizes the system of “nature” while unfolding the content of the very process—resembles much more Hegel’s logic than Kant’s critique of reason. The Marburg school’s theory of concepts, which an heir to this group of thinkers, Ernst Cassirer, developed in his *Substance Concept and Function Concept*, cannot but remind us of Hegel’s conceptualism in which the more universal a concept is, the more concrete it is.¹⁶ Despite this

similarity between them, however, we should not forget that there is also a great difference between the Marburg School (which insists on following Kant) and Hegel.

Hegel's dialectic gives the absolute process that constitutes the world reality while the Marburg School's logic only comprises a process of mathematical natural science. Accordingly, Hegel's logic is a metaphysics that discusses the principle of reality while the Marburg School's logic stops at a methodology of natural science as the study of phenomena. That is why it is appropriate to call Hegel's philosophy "panlogicism" while the philosophy of this school is "panmethodologicism."¹⁷ Hegel thinks that the system of the concept as the self-determining process of the "absolute" has been completed, whereas the Marburg School strongly insists that the system of science cannot be completed in the end. Where does this difference come from? I think it comes from the fact that this school's logic, notwithstanding its rationalistic tendency, presupposes a relation to what is directly and empirically given in its foundation. As mentioned earlier, what this school calls "experience" represents the "object of knowledge" and it is what all thinking aims at as its end. Thus, the object is not given to thinking but is from the start determined as such only by thinking. Insofar as this thinking is essentially an infinite process, the determination of an object cannot be realized in a single, absolute determination. Hence, this experience becomes an "always continuing and yet never completed process" and the object becomes the "infinite problem" that thinking strives to determine in the infinite progress of experience.

However, though the object is called a problem, it ceases to be a problem once it is solved; but it must be given in the first place as something that should be solved in the future. We can determine the value, x , only when we solve the equation; but in order to determine the value, it is required that we be given the equation that defines x as the unknown number. Many empiricists make the mistake of thinking that the object is given independently of thinking. In fact, it is, precisely because the object should be potentially given to thinking as a problem that we ought to determine through thinking. Only in this way can thinking be guided along the path of its advancement and determine its direction. What, then, is the potentially given for thinking? This must be sensation as immediate experience (*chokuseitsu-keiken* 直接経験). I wonder if the reason why the process of knowledge cannot reach final completion is because this immediate experience, which promotes the advancement of thinking, comprises an infinite progress. This consideration given to sensation marks a major difference of the Marburg School from Hegel who tried to unfold the process of dialectical thinking only through the concept. With regard to this point, the Marburg School thinkers are still following the fundamental spirit of Kant even though their philosophical arguments have gotten very close to Hegel's philosophy.

It is extremely difficult to pin down the Marburg School thinkers' attitudes toward Cohen's interpretation of sensation. Cassirer, for instance, clearly recognizes the importance of sensation while Paul Natorp, though he belongs to the same school of thought, tries to reduce its significance in relation to knowledge as much as possible (not unlike the way in which Cohen seems to do so).¹⁸ Cohen argues that sensation can be recognized in logic only insofar as it is objectified by thinking; and then, he regards it as a problem of psychophysics while rejecting it as the given for thinking. But isn't the foundation of what he calls thinking finally reducible to sensation as direct experience? On the flip side of his emphasis on the productive principle of thinking as well as on the impossibility of sensation in itself as constituting an element of knowledge, Cohen does not seem to discard this demand [derived from the givenness of sensation]. Rather, I must admit, he presupposes the regulative significance of sensation for thinking. He claims that thinking by itself produces nature in accordance with the infinitesimal principle without waiting for sensation. However, he also says that this thinking does not freely create its content out of itself in accord with its own will without having anything to do with sensation, but rather that it can put itself in motion only when there is a demand of sensation. In

other words, thinking determines the direction of its advancement based on this demand [derived from the sensation]. What distinguishes the thinking of natural science from the judgments of formal logic or mathematics is only its relation to this demand. Even if sensation suffers from such a limitation as a law of consciousness with regard to its demand and has the drawback that it lacks particular sensations pertaining to electricity and magnetism, we still cannot deny that it constitutes a demand that initiates and regulates thinking.

The category of real judgment, i.e., the individual (*das Einzelne*), clearly indicates the demand that sensitivity describes in an incomplete fashion.¹⁹ In this sense, all the other categories, insofar as they are aiming at the individuals, take sensation into account. Thus, even though thinking produces nature, we must say that what puts thinking in motion and directs it is sensation. Sensation cannot be an element of knowledge as the given quantity vis-à-vis thinking, but is a presupposition of knowledge that gives an immanent instruction to thinking. In this sense, Cohen argues that thinking affirms the demand of sensation even though the former is independent of the content of the latter.²⁰ In this way, we can understand why he says, “thinking discovers existence” even though “existence is established through thinking.”²¹ This is precisely the point in which he distinguishes scientific thinking from dogmatic metaphysics. Wilhelm Jerusalem’s criticism that Cohen disregards these two distinctions is probably based on a misunderstanding.²² August Messer’s interpretation is flawless with regard to this point.²³ If we continue our thought in this manner, Cohen’s fundamental principle can be understood as expressing the continuous relationship between thinking and sensation in the mathematical sense of the word. If we trace back the continuous process of thinking to its source, we must reach the fundamental ground that infinitesimally includes thinking. This is the activating source of thinking, and also since it is infinitesimal thought, we can say that it is *not* thinking. Isn’t this precisely the sensation that we just described as immediate experience?

We can see this point more clearly if we pay attention to Natorp’s explanation that Cohen’s fundamental ground cannot be nothing, since being cannot be generated out of nothing but has to be a certain “fundamental something,”²⁴ and so, this certain “fundamental something” is the interrelation (*Zusammenhang*) that relies on the fundamental unity that has not yet received any determination of thinking.²⁵ If we say that it is the foundation of thinking, then it cannot have the determination of thinking. Also, what we mean by the interrelation (*Zusammenhang*) is that which implicitly carries a manifold of contents. If this is not sensation as immediate experience, what can it be? But since it includes no determinations of thinking, we cannot explain what it is from the standpoint of logicism but only hold it as a limit-concept. As a matter of course Cohen, who tried to perfect logicism, took this “fundamental ground” as the first hypothesis. Then, the reason why Natorp interprets this notion as interrelation (*Zusammenhang*), I think, is because he has tacitly anticipated it as constituting various sensations. It is impossible to conceptually describe sensation as that which is prior to any determinations of thinking, but it can be identified through direct experience as the unity of the manifold. In fact, Cassirer argues that “For [immediate experience], there is only one plane of ‘existence’ (*Dasein*), and this includes all contents uniformly and without distinction. What is grasped by consciousness here now ‘is,’ and is precisely in the form offered by direct experience.”²⁶ Sensation as immediate experience can be the ground of speculative thinking, and its relation to the thinking is truly comparable to the relation of a point to a line or the differential to the finite quantity.

Immediate experience, thus, is the ground of thinking and at the same time the object of knowledge. Both the ground and the object are only concepts that we construct through seeing sensation (namely, immediate experience) from different angles. If we look at sensation as the initiating source of thinking, it is the fundamental ground and if it is conceived as a potential problem that thinking ought to determine, then it becomes the object. In relation to the Marburg School, the object is not given prior to thinking but precisely as the eternal problem vis-à-vis the

infinite process of thinking. Experience is an endless progress toward the single and certain determination of this object—the object that can never be exhaustively explicated. However, since the problem has to be given in the first place, regardless of the fact that it is already called a problem or the end, the goal must be something that has been shown beforehand. Max Frischeisen-Köhler, in this sense, argues that “the problem must be at least given to knowledge.”²⁷ Or else, as Messer has pointed out, even though there is a change or a progress in the whole process of knowledge, there cannot be any development or approximation.²⁸ Hence, we can see how this object is not given as determinate something but must be given as something that ought to be determined. Natorp agrees with this point by saying, it is “the object of experience X which has not yet been determined and yet ought to be determined.”²⁹

Here, the statement that the object is given to thinking does not mean that it exists independently of thinking in opposition to it. This hypothesis would fall victim to a metaphysical dogmatism that contradicts the general stance of Criticism. What can be acknowledged to be given to thinking, as Cohen rightly argues, is something that thinking itself can discover.³⁰ What exists independently of thinking does not have any reason to be discovered by thinking. In order for it to be discovered, therefore, it must be capable of becoming the content of thinking. Also, since the object (as that which ought to be determined later) cannot yet be the content of thinking, there is no other way for it to be but to be implied by its ground as potency vis-à-vis thinking. This is precisely what we have discussed earlier as the content of sensation as immediate experience. This becomes the initiating source and the goal of thinking. When it becomes the latter (i.e., the goal of thinking) and we see it as a norm that determines the direction of its advancement, we call it “object.” This is probably what Messer means when he says that sensation does not only propose a problem, but also, determines the truth of the answer.³¹ Natorp also argues that the object as the problem points to the limit of a logic that takes only being (*Sein*) as its object, and that if we transcend this limit, we will enter the domain of “oughtness” (*Sollen*).³² Here, the limit of logic clearly points toward the limit of epistemology that can be discussed from the standpoint of logicism.

In relation to the logical method, logical thinking is fundamentally a hypothesis and what we cannot explain by means of it goes beyond the domain of thinking itself. However, is it possible for us not to directly equate the limit of logicism with that of epistemology and then to discover the true nature of epistemology, if we acknowledge an a priori fact that can be identified through direct experience—the fact of experience that does not presuppose the determination of thinking? The ground of thinking and the object of knowledge are both precisely sensation as direct experience. Thinking is initiated by this ground and also determines the direction of its activity toward this object as its goal. Since the direct experience essentially precedes any determinations of thinking, it gives the harmonious and undifferentiated unity that does not clearly show the distinction between its content and act. However, when this distinction becomes explicit, the content becomes the object of thought and the act becomes the activity of thinking. What the content of direct experience as object demands of the activity of thinking is, in short, “oughtness”: hence, since thinking originally shares the same immediate experience with the object, it can know the demand that it must follow in its advancement and know the goal that it must strive to approach in the very process of advancement. According to this interpretation, we can understand the great significance of sensation that occupied an ambiguous place in Cohen’s logic. It is more than what is objectified by thinking as the object of psycho-physics. But it constitutes the direct experience that rather becomes the object and the source of thinking as sensation, which has not yet received any determination from thinking.

That something is not determined and that it has not yet entered consciousness are two different things. Sensation that has not yet received any determination of thinking rather enters consciousness as the source and the object of thinking. It is true, as this school claims, this

sensation cannot be logically explained. But this does not serve as a reason for eliminating sensation from epistemology; instead, doesn't it point toward the fact that sensation lies at the limit of logicism? If we are going to admit the limit of the logical method and supplement it with the empirical method, we will be able to further perfect our understanding of the problem of epistemology. We should not simply eradicate the remains of empiricism that Kant has left us in his philosophy. It is necessary to give an appropriate solution to the problem by thinking about his motivation for preserving some elements of empiricism. The sensibility that the Marburg School has discarded is a necessary concept for explaining knowledge as that which gives object to understanding as the problem of scientific knowing. If we understand it as if it were standing over against understanding and serving as a faculty independent of thought that works in accord with the form of the space-time intuition, then we will fall victim to some inconsistency. We can think of it as the direct experience that is mathematically continuous with thinking and acknowledge it as a directly identifiable fact (that is to say, demonstrable without resorting to the categories of thinking) even though it is non-logical.

If that is the case, why is it that the Marburg School thinkers' logic has a great value even though it ultimately remains within the limits of logicism? The answer, I think, lies in the fact that it has organized the logical system of natural scientific, and especially mathematico-scientific, knowledge. The characteristics of the school lie in the fact that it has clarified what kinds of categories are necessary for the establishment of knowledge in mathematical natural science rather than examining what kind of procedure the study of natural science (as a single empirical fact) uses; and they rigorously organized the system of categories that reach out gradually from what is most basic to what is derivative by following the order in which some categories are logically prior or posterior (as well as conceptually fundamental or derivative in relation) to others. From this viewpoint, there is no other school that has as clearly analyzed and critically understood the foundation of mathematics and physics as the Marburg thinkers. The methodology of positive science, of which Mach is a representative figure, has dominated the field of natural science today. Given that even the great Poincaré could not understand the true meaning of a priori and erroneously resorted to a psychological interpretation, it is a remarkable achievement that these thinkers from Marburg have followed through with the Kantian critical standpoint and established the great system of the logical theory of knowledge.³³

Nevertheless, natural science does not represent the whole of knowledge. There is scientific knowledge other than natural science and also, there is commonsensical knowing prior to all sciences. If we are to speak in relation to the facts, natural science takes nature that is built on the common sense (which is different from what Marburg School thinkers argue is the natural science) as the object of its investigation. This [commonsensical nature] is what stands between the object, x (as the problem that thought must determine), and the product of natural science (that answers the problem): hence it has not achieved any determinate content like the latter. Yet this does not mean that it has no determination whatsoever like the former, but has a certain level of determination. Indeed, in fact, even natural scientific studies do not correspond with the order of the logical system that the Marburg School has set forth. This school's logic aims at understanding and critiquing the product of science written in the texts of Cohen but not at describing the actual results of scientific studies. Contrary to the logic of the Marburg School, the actual process of natural scientific studies prioritizes the particular, derivative determination and gradually proceeds to the universal, fundamental determinations. Accordingly, common sense constitutes nature prior to this scientific knowledge through adding the most particular, superficial and thin determinations to it. The so-called "nature" is the spatio-temporal compound whose content is entirely non-mathematical.³⁴ If we limited the concept of knowledge to the knowledge of mathematical science, we would be guilty of being dogmatic. Since, in fact, pre-scientific nature based on our common sense exists prior to the "nature" of natural science, we

would have to explain this pre-scientific knowledge especially if we are going to claim that epistemology is the study of knowledge in general.

It is Rickert from the Southwest School in Freiburg who, by holding the same standpoint of logicism as that of the Marburg School, has initiated his investigation of knowledge through the explanation of pre-scientific knowledge (without limiting the knowledge to that of natural science) and established a distinctive epistemology and scientific methodology.

3

As we have seen above, the Marburg School's doctrine of logic organizes the method of mathematical natural science into a logical system. However, it is dogmatic to interpret the significance of knowledge as being identical with that of natural science. We must acknowledge pre-scientific knowledge that precedes all sciences (including scientific knowledge other than natural science) if we are not going to impose any special restrictions on the term "knowledge." Rickert clearly acknowledges this point. In the same manner as the thinkers from Marburg, he has also inherited the spirit of Kantian philosophy, and has opposed the psychologism that tries to establish epistemology on the basis of psychological experience and taken the standpoint of logicism that logically elucidates the condition for the possibility of knowledge as value. Nevertheless, besides the methodological agreements in the way they investigate the theory of knowledge, there are many aspects of Rickert's theory that contrast with that of the Marburg School philosophers. The most important point is that they disagree in their interpretations of the problem of epistemology. For the Marburg school thinkers, knowledge pertains to natural science and particularly mathematical natural science. Epistemology (namely, "logic" for this school of thought) aims at nothing but logically demonstrating the necessary conditions for the establishment of mathematical natural science. Rickert inherits the philosophy of Windelband (who represents the Heidelberg School), for he strongly argues against equating science in general with natural science, establishes the human sciences that should be studied with a completely different method, and further articulates that what both of these sciences comprehend and process through different methods as the object of their inquiries is entirely the same and common empirical reality.

Empirical reality exists prior to all sciences as their material and without it, sciences cannot accomplish their work. Rickert states that "since all sciences are about processing certain materials, there come to be two problems, namely the problem of the materials and that of the processes."³⁵ The constitutive form of thinking that enables the establishment of the former (i.e., empirical reality as the materials of science) is the categories and it must be strictly distinguished from the methodological form that the science uses for processing the materials that these categories have already constituted. What empirical realism acknowledges as reality from the standpoint of common sense is established simply through the categories as the reality-form (*Wirklichkeitsform*): hence, it differs from the "nature" of natural science that has been processed through the methodological form. The former is established prior to the latter while the latter presupposes the former. The reason why Kant enumerated a number of methodological forms as the categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and equated the natural-scientific "nature" with empirical reality is because he did not know the possibility of science outside of natural science. It is the result of his idea that science is nothing but natural science.³⁶ In order to legitimately build the methodology of science, we need firstly to acknowledge the empirical reality that is presupposed as the material of scientific investigation and then trace the latter back to the standpoint of common sense in terms of empirical realism. In this standpoint, the (empirical)

reality is not the “nature” of natural science but something that has not been processed through any methodological forms.

The concept of reality, which seems to be complete and communicative from the standpoint of empirical realism despite the fact that it has not gone through any scientific processes, seems to be lacking not only in Kant, but also in theories of knowledge in general. But it is extremely important for critical philosophy and particularly for the systematic organization of the categories.³⁷

From what I have discussed so far, it should be clear that the Marburg School’s logic, too, completely lacks this insight. Rickert’s theory supplements precisely this shortcoming, and, as he argues, epistemology must explain the establishment of the commonsensical knowledge that precedes science. The object of science is something that is already established prior to science in the stage of common sense. However, I think that the relations of common sense and science, constitutive form and methodological form, empirical reality and scientific concepts are continuous; they are not separated from each other as Rickert thinks. According to his theory, what common sense acknowledges as empirical reality is the particular that the judging subject (or supra-individual “consciousness-in-general”) constitutes through its constitutive form or the categories: and because of that, it is particular. Natural science processes this empirical reality as material through its methodological forms and constitutes the universal concept through understanding it. This subjectivity (Rickert argues) is not consciousness-in-general but the individual subject and its judgment.³⁸

We will discuss in the following section how these two subjectivities differ from each other. But for now, I would like to ask if the methodological form here may not actually be identical with the categories. Stated more specifically, isn’t it the case that when we see the categories, which serve as the constitutive form of particular experiences, as the forms of universal concepts, we call them the “methodological forms?” I think that the categories that Rickert proposes as the basis of causation and methodological forms that present the laws of nature have precisely this kind of relationship.³⁹ As Cassirer criticizes, Rickert saw the relation of universal concept and particular fact as an external relation (i.e., a “subsumptive relation” in the formal logical sense). This may be why he ended up separating concept and fact. If we are to take the categories as the principles that establish the particular, the categories themselves, being universal, are what Cassirer calls “functional concepts,” which hold particulars as the series of their value.⁴⁰ If scientific laws are an abstraction from such functional relations (not in the sense of generalizing abstraction but of isolating abstraction), the methodological forms will be reducible to the categories and so it will be impossible to separate them. This is a significant problem in Rickert’s theory of the “limit of the constitution of the natural scientific concept” but I cannot go into it here.⁴¹

Empirical reality is the commonsensical that becomes material for science, but we should not think that it exists as something complete and unified as common sense imagines. According to Rickert, it constitutes a heterogeneous continuum that has the two characteristics of continuity and heterogeneity.⁴² Already continuous, this empirical reality, that is, the content of consciousness formed through the categories, when it is seen from the standpoint of epistemology is nothing but the idea of the whole or the thought of the problem concerning the organization of the sum total of the given into unified and coherent reality, rather than the universe that becomes complete reality only when it is conceptualized as the whole. This problem arises necessarily, but is something that we cannot in the end exhaustively solve.⁴³ In this manner, we can maintain the Marburg school’s theory without contradiction—the theory that the object is

an inexhaustible problem for thinking—even if we think that empirical reality exists prior to science in accord with Rickert’s theory.

However, there are differences between their explanations of the locus of the reason for the inexhaustible problem of object, i.e., an idea. Rickert thinks that it originates from the nature of thought-content rather than the infinite process of thinking as the Marburg School would have it. According to him, thinking is not that which creates the content as the Marburg thinkers would argue since thinking essentially means to judge. In other words, judgment precisely means to affirm (or negate) the norm serving as the standard for grounding the content. Because of that, the content of the judgment is entirely identical with the content of representation and in this case, we can think of judgment as the form added to the content of representation as a certain non-representational thing. The category stands between the norm that becomes the purpose of its affirmation (namely, the object of knowledge in Rickert’s sense) and the content of judgment (namely, the product of knowing), thereby serving as the medium for concretizing the norm through the representational content.⁴⁴ Thinking must be given content from outside the norm or the categories. Only when there is content, can thinking begin to act. Thus, the reason why the process of thinking becomes infinite is because its content after all consists of this infinitely continuous development.

According to Rickert, empirical reality is heterogeneous continuity constituted through the categories as the reality-form; however, we have to think that a manifold of individual facts as its content must be given in the first place. In other words, before constituting reality, its elements have to be established as the given. For this reason, we need the category of “givenness” (*Gegebenheit*) that makes the content of consciousness as the given in relation to the judging subject. Only through this category (of givenness) and that of reality, can we establish the world of empirical reality that serves as the materials for science. In this sense, Rickert argues, “the most primitive individual experience that we can think of, that is, every perceived sense-impression becomes an epistemological problem and in terms of epistemology, we can no longer have what we call ‘pure experience.’”⁴⁵ The Marburg School thinkers similarly hold that even the individual perceptions (that common sense would see simply as the given) are established through thinking. Also, we have to recognize their profound insight in their clarification of the significance of thinking as an element of experience in response to naïve empiricism.

However, there are some differences between Rickert’s and Marburg School’s theory of thinking. Rickert uses the expressions that make us think of the Marburg School’s argument for creative thinking, and yet he adds quotation marks to the term “creation,” thereby drawing our attention to the reason why it does not indicate the creation of content but formal creation unlike rationalism (for this phrase sounds a bit similar to rationalism).⁴⁶ He argues that the essence of judgment does not lie in an analytic union of representational content but only in a transferring of the content to a new form; hence, the content must be given to the judgment in the first place. Perceptions that are thought to be individual facts given in common sense can be established only through the category of “givenness.” However, the content (which becomes given through the very category) must be firstly given to the subject that judges it. In order for it to be judged as the given content, we need the category of the given but there is nothing as the “given” when there is only the category of the given or its foundational norm. Indeed, before being thought in accord with the category of the given, its content is not anything to which we can even predicate the “givenness.” Nevertheless, we cannot completely deny its existence just because we cannot predicate its givenness.

This is precisely what Rickert calls “representational content.” This cannot have any determinations as a priori something that precedes any thought determinations but we can perceive it through immediate experience. Only when there is a content of the immediate experience, can thinking constitute the world of empirical reality through the categories of

“givenness” and “reality.” In fact, the transcendental oughtness, approved through judgment that Rickert calls the “object of knowledge,” exists within this immediate experience. Unless this were the case, it would be impossible for it as the norm to be known by the subject. In this manner, what he calls “object” can be reduced to the content of immediate experience in the same way as the Marburg School’s object. This immediate experience cannot be included in the system of logicistic epistemology because it does not receive any determinations of thinking. But we still have to acknowledge it as a limit concept. I think we can determine this representational content of immediate experience as the limit concept to the logicistic epistemology in the sense that it cannot be a thought in any way—just as Rickert has determined the “consciousness in general” as the limit concept in the sense that it cannot be any object [of knowledge]. Only when we acknowledge the representational concept as the limit concept, can we understand Rickert’s theory of judgment. The characteristics of Ricker’s theory lie in the fact that it has clarified the formality of thought creation that neither Cohen nor Natorp have clearly acknowledged and further recognized the transcendental element of knowledge as the presentational content. But at the same time, we can definitely say that his theory has further revealed the limit of logicism. Only from the standpoint of immediate experience, can we shed more light on the boundaries beyond this limit. We can comprehensively elucidate Cohen’s and Natorp’s “object” as well as Rickert’s “content” or “object” only through this [notion of immediate experience]. The logicists’ epistemology will end up being a fictitious argument unless it is grounded by and further developed through this standpoint.

4

In the previous section, I have argued that we must admit a priori immediate experience, which has not yet been determined by any categories, as the foundation of the objectivity of knowledge. Now, in order to clarify the significance of this point, I would like to go on to critique Rickert’s theory of the subject.

Rickert sets up three distinct modes of the subject-object opposition: First, the body and the mind of an “I” are regarded as subject and what is other to it as object. We should call this subject the intellectual and physical subject. Second, the self’s body and the other’s mind are ascribed to the external world while only the content of ego’s consciousness is the subject (i.e., psychological subjectivity). In this case, what does not belong to the consciousness of the “I” becomes object, in an opposition of transcendent and immanent realms. The third opposition further sees the content of self’s consciousness as object while subject is described as being conscious of this content. In this case, the object-subject distinction is that between the content of consciousness and consciousness.⁴⁷ The first opposition has no significance whatsoever for epistemology. The second will eventually lose all meaning once we critically examine the significance of what can be acknowledged as object. Therefore, in terms of epistemology, the most important object-subject distinction is the third opposition between consciousness and its content.

Knowledge means judgment and since the true/false distinction can only appear through it, the subject of knowledge must be the judging subject. When it takes the transcendent norm as object and through it affirms the content of consciousness, knowledge is established. If subject stands in opposition to object as the entire content of consciousness (in the way we just described), the subject itself cannot be a content of consciousness and hence it cannot have any content at all. The mind of a single individual that becomes the object of psychology as that which senses, wills and feels belongs to the object insofar as it is the content of consciousness, and it presupposes the supra-individual judging subject.⁴⁸ It is the subject that remains after we

think of an individual “I” entirely as object;⁴⁹ and since, in fact, we cannot completely objectify the “I,” it becomes the limit concept that we cannot ultimately realize.⁵⁰ According to Rickert,

we must say “it is” to every content of consciousness. Thus, the term “being” means nothing unless it is an element of judgment or because saying “being” is the same as saying “affirmed being,” ... we must think that the concept of the content of consciousness is identical with the content of consciousness that is judged “to be.”⁵¹

Since the phenomenology of an individual mind can be established through the judgment of “to be” insofar as we are conscious of it as the content of consciousness, we must presuppose the subject that judges this. In this manner, the subject that is necessarily presupposed as “being” (when we become aware of the content of consciousness) and yet never becomes the content of consciousness is the consciousness-in-general. That is why Rickert does not only acknowledge this as an abstract concept that we cannot ever reach in reality,⁵² but also claims that we must necessarily acknowledge it as the judging subject that affirms the “being” [of all things] based on “transcendent oughtness” in accord with two facts: (1) judgment is not a representation and (2) the concept of “being” can be understood only as an element of judgment.⁵³

Is Rickert’s claim really making an acute point? I think he is right to argue that knowledge is not established through representation but only through judgment and also that the essence of judgment lies in the act of affirmation/negation. In terms of content, an actual color and a represented color are the same; the former only takes on a new form (as the latter) through judgment. If we admit the “transcendent oughtness” as object of this judgment, it is not necessary to hold transcendent reality as object of knowledge outside such oughtness. It is also correct for him to interpret object as a content of consciousness that is judged “to be.” However, we need to pay attention to the point that the content of consciousness that is judged “to be” is directly experienced prior to the very judgment. We can always prove that there is an immediate experience prior to all judgment. Frischeisen-Köhler also argues in this sense that “we can be conscious of a certain thing in every moment without turning what we are conscious of or what we perceive into judgment and perceive a single state of being or experience.”⁵⁴ The perception of this consciousness precedes all judgment and therefore, it does not have any conceptual determinations. The judgment that “we are conscious of something as being there” is established only after there is this fact of immediate experience and it is not that this judgment establishes the immediate experience.

This immediate experience precedes all judgment and also serves as the foundation of all judgment. The phenomena of mind, which are the object of psychology, can be judged as what we are conscious of, and natural phenomena, which are the object of natural science, can be judged as the given reality. That is because they are the determinate organizations based on the fact of immediate experience. That is why Rickert is right to say that the content of consciousness (as the object of psychology) is objectivity generated through judgment, but his statement that “what we are conscious of is necessarily the object because it gives the content that is judged as what we are conscious of” confuses the fact of immediate experience with the result of reflective thinking. All facts of consciousness become object when they are judged to be “what we are conscious of.” Nevertheless, we immediately experience this as the fact of consciousness prior to such judgment. Even though the fact of consciousness and the judged content of consciousness are the same in content, they are different in form. The latter can be what it is only when it is determinately constituted through a single category named “consciousness” while the former represents the a priori and immediate fact. We have to acknowledge this immediate experience as the most fundamental fact that includes subject and object; and acknowledge activity and content as the potency without any clear division between

the opposing terms. This marks a limit to the epistemology of logicism; but we would have to say that to equate this [fundamental fact] with the judged content of consciousness (as Rickert does) goes beyond the legitimate bounds of logicism and ignores its limitation. We need to clearly distinguish these two.

Thus, we now know that we will face some problems if we think that consciousness is consciousness-in-general as the limit concept (wherein Rickert's subject regards all content of consciousness as object) from the standpoint of the immediate fact that has no division between subject and object. Our content of judgment can all become the content of consciousness if we reflect on it. Yet not only the psychological phenomena that are already judged as the content of consciousness, but also the natural phenomena that are judged through the given categories of reality (when we reflect on the process of its establishment) can be judged as the content of consciousness. Therefore, it seems like a legitimate idea at an outset to say in accord with Rickert that the subject would have to be that which cannot be the content of consciousness in any way. However, the content of consciousness can become the object in this manner because it is processed through the reflection of judgment. As I have just argued, the immediate experience can be directly perceived as the fact of consciousness without judgment. That is why the subject of judgment cannot be at the same time the object of judgment (since that would be a clear contradiction) but it also cannot *not* be directly experienced. The content of consciousness that becomes the content of judgment is the object and in this sense, it must stand in opposition to the subject; but the subject can at the same time be the direct experience which has not yet gone through the process of judgment. I wonder that the reason why Rickert does not acknowledge this point is because he equivocates the fact of direct experience and the result of reflective thinking, thereby falling victim to a violation of logicism by regarding what is not conceptually determinable as nothing.

Such a subject, as immediate experience, does not give a unified content of consciousness or the unified consciousness of a single individual as the object of psychology. Since it entirely precedes the distinction of self and other, we can call it "consciousness-in-general." Also, the object that always becomes the content of judgment in any case cannot be determinately organized when at the same time the subject itself is judged as the consciousness of the single individual. That is because the subject ends up becoming the object in this case. Thus, we can see how the subject in any kind of judgment is not the individual consciousness but "consciousness in general." Further, the activity of judgment as the immediate experience (which constitutes consciousness-in-general) can be unified into that which belongs to the individual consciousness if it is determined through reflective thinking. This is why we can regard the activity of judgment to be the mental phenomena of a single individual, namely, the object of psychology. Nevertheless, the activity of judgment cannot be subjectivity as belonging to individual consciousness in this manner. It must be the subject as the direct experience, which precedes such reflective thinking. Only through this fact of immediate experience does, the determinate organization of reflective thinking become possible. Therefore, we can say that the activity of judgment is a single phenomenon of the individual mind but the subject of knowledge is not the individual mind but consciousness-in-general. The activity of judgment is the subject not as that which belongs to the individual mind but as general consciousness that remains apart from such determination as the individual mind.

In this sense, as Rickert has argued earlier, the subject that carries out the judgment of empirical reality is the supra-individual "consciousness-in-general" and the subject that achieves scientific knowledge is the individual judging subject. It becomes difficult to maintain the argument that the form of the former gives the category while that of the latter gives the methodological form. The judging subject in either case gives "consciousness-in-general" as the immediate experience. Furthermore, if we reflect on the activity of judgment, we can also think

of it as a single phenomenon of the individual mind. I have argued in the previous section that the category and the methodological form can be reduced to one; in the same manner, I believe that both subjects here are essentially identical with each other.

Next, we have to examine whether or not Rickert consistently holds the idea that subject is merely a limit concept. According to his theory of judgment, judgment is an activity of affirming (or negating) “transcendent oughtness.” Then, he argues that this “transcendent oughtness” can be experienced as the feeling of certainty in our consciousness. But, if the subject remains a limit concept (as he maintains), how can it possess such an empirical and concrete content as the feeling of certainty? If we grant that the feeling of certainty belongs to the subject, then we will fall victim to the contradiction that it belongs to subject and object at the same time. That is obviously because the feeling would have to be something that we are conscious of. Also, from Rickert’s standpoint, since all of what we are conscious of is the content of judgment (that is to say, they are what we are conscious of as being there), they all become the object. In order to escape this contradiction, he must admit that there can be the fact of consciousness that we directly experience before judgment and also that the subject lies in the activity of judgment as direct experience.

The category of “givenness” that he determines as the most basic category comes to have a meaning only when the subject (that is judged as the given in relation to the category) is seen to be experienced *in concreto* rather than merely as the limit-concept. His theory of judgment clearly shows how impossible it is for him to hold his claim that the judging subject remains as merely the limit concept standing in opposition to all contents of consciousness as the object and also that it be beyond the reach of our experience. Rickert himself argues that the “I” cannot possibly be objectified and that “the knowing subject cannot be separated from a part of the content of consciousness that becomes the psychological subject.”⁵⁵ Aren’t these arguments implicitly pointing toward the very impossibility of holding his claim that the subject remains outside the realm of our experience? The term “limit” in his phrase “limit-concept” indicates the limit of logicism. Or even if we substitute such objective concept of value with the psychological concept of oughtness or the feeling of certainty, the subject cannot essentially approve this value unless it can actually experience it; hence, it must ultimately have a concrete content.

If we are to free ourselves from this contradiction and follow through with the logicism, we have to give up the task of explaining the generation of knowledge. Then we must demonstrate that there has to be the transcendent value in the first place and discuss the knowledge, which is established through such value, simply as a result (as Marburg School thinkers do). In this case, the subject becomes a general hypothesis for epistemology simply as a concept that affirms the transcendent value. This is probably why Rickert has come to pay attention to this point in his recent article, “Two ways of Epistemology.”⁵⁶ In this manner, we can escape the contradiction that we just mentioned but at the same time we have to keep in our mind that logicism has to remain within a certain boundary if it is to stick to its principle. From this standpoint, the transcendent value, the judging subject that affirms this value and the category that intermediates these two are all merely epistemologically presupposed concepts and we cannot concretely know the content of these concepts.

However, we believe that, so long as the concepts are not vacuous, they are concretized in one way or another. Also, we cannot help but seek to clarify their actual contents and their relations to each other. We desire to regard the judging subject not as the abstract limit-concept but as having a concrete content and knowledge not as the result of knowing but also as the process. This demand is natural so long as we do not deliberately limit the problem of epistemology. It has been already clear that we cannot satisfy this demand from the standpoint of logicism and we have no choice but to respond to it from the standpoint of immediate experience. I believe what I have argued so far has implicitly shown that this standpoint [of

immediate experience] does not necessarily contradict that of logicism but is capable of harmoniously complementing it.

5

We can summarize my critique of logicism in the previous four sections in the following three points: First, thinking by no means creates the content of thinking (namely, the object of knowledge). The productive power of thinking is merely formal and does not reach its content. The content of thinking becomes what it is only through receiving the formal determinations; but in order for this to take place, there has to be the given prior to thinking. This a priori “given” constitutes the limit vis-à-vis the standpoint of logicism. Second, the subject of knowledge belongs to the activity of thinking but insofar as it is the activity and the subject, it cannot be the content of thinking or the object. From the standpoint of logicism, we can only presuppose it as the limit ideal and cannot examine what it is *in concreto*. Third, the standpoint of logicism (according to the previous two points) cannot discuss how the subject can know the transcendent oughtness or how the objective value is realized as the content even if we can say that the establishment of knowledge lies in the affirmation of the transcendent oughtness and the realization of the objective value as the content. I have briefly shown in Section 3 and 4 how the standpoint of immediate experience can clarify these limits of logicism. But before explaining this point, we need to consider if this standpoint of immediate experience ultimately contradicts that of logicism and also if the former is not reducible to psychologism, which is usually in conflict with the latter.

On the basis of the following two points, logicistic philosophers reject any empirical method as a legitimate method of epistemology: First, empiricism falls victim to circular reasoning since the empirical facts that it takes as the starting point of epistemological investigation already presuppose the establishment of truth and value (which should be acknowledged only after the investigation) as well as the validity of the categories that are based on this value. Second, even if empiricism can escape the first problem and hold the standpoint that does not presuppose any truth or value, it would have to admit that this standpoint itself does not have the capacity to discuss any truth or value. Now, are these criticisms applicable to the notion of immediate experience?

According to the logicians, the empirical facts that serve as the starting point of empiricism always presuppose the category of thinking. Of course, there must be what they call the facts of pure experience or the category of “givenness” (along with the categories of thinking in order for the empirical facts to be acknowledged as such). Therefore, if empiricism tries to explain the establishment of knowledge through empirical facts, it is already hypothesizing the establishment of knowledge and the category of validity at the starting point of the explanation; hence, they argue, this is clearly a case of circular reasoning. This sharp criticism acutely diagnoses the problems with many forms of empiricism. However, as I have argued above, if we are to say that all forms of empiricism commit this kind of contradiction, we would have to ignore the possibility of direct experience that does not presuppose any categories of thinking and thereby commit a dogmatism that contracts the concept of facts to that which is constituted by the category of thinking alone. If we are to admit, therefore, that there is an immediate fact of consciousness which has not gone through any process of thinking, the first criticism would have to be dissolved.

Then is it appropriate to think in accord with the second criticism that we cannot draw any truth or value from empirical facts? As Johannes Volkelt argues in detail in his *Experience and Thought* (1896), if we interpret experience as individual moments or fragmentary facts, we cannot

possibly claim it to be the foundation of knowledge. However, can all experiences be solely individual and momentary facts? The answer is “No.” These characteristics do not essentially belong to the concrete and immediate experience but are the results of adding thought-determinations to it. The facts of immediate experience themselves do not have any determinations that they are the contents of our consciousness. The content of our consciousness comes to be only when the reflective thinking determinately organizes [the facts of immediate experience] through the form of the categories of “consciousness.” The facts of immediate experience themselves do not have such a determination as belonging to our consciousness. There is not yet any distinction of “I” and non-“I” but they are simply the immediate facts that do not show any distinction of consciousness and transcendence. Similarly, the argument that experience consists of momentary facts does not correspond with the notion of immediate experience either. The past is not since it has gone, nor is the future since it has not yet come to be; hence, the statement that experience remains as the consciousness of each empirical moment does not describe the true nature of immediate experience, but only indicates a result of organizing immediate experience through the category of time. The immediate experience, contrariwise, points to the eternal present that harmoniously unifies the past and the future; and in this sense, it is trans-temporal. Stated otherwise, Bergson’s pure *durée* represents its true nature. (I do not fully understand Bergson’s theory of mind-body relation or the world-view yet. However, I cannot help but express my amazement and admiration for the deep insight in his notion of the “direct givenness of consciousness.”) If we think in this manner, the argument that experience is individualistic and momentary does not apply to the notion of immediate experience but in fact, we can see how it only touches on the result of adding thought-determinations to the immediate experience.

Moreover, it is also a mistake to think that experiences are merely fragmentary and do not contain any relations. Actually, since immediate experience has not yet received any thought-determinations, the relations contained therein cannot have any conceptual form. However, the fact that a thing is not determined does not mean that we cannot be conscious of it. Since the consciousness of relations as a transcendental and immediate fact can also exist, immediate experience actually consists of an internal unity of manifold contents. Because of this, the critique that we cannot draw knowledge, which demands necessity and universal validity, from the individual and momentary experiences that provide fragmentary facts only comes from a certain interpretation of the notion of experience. Hence, it should be clear that the notion of immediate experience transcends any of the difficulties pertaining to empiricism in relation to the philosophical foundation of knowledge.⁵⁷

Even if we can overcome these concerns that we cannot explain knowledge through immediate experience, where can we find the positive ground for its possibility? Can we possibly draw the value of knowledge from the facts of immediate experience? I believe that this is possible due to the fact that immediate experience embodies the absolute value. Originally, the concept of value indicates the possibility of realizing a demand. In other words, a certain demand, when it is equipped with the possibility of being realized at some point in time, has a value in relation to that which holds the demand. Therefore, in order for a value to be known as such, there has to be some gap between the demand and its realization. In this sense, since there is no gap between its demand and realization in immediate experience, we tend to overlook its characteristics as a value; but if we pay closer attention to it, we can easily perceive that it constitutes the world of absolute value. It should be impossible for anyone to deny that the facts of immediate experience are absolutely certain. Then, what is the absolute certainty? It means an immediate realization in which there is no gap between the demand of truth and its realization. In short, it is the state in which the possibility is immediately realized.

Thus, the fact of immediate experience gives the realization of absolute value and points toward what Windelband calls the world of “validity in itself” (*An-Sich Gelten*).⁵⁸ All the other values of knowledge are derived from this absolute value. The statement that we cannot draw any truth or value from the fact of experience represents a critique that remains forgetful of an important point that the fact of immediate experience embodies the absolute value. In fact, what we call “truth,” “value,” and “logical norm” are possible only when there is absolute value of this immediate experience. The logicist thinkers have also recognized that their “value” and “norm” are not anything that they can demonstrate but rather are what they presuppose for all demonstrations. Accordingly, this serves as the fundamental presupposition for logicism but from the standpoint of pure experience, we can perceive it through the facts of immediate experience.

6

In the previous section, I believe I have sufficiently sketched out the possibility that the standpoint of immediate experience can complement logicism. In this final section, therefore, I would like to conclude by showing how the complementary relation of the notion of immediate experience to the limit of logicism works.

There is no distinction between content and activity in immediate experience. When we say that we experience this or that, we presuppose the content-activity distinction, but in fact this statement can be made only when we add reflective thought to the immediate experience, and hence it does not express the immediate experience as what it is. It is the immediate fact in which conceptual distinctions have not appeared—the distinctions that we should be able to describe with language. Accordingly, there is certainly no subject-object distinction. What we call “subject” and “object” are the opposing distinctions that take place only when there is thinking. Immediate experience denotes the state of no-distinction between subject and object, the state prior to the very distinction. But then, does this fact of immediate experience represent some kind of complete chaos? The answer is in the negative. Rather, it represents a fundamental unity, which potentially contains manifold relations that are later to be conceptually constituted through logical ordering.⁵⁹ This unity, moreover, does not denote, nor provide the unity of various things that exist parallel to each other at a certain point in time but rather is the internal and developmental unity that Bergson describes with his notion of pure duration, namely the trans-temporal duration that unifies the past and the future. Thinking is the process of making explicit the distinctions that are implicit in immediate experience, of clarifying the relations between these distinct elements, and of leading us to a richer unity. This is precisely the developmental aspect of the immediate experience. Thus, the fundamental source of thinking is clearly immediate experience.

The first step for thinking to make explicit what is implicit in immediate experience is to differentiate its content and activity from the fact of immediate experience. Immediate experience itself cannot actually have the activity-content distinction but implicitly contains it. For instance, an experience of “blue” remains nothing more than an experience of the blue color, but even this immediate experience implicitly contains the not-yet-determined distinction between the blue itself and the activity of experiencing the blue. Theodor Lipps’s distinction of *experience* (*Erlebnis*) as the *experienced* (*das Erlebte*) and *experiencing* (*das Erlebende*) is based on a reflection on the same point.⁶⁰ This is an incidental remark, but I have to note here the remarkably close similarities between Lipps’s theory of knowledge (which comes from the tradition of Psychologism) and those of Windelband and Rickert that represent the tradition of logicism. One of the reasons for these remarkable similarities is probably that Brentano’s theory

of judgment influenced the work of both. At any rate, it is a striking fact that actually shows a harmony between logicism and empiricism.⁶¹ This is what Frischeisen-Köhler points out when he says that “the given is neither objective nor subjective, but the subjective moment and the objective moment are distinguished from each other *in abstracto*.”⁶² When this implicit and potential distinction becomes an explicit and actual one, content comes to stand over against activity as object to subject and the former is determined as the given independently of the latter. In this manner, the content-side of immediate experience, established as that which stands against its activity-side, represents the judgment of “givenness.” Rickert’s category of “givenness” is precisely the form of this judgment.

What oughtness or norm is affirmed when this judgment is made? As I have mentioned earlier, it is immediate experience as the fact that directly embodies value. In light of the implicit distinction between content and activity, it means that the demand from the side of activity is directly realized on the side of content, thereby signaling the harmonious unity of the two. In this sense, if we are to say that they are now explicitly distinguished from each other, there is going to be a gap between the demand and its realization and thereby, the content comes to have a possibility of realizing this demand. Here appears value in the usual sense of the word. Thus, we must say that the value essentially belongs to the side of the empirical content. The demand of the content to be affirmed to have this value, which further demands to be affirmed on the side of activity, constitutes the transcendent oughtness which Lipps calls the “categorical imperative.” In this manner, when content is regarded as object, and demands its affirmation from the activity as the subject and determines the direction of the activity’s movement, it becomes the object of knowledge. The meaning of object as Rickert defines it, can be found principally in this norm, whereas, as Cohen and Natorp define it, the focus is on the content itself, which includes this norm. Both cases precisely point toward the content of immediate experience.

Rickert and Natorp admit that such content is unintelligible from the standpoint of logicism. Then how can we know its demand for affirmation of activity as the norm of thinking or oughtness? How can the subject know value? These problems can be solved rather easily through adopting the standpoint of immediate experience. When the activity-side of immediate experience is distinguished from the content-side and the latter is determined to stand over against the former, the activity becomes the subject as the activity of thinking. But since this subjectivity itself is immediate experience, it can experience the demand for approval, which is given by the content of judgment (i.e., the object of knowledge), as the norm or oughtness. Value is the concept seen from the standpoint of this objective content. *Contra* Rickert, the subject cannot be a limit concept devoid of any concrete content. Rather, it consists of certain data of immediate experience. Hence, it allows us to experience the demand of the objective content for its approval as oughtness or norm and to establish judgment through approving this demand. Since this subject as immediate experience does not have any conceptual determination, it does not constitute the consciousness of an individual “I” but consciousness-in-general in the sense that it is supra-individual (or perhaps it is more appropriate to call it pre-individual). In this sense, consciousness-in-general does not remain an abstract concept, but represents the concept that constitutes the concrete content of immediate experience. Knowledge has necessity and universal validity because this consciousness-in-general as the subject establishes its content through the transcendent oughtness.

What I have discussed so far in this section is the process through which the first step of thinking, i.e., the judgment of “givenness,” emerges from immediate experience, but we can think all judgments that constitute the succeeding steps of thinking through this [process]. What differentiates these manifold judgments from the judgment of “givenness” is that the latter distinguishes the content of immediate experience from its activity in their oppositional relation to each other, proceeds to explicitly determine the implicit distinctions that are inherent in the

content itself, and further clarifies the relations of these elements. As Wilhelm Wundt strongly argues, a judgment is not meant to unify the separated elements anew, but to analyze the elements of a composite totality and elucidate their relations. At the base of judgment, we always find immediate experience. Since, as we have seen earlier, immediate experience gives the internal unity of the manifold, the function of the judgment is precisely to transfer this manifold from its implicit state to the explicit and to lead us to a much richer unity through explaining their relations.

The relations of these elements make explicit what is originally implicit in immediate experience. Judgment requires the foundation of immediate experience. The transcendent oughtness or the norm is precisely the demand/affirmation of the content on the basis of the value embodied in this immediate experience. Since the categories are the conceptually unified form in which the unity of this immediate experience is made explicit, we must say that their foundation lies entirely in immediate experience. The “kingdom of validity” (*Reich des Geltens*) as the “totalities of correlations and relations of beings” (*Inbegriffe der Zusammenhänge und Beziehungen des Seienden*) that Windelband defines as the foundation of the ontological world lies in the world of immediate experience.⁶³ The logicians are actually right in objecting that experience, understood in the way empiricists and positivists usually do, certainly presupposes the categories; but, immediate experience in the true sense of the word is not based on the categories but serves as their foundation. As Nishida argues, immediate experience does not come to be after the categories, but its unity renders the categories possible. The facts of immediate experience must lie at the foundation of logical thinking. Thus, since the subject that judges in accord with these categories always represents the activity of thinking as immediate experience, we should call it “pre-individual consciousness-in-general.” The knowledge generated out of such judgment can be objective knowledge that possesses necessity and universal validity because of such consciousness-in-general.

If the subject of knowledge is consciousness-in-general, what is its relation to an individual consciousness? Normally, on what basis do we think each of our respective knowledge as representing “my” conscious activity? What does it mean when Rickert says that the subject of knowledge cannot be separated at all from a part of the content of one’s consciousness (which becomes the psychological subject)? As I just explained, immediate experience is latently equipped with both content and activity. The world of given reality, which can become the object of natural science, is established when we make this content/activity distinction explicit, fix the content as standing over against the activity, and further determinately organize them through the various categories of reality. In this manner, the activity of immediate experience in and of itself can also be the content of the same immediate experience. This may seem strange at first glance, but can be easily grasped if one thinks of the true nature of immediate experience as pure duration. Since in pure duration the present carries the form of the past within itself, immediate experience can internally carry the past phase of itself and furthermore determine it as its own content.

This unifying self-organization of immediate experience constitutes reflective thinking and the form of this thinking is the categories of consciousness. Individual consciousness is the self-unification of the activity of immediate experience as the content of thinking; accordingly, it is obviously an objective reality. In this manner, immediate experience can be reflectively judged as the content of consciousness but it is not established through this judgment. Rather, immediate experience enables the judgment to be what it is. The content of immediate experience, determinately organized as the world of given reality in the judgment of natural science, does not presuppose the judgment that it is the content of consciousness. We can judge something as the contents of consciousness when we judge immediate experience, which contains these contents, through our reflective thinking; accordingly, the immediate experience,

containing these contents, is already established prior to the judgment. Therefore, we cannot equate the immediate experience with the content of consciousness, which is judged as object through reflective thinking.

It is wrong to think in accord with Rickert that because all content of consciousness is object, subject is no more than a limit concept over against it. The subject can be directly experienced as the activity of thinking. Thus, the activity of thinking as immediate experience is further equipped with the possibility that it be constituted as the content of individual consciousness due to the nature of immediate experience that we just discussed. Also, the knowledge established through this activity of thinking can be thought of as an activity that takes place in “my” individual consciousness through our reflections. However, it is not that there is individual consciousness and then later knowledge. Because pre-individual consciousness-in-general is established as subject and further individual consciousness is formed out of this general consciousness through reflective thinking, knowledge itself is not individual. Rickert’s statement that the subject of knowledge cannot be separated from individual consciousness can be understood to mean in this light that the former as immediate experience essentially possesses the characteristics that are to be constitutively unified into the latter. In this manner, the subject of knowledge and individual consciousness belong to totally different ranks in epistemology and consequently, consciousness-in-general as immediate experience is transcendental in its nature and presupposed for the establishment of individual consciousness. Through elucidating and distinguishing these two kinds of consciousness, thus, the standpoint of immediate experience can escape the troubles of psychologism and become a complement to logicism.

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¹ Tanabe Hajime, *Tanabe Hajime Zenshū* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1964), 1: 28–61; hereafter THZ. For the translated list of early essays from this volume of Tanabe Zenshū, see Takeshi Morisato and Timothy Burns, “Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Deductive Reasoning: The Relation of the Universal and the Particular in Early Works of Tanabe Hajime,” *Comparative and Continental Philosophy* 5 (2013): 124–49; Takeshi Morisato and Cody Staton, “An Essay on Kant’s Theory of Freedom from the Early Works of Tanabe Hajime,” *Comparative and Continental Philosophy* 5 (2013): 150–56; “Two Essays on Moral Freedom from the Early Works of Tanabe Hajime,” *Comparative and Continental Philosophy* 8.2 (2016): 144–59.

² Tanabe (1964: Vol. 1: 3–10).

³ Nishida published this article in two parts in the journal of *Geimon* 藝文 (1911): 16–34 and 84–97. This journal is not easily accessible and so, to find the same text, see Nishida Kitarō, *Nishida Kitarō Zenshū*, ed., Takeda Atsushi, Klaus Riesenhuber, Kosaka Kunitsugu, and Fujita Masakatsu (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2003), 1: 169–89.

⁴ According to Mutai Risaku 務基理作 (1890–1974), Nishida first mentioned Tanabe’s name in the end of 1915 or the beginning of 1916 in reference to “The Limit of Logicism in Epistemology.” The Kyoto School economist, Ishikawa Kōji 石川興二 (1892–1976), who spent some time with Tanabe in Germany between 1922–24, reports that Tanabe himself expressed his academic mission as to “logically clarify Nishidian philosophy.” Cf. Mutai, “Tanabe Hajime in His Early Days at the Kyoto University,” *Supplementary Volume to the Vol. 4 of Tanabe Hajime Zenshū*, 1; Ishikawa, “My Memory of Tanabe Hajime in Germany,” *Supplementary Volume to the Vol. 2 of Tanabe Hajime Zenshū*, 3.

- ⁵ It is impossible to cover all the recent publications on the Neo-Kantian philosophy but let me enumerate here some of the notable works: ed. Tom Rockmore, *Heidegger, German Idealism and Neo-Kantianism* (New York: Humanity Books, 2000); Rudolf A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft, *Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009); Sebastian Luft, *The Neo-Kantian Reader* (London: Routledge, 2015), *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer: A Novel Assessment* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2015), *The Space of Culture: Towards a Neo-kantian Philosophy of Culture—Cohen, Natorp, and Cassirer* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Frederick C. Beiser, *After Hegel: German Philosophy 1840–1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); *The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism, 1796–1880* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Nikolas De Warren and Adrea Staiti, *New Approaches to Neo-Kantianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). As this list indicates, studies of Neo-Kantianism are a burgeoning field.
- ⁶ I would like to thank Joseph O’Leary for scrupulously going through the earlier version of my translation. His critical comments and acute editorial suggestions were indispensable for the formation of this article.
- ⁷ Hermann Cohen, *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis* (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1914), 60 [50]. [Tanabe cites the first edition of the text and the pagination of his citations will be indicated in square brackets.]
- ⁸ Cohen (1914: 62 [52]).
- ⁹ Cohen (1914: 67 [55]).
- ¹⁰ Cohen (1914: 68 [56]).
- ¹¹ Paul Natorp, *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften* (Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1910), 18.
- ¹² Natorp (1910: 89).
- ¹³ Cohen (1914: 490 [422]).
- ¹⁴ Cohen (1914: 53 [49]).
- ¹⁵ Cohen (1914: 18–9 [17], 81 [67], 19–20 [18], 5–6 [5], 52–3 [48]).
- ¹⁶ See Ernst Cassirer, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1923), Part I, Chapter IV, Section IX; *Substance and Function: And Einstein’s Theory of Relativity*, trans., William Curtis Swabey and Marie Collins Swabey (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1923), 204–20. The pagination of the translation text will be indicated in parentheses.
- ¹⁷ Max Frischeisen-Köhler, *Wissenschaft und Wirklichkeit* (Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1912), 66.
- ¹⁸ Cassirer (1923: 360 [271] ff.)
- ¹⁹ Cohen (1914: 471–72 [407]).
- ²⁰ Cohen (1914: 462–63 [398]).
- ²¹ Cohen (1914: 28–9, [26]).
- ²² Cf. Wilhelm Jerusalem, *Der kritische Idealismus und die reine Logik* (Vienna and Leipzig: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1905). See also my articles in Vol. 292 and 293 of the *Journal of Philosophy* (*tetsugaku zasshi* 哲学雑誌).
- ²³ August Messer, *Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie* (Leipzig: Dürr’schen Buchhandlung, 1909), 102–04.
- ²⁴ Natorp (1910: 25).
- ²⁵ Natorp (1910: 21).
- ²⁶ Cassirer (1923: 360 [272]).
- ²⁷ Frischeisen-Köhler (1912: 53).
- ²⁸ Messer (1909: 114).
- ²⁹ Natorp (1910: 15).
- ³⁰ Cohen (1914: 82 [68]).
- ³¹ Messer (1909: 115).
- ³² Natorp (1910: 93).
- ³³ Cf. Henri Poincaré, *Wissenschaft und Hypothese* (Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1904), 93; *Science and Hypothesis* (London: The Walter Scott Publishing Co., 1905), 91.

- 34 Heinrich Rickert, *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis: Einführung in die Transzendentalphilosophie* (Tübingen and Leipzig: J. C. B. Mohr, 1904), 188–91.
- 35 Rickert (1904: 188).
- 36 Rickert (1904: 210).
- 37 Rickert (1904: 210–11).
- 38 Rickert (1904: 210–26).
- 39 Rickert (1904: 212–4).
- 40 Cassirer (1923: 293 [221] ff.)
- 41 Frischeisen-Köhler (1912: 142).
- 42 Heinrich Rickert, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung Eine logische Einleitung in die historischen Wissenschaften* (Freiburg and Leipzig: 1913), 30–6; *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1926), 31–2.
- 43 Rickert (1904: 202).
- 44 Rickert (1904: 172).
- 45 Rickert (1904: 182).
- 46 Cf. (Rickert 1904: 182–83): “individual experiences as well as perceptions are created only through the approval of norm and the category of the given” (182).
- 47 Rickert (1904: 12–14); Rickert (1913: 128–38).
- 48 Rickert (1913: 128–47).
- 49 Rickert (1904: 144).
- 50 Rickert (1904: 145).
- 51 Rickert (1904:147).
- 52 Rickert (1904: 149).
- 53 Rickert (1904: 150–57).
- 54 Frischeisen-Köhler (1912: 124).
- 55 Rickert (1913: 138).
- 56 In this article, he apparently focuses on the result of knowing or more precisely the meaning of sentences that express thought rather than the knowledge as a process. Cf. Nishida Kitarō, “On the Pure Logician Claims on Epistemology” 認識論に於ける純論理派の主張に就て, *Geimon* 藝文 vol. 2: 29; and see also Frischeisen-Köhler (1912: 118–20). Since *Geimon* is not easily accessible to most western readers, consult the new edition of *Nishida Kitarō Zenshū* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003), 1: 187–88.
- 57 Cf. Nishida, *An Inquiry into the Good* 善の研究, Chapter One and “On the Pure Logician Claims on Epistemology.”
- 58 Wilhelm Windelband, *Die Prinzipien der Logik* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1913), 53.
- 59 I use the term “potentially” here in the sense that [the immediate experience] has not received any logical determination and have not shown explicitly the diverse relations that the conceptual clarification describes.
- 60 Theodor Lipps, *Psychologische Untersuchungen* (Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann, 1907), 1–18. See my introductory article on this text in Vol. 285 of the Philosophical Journal 哲學雜誌.
- 61 Lipps, *Psychologische Untersuchungen*, Part I, Chapter 4; and see also his “Naturphilosophie,” *Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts*, ed. Wilhelm Windelband (Heidelberg: 1907), 58–182.
- 62 Frischeisen-Köhler (1912: 220).
- 63 Windelband (1913: 53–4).