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

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Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies

Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies is a bi-annual, peer-reviewed, international journal dedicated to comparative thought. It seeks to explore common spaces and differences between philosophical traditions in a global context. Without postulating cultures as monolithic, homogenous, or segregated wholes, it aspires to address key philosophical issues which bear on specific methodological, epistemological, hermeneutic, ethical, social, and political questions in comparative thought. *Confluence* aims to develop the contours of a philosophical understanding not subservient to dominant paradigms and provide a platform for diverse philosophical voices, including those long silenced by dominant academic discourses and institutions. *Confluence* also endeavors to serve as a juncture where specific philosophical issues of global interest may be explored in an imaginative, thought-provoking, and pioneering way.

We welcome innovative and persuasive ways of conceptualizing, articulating, and representing intercultural encounters. Contributions should be able to facilitate the development of new perspectives on current global thought-processes and sketch the outlines of salient future developments.

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Thinking Dialogically about Dialogue with Martin Buber and Daya Krishna[1]

Abstract
The first half of the paper consists of a philosophical reflection upon a historical exchange. I discuss Buber's famous letter, and another (less known but not less interesting) letter by J. L. Magnes, to Mahatma Gandhi, both challenging the universality of the principle of ahiṃsā (non-violence). I also touch on Buber's interest and acquaintance with Indian philosophy, as an instance of dialogue de-facto (not just in theory) across cultures. Gandhi never answered these letters, but his grandson and philosopher extraordinaire Ramchandra Gandhi ›answers‹ Buber, not on the letter but about the ideal of dialogue at large, and the interconnection of dialogue and ahiṃsā.

The second half of the paper focuses on the work of Daya Krishna, another ›philosopher of dialogue.‹ from within Daya Krishna's vast philosophical corpus, I underscore one of his last projects, in which he sketches the outlines of what he refers to as »knowledge without certainty,« contrary to common and traditional ways of perceiving the concept of knowledge. I argue that the pramāṇa, means and measure of knowledge, in the intriguing case of »knowledge without certainty,« depicted by Daya Krishna as open-ended, dynamic, constantly evolving, is inevitably dialogue, and I aim to disclose the meaning and salience of dialogue in Daya Krishna's oeuvre.

However, not just the content, but also the form, or the ›how,‹ matters in my paper. I use different materials across genres and disciplines to rethink, in dialogue with Buber and Daya Krishna, the possibilities and impossibilities (with emphasis on the possibilities) of dialogue. These ›materials‹ include Milan Kundera and Richard Rorty, Krishna and Arjuna (of the *Bhagavadgītā*), Vrinda Dalmiya who works with the notion of care as bridging between epistemology and ethics, Wes Anderson on seeing through the eyes of the other,

[1] This paper is dedicated with love to Chava Magnes.

and Ben Okri on hospitality in the realm of ideas. As author of the present paper I am moderating an imagined a multi-vocal dialogue between these ›participants‹ on dialogue as concept, as craft and especially, as a great necessity in the world in which we live.

Keywords
Martin Buber, Daya Krishna, Ramchandra Gandhi, Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, dialogue, »knowledge without certainty,« ahiṃsā (non-violence).

> The young chevalier looks at the stranger.
> […]
> ›You're from the eighteenth century?‹
> The question is peculiar, absurd, but the way the man asks it is even more so, with a strange intonation, as if he were a messenger come from a foreign kingdom and had learned his French at court without knowing France. It is that intonation, that unbelievable pronunciation, which made the chevalier think this man really might belong to some other period.
> ›Yes, and you?‹ he asks.
> ›Me? The twentieth.‹ Then he adds: ›The end of the twentieth.‹
> […]
> The chevalier sees in his stare the stubborn urge to speak. Something in that stubbornness disturbs him. He understands that that impatience to speak is also an implacable uninterest in listening. […] He instantly loses the taste for saying anything at all, and at once he ceases to see any reason to prolong the encounter (Kundera 1995: 127–129).[2]

1 Overture

Everyone today speaks about dialogue. Everyone aspires to be in dialogue, or at least this is what everyone says; dialogue between friends, enemies, states, religions, ›east and west,‹ ›north and south.‹ Everyone speaks of the necessity of dialogue, but very few engage in a dialogue, since dialogue is not an easy undertaking. To be in dialogue is to see the other, which is a difficult challenge, as one usually concentrates on oneself, and is used to thinking in terms of ›I‹ and ›my.‹ Here *Bhagavadgītā* (BG) 2.71 comes to mind: »Having abandoned all his desires,

[2] M. Kundera, *Slowness*, L. Asher (trans.), London: Faber and Faber, 1995.

roaming about without desires, without ›mine‹ and without ›I,‹ the human person reaches the sublime (vihāya kāmān yaḥ sarvān, pumāṁś carati niḥspṛhaḥ, nirmamo nirahaṅkāraḥ, sa śāntim adhigacchati).«

The *Bhagavadgītā* itself is a dialogue, one of the most famous dialogues ever composed. The śloka quoted here prescribes the yogic path to the sublime (śānti). However, the same procedure, namely suspending (not one's desires, but) the ›I‹ and ›my,‹ which are not different from one another, can also be taken as a ›path‹ toward you, ›the sublime you‹ (as the antonym of Sartre's »L'enfer, c'est les autres«). Vrinda Dalmiya speaks of this »selflessness« in terms of »care.« Her argument is that »the heart of the cognitive moment lies in selflessness (what is sometimes termed ›objectivity‹) – where we, along with our biases and expectations, recede so that the object of knowledge can present itself« (Dalmiya 2002: 47).[3]

This is to say that Dalmiya notices the same ›movement‹ of the self, from foreground to background, both in the ›cognitive moment‹ and in the act of reaching out to the other, which she refers to as »care.« »Both entail,« she says, »a backgrounding of the subject, to create a space for the other – be it another person or the object of knowledge« *(ibid.)*.

The same point, about »knowledge as care,« and »care« as consisting of a noetic dimension, is also raised by Ben Okri, the Nigerian poet and novelist, in a short essay titled ›Hospitality.‹ Here he writes: »There is also intellectual hospitality, the hospitality to ideas, to dreams, to ways of seeing, to perception, to cultures. We will call this invisible hospitality. This is the most important hospitality of all, and it includes all other hospitalities« (Okri 2011: 55).[4]

Dalmiya's attempt, in my reading, is to reveal, or even to restore, the ethical foundation of every epistemological episode. Her episte-mo-ethical ideal is not unrelated to the picture of dialogue to be sketched here as we move on.

Moreover, Dalmiya's argument, as far as the ›cognitive moment‹ is concerned, sits well with the picture of consciousness, as depicted by Patañjali of the *Yogasūtra* (YS), a philosopher of mind (among other things) who thought and wrote sometime around the second

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[3] V. Dalmiya, ›Why Should a Knower Care?‹ *Hypatia,* Vol. 17, No. 1, 2002, pp. 34–52.

[4] B. Okri *A Time for New Dreams,* London: Rider, 2011.

or third century CE. In his discussion of object-centered meditation (which paves the way to objectless-meditation), he suggests that here, »consciousness is as-if emptied of its [subjective] nature, and the object [of meditation] alone shines forth« (YS 1.43).[5]

Like in Dalmiya, one's subjectivity ›recedes,‹ as it were, to clear a space for ›the other,‹ object in Patañjali's case, or another subject, the ›you‹ which ›care ethics‹ speaks of.

However a dialogue is not just about seeing the other, but also about seeing through the other's eyes, even if just for an instance. This is to say that for the sake of a dialogue (not the usual pseudo-dialogue, or non-dialogue in the name of a dialogue), one has to ›leave his body,‹ and to ›enter the body,‹ or ›head,‹ or mind of the other.

Take for example Wes Anderson's movie *Darjeeling Limited* (2007), that tells the story of three American brothers, who travel to India after their father's death, following the oriental fantasy, ›in search of themselves.‹ One of them, Peter (played by Adrian Brody), wears heavy glasses, but whenever he wants to see something, he has to take them off. These are his father's glasses, with his prescription. Peter tries to understand his dead father, to see through his eyes, through his glasses. These glasses, as a metaphor, express the impossible desire to see through the eyes of the other. Only a dialogue has the capacity to make the impossible possible.

2 Martin Buber and Indian Philosophy

Martin Buber (1878–1965) is one of the few who does not merely speak, but who also engages in a dialogue. And one of Buber's least known dialogues is his dialogue with Indian philosophy. Western philosophy, past and present, is hardly open to other thinking traditions. There are of course exceptions, but by and large, Western philosophy (like the West in general) is ›Eurocentric,‹ i. e. believes that the sun

[5] The full sūtra says that, »nirvitarkā (samāpatti) [which is the higher level of meditation on ›concrete objects,‹ as against the next level of meditation which concentrates on subtle, or abstract, or in Sanskrit sūkṣma, objects] occurs when memory is ›purified‹ [i. e. ›deleted,‹ or emptied of its contents], consciousness is as-if emptied of its [subjective] nature, and the object [of meditation] alone shines forth (smṛti-pariśuddhau sva-rūpa-śūnyā-iva-artha-mātra-nirbhāsā nirvitarkā)«; I work with the *Yogasūtra* text as it occurs in Swami Hariharananda Aranya's *Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali* (Kolkata: University of Calcutta, 2012). The translation is mine.

rises in West Europe and sets in North America. Everything else is marginal, or peripheral, and cannot be considered as ›really‹ philosophical.

Here I recall Daya Krishna's introduction to *The Art of the Conceptual*, a collection of his essays.[6] A staunch believer in the power of dialogue, he writes here that,

> The story of Western thinkers' response to a basic criticism of their work is interesting, as it reveals a strange sort of resistance to come to terms with a fundamental critique of their work, particularly from persons belonging to other cultures. […] Until and unless the West becomes an object of study of non-Western social scientists to the same extent, and in the same manner, as the non-Western world has been studied by the Western students of those societies and cultures, not only no balance will be achieved in the comparative study of societies and cultures, but the puerility and perversity of much of what is being done shall not be exposed. […] The West of course is not prepared to welcome such a reciprocal enterprise to redress the balance, or even to admit its feasibility or desirability. […] It is being asserted that it is only those who are superior in power may study those who are inferior to them (*ibid*.: xiii, xv and xvi).

Daya Krishna speaks of the politics of ›comparative studies.‹ Political and economic power sets the tone of intellectual interactions between India and the West. It is an illustration of the Buberian »I-It« relationship, as against his dialogic »I-Thou« confluence. Daya Krishna pleads for reciprocity, and the classical ideal of ānṛśaṃsya,[7] interweaving non-violence with a sense of fairness and equality, comes to mind. Moreover he speaks of the one-sidedness of ›comparative studies,‹ that are not merely based on Western standards alone, but which make a clear-cut distinction between the Western subject and the non-Western object. His fury at the colonial overtones of »much of what is being done« is transparent. And finally, when speaking of sheer refusal to listen to any fundamental critique by an ›outsider,‹ Daya Krishna hints – or so I read him – at the siddhāntin-pūrvapakṣin equation. In classical Indian philosophy, the philosopher (or siddhāntin) is required to formulate his position in a dialogue (and often a

[6] D. Krishna, *The Art of the Conceptual: Explorations in a Conceptual Maze over Three Decades*, Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research and Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1989.

[7] On ānṛśaṃsya as notion and ideal, see Mukund Lath's paper: »The Concept of ānṛśaṃsya in the *Mahābhārata*,« in R. N. Dandekar (ed.), *The Mahābhārata Revisited*, Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 2011, pp. 113–119.

harsh debate) with the pūrvapakṣin, his ›philosophical opponent.‹ This is to say that the philosopher has to write his opponent's objections and to provide answers to them, to the best of his creativity. It is one thing to be acquainted with different positions and to refer to them, to agree or take issue, as every scholar does. It is altogether another thing to actually write the position of my opponent (to which I strongly oppose) to the best of my philosophical capacity. It is like playing chess against oneself. One has to play his best with both the black and the white pieces. One needs at least a quantum of imagination, to play the role of the pūrvapakṣin.

Martin Buber was not deaf to philosophies of the non-West. His interaction with the so-called ›East‹ echoes in his numerous writings. In his paper ›Martin Buber and Asia,‹ Maurice Friedman – Buber's biographer and the English translator of many of his writings – spotlights Buber's deep interest in Asian philosophies, especially Daoism and Zen Buddhism.[8]

According to Friedman,

> We cannot understand Buber's central work to which his thought led, and from which the rest came, namely, *Ich und Du*, *I and Thou*, unless we understand the Taoist concept of wu wei. If we look at Part Two of *I and Thou*, we discover that everything that Buber says about the free man who wills without arbitrariness is, in fact, the direct application in almost the same words of what he wrote in ›The Teaching of the Tao‹ about the perfected man of the Tao (1976: 419).[9]

India, however, is hardly referred to in Friedman's account on Buber and ›the East.‹ He does mention a meeting between Buber and Rabindranath Tagore (in 1926), and Buber's ambivalent approach to Advaita Vedānta (in »Daniel: Dialogues on Realization,« and later in *I and Thou*). This ambivalence is twofold: first, with regard to the primacy of a ›beyond‹ over the ›here and now‹ in Advaita philosophy as read

[8] In this respect, he mentions Buber's essays »The Teaching of the Tao« (1911), »Daniel: Dialogues on Realization« (1913), »The Spirit of Orient and Judaism« (1916), and »China and Us« (1928), and his later book *The Place of Hasidism in the History of Religions* (*The Origin and Meaning of Hasidism*, 1960). Friedman further highlights the Daoist influence on Buber's Magnum Opus *I and Thou* (1923). M. Buber, *I and Thou*, R. G. Smith (trans.), Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1937 [*Ich und Du, Leipzig:* Inselverlag, 1923] (http://www.bahaistudies.net/asma/iandthou.pdf; last accessed on 24 November 2015).

[9] M. Friedman, ›Martin Buber and Asia,‹ *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 1976, pp. 411–426.

by Buber; and second, with regard to the question of dualism (I-Thou) versus non-dualism (a-dvaita). I will come back to this question as we move on.

In the following paragraphs, I want to focus on Buber's dialogue with Indian philosophy, through two of his texts: *I and Thou*, apropos the question of (non-) dualism, and his letter to Gandhi, the famous Indian Mahatma, in which he argues against the universality of the principle of non-violence. I will start with the latter, namely with the letter.

Buber's letter to Gandhi, composed in 1939, is a response to an article published by the Mahatma in his journal *Harijan* toward the end of 1938, where he expresses his views with regard to the Jews in Germany under the Nazi regime, and speaks of the possibility of a »national home« for the Jewish people in Palestine-Israel. In a nutshell, Gandhi argues that the Jews in Europe should adopt his own satyagraha (truthfulness in action) approach, rooted in ahiṃsā (non-violence). And he rejects their yearning for a »national home,« stating that,

> like other peoples of the earth, [the Jews should] make that country their home where they are born and where they earn their livelihood. […] Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English or France to the French.[10]

My focus here is neither on Gandhi's controversial comments, nor on Buber's furious reaction (he refers to these comments as »tragic-comic«), but the universality of non-violence, which Buber challenges. Buber's letter reveals close acquaintance with Gandhian terminology. He freely uses terms such as ahiṃsā and satyagraha, and argues that even though non-violence is indeed preferable in most cases, there are still borderline cases, in which it is hardly effective. Such a case, he argues, is the Nazi regime. »Are you not aware,« Buber asks Gandhi sharply,

> of the burning of synagogues and scrolls of the Law? […] Do you know or do you not know, Mahatma, what a concentration camp is like and what goes on there? Do you know of the torments in the concentration camp, of

[10] Gandhi's article, and the letters sent to him in response by Buber and Magnes, from which I quote here, can be found in Arvind Sharma's book *Modern Hindu Thought: The Essential Texts* (Delhi: Oxford University Press 2002), as appendix to the chapter on M. K. Gandhi. The quote from Gandhi occurs on p. 287 in Sharma's anthology.

its methods of slow and quick slaughter? I cannot assume that you know of this (Sharma 2002: 291).

Drawing on the *Bhagavadgītā*, the classic yoga text, thus displaying again his acquaintance with Gandhi's world, Buber further writes:

The Mahabharata is an epos of warlike, disciplined force. In the greatest of its poems, the *Bhagavad Gita*, it is told how Arjuna decides on the battlefield that he will not commit the sin of killing his relations who are opposed to him, and he lets fall his bow and arrow. But the god reproaches him, saying that such action is unmanly and shameful; there is nothing better for a knight in arms than a just fight (*ibid*.: 301).

Buber evokes the same dilemma, raised in the *Mahābhārata* by Krishna, the »devious divinity« (I borrow the phrase from B. K. Matilal)[11] of the great epic: does the protection of dharma (›morality‹) necessitate, even if just in rare cases, instances of adharma (›immorality‹)? Does adharma in the service of dharma, or immorality for the protection of morality, or war for the restoration of peace, become ›legitimate?‹

It is worth noting here that not only Buber wrote to Gandhi in reply to his Jews/Palestine article, but also J. L. Magnes, another Israeli philosopher and humanist. Like Buber, Magnes challenges the universality of non-violence as a mahāvrata, »great vow,« which according to Patañjali of the *Yogasūtra* should be observed »irrespective of birth« (or ›caste‹), place, time, circumstances, and even the »call of duty« (namely sacrificing animals in the case of a Brahmin, or fighting a war in the case of a Kṣatriya).[12] According to Magnes, satyagraha, or ›truthfulness in action‹ rooted in non-violence, is not universal, because it does not suit everyone. »The Jews,« he explains, »are a people who exalt life, and they can hardly be said to disdain death. […] For this reason I have often wondered if we are fit subjects for Satyagraha« (*ibid*.: 305).

Acquainted with Gandhian terminology not less than Buber, Magnes suggests that the effectiveness of non-violence as a »weapon« relies on disdain for death. Gandhi, who treated plague patients, when there was no cure to this fatal disease, and whose numerous »fasts to death« demonstrate his uncompromised willingness »to go all the

[11] B. K. Matilal, »Kṛṣṇa – In Defense of a Devious Divinity,« in J. Ganeri (ed.), *Ethics and Epics: The Collected Essays of Bimal Krishna Matilal*, Vol. 2, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 91–108.

[12] YS 2.31: jāti-deśa-kāla-samaya-anavacchinnāḥ sārva-bhaumā mahā-vratam.

way« for the sake of his principles, is the paradigm of this »disdain.« This is the reason that non-violence served him so efficiently, at least according to Magnes. But whoever exalts life, as the Jews do, or are supposed to do in accordance with their tradition, »is not fit for satyagraha,« and needs to find, or create for himself, other ways of action. Magnes sees Gandhi as totally indifferent to life and death alike, striving to transcend both, whereas the Judaic tradition as he understands it does not allow such indifference. It sanctifies rāga (attachment) to life, and dveśa (aversion) to death, if I may use Pātañjala-yoga terms once again.

3 Ramchandra Gandhi In Dialogue With Buber

Gandhi never replied. The letters probably never reached their destination. But Buber did receive an answer, not in a letter for a letter, but in a book for a book. This is to say that a whole book was written in reply, or response, to Buber's *I and Thou* by Ramchandra Gandhi, the grandson of the Mahatma and a unique philosopher in his own right. Ramchandra Gandhi (RCG) ›answered‹ Buber in a collection of essays titled *I am Thou* (1984).[13] If Buber advocates the transformation from the third person to the second person, as far as »the other« is concerned, namely from »it« (consisting of »he« and »she«) to »thou« or »you«; then RCG suggests taking the next logical step, through the act of transforming the second person to a first person, thus replacing Buber's dualistic »I and Thou« with the advaitic formulation »I am thou.« Here I recall Ramana Maharshi's – RCG's inspiration in *I am Thou* – famous couplet which comprises of his advaitic, or non-dualistic teaching:

Aruṇācala Śiva, Aruṇācala Śiva, Aruṇācala Śiva, Śiva Aruṇācala |
Aruṇācala Śiva, Aruṇācala Śiva, Aruṇācala Śiva, Śiva Aruṇācala ||

The couplet is made of two identical stanzas, two that are one. Each stanza consists of two words, Aruṇācala and Śiva, two words with a single reference, god Śiva, or mount Aruṇācala as his ›physical‹ manifestation, or even Ramana Maharshi himself as a human avatar of a ›beyond‹ which the words Aruṇācala and Śiva point at. The couplet is

[13] R. Gandhi, *I am Thou: Meditations on the Truth of India*, Pune: Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publications, 1984.

›dualistic,‹ but is all about ›non-dualism.‹ In the same way, I read RCG as conceiving of the Buberian »I-Thou« dialogue as a step, or stage, toward the revealment of the common denominator, the ātman if you wish, which the two interlocutors share, and which makes them ›two,‹ but at another level ›one.‹ Love is the best illustration for advaita, Vivek Datta – thinker and poet from Binsar – once told me[14]. It has the power to transform and transcend the twoness of ›you‹ and ›I.‹ Another illustration is that of the saṅgam, or ›intersection‹ of three rivers/goddesses at Prayāg Raj, near Allahabad, namely Gaṅgā, Yamunā and Sarasvatī. The former two rivers are flowing with water. The latter is metaphoric, subtle, subterranean. I want to suggest that according to RCG, the dialogic saṅgam of Gaṅgā and Yamunā, ›you‹ and ›I,‹ is of the capacity to reveal Sarasvatī, not as a third party, but as the embodiment of advaita, the ›not-twoness‹ of Yamunā and Gaṅgā.

Martin Buber did not read RCG, but he does refer – in *I and Thou* – to classical Indian formulations on which RCG draws. »The doctrine of absorption,« Buber writes,

> demands, and promises refuge in pure Subject. But in lived reality there is not something thinking without something thought, rather is the thinking no less dependent on the thing thought than the latter on the former. A subject deprived of its object is deprived of its reality […] Concentration and outgoing [consciousness] are necessary, both in truth, at once the one and the other (Buber 1937: 89–90, 95).

According to him, the thinking subject »needs« objects and other subjects, as he claims his substantiality through them. Buber is hardly interested in the »pure subject,« such as the Upaniṣadic ātman, or the Sāṃkhya-Yoga notion of puruṣa. He is not interested in ›freedom as disengagement.‹ For him, introversive contemplation and world-facing intentionality are both »necessary,« »real,« complementing one another. This is to say that unlike RCG, who prefers oneness over twoness, and sees twoness as the »raw material« of alienation, racism and wars, Buber has something different to offer. He pleads for »free movement« between two modes of consciousness: on the one hand, introversion or »absorption,« an »I« which consists of – and is no other than the »you« – as in RCG, and on the other hand, a dialogic encounter, which reveals the twoness of »you« and »I«; twoness which creates the »lived reality«; twoness in a positive, creative sense.

[14] Personal communication, September 2005.

Buber does not turn his back to the metaphysical, but refuses to accept its monopoly, or primacy. Moreover, he is not interested in the metaphysical unless it has an impact on the »lived realty,« namely on the ethical realm, the realm in which »you« and »I« can meet.

So immense was Buber's interest in Indian philosophy, that in part three of *I and Thou*, he offers a short narration followed by an analysis of the famous *Chāndogya–Upaniṣad* story about Indra, Virocana and Prajāpati.[15] In a nutshell, it is a story about self-identity and freedom, investigating three states or stages of consciousness: waking consciousness, dreaming consciousness, and consciousness during suṣupti or dreamless-sleep. Thereafter, the story introduces a »fourth state« (caturtha/turīya), which transcends the other three, or as Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, ›the father‹ of contemporary Indian philosophy, puts it, »It is not only a stage among stages; it is the truth of the other stages« (Bhattacharyya 2008: 29).[16]

Buber believed that the story culminates in dreamless-sleep as the highest stage of consciousness. His analysis shows that he was not aware of the fourth stage. His critique of the Upaniṣadic message, or more broadly of the advaitic (non-dualistic) position, is that it »forgets« and neglects the world and the worldly (»earthly affairs« in R. G. Smith's translation), for the sake of the metaphysical »beyond.« Buber writes:

> What does it help my soul that it can be withdrawn from this world here into unity, when this world itself has of necessity no part in the unity? […] [T]he reality of the everyday hour on earth, with a streak of sun on a maple twig and the glimpse of the eternal Thou, is greater for us […] In so far as the [Upaniṣadic] doctrine contains guidance for absorption in true being, it leads not to lived reality but to ›annihilation,‹ where no consciousness reigns and whence no memory leads […] But we with holy care wish to foster the holy good of our reality […] Absorption wishes to preserve only the ›pure,‹ the real, the lasting, and to cast away everything else (Buber 1937: 87–89).

Buber confesses that unlike the Upaniṣadic author, he is interested in »the reality of the everyday hour on earth.« His outspoken yearning for »a streak of sun on a maple twig,« and his depiction of the »Upa-

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[15] *Chāndogya–Upaniṣad* (8.7.1–8.12.6). The story occurs in Patrick Olivelle (ed. and trans.), *The Early Upaniṣads*, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 278–287.

[16] K. C. Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Philosophy*, G. Bhattacharyya (ed.), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2008 [1958].

niṣadic doctrine« as leading »not to lived reality but to annihilation, where no consciousness reigns and whence no memory leads,« both refer to – and take issue with – dreamless-sleep as a mystic or spiritual ideal. »Death,« he adds, »can be replaced by its likeness of the deep-sleep, which is just as impenetrable« (*ibid*.: 90).

Death, or for that matter deathlike dreamless-sleep, does not suit Buber's vision. The Upaniṣadic message is not affirmative enough for him. He is in search not just of a »holy Nay,« as he (or R. G. Smith, his English translator) puts it, but of a »holy Yea,« in and for the world. But ›the fourth state of consciousness‹ – which Buber seems to not have been aware of as he wrote his ›commentary‹ of the Upaniṣad – consists of a measure of world-affirmation. Not exactly with the ethical edge that Buber pleads for, but nevertheless with a sense of »return« from the »withdrawal« conveyed by the inner-journey from waking to dreamless-sleep.[17]

4 From Buber to Daya Krishna

From Buber, I want to move on to Daya Krishna (1924–2007), one of the most creative philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century. Dialogue, in theory and practice alike, is a central feature of his philosophy.

In the following paragraphs, I will touch on merely one angle of Daya Krishna's vast writings on and in dialogue, relating to one of his last projects. This philosophical project, elaborated in a series of articles, his ›knowledge articles,‹[18] composed between 2004 and 2007, aims at ›deconstructing‹ the concept of knowledge, toward the formulation of what he refers to as »knowledge without certainty.« The transition from Buber to Daya Krishna (henceforth DK), as the fol-

[17] On the affirmative aspects of »the fourth state of consciousness,« see my paper ›Ayam aham asmīti: Self-consciousness and Identity in the Eighth Chapter of the *Chāndogya–Upaniṣad* vs. Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya,‹ *Journal of Indian Philosophy,* Vol. 36, No. 2, 2007, pp. 319–333.

[18] ›Knowledge: Whose Is It, What Is It, and Why Has It to Be True?‹ *Indian Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol. 32, No. 3, 2005, pp. 179–187; ›Definition, Deception and the Enterprise of Knowledge,‹ *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research,* Vol. 22, No. 1, 2005, pp. 75–89; ›Chance, Probability, Indeterminacy and Knowledge,‹ *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research,* Vol. 24, No. 2, 2007, pp. 91–110; ›Knowledge, Predictability and Truth‹ (2007; unpublished).

lowing lines will show, is a natural one. Like Buber, DK cherishes the metaphysical if and only if it has substantial impact on the vyavahāra, on »earthly affairs,« as Buber-Smith puts it. And like Buber, DK is more interested in the »I-You« interaction, than in the Upaniṣadic-Advaitic all pervasive (ātmanic) »I« which literally ›devours‹ the »You.« I emphasize the proximity between the two, but like in every other comparison, there is also a difference.

To put it very directly, Buber is ›religious,‹ DK ›secular‹ (the quote marks on both words are essential); Buber is tradition-based, whereas DK is free of (or freed himself from) any religious or theological background, adhering merely to the kalpanā-pramāṇa, to imagination, or conceptual imagination as he used to put it, as means and method to transgress the borderlines of the »I,« and to establish a dialogue, or in fact dialogues in the plural, which for him are a necessary condition for the occurrence of knowledge; and DK, like every other philosopher, is deeply interested in knowledge. But the question is whether Buber's commitment to the tradition, and more specifically to the Jewish tradition, compared with DK's uncommitted situation, is necessarily a matter of bondage, and moreover what is the relation in a phrase such as »religious philosopher,« or »Jewish philosopher« (both phrases are used by Hilary Putnam, and many others, with reference to Buber)[19], between these two components, or two hats. The same, of course, can be asked about Śaṅkara, for instance, in the Indian tradition. Is the ambivalence (or tension, as Putnam, a Jewish philosopher himself, puts it and writes about in the first person) between philosophy and religion (keeping in mind that the borderline between the two is often blurred) contributive and enriching, or paralyzing, philosophy-wise, and at the other end of the scale, religion-wise? Is religion a »conversation stopper,« as Richard Rorty provocatively argues,[20] dialogue included? Rorty, we will discover as we move on, is not an eager advocate for philosophy either. For him, the two variables of the equation »religious philosopher« are flawed and outdated.

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[19] H. Putnam, *Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life: Rosenzweig, Buber, Levinas, Wittgenstein*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008.

[20] R. Rorty, ›Religion as Conversation-stopper,‹ *Common Knowledge*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1994, pp. 1–6; I have taken the phrase out of its immediate context. In his paper, Rorty speaks of the politization of religion, of hypocrisy and fake righteousness, of private life versus public policy.

5 Knowledge without Certainty

DK ›felt‹ that old definitions of knowledge, and primarily the famous »justified true belief,« have become axioms, intended to »satisfy« or »pacify« psychological insecurity and craving for stability and endurance, rather than questionable »tools,« with which one »measures,« or »creates« the so-called »reality.« In place of these old definitions, DK »plays,« or begins »to play,« with a new concept, the concept of »knowledge without certainty« (KWC).

How are we to even start thinking about a concept of knowledge which embraces, rather than rejects uncertainty, ambiguity, probability, even chance? Such a concept of knowledge stands in sheer contrast to everything which we have become used to thinking about knowledge. DK's concept of KWC is rooted in dialogue.

»Knowledge,« he writes,

> Does not belong to anybody, even though one says, ›I know‹ […] knowledge is collective, cumulative affair of humankind, and if it had to be regarded as ›belonging‹ to anybody, it would be to the humankind as such, and not to this or that ›I.‹ But humankind includes not only those who lived in the past, but those who will live in the future also. […] knowledge is an ongoing human enterprise, a collective puruṣārtha of humankind. […] A puruṣārtha is a matter of seeking, perennial seeking, as perennial as time itself, and hence not something that can be possessed, or meant to be possessed (Krishna 2005: 185).

The dialogue depicted here is multilayered. First, knowledge is a collective puruṣārtha, or ›human seeking,‹ not ›personal‹ or ›private‹ in any way. As such, it necessitates a dialogue between the ›members‹ of »the interrelated and interacting community, both visible and invisible,« as DK puts it (Krishna 2007: 9). Second, as a »seeking,« KWC is an open-ended, tentative, continuous, and dynamic process. In this respect, it is based on a »trikāla-dialogue«: a dialogue with the past, with history, with one's intellectual heritage; a dialogue here and now, with the manifold »you«; and a dialogue with the future as the ultimate unknown. DK's KWC is the ›antonym‹ of Śaṅkara's brahmavidyā, ›knowledge‹ which is all about certainty. For the famous (approximately) eighth century Advaita philosopher, »real knowledge« (as against avidyā, which amounts to the shadows of the Platonic cave) pertains solely to the Brahman, an »eternal beyond« which is supposed to be the crux of »me,« i.e. selfhood without I-ness, or ātman surpassing asmadpratyaya. Śaṅkara refers to brahmavidyā as

trikālābādhita, »unrefuted and irrefutable in any of the three times,« namely past, present and future. For him, »knowledge« (and his ›grand project‹ is about the ›knowledgification‹ of the advaitic, non-dual, metaphysic experience) is unchangeable by definition. The future, absolutely irrelevant for Śaṅkara's brahmavidyā, transcending time and temporality, is present in DK's KWC as inherent uncertainty. »What is known,« he writes, »is not only incomplete, but full of inaccuracies, inadequacies and errors, about which one knows nothing, except that they must be there, if the enterprise of knowledge has to go on, as it must« (Krishna 2005: 88).

The future will »fill the gaps« of knowledge in its present phase, and will have its own new, unseen at present »gaps,« to be again filled in the future's future, and so on. The future will not bring about the certainty which DK's concept of knowledge sobered up from. It is knowledge aware of its limitations and unavoidable lacunas. Contrary to Śaṅkara's unchangeable brahmavidyā, DK's KWC anticipates and invites change.

In a paraphrase on Leibniz's famous maxim, KWC is »pregnant with the future.« On knowledge as allegedly »final« and »conclusive,« DK writes sarcastically: »If knowledge and truth were what they are said to be [final, indubitable], the game of knowledge would have ended long ago« (Krishna 2007: 10).

6 The End of Philosophy?

Some indeed believe that ›the game is over.‹ I am not talking of Śaṅkara, or those who accept the authority of ›revelation‹ in the monotheistic traditions. For them, it is no ›game.‹ For them, the human person can only strive, hope, and pray to be »granted entry« to »knowledge that is already there, given in all its finality and completion once and for all, and that nothing could be added to it in principle ever after« (*ibid.*: 12).

I am talking of those, who believe, as Whitehead did, that: »the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato« (Whitehead 1979: 39).[21]

[21] A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, New York: Free Press, 1979 [1929].

Whitehead's statement is famous, but the exact quote is interesting. He speaks of »the European philosophical tradition.« Is it an acknowledgement of other philosophical traditions?

A different ›the game is over‹ position is taken by those who speak of »the end of philosophy.« Take for example Richard Rorty. »I hope,« he writes,

> that the twenty-first century may complete a process which began in the nineteenth – the gradual replacement of philosophy by art and concrete, albeit utopian, politics. The creation of imaginary significations which enable us to tell each other new stories about who we are, why we are good, and how we can become better, has gradually become, between Kant's time and ours, the province of narrative rather than theory. Theories about the nature of Humanity have been gradually displaced by narratives about how we, we Europeans, came to be what we are, of how we live now, and how we might some day live. Already in Hegel's partial historicization of philosophy we see the beginnings of a turn from theorizing to story-telling (Rorty 1989: 26).[22]

Philosophy, in Rorty's depiction, sounds »outdated.« It played a significant historical role, and brought »us« (»we Europeans,« he writes) to where we are today, »mature,« »sober,« »post-philosophical« as he puts it. »Philosophy in the Kantian sense,« Rorty further writes,

> would end if people no longer took seriously the idea that they had a True Self, a Real Human Nature, deep within them. It would end when they ceased to think of themselves as ›born free,‹ and instead saw freedom as simply a relatively recent, glorious, European invention – and none the worse for having been invented rather than discovered. […] In such a post-philosophical period, we might not look back on Plato as ›the greatest philosopher of all‹ […] We might view him instead as one of the first great writers of fiction, a man who helped open up the potentialities of dramatic narrative as well as those of irony. […] What is important about the canon of great philosophers is neither the questions these men asked, nor the ›results‹ they offered, but simply their assistance in keeping culture from freezing over by proposing novel vocabularies, novel perspectives, novel recontextualizations of familiar material (*ibid*.: 26–27, 29).

There is something playful, even seductive, in Rorty's ›game over‹ articulation: Plato as a fiction-writer, metaphysics as an expired product in the supermarket of ideas, and »great philosophers« as contri-

[22] R. Rorty, ›Comments on Castoriadis's *The End of Philosophy?*‹ *Salmagundi*, Vol. 82/83, 1989, pp. 24–30.

buting vocabularies and recontextualizations, the word recontextualization itself demonstrating what a philosophical »vocabulary« is all about. What are we left with, then? »We would view the novel,« Rorty says, »rather than the treatise as the genre in which the European intellect comes to fruition« (*ibid.*: 27).

Implied is cultural relativism. The »European intellect« takes us back to the aforementioned »we Europeans.« With regard to his preference of the novel over the (philosophical) treatise, Rorty draws on Milan Kundera, who promises in his essay »The Novel and Europe« (later republished as »The Depreciated Legacy of Cervantes«) that, »the precious essence of the European spirit is being held safe as in a treasure chest inside the history of the novel, the wisdom of the novel« (as quoted by Rorty, *ibid.*).

But in the very same essay, Rorty omits to note, Kundera further writes: »To what am I attached, then? To god? Country? The people? The individual? My answer is as ridiculous as it is sincere. I am attached to nothing but the depreciated legacy of Cervantes.«[23]

7 »To Comprehend the World as a Question«

Kundera refuses to take refuge in »usual suspects« such as »god« or »the people.« He cannot even accept the individual as his Punctum Archimedis. Such a move will strip the individual of his individuality. As his »last resort,« Kundera opts for Cervantes. In an interview appended to *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*, he explains this »ridiculous« choice:

> When Don Quixote went out into the world, that world turned into a mystery before his eyes. That is the legacy of the first European novel to the entire subsequent history of the novel. The novel teaches us to comprehend the world as a question. There is wisdom and tolerance in that attitude (Kundera 1983: 237).[24]

Kundera sees in Cervantes a sense of open-endedness, which Richard Rorty (with reference to Kundera) depicts as »an ongoing suspenseful

[23] M. Kundera, »The Depreciated Legacy of Cervantes,« 1984 (http://lazenby.tumblr.com/post/2595964796/the-depreciated-legacy-of-cervantes; last accessed on 24 November 2015).

[24] M. Kundera, *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*, M. H. Heim (transl.), Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983.

adventure in which we are participating« (Rorty 1991: 67),[25] as against what he refers to as »structure« (the antonym of »process«), creating the false impression of »finality« and »objectivity.«

Kundera takes me back to Daya Krishna (DK). There is something Don Quixotic in DK's philosophic approach. First in the sense that he constantly – paper after paper and book after book – »tilts at windmills,« namely questions, challenges and takes issue with conventional readings and conceptions, especially in Indian philosophy, with what he himself used to refer to as »myths.« The examples are numerous. DK was a myth-breaker (Rorty thought that philosophers are myth-makers). Take for instance DK's paper titled ›The Shock-Proof, Evidence-Proof, Argument-Proof World of Sāmpradāyika Scholarship in Indian Philosophy.‹[26] The title challenges the conventional reading of Indian philosophy through what DK refers to as »sāmpradāyika scholarship,« namely thinking rigidly in terms of »philosophical schools.« »The ghost of the schools,« DK writes,

> seems to overpower us so much that we forget the ›problem,‹ and talk only of what Nyāya said, or the Sāṃkhya, or the Buddhist, or the Advaitin. It is reporting of the worst kind. It may show knowledge of the text, but not that one has philosophically thought about it.[27]

DK refers to what usually goes under the name of »philosophy« as »reporting.« The antonym of »reporting,« in his formulation, is »thinking.« DK is similarly impatient about the common reading of Indian philosophy as a »highway« leading from duḥkha (»suffering«) to mokṣa (»release from suffering,« »freedom«). In this respect he writes (in a review article on his friend K. Satchidananda Murty's book *The Realm of Between*)[28]:

> [T]he dazzling brilliance of the book hides a deep yawning deficiency, which to my mind, emanates from the brilliance itself and is its darker shadow […] The structure of the book shows an uncritical acceptance of the usual moves made in the philosophy of religion, which have been accepted so often that

[25] R. Rorty, »Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens,« in R. Rorty, *Essays in Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 pp. 66–82.

[26] D. Krishna, ›The Shock-Proof, Evidence-Proof, Argument-Proof World of Sāṃpradāyika Scholarship in Indian Philosophy,‹ *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2000, pp. 143–159.

[27] I quote from a letter, written by DK to a close friend on January 4th. 2005.

[28] K. S. Murty, *The Realm of Between*, Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1973.

they have began to be taken as axiomatic truths by everyone who thinks or writes on the subject. Murty opens his book by talking of suffering (what else did you expect?) and then, as I am sure you will expect, there is salvation. […] What is more disturbing is Murty's unquestioning acceptance of the equation of suffering with the transience of phenomena. […] Murty's discussion of suffering and salvation is limited to traditional formulations. […] He forgets, as so many others, that if transience, temporality and cessation produce a feeling of terror and meaninglessness in many, so may a state where there is immortality implying no change whatsoever. Even the Lord himself is supposed to have been ›tired‹ of his ›lonely‹ state and is supposed to have said, ›I am one, let me be many‹ (eko'haṃ, bahu syām) (Krishna 1995: 169–171, 175).[29]

DK is not merely »tired« of the traditional duḥkha/mokṣa binary, which has become »axiomatic,« but moreover pleads for a critical analysis of the concepts of »suffering« and »salvation.« Such an analysis is the crux of his paper. Also conveyed here is DK's constant appeal for newness and creativity (instead of »reporting,« repeating, or writing footnotes to Plato, or to the Upaniṣads, or to Śaṅkara) in philosophical thinking[30]. He sees the abiding to old formulations, whether in Murty's work discussed here, or elsewhere (DK's biting paper with the biting title »Rasa: The Bane of Indian Aesthetics« comes to mind)[31], as nothing less than a »dark shadow.«

DK was never exhausted of »fighting« (questioning, refuting) the conventional picture of Indian philosophy. »The picture of Indian philosophy,« he says,

that has been presented by Radhakrishnan, Hiriyana and others […] is not the story of Indian philosophy. We have been fed on the Western presentation of Indian philosophy, which hardly captures the spirit and history of Indian philosophy. […] If I were not to know Indian philosophy myself, I would say that [their presentation] is wonderful, that it presents it clearly,

[29] D. Krishna, »The Realms of Between: Some Reflections on Murty's *The Realm of Between*,« in *The Philosophy of K. Satchidananda Murty*, S. Bhattacharyya and A. Vohra (eds.), Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1995, pp. 169–176; DK quotes from *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* (6.2.3).

[30] On newness and creativity in philosophical thinking apropos Daya Krishna see A. Chakrabarti's paper »New Stuff: On the Very Idea of Creativity in Philosophical Thinking,« in N. Bhushan et al., *Contrary Thinking: Selected Essays of Daya Krishna*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 3–12; and my paper ›Philosophical Miscellanea: Excerpts from an Ongoing Dialogue with Daya Krishna,‹ *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 63, No. 4, 2013, pp. 491–512.

[31] D. Krishna, ›Rasa – The Bane of Indian Aesthetics,‹ *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2004, pp. 119–135.

with great insight and understanding. Now that I know a little Indian philosophy, I say that they are not concerned with the problems that Indian philosophers were concerned with.[32]

DK suggests that the prevalent picture of Indian philosophy is anachronistic, and is to a large extent »Western« in nature. In this respect, the main ›windmill‹ that Don Daya fights against is the equation of Indian philosophy with mokṣa, which he sees a sign of »exotification,« or »spiritualization,« extraordinarily adopted, or internalized by Indian scholars, even of the stature of Radhakrishnan and Hiriyana. The problem with the »myth« about Indian philosophy as mokṣa-centered is that it is projected as monolithic, and moreover as »instrumental« and harnessed for the sake of a »trans-philosophical end,« as DK puts it, with religious overtones. His pertinacious effort to counter-project Indian philosophy as argumentative and manifold, as much as its Western sister, and sheer refusal to privilege the metaphysic horizon of mokṣa, ›earned‹ him an article by Karl Potter, titled »Are all Indian philosophers Indian philosophers?.« Potter writes passionately that,

Daya doesn't give a fig for mokṣa. He would like Indian philosophy not to be tied to mokṣa, and he is irritated that these darśana-wallahs have presumed to take over the mantle of philosophy which, he thinks, belongs to those who do the kinds of things he and other professional philosophers do. So, since he feels strongly that Indian philosophy ought not to be confined to mokṣa-seeking inquiries, he argues that it isn't. […] ›American philosophy‹ meaning pragmatism, transcendentalism and other peculiarly American contributions is different from ›American philosophy‹ meaning anything philosophical carried out by an American. I am an American philosopher, but probably not an American philosopher! Can't Daya be happy being an Indian philosopher who is not an Indian philosopher? (Potter 1985: 147)[33]

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[32] Personal communication with Jay Garfield and Nalini Bhushan, as quoted in the introduction of their anthology *Indian Philosophy in English: From Renaissance to Independence*, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. xiii-xiv); also see D. Krishna's papers: »A Plea For a New History of Philosophy in India,« in his *New Perspectives in Indian Philosophy*, Delhi and Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 2001, pp. 1–9; »Emerging New Approaches in the Study of Classical Indian Philosophy,« in G. Floistad (ed.), *Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey*, Vol. 7, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993, pp. 69–72; and ›Towards a Field Theory of Indian Philosophy: Suggestions for a New Way of Looking at Indian Philosophy,‹ *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1998, pp. 81–87.

[33] K. Potter, ›Are All Indian Philosophers Indian Philosophers?‹ *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1985, pp. 145–149.

Potter insists on the mokṣa-centeredness of Indian philosophy, and implies that everyone uninterested in mokṣa is not an »Indian philosopher.« DK is not uninterested in the concept of freedom, mokṣa included. As with other concepts, DK plays with the concept at hand, disconnecting and reconnecting it to other concepts near and far, and stripping its traditional formulations of any authority. He neither accepts mokṣa as a parama-puruṣārtha, i. e. as the highest »human end,« nor perceives his philosophical work as a parikramā around mokṣa as a center of (philosophical?) devotion, or for that matter, around any other singular concept or agenda. He declares (in »The Shock-Proof« article) that his only loyalty is to niḥsaṅga-buddhi, »disloyal« or »unattached« consciousness, analogous – he explains – to the *Bhagavadgītā*'s niṣkāma-karma, an action which is not intended to fulfill any end besides, or beyond, the action itself.

But DK, for me, is a ›philosophical avatar‹ of Don Quixote, not merely because of his aptitude for tilting at »shock-proof« windmills, but also, in fact primarily, owing to the fact that like Cervantes' antihero, in Kundera's interpretation, he »comprehend[s] the world as a question.« Take for instance his paper »The Undeciphered Text: Anomalies, Problems and paradoxes in the *Yogasūtra*.«[34] The title says it all. So much has been written on the *Yogasūtra*, traditionally as also contemporarily, and yet for DK it is an »undeciphered text.« In this respect, he argues that, »One cannot understand any work, unless one ceases to see it as a finished product« (Krishna 1999: 20).[35]

DK further explains his »working method,« which »opens the text,« any text:

> I understand a text better when I ask myself what does the author try to do. I make the text my own and then see which questions arise in my mind, and whether the author's thoughts moved in the same way as mine or not. Thus I get into his work, into his thought process, taking it up and carrying it in a direction it was not taken before (*ibid.*: 21).

In this paragraph, newness, creativity and dialogue interconnect. It is a dialogue with the text, including »the hidden text,« namely think-

[34] D. Krishna, »The Undeciphered Text: Anomalies, Problems and Paradoxes in the *Yogasūtra*,« in his *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective*, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 2006, pp. 204–223 [Enlarged and revised edition].

[35] D. Krishna, ›Thinking Creatively about the Creative Act,‹ *Punjab University Research Bulletin*, Vol. 30, Nos. 1–2, 1999, pp. 18–26.

ing-directions which the author has not pursued, and which are waiting to be explored.

I want to take a few steps back, to Rorty. For him, we saw, »what is important about the canon of great philosophers,« is neither the questions they raised, nor the answers offered by them, but their ›assistance in keeping culture from freezing.‹ For DK, ›what is important‹ in the work of everyone engaged in philosophy, are the questions, or the act (and art) of asking questions. For him, questions are the fuel of philosophy. Answers are merely tentative, but they too are important in the sense that they give birth to new questions. »Philosophy, DK had decided early on in his career,« Arindam Chakrabarti suggests,

> is an act of desire, raising of questions, discovery of problems, getting into and out of confusions. So, to be creative in philosophical thinking is to come up with new desires, hitherto un-raised problems, to detect and disentangle confusions never suspected before (Chakrabarti 2011: 5).

DK was well-aware of the political overtones of questioning. »The arrogance of knowledge,« he writes,

> is as much an arrogance as the arrogance of power, and both lead to essential asymmetries which, however real, militate against innovation and creativity. A questioning attitude may prick the pretentions of both, as neither is as certain or secure as it usually proclaims itself to be (Krishna 1988: 48).[36]

Here he speaks of »a questioning approach« as an effective ahiṃsāic »weapon« against the arrogance of power and knowledge, or even knowledge as power. DK's deep belief in the transformative power of philosophy, of thinking, of the logos is thus revealed, as well as the socio-political ṛṇa – »debt,« or »responsibility« – that the intellectual community, according to him, has to pay, or to undertake. Like Rorty, DK is hardly taken by nostalgia. But unlike his American contemporary, who speaks of »the end of philosophy,« DK believes that philosophy has an important role to play in the »post-everything« world in which we live. In this respect, knowledge – as concept, ideal, even »commodity« or »manufactured product« – has to be perceived and worked with in a »new« way. Otherwise, DK fears, philosophy will be left »far behind« science and technology which »move forward« in

[36] D. Krishna, ›Thinking vs. Thought: Strategies for Conceptual Creativity,‹ *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1988, pp. 47–57.

giant steps, and will become »irrelevant,« or come to what Rorty calls its »end« (in the terminatory, not purposeful sense of the word). »Today,« he writes to a close friend (in a letter dated July 8th 2005),

> we have reached a position which I would like to call ›postmodern modernity.‹ Philosophy functions as the ›cognitive conscience‹ of all the realms of ›knowing,‹ ›feeling‹ and ›action,‹ and has to come to terms with it. The challenge which we have to address ourselves to, if we are to relate ourselves to contemporary concerns, is how to deal with this situation. To put the same thing differently, philosophy as it has developed up till now has become irrelevant to the emerging situation where ›engineered transformation‹ of all reality, including man himself, life in general, along with the exploration in space are questioning everything. The ›earth-centricity‹ and ›bio-centricity‹ of man has determined his thinking. In the realm of nuclear physics, new forms of matter are being created, with properties which question the old notions of matter, space, time and causality. In the field of economics, and to some extent of politics, the situation is even more alarming. The basic parameters on which the science of economics and sociology were based are in jeopardy, as the notions of land, labour, capital and organization have gone a sea-change as they are not there as something ›given,‹ or as a constraint, but instead as something which can be overcome by human ingenuity and effort. This is the challenge to philosophers, as I see it. Whether we can come to terms with it in any meaningful way is difficult to say, but we must become aware of it and try to deal with it so that our thinking may be relevant to the incoming generation which increasingly finds all past knowledge irrelevant to their ›living‹ concerns.

DK's concern was not about philosophy as a ›professional guild,‹ or an academic discipline among other disciplines. A world without conceptual analytic reflection was for him »flat« and »dull.« His concern was about the future of humanity, nothing less. He was interested in knowledge in the age of robotics. In this respect he was not afraid of thinking, for instance, of knowledge without body, senses, and even consciousness, if »machines« are supposed »to know« (Krishna 2005: 181). Elsewhere, DK intimates that, »There is just no such thing as ›knowledge‹ but only ›knowledge‹ in the plural« (Krishna 2007: 10).

Despite the abyss between them on the role and value of philosophy and philosophizing, DK – like Rorty – did not believe in »ultimate truths,« and certainly not in an »Ultimate Truth.« He also did not believe – again like Rorty – in »philosophical systems,« or »Omnibuses« (I draw on Kierkegaard's sarcastic remark at the end of his preface to *Fear and Trembling*). The Indian scholar and cultural historian Mukund Lath explains that DK was a »refutation specialist,« or

as he puts it in Hindi, »vo khaṇḍan kiya«[37]. I always imagine DK as a ›sādhu,‹ wandering and wondering between systems and texts. He used to arrive (in a system, or a text), leave the darśana-wallahs (the articulation is Potter's, but for me, darśana as »system« applies as much to Śaṅkara's corpus as to Kant's) a pile of questions for consideration, and move on, to the next system, text, discipline.

I opened with Kundera's imagined dialogue between an eighteenth-century chevalier and Vincent, a twentieth century »philosopher in residence« of a trendy Parisian café, a dialogue which fails, owing to the latter's »stubborn urge to speak« which is also an »implacable uninterest in listening.« The problem is that every dialogue, not just imagined dialogues across eras, is ›infected‹ by the same virus, the virus of ›I-centricity.‹ It is like driving down a two-way street, without noticing that your ›brights‹ are on. It happens all the time. The question is what would make me ›dim the lights,‹ or overcome the ›stubborn urge‹ to speak at the expense of listening to the other. DK writes:

> Strangely, the ›you‹ to whom ›I‹ talk, talks of himself or herself as ›I,‹ and addresses me as ›you.‹ It is this that makes me realize that it is as much an ›I‹ as I think myself to be (Krishna 2005: 181).

I quoted this paragraph because of the word »strangely.« The acknowledgement of the other, which may suddenly occur, or alas, never happen, makes one realize that »strangely,« one is not the only »subject« on the road. In a famous argument, in his famous essay »The Subject as Freedom«[38], Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya (KCB) suggests that since I never perceive my body fully (»one's body is only half-perceived,« he says) in a direct manner – for example, I never saw my back or my face (a mirror is indirect) – I count on the perception of other people (or of »another observing body,« as KCB puts it). The fact that you see my back, which I do not, validates – so to say – my »full« existence. My body is non-solipsistic, in the sense

[37] Personal communication, July 2015.

[38] Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, »The Subject as Freedom,« in his *Search for the Absolute in Neo-Vedānta*, G. B. Burch (ed.), Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, pp. 87–174; I draw here on Chapters 3 and 4 of KCB's essay, »Bodily Subjectivity« and »Bodily Subjectivity (cont.).« Also see A. Chakrabarti's paper ›Indian Philosophy of the Body and the Senses,‹ *Bulletin of the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture*, 2010, pp. 66–73, in which he offers his own bhāṣya to KCB's argument.

that I depend on the other's gaze. Therefore, to be (in) a body is to imply the existence of the other. This is to say that if Descartes, for example, needed god to save one from the »prison-house« of »I-amness,« which does not entail a »you-areness«; then KCB does not need god. He can do well with you, the YOU who are implied by my own embodied perception. In KCB's move, you make me »complete.« For DK, you are not enough. »Much has been said,« he writes,

> about the dialogical interchange between the ›I‹ and the ›You,‹ or the ›Thou,‹ or the other potential ›I,‹ to whom one is a ›You‹ or ›Thou‹; but little, very little, about what the ›he‹ or the ›she‹ does to a ›conversation‹ or ›discussion‹ that occurs all the time. The interaction and the interplay become more complex. […] The problem created by the increase in number of the ›interacting‹ variables is well known in physics, but here the ›interaction‹ is between beings who are ›trying‹ to ›think‹ in the context of what someone else has ›thought‹ and ›said.‹ Surprise is the heart of this interaction, surprise at the ›unthought-of‹ possibility that suggests ›new‹ directions of thought, when one felt one was ›stuck‹ with the ›old‹ alternatives (Krishna 2007: 5).

DK is interested in a multi-vocal interaction. The analogy to the world of physics in interesting, as well as his emphasis on »surprise,« interconnected with the unthought-of possibilities that such an interaction is of the capacity of opening.

For DK, you, and even the manifold you, does not make me »complete.« DK is a master of the incomplete. Knowledge, we saw above, is according to him a matter of perennial seeking. This seeking takes place through thinking, which DK differentiates from »thought.« The latter is just a tentative »product« of thinking as a collective process; a process that is both anādi and ananta, beginning-less and endless. But dialogue, or »conversation, dialogue, debate and discussion,« as DK unpacks the interaction-toolbox, »are everywhere; not just in knowledge, but in all that man does or seeks, as in these man finds and feels and discovers what ›being human‹ is« (*ibid.*: 34).

For Daya Krishna, man is a dialogical animal.

–Daniel Raveh, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel

Siddhis and Psi Research: An Interdisciplinary Analysis*

Abstract
Psi experiences, or siddhis, are one among many varieties of human experiences reported from ancient times across cultural and geographical boundaries. The data and theories from psi research inform philosophical debates on the nature of time, causality, information and their implications for the free-will–determinism debate. In this article we present an overview of theoretical approaches of psi research, and the varieties of siddhis mentioned in classical Indian literature. Further, we examine siddhis in relation to the findings from contemporary psi research, with particular reference to informational psi, along the dimensions of training, personality, and meditation.

Keywords
Siddhis, Psi research, Extrasensory Perception.

> »If scientific analysis were conclusively to demonstrate certain claims in Buddhism to be false, then we must accept the findings of science and abandon those claims.«
> Dalai Lama XIV, *The Universe in a Single Atom: The Convergence of Science and Spirituality*

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* Edward F. Kelly served as one of the blind referees for Sonali Bhatt Marwaha's article ›Siddhis and Psi Research.‹ Since Kelly's report in our view highlighted issues which we believe could be of interest to our readers, but which, however, exceeded the scope of Marwaha's article, we, the editors, decided to reveal Marwaha's and Kelly's identities to one another and to request from Kelly a brief discussion of his own views on psi research. We are pleased that both Sonali Bhatt Marwaha and Edward Kelly agreed to this intellectual exchange seeing as we believe that it advances the current debate. We are particularly grateful to Marwaha in this regard since this format did not allow her the opportunity to respond to Kelly's statement.

1 Introduction

Since the 1930s, Indian philosophy began its transformation into an Indian psychology. Indian psychology is derived from classical Indian thought that offers fruitful psychological models and theories that hold pan human interest. »Indian psychology« is the name used by those who pioneered in the area of applying classical Indian thought to contemporary psychology. Numerous books have been published that seek to expand on a psychology based in Indian philosophical systems. Examples include, Jadunath Sinha's three volumes titled *Indian Psychology* (1933/1958), Rhys Davids' *The Birth of Indian Psychology and Its Development in Buddhism* (1936), Raghunath Safaya's *Indian Psychology* (1976), B. Kuppuswamy's *Elements of Ancient Indian Psychology* (1985) (Rao 2008: 3).[1] Recent publications include *Towards a Spiritual Psychology* (Rao, and Marwaha 2005)[2], *Handbook of Indian Psychology* (Rao, Paranjpe, and Dalal 2008), and *Foundations of Indian Psychology* (Cornelissen, Misra, and Varma 2011)[3].

According to Rao (2008: 7), »Indian psychology has consciousness as its core concept. Centrality of consciousness is its defining characteristic. Consciousness is considered to be a primary principle irreducible to brain states. The brain does not generate consciousness; it simply reflects consciousness and often by filtering, limiting and embellishing it.« While this emphasizes only dualist and idealist views, the materialist view in the Indian tradition has largely been ignored. The materialist schools in Indian philosophy include early Tantra, pre-classical Sāṃkhya, Lokāyatā/Cārvāka schools, and contributions by some Buddhist and Jaina scholars. Modern Indian philosophers include Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, M. N. Roy, J. Bandopadhyaya, S. Joshi, K. K. Mital, S. N. Prasad, Ramakrishna Bhattacharya and P. P. Gokhale. In Chattopadhyaya's (1973: 335)[4] analysis, »the

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[1] K. R. Rao, »Prologue: Introducing Indian Psychology,« in K. R. Rao, A. C. Paranjpe, and A. K. Dalal (eds.), *Handbook of Indian Psychology*, New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2008, pp. 1–18.

[2] K. R. Rao, and S. B. Marwaha, *Towards a Spiritual Psychology: Essays in Indian Psychology*, New Delhi: Samvad India Foundation, 2005.

[3] M. Cornelissen, G. Misra, and S. Varma, *Foundations of Indian Psychology*, Delhi: Pearson, 2011.

[4] D. Chattopadhyaya, *Lokāyatā: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism*, Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1973.

search for the inner truth within the body led the [early] Tantrikas not to any subtle non-physical spiritual principle but rather to the human nervous system in its essentially physical aspect.« An overview of the roots of Indian materialism can be found in Marwaha (2013)[5].

Supporting the transition of Indian philosophy to Indian psychology is experimental philosophy, which paves the way for putting to test philosophical constructs, whether ancient or modern. Experimental philosophy is an interdisciplinary field that applies the methods of psychological science to examine traditional philosophical problems (Lombrozo, Knobe, and Nichols 2014: 1)[6].

As may often be the case, questions in one field may have been partially addressed in another field, and the next step forward requires synergy between the disciplines. Examining siddhis – psi in the Western tradition – is a case in point. Psi research includes informational psi (extrasensory perception/anomalous cognition), mind-matter interaction (psychokinesis), and survival research (reincarnation, near-death experiences, out-of-body experiences, and mediumship research). With a vast body of experimental literature, much is known today about psi even though much remains to be known.

In this article we bring the reader up-to-date with the current theoretical advances in psi research, and aim to bridge the classical Indian understanding of siddhis with data from experimental psi research, with specific reference to informational psi. While a variety of siddhis are mentioned in different philosophical/theoretical systems, they generally fall within the same categories as those mentioned in the *Yoga Sūtras* (YS), thus, we use the YS as our point of reference[7].

In the following we present a brief overview of psi in Indian thought, wherein we discuss (a) psi in Tantra, (b) psi in Buddhist and Jain thought, and (c) The *Yoga Sūtras* (Section 2). This is followed by, in Section 3, an overview of concepts in contemporary psi research, which includes (a) the fundamental problem of informational psi, and

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[5] S. B. Marwaha, ›Roots of Indian Materialism in Tantra and Pre-Classical Sāṃkhya,‹ *Asian Philosophy*, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2013, pp. 180–198.

[6] T. Lobmrozo, J. Knobe, and S. Nichols, *Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 1*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

[7] Interpretations of *Yoga Sūtras* referred to here are from Taimni (1961) and Rao (2011). See: I. K. Taimni, *The Science of Yoga: The Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali in Sanskrit with Transliteration in Roman, Translation in English and Commentary*, Wheaton, IL: Theosophical Pub. House, 1961.

(b) theoretical approaches to psi phenomena. Further, we discuss the dimensions along which contemporary psi research has cast light on the yoga theory of siddhis with specific reference to (a) training, (b) personality, and (c) meditation in Section 4. This is followed by the concluding comments in Section 5. In an interdisciplinary work such as this, space limitations constrain the depths that can be discussed here. All the schools and concepts alluded to here have a very large body of work and diverse theoretical viewpoints behind them; no doubt this brief article does not do justice to all views and the depth of ideas and discussions behind them. References cited in this work serve as good sources for in-depth information for the various areas mentioned.

2 Psi in Indian Thought

Psi experiences are one among many varieties of human experiences reported from ancient times across cultural and geographical boundaries. They have been discussed in classical Indian philosophies including Hindu Tantra (~500–600 CE), Jain (~400–300 BCE), Buddhist (~400 BCE), Nyāya (~300 BCE), Vaiśeṣika (~200 BCE), and in the more systematized text of Patañjali's *Yoga Sūtras* (~200 CE), including critiques by the Lokāyatā (~500 BCE) and Mīmāṃsā (~400 BCE).

In discussing psi in various schools of classical Indian thought, Sinha (1958: 334)[8] states:

> The Indian treatment of super-normal perceptions is more descriptive than explanatory. […] Super-normal perceptions are above the general laws and conditions of normal perceptions. They transcend the categories of time, space, and causality, and apprehend the real nature of things divested of all their accidental associations of names, concepts, and so forth. So we cannot understand their nature by appealing to the facts of ordinary perceptions. We must have a conception of these higher grades of super-normal perception on the basis of speculation, unless we ourselves attain the stage of higher intuitions.

In reading Sinha and his account of various philosophers from all the schools, it becomes evident that speculation regarding the occurrence

[8] J. Sinha, *Indian Psychology, Cognition*, Calcutta: Sinha Pub. House, 1958.

of psi experiences were embedded within the core constructs of the particular school, but with sufficient differences between scholars within a school. Sinha (1969)[9] also discusses the epistemological values of psi perceptions according to various classical scholars. In the following, a brief description of types of psi in Tantra, Buddhist, Jaina, and Yoga are listed.

Psi in Tantra

Early Tantra was a pre-spiritualistic, pre-Vedic, primitive proto-materialism. The early Tantra view has no reference to soul, god, liberation, heaven, prayer or sacrifice, karma, or afterlife. It perceived the human body and nature as two aspects of the same fundamental reality. It believed in the productive activity of nature and the female principle. Early tantriks explored the nervous system; (for example, *cakras* and *nādi* may essentially be early understanding of the nervous system), and they concluded that the brain is the seat of consciousness. Consciousness did not occupy a central position in their worldview. The later Tantra, what most modern readers are familiar with, was cast upon the model of the metaphysics of Classical Sāṃkhya, and hence takes on a dualist understanding of reality (Chattopadhyaya 1973[10]; Marwaha 2013; Sinha 1958).

According to Feuerstein (1998: 4)[11], in later Tantra, siddhi »can refer either to the spiritual attainment of liberation, or enlightenment, or to the extraordinary powers or paranormal abilities ascribed to Tantric masters as a result of enlightenment or by virtue of mastery of the advanced stages of concentration.« Tantra, and Yoga in general, recognize eight great paranormal powers, called *mahā-siddhis:* (1) *Aṇimā* (atomization), the ability to make oneself as small as an atom *(aṇu)*, implying invisibility. (2) *Mahima* (magnification), the ability to make oneself infinitely large. (3) *Laghima* (levitation), the ability to defy the law of gravity, or in the words of Vijñāna Bhikṣu's *Yoga-Varttika* (3.45), »to become as light as a cotton tuft on a pain-

[9] J. Sinha, *Indian Psychology, Perception*, Calcutta: Sinha Pub. House, 1969.
[10] D. Chattopadhyaya, *Lokāyatā: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism*, Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1973.
[11] G. Feuerstein, *Tantra: The Path of Ecstasy*, Boston: Shambhala, 1988.

ter's brush« *(ibid.)*. (4) *Prāpti* (extension), in the words of the *Yoga-Bhāśya* (3.45), the ability to »touch the moon with one's fingertips« *(ibid.)*. (5) *Prākāmya* (will), the ability to exert one's will without obstruction. For instance, the y*ogin* who possesses this power can, according to the *Yoga-Bhāśya* (3.45), dive into the earth as if it were water. (6) *Vaśitva* (mastery), the ability to control the five material elements *(bhūta)* and their subtle templates (i. e., the five *tanmātra*). (7) *Iśitriva* (lordship), the ability to completely control the manifestation, arrangement, and destruction of the elements and the objects composed of them. (8) *Kāmavasayitva* (from *kāma,* »desire,« and *avasayitva,* »fulfillment«), the ability to have all one's desires fulfilled by controlling the very nature of the elements (*ibid:* 264–265).

Psi in Jaina and Buddhist Thought

In Jaina epistemology knowledge is of two kinds: indirect and direct. Indirect knowledge is of two kinds, perceptual awareness obtained through sensory processes and knowledge received through scriptural authority. Direct knowledge is transcendental perception, or extra-sensory knowledge, and is of three types: (1) awareness unbound by space and time termed *kevala jñana,* (2) knowledge of events and objects remote in space and time called *avadhi* and (3) direct knowledge of thoughts of others known as *manahparyāya* (Rao 2011: 254)[12]. Clairvoyant knowledge *(avadhi)* is not mediated by the senses, because it arises without the involvement of the mind. The mind in Jaina theory is also material, but of a different kind from the physical, and manifests in ever fluctuating modes *(manaḥparyāya)*. Telepathic knowledge arises from knowing these modes/states of the mind without any sensory aids. There are some differences among Jaina thinkers whether *manaḥparyāya* gives only the state of another mind from which one infers the relevant objects of thought or whether it gives direct access to the objects of other's thought (*ibid:* 524–526).

In the Buddhist theory of knowledge, perception *(pratyakṣa)* – distinguished from imagination – is regarded as the foundational

[12] K. R. Rao, *Cognitive Anomalies, Consciousness and Yoga*, New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations for the Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture and Matrix Publishers, 2011.

means of obtaining knowledge *(pramāṇa)* insofar as inference *(anumāna)* depends on it (Bhatt 2008: 315)[13]. Perception is further classified into *indriya pratyakṣa* (sense perception), *mānasa pratyakṣa* (mental perception), *svasamvedana pratyakṣa* (self cognition), and yogi *pratyakṣa* (mystic perception). Mystic perception is produced from the »subculminated state of deep meditation on a fundamental reality« (*ibid:* 334). Yogic perception should, in short, be: (a) unobtainable through other valid sources of knowledge; (b) confirmed by later experience; and (c) devoid of any element of supposition *(kalpanā)*.

Kalupahana (2008: 79–80)[14] lists the extraordinary perceptions or powers recognized in early Buddhism: (1) Psychokinesis *(iddhividha)*, which is not a form of knowledge but a power, consists of various manifestations of the »power of will« during the contemplations. (2) Clairaudience *(dibba sota)*, the faculty of perceiving sounds even at a distance, far beyond the reach of ordinary auditory faculty. This extension of the auditory perception both in extent and in depth enables a person to perceive directly certain correlated phenomena that are otherwise only inferred. (3) Telepathy *(cetopariyañaṇa)*, which enables one to comprehend the general state as well as the functioning of the mind of another person. (4) Retrocognition *(pubbenivasanussati)*, the ability to perceive one's own past history, is dependent on memory and brings out the information, not only of the past in this life, but also some of the past lives where the impressions have been rather strong. (5) Clairvoyance *(dibbacakkhu* or *cut'upapataña-ṇa)*, the knowledge of the deceased and survival of other beings who wander along in the life process conditioned, among other factors, by one's own behavior. The Buddhist description utilizes the present participle as »sees beings who are passing away, are being born and moving according to their deeds« (*ibid.*: 80).

[13] S. R. Bhatt, »Indian Theories of Perception: An Inter-School Dialogue from Buddhist Perspective,« in Rao et al. (2008: 313–335).

[14] D. J. Kalupahana, »The Foundations of Early Buddhist Psychology,« in Rao et al. (2008: 73–84).

The Yoga Sūtras

> »The leading idea of Patañjali's philosophy is that all things result from the action of spirit upon matter; that the universe arose from the reflection of spirit upon matter in a visible form.«
> Tātyā, and Olcott (2013 [1885]: ix)[15]

The eight-limbs of yoga, as enumerated by Patañjali, are *yama* (restraints), *niyama* (observances or disciplines), *āsana* (physical posture), *prāṇāyāma* (breath control), *pratyāhāra* (control or withdrawal of the senses), *dhāraṇā* (concentration), *dhyāna* (meditation) and *samādhi* (state of super-consciousness) (YS II.29). Vibhūti Pāda, Part III of the *Yoga Sūtras*, deals primarily with siddhis. *Dhāraṇā* is the practice of focused attention on an object or thought. *Dhāraṇā* thus takes into account the intentional nature of the mind at this stage. *Dhyāna* is prolonged, continuous and unwavering concentration on a single object. *Samādhi* is a resultant state in which the distinction between the knowing subject and the object disappears; only the object of focus is in awareness; and the subject is »absorbed« in it. The three together refer to *saṃyama* or meditation (Rao 2011: 611–612).

According to Patañjali, siddhis or supernormal powers are obtained by *saṃyama* or perfect meditation, leading to clarity of insight. This enables the yogin to gain knowledge of the past and future. This is possible both for objects and the knowledge of the mind of another person, when *saṃyama* is done on an object or the mind of another. This knowledge is generated purely by the mind. In Part III of the YS, Patañjali covers a wide variety of siddhis.

The varieties of siddhis noted by Patañjali include those that: give extraordinary knowledge, including the awareness of thoughts in other's minds (YS III.16–20); give one excellence in bodily functions, including the ability to become invisible (III.21); develop clairvoyant abilities and know the distant, hidden and subtle objects (III.25). Others enable gaining insight into celestial things such as stars (III.27), gaining knowledge of one's anatomy (III.29), overcoming hunger and thirst (III.30), enable one's thought entering into the body of another person (III.38), the ability to walk on water or a bed of thorns (III.39) and move in space (III.42). In addition, Patañjali

[15] T. Tātyā, and H. S. Olcott, *The Being the Text with Patañjali, With Commentary*, London: Forgotten Books, 2013 [1885].

refers to extraordinary sensory abilities as well as gaining nonsensory intuitive knowledge, such as supernormal hearing, feeling, sight, taste and smell (III.36), and intuitive awareness (III.25, 33) (Rao 2011: 521).

In addition to these, the YS mention eight *mahāsiddhis* (great powers). They include the power to expand into space and become big, the power to become light, the power to become heavy, the power to reach out anywhere, the power to realize any wish, the power to create, the power to command and conquer. While these siddhis do not come within the purview of psi research, it must be noted that these may refer to siddhis of the experiential self, rather than the physical self. As Rao (2011: 521) notes, »It is difficult to discern whether some of these are metaphorical allusions or genuine phenomena. The description of powers is often very terse leaving room for ambiguity.« As Braud (2010: 247)[16] analyzes:

> Some of the siddhis are relatively mundane, some physiological, some psychological, some paranormal, some spiritual and mystical. Some of these might be understood as the fruits of ordinary deep thinking or pondering, whereas others might be resultants of other forms of knowing – direct knowing, insight, intuition, or revelation. Some of the siddhis (e.g., knowing the thoughts of others; clairaudience, knowledge of the subtle, concealed, and remote) are identical, or similar, to forms of receptive [informational] psi.

As is well known, there are substantial difficulties in the understanding of classical texts because the exact significance of the text is lost in interpretation, and the subsequent analyses of the *sūtras* are influenced by the views of the commentator, including the changing times and knowledge base during which the interpretations are made. This makes it difficult to determine what the ›authentic‹ translation is. As Rao and Paranjpe (2008: 188)[17] note, »While Yoga as a system of philosophy is clearly related to Sāṃkhya and makes similar metaphysical assumptions with very minor variations, the commentators on Patañjali's *Yoga-Sūtras* belong to various philosophical persuasions, varying from realism to idealism and dualism to monism.«

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[16] W. G. Braud, »Patañjali Yoga and Siddhis: Their Relevance to Parapsychological Theory and Research,« in Rao et al. (2008: 217–243).

[17] K. R. Rao, and A. C. Paranjpe, »Yoga Psychology: Theory and Application,« in Rao et al. (2008: 186–216).

3 Contemporary Psi Research

From antiquity, humankind has come a long way in understanding the nature of Nature. Organized and sustained psi research as a scientific pursuit dates its formal start to February 20th, 1882, with the establishment of the Society for Psychical Research (SPR) in London (Zingrone, and Alvarado 2015)[18].

Nomenclature has changed over the decades, with the accumulation of experimental data and a greater understanding of the phenomena. Since the 1980s, as part of the Star Gate program[19], May, Spottiswoode, and James (1994a)[20] adopted the term »anomalous mental phenomena« (AMP) instead of the more widely known psi. Likewise, they use the terms »anomalous cognition« (AC)[21] (which has now gained acceptance), and »anomalous perturbation« (AP) for extrasensory perception (ESP) and psychokinesis (PK), respectively. They have done so because they believe that these terms are more naturally descriptive of the observables and are neutral in that they do not imply mechanisms. The »anomaly« in AMP refers to the insufficient understanding of the phenomenon, rather than the validity of experi-

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[18] N. L. Zingrone, and C. S. Alvarado, »A Brief History of Psi Research,« in E. C. May, and S. B. Marwaha (eds.), *Extrasensory Perception: Support, Skepticism, and Science, Volume I – History, Controversy, and Research*, Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015a, pp. 35–80.

[19] Star Gate Program: The U.S. government funded a 20-year, $ 20 million anomalous mental phenomena program, best known by its last code name Star Gate, spanning from 1972 through 1995, at SRI International and Science Applications International Corporation, California (USA). The primary objective of the Star Gate program was to investigate the phenomenon of remote viewing (RV) as an aid in gathering intelligence during the Cold War, to assess the Soviet threat to the United States in general, and in their use of RV and to conduct basic and applied research to improve RV as an intelligence asset. At its peak, it had 12 full-time scientists on its roll. The principal investigators were Dr. Harold E. Puthoff (1972–1985), Russell Targ (1972–1982), and Dr. Edwin C. May (1976–1995). The formerly classified program was declassified in 2000.

[20] E. C. May, S. J. P. Spottiswoode, and C. L. James, ›Managing the Target-Pool Bandwidth: Possible Noise Reduction for Anomalous Cognition,‹ *Journal of Parapsychology*, Vol. 58, No. 3, 1994a, pp. 303–313.

[21] Anomalous cognition (AC) is defined as the perception and cognition of information that emerges from a distant point in space-time, but which is blocked from the usual sensory systems by distance, shielding or time. In this process, some individuals are able to gain access to information from events outside the range of their senses by a currently not understood mechanism. Anomalous perturbation is defined as the interaction with matter solely by mental means alone *(ibid)*.

mental data. Collectively, the AMP are also known as cognitive anomalies. The general term *psi* encompasses a wide range of phenomena of which AC and micro-AP/micro-PK, have been teased into the laboratory, while others such as macro-PK and survival research, are quite difficult to bring under controlled laboratory conditions. Psi research includes three classes of experiences:

1. Informational psi: Anomalous cognition (AC) or extrasensory perception (ESP), a.k.a. precognition/remote viewing, clairvoyance, and telepathy. Marwaha and May (2016)[22] have proposed that precognition may be the only form of psi phenomenon, as clairvoyance and telepathy can be subsumed within it, as it is impossible to close the precognition door; further, it collapses the problem space within which to search for a mechanism. Based on experimental data, they have defined precognition as an *atypical perceptual ability that allows the acquisition of non-inferential information arising from a future point in space-time* (Marwaha, and May 2015a)[23].
2. Mind–Matter Problems: This refers to mental interaction with animate or inanimate matter. The research data for micro-psychokinesis[24] is weak with regard to its claimed effect size, but is, nonetheless, statistically robust. While there may be evidence for macro-psychokinesis[25] from field studies based on observational data, there is little *experimental* evidence to support it. Because of the crushing definitional problems of psychokinesis (i.e., negative or operational) and based on an analysis of the micro-psychokinesis data using the formulations of decision augmentation theory (DAT)[26] the evidence for psychokinesis is inconclusive.

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[22] S. B. Marwaha, and E. C. May, ›Precognition: The Only Form of Psi?‹ *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, Vol. 23, Nos. 3–4, 2016, pp. 76–100.

[23] S. B. Marwaha, and E. C. May, ›Rethinking Extrasensory Perception: Towards a Multiphasic Model of Precognition,‹ *SAGE Open*, Vol. January-March 2015, No. 1–17, 2015a (DOI: 10.1177/2158244015576056; last accessed on 11 January 2016).

[24] Micro-psychokinesis (micro-PK) is a form of anomalous perturbation that requires inferential statistics to observe an effect. Random number generators are considered examples of micro-PK.

[25] Macro-psychokinesis (macro-PK) is a form of anomalous perturbation that does not require inferential statistics to observe an effect. Bending rods of metal by mental means alone is an example.

[26] According to the Decision Augmentation Theory (DAT) AC information is in-

3. Survival Research: Reincarnation, near-death experiences, out-of-body experiences, and mediumship research. Post-mortem survival is based on the assumption that some aspect of the self (nonmaterial soul, consciousness) survives bodily death, retains autobiographical memory, can influence matter, and communicate with the living. However, according to the super-psi hypothesis, all evidence suggestive of survival is the result of the product of powerful sub-conscious psychic activity by living agents, mobilized and guided by deep-seated psychological needs. The super-psi theorist is obviously committed to the existence of informational psi. As this area is problematical with regard to evidence, there is an impasse between the super-psi and survival hypotheses because when they are compared in terms of their theoretical virtues neither has a decisive overall advantage (e. g., Braude 1992; Sudduth 2009)[27].

The complexity of the psi problem underlying the experiential manifestations renders this a difficult problem to solve. Nevertheless, the evidence for psi is far-reaching, statistically validated, and worldwide. Although the field of psi research has received a skeptical onslaught along many dimensions including absence of scientific rigor, lack of evidence, inadequate statistical methods, and absence of causal mechanisms, Mark Leary, professor of psychology and neuroscience at Duke University, contradicting skeptics, has stated:

[…] my reading of the research literature suggests that parapsychologists are among the best experimentalists in science because they know that they must design more sophisticated, bias-proof studies than scientists in other fields in order to be believed. […] As a result, their research designs are as tight, if not tighter, than those in more accepted areas, and they are often more critical of each others' work than is typical in science. They know that

cluded along with the usual inputs that result in a final human decision that favors a »desired« outcome. In statistical parlance, DAT says that a slight, systematic bias is introduced into the decision process by AC (E. C. May, J. M. Utts, and S. J. P. Spottiswoode, ›Decision Augmentation Theory: Toward a Model of Anomalous Mental Phenomena‹, *Journal of Parapsychology*, Vol. 59, No. 3, 1995, pp. 195–220.

[27] S. E. Braude, ›Survival or Super-Psi?‹ *Journal of Scientific Exploration*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1992, pp. 127–144; M. Sudduth, ›Super-Psi and the Survivalist Interpretation of Mediumship,‹ *Journal of Scientific Exploration*, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2009, pp. 167–193.

critics will question every aspect of their research designs and analyses and thus work extra hard to design convincing studies (2011: 276)[28].

Recent publications such as *Advances in Parapsychological Research: Vol. 9* (Krippner, Rock, Beischel et al. 2013), *Anomalous Cognition: Remote Viewing Research and Theory* (May, and Marwaha 2014), *Evidence of Psi: Thirteen Empirical Research Reports* (Broderick, and Goertzel 2015), *Extrasensory Perception: Support, Skepticism, and Science, Volume I History, Controversy and Research, Volume II Theories of Psi* (May, and Marwaha 2015a, 2015b), *Parapsychology in the Twenty-First Century: Essays on the Future of Psychical Research* (Thalbourne, and Storm 2005), *Parapsychology: A Handbook for the 21st Century* (Cardeña, Palmer, and Marcusson-Clavertz 2015), *The Survival Hypothesis: Essays on Mediumship* (Rock 2014), provide the state-of-the-art in psi research.[29]

The Fundamental Problem of Informational Psi

Psi research examines the subjective experience of acquiring information from a distant space-time point. The fascination with this aspect of human cognition focused early research on the experiencer and his experience. However, as researchers delved further into the problem, it became apparent that the picture was far larger than just human experience. The psi experience was a manifestation of far more fundamental questions; in its essence, it addresses the fundamental pro-

[28] M. Leary, ›Why Are (Some) Scientists so Opposed to Parapsychology?‹ *Explore: The Journal of Science and Healing*, Vol. 7, No. 5, 2011, pp. 275–277.

[29] S. Krippner, A. J. Rock, J. Beischel, H. L. Friedman and C. L. Fracasso (eds.), *Advances in Parapsychological Research: Vol. 9*, Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2013; E. C. May, and S. B. Marwaha (ed.), *Anomalous Cognition: Remote Viewing Research and Theory*, Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2014; D. Broderick, and B. Goertzel, (eds.), *Evidence of Psi: Thirteen Empirical Research Reports*, Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2015; E. C. May, and S. B. Marwaha (eds.), *Extrasensory Perception: Support, Skepticism, and Science*, Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, [Vol. 1] 2015a [Vol. 2] 2015b; M. A. Thalbourne, and L. Storm (eds.), *Parapsychology in the Twenty-First Century: Essays on the Future of Psychical Research*, Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2005; E. Cardeña, J. Palmer, and D. Marcusson-Clavertz (eds.), *Parapsychology: A Handbook for the 21st Century*, Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2015; A. J. Rock (ed.), *The Survival Hypothesis: Essays on Mediumship*, Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2014.

blems of the direction of time, causality, and information flow (May, and Marwaha 2015a: 3–8).[30]

Understanding time lies not just in the purview of physics alone. Precognition, itself, challenges the notion that time at the human level must move in one direction only. So it is both a psi research question as well as a physics one: How is it possible for non-inferential information from some point in the future to propagate backward in time to the present? Causality poses equally difficult challenges. We are all familiar with the concept that the pen I am holding above the desk cannot drop to the desk unless and until I have opened my fingers – causality at work. At first look, precognition appears to violate this concept. Yet, when Corry (2015)[31] examined the logical possibility of causality violation in ESP he found that there is nothing impossible about precognition.

The second law of thermodynamics reconciles this apparent conundrum of causality violation. That is, this law demands that entropy – a measure of disorder – can never decrease in a closed system. Suppose we take an ordered manuscript of 300 pages (low entropy) and toss them helter-skelter into the air. The pages land in a disordered mess. There are a huge number of ways in which the pages might land, but only one way in which they are in serial order. There are now a number of papers (May 1995, 2011, 2015; May, Spottiswoode, and James 1994b; May, Spottiswoode, and Faith 2000)[32] that show that the detection of informational psi is persistently correlated with the changes of entropy of the target system. Marwaha and May (2015a) take advantage of this finding to provide plausibility argu-

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[30] E. C. May, and S. B. Marwaha, »The Fundamentals of Psi,« in (2015a: 1–31).

[31] R. Corry, »ESP, Causation, and the Possibility of Precognition,« in May, and Marwaha (2015a: 107–127).

[32] E. C. May, »AC Technical Trials: Inspiration for the Target Entropy Concept,« *Proceedings of the 38th Annual Parapsychology Association*, 1995, pp. 193–211; E. C. May, »Toward a Classical Thermodynamic Model for Retro-cognition, in D. Sheehan (ed.), *Quantum Retrocausation: Theory and Experiment*, Melville, NY: American Institute of Physics, 2011, pp. 297–307; E. C. May, »Entropy and Precognition: The Physics Domain of the Multiphasic Model of Precognition,« in May, and Marwaha (2015b: 125–144); E. C. May, S. J. P. Spottiswoode, and C. L. James, ›Shannon Entropy: A Possible Intrinsic Target Property‹, *Journal of Parapsychology*, Vol. 58, 1994b, 384–401; E. C. May, S. J. P. Spottiswoode, and L. V. Faith, ›Correlation of the Gradient of Shannon Entropy and Anomalous Cognition: Toward an AC sensory system,‹ *Journal of Scientific Exploration*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2000, pp. 53–72.

ments to answer the above mysterious question – how does information propagate backward in time.

Theoretical Approaches to Psi Phenomena

There are several competing approaches to understanding the mechanism of psi, which include dualism, panpsychism, psychological, neuroscientific, and physicalist views, including those based upon a quantum metaphor, quantum mechanics (QM), or signal-detection. Details of these models can be found in May, and Marwaha (2015b).

The observables in informational psi phenomena are: (a) information originating at some distant space-time point and (b) the information eventually reported as some form of cognition. As stated, there is experimental evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, for the validity of informational psi (e.g., May 1988; May, Utts, Trask et al. 1989)[33].

Dualist/panpsychist accounts of psi/siddhis, are based on first-person experiences and their analyses are embedded within the constructs of philosophical systems. While there are Western proponents of dualism and panpsychism in psi (e.g., John Beloff, Larry Dossey, Stephen Schwartz), this viewpoint is embedded in Indian philosophy. K. Ramakrishna Rao, former chairman of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, is the leading proponent of this view from the Eastern perspective. This is well articulated in his comprehensive ›Trident (Triśūla) Model of Person,‹ based on Advaita and Yoga philosophy (Rao 2011, 2012[34]). Limitations in space do not permit elaboration of this thesis.

Walker introduced the QM theory of psi, with particular reference to psychokinesis. According to Walker (1973)[35] »psi phenomena

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[33] E. C. May, *An Application Oriented Remote Viewing Experiment*. SRI Project 2740, Final Report Covering the Period 1 May 1987 to April 1988. Menlo Park, CA: SRI International, 1988; E. C. May, J. M. Utts, V. V. Trask, W. W. Luke, T. J. Frivold, and B. S. Humphrey, *Review of the Psychoenergetic Research Conducted at SRI International (1973–1988)*, SRI International Technical Report, March 1989, Menlo Park, CA: SRI International, 1989.

[34] K. R. Rao, ›Complementarity of Advaita Non-Dualism and Yoga Dualism in Indian Psychology‹, *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, Vol. 19, Nos. 9–10, 2012, pp. 121–142.

[35] E. H. Walker, »Application of the Quantum Theory of Consciousness to the Pro-

are attributed to quantum mechanical (QM) effects associated with observer-mediated state vector collapse.« Several criticisms have been put forth which have been reviewed by Walker (1984)[36]. The domain of applicability of QM is only to the micro-world. In the macro-world, including the brain, environmental decoherence, i. e. interference from the surrounding, is a persistent feature that argues against the role of QM in psi. Most recently, Marwaha and May (2015b)[37] have argued against the probability of the role of consciousness in the universe and in particular with regard to entanglement and the role of humans in the collapse of the state vector to one of its allowed *eigenstates*.[38] Even if we assume that a state vector collapse has occurred due to the presence of consciousness, information from a correlation will still require a signal to interact with the brain/consciousness. Additionally, decision augmentation theory, as mentioned earlier, provides a plausible argument for the micro-psychokinesis data.

There are at least two compelling arguments in support of a signal-based model of informational psi. All of our known sensory systems respond to external signals from the environment. Electromagnetic photons strike the retina allowing us to see; compression wave phonemes strike the sensory systems in our ears allowing us to hear, and so on. So it is a parsimonious approach to assume that psi must also be based upon a signal. Additionally, our known sensory systems are gradient detectors; that is, they are more sensitive at sensing changes at their ›front ends‹ than they are at detecting steady states. For example, it is much easier to notice a faint blinking light than one that is not. Apparently psi is easier to detect when the entropy of target stimuli is changing than when it is not – just like the other sensory systems. Thus Marwaha and May (2015a, 2015c) proposed a signal-based process-oriented multiphasic model of precognition, wherein they formally divide the problem space into the physics and neuroscience domains: The physics domain (PD; information-centric

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blem of Psi Phenomena,« in W. G. Roll, R. L. Morris, and J. D. Morris (eds.), *Research in Parapsychology, 1972,* Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1973, pp. 51–53.

[36] E. H. Walker, ›A Review of Criticisms of the Quantum Mechanical Theory of Psi Phenomena,‹ *Journal of Parapsychology*, Vol. 48, No. 4, 1984, pp. 277–332.

[37] S. B. Marwaha, and E. C. May, ›A Refutation of the Dualist Perspective in Psi Research,‹ *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 5–6, 2015b, pp.70–95.

[38] A measurement of a quantum system with many possibilities can only end up in one of them, which is called an *eigenstate*.

perspective) deals exclusively with the external physical world, and putative retrocausal signals emerging from a distant space-time point. The neuroscience domain (ND; person-centric perspective) addresses the question of how putative retrocausal signals are perceived and processed by the brain leading to a subjective experience. In their view, the putative retrocausal signals come to the ›vicinity‹ of the percipient (a PD problem), like any other sensory signals, and the percipient may thus be acquiring information that is occurring locally, in real-time. Thus, precognition may be like any other sense, albeit an atypical one as it is not universal to the species, in that only about 1 % of individuals may possess the ability, and it may require an idiosyncratic type of cortical structure and processing. This rethinking about the mechanism and process of psi merits discussion.

4 Psi Research and Siddhis

In this section we examine siddhis from the perspective of psi research along the dimensions of training, personality, and meditation. While these areas are *independent* of theoretical perspectives, they influence theory building.

A succinct summary of what is well established about psi is as follows: (1) A general conclusion can be drawn that AC ability exists; there is both field and statistical evidence for it. (2) Approximately 1 % of the general population possesses a natural remote viewing [AC] ability. (3) Experienced viewers are significantly better than the general population. (4) Laboratory and operational remote viewing show the greatest potential for practical applications. (5) AC ability does not degrade over time [with the caveat that mental and physical health status will influence performance as it does for any other task]. (6) There is no quantitative evidence to support a training hypothesis. (7) AC quality is independent of target distance and/or size. (8) Electromagnetic shielding is not effective against acquisition of information from a distant space-time point (May, Utts, Trask et al. 1989).

Telepathy refers to the anomalous acquisition of information concerning the thoughts, feelings or activity of another conscious being. Procedurally, it is difficult to determine exactly what the target is, as one has to either rely on a pre-recorded note of the target stimulus (a clairvoyant condition) or rely on a post-session narration of

the target stimulus (a precognition condition). Related siddhis include those that give extraordinary knowledge, including the awareness of thoughts in others' minds (YS III.16–20), and the ability to enter one's thoughts into the body of another person (YS III.38).

Clairvoyance generally refers to information received from a distance, beyond the reach of the ordinary senses. It refers to the AC of objects and events as distinguished from AC of thoughts and mental states of individuals. Procedurally it means that the target stimuli in experiments are occurring in real-time, and are randomly generated *before* data collection is initiated. Related siddhis include knowing distant, hidden and subtle objects (YS III.25).

Precognition is an atypical perceptual ability that allows the acquisition of non-inferential information arising from a future point in space-time; that is, not enough time has passed between their occurrences for there to exist a causal relationship. In practical laboratory terms, it requires that target stimuli are randomly generated *after* responses are collected and secured. Related siddhis include supernormal hearing, feeling, sight, taste and smell (III.36), and intuitive awareness (III.25, 33).

Training

That psi may be an innate ability, is reflected in YS IV.1, »The Siddhis are the result of birth, drugs, Mantras, austerities or Samadhi« (Taimni 1961: 322). However, the point that psi can be developed by training has not been established in the research literature. According to the YS (III), it is only after years of intensive yoga practice, including a disciplined life style, and becoming adept in *saṃyama (dhāraṇā, dhyāna, samādhi)* that siddhis begin to »happen.«

Research so far has shown that training participants with no inherent psi-ability has no effect on their psi performance (May, Utts, Trask, et al. 1989: 2). At best, you can train persons with psi abilities in the techniques of responding on psi tests rather than on developing the skill from scratch. For e.g., you need to have an inherent musical ability to be able to train to use a musical instrument.

Researchers typically use a protocol that involves a pre- post-training, effort and control design to determine the effect of yoga training on psi ability. A 6–8 week training program of about 2–4 hours/week of yoga practice, usually with a student population, is

planned for such studies. It is hypothesized, that at the end of this trial period, some psi abilities may be observed or there may be an enhancement in the ability as determined in a pre-training baseline. This is quite contrary to the Yoga theory, according to which siddhis begin to occur only after years (or even lifetimes) of arduous and sustained practice of yoga and mastering *saṃyama*.

Roney-Dougal, and Solfvin (2006)[39], examined the meditation–psi connection with long-term Buddhist meditation practitioners, and found non-significant relation between meditation and psi. In a later study (2008)[40], they found a significant relation between meditation and performance on psi task. While these are preliminary studies, one can speculate that probably, the participants of the two studies had different innate psi abilities, which are on a continuum from no ability to highly proficient. Even with a participant population of advanced meditators (usually advanced in age also) it may not be possible to determine whether the ability was *inherent* or a *consequence* of meditation.

Contrary to the Yoga hypothesis, we find that our well-calibrated participants in psi studies (over 30 years' experience) at our laboratory, have never been practitioners of yoga, or even aware of its larger philosophy. They do use their own methods of calming down to assist in the process of focusing on the task at hand, but they are not intense as meditative practices. Moreover, research trials are sometime conducted in noisy environments, without having an effect on the robustness of the data obtained. Braud (2008: 226) suggests, the »chief applicability [of yoga practices] to psi inquiry is that these practises might help practitioners become generally less distracted and calmer in body and mind, and this increased quietude, accompanied by a more inwardly-directed focus of attention, might facilitate access to more subtle, internal carriers of psychically-sourced information.« Thus, experimental work using yoga to *develop* psi ability does not appear to be a valid approach; using persons with innate psi

[39] S. M. Roney-Dougal, and J. Solfvin, ›Yogic Attainment in Relation to Awareness of Precognitive Targets,‹ *Journal of Parapsychology*, Vol. 70, No. 1, 2006, pp. 91–120.

[40] S. M. Roney-Dougal, and J. Solfvin, ›Exploring the Relationship Between Two Tibetan Meditation Techniques, the Stroop Effect and Precognition,‹ *Proceedings of the 51st Annual Convention of the Parapsychological Association*, Winchester, Britain, 2008, pp. 187–203.

ability is a valid approach, for both evidential and process-oriented research.

Personality

Based in Sāṃkhya-Yoga theory, the three *guṇas*[41] – *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* – are the inherent qualities of *prakṛti* (primordial matter), and are thought to be the building blocks of nature. While this is essentially a metaphysical concept, Indian psychology has adopted the *guṇa* construct as a personality theory. In the context of this discussion, we refer to this application of the *guṇa* concept.

According to Braud (1981)[42], the relevance of *guṇas* to psi is that systems that are characterized by an excess of inertial constraints *(tamas)* or by overdrivenness or overactivity constraints *(rajas)* are less susceptible to psi interactions than are systems characterized by more balanced (similar to *sattva*) modes of functioning. Based on a review of empirical studies, Sitamma (2005: 271–272)[43] reports that:

> […] studies reveal that *sattva* correlates significantly and positively with introversion and self-actualization; and negatively with extraversion and neuroticism. *Rajas* correlates significantly and positively with extraversion, and negatively with self-actualization. *Tamas* correlates significantly and positively with neuroticism, psychoticism, and self-actualization. […] In the studies that related the *guṇas* to ESP only *tamas* was found to be significantly and negatively correlated to ESP.

As stated, according to the YS (III.37), it is by only following the practice of *saṃyama* that siddhis begin to happen. At this stage, the practitioner has a preponderance of the *sattva guṇa*. Transposing this idea on to the personality–*guṇa* combine, it can be stated that the sattvic personality, with the characteristic of introversion comes into

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[41] *Guṇas* – Attribute; property, quality, or characteristic arising from nature *(prakṛti)* itself; as a rule, when »*guṇa*« is used, it is in reference to the three fundamental qualities, »strands« or interacting components of *prakṛti*, the primordial materiality of the universe: *sattva* – purity, light, information content, *rajas* – activity, passion, and *tamas* – dullness, inertia, and ignorance (Rao 2011: 789).

[42] W. G. Braud, »Lability and Inertia in Psychic Functioning,« in B. Shapin, and L. Coly (eds.), *Concepts and Theories of Parapsychology*, New York: Parapsychology Foundation, 1981, pp. 1–36.

[43] M. Sitamma, »Trigunas: A Review of Empirical Studies,« in Rao, and Marwaha (2005: 271–272).

play. This is an appropriate analysis based on the state of the practitioner at this stage of meditation.

Personality has been one of the most widely studied aspects in psi research for understanding the process and to serve as a psi predictive factor. Extraversion–introversion was one of the most widely explored dimensions of personality in relation to ESP. A meta-analyses of 60 independent studies carried out by Honorton, Ferrari and Bem (1998)[44] showed that extraverted participants tend to obtain higher ESP scores than introverted participants. Extraversion has not been predictive of psi ability and its apparent correlation with psi appears to be an artifact of the data collection procedure; introversion appears not to play a role in psi performance. Based on this data, one needs to reexamine the sattvic personality–siddhis ability relationship.

Hartmann (1991)[45] proposed the concept of boundary »thinness« versus »thickness« as a dimension of personality. In the broadest sense, Hartmann's concept refers to the boundary between any two processes in the mind, e.g., thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. Boundary »thinness« refers to the connection, overlap, and blending between these different mental processes. In the opposite end of the continuum, boundary thickness refers to the extent to which these processes are separated, demarcated, and distant from one another (Sand, and Levine 1996)[46].

According to Hartmann, Harrison, and Zborowski (2001)[47] there is a correlation between thin boundaries and a belief in or tendency to experience paranormal phenomena. Groups of people who characterize themselves as shamans or psychics have been found to score thin on the Boundary Questionnaire (Krippner, Wickramasekera, et al., 1998)[48]. As Hartmann et al. state, if thin versus thick boundaries re-

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[44] C. Honorton, D. C. Ferrari, and D. J. Bem, ›Extraversion and ESP Performance: A Meta-Analysis and a New Confirmation,‹ *Journal of Parapsychology*, Vol. 62, 1998, pp. 255–276.

[45] E. Hartmann, *Boundaries in the Mind*, New York: Basic Books, 1991.

[46] S. Sand, and R. Levin, ›Concordance between Hartmann's Boundary Questionnaire and the Eysenck Personality Inventory,‹ *Perceptual and Motor Skills*, Vol. 82, No. 1, 1996, pp. 192–194.

[47] E. Hartmann, R. Harrison, and M. Zborowski, ›Boundaries in the Mind: Past Research and Future Directions,‹ *North American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2001, pp. 347–368.

[48] S. Krippner, I. Wickramasekera, J. Wickramasekera, and C. Winstead, ›The Ramtha

presents a clear-cut personality dimension and also an aspect of mental state functioning, one would predict that thick versus thin boundary functioning should be detectable on the biological level, in terms of brain function and activity. In simple terms, one might suggest that thin boundaries, relative to thick boundaries, might be associated with more hyperconnectivity. Simmonds-Moore (2010)[49] has previously argued that synesthesia, often defined as the »merging of the senses,« could reflect one type of boundary thinness, which may fundamentally underpin a variety of anomalous experiences. This is supported by Parra (2015)[50] in his study of out-of-body experiences, where he finds that people who scored thinner boundaries also tended to score higher on spirituality, emotional impact, transliminality, and anomalous experiences. These ideas are supportive of Hypothesis 2.1 of the model of precognition, which states that cortical hyperassociative mechanisms may underlie psi experiences (Marwaha, and May 2015a).

Meditation

Recent neuroscientific studies on meditation may shed some light on the yoga–psi question. Newberg (2014: 1)[51] states »A neuroscientific study of spiritual practices and experiences has the potential to provide fascinating data to further our understanding of the relationship between the brain and such phenomena.«

Using magnetic resonance imaging to compare age-related gray matter (GM) decline in yogins and controls, Villemure, Čeko, Cotton, and Bushnell (2015: 10)[52] report that regular practice of yoga may

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Phenomenon: Psychological, Phenomenological, and Geomagnetic Data,‹ *Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research*, Vol. 92, 1998, pp.1–24.

[49] C. A. Simmonds-Moore, »Personality Variables in Spontaneous Psi Research: Contextualizing the Boundary Construct in its Relationship to Spontaneous Psi Phenomena,« in C. A. Roe, W. Kramer, and L. Coly (eds.), *Proceedings of an International Conference Utrecht II: Charting the Future of Parapsychology*, New York: Parapsychology Foundation, 2010.

[50] A. Parra ›On the Edge of the Anomalous Experience: Out of Body Experiences, Transliminality and »Thin« Boundaries,‹ *International Journal of Neurology Research*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2015, pp. 8–13.

[51] A. B. Newberg, ›The Neuroscientific Study of Spiritual Practices,‹ *Frontiers in Psychology* (DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00215; last accessed on 11 January 2016).

[52] C. Villemure, M. Čeko, V. A. Cotton, and M. C. Bushnell, ›Neuroprotective Effects of Yoga Practice: Age-, Experience-, and Frequency-Dependent Plasticity,‹ *Frontiers of*

have neuroprotective effects against whole brain age-related GM decline. Their results suggest that yoga practice is associated with larger brain volume in areas involved in bodily representation, attention, self-relevant processing, visualization, and stress regulation, providing a neural basis for some of the beneficial effects of yoga. These experience-related changes were located in the left hemisphere suggesting that increasing years of yoga practice progressively tunes the brain toward a parasympathetically driven mode and positive affective states. They further state that their study involved ordinary North Americans, and as such, if the observed structural brain variances are indeed related to yoga training, they should be within the reach of the average person and not reserved to a select few. Luders, Kurth et al. (2012)[53] and Lazar, Kerr, Wasserman et al. (2005)[54] report that meditators showed larger gyrification (the pattern and degree of cortical folding on the surface of the brain) in some of the areas where prior analyses revealed thicker gray matter cortices in meditators as compared to nonmeditators. Following their extensive analysis of the neurological correlates of various types of meditation practices, Mehrmann and Karmacharya (2015)[55] advise caution, because »[…] the neurological correlates of specific [meditation] practices differ significantly between populations, such as the differences one may find between monks, lay persons, adults, children, and individuals with psychopathology.« This brings to fore the question whether the cortical changes were indeed due to the practice, or they were already preexistent.

As the research data indicate, psi is an inherent ability, rather than a learnt ability. This supports the view that »siddhis are the result of birth« (YS IV.1). However, the role of training, drugs, man-

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Human Neuroscience, Vol. 9, No. 281, 2015, p.10 (DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00281; last accessed on 11 January 2016).

[53] E. Luders, F. Kurth, E. A. Mayer, A. W. Toga, K. L. Narr, and C. Gaser, ›The Unique Brain Anatomy of Meditation Practitioners: Alterations in Cortical Gyrification,‹ *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*, Vol. 34, Article 6, 34, 2012 (DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00034; last accessed on 11 January 2016).

[54] S. W. Lazar, C. E. Kerr, R. Wasserman, et al., ›Meditation Experience is Associated with Increased Cortical Thickness,‹ *Neuroreport*, Vol. 16, 1983–1987, 2005.

[55] C. Mehrmann, and R. Karmacharya, ›Principles and Neurobiological Correlates of Concentrative, Diffuse, and Insight Meditation,‹ *Harvard Review of Psychiatry*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2013, pp. 205–218.

tras, austerities or *samādhi* in the development of siddhis has not been experimentally validated.

5 Concluding Comments

In this article we have examined some aspects of the hypotheses put forth by the dualist Sāṃkhya-Yoga school, based primarily in first-person experiences, alongside experimental evidence from psi research.

This line of analysis may be unacceptable to many. As Taimni (1961: vii) states:

> [...] this [Yoga] Science of sciences is too comprehensive in its nature and too profound in its doctrines to be fitted into the framework of any particular philosophy, ancient or modern. It stands in its own right as a Science based upon the eternal laws of the higher life and does not require the support of any science or philosophical system to uphold its claims. Its truths are based on the experiences and experiments of an unbroken line of mystics, occultists, saints and sages who have realized and borne witness to them throughout the ages.

However, determining the validity of constructs is an essential step in the process and progress of *any* science.

According to Sāṃkhya-Yoga, non-material consciousness plays an instrumental role in the formation of our experiences. However, this hypothesis is unable to determine how a non-material consciousness can interact with matter – our brain and external objects. Marwaha and May (2015b) have argued against the possibility of a non-material consciousness based on (1) the physics principle that if there is any interaction at all, by definition, the cross section for that interaction must be non-zero, which demands that some part of consciousness must be material and (2) while there are clear quantum phenomena happening in the brain (e.g., single ion transport systems) the brain does not act as a collective quantum system. It is unlikely that single ions or atoms contribute to any aspect of large-scale phenomena such as personality or consciousness. These arguments suggest that a non-material consciousness cannot interact with matter (brain) to create subjective experiences.

The issues raised in this article require us to reconsider the hypotheses put forth by the dualist schools. As Marwaha and May (2015a) indicate, psi may be an atypical perceptual ability based on the perception of retrocausal signals emerging from a future point on space-time, but occurring in the »now« of the percipient. These signals are hypothesized to be perceived by an atypical transducer, and processed by a hyperassociative mechanism in the brain, with cognitions occurring in the same manner as do signals to other sensory systems.

Unless hypotheses of the physics and neuroscience domains are ruled off the table, it becomes difficult to state that psi is a purely non-local non-sensory experience emerging from a non-material consciousness interacting with the brain.

The weight of evidence for psi/siddhis is tilting towards the brain. As Gulyás, Bíró, et al. (2015: 8)[56] report, »that the brain contains almost fully its navigation skeleton appears as a mathematically clear and conclusive evidence that the spatial organization of the brain is nearly optimal for communication and information transfer, corroborating existing work on the subject.«

Legitimate questions asked of any theory include: What are the definitions of the core constructs? In what domain is the theory valid? For example, is the theory valid in the microscopic or macroscopic world? What are the questions that the theory addresses in understanding a phenomenon? Can the hypotheses put forth by the theory be verified? What does the theory predict? Questions such as these must also be asked of any dualist/panpsychist model, whether classical or contemporary, that addresses aspects of human experience.

The fundamental problem of psi – how does information get from there/then to here/now – rests in the information-centric physics domain, for which the neuroscience domain can provide clues. The fundamental questions that the experience of precognition raises – the nature of time, causality, and information – can be explored from the philosophical perspective, to which Indian philosophy can contribute substantially. Precognition data adds a dimension to the perennial free-will–determinism debate. While the experience of psi

[56] A. Gulyás, et al., ›Navigable Networks as Nash Equilibria of Navigation Games,‹ *Nature Communications*, Vol. 6, No. 7651, 2015 (DOI: 10.1038/ncomms8651; last accessed on 11 January 2016).

may be understood in the neuroscience domain, the final theatre of explaining psi rests in the physics domain.[57]

–Sonali Bhatt Marwaha, Visakhapatnam, India, Associate, Laboratories for Fundamental Research, Palo Alto, California, USA

[57] The recent theoretical advances in psi research cited in this work are based on the consolidation of research findings from the 20 year (1974–1995) $ 20 m U.S. government sponsored research in remote viewing (precognition/anomalous cognition) and psychokinesis, best known by its last code name Star Gate, and thereafter the continuation of the program at the Laboratories for Fundamental Research (LFR). I gratefully acknowledge Dr. Edwin C. May, program director Star Gate (1985–1995), and President and founder of the LFR for commenting on this article. My deep appreciation to Prof. Charles T. Tart for his valuable comments in steering me to a more judicious approach in writing this paper.

Brief Comments on »Siddhis and Psi Research: An Interdisciplinary Analysis«

I began reading this paper in hope of finding an unbiased introduction to the scientific literature on psi phenomena, recognition of parallels in the vast Indian literature regarding »siddhis« or »attainments,« and an open-minded entertainment of the possibility that the Indian philosophical schools might have something useful to say about how the world must be constructed in order that such phenomena can occur. What we get, unfortunately, is something very different.

The paper begins well enough, with an informative introduction to psi-like phenomena in the context of Indian thought, supported by many useful references. Problems begin to surface in Section 3 on contemporary psi research, where Dr. Marwaha tilts sharply toward views held primarily by herself and her American physicist colleague Ed May, who are unusual in combining acceptance of the reality of psi – especially precognition, curiously enough, which most philosophers find particularly challenging conceptually – with an expectation that everything will ultimately prove explainable in terms of classical physics and neuroscience. I urge readers to take several aspects of Marwaha's survey with particular reservation: First, the largely implicit presumption that laboratory experimentation is the primary or only path to valid scientific knowledge; second, and dependent on that presumption, denial of the reality of macro-PK, for which there exists an abundance of high-quality observational evidence (see e. g. Steve Braude's *The Limits of Influence,* and a forthcoming book by Michael Grosso entitled *The Man Who Could Fly,* detailing the massively witnessed levitations of Joseph of Copertino)[1]; and third, the suggestion that evidence for post-mortem survival can justifiably be set

[1] S. Braude, *The Limits of Influence: Psychokinesis and the Philosophy* of *Science,* Lanham: University Press of America, 1997 [revised edition]; M. Grosso, *The Man Who Could Fly: St. Joseph of Copertino and the Mystery of Levitation,* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming.

aside on grounds that some of it can likely be explained in terms of psi abilities in living persons (for serious introductions to this literature see e.g. Alan Gauld's *Mediumship and Survival*, Steve Braude's *Immortal Remains*, and Ian Stevenson's monumental *Reincarnation and Biology*)[2].

Having now artificially contracted the scope of her discussion to *informational* forms of psi, Marwaha goes on in the balance of her paper to advocate for what she regards as the best existing theory of such phenomena, namely a signal-based model of precognition recently advanced by herself and Ed May. Ignoring the widespread sense among psi researchers that the world portrayed by quantum theory is inherently friendlier to psi than that of classical physics (see e.g. Dean Radin's *Entangled Minds*[3]), she summarily dismisses quantum theory as irrelevant to the macro-world. More importantly, she also seeks to dismiss all dualist, panpsychist, and idealistic notions deriving from the Indian philosophical traditions themselves; indeed, the main point of her paper seems to be that although Patanjali and his peers were correct in recognizing the empirical reality of (some) psi phenomena, their theoretical and practical views regarding the production of such phenomena are of little or no value. Section 4 presents weak empirical arguments to that effect, when the basic fact of the matter is that we have barely scratched the surface in terms of relevant research, and the concluding Section 5 offers up a transparently circular argument against the possibility of a non-physical consciousness, coupled with the false suggestion that no such theory could explain its interactions with the brain, or the normal dependence of conscious experience on brain processes (see Chapter 9 of Kelly et al., *Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century*[4]).

In sum, and contrary to the stated aims of *Confluence*, Dr. Marwaha's paper remains fundamentally subservient to the dominant

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[2] A. Gauld, *Mediumship and Survival: A Century of Investigations*, London: Heinemann, 1982; S. Braude, *Immortal Remains: The Evidence for Life After Death*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003; I. Stevenson, *Where Reincarnation and Biology Intersect*, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997.

[3] D. Radin, *Entangled Minds: Extrasensory Experiences in a Quantum Reality*, New York: Paraview Pocket Books, 2006.

[4] E. F. Kelly, »Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century,« in E. F. Kelly et al. (eds.), *Irreducible Mind: Towards a Psychology for the 21st. Century*, Lanham etc.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010, pp. 577–644.

physicalist paradigm, and seeks to continue the silencing of »deviant« views. For a radically different kind of engagement with non-Anglo traditions along lines sketched in my introductory paragraph, see Kelly, Crabtree, and Marshall (eds.), *Beyond Physicalism: Toward Reconciliation of Science and Spirituality*[5], the central thrust of which is that interconnected phenomena including psi, post-mortem survival and mystical experience necessarily drive us toward an expanded metaphysics having much in common with traditional mystically-informed religious philosophies of India and the Middle East.

–Edward F. Kelly, Research Professor, Division of Perceptual Studies, University of Virginia, USA

[5] E. F. Kelly, »Introduction: Science and Spirituality at a Crossroads,« in E. Kelly, A. Crabtree, and P. Marshall (eds.), *Beyond Physicalism: Toward Reconciliation of Science and Spirituality*, Lanham etc.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015, pp. xi-xxix.

The Scientific Revolution and the Transmission Problem

Abstract
Recent dialogical histories of science propose that the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century was shaped by contributions from different astronomical traditions of the Eurasian region – especially the Maragha School of Arabic astronomy, the Chinese infinite empty space cosmology and the Indian Kerala School of astronomy. Such narratives are based on many discoveries in these traditions which antedate similar discoveries made in Europe during the Scientific Revolution. These views have generated intense objections from critics of the dialogical perspective who maintain independent discovery in Europe of these parallel achievements by repudiating claims for transmission as lacking documentary evidence or acknowledgment. This paper explores these debates using transmissions from the Maragha tradition as a case study. It proposes that a plausible case for transmissions can be made on the basis of circumstantial evidence even in the absence of direct documentary evidence.

Keywords
Maragha School, Scientific Revolution, transmission problem, Copernicus, dialogical histories.

1 Toward Dialogical Histories

In recent years there has emerged an increasing interest in articulating dialogical histories of modern science motivated to a large extent by the turn to global histories of the modern world that look at how interactive processes across civilizations mediated by trade, religion and trans-regional empires have shaped local, regional civilizations

and intra-national developments.[1] Modern science itself, although it developed largely within Europe, has also been seen as influenced by the global linkages in which much geographical, medical, botanical, and technological knowledge exchanges took place between wide geographical regions of the world. However, the Scientific Revolution which played such a critical role in the emergence of the modern world has often been seen as a phenomenon largely insulated by such global dialogues since most historians see it as built on the achievements of ancient and early modern Europeans alone.

However, there is an increasing number of writers who have proposed that non-European contributions played a seminal role in the Scientific Revolution, especially the astronomical revolution associated with Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and Newton. The pioneer in this area is Joseph Needham who documented the significant contributions made by Chinese cosmology, especially the importance of the Chinese infinite empty space theory in transforming European thinking from the closed world of the medieval era. Paralleling these studies is George Gheverghese Joseph's efforts to identify and delineate the impact of the mathematical discoveries of the Kerala School of Indian astronomy on the Scientific Revolution. At the same time George Saliba has emphasised the role that the Arabic Maragha School of astronomy played in developing mathematical techniques and tools that rendered possible the Copernican revolution. In his study *The Dialogue of Civilisations in the Birth of Modern Science* Arun Bala shows how Chinese, Indian and Arabic traditions of astronomy came to be integrated within the Scientific Revolution that led to modern science.[2]

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[1] For an overview of recent surveys of global historical approaches see the essays written by leading international scholars in P. Duara, V. Murthy and A. Sartori (eds.), *A Companion to Global Historical Thought*, Wiley Blackwell, 2014.

[2] See: J. Needham, *Chinese Astronomy and the Jesuit Mission: An Encounter of Cultures*, London: The China Society, 1958; G. Saliba, *Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance*, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2007; G. G. Joseph, *The Crest of the Peacock: Non-European Roots of Mathematics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011; A. Bala, *The Dialogue of Civilizations in the Birth of Modern Science*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. These dialogical histories have begun to put into question orthodox histories concerned with identifying influences only within Europe that came to impact the Scientific Revolution. By contrast: H. Butterfield, *The Origins of Modern Science 1300–1800*, New York: The Free Press, 1957; R. Hall, *The Scientific Revolution 1500–1800: The Formation of the Modern Scientific Attitude*, London: Longmans, 1954; E. J. Dijksterhuis, *The Mechanization of the*

These dialogical historians of the Scientific Revolution demand that we need to radically revise our notions of the historical and geographical contexts of the event. Historically they regard the period from 500 to 1500, often seen as the dark ages of science in Europe[3], as a time of great advances in astronomy in the Arabic, Chinese and Indian civilisations. Paralleling these differences in historical understanding is a different geographical conception. In contrast to histories that see this geography as ranging only over the European continent, dialogical historians see the circulation of knowledge across the Eurasian region as integral to both comprehending and making possible the Scientific Revolution.[4]

However, the emerging dialogical approaches to the Scientific Revolution have generated intense controversy. Although some writers question the notion of a scientific revolution at the dawn of the

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World Picture, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961) emphasise the ancient Greek influence; F. A. Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition,* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964) the role of neo-Platonic hermeticism; P. Duhem, *Medieval Cosmology: Theories of Infinity, Place, Time, Void and the Plurality of World,* (R. Ariew, trans., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985) and E. Grant, *The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) the impact of medieval scholasticism. The recent study by R. S. Westman, *The Copernican Question: Prognostication, Skepticism and Celestial Order,* (California: University of California Press, 2011) which highlights the role that astrology played in the Scientific Revolution, continues this trend of not taking into account contributions from other civilizations.

[3] Some medieval historians disagree with this claim. See Duhem (1985) and J. Hannam, *The Genesis of Science: How the Christian Middle Ages Launched the Scientific Revolution,* Regnery Publishing, 2011.

[4] Such dialogical connections were also important in the constructions of premodern Arabic, Chinese and Indian traditions of science which cannot also be treated as purely endogenous. An early account of such connections written in the eleventh century by S. Al-Andalusi, *Science in the Medieval World: Book of the Categories of Nations,* (S. I. Salem and A. Kumar, trans., Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991) serves to emphasise this point. Maragha tradition influences on Chinese astronomy have been noted by W. Hartner, ›The Astronomical Instruments of Cha-ma-lu-ting, Their Identification, and Their Relations to the Instruments of the Observatory of Marāgha‹, *Isis,* Vol. 41, No. 2, 1950, pp. 184–194. We also have evidence for Greek impact on Indian astronomy in texts such as *Yavanajataka* by Yavanesvara (»Ruler of the Greeks«), and Varahamihira's translation of the *Paulisa Siddhanta* (»Treatise of Paul«), and the *Romaka Siddhanta* (»Treatise of the Romans«). D. Pingree, ›The Recovery of Early Greek Astronomy from India‹, *Journal for the History of Astronomy,* Vol. 7, 1976, pp. 109–123 has noted that many Greek astronomical models antedating Ptolemy can only be known through Indian translations.

modern era[5], and others trace its roots into the Scholastic age, the concept of such a radical disjuncture continues to have traction. Critics of the dialogical approach have noted the problem of establishing whether ideas, theories, techniques or practices from non-Western astronomical traditions were transmitted to Europe. Generally such critics do not dispute that the non-Western discoveries antedated those of the Scientific Revolution, but they insist that what dialogical historians often claim to be transmissions were really independent discoveries made in Europe. Hence the issue of establishing transmission or independent discovery has become central to the controversies that surround dialogical historians and their adversaries.

2 Copernicus and the Maragha Parallels

The most intense and extended debates concerning this issue are associated with the Maragha School, and serve to illustrate the epistemological concerns surrounding claims for transmission and independent discovery. Dialogical histories argue that the Maragha School anticipated many mathematical techniques and devices used by Copernicus in the formulation of his heliocentric model. Although the heliocentric theory of Copernicus was revolutionary and went far beyond Maragha School geocentrism, they deem his epistemological motives and mathematical techniques were not simply inspired by Ptolemy without the significant mediation of the Arabic tradition, *contra* the position adopted by Dijksterhuis when he writes »barring the application of trigonometric methods of computation one finds nothing in [*De Revolutionibus*] that might not just as well have been written in the second century CE by a successor of Ptolemy« (1961: 288).

Both Maragha School astronomers and Copernicus actually introduce new techniques motivated by attempts to remove the notion of an equant deployed by Ptolemy, who had introduced it as a device to make possible a more mathematically precise description of observed phenomenon. Despite their different heliocentric and geocentric conceptions of planetary motions both see Ptolemy as introducing a hypothesis that violated physical plausibility, since it made

[5] See S. Shapin, *The Scientific Revolution*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996; Duhem (1985).

the assumption that a celestial sphere can rotate uniformly about an axis that did not pass through its centre. Indeed objections to the use of the equant were raised by the Arabic polymath Ibn al-Haytham (965–1040 CE) in his study *Doubts Concerning Ptolemy* in the eleventh century. His critique inspired Arabic astronomers to look for new mathematical techniques that would eliminate the need to deploy the equant in astronomical theory.[6]

The first step in solving the problem of the equant was the discovery of a mathematical theorem now labelled the ›Tusi couple‹ by Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (1201–1274). The theorem considers two spheres, with one having half the radius of the other and inside the larger sphere in contact with it at one point. If the larger sphere rotates about an axis, and the smaller sphere rotates at twice the speed about a parallel axis in the opposite direction, then the theorem states that the original point of contact would oscillate back and forth along a diameter of the larger sphere. The Tusi couple allowed astronomers to enlarge and shrink the size of the epicycle radius using only combinations of uniform circular motion (Saliba 2007: 158).

The second step is the discovery of the Urdi lemma by Muyyad al-Din al-Urdi (1200–1266), as a development of the Apollonius theorem. According to this lemma if we draw two lines of equal length from a given straight line that make equal angles either internally or externally with it, and connect their tops to each other, the straight line which results will be parallel to the original line. What makes the Urdi lemma so useful for planetary model building is that it allows astronomers to transform eccentric models into epicyclic ones (*ibid.*: 202).

Taken together the Tusi couple and Urdi lemma gave enough flexibility for model building so that Ibn al-Shatir (1304–1375) was able to formulate his non-Ptolemaic geocentric model of the universe without using the equant. Moreover the predictive power of his model was not inferior to that of Ptolemy's. This was the culmination of the Maragha School project for eliminating the equant begun in response to Ibn al-Haytham's critique of Ptolemy (*ibid.*: 162–165).

What is striking is that Copernicus's theory, despite the revolutionary heliocentric model it adopts in contrast to the geocentric mod-

[6] For a comprehensive survey of these responses see Saliba (2007), especially Chapter 4. Saliba also notes that Ibn al-Haytham not only influenced the Maragha tradition but also shaped European Renaissance science (*ibid.*: 109).

el of al-Shatir, nevertheless exhibits what can be termed ›structural parallels‹ to it. Such structural parallels are very common in the history of science when new theories replace earlier ones in revolutionary situations. The philosopher of science John Worrall makes this point by illustrating it with the example of electromagnetic theory:

> There was an important element of continuity in the shift from Fresnel to Maxwell – and this was much more than a simple question of carrying over the successful empirical content into the new theory. At the same time it was rather less than a carrying over of the full theoretical content or full theoretical mechanisms (even in »approximate« form) […] There was continuity or accumulation in the shift, but the continuity is one of form or structure, not of content (Worrall 1989: 117).[7]

Such structural mathematical continuities are also exhibited by the Copernican and ibn al-Shatir models despite both being used to frame different cosmological theories. The Copernican model can be seen as mathematically similar to the al-Shatir theory once we invert the vector connecting the Earth and the Sun – i. e. make the Sun rather than the Earth the center of orbit for the planets. It is such structural continuities, similar to those that occur when one theory develops out of and displaces a predecessor, that support the claim by dialogical historians that the al-Shatir model was a geocentric predecessor of Copernicus' heliocentric theory.

Indeed both theories are motivated by the same desire to eliminate the equant and use the same theorems – the Tusi couple and the Urdi lemma – to accomplish this project. Moreover, the resemblances between the Copernican model and that of al-Shatir do not simply end here. In order to deal with the problem that Ptolemy's moon epicycles would exaggerate the moon's visual diameter, and amplify parallax effects beyond what is observed, Ibn al-Shatir had constructed a new model of lunar motion – one similar to that later deployed by Copernicus.

Ibn al-Shatir also reformed Ptolemy's model of the motion of the planet Mercury. With the exception of Mercury, he used constructions for all planets identical to that deployed by Ptolemy but with variations in the speed and size of the epicycles. However in the case

[7] J. Worrall, ›Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?‹ *Dialectica*, Vol. 43, pp. 99–124. Reprinted in D. Papineau (ed.), *The Philosophy of Science*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 139–165.

of Mercury, he applied the Tusi couple once again in the last step – a procedure that was followed by Copernicus for the same planet more than two centuries later (Saliba 2007: 163–164).

Was the Maragha School motivation to eliminate the equant and its discoveries transmitted to Copernicus? An affirmative answer to this question seems reasonable if we adopt the criterion Needham recommended for establishing transmissions of Chinese discoveries to Europe when he writes:

> Of course there may have been some degree of independence in the European advances. Even when we have good reason to believe in a transmission from China to the West we know very little of the means by which it took place. But as in all other fields of science and technology the onus of proof lies upon those who wish to maintain fully independent invention, and the longer the period elapsing between the successive appearances of a discovery or invention in two or more cultures concerned, the heavier the onus generally is (Needham 1970: 70).[8]

Needham clearly offers us a criterion for inferring transmission based on priority of discovery and the temporal interval that separates rediscovery in another culture. Adopting this criterion we would have to say that the parallels with discoveries in the Scientific Revolution earlier made by the Maragha School should be seen as also having influenced similar discoveries in Europe since they preceded rediscovery in Europe by many decades if not centuries.

Needham's approach has been used by other historians for transmissions from West to East. Van der Waerden argued that Aryabhata's trigonometry had methodological similarities with earlier Greek works and therefore must have been borrowed from them. Using a similar argument he claimed that Bhaskara II's work on Diophantine equations can be traced to an *unknown* Greek manuscript he must have had access to. It leads van der Waerden to conclude that the works of Aryabhata and Bhaskara had Greek origins since, as he put it, »in the history of science independent inventions are exceptions: the general rule is dependence« (van der Waerden 1976: 224).[9] Similarly Neugebauer appealed to »priority, accessible communication routes and methodological similarities« to demonstrate that the In-

[8] J. Needham, *Clerks and Craftsmen in China and the West*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

[9] B. van der Waerden, ›Pell's equation in Greek and Hindu Mathematics‹, *Russian Mathematical Surveys*, Vol. 31, 1976, pp. 210–225.

dian *Siddhantas* (astronomical treatises) had Greek origins (Neugebauer 1962: 166–167).[10]

However, the historian of science Floris Cohen questions the principle adopted by Needham. He argues that Needham rightly assumes that absence of evidence for transmission cannot be used to establish independent discovery. But he considers Needham to assume wrongly that in the absence of evidence against transmission we can take influence to have occurred simply on the basis that it was possible. Cohen writes:

> Although it is true that, if no transmission took place, there will necessarily be no source material to indicate transmission, the absence of source material need not prove independent rediscovery, even though it would seem to count against transmission rather than for it. Thus the two possibilities are not logically symmetrical but since one can argue endlessly over whether the affirmation that stands in need of proof is transmission or independent rediscovery without ever getting anywhere, it would seem better to seek another criterion if one wishes to say anything at all about these really quite doubtful yet highly important matters (Cohen 1994: 436).[11]

Despite recommending that we find another criterion, Cohen himself does not offer one. Instead he assumes that absence of evidence for transmission counts against transmission. Thus he disputes Needham's demand that the onus of proof lies upon those who wish to claim independent discovery and sees it as unnecessary to offer positive evidence for such discovery. This allows him to slide into a perspective of the history of the Scientific Revolution that ignores wider Eurasian contributions that made it possible. If he had made the symmetric demand that we should provide positive evidence both for transmission and for independent discovery then the absence of evidence either way would have left him in a limbo state, where he could neither articulate a history confined to European contributions nor a dialogical history accommodating wider Eurasian connections. This is further confirmed in a subsequent study by Cohen, *How Modern Science Came into the World*, where he does develop a full-fledged explanation for why the Scientific Revolution took place in Europe. Here he not only explicitly assumes that there were no *significant* Arabic influences, but also claims that we should »regard Copernicus

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[10] O. Neugebauer, *The Exact Sciences in Antiquity*, New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
[11] H. F. Cohen, *The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

as Ptolemy's last and greatest heir, who throughout books II–VI of *De Revolutionibus* carried the hoary art of ›saving the phenomena‹ to new heights by means of his heliocentric, Aristarchos-inspired hypothesis« (Cohen 2011: 209).[12] Cohen then proceeds to maintain controversially that Kepler, who replaced Copernican complex epicycles with simple ellipses, was the real revolutionary and seems to overlook that Kepler himself explicitly acknowledged Copernicus in his study *Epitome Astronomiae Copernicanae.*

Indeed Cohen's asymmetric approach in dealing with establishing transmission and independent discovery is reminiscent of many historians who find it easier to claim transmission from Europe to other cultures without positive evidence, but demand such evidence when the transmission is from other cultures into Europe. This double standard, designed to work against dialogical approaches to history, has been noted by Joseph:

> [A] case for claiming the transmission of knowledge from Europe to places outside does not necessarily rest on direct documentary evidence. In certain circumstances priority, communication routes, and similarities appear to establish transmission from West to East as more plausible, on balance of probabilities, than independent discovery in the East. However, when it comes to East-to-West transmissions, there seems to be a complete change of orientation. The criterion is no longer the comparative notion of ›balance of probabilities‹ but the absolute notion of ›beyond all reasonable doubt‹. This double standard makes it possible to sustain a case for Eurocentric histories against their dialogical competitors, even in those situations where an across-the-board application of the principle of the balance of probabilities would make a stronger case for East-to-West transmissions (Joseph 2011: 437–438).

The dispute between Needham and Cohen may be formulated as follows. Needham demands, given priority and possibility of communication, strong proof for independent discovery and weak proof for transmission, that is, transmission is assumed if independent discovery cannot be established. By contrast Cohen demands strong proof for transmission and weak proof for independent discovery, that is, independent discovery is assumed if transmission cannot be established. Thus adopting Needham's approach would lead us to a Eurasia-centric dialogical history, but adopting Cohen's would guide us

[12] H. F. Cohen, *How Modern Science Came into the World: Four Civilizations, One 17th-Century Breakthrough*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011.

into a Euro-centric history that ignores the wider Eurasian connections.

Clearly we need better criteria than those assumed by Needham explicitly, or presumed by Cohen implicitly, if we are to resolve the transmission versus independent discovery debate in a rational fashion. Such criteria cannot always hope to establish either transmission or independent discovery beyond reasonable doubt. To do so we would always be required to find evidence in the form of translations or other kinds of documentary proof, or explicit acknowledgement of the influence. In the absence of such evidence the best that we can have is a balance of probabilities judgement between claims for transmission and claims for independent discovery. Such a judgement cannot, like the Needham and Cohen approaches, demand establishing a claim beyond reasonable doubt in one direction, and assume that the failure to do this allows us to make the claim in the other direction.

3 Transmission versus Independent Discovery

Arguments for transmissions from the Maragha School have been made by many writers such as Kennedy and Roberts (1959), Hartner (1973), Swerdlow and Neugebauer (1984), Ragep (2007) and Saliba (2007).[13] Contesting these transmission are those who propose independent discovery including Rosinska (1974), Bono (1995), Huff (2011), Kokowski (2012) and Blåsjö (2014).[14] Perhaps the most com-

[13] E. S. Kennedy and V. Roberts, ›The Planetary Theory of Ibn al-Shatir‹, *Isis*, Vol. 50, 1959, pp. 227–235; W. Hartner, ›Copernicus, the Man, the Work, and its History‹, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. 117, 1973, pp. 413–422; N. M. Swerdlow, and O. Neugebauer, *Mathematical Astronomy in Copernicus's De Revolutionibus*, New York: Springer Verlag, 1984; F. J. Ragep, ›Copernicus and His Islamic Predecessors: Some Historical Remarks‹, *History of Science*, Vol. 45, 2007, pp. 65–81.

[14] G. Rosinska, ›Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and Ibn al-Shatir in Cracow?‹ *Isis*, Vol. 65, 1974, pp. 239–243; M. Di Bono, ›Copernicus, Amico, Fracastoro and Tusi's Device: Observations on the Use and Transmission of a Model‹, *Journal for the History of Astronomy*, Vol. 26, 1995, pp. 133–154; T. E. Huff, *Intellectual Curiosity and the Scientific Revolution: A Global Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011; M. Kokowski, ›Copernicus, Arabic Science, and The Scientific (R)evolution‹, in A. Bala (ed.), *Asia, Europe and the Emergence of Modern Science: Knowledge Crossing Boundaries*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 55–72; V. Blåsjö, ›A Critique of the Arguments for Maragha Influence on Copernicus‹, *Journal for the History of Astronomy*, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2014, pp. 183–195.

prehensive account of the transmission position is given by Saliba who argues that the Copernican theory can be easily derived from the al-Shatir model by inverting the vector connecting the Earth-Moon system with the Sun. He also points to more specific circumstantial evidence to show that the way Copernicus deployed the Tusi couple and the Urdi lemma, as well as his models for the Moon and Mercury, were directly drawn from Ibn al-Shatir. Saliba's case for transmission has been systematically contested by Viktor Blåsjö who argues for independent discovery in a recent paper entitled *A Critique of the Arguments for Maragha Influence on Copernicus.* We will now compare their arguments to explore more deeply the epistemological issues surrounding transmission versus independent discovery debates between dialogical historians and their critics.

Consider the Tusi couple, which came to be deployed as a substitute for the equant by Maragha School astronomers, that combines two circular motions to generate rectilinear motion. Since Copernicus uses the device as well to eliminate the equant, Saliba has argued that he must have learnt it in some way from the Arabic tradition. However Blåsjö disputes this claim. He writes:

> [T]he Tusi couple is nothing but the special case of a simple epicyclic model where the epicycle has the same radius as the deferent. It would therefore be natural for the Tusi couple to suggest itself to a skilled geometer working in the Ptolemaic tradition. Thus independent discovery by Copernicus is not at all implausible (Blåsjö 2014: 185).

Blåsjö's argument that Copernicus as a skilled geometer could easily have discovered the Tusi couple leaves unanswered the question why it was not discovered much earlier in Europe by astronomers working with the Ptolemaic model, or by other astronomers in the Arabic tradition before al-Tusi. In fact al-Tusi himself was motivated to make this discovery because he accepted Ibn al-Haytham's demand nearly two centuries earlier that astronomers should do away with the equant. But the fact that in the Arabic world it required two centuries to accomplish this discovery makes Blåsjö's claim that any skilled geometer could easily have discovered the theorem extremely implausible.

Blåsjö also addresses the circumstantial evidence, first noted by Hartner, that Copernicus used an order of the letters in Latin that followed the order of Arabic letters used by Tusi in his proof of the Tusi couple. Hartner concludes that this »proves clearly that we have

to do with a case of borrowing« (Hartner 1973: 421). However, only five of the six letters in the Tusi figure agree with that of Copernicus. Saliba argues that the sixth letter came from a misreading of an Arabic character which was translated as an F rather than a Z. Blåsjö disputes this point. He argues that anyone familiar with Arabic would not make such a mistake, and that the order of the letters follows that in which the points are invoked when Copernicus gives his proof of the theorem. This argument has some plausibility. If the lettering follows the order in which the points are invoked in the proof of the theorem both Tusi and Copernicus are likely to independently label the points in the same order. However, showing that Copernicus may have given independent justification of the theorem does not show he independently discovered it. It would be reasonable to say that any skilled geometer could prove the theorem once it has been discovered, but we have seen that it is extremely implausible to suggest that any such geometer could have discovered the theorem.

Let us now turn to the Urdi lemma which, like the Tusi couple, was also unknown to the ancient Greeks. Although Copernicus did attempt to prove the Tusi couple he gave no formal proof for the Urdi lemma. It leads Saliba to conclude that »the almost unconscious use of Urdi's Lemma by Copernicus […] must raise doubts about Copernicus's awareness of the roots of all the mathematical techniques that were at his disposal« (Saliba 2007: 205). However, Blåsjö disputes the charge that Copernicus was ignorant of what he was doing. He argues that the Urdi lemma is not used by Copernicus as a theorem in the way he deploys the Tusi couple but merely as a tool to define his planetary models. Consequently he would not have felt any need to give formal proof of the Urdi lemma since it was not proposed as a theorem. Even if Blåsjö is right, Copernicus would have had to have known the theorem in order to construct the model. Blåsjö seems to presume that Copernicus would have independently discovered the Urdi lemma. Again this is extremely implausible since if he had done so he would have mentioned it as a discovery of a new mathematical theorem.

Indeed it is particularly striking that although Copernicus deployed the Tusi couple and the Urdi lemma in his astronomical model, he did not make any mention of the fact that he independently discovered these theorems quite unknown to the Greeks. Neither did anyone of the other astronomers and geometers reading Copernicus' treatise attribute to him the discovery of two new geometrical theo-

rems. This suggests that these theorems must have been quite widely known even before Copernicus invoked them for use in his heliocentric model of the universe.

George Saliba writes that »Ibn al-Shatir's lunar model was indeed identical, in every respect, to that of Copernicus« (*ibid.*: 196). Both their lunar models were intended to rectify perceived defects in Ptolemy's lunar model that were first noted by Ibn al-Haytham. The main problem with the Ptolemaic theory was that the structure of epicycles that defined the moon's motion caused its furthest distance from the earth to be more than twice the nearest. However, the changes in the visual appearance of the moon, and the parallax effects it exhibited, did not conform to such large variations in its distance from the earth. Despite his undoubted genius al-Haytham was unable to solve the problem which was taken up by a string of mathematical astronomers who followed him, including al-Tusi and Urdi, until it was finally solved by Ibn al-Shatir more than two centuries later. The same solution was offered by Copernicus lending credibility to Saliba's claim that Copernicus was influenced by Ibn al-Shatir.

Blåsjö disputes this. He writes:

> Copernicus and ibn al-Shatir solve this same obvious problem in the same obvious way, namely by controlling the effect of the epicycle by varying its size instead of its distance. This has the same visual effect so far as the longitudinal position of the Moon is concerned but without requiring great variations in its distance. The variation in the radius of the epicycle is achieved by a second epicycle, whose period is such that it always displaces the Moon inwards and outwards when Ptolemy moved it further and closer respectively. […] This single idea constitutes the full extent of the similarities, or alleged ›identity‹, of Copernicus' and Ibn al-Shatir's lunar models. There can be little doubt that this very simple idea would have suggested itself to any serious astronomer tackling the problem, so this trivial agreement proves nothing about influence (Blåsjö 2014: 189).

It is quite striking that the major achievement of solving the problem of lunar motion is seen by Blåsjö as a simple idea that would have occurred to any astronomer. Since Ptolemy himself would have been aware of the problem it makes one wonder why a solution that appears so obvious to Blåsjö would not have been adopted by Ptolemy himself. Moreover, even after Ibn al-Haytham pointed to the problem, it took centuries of work by a chain of astronomers for a solution to be found.

The similarity between Copernicus's model for planetary motion

with that of Ibn al-Shatir has also been noted. This is especially the case for the planet Mercury where the similarity between them is even more striking because here is where they make the greatest changes to the Ptolemaic model, if we make allowance for the fact that Copernicus was proposing a heliocentric theory but Ibn al-Shatir a geocentric one. It leads Saliba to argue that Copernicus was following the Maragha tradition. But Blåsjö again disputes this claim by writing:

> The similarities between Copernicus's planetary models and those of the late medieval Islamic astronomers are not surprising. Heliocentrism aside, Copernicus picked up where Ptolemy left off and attempted to reform Ptolemaic astronomy while adhering to the framework of classical Greek astronomy very closely and conservatively, as did his Islamic counterparts. Overlapping, independent discoveries are to be expected in such circumstances. […] This leaves us no good reasons for believing that Copernicus was influenced by late medieval Islamic astronomy (*ibid.*: 193–194).

Blåsjö's conclusion is questionable because there are many ways of constructing non-Ptolemaic astronomical models that do away with the equant by deploying the Tusi-couple and the Urdi lemma. The al-Shatir model is merely one possible approach. In the sixteenth century Shams al-Din al-Khafri (died 1550) produced four such different models for Mercury's motion. None of them were similar to the others in mathematical construction but all of them were able to account for the same set of observations (Saliba 2007: 166). This raises the question: Why did Copernicus propose a model so similar to the Ibn al-Shatir model and not any of the other possible models that al-Khafri had devised? This seems too much of a coincidence suggesting that it is reasonable to assume that Copernicus was indeed influenced by Ibn al-Shatir.

Moreover, Blåsjö places too much weight on the singular genius of Copernicus to make the leap directly from Ptolemy to his heliocentric theory bypassing the Maragha revolution. Yet the Maragha revolution was many centuries in the making. It began with Ibn al-Haytham's critique of the Ptolemaic model and its use of the equant, the discovery of the Tusi couple and the Urdi lemma, the construction by various astronomers of planetary models rectifying the problems found in Ptolemy, culminating in the Ibn al-Shatir model which was but one of several possible models as demonstrated by al-Khafri. Yet Copernicus is seen by Blåsjö as not only rediscovering independently

the Tusi couple and the Urdi lemma, and constructing a planetary model similar to that of Ibn al-Shatir's, but also deploying all this to produce a revolutionary heliocentric model of the universe. This seems too much to accomplish in a singular lifetime even for the genius of a Copernicus – a point earlier stressed by Ragep when he notes:

> What seems to be overlooked by those who advocate a reinvention by Copernicus and/or his contemporaries of the mathematical models previously used by Islamic astronomers is the lack of an historical context for those models within European astronomy. At the least, one would expect to find some tradition of criticism of Ptolemy in Europe in which those models would make sense. But in fact this is not the case. Copernicus's statement of his dissatisfaction with Ptolemaic astronomy, which is the ostensible reason he gives for his drastic cosmological change, had no precedent in Europe but did have a continuous five-hundred-year precedent in the Islamic world. […] Those who advocate parallel development would thus seem to be claiming that a centuries long tradition with no analogue whatsoever in Europe was recapitulated, somehow, in the life of one individual who not only paralleled the criticisms but also the same models and revised models in the course of some thirty years. Needless to say, such an approach is ahistorical in the extreme (Ragep 2007: 70–71).[15]

Moreover there is evidence that the use of harmonic operators, developed by Maragha astronomers, spread to early sixteenth-century Latin astronomers such as Angelus, Johann Werner and Copernicus (Dobrzycki and Kremer 1996: 189).[16] Such connections would explain why Copernicus might have been motivated to address the equant problem, and even recognise potential solutions for it when he found it in the writings of these authors. Indeed Owen Gingerich has suggested that Copernicus could have come to know of the Urdi lemma without being aware of its Islamic antecedence, through acquaintance

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[15] However, where we do have similar historical contexts it is possible to make a case for independent discoveries across cultures. Thus the parallel discovery of the theory of the rainbow by Kamal al-Din al-Farisi and Theodoric of Freiberg can be seen as independent achievements built upon the optical discoveries of al-Haytham. Such independent discoveries are common where scientists working far apart are nevertheless operating within the same conceptual paradigm. See D. Lamb and S. M. Easton, *Multiple Discovery: The Pattern of Scientific Progress*, Amersham: Avebury Press, 1984.

[16] J. Dobrzycki and R. L. Kremer, ›Peurbach and Maragha Astronomy? The Ephemerides of Johannes Angelus and Their Implications‹, *Journal for the History of Astronomy*, Vol. 27, 1996, pp. 187–237.

with the works of Angelus (Gingerich 2004: 263–265).[17] All this suggests that it is far more credible to believe, as Swerdlow and Neugebauer conclude in their study *Mathematical Astronomy in Copernicus' De Revolutionibus*, that »In a very real sense, Copernicus can be looked upon as if not the last, surely as the most noted follower of the Maragha School« (Swerdlow and Neugebauer 1984: 225).

4 Rethinking the Transmission Problem

However, even if the case for transmission appears to be comparatively more plausible than independent discovery it still leaves unanswered a number of problems raised by critics of transmission. This is highlighted by Blåsjö who writes:

> Copernicus's planetary models exhibit some striking similarities to those of late medieval astronomers. On this basis many have concluded that he must have been influenced by them. We claim that no good evidence for this inference exists. Certainly there is no direct trace of it in the documentary record: the sources Copernicus supposedly copied from are not cited by him or any of his European contemporaries – despite the fact that Copernicus cites numerous earlier Islamic sources – and there is virtually no evidence they were accessible to him (Blåsjö 2014: 183).

Blåsjö raises three key concerns that any transmission theory must address. First why is there no documentary evidence by way of translations or records of this influence? Second why is there no acknowledgement of this influence by either Copernicus or his European contemporaries? Finally, if Eurocentrism is the cause for lack of acknowledgement as Joseph suggests, why does Copernicus acknowledge other Arabic sources but not those of the Maragha School? Answering these questions adequately would greatly strengthen claims for transmission.

I would like to argue that transmissions did not occur directly through translations or readings of Arabic texts, but were mediated by oral exchanges with scholars who travelled between Europe and the Islamic world. Such exchanges would not leave direct documentary evidence or motivate acknowledgement in writing. Support for

[17] O. Gingerich, *The Book Nobody Read: Chasing the Revolutions of Nicolaus Copernicus*, New York: Walker & Company, 2004. I would also like to thank one of the anonymous reviewer of this article for bringing these connections to my attention.

such transmissions comes from a recent paper by Robert Morrison in which he argues that Jewish scholars expelled from Spain in 1492 constituted a transnational diaspora creating connections between the Christian and Islamic worlds and serving as a conduit for scientific knowledge in the mid-sixteenth century (Morrison 2014: 34).[18]

In particular Morrison points to Moses Galeano (Musa Jalinus) as a possible transmitter of scientific knowledge between the Ottoman Empire and the Veneto, especially between 1497 and 1502. He notes that Galeano had knowledge of the Arabic scientific theories that appear in Copernicus' work and was in contact with Christian scholars in the Veneto where Copernicus studied medicine at the University of Padua between 1501 and 1503 (*ibid.*: 35). He also adds that Galeano had knowledge and understanding of Ibn al-Shatir's theoretical astronomy (*ibid.*: 39). This leads Morrison to conclude:

> [T]here may be a limit to how much can be attributed to independent discovery in the face of a plausible path of transmission. Andre Goddu has written that without a clear path of transmission to explain the parallels between the astronomy of the Islamic world and the work of Renaissance astronomers, including Copernicus, we should entertain other explanations. To account for the overwhelming parallels between Copernicus's models and Ibn al-Shatir's, he noted that Sandivogius of Czechel and Albert of Brudzewo proposed double-epicycle models for the moon. But those lunar models were not the same as Ibn al-Shatir's and Copernicus's and there was no explanation of how those double-epicycle lunar models led to planetary models that, with the exception of heliocentrism, were equivalent to Ibn al-Shatir's. In contrast, the network of transmission that this article has described would seem to offer a more plausible explanation (*ibid.*: 57).

The presence of Jewish scholars who moved between the Islamic and Christian worlds is also significant for another reason. These were scholars capable of reading both Latin and Arabic and transmitting knowledge from one culture to the other without the need to do actual written translations. This further weakens the plausibility of independent discovery claims and strengthens that of dialogical connections.

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[18] R. Morrison, ›A Scholarly Intermediary between the Ottoman Empire and Renaissance Europe‹, *Isis*, Vol. 105, 2014, pp. 32–57. For a more comprehensive study of such exchanges through intermediaries between the Latin and Islamic worlds see A. Ben-Zaken, *Cross-cultural Scientific Exchanges in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1560–1660*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010.

Indeed the hypothesis of oral transmission resolves many of the objections that motivate claims for independent discovery by critics of dialogical historians. It explains the absence of documentary evidence for transmission, how Maragha knowledge could be acquired without acquaintance with the Arabic language, why European astronomers came to such knowledge only after corridors of communication were opened through Jewish scholars and others, why Copernicus's use of the Tusi couple and Urdi lemma were not seen as seminal mathematical achievements, and why Copernicus developed the Ibn al-Shatir model rather than al-Khafri's other variants.

By contrast the hypothesis of independent discovery adopted by critics of the dialogical approaches makes the incredible assumption that Copernicus's genius not only recapitulated centuries of Maragha School mathematical achievements single-handedly, but also used these to frame a revolutionary new astronomical vision. Moreover it cannot explain either why Copernicus's contemporaries did not see his use of the Tusi couple and Urdi lemma as seminal mathematical achievements, or why his model coincidentally paralleled Ibn al-Shatir's and not any of al-Khafri's other possible variants. Thus from the point of view of comparative plausibility the dialogical historical case for transmission of Maragha discoveries to Copernicus appears more plausible than that for independent discovery as claimed by its critics, even though no conclusive documentary evidence can settle the matter either way.

This conclusion has wider implications for the dialogical construction of the history of the Scientific Revolution. It is not just the Maragha School, but also the contributions from the Chinese infinite empty space cosmology and Indian Kerala School astronomy that have been repudiated by critics of the dialogical approach on the grounds of lack of documentary evidence. The tacit assumption informing such judgments is that all transmission must be established by documentary evidence. But we have seen that transmissions made through intermediaries or brokers across cultures need not leave documentary evidence, but could nevertheless be traced through circumstantial evidence. Thus we cannot assume independent discovery simply on the basis of absence of documentary evidence. What seems more reasonable is to compare the circumstantial evidence for both transmission and independent discovery against each other to determine which has greater plausibility. By adopting this approach we have found that the case for transmission from the Maragha School

to Copernicus has more credibility than the case for independent discovery. If similar approaches show dialogical influences from Indian and Chinese astronomical traditions on the Scientific Revolution we might be required to radically revise our orthodox conceptions of the role that a dialogue of civilizations played in the birth of modern science.

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On the Paradigm Shift of Comparative Studies of Heidegger and Chinese Philosophy

Abstract
In this paper, I first address two facets that can play a role in initiating a paradigm shift in comparative studies of Heidegger and Chinese philosophy: One is the necessity of renovating methodology in studies of Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy. The other is an adequate understanding of Heidegger's own comportment toward East-West dialogue. In this connection I briefly respond to some criticisms of my book *Heidegger on East-West Dialogue: Anticipating the Event*. Then I stake out three directions of re-configuration or re-orientation entailed in such a paradigm shift. The first direction is concerned with a deconstruction of the notion of philosophy. The second direction is related to a critical and intercultural approach to Heidegger's thinking. The third direction is connected with the overcoming of the unilateral direction in comparative studies.

Keywords
Heidegger, comparative philosophy, Chinese philosophy, paradigm shift, East-West dialogue.

1 Introduction

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) is undeniably one of the few Western philosophers who has exerted great influence upon the general direction of development of Western philosophy since the publication of *Being and Time* in 1927. His *Denkweg* has effectively initiated a mode of thinking that allegedly takes its point of departure from human finitude and stays close to human beings' being-together with things in the world. What is unique about Heidegger also consists in his multi-layered baffling connection with ancient Eastern sources and with contemporary Asian thinkers.

For almost half a century, most Chinese scholars have taken Heidegger's relation to Chinese philosophy to be a closed case, either assuming an unreserved absorption of, in particular, Daoist ideas on the part of Heidegger, or stopping at the seemingly indisputable similarities between the two. The representative scholar of such an orientation is Zhang Xianglong. His book in Chinese entitled *Heidegger's Thinking and the Chinese Dao of Heaven: The Opening and Fusion of the Ultimate Horizon*, is now considered as a classic in the Chinese academia.[1] It is understandable that, at a time when traditional Chinese thought was depreciated in the 1980's and 1990's, Heidegger's interest in Daoism seemed to have offered hope for some Chinese scholars who shared attachment to their own heritage. Hence, despite occasional criticisms that have been ignored, Zhang's view continues to be a major source of influence on scholars from various fields of academic studies.[2]

In the English/Western world, the situation is similar, but the voices of critics are relatively easier to be heard. A number of articles from *Heidegger and Asian Thought* presented Daoist or Zen themes in typically Heideggerian terms, in particular the contributions by Graham Parkes and Joan Stambaugh.[3] In his review of *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, John Maraldo perceives quite a number of strained and questionable comparisons, and wonders »what causes so many commentators to seek a non-Western, often Daoist or Zen, counterpart to so many seminal Heideggerian themes« (Maraldo 1990: 102).[4] Such enthusiasm may be related to the current situation where both philosophers doing Asian philosophy and philosophers based in Asia attempt to borrow intellectual means and vocabulary from Western philosophers for its contemporary development. It also has to do with the fact that resonances among different cultural tradi-

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[1] Zhang Xianglong, *Heidegger's Thinking and the Chinese Dao of Heaven: The Opening and Fusion of the Ultimate Horizon*, Beijing: Sanlian Shudian, 1996.

[2] *Cf.* Na Wei, *The Mutual Interpretation of Daoism and Heidegger*, Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2004.

[3] G. Parkes, »Thoughts on the Way: *Being and Time* via Lao-Chuang,« J. Stambaugh, »Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics,« both in G. Parkes (ed.), *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987, pp. 105–143, and pp. 79–92.

[4] J. C. Maraldo, »Review of *Heidegger and Asian Thought* – Graham Parkes,« *Philosophy East & West*, Vol. 40, 1990, pp. 100–105.

tions can be more easily found within works of a poetic bent.[5] Nonetheless, the poetic façade of Heidegger's work need more subtle analysis.

In their review of *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, written in 1997, Taylor Carman and Bryan Van Norden observe that the contributors either try to avoid or simply ignore the pervasively Western orientation of Heidegger's philosophy, as well as Heidegger's evident scepticism regarding the prospect of any synthesis of Eastern and Western thought.[6] In this way, the difficulties involved in the comparative enterprise concerning Heidegger and Asian philosophy are under-estimated from the outset. It is a pity that comparative scholarship in connection with Heidegger has failed to take into account Carman and van Norden's criticism.

The introduction of May's work into the English world in 1996 has created a considerable impact on comparative studies of Heidegger.[7] Convinced of May's findings, Parkes has withdrawn his claim that studies of the independent congruence of ideas assume primacy over those concentrating on the question of direct influence. However, the influence to which he turns is unilaterally restricted to the alleged influence of Asian classics upon Heidegger's thought. It is true that, chronologically speaking, alleged authors of Asian classics cannot possibly have stood under the sway of Heidegger's imposing manner of philosophizing. However, contemporary interpretations of classic Asian texts have not been immune from Heidegger's formidable presence in the academic circle in Asia.

On the other hand, most scholars of mainstream Heidegger studies have refrained from attaching importance to Heidegger's Asian connection. Currently, this situation is beginning to change with the development of teaching of and research into Chinese philosophy in the international academic world, and with the disclosure of Heidegger's own stance toward the issue of East-West dialogue. In this arti-

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[5] Compared with comparative philosophy, comparative literature enjoys a much longer history and is well-embedded in the state of art of literary studies.

[6] See Carman and Van Norden, »Being-in-the-Way,« previously available at http://faculty.vassar.edu/brannor/heidegger.html. Unfortunately it has been removed. For more literature related to Heidegger and Asian philosophy, see http://www.beyng.com/hlinks/hasia.html (last accessed on 18 January 2016).

[7] R. May, *Ex Oriente Lux: Heideggers Werk unter ostasiatischem Einfluss*, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1989; *Heidegger's Hidden Sources: East Asian Influences on His Work*, G. Parkes (trans.), London: Routledge, 1996.

cle, I first address two facets that can play a role in initiating a paradigm shift in comparative studies of Heidegger and Chinese philosophy; then I stake out three directions of re-configuration or re-orientation entailed in such a paradigm shift.[8]

2 The Two Facets

The first facet that calls for a paradigm shift concerns Heidegger's insights regarding the necessity of renovating methodology in studies of Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy. Heidegger realized, earlier than the emergence of the discourses of orientalism, postcolonialism, and postmodernism, the limitation of translation and interpretation of Asian classics by Western scholars. In a letter to a German scholar of Buddhism in 1955, he pointed out that »Buddhism and not less so Chinese and Japanese thought need a completely different interpretation, which is free from the eighteenth and nineteenth century images« (Heidegger 1990: 91).[9] One limitation of the early translators (in particular the ones available in Heidegger's times) is that they have heavily assimilated Asian ideas to Western religious conceptions. For instance, in their respective versions of the *Daodejing* (道德經), Richard Wilhelm translated *Dao* as *Sinn*, which insinuated the *logos* in *The Gospel of Saint John;* and Victor von Strauss directly rendered *Dao* as *Gott*.[10]

Another serious limitation is that the early interpreters have forced Asian thinking into the model of Western philosophy. Heidegger criticized several times that Wilhelm had rendered ancient Chinese texts in light of the Kantian philosophy. In a conversation of 1952, Heidegger remarks,

> With our logistic-grammatical conceptual apparatus there are many words [when translating] that we cannot grasp sharply. For example when I read the translations from Chinese by Richard Wilhelm, I see that he has ap-

[8] The focus of this paper is the paradigm shift needed in comparative studies that involves Heidegger specifically. I don't address the more general issue of the methodology of interpreting classical East Asian thinking in a modern language.

[9] Cited in H. Hecker, »Heidegger und Schopenhauer,« in *Schopenhauer Jahrbuch*, Vol. 71, 1990. My translation.

[10] R. Wilhelm, *Laotse Tao Te King: Das Buch des Alten vom Sinn und Leben*, Jena: Eugen Diederichs Verlag, 1911. V. von Strauss, *Lao-Tse's Tao Te King*, Leipzig: Verlag der »Asia Major,« 1874. Wilhelm was a protestant minister and missionary to China.

proached the text completely in the framework of Kantian philosophy (Heidegger 1997: 269).[11]

In »Basic Principles of Thinking« of 1957, Heidegger makes his point more sharply,

> [t]he reference to the λόγος-character of Western thought contains for us the behest that before touching upon these foreign worlds, should we risk it, we first ask ourselves whether we at all have the ear to hear what is thought there. This question becomes all the more burning as European thinking also threatens to become planetary, in that contemporary Indians, Chinese and Japanese in many cases report their experiences to us only in our European way of thinking. Thus from there and from here everything is stirred up in a gigantic mishmash wherein it is no longer discernible whether or not the ancient Indians were English empiricists and Laozi a Kantian. Where and how is there supposed to be an awakening conversation calling each back into its own essence, if on both sides substancelessness has the final word? (Heidegger 2012: 137)[12]

Heidegger ascribes the causes of these limitations not to expansionist colonialism, but to the *logos*-character of Western thinking, to its »conceptual apparatus.« It is in his view the dualistic metaphysical system that has prevented Europeans from properly mastering Asian languages and understanding Asian ideas. Furthermore, due to globalization (which Heidegger called »planetarization« in the 1950s), the mode of experience and scheme of thinking of Asian intellectuals have been subjected to the sway of European conceptual systems, to such an extent that they have become insulated from their own traditions and thus are no longer in a position to present authentic accounts about them. Consequently, in a chaotic mixing up of various sources, ancient Asian thinkers have been misinterpreted along the lines of European philosophers. All this chaos was generated from the planetarization of European thinking.[13]

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[11] H. Hecker, »Als Buddhist im Gespräch mit Heidegger,« in W. Hartig, *Die Lehre des Buddha und Heidegger: Beiträge zum Ost-West-Dialog des Denkens im 20. Jahrhundert*, Konstanz: Universität Konstanz, 1997, pp. 268–270. My translation.

[12] M. Heidegger, *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, A. J. Mitchell (trans.), Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2012 [*Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge, Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 79, 1994, p. 145].

[13] Of course, today Richard Wilhelm and Victor von Strauss are not representative of scholarship on Chinese thought any more. This change is compatible with the needed paradigm shift which this paper is discussing.

In *Time and Being* of 1962, Heidegger articulates similar considerations that Asian thinking has been rendered inaccessible. He states,

> Being as presencing in the sense of calculable material […] claims all the inhabitants of the earth in a uniform manner without the inhabitants of the non-European continents explicitly knowing this or even being able or wanting to know of the origin of this determination of Being (Heidegger 1972: 7).[14]

For Heidegger, Being as presencing is essentially interrelated with the metaphysical mode of representation of European languages. People in non-European continents are not excluded from the planetary expansion of this mode of determination of Being, even if they may not be aware of this, or have no intention to know anything about its origin. The matter is not just that Europeans have no access to Asian thought, but also that Asian people themselves, dominated by the planetary European mode of thinking, have no access to their own traditions either.

Although Heidegger's critical remarks primarily concern »Asian studies« conducted by European intellectuals, Chinese scholars can also benefit from his insights. This is different from first enshrining Heidegger's formulations or ideas and then trying to suit the feet of Chinese thinking into his shoes. Rather, the lesson Heidegger offers has to be understood at the methodological level, that is, as part of a needed paradigm shift in approaching Chinese philosophy. It is pressing time that scholars of Chinese philosophy become aware of both the explicit and implicit restrictions caused by the domination of Western ways of thinking, and cast off the practice of resorting to Western categories as the standard against which corresponding terms are to be elicited from Chinese sources. Inquiries into Chinese classics have to be carried out with reference to relevant historical contexts, and thus allow ideas and terms peculiar to these texts come forth in their own right. Only when Chinese philosophy begins to speak for itself in the international academic world can one avoid unjustifiably assimilating the general orientations and basic ideas from Chinese sources to Heidegger's *Denkweg*.

For a needed paradigm shift, we first have to become aware of the »inaccessibility« of ancient Chinese texts for *both* Western and East-

[14] M. Heidegger, »Time and Being,« in *On Time and Being*, New York: Harper and Row, 1972, pp. 1–24 [»Zeit und Sein,« in *Zur Sache des Denkens, Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 14, p. 11].

ern scholars, who have been trapped in the dualism prevalent in Western conceptual frameworks. In recent decades, some scholars who try to provide a general account of Chinese and comparative philosophy have criticized this kind of »transcendental pretence,« but comparative studies involving Heidegger and other specific comparative investigations lag behind.[15]

The second facet that can be conducive to a paradigm shift in comparative studies of Heidegger and Chinese philosophy is an adequate understanding of Heidegger's own comportment toward East-West dialogue. Since the publication of my monograph on this topic in 2008, there have appeared a few misrepresentations of its purport.[16] Some reduce my more-nuanced research to a simplistic dismissal of the influence of East Asian thinking on Heidegger's work, or to a negative appraisal of his position on East-West dialogue. However, it should be clear from reading the book that I do not in any case ignore Heidegger's connection with East Asian thinking. Rather, I have brought more such »facts« into light. Nonetheless, the point is how to ascertain and evaluate such influence.

A concrete example of this kind of criticism is Bret Davis's description of my approach, in his contribution to the *Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, as defining Heidegger as an »inveterate Eurocentrist« (Davis 2013: 459)[17] However, the word »Eurocentrism« with reference to Heidegger occurs only once in my book, and I have never used this word as a conclusive characterization of Heidegger's stance. The general orientation of my book is to disclose why Heidegger fails to provide a substantial account of East-West dialogue *despite* abundant evidence of his interest in Asian thinking. What is

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[15] For »transcendental pretence,« see Lin Ma, and J. van Brakel, *Fundamentals of Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy*, New York: State University of New York Press, forthcoming in 2016, pp. 215–218.

[16] Lin Ma, *Heidegger on East-West Dialogue: Anticipating the Event*, New York/London: Routledge, 2008.

[17] B. W. Davis, »Heidegger and Asian Philosophy,« in F. Raffoul and E. S. Nelson (eds.), *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, New York: Bloomsbury, 2013, pp. 459–471. His review of my book in *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* (Vol. 41, No. 3, 2010, pp. 327–329) presents a more balanced evaluation. For other nuanced evaluations of my book see Karin De Boer's review in *European Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2010, pp. 468–480; David Kolb's review in *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 83, No. 1, 2009, pp. 164–167; John A. Tucker's review in *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2009, pp. 475–478.

emphasized is to read Heidegger's writings subtly and open-mindedly. Heidegger's »interest« as such in Asian thinking is not denied at all.[18] While failing to present my position faithfully, what Davis has to say in terms of Heidegger's connection with Asian thought is little more than such a remark: »one can hardly doubt Heidegger's interest in and respect for Asian *thinking*« (Davis 2013: 460). But what can this acknowledgement lead to? Almost all Chinese people take »interest« in »Western« sciences, but what point can be made out of this? Can this be taken as strong evidence that proves the importance of (Western) sciences, or evidence that proves that Chinese people are so smart in spotting good things? Despite the claim of Heidegger's »interest« in Asian thinking, Davis is in no way concrete about this »interest,« if only because he does not mention the about ten occasions when Heidegger cited from the *Daodejing* and the *Zhuangzi* in his writings or speeches.[19]

I have always considered that it is unscholarly to attach one stamp or another to Heidegger, either »transcultural« or »Eurocentric,« and then claim that the case is closed (Otherwise I would have had no »interest« in writing a whole book on this topic). Certainly, there may be moments of both strands in different periods of Heidegger's *Denkweg*. What is at issue is to properly analyze, at least be aware of, these different strands before one makes any grand claim and before one engages in any comparative study that only assimilates everything to Heidegger. Heidegger himself has actually warned of this last approach wisely and prophetically.[20] For him, generally speaking, the allegedly inevitable event of East-West dialogue can only be anticipated until the Western philosophical tradition gains maturity through its own self-transformation. Nevertheless, at the ontic level, East Asian sources undeniably play a role in Heidegger's search for ways out of the *Ge-stell*.

What I aimed at in my book was to do more than straightforward comparisons in the outdated fashion. My view is that only when one gains a perspicuous overview concerning Heidegger's all-too-evasive

[18] It is denied in dominant »Heidegger Studies« and by Heidegger's family who controls access to his *Nachlass*.

[19] Davis' contribution to the *Companion* focuses almost exclusively on showing what Zen can learn from Heidegger and vice versa (2013: 468 and *passim*).

[20] *Cf*. chapter 7 Lin Ma (2008).

attitude toward East-West dialogue can one transform comparative studies on the basis of a more solid scholarship and with the aid of a new paradigm. In this sense, what I have carried out in the book can be called a meta-comparative project.

Heidegger's denouncement of metaphysics has misled some researchers into believing that his philosophical enterprise is set radically against the Western metaphysical tradition. This belief opens avenues for the claim that Heidegger considers that Asian traditions have resources in store for the proper thinking of the question of Being and of the nature of language. This may well be an idea Heidegger sometimes entertains. However, one must notice that, in the whole of his philosophical enterprise, Heidegger has never changed his belief that the statement »philosophy is Western« is a tautology,[21] and that there is no such thing as Chinese or Indian philosophy (Heidegger 1968: 224).[22] Serious thinking can only arise from within the same lineage that is born of the first beginning. Instead of rejecting the Western tradition, Heidegger's ultimate anticipation is that Western-European metaphysics in the true sense of the word occur in the other beginning, and that Western-European *Dasein* corresponds to the call of Being and reflects on the question of Being from out of its own ground.

Some commentators are concerned that when Heidegger claims that Western philosophy is a tautology and that there is no Chinese or Indian philosophy, he is actually offering praise to Chinese and Indian thinking that remain uncontaminated by the Western metaphysical system, while he is using »philosophy« in a derogatory way. However, Heidegger does not reject philosophy despite his criticism of it. A new mode of thinking can only be initiated from within the Western philosophical heritage.[23]

On the other hand, Heidegger's position also manifested potentiality for modifications or variations, especially after the Second World War. Because of the exacerbation of the *Ge-stell*, Heidegger began to contemplate the »preliminary« thought that ancient Asian traditions, insofar as they remain uncontaminated by the dualistic conceptual system of Western metaphysics, might be of help for the

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[21] M. Heidegger, *Was ist das, die Philosophie? What Is Philosophy?* (Schenectady, NY: The New College and University Press, 1956; bilingual edition), pp. 30–31.

[22] M. Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking?* New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

[23] For a detailed discussion, see Lin Ma (2008: 51–56).

enactment of the other beginning. In addition to the more familiar story about his collaborated translation of a few chapters from the *Daodejing* in the Summer of 1946 and his citations from it, in 1960 Heidegger inquired about the Sanskrit words that could correspond to his terminology of unconcealment, forgetfulness, Being, and beings, and in the 1950's he asked about the Japanese words for »art« and »language.«

Heidegger may have assimilated a few expressions and verses from Asian intellectual sources into his writings. On a positive note, he could be called, with proper qualifications, a transcultural thinker. Proceeding from a Davidsonian principle of charity, it could be said that he has initiated a Heideggerian style of reading Asian classics and of interpreting Asian ideas in analogy with his approach to Greek philosophers. However, Heidegger's interest in Asian texts is often limited to his motivation of finding support for his own preconceived ideas. Despite his contact with Asian sources, he has never considered modifying his central beliefs in light of the fundamental insights from other traditions, for example, the idea that the human being is only one thing among the ten thousand things (*wanwu* 萬物), and thus there exists no unsurpassable gap between it and other things. Because of the unilateral character of his queries made from the European perspective, requesting certain items of information about Asian languages neither conflict with nor detract from the central thrust of Heidegger's thinking.[24] The prerequisite for a fruitful confrontation with East Asian »thinking« is an authentic dialogue with Greek philosophers whereby European thinking could achieve its self-transformation.

Hence, the second facet inducing the need for a paradigm shift concerns the complexities of assessing Heidegger's attitude toward the necessity and possibility of East-West dialogue. In another recent co-authored article, we further explored the intricacies of Heidegger's reflection on technology and the *Ge-stell* by focusing on a new term:

[24] Other authors express similar views in saying that what Heidegger sees, in particular in chapter 11 of the *Daodejing*, is a shadow of his reflection on *Seyn*. His idea is an imposition upon Laozi's thinking. What Heidegger considers is the Germanized Laozi and Zhuangzi. Their analysis of Heidegger's reading of chapter 11 bear affinities with my earlier article ›Deciphering Heidegger's Connection with the *Daodejing*,‹ *Asian Philosophy*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2006, pp. 149–171. See Jin Xiping and Liqiang, »Heidegger Studies in China,« *World Philosophy*, 2009, No. 4. pp. 8–31.

Gestellnis, which figures in Heidegger's writings in the 1970's.[25] *Gestellnis* is the essence of the *Ge-stell*. It shows a way toward the fore-garden of *Eignis* (a term Heidegger uses in the last decade of his life). In opposing the *Ge-stell* mode of comportment toward beings, Heidegger glimpses at the promise of the other thinking *(das andere Denken)*, which seems to be useless from the perspective of traditional metaphysical thinking. We reveal that, in characterizing this mode of thinking, Heidegger resorts to Zhuangzi's parables of the useless tree.

One way of stepping out of the *Ge-stell* is to make central the comportment toward beings as embodied in non-metaphysical art. In charting this course, Heidegger again turns toward ancient Asian traditions (insofar as they remain un-contaminated by current planetary-interstellar world conditions), which for him epitomize dissolution of the dichotomy of appearance and essence. From Heidegger's standpoint, before the Western tradition gains maturity through its own self-transformation, the allegedly inevitable event of East-West dialogue can only be anticipated. However, at the ontic level East Asian sources have undeniably played a role in his search for ways out of the *Ge-stell*.

3 The Three Directions of the Paradigm Shift

From the perspectives outlined above, the needed paradigm shift of comparative studies of Heidegger and Chinese philosophy involves re-configuration in terms of three directions or orientations.[26] These three directions are open for discussion; they are disputable or perhaps not complete. The phrase »paradigm shift« may focus on »theory/interpretation,« »method,« »practice.« My proposal is primarily methodological, and yet at the same time it also calls for new interpretations of both Heidegger's thinking and different strands of Chinese philosophy.

First, because of the expansion of Western thinking, modern academic systems have been unavoidably entrenched in a dualistic fra-

[25] Lin Ma and J. van Brakel, ›Out of the *Ge-stell?* The Role of the East in Heidegger's *Das andere Denken*,‹ *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 64, No. 3, 2014, pp. 527–562.
[26] These suggested directions of re-configuration may be applicable to comparative philosophy in general.

mework. Hence a complete renovation of the method of understanding and interpreting Chinese philosophy is called for. Some scholars suggest that because this situation is caused by employing (Western) philosophy to interpret Chinese thinking, we should turn away from philosophy toward other disciplines, such as cultural studies and anthropology, which seem to be more compatible with Chinese thinking.[27] However, these non-philosophy disciplines are also tainted by the dualistic Western framework; therefore, they cannot provide an essential change.

For the time being, the dualistic framework and the »transcendental pretence« of Western metaphysics cannot be avoided completely, neither by Sinologists, nor by Chinese philosophers, nor by Heidegger, nor by Derrida. However, it can be deconstructed, as Heidegger aimed for. Moreover, we have to keep in mind that the connotation and extension of philosophy always keeps on transforming itself. Sophisticated and abstract discourses are not the exclusive property of Western philosophy. We need to excavate and develop ideas of Chinese classical texts in connection with both the historical realities wherein these ideas were embedded *and* their relevance to the contemporary world. This stance has already been taken by quite a few »generalists« among comparativists (although they may not live up to their own expectations). However, for the bulk and certainly the popular variants of comparative philosophy, the situation has remained unchanged, including concrete inquires of Chinese philosophy in comparison with Heidegger.

Second, there is necessity of reading and analyzing Heidegger's work in relation to not only his multi-faceted stance on East-West dialogue, but also to the state of art of Heidegger studies which continue to reveal new aspects of his thinking with recent publication of his works.[28] For example, in another co-authored article, with reference to a range of sources from recently published volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe* written from about 1940 until 1976, we trace and elucidate Heidegger's radical re-thinking on the reversed relation be-

[27] Such a view can be found in Chenyang Li, »Comparative Philosophy and Cultural Patterns,« Keynote speech delivered at the 47th Annual Conference of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, 2014.

[28] Up to one hundred volumes of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* have appeared in the past forty years; the end is in sight.

tween science and technology.[29] We show that such claims as »modern science is application of the essence of technology« are essentially grounded in Heidegger's idea that science and technology have a »common origin« in the history of Being, and thus share the same comportment toward being, that is, calculability, orderability, predictability. In addition, we also argue that, although different ontic epochs can be distinguished in the evolvement of science and/or technology, for Heidegger there is only one unique ontological Epoch of modernity that encompasses various ontic epochs. Therefore, such suggestions as we have now gone from an »epoch of objectivity« to an »epoch of orderability [*Bestellbarkeit*]« cannot be considered to be an ontological shift.

We need to re-discover Heidegger as a thinker who is always on the way and who has his own *Holzwege*, instead of resorting to a stereotypical picture of him, as was the case with most literature of comparative inquiries in the past decades. Generally speaking, we can distinguish between three approaches to studies of Western philosophy. The first approach is to faithfully interpret the work of Western philosophers along the line of their own thinking. The second approach is to critically analyze and engage with the ideas of Western philosophers. The third approach is to further develop a certain theme or to provide an alternative solution to a certain issue on the basis of a mastery of the first two approaches. The last approach to Western philosophy should be used for comparative inquiries. This is to be achieved in combination with the next direction.

The third direction of re-configuration concerns the overcoming of the unilateral direction in comparative studies. It has been common that one starts from Heidegger's key terms and thoughts, tries to identify locutions and ideas in the writings of Chinese thinkers that seem to echo the former, and then either interprets the latter in accordance with Heidegger's surface discourse, or draws on superficial resemblances of the latter as a sort of elaboration or corroboration of Heidegger's theses. This is valuable in introducing Chinese thought into contemporary reflections and discourses. Nonetheless, it is high time that we reverse such a direction, or, to put it in other words, we should now transcend the stages of looking for resonances or »struc-

[29] Lin Ma and J. van Brakel, ›Heidegger's Thinking on the Same of Science and Technology,‹ *Continental Philosophical Review*, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2014, pp. 19–43.

tural« affinities and stake out »substantial« disparities between Heidegger and Chinese philosophy.

A good example that illustrates such a reversal is David Chai's recent article in *Review of Metaphysics*.[30] Although in a footnote he quibbles that my book *Heidegger on East-West Dialogue* does not present a direct comparative study, the reversal of the direction of comparative studies my book tries to point to is reflected in the general orientation of his article. Chai first distinguishes the different sense of clearing between Heidegger and Daoism, and then attempts to conduct a critique of Heidegger from the perspective of philosophical Daoism. According to him, clearing for Heidegger is the site where truth is revealed; but clearing for Daoism is the self-embracement of nothingness. Heidegger failed to fully grasp the cosmological significance of the nothingness of the clearing.

In 2012–2013, Jaap van Brakel and I organized a set of papers under the heading »Re-Discovering Heidegger and Chinese Philosophy« on the initiative of a journal and with the agreement that we write an introduction of 2,000 words. However, it turned out to be an occasion for me to be subject to unexpected abuse and insult by a special »editor« of the journal. If I were not a *woman* affiliated to a Chinese academic institution, things might have gone rather differently. My painful and humiliating experience from working on this special issue discloses the still prevalent and taking-for-granted inequality between scholars based in the West and scholars based in China. It indicates that the academic world also urgently needs a »paradigm shift.« I was also shocked by the fact that publication ethics does not seem to have a place in such situation. No matter what has happened and will happen, I shall adhere to my commitment to academic work, and I hope that my continuous work will contribute to achieving the paradigm shift.

All the papers we organized for the special issue demonstrate elements of the above-mentioned three new directions.[31] First, most of them approach their topics on the basis of a solid study of original sources from not only Daoism and Buddhism, but also from Confucianism, with which Heidegger has rarely been brought into compar-

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[30] D. Chai, ›Nothingness and the Clearing: Heidegger, Daoism and the Quest for Primal Clarity,‹ *Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 67, No. 3, 2014, pp. 583–601.

[31] See the reference in »Note and Acknowledgement« at the end.

ison. Second, a few authors have attended to Heidegger's position regarding the precondition for an East-West dialogue in their comparative explorations. Third, most authors manifest nuanced and bilateral ways of bringing together Heidegger's ideas and alternatives provided by Chinese philosophy. Although in some papers Heidegger still comes forth first, the examinations of his texts have been informed by an understanding and appreciation of the Chinese *Dao*.

My own contribution addresses the intricacies of Heidegger's existential notion of *Mitsein* (Being-with), and expounds a different way of understanding the relevant subject matter in light of a reinterpretation of Zhuangzi's fish story.[32] I show that Heidegger's account of *Mitsein* is ultimately situated within the limit of an encompassing set of Dasein's structural components. What is more problematic is his prior conception of the connection between Dasein and others as disengaged with one other. Hence, the »with« of Heidegger's Being-with seems to be hollow. As an alternative, I explicate a Zhuangzian idea of what I call *Mitzutun*, literally meaning doing something with (others). I argue that »with« of the Zhuangzian *Mitzutun* is lived out by human beings and non-human beings in the variegated forms of life.

Apart from my own participation in this set of papers, I have made further explorations that aim at a paradigm shift in comparative inquiries of Heidegger and Chinese philosophy. My latest article explores some aspects of Heidegger's thematization on the essential being of artwork and confronts it with alternative modes of thinking as implicated in the *Zhuangzi* and inherited and elaborated by Su Shi 蘇軾 (1037–1101).[33] The Daoist tradition takes a living being as the prototype of a thing (*wu* 物), which has its peculiar heavenly rhythms (*tianli* 天理), and does not set up a stringent stratification among things. Hence, it does not consider artwork apart from concrete activities in which the artist attends and attunes to the heavenly rhythms of things. Heidegger selects equipment *(Zeug)* as the prototype of a thing, and conceives the being of a thing in terms of readiness-to-hand. With Heidegger, an artwork as a »no-thing« has to stand aloof

[32] I was ordered to remove references to Roger T. Ames and Liu Xiaogan's work from my paper by the editors of the journal who charge them of »involving in plagiarism.«
[33] Lin Ma, ›Thinking with Zhuangzi and Su Shi against Heidegger on Artwork,‹ *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 65, No. 3, 2015, pp. 809–845. Su Shi has saved and enhanced the beauty of the West Lake.

from the mundane life so as to serve as the site, or non-site, where the truth of things is unconcealed. This is epitomized by the Greek temple, which alone gives meaning to all its constituents and surroundings. Through an innovative description of the West Lake and a new interpretation of *yitian hetian* (以天合天), I show that in the Daoist tradition the idea of artwork is open to multiple interpenetrating determinations. There is never just *an* artwork, but *a stream of* artwork(s) resonating with and enhancing one another.

In yet another forthcoming paper, I compare Mou Zongsan's notion of the self-reversal of moral reason with Heidegger's idea of the other beginning of the Western philosophical tradition.[34] I reveal that both Mou Zongsan and Heidegger attach importance to providing theoretical justification and guidance for the self-renewal of their respective traditions. In doing so, they both attempt to coordinate the tension between modern science/technology and traditions. Regarding the issue of intercultural communication and integration, they seem to hold quite different positions. Mou Zongsan appears to have no doubt about learning from the West, while Heidegger insists that a dialogue with the East can only become possible after the West achieves its self-transformation. My view is that Mou Zongsan's notion of self-reversal shows more signs of a Kantian dualism with regard to Chinese and Western traditions, while Heidegger has explored more deeply the problematics of modernity by reflecting on the sources of technology.

In addition to publications in English, I have contributed several articles in Chinese on the basis of the materials from *Heidegger on East-West Dialogue*, including discussions of Heidegger's citations from the *Daodejing* on seven occasions, an exploration of his connection with Daoism with a focus on his references to the Chinese *Dao*, and a balanced and convincing account so far as possible of Heidegger's reflection on Asian languages.[35] It seems that a number of Chi-

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[34] Lin Ma, ›Mou Zongsan's Self-Reversal and Heidegger's Other Beginning,‹ *Philosophy East and West* (forthcoming).

[35] See Lin Ma »Sages do not Travel? Heidegger's Appropriation of the *Daodejing*,« *Philosophers* (Beijing: People's Press, Vol. 3), 2009; ›A New Interpretation of Heidegger's Connection with Daoist Thinking,‹ *Journal of Yunnan University* (Social Sciences Edition; Kunming) Vol. 8, No. 6, 2009, pp. 32–39; ›An Inquiry of Heidegger's Relation to Asian Languages,‹ *World Philosophy* (Beijing), No. 4, 2008, pp. 48–60.

nese scholars have accepted my view and argument, which finds reflection in their papers.[36]

My criticisms and confrontation with Heidegger does not mean that he has nothing to offer us. Heidegger is right in starting with the ontic and the phenomenal world. The problem is that he has taken certain (Western) ontic elements as absolutely bound up with the ontological, and in this way has excluded the ontological significance of other ontic elements. On the other hand, some Chinese authorities, as Mou Zongsan did, seem to be still conducting their thinking under the spell of the *Ge-stell* in resorting to ideas of transcendence borrowed from the West and using them as the fundamental characterizations of Chinese thought. With them, philosophy seems to be generated from the height of a theistic infinity and in this way easily lends itself to the self-promotion and even self-deification of human beings in the image of the absolute God as the supreme moral judge and final arbitrator of the world.

The paradigm shift of comparative studies of Heidegger and Chinese philosophy goes abreast with the paradigm shift of the style of doing philosophy in the direction of honestly starting with the human finitude and attending to the heavenly rhythm of the ten thousand things. I hope that the paradigm shift as suggested by the two facets and in terms of the three directions will find more sympathetic readers. I would like to invite critics to join in the dialogue with me.

Note and Acknowledgement: This paper is an expansion of my introduction to the special issue Jaap van Brakel and I organized, which at the very end of 2015 finally became accessible to the readers in a journal. The original title was »Introduction: Re-Discovering Heidegger and Chinese Philosophy,« which I submitted in June 2014. It had passed the stages of copyright transference and proof-reading. However, it was simply omitted from the special issue because I had removed one sentence in which I was supposed to sing praises to a special »editor« from the acknowledgement (the acknowledgement which was not written by myself, but was imposed by the journal's editors).

Van Brakel and I had also organized double blind reviews of these papers, and Jaap had in addition read all of them and offered

[36] See for example, Peng Fuchun »Heidegger and Laozi on *Dao*,« *Jianghan Luntan*, No. 2, 2013, pp. 42–49.

suggestions for revisions for each paper. In September 2013, we submitted eight papers to this journal together with the review reports and Jaap's comments. We regret that Chenyang Li withdrew his paper entitled »A Heideggerian interpretation of *cheng*« out of losing confidence in working with the journal editors. As a result, seven papers and my introduction were left at their disposal. Most ironically, while we had been very much worried that one or two papers may be rejected, it turned out that, the trouble that special »editor« had made was primarily directed at preventing, by non-academic means, that *I* (in my very identity) cannot have my introduction to the issue published.

I'm grateful in particular for the patient and encouraging messages from Monika Kirloskar, who also agrees that the academic world needs a paradigm shift (without knowing anything about the complicated story of this introduction). Monika's messages have been an invaluable help to me in bringing this text to light in its full-fledged version and letting my voice be heard in the academic world.

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Islam: Philosophy and Law-making

Abstract
Historically, ethical deliberations amongst religious scholars in Islam played a far more important role in determining ethical and social practices of Muslims than did analogous deliberations by philosophers. A common language was never developed between scholars of the two disciplines, a circumstance which still feeds into a growingly unhealthy relationship in Muslim society today between two registers, the religious and the rational. Primarily this was the result of the philosophers' dogma that theirs was a superior reasoning methodology to that of the jurists. Besides challenging this dogma by exposing the rational rigor practiced by jurists, this paper argues that a long-needed common language between the two registers is vital if modern Muslim society is to set a healthy course for itself in an ever-changing world.

Keywords
philosophy, jurisprudence, Islam, translation, Reason.

1 The General Context

Sometime in the twelfth century the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rushd/Averroes (d. 1198), who served as Judge in Cordoba and Marrakesh (present-day Morocco) under the Almohads, wrote *The Decisive Treatise* in which he tried to show why and how revealed Law *(shari'a)* and independent Reason *(hikma)* are compatible.[1] Writing

[1] See the translation by C. Butterworth, Brigham Young University Press, 2001. (Downloadable at: www.andrsib.com/dt; last accessed on 25 September 2015). Averroes explains that the two truths of religion and philosophy cannot contradict one another. He continues to argue that in whichever particular matter there ostensibly

as a philosopher with a practical involvement in religious law the upshot of his argument was that the revealed Word of God (the Qur'an) legitimates the interpretation of the Law in a way that reconciles it with Reason wherever *the letter* of the former seems to conflict with it. As a devoted Aristotelian, what Averroes emphasized in introducing Reason was the methodology of demonstrative syllogisms, and the truths that are *deducible* by means of it – a methodology which he held to have a higher value than any other kind of syllogism – including, particularly, the *analogical,* that was in common use by legal scholars. While he introduces Reason this way – as a demonstrative methodology – he leads the reader to the more general conclusion that *falsafa,* or philosophy – the *paradigm* of *hikma* (wisdom) – has a higher value as a science than any of the other sciences prevalent at the time (e. g., Law). However, what he did *not* explicitly say – but one is justified to assume from the whole text he meant – is that such syllogisms would have to be constructed from universal truths as premises that are held to be such on rational grounds *rather than on faith.* In other words, that he considered statements in the Qur'an itself as well as the sayings of the prophet to be subject to the ruling that these (not just the legal corpus deduced from them) should be interpreted wherever they conflicted with Reason. Only then could they be used as premises in the demonstrative syllogisms. Therefore, what was and remains an issue is not so much the *deductive* nature of a reasoning methodology in contradistinction to the (supposedly) *inferential* nature of the analogical reasoning used by legal scholars – what he initially proposes as the flagging mark of Reason – as it is the *premises* themselves on which a demonstrative syllogism could be built: statements which are held to be true on the basis of faith.

Already, therefore, the scope of statements Averroes held to be ›interpretable‹ from the religious register would seem to be quite extensive. What about the interpretative operation itself? What did Averroes mean by it? This is what he tells us:

The meaning of interpretation is: drawing out the figurative significance of an utterance from its true significance without violating the custom of the Arabic language with respect to figurative speech in doing so – such as call-

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seems to be a contradiction, the letter of the law could be translated (interpreted) such as to fit with Reason – as long as this interpretation abides by the relevant rules and grammar of language (e. g., the meaning of an expression, its implications, its presuppositions, etc.).

ing a thing by what resembles it, its cause, its consequence, what compares to it, or another of the things enumerated in making the sorts of figurative discourse cognizable (*ibid* III (13) ll.3–18: 9).

The restrictive condition (the non-violation of grammatical rules) is offset by what turns out to be quite an expansive margin allowed for translating a ›figurative‹ into a ›true‹ meaning: one need only imagine the many ways in which one signification can be replaced by any one of its many comparisons and resemblances – let alone by any one of its many causes and consequences. With these interpretative tools in hand, the re-articulation of a figurative (religious) register into a rational one can obviously be quite radical.

Did Averroes wish to use his argument for embarking on such a radical re-articulation of the Qur'an and the prophet's statements? Quite the opposite: in another of his works, *The Incoherence,*[2] where he takes up the challenge of responding to a major critique of philosophy by Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), he expresses extreme displeasure with an earlier philosopher, Ibn Sine/Avicenna (d. 1027), whom he thinks is to blame for having so popularized philosophical doctrines as to make philosophy itself victim to the kind of misunderstandings that led to that critique. Indeed, the main ›message‹ of Averroes's *Decisive Treatise* is that while the two registers, the religious and the rational, are compatible, they in fact should be kept apart. Conflating them at the popular level can lead to the kind of misunderstandings and ideological conflicts in the community as those that resulted from Avicenna's writings.

Why, then, take the trouble to argue in favor of interpretation? A logical answer would seem to be that – from the perspective of his role as lawmaker – what he had in mind was less to change peoples' beliefs about God or the Day of Judgment or the Afterlife than to establish Reason as the standard for informing the practical governance of the Muslim community. In other words, that it was less to do with wishing to intervene in the sphere of beliefs than it was to do with the sphere of practices.

One can perhaps better appreciate Averroes's project by invoking a modern-day debate: one can view his proposal (with a caveat, see below) as one of *translation* – that lawmaking (defining the norms by which a society lives) requires that religious discourse – specifically in

[2] *Averroes's Tahafut alTahafut,* S. Van den Bergh (ed. and trans.), The Gibb Memorial Series, No. 19, Cambridge: Luzac, 1978 [in English].

this field – be translated into rational terms. However, for Averroes, and unlike the case for contemporary liberal philosophers like John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, the framework for the proposed translation was limited: for him, the *paradigm* was the Revealed Law – not secular law – and the *exception* were those parts of the Revealed Law that ostensibly conflicted with it.[3] After all, his age was religious and not secular. Even so, Averroes's proposal was earthshaking. In many ways, it still is. Modern Muslim Society – despite the introduction of new political structures and secular laws – is still largely defined, if not ruled, by Islamic Law. This binary immanence of authority – one religious and the other political/secular – has been and seems likely to continue to be a basic feature of it at least for some time to come. Essentially, the reason for this is historical: ever since the prophet's death in 632 political and religious authorities (who *rules* and who has the authority to *legislate)* started to diverge from one another, each eventually coming to assume its own self-legitimating power. Being a Muslim and being a subject or citizen came to be two distinct registers, or identities. This being the case, and despite an uneasy relationship between the two authorities over time there never arose – as what happened in Christianity – a radical ›break-off‹ point where *the State* tried or needed to wrest *political* authority from *the Mosque.* The latter never had it to begin with. All it possessed, and claimed, was a legislative power – to *define* what being a Muslim is. But this is no mean power: it covers both what it means to *be* a Muslim – what the basic articles of faith are; and it covers what the right things for a Muslim to *do* are. If the former sphere is less likely to be an ongoing bone of contention between the two authorities (though episodic con-

[3] A major debate in current philosophy revolves around whether and how ›private‹ (typically, religious) reasons as opposed to ›public‹ (typically neutral or secular) reasons for holding (political) views are justificatory for admitting such views into a rational discourse for the purposes of positively feeding into an ongoing articulation of best governance policy. Liberalists – e.g., John Rawls and Habermas –, for whom a necessary condition for democratic governance is the existence of a free space for reasoned discourse – argue that private reasons must be *translated* into a ›universal‹ language that could be accepted by any rational citizen who does not share the same ›beliefs.‹ Habermas is in particular concerned with the formal discourse used for policy-formation – e.g., in Parliament. »Translation« thus comes to acquire a special meaning in this context – Is the requirement itself »democratic«? Is the translation meant possible in the first place? See, for example, B. Arfi, ›Habermas and the Aporia of Translating Religion in Democracy,‹ *European Journal of Social Theory,* December 2014, pp. 1–18.

frontations could take place, as they did throughout Islamic history), the latter as a quotidian space determining living practices is a natural area where *ruling* can easily begin to infringe on (religious) *legislating.* Indeed, the natural lawmaking demands of an expanding secular/political authority – even if not in some dramatic episode in history challenging religious law – continued over time and by necessity to widen its intervention in the sphere defining human action, thereby increasing the friction specifically in this area between religious and political legislating authorities. Had a common language existed from the beginning between jurists and philosophers, a positive intellectual engagement might have developed and in doing so laid the groundwork for a similar engagement today.

In a way, one can read Averroes's project as one by which he tried to forestall such friction by proposing that, where the practical governance of a community is concerned, the Revealed Law itself legitimates the interpretation of religious law in such a way as to make it compatible with what Reason dictates.

In this essay, it will be argued that the Averroes project for translation failed because of its (and philosophy's) presumption of its possession of a superior reasoning methodology to that of the jurists. While a common language is one that is shared by equal partners, and could draw such partners to the dialogue table, a ›translation initiative‹ is one that predefines the interlocutor as being rationally inferior. Muslim religious scholars could not possibly have been ›wooed‹ by such an initiative. Nor can they be today by a superior attitude of ›rationalists.‹

2 Reason in Islam

Perhaps a good place to start is Averroes's portrayal of Philosophy as the epitome of Reason: long before philosophy as a Greek body of science first came to be adopted in the Muslim world by Averroes's predecessors in the eighth century, Muslim scholars had already begun their own investigations into their religion and its implications. Two fields or disciplines that are worth mentioning in this context are those of law and hermeneutics: the former to fill in the gap concerning judgments to be passed on arising practices in the community, and the latter initially to understand and expound upon Qur'anic or the prophet's pronouncements on matters affecting political life and reli-

gious beliefs. The former field eventually branched off into what came to be known as the discipline of Jurisprudence *(fiqh)*, covering both the foundational elements of law as well as an ever-expanding body of particular judgments; one component or offshoot of the latter with which we are concerned came to be called *kalam* – literally, ›speech‹ – and is often referred to as dialectics, speculative discourse, or even theology (although its content is as much about the world as about God). The earliest practitioners of *kalam* were religious scholars who were concerned with such matters as the rightful succession of political rulers, the rightness of resisting incumbent rulers, what freedom of the will means, and how that can be understood in the context of reward and punishment. Their *source* or ›material‹ for thinking and arguing about those matters was the Qur'an as well as the prophet's sayings. These were thoroughly analyzed for articulating positions on the issues in question. Over time, two schools in this discipline evolved, the *Mu'tazilites* and the *Ash'arites*, the former coming earlier in time, and generally described as the more ›rationalist‹ of the two schools for holding such views as that of the objective nature of moral values, and of free human agency; but more significantly for our purposes also for holding the view that the standard for deciding between two ›source statements‹ when these seemed to conflict with one another must be Reason. However, unlike Averroes's Reason, theirs was closer to what one might today call ›common sense‹ – a register arrived at through rational deliberation.

A major characteristic of *kalam* was the use of analogical reasoning: that new facts to be known can only become so on the basis of other known facts, the basis for knowing which are the sensory faculties. Primarily, the facts known by the sensory faculties are by necessity particulars and not ›universal truths,‹ or ›universals.‹ Among such facts, but having the special divine status they are held to have, are those expressed in the Qur'an and by the prophet, and which are transmitted through particular channels to their recipients. In terms of factual value, ›X said …‹ and ›The Qur'an says‹ are on this score therefore equivalent. In terms of truth-value, however, the former is not self-validating whereas the latter is. The validation or repudiation of the former fact – i. e., the assessment of its content – depends on other facts, or other sensory experiences. The sacrosanct status of Qur'anic facts on the other hand cancels the need for validation. As to logical principles (e. g., the law of non-contradiction), these were typically held to be true *a posteriori*, i. e., in respect of sensory experi-

ence, and not *a priori,* i.e., as foundations of knowledge. The same holds for metaphysical statements that are claimed to be *a priori* – universally or generally true. These were considered to be such – to the extent it was possible to be hold them so – only by virtue of analogical reasoning, and not by a cognition of some universal metaphysical truth. This held, in the first place, even for general empirical statements. That is, it was generally held that the *inference* that ›Heavy objects fall‹ is one that is not verifiable empirically, and therefore cognizable as an objective fact, given that infinite instances of heavy objects cannot possibly be captured. When it is held to be true then it is held so analogically, by associating one fact (the motion associated with a particular heavy object) with another. A *justified* association between two facts or events is one where the *reason* for one given particular fact being of such and such a description (the heaviness behind one object's fall) is found to obtain in another, making the second of that same description. This methodology (an arguably questionable technique to avoid generalization, see below) was also essential for the legal scholars in their work, as we shall see. But if it held for general empirical statements, it also held, more fundamentally, for the general metaphysical statements philosophers assumed to be *a priori* true. This is why deductions from these were tentative and not conclusive – not because of the deductive operation itself, but because of the inconclusive nature of the universal statements that make them up.

Indeed, religious scholars from the two aforementioned fields were not logically averse to the deductive operation itself. For example, if there were a rule in the Qur'an on a particular matter, such as alimony, or inheritance, then by deduction such a rule would be held to be applicable to a particular case before them. What they were averse to were those general statements (e.g. on the nature of the world) that were inferential in nature – these being empirically unverifiable – such as the claim that the spatio-temporal world is infinite, there being nothing beyond it; or that it is round. Such statements in metaphysics, offered by the philosophers as foundational, were held to be hypothetical and ill-chosen therefore as certain truths to be used as premises in the philosophers' logical system.

Although some common elements can be found in both Averroes and the Mu'tazilites, such as the objectivity of moral values, and the need for applying Reason when interpreting original sources, nonetheless Averroes shared with many of his predecessors in the *falsafa*

tradition the view that *kalam*'s dialectical style of reasoning was inferior to the demonstrative style of the philosophers. As already stated, however, the bone of contention was not the deductive method *per se* (though this was flagged by the philosophers as being *the* issue), but the status of the general truths to which deduction should apply. The general assumption of the philosophers – as explained, for example, by Alfarabi (d. 950) – was that with Aristotle, and the refinement of the mathematical sciences, all previous methods for arriving at knowledge, including Plato's dialectical style, had become superseded. Henceforth, as in mathematics, certain knowledge could be demonstrably arrived at by deduction. But where does one begin? How does one come by those general truths that are needed for deduction? Do the metaphysical ›truths‹ proposed by the philosophers enjoy the same undisputed status as mathematical truths, rendering a metaphysical syllogism equivalent to a mathematical one? The religious scholars we have been considering did not think so. Using modern terminology, they did not believe there are synthetic *a priori* truths in this area, any statement seeming to be such being *a posteriori,* and therefore essentially unverifiable. The closest to achieving certainty about it – or, more specifically, *reliability* on it – is the use of analogical reasoning. The inferential nature of analogical reasoning proposes that a mental move from one particular fact or event to another depend upon the identification of the particular reason or cause for that first particular fact or event being of a specific description. Once that reason or cause has been identified, then it can be judged as one that either obtains or does not obtain with regard to the second particular fact or event being presented. If I identify why that object before me is a tree (or why I consider it to be such), then I can decide whether that other object before me is also a tree. The mental move involved is *lateral.* In the philosophical tradition, on the other hand, ›what a tree is‹ is held to be a general truth that comes to be cognized gradually through an incremental process of abstraction – sensory images of one particular after another eventually yielding the concept or idea of Tree, which then allows me to cognize a specific object now presented before me as an instance of the idea Tree. The mental move involved here is by contrast *vertical.* This approach would then apply to understanding the ›weightier‹ issues of such matters as Justice or Existence or Movement, etc., each being posited as a general idea possessed of some kind of independent existence. A further philosophical move would then be to propose that such ›concepts‹ or ›ideas‹

have some kind of ontological status in the metaphysical world about which general statements could be made and used as the bases for deductive syllogisms and knowledge, just as in the mathematical sciences.[4]

For the religious scholars, on the other hand, this entire approach to general ideas and the truths reflecting their relationship with one another was questionable. Indeed, they were altogether averse to holding that there exist independent entities (*viz.*, ideas) that abstract terms or nouns signify, and their deliberations on the whole remained pegged to analyzing words as parts of ordinary speech, and the psychological states of mind of speakers. The only ›metaphysical‹ truths that were reliable – they believed – could be found in the Qur'an and the prophet's sayings. Otherwise, it was not via a process of abstraction that what is considered a general truth can be arrived at, but by analogy – a process that by its very definition remains particularized. As already stated, their route to avoid the inferential generalization proposed by philosophers was that of identifying the particular cause or reason for why something is as it is described to be. Arguably, however, identifying such a cause or reason to justify *sameness* (between two particulars) is to identify a *general* truth, akin to the philosophers' *idea* or *concept*. Unfortunately, this matter was never dealt with by the philosophers. For them, it was part of a ›register‹ that did not concern the genuine seekers of truth and knowledge. The philosophers not only believed that the metaphysical truths they held onto were either rationally self-evident or verifiable, but also that those truths held by the religious scholars were only figurative, their real meanings being those articulated in the rational register. In sum, then, they believed that *kalam*'s source material (the Qur'an and the prophet's sayings), besides *kalam*'s discourse methodology, were both epistemologically inferior to their own foundational ›rational‹ truths, as well as to their demonstrative methodology.

The philosophers' patronizing attitude towards the reasoning methodology and tradition of the religious scholars was unfortunate. It meant they did not consider that a common language with them was possible. By ›common language‹ is not meant ›a translation manual‹ which would set out to reformulate one kind of discourse (that of

[4] Some of the discussion in this part of the paper is drawn from works by the famous religious scholar Ibn Taymiyah (d. 1328), and especially his work *The Response to the Logicians* (Beirut, n.d.) [in Arabic].

beliefs or a creed) into an infallible language of science. Rather, what is meant is the effort at reaching out to the religious scholars – who, after all, were a central feature of Muslim society – to try to develop in conversation with them a syncretic language. A dialogue in such a language would have benefited the two kinds of rational pursuits – both, still in need of mutual reinforcement – and kept them close to one another, and as a result kept the intellectual environment in society more intact. As it was, while the philosophers' ›haughtiness‹ reinforced the sense among Muslims that philosophers were somehow a different *genre* of people living in their midst, in more particular terms it meant that their input in shaping the identity of that society was minimal, if not nil. Theirs was a language that did not on the whole contribute to the intellectual or political shaping of Muslim identity, even though some, like Abu Nasr Al-Farabi, would devote much of his philosophical efforts on political theory. However, while his theory is today of interest to scholars, it was of no relevance to the politics of his day. Indirect influences (in both directions) are not being discounted here: what is being brought into focus is the near-absence of a direct positive dialogue where the two disciplines might have been able to lay the grounds for a common ground between them – one that might have become a solid foundation for a more general co-habitation in Muslim culture between religious and secular dispositions.

This was especially true in that area of religious scholarship, namely Law, whose effect on the shaping of Muslim identity remains dominant to this day. Like their *kalam* peers, but on the practical side, Muslim legal scholars were devoting their efforts at structuring that part of Muslim identity having to do with practices – what the *right things* for Muslims *to do* were. As can be gathered, this is a vast area determining society's code of ethics. The jurists' efforts should in theory have drawn philosophers influenced by the political writings of Aristotle and Plato – and who therefore had specific theories about what the *good* life or *happiness* consists in – to test these theories in light of a real-life context. Not only would they have been able then to participate positively in what was developing as an Islamic philosophy of Law: the exercise itself would have laid the grounds for the much-needed mature practice today of addressing arising problems faced by the contemporary Muslim in an integrated ethical frame, thus keeping the intellectual climate of the Muslim community intact. As it was, philosophers thinking and writing about how society

should best be ordered on the whole did this as though theirs was not a society that concerned them. Moral philosophy and Islamic Law as *disciplines* have as a result remained strangers to one another.

Once again, one of the main differences between the two disciplines that made for that alienation was the jurists' *analogical* as opposed to the philosophers' *deductive* methodology in reasoning: whereas jurists had to deliberate about how best to infer rules, and what such rules are, philosophers felt that they were possessed of definitive answers to all questions. Theirs, they felt, was *a science.* Curiously, though, they treated their ›science‹ as a religion. It provided all the answers. Jurists, on their part, felt an obligation to deliberate about how to apply their religion to the lived life of Muslims. This meant they had to *innovate.* It was not that they were averse to deductive reasoning: where clear rules existed in their *sources,* they would happily apply those rules to particular issues as those arose – for example, to declare the beginning of the fasting month on the sighting of the new moon. But since most of their ›sources‹ consisted of *examples* – such as the marriage of the prophet to a Christian, called ›Mariya‹ – it became incumbent on them to work out from such examples what the right thing to do was if another case of an interreligious marriage came up for a legal opinion. Over time, it is these jurists' improvisations and mode of reasoning that have come to determine the nature of Muslim society.

Before closing this section, it is important finally to point out that, as already mentioned, not all philosophers necessarily shared the attitude towards *kalam* and its methodology described above. One prominent exception was Avicenna, whom Averroes criticized (in his *Incoherence*) for ›misrepresenting‹ Aristotelianism, but who was also criticized from the other side by the later religious scholar Ibn Taymiyah (in his *The Response*) as having philosophized *kalam.* In effect, both criticisms – coming as they did from opposite angles – reflected the sense that Avicenna's *oeuvre* was expressed in a new language – neither that exclusively of the philosophers, but nor that on the other hand of the religious scholars. In theory, it could be seen as an attempt to create a common language – one that was as open to the deliberative approach of the *kalam* scholars as to the discourse prevalent among the philosophers, and in many ways this new approach was to have more influence on the general intellectual climate than that, say, of Alfarabi earlier, or of Averroes later. Even so, the gulf separating religious and rational discourse, and between religious

and rational intellectual climates persisted. The climate was not ripe yet for bringing the two approaches to Reason to a par, where a common intellectual language would take hold and become a common register.

3 The Lawmakers

Immediately upon the prophet's death a debate arose among his followers (one which has not been settled to this day) whether his functions as political ruler and as religious adjudicator are best combined in his successors or kept separate. While the answer in favor of such a combination became fixed from early on among those who came to be identified as *shi'ites*, it remained in theory at least an open question among those belonging to Islam's mainstream, or the *sunnis*. From early on, scholars argued that ›living the Muslim life‹ is a matter that is best mentored by heads of households, and should not be the responsibility of the political ruler.

In practice, the two functions quickly diverged, religious authority (that of determining what being a Muslim *means*, in faith and practice) slowly becoming the domain of religious scholars *('ulama)*. If, among these, *kalam* scholars focused on the first component (what a Muslim should believe about God and the world), it was the jurists *(fuqaha')* who slowly ›appropriated‹ the second task – that of determining practices, or what the *right things for Muslims to do* are.

As already stated, the jurists' *source* for their deliberations in their work consisted of the Qur'an, the prophet's sayings and deeds, as well as the prophet's companions' practices. Together, these were regarded as the *sunna* (from where the word *sunni* comes) – meaning the foundations of the religion. Where a general rule or statement in the sources existed, jurists would have no issue with *deducing* a particular adjudication from it. Where, on the other hand, the issue to be adjudicated was not covered by such a rule, jurists would employ analogy – inferring from a particular item in the sources a judgment on a particular practice.

However, jurists quickly came to realize that, left without guidelines, analogical reasoning could well end up being open to all kinds of interpretations, often depending on the nature of the scholar making them. Over time (and here the reference is to a cross-generational discourse among such scholars spread over several centuries) a legal

system was therefore felt necessary and was developed to provide the required guidelines – one that is arguably unprecedented in the history of the philosophy of law. Despite the eventual development of four major schools of Law in *sunni* Islam (named after four different respected scholars associated with them) the legal system in use remained essentially the same.

It may be worth bearing in mind – for a fuller appreciation of those jurists' deliberations – the parallel deliberations by European jurists over the past two centuries to determine the source of law's binding authority: does this derive from the authority of its propagator? its enforcement? its precedence? the deliberative nature of a consensus over it? its purpose?[5] Seeking a way to systemize their analogical practices – finding the appropriate example from their sources to apply to an arising case before them – Muslim jurists quickly came to the conclusion that their analogical inferences could be streamlined only if there were a clear *purpose* for the Law that they must make clear for themselves. Law's purpose would be a beacon acting as a guideline to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate inferences – which otherwise may well be haphazard. In other words – and amazingly, given that the Law as they regarded it was primarily God's Law – they decided that the complying authority of its practical application – what came down to being their own adjudications or legal opinions – must be defined by its purpose. One cannot overemphasize the significance of the jurists' decision. What in effect it amounts to is to avail the jurists with the power to identify right and wrong practices, and hence to formulate a Muslim code of ethics out of a continuous process of adjudications – all informed by the *purpose* the jurists defined. In contrast to the fixed five articles of faith derived from the *source* that jurists concurred identify what *being* a Muslim is (see below), the open-ended domain of constantly-needed adjudications on right *practices* in arising cases (e.g., abortion, gender, genetic design, terrorism, etc.) obviously reach out to affect a far more extensive part of Muslim life, determining the better part of Muslim identity. The jurists' decision that Law is prudential, arguably a ›modern‹ interpretation, and clearly of radical significance to Muslim identity, thus came about through the curious circumstance of their adoption of that kind of reasoning which philosophers derogated them for

[5] See S. Delacroix, *Legal Norms and Normativity: An Essay in Genealogy (Legal Theory Today)*, Oregon: Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 2006.

using. Their next task, however, was to identify what that purpose was.

It is a measure of their commendably rational approach that they converged on identifying that purpose as being ›the good‹ or ›the interest‹ of the Muslim. The significance of this still holds – an ›enlightened‹ focus on the individual's ›good‹ nowadays standing in sharp contrast with those interpretations of Islam which place it instead on some general entity such as the religion itself, or the community, resulting in a total disregard to individual human rights. It makes all the difference – in Islam or elsewhere – whether Law's purpose is viewed as being pegged to the *regime* or to its individual members, and the jurists' focus on the individual should have been a welcome sign for philosophers to engage with jurists on defining what that individual interest consisted in – that, after all, constituted an important part of the practical component of the philosophy they saw themselves as scholars of.

The next – and perhaps more difficult task for the jurists – was to decide on how to define that individual interest or good. It will be recalled that we are considering an inter-generational discourse – what might be called a ›process of deliberation,‹ where ideas from one generation would have been taken up, discussed, refined or rejected by scholars from the same or a later generation, eventually to crystallize as a single system. The deliberation over what ›the individual Muslim's good‹ is was therefore to some extent open-ended, with various items and priorities being proposed and discussed, and the ›field‹ being still open today for possible suggestions. On the whole, however, an almost unanimous consensus was reached over a list of five highest priority items, ordered as follows: (a) religion, (b) life, (c) intellect, (d) progeny, and (e) material goods.

It is well-worth pondering these interests or goods, as well as their ranking, given their deep significance to Islam's code of ethics. To begin with, it is important to understand what is meant by the first item on the list – the Muslim's religion. A ›conservative‹ jurist today might argue that by this is meant that the Law's purpose is first and foremost the safeguarding of Islam itself – that is, the *regime* or *religion* of Islam. However, from what was already stated, such an interpretation would miss the point, and would be inconsistent with the logic of the system, which was predicated on the individual: Law's (Religion's) purpose cannot surely be the safeguarding of itself (Religion)! The purpose of prescribing prayer, for example, cannot be the

safeguarding of the *institution* of prayer itself: prayer must have been prescribed for the good of the individual performing it. Indeed, behind the misinterpretation of this particular item would stand the school of thinking which argues in favor of *politicizing* Islam, or seeking the institution of a *regime* rather than the cultivation of ›the good Muslim.‹ Surely, however, what seems more reasonable to be understood by ›the Muslim's religion‹ in this context – just as in the case of the other items on the list – is simply the individual's religious conscience: the safeguarding of his/her freedom of religious beliefs or speculations. It is important to recall at this point that the major religious scholars in history to whom are attributed the origins of the different schools of law were themselves often in conflict with the political authorities, insisting on their *freedom* to hold on to the religious views they believed in. It is not meant here that a Muslim could hold beliefs inconsistent with those of Islam's articles of faith (believing in God and the Afterlife, His prophets, and the Day of Judgment, as well as in the fulfillment of the obligations for Prayer and Pilgrimage, Fasting, and the extraction of percentage of one's income for the poor). Not to hold to such beliefs and obligations would surely mean such a person was *not* a Muslim. But beyond these foundational articles of faith, the Muslim should be free to believe, for example, that the Word of God is eternal, or that it is legitimate to resist a corrupt political ruler, or that an efficient non-Muslim political ruler over a Muslim community is better than an inefficient or corrupt Muslim ruler over that same community.[6] A Muslim should not be bound by an ideology or a belief upheld by the regime's authority (or one that is upheld or declared by a particular religious authority) that seems to him/her to be inconsistent with his/her religious conscience.

To appreciate Islam properly, given the above-stated priority listing, is to appreciate the high value accorded to religious conscience in

[6] There were the views, respectively, held by the founding fathers of Islamic Law: Abu Hanifa (d. 767) upheld the right to resist ›deviant‹ Caliphs; Ibn Hanbal (d. 856) upheld the right to believing and declaring – *contra* to then-ideology – that the Qur'an was eternal rather than created; and Ibn Taymiyah held the view that a necessary condition for rule is efficacy. He further believed (see below) that politics and religion should be separate from each other – that religion has more to do with faith than with citizenship. Both Abu Hanifa and Ibn Hanbal were incarcerated by their rulers, the latter reportedly also tortured. It is important for the modern reader to realize that it is these ›anti-establishment‹ scholars – rather than the Caliphs – who ended up defining Islamic Law, and commanding the following of the Muslim community.

contrast to that accorded to material well-being, and to understand what human life is about in that context: clearly, life's *worth* in this view is a function primarily of the freedom of religious conscience, and it is only lastly to be measured in terms of material well-being. Significantly, also, the individual's *intellect* – their reasoning capacity – comes high on the list, immediately after life, and higher even than the interest an individual has in their progeny. This, again, should have been – and continues to be – an incentive and an inroad for those placing a high value on Reason to engage positively in a dialogue with jurists in the determination of what ›a good social order‹ must look like. The logarithm, of course, is proposed as a complete set, each of the items being concerns or goods that Law's purpose is to safeguard. It is beyond the purpose of this work to criticize or defend this logarithm, only to show how jurists attempted to make the practical connection between the transcendent Word of God on the one hand, and the normal individual human being on the other: at the end of the day, it was the ›good‹ of the individual for which God's Word was transmitted through Muhammad. Given these scholars' effect on Islam's code of ethics, one cannot but feel sorry that philosophers on the whole disdained from engaging with them in the belief that their reasoning register and methodology was inferior to theirs.

Jurists did not satisfy themselves with itemizing what the interest or good of the individual is. Clearly, other problems faced them, such as when conflicts seemed to arise between different goods or interests. What is to be done in such cases? What is to be done in cases where a potential harm seems to conflict with the provision of a good? Which of these (the prevention of harm or the realization of a good) should take precedence? What about the principle of presumed innocence? What about extenuating circumstances where obligatory rules are explicit? Is extracting a confession through torture allowed? These and many similar matters came to be organized under what might be called ›rules of adjudication.‹ These, then, became part and parcel of what is known as Islamic Law.

The names of two scholars are worth noting in the conclusion to this section, both Andalusian, and each standing at opposite sides of the jurisprudential pole: the first is Ibn Hazm (d. 1064), made famous recently in the homily of Pope at Regensburg, being cited as an example of the ›non-rational‹ face of Islam.[7] While it is true that Ibn

[7] For a more elaborate exposition of the late Pope's homily in this regard, see my

Hazm was a ›literalist‹ who was critical of the legal tradition, it is important to point out that his critique – which in fact confirms rather than denies the rationalist face of the legal tradition – was inspired by his sense that that a self-appointed ›clerical elite‹ had unfortunately come over time to impose itself on what should have been a direct interaction between the God's Word and the individual. In other words, his project was arguably more one of ›liberation‹ of the individual from what had by then become or was viewed as having become a rigid clerical hegemony, rather than as being a paradigm of the ›non-rationalism‹ face of Islam.[8]

The second scholar worth mentioning is al-Shatibi (d. 1388). With him we discover another rationalist ›leap‹ in that legal tradition: while jurists had all the time until then distinguished between their *source* and their *methodology*, al-Shatibi took the further bold step of proposing that analogical syllogisms (the methodology) be regarded as being embedded in the source as to be a part of it. Reasoning, in other words, was argued by him to be a necessary component of the source, rather than an accidental appendage to it, happening to be needed in order to understand the Law. As stated in the previous section, Averroes had pointed out some of the passages in the Qur'an exhorting the use of Reason. With al-Shatibi, this circumstance encouraged him to propose that Reason was therefore embedded in the Law.

4 A Common Language?

Many Muslims today still ask themselves if it is in Islam's nature to seek the materialization of itself in a State form. As stated above, this question was never settled among religious scholars in mainstream

»Violenza: Razionalita e Ragioevolezza,« *Dio Salvi La Ragionei, Benedetto XVI, et al.*, Siena: Cantagalli Publisher, 2007. An English version can be found at my website (sari.alquds.edu).

[8] It has been interestingly argued in a recent paper by Adam Sabra (see his »Ibn Hazm's literalism: A critique of Islamic legal theory,« in C. Adang et al. (ed.), *Ibn Hazm of Cordoba: The Life and Works of a Controversial Thinker* (Brill 2013) that Ibn Hazm's critique was inspired by a *liberalist* reaction against what by then had become a self-appointed class of ›clerics‹ (legal scholars or *'ulama*) who claimed a religious authority that Islam does not bestow on them. He therefore wished that the Qur'an be reclaimed by the people for whom it was revealed and who were not in need of scholarly mediators to understand it.

sunni Islam, and although Islamic Caliphates continued to exist following the prophet's death and right up to the First World War, political and religious authorities in effect remained separate from one another, a tense symbiotic relationship existing between them. While political authorities exercised physical power over their subjects, religious authority reigned over peoples' hearts – a dual system resulting in individuals constantly harboring a dual identity, along with a dual loyalty, political and religious. Each one of the two authorities was in need of the other for legitimating itself, with each one of them constantly having to take account of the power of the other. Islamic Law – defining practices – constituted the middle ground: religious scholars, appointed by political rulers or functioning independently, would both determine Islam's code of ethics, and adjudicate. This curious mode of co-existence essentially continued uninterrupted until, starting with the eighteenth century, the balance of power in the ›Old World‹ began to change, with Europe slowly replacing the Islamic world in its overall ascendancy. By the end of the First World War the die was cast, and ›the Muslim World‹ began to seek other pathways for meeting its new challenges. Given its history, the alternatives before it presented themselves either as that of the religious ›taking over‹ of politics – essentially, the recent ›Islamic State‹ movement is merely one radical face of this trend; the political ›taking over‹ of religion – essentially, the present counter-revolutionary regime in Egypt represents one anti-democratic face of this trend; or, finally, the maintenance of the pre-existing dual system, whether in some renewed form where either welfare or democratization measures (or both) are increased to maintain stability as in some Muslim countries in the region; or where stricter authoritarian measures are enforced, as in others.[9] In the Arab World, the ›seeds‹ of these different ›trends‹ and their offshoots began to be planted by the beginning of the twen-

[9] See A. Nai'm, *Islam and the Secular State,* Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010. The author eventually argues, after laying out the historic context of the relationship between religious and state laws, that for a healthy future symbiosis between the two state law should suffice itself with ensuring that basic human rights as expounded in various international charters are part of a legislation which otherwise should be ›given back‹ to religious legal scholars. While understandable, the author's argument risks invoking the ›classical trap‹ of portraying religious law on the moral level as belonging to a ›foreign‹ legal register. The argument forwarded in this paper, in contrast, supports a mutual effort aimed at formulating a single register. It is assumed that religious law, properly understood, is open to a moral deliberation that will underwrite those rights of the individual Na'im is concerned with.

tieth century. In retrospect, two seminal ›projects‹ are worth pointing out in this context, that of Farah Anton's (d. 1922) secularist invocation of the rationalist tradition in Islam as best expressed by Averroes, and that of ›True Islam's‹ revivalism by Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905). More on them will be said below.

The question if and how religion (Mosque, Church or Synagogue) and State can co-exist is one faced by different countries, each in the context of its own specificities. What stands out in the Islamic context is first the historic separation and symbiosis alluded to, and second Law's direct relevance to the determination of the nature of the contact point or border between them. But this being the contact point, it is also the ground of possible friction. This friction can either be expressed in conflictual situations between political and religious authorities; or it can express itself more deeply within the community in the form of conflictual loyalties and identities. Given Islamic Law's foundational role in formulating Muslim social identity, conflictual situations at this level can prove to be more dangerous, as when communities may come to clash violently with one another over power. As we saw, Averroes's attempt at a reconciliation, significantly in the field of Law, sought to provide a ›translational‹ approach: to translate religious into a rational language whenever conflict arose. However, both his own attitude, as that of other philosophers, was based on the belief that religious discourse – even in the legal field – was not as rationally pure and decisive as philosophical discourse. As already stated, this belief was based on the assumption that ›Pure Reason,‹ expressed by Aristotelian logic and metaphysics, is superior to all other kinds of reasoning. But it was not just logic and metaphysics which philosophers could feel superior about: more effectively, it was also the field of the practical and mechanical sciences, which happened to be introduced into the Muslim world by the philosophers themselves, as part of the transmitted Greek traditions, whose main instruments they were. Philosophers could therefore understandably feel they were far more advanced in their knowledge than were the religious scholars. But this ›superior‹ attitude, coupled with the ›patronizing‹ translation proposal reflecting it, clearly had no chance of attracting the respect of religious scholars. After all, these viewed the philosophers' own register as being ›transmitted,‹ like theirs, but – significantly in the fields of logic and metaphysics – unlike theirs for being drawn from a far lesser authority. The only way a real dialogue could have taken place would have been if philosophers (who pre-

sented themselves as representatives of science) were open-minded both to the limitations of their own methodology as well as to the potential rigor of that of the religious scholars. *Had that existed, a positive intellectual engagement might have developed between the two, especially in the field of Law, allowing for the development of a common language between them, and therefore also between the two registers.* In its turn, a common language between the two registers would have helped create or consolidate a single frame of reference for the two world-views, where differences or disagreements are not such as to pose a threat to the cohesion of social identity. The need for such a common language holds even today, where the ›religious register‹ has come more and more to closed in on itself, and to take more distance from non-Islamic registers.

One could think of two meanings for ›a common language‹ – a deep meaning and a surface meaning. According to the first a wide-ranging and translucent deliberative discourse between religious and secular scholars would exist in which different positions and ideas would be proposed and defended, whether in the same or different writings, and where therefore a consensual frame for disagreements could be registered as equal contenders for truth, the judgment of which being the reader's choice. While a ›perfect‹ common language of this kind might be unrealizable, nonetheless one can imagine the possibility of its realization in different degrees and different contexts across a spectrum. Open societies and democracies are contexts where its spread is potentially most far-reaching, and where ideological confrontations are least threatening.

By a surface-meaning for a common language, on the other hand, would be meant one restricted to the determination of society's code of ethics – Law, and what the *right things to do* are: what effectively characterizes a Muslim's behavioral identity – those behaviors he or she feels define them as Muslims. On the other hand, by surface-meaning one would mean a meaning restricted to the determination of society's code of ethics: both Law as well as what the right things to do as a Muslim are (i.e., those behaviors he or she feels define them as Muslims). While this will necessarily widen the circle of participants in such a deliberation to include scholars and intellectuals from different backgrounds and with different expertise, the discourse itself need not be *about* those backgrounds, though it will be informed by them. A recent initiative by the Islamic Council of States (see below) may serve as an example of what is meant. Given

Islam's already-explained ›dual-system,‹ a common language in this context would not need to apply – as Habermas argues it should apply in Europe's context – to formal political institutions (the provenance of politics). Already, a common language in the domain of law and ethics – once it comes to exist in the fashion suggested – would pre-empt the need for a common *political* or ideological register: two ›world-views‹ in parliament could still be at odds with one another, numbers deciding between them. But laws determining ethical conduct being instituted in Parliament would already be culled by reasoned debate. The example of the recent abortion campaign in Morocco may serve here as an example: regardless of the ideological differences in Parliament, or in society at large, a reasoned debate among jurists and specialists on a best practice in this issue could produce and then present Parliament or decision-makers with a largely ideologically-neutral, but ethically best motion for debate.

The attempt to bridge between legal and secular legal languages in many Muslim societies has been tried in modern times through the incorporation of an article in the relevant constitution declaring that Islamic Law is (either) *a* or *the* source for that constitution. But this already confirms an existing ideological duality of loyalties and identities – a duality that underlies much of today's social instability: it leaves it an open confrontational question at the political level as to which of the two registers is superior, and therefore needing to be *translated* into the language of the other. At worst, a legal argument in a criminal court could be so selectively drawn from the two registers (in one paragraph, drawing on Islamic Law's focus on the good of the individual, but in another on the State Law's focus on ›internal security,‹ or the ›good of the state‹) in such a way as to suit a politically motivated prosecution against civil activists. Better than a double-standard, and rather than translation, or interpretation (as per Averroes), what would make for fairness and stability at this level is a matured common legal language that would bridge that divide between the two registers.

But if a bridging attempt, however it is viewed, has at least come to be seen as a necessity in the modern age, it was unfortunately not even considered by past philosophers, excepting Averroes. As already stated, Muslim legal scholars commendably and creatively engaged themselves in the development of Islamic Law – a project which, had past philosophers recognized for the importance it held for society, might have enticed them to contribute to it. Did such philosophers

have anything to contribute in this regard? Would their contribution have been well-received by the religious scholars? Let us consider the following possibility: we can imagine a past world where one of these philosophers – a non-believer – decides to step into the legal debate with a contribution of his own. He is driven by his belief in what he considers to be a morally rational principle – a basic moral rule which could be adequately transcribed into an ethical code prescribing rational moral behavior. Briefly, he believes that a human being behaving rationally would not seek the attainment of a pleasure for himself if the pain or harm ensuing from it exceeds it in quantity or quality. Viewing the areas of possible contributions in the legal debate before him – whether the Law has a purpose, what that is, and what adjudication rules might apply to it – he wisely decides that it would be best if he could make his ›principle‹ relevant to the adjudication rules as to be reflected by them: one adjudication rule the jurists could add to their list would be to ensure the enactment of this moral principle.

The formulation of the ›moral rule‹ the philosopher therefore chooses to propose is one that he sees must at once address his interlocutor's beliefs as well as his own. To choose otherwise is to preempt his chances for a fair hearing. It therefore incorporates the doctrine – in which he himself does not believe – of an afterlife. The doctrine of an afterlife with rewards and punishments being an essential ingredient of Islam, he formulates the rule in such a way as to address his own ethical concerns in this life, as well as those of his interlocutors in the afterlife. Thus the rule he proposes could be the following:

> We should neither pursue a pleasure whose attainment precludes us from that afterlife, or one that will impose on us in this life a pain which in quality or quantity is greater than that of the pleasure chosen.

As is clear, there are two parts to this rule, one relating to a *this*-life and the other to an *after*-life, which significantly are combined together. While the rule is formulated as an imperative or a prescription (we *should* not), it is clearly predicated on a rational assumption (that ›we‹ *would* not). It is of course the *this*-life part that our philosopher is concerned with, where he thinks a person of sound mind and acting reasonably (the ›we‹ he has in mind) would not, by virtue of Reason alone, pursue a pleasure (a good) *in this life* which he knows will be out-measured by the pain (harm) to himself *in this life* resulting from it. Even, however, if the realization of such pleasure can be brought about by stealthy stratagems without therefore the risk of incurring

earthly pain (however we may define this), one who believes in the afterlife would by extension of the rule still regard this formula valid if thought about rationally, making the imperative applicable across worlds. In other words, though being entirely Reason-based, the proposed imperative would still have its binding value for a believer in the after-life.

Being well-acquainted with the Islamic jurists' rules of adjudication, our philosopher would propose to his interlocutors that this imperative goes well with their own basic rule which they believe the Law must safeguard, namely, the principle that the prevention of harm must outweigh the realization of a good. This being the case, perhaps a follow-up debate would then ensue about whether the ›good‹ or ›harm‹ to be measured should be understood as being specific to the person himself or as referring more generally to others (e. g., the community). The philosopher's formulation *(to himself)* might then encourage the discussion of an issue which lies at the heart of Islamic Law, namely, whether Law's purpose is the safeguarding of the good of the individual or that of the *regime* (of Islam), and how best to reconcile between these, or to understand the relationship between them – which of these two purposes presupposes the other. The philosopher might also encourage a debate about what might be meant by a ›quantitative‹ or ›qualitative‹ measurement – an issue in the adjudication rules which also needs clarification.

In theory, in other words, the grounds for a commonly formulated legal register was conceivable. What makes it seem more so is the fact that, as it happens, the above rule is found in *The Moral Life of the Philosopher,* the work of one of the philosophers most reviled by traditionalist scholars, Abu Bakr al-Razi (d. 925). In another of his works, *The Book of Spiritual Medicine,* Razi suggests that acting by such a rule would assure us of a just reward in the afterlife, given that ›the Original Source‹ (*al Bari* –his ambivalent reference to God) is absolutely knowledgeable, just and merciful (terms he knows were in common use by religious scholars).[10]

Why did such a profitable dialogue not take place? The sad answer is that in real life, al-Razi's metaphysical beliefs – as these were

[10] For excerpts and a summary of the former work as well as the translation of the second into English, see A. J. Arberry, *The Spiritual Physick of Rhazes,* London: John Murray, 1950. This is downloadable on (http://files.libertyfund.org/files/1791/0955_Bk.pdf; last accessed on 5 November 2015).

reported – made him a target of scathing attacks by religious scholars, his potential contribution to the development of a common discourse or language with them thereby becoming totally impossible. Razi's dilemma (and its effect on the project of a common language) could be viewed as an example of the unfortunate relationship that existed between philosophical and religious scholarships. He clearly had something important to contribute to the moral debate formulating Islamic identity, but the chances of his being heard in the ›corridors of power,‹ where that identity was being formulated, were summarily preempted by his metaphysical beliefs (the accusations against him included the claim that he did not believe in prophecy). Arguably, of course, the fault was as much that of the religious scholars – for refusing to tolerate philosophy – as it was his, if not more. However, on the assumption – believed by the philosophers themselves – that they were smarter and more knowledgeable than the religious scholars, and could see better what a best human life should look like, it is surely more strongly arguable that – even on their own terms – it was more their responsibility to seek the religious scholars' ears than the other way round, and therefore to find a best way for doing so. This could not have happened by adopting a superior attitude. Alfarabi, possessed of a brilliantly analytic mind, had unfortunately already set the tone for this philosophical attitude: in many ways enlightened – but also blinded – by the received Greek tradition, he stuck to the elitist belief in a rigidly hierarchic system of knowledge and knowers' which are best kept separate from one another. The language of exchange between them, he thought, needs to be formulated in terms that are suitable for each one of the different levels – in other words, *translation*. Otherwise, he warned, philosophers in particular would find themselves outcast in their societies. As it turned out, however, his prescription was for a self-imposed exile from society. Even were one to accept that his concern was with the ›preventing of harm‹ to society in the ›deep‹ sense – so to speak, needlessly confusing a public incapable of a mature rational discourse – the application of his ›non-meddling‹ prescription to society's code of ethics must itself surely have had the opposite effect: the harm resulting from the stratification of two distinct and often conflicting ethical registers and two distinct and often conflicting identities.

As already stated, one of the salient marks of the introduction of philosophy into the Islamic milieu was science. Beginning with al-Kindi (d. 873), philosophers could be viewed as having been – among

other things – the harbingers of a practical field (e.g., medicine, astronomy, engineering) which was of immense value to Muslim society, and they were, in that capacity at least, made good use of by that society. Razi himself is best renowned for his contributions in the fields of health and medicine, and was gratefully recognized for serving society in that function. Arguably, his technical contributions in the legal field might have also been welcomed, had his ideological views not jarred with those of his religious interlocutors, for whom, unlike the case with medicine, this particular technical area was viewed as lying within their province. In a sense, then, one might well understand the logic of al-Ghazali's singling out in his critique of philosophers their metaphysical views, as well as Averroes's argument that philosophers should in effect keep these views to themselves. After all, as al-Ghazali argued, these views were essentially hypothetical, not possessed of the certainties of science. On the other hand, however, what was and remains a critical issue is whether and to what the extent Islam is viewed and projected as a religion that tolerates difference – a matter that could only be formulated through the combined efforts of open-minded legal and other Muslim scholars committed to seeing that religion is always ahead in its humanistic message of the constant advances in knowledge and moral reach.

5 Islamism and Secularism

As previously stated, the Arab world in particular began to witness new stirrings as the Ottoman Caliphate was nearing its demise towards the end of the nineteenth century, and these began to manifest themselves in specific ideological strands with the collapse of that Caliphate, the end of the First World War, and the creation of the ›national states‹ as these were conceived and even allotted by the victorious ›Allies.‹ New voices began to be raised for some deep soul-searching in the Arab society's then-prevalent modes of beliefs and habits, some calling for a renaissance of Islam's ›glorious past.‹ However, there was no agreement over what the ingredients of this past's glory were. Some saw it in religion itself. Others saw it in the scientific and rational feats of Islam that *followed* upon the institution of that religion, and that could now be rehabilitated through a ›nationalist‹ (albeit *pan*-Arabic) cause. Others still, influenced by Marxist thought, began arguing in favor of seeing the world through the dif-

ferent eyes of class dialectics, leaving behind antiquated theories of nationalism and religion.

In 1903 a Christian intellectual and journalist by the name of Farah Anton, originally Syrian, opened a new page in the intellectual scene by publishing a book on Averroes.[11] For him, the rationalist Averroes represented ›the best‹ of Islam's past that can be drawn upon for resuscitating the Muslim world – now as a ›virginal Eastern/Arab region‹ – from its slumber. Informed by the Averroist tradition, Anton argued, religion and politics could be made separate from each other, the former retaining its respectful place as the concern and practice of the individual, with the latter becoming a secular instrument of Reason that can empower the Arab world to navigate the modern challenges it now faced. For Anton, an Arab Christian, the »Muslim Arab World« was more of a linguistic culture and civilization than a particular religion. In this culture, Christians (and Jews) ›belonged‹ as much as Muslims did. Islam's ›rationalist‹ tradition, he believed, would empower the slumbering world to renew its potential and to stand up to growing European domination.

But Farah Anton's was not the only voice proposing a ›way out‹ of the Arab-Muslim world's intellectual and political disarray. Viewing this disarray from an opposite perspective, the religious scholar Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) – a younger colleague and student of the visionary and activist Jamal Eddin al-Afghani (d. 1897), and who later became the *mufti* in Cairo's al-Azhar – saw matters differently, and argued instead in favor of reviving Islam's original doctrine and system of rule, which he (and his teacher) believed to have been smothered by generations of corrupt practice. In what can be in retrospect considered a landmark debate between the two carried out in local Cairo magazines *(al-Jami'a* and *al-Manar)* – Anton, like many

[11] See W. Abu-'Uksa, ›Liberal Tolerance in Arab Political Thought: Translating Farah Antun (1874–1922),‹ *Journal of Levantine Studies*, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 151–57. The exchange between Anton and 'Abduh was published in *al-Manar* and *al-Jami'a*, the latter being Anton's own journal. In recognition of its current significance, this exchange was recently collected and published in Beirut, Lebanon, alongside a reprint of Antun's work on Averroes (see: *Ibn Rushd wa Falsafatuhu*, intr. T. Tizini, Beirut: Dar Al Farabi, 1998, pp. 45–367). A second print of this was published by Edition ANEP, (Algeria: Alger, 2001). 'Abduh mistakenly understood Antun's critique of then-prevalent social mores as a criticism of Islam as compared with Christianity. The debate came against the background of a more general movement of modern reformists challenging Islamic ›values‹ and mores – for example, the status of women, the *hijab*, participation in parliamentary elections, etc.

other intellectuals, had moved there from Syria further away from Ottoman influence – the groundwork for the more general question that has come to capture today's reality in the Arab world was set. Does ›the way out‹ require that politics be separated from religion (Islamic Law), or does it instead require that ›unadulterated‹ Islamic Law be resuscitated and made to inform politics?[12]

As previously stated, in its more general form this question had been posed, but never resolved, right from the beginning of the institution of the Caliphate regime. In effect, religious and political authorities had developed side by side – a symbiotic duo with each side keeping a watchful eye on the other, and an underlying tug-of-war between them. Now with the replacement of the Islamic Caliphate *regime* by a political system of ›nation-states,‹ the lawmaking space becoming available for political authority suddenly expanded, becoming the paradigm. The right to prescribe basic laws – essentially, derived from the French and Mandatory British legal systems – came to be appropriated by the State, effectively expropriating what had primarily been the provenance of religious authority. However, mindful of religion's importance to the community, and by way of appeasement, newly emerging Arab countries came to cite Islamic law as *one* major *source* of Law in their constitutions. It would also be stated the the religion of *the state* is that of Islam. Religious courts were allowed to continue adjudications in family and inheritance matters. As recent historical events in the region have shown, this ›compromise formula‹ has not proven to be entirely satisfactory: how could the religion of the State be Islam and yet not have Islamic Law as its sole legal authority? Or, be a political regime and yet have Islamic Law as a major source of jurisdiction? Indeed, what does it mean to say the *state* has a religion? Is religion something a state (rather than an individual or a people) *has?* (Consider here the debate in Israel about whether it should remain a state *of* the Jewish people, or *itself* become a Jewish State).

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[12] For an account of some of the seminal workshops held during the twentieth century in Kuwait and Cairo to which major Arab thinkers were invited, see I. Boullata, *Trends and Issues in Contemporary Arab Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990). It may be important to point out that ›secularist thinkers‹ not only included Marxists or communists (most of whom declined to attend what they considered as ›liberal bourgeoisie‹ workshops), but also certain nationalist and pan-Arabist thinkers for whom religion was no longer thought to be relevant for steering the Arab world towards economic and social progress.

Meantime, in the Arabian Peninsula, political fermentations in the eighteenth century forged an alliance between the tribal founders of Saudi Arabia and the religious ideology of the scholar Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) making for the type of Islam now governing that country and being proselytized by it throughout the Muslim world. Iran, on the other side of the Persian/Arab Gulf, and following the revolution against the secular *Reza* dynasty in 1979, developed into a full theocracy ruled by its own brand of *shi'ite* Islam – a brand originating in early disputes over rightful caliphate successions, and having adherents also in the Arab world.

It is in this fragmented context that the Anton-Abduh debate at the beginning of the past century on state and religion began to assume a new life, now splintering into many directions. This ›new life‹ only began to impress itself upon the political stage with the collapse – the failure to deliver political or economic returns – of the secularist/socialist/nationalist ›experiment‹ of major Arab countries (Iraq, Egypt, Syria); as well as with the weakening of Marxist movements and thought partly brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the intellectual level, in one case the Averroist line (viewed as representing a rationalist Islam) has been argued for quite strongly by the recently deceased Moroccan philosopher Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri (d. 2010). Another line of rationalism favored recently has been that of a religious movement, the *Mu'tazilites* school of *kalam*. This (now sometimes referred to as *›neo-Mu'tazilism‹)*, is perhaps most famously associated with another recently deceased Egyptian intellectual, Nasr Abu Zeid (d. 2010). (His writings, declared to be proof of his apostasy in a Muslim court, further led to the imposition on him of a divorce from his wife). Other contemporary ›reformists‹ have included the Egyptian scholar Hasan Hanafi, for whom Islam constitutes the backbone for, but not the restricting limit to the further expansion of its moral and rational reach. In all of the above cases, the inspiration for a renewed ›powerhouse‹ has been sought from those ›rationalist‹ elements of the ›glorious past‹ that are perceived to be relevant to Muslim society. On the other side of the spectrum, countering these calls, however, and with far greater impact on the political scene, have been those religious movements (described as *Islamist* of one kind or another) fighting for the reinstatement of their respective visions of an unadulterated Islamic Law. The main ideological confrontation, then, has in recent years been that between a rationalist school calling for subjecting State politics (and

its judiciary arm) to Reason – now in an ›Islamicized‹ form; and another calling for the subjection of politics to Islam as defined by its (conservative) Laws. In the aftermath of the general failure of other alternatives – Marxism and secular nationalism – the ›option‹ of subjecting religion (Islamic Law) to politics no longer proffers itself at the practical level as a realistic alternative. If, in what used to be a ›Christian‹ world the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has most recently argued (*contra* Habermas) in favor of at least recognizing religion as ›an option‹ among others to be admitted into the formal debates of lawmaking (without, therefore, the requirement for a *translation* into a secular or ›neutral‹ language), the required plea for ›optionality‹ in the Muslim world in contrast now has come to be needed in exactly the opposite direction: for the admission of a secular discourse into a religion-informed public sphere. One hundred years after the First World War and the sprouting of new ideas, in other words, the pendulum seems to have swung back, leading the region again into a religious era, almost as that which confronted the philosophers in the past, but now of the hardened kind. But significantly, to turn back to our earlier discussion, it would be a grievous mistake – as it has been in the past – to posit the present confrontation as that between a Reason-informed ideology and a non-rational (or rationally inferior) one: indeed, in many ways, given the apparent mismanagement of political rulers and authorities in the Arab world, and their characterization as self-serving and corrupt regimes, the Islamic State ideology – despite its terrorism tactics – has been proving itself on the ground to be possessed of a far more ›rational‹ methodology, while professing to offer a just vision for society.

Indeed, Reason or rationality is not the issue: the recently created Islamic State (IS) just happens to be another one of those political actors for whom violence is conceived as a rational means for the achievement of their ends.[13] For, consider the following: the *end-vision* of the so-called ›Islamic State‹ combatants (to set up a ›pure‹

[13] In May 2015 *The Project on Middle East Political Science* (POMEPS) published a series of memos (posted as POMEPS STUDIES 15, at: pomeps.org), including one, »The Islamic State as an ordinary insurgency,« by Reyko Huang, which compares the Islamic State's methods with that of other, religious and non-religious insurgency movements. Distinguishing between »religion-centered« and »actor-centered« frameworks for understanding such movements' strategies and tactics, the author emphasizes the role of the second of these factors in determining their well-reasoned plans and actions. The author's findings thus corroborate the point being made in this paper

Islamic polity in countries where Muslim majorities live) may of itself or from a given perspective seem far-fetched and arguably irrational. Significantly, however, their underlying ›program‹ to bring about that vision – though rooted in terrorism – is eminently rational: working from a Hobbesian framework that views a civic polity as one that emerges from chaos, and where that human chaos or state of nature is taken to be one of fear and of war of all against all, a total replacement of an existing religious polity by an entirely different one could arguably require returning to the blackboard through the recreation – through consciously conceived acts of brutal terrorism and the spreading of fear – of that primal state of chaos. Once such a state is created, a new ›social contract‹ between subjects and ruler could be established, rooted in what is conceived to be the pure Islamic message of the religion's founder. The project would be that of a ›political reconstruction‹ – from scratch – of the religious polity.[14] While the analogy might seem provocative in this context, consider the simile Descartes uses of structuring a town anew rather than build on its existing layout for his rational reconstruction project in epistemology.[15] Abstracted from its moral context, one could say of IS's strategy that ›though this be madness, yet there's *method* in it,‹ as Shakespeare's Polonius, commenting on Hamlet, is made to say. In short, what is absent from the reasoning employed by such actors, including Muslims, is not Reason *per se* but what might be considered *moral* Reason.

In particular, the Islamic State strategy is informed by two interdependent attitudes to politics and morality: a generic distinction between a *given* Law (a prefixed ethical code prescribing a best social order) and common moral-sense (a Reason-sensitive and ›open program‹ code of ethics); and that between ends and means – where, given a prefixed vision of a best social order, the moral characteriza-

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that rational methodologies can describe the acts of fanatical as well as ›reasonable‹ actors.

[14] See one of their major manifestos, *The Management of Savagery*, W. McCants (trans.), downloadable at: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/abu-bakr-naji-the-management-of-savagery-the-most-critical-stage-through-which-the-umma-will-pass.pdf (last accessed on 25 September 2015).

[15] R. Descartes, *A Discourse on Method* (J. Veitch, trans., intro. A. D. Lindsay), London: Dent. 1965. See Part II. While Descartes does not recommend this approach as one to be used as a matter of course, he explains he has decided to use it for his own reconstruction of knowledge edifice.

tion of the means to achieve it becomes completely irrelevant. Taken together, it should not come as a surprise that these two attitudes could produce the kind of disastrous political landscapes as those described above. Chopping heads off can be viewed as a rational means for securing world peace or religious harmony. While, therefore, it is not Reason or Rationality *per se* that are at issue, what is at issue are the vision and the means to achieve that – both of which are *moral* rather than rational considerations: Should the focus of Islamic Law be on guaranteeing the good or interest of the individual, or should it be – as a prior obligation – on the good or interest of the ›order‹ of which the individual is member?

The second-option approach – one adopted by many Islamist movements – presupposes a unique vision of what that best order is. It is a vision of a fixed, or static order. It therefore allows for – indeed, even obligates – a group holding that vision to use all means to bring it about. This holds for this interpretation of Islam as for any other ›ideology‹ – including those ideologies in the past century that have led to the unprecedented deaths of millions in Europe. The first-option approach, on the other hand, cognizant of the dynamic nature of human lives, leaves the matter of characterizing a best order to the individuals themselves – indeed, it defines instances of right and wrong practices, as well as a number of rules, but above all it ›explains itself‹ as a Law whose purpose is to safeguard the ›good‹ or ›interest‹ of the individual Muslim. Safeguarding that good or interest would *eo ipso* guarantee a best Islamic order. Guided by Law's purpose, jurists are obliged to continue deliberating about the best answer for any number of newly-arising questions. Paradoxically, it is a ›liberalist‹ approach that leaves the door open (in theory at least) for determining what in practical terms a best order is. To draw on a contemporary legal model, jurists act more like judges in the British legal system (deliberating applicable principles based on past practices), rather than as lawyers (applying principles to cases at hand). While past religious scholars (both in *fiqh* and *kalam*) adopted rational methodologies consistent with this approach, philosophers on the whole – taken in by fixed Aristotelian or Platonic visions – adopted the opposite, fixed-vision methodological approach. For them, Greek philosophy had all the answers. Philosophers therefore saw no value in ›stooping down‹ to the jurists' deliberations. During the past century, with the ascendancy of politics over religion, a regime of civil laws – essentially derived from the French and Mandatory British legal systems – has

come to define human relations and practices, with religious law retaining a secondary status (family and inheritance). In other words, civil and religious laws continued to reflect two different registers, as if derived from different sources, the one ›rational‹ (now in ascendancy) and the other ›religious‹ (as if a historic leftover). But given the widening gulf between the religious and secular perspectives on what ›the good life is,‹ or what ›a best order is,‹ it has now become more urgent than ever in the past that this presumed schism between the two approaches is bridged, a minimal common language needing to be formulated between them. Is this possible? Given the two approaches to Reason – the one deliberative (religion) and the other deductive (state) – is it possible, in particular, for the state legal system to begin a process of reformulating its laws through a deliberative engagement with religious scholars in such a way that a single code of ethics for Muslim society could emerge?

What is being posed as lying at the heart of the matter of instability in Arab Muslim countries is the question whether the general confrontation between the religious and secular world-perspectives can begin to be bridged through the creation of a common language between civil and religious laws. The formulation of such a language – to replace an existing dual system – would perhaps provide the stable foundation for a deeper-structured common language in society, and the kind of open space that could contain pluralism. In other words, the area being identified for the moment as a possible ground for a common language concerns practices that are informed by beliefs rather the beliefs themselves – not for example, about God, but about whether women should be allowed to drive cars or have abortions. A common language in the minimal sense would be one where deliberation would concern those practices. The question therefore is about whether, in this day and age, two different registers – religious and secular – can fuse into one.

Perhaps one could learn about what is possible from a specific initiative launched in 1981 by the Council of Islamic States: the »International Muslim Jurisprudence Form.« The forum includes members from forty-three Muslim countries, and was established so that Muslim jurists and scholars could debate and decide upon issues arising from modern developments in various fields (mostly in science as this affects society, but also in finance, public properties, road accidents, etc.), and which need the formulation of a Muslim legal ›position‹ regarding them. Several points are worthy of note in this con-

nection. The first is that the formulated ›position‹ – if one is commonly or by majority arrived at – is stated as a scholarly *ijtihad* (a considered opinion arrived at by *inference*). No claim of absolute ›truth‹ is made. The second is that such a considered opinion is formulated through a process of *deliberation* among a group of scholars, selected from different Muslim countries. No single ›authority‹ is turned to for a definitive answer. The third point is that this group invites specialists from different fields when the discussion involves matters that lie within those specialists' fields of expertise. The forum convenes once a year and is hosted by one of the participating Muslim countries. Its headquarters is in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. It deals with all issues posed by modernity. As reported in a recent study, one area that has been a focus of special attention for scholars in this forum is medicine – questions having to do with treatment (e. g. by male doctors of female patients, or euthanasia, etc., transplants, birth control, AIDS, and fasting). The study shows how scholars would draw in those deliberations on Islamic sources, Law's purpose, the rules of adjudication, as well as relevant observations of past scholars belonging to the four main schools, and would then proceed to form a judgment. A cursory reading of the meticulous deliberations (e. g., on how to define ›a hopeless case‹ in the context of whether medical treatment should be continued) shows promise of a common-sense legal language – expressing both religious and non-religious concerns – that can address modern demands.[16]

[16] The study has been done as a Master's thesis at the Faculty of Religion at al-Quds University under the title ›A Study of the Contemporary Medical Decisions taken by the International Islamic Jurisprudence Forum,‹ by Dima Nashashibi (Jerusalem: Sa'ed, 2015; in Arabic). What seems to stand out in this Forum's work is the fact that it is underwritten by the government of Saudi Arabia – commonly (and justifiably) regarded as a ›conservative‹ Muslim country. The work of the Forum, however, seems to enjoy some independence on account of its international make-up, and on account of the fact that its umbrella organization is the *Council of Islamic States* rather than any particular Muslim country. It has more credibility, therefore, than that of functionaries (such as at al-Azhar in Cairo) or of ›renegade jurists‹ (such as al-Qardawi in Qatar). In both of these latter cases, the government of the host country plays the role of *maestro* – though, as reported recently in a study on al-Azhar's educational initiatives, there seems to be a large divide between the upper echelon at al-Azhar, and the real teachings of Islamic Law under al-Azhar's tutelage that seem to be taking place across the country, which do not reflect the *maestro's* policies – for this, see the article by H. Abou Zeid, ›Al-Azhar's »Imcopotence,«‹ published in *Al-Ahram Weekly* (Issue 1253, 2nd July 2015). This is downloadable in English at: weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/12679/21/Al-Azhar's-`imcopotence'.aspx (last accessed on 5 November 2015).

In theory at least – especially assuming the intellectual independence of these scholars – such a forum seems to provide the perfect model for creating the kind of ›common language‹ referred to above. However, instead of religious law thus evolving by itself, what is argued is needed is that such a forum should in fact be one where ›a-religious‹ legalists and experts would be partners in this project. ›A-religious‹ need not mean people who are non-religious, or who are anti-religious: all it need mean are scholars and experts whose input is informed by what they consider to be a neutral or scientific register. These may also include moral philosophers. Legal opinions emerging from these deliberations can then be filtered into the laws of the state, these slowly coming to reflect indigenous social values rather than seeming to be an independent register derived from foreign sources. Importantly, the emergent common language meant would not be one formed by *translation* or *interpretation* – Averroes's (or Habermas's) condition: rather, it would be formed through deliberation by experts of equally-recognized scholarly standing from different fields alongside Muslim legal scholars. Although primarily focused on *practices* rather than *beliefs*, its effects on characterizing Muslim society would be far-reaching, and one can imagine that it could finally provide a veritable foundation for precisely that more general common language in society whose absence today is sorely missed, and where divergent beliefs or ideologies have come to express themselves in extremist and exclusivist forms.

In conclusion, then, this paper has proposed the argument that neither the philosophical, nor the so-called religious-informed rationalisms of the early period of Islam can by itself provide us today with that stabilizing foundation needed to bridge religious with political authorities: instead, what is needed is a minimal common language between them, one that can be developed through a deliberative discourse over society's practices, or code of ethics. This – an exercise unfortunately ignored by past philosophers – may now constitute the firm and cohesive foundations for modern Muslim societies.

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Symposium:
»Is Reason a Neutral Tool in Comparative Philosophy?«

A Manifesto for Re:emergent Philosophy

Abstract
Is Reason a Neutral Tool in Comparative Philosophy? In his answer to the symposium's question, Jonardon Ganeri develops a »Manifesto for [a] Re:emergent Philosophy.« Tracking changes in the understanding of ›comparative philosophy,‹ he sketches how today's world of academic philosophy seems to be set to enter an »age of re:emergence« in which world philosophies will (and can) be studied through modes of global participation. In their responses, the symposium's discussants tease out implications of this *Manifesto* for different issues: While Mustafa Abu Sway suggests that comparative philosophy be understood as an intra-philosophical dialogue, whose aim depends on its participants, Paul Boghossian questions whether there can be conflicting, yet equally valid, ways of arriving at justified beliefs about the world. For her part, Georgina Stewart draws out the similarities between Ganeri's understanding of comparative philosophy and the ethical stance involved in studying Maori science. In his *Reply*, Ganeri fleshes out his understanding of a pluralistic realism. Only an epistemic culture, which is open to a plurality of epistemic stances, he contends, can propel polycentric modes of knowledge production.

Keywords
Comparative philosophy, intellectual decolonization, intra-philosophical dialogue, relativism, Indigenous philosophies, Jonardon Ganeri, Mustafa Abu Sway, Paul Boghossian, Georgina Stewart.

Insofar as »comparative philosophy« is a branch of philosophy reason must be instrumental in its pursuit, given that philosophy is the employment of the human capacity for reasoned thought to »understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term«. But comparative philosophy

is not, I submit, a branch of philosophy nor it is a distinct philosophical method: it is an expedient heuristic introduced at a particular moment in world history as part of a global movement towards intellectual decolonisation. The ambition of comparative philosophy was not to generate new philosophical insights but to protect thinkers in colonised countries from the peculiar form of intellectual servitude colonialism sought to impose. Recognition and integration were its leading motifs: a first generation of philosophers, still colonised, seeking recognition for indigenous manners of understanding through the demonstration of their comparability with colonial insight; a second generation, in the years after the end of colonial rule, hoping for assimilation and integration in an internationalised philosophical academy. Philosophers writing bravely against the grain in colonised societies or in the ferment of postcolonial nation state formation made extraordinary progress in the rediscovery of lost philosophical inheritances and in the demonstration of their full entitlement to philosophical recognition. Yet coloniser philosophy remained in such endeavours a privileged mode of thought and point of reference, if only as a focus of resistance. These projects aimed either to incorporate indigenous thinking into an unchallenged colonial paradigm or else to reverse colonial asymmetries while leaving a fundamentally colonial structure intact.

By ›colonial‹ I mean European in the context of South America, Africa and much of South-east Asia; British in the context of India and the rest of South Asia, the Gulf, North America, Australasia, and southern Africa; Soviet in the context of Central Asia, the Baltic and the Caucasus; Han in the context of Tibet, Mongolia, and inside mainland China; American in the context of the Pacific basin; Danish in the context of Nordic countries; Japanese in the context of Korea, Taiwan and China. When in what follows I refer to »the colonial use of reason« I shall not mean its use by the ancients or pre-moderns but by those philosophical giants in the 18th and 19th centuries who provided colonialism with its moral and intellectual foundations. This colonial use of reason represented itself as impartial, objective and universal but was in fact anything but, and that was its first dishonesty. Its second was the way it defended its claims to impartiality and universality over and against competing claims from outside. It did not engage in honest debate, philosopher to philosopher, but instead dismissed the alternative's claim to universality altogether. So colonisers took what was in fact itself a local way of using reason (one con-

textually entangled with the history of the colonial project), falsely promoted it as a uniquely acontextual methodology, and denied that outsiders had so much as a concept of the general application of reason on the grounds that they did not share its parochial epistemic practices.

Colonial rationalists' false claim to neutrality catches the excluded outsider in a vicious dilemma: make your use of reason like ours (in which case what extra value does your philosophy bring to the table?), or admit that you are outside reason and not actually engaged in philosophy at all. The dilemma is false because the neutrality of colonial reason it presupposes is a phoney mixture of two myths. The first, that the colonial will to universality is impartial; the second that the existence of the outsider's will to universality is to be denied. In denying outsiders a will to universality, the coloniser denied them their humanity, and the various ignominious philosophical rationalisations of colonial rule were but corollaries of this basic double move. Simone Weil would observe it in the intrinsic absurdity of children in French Polynesia being made to recite »Our ancestors the Gauls had blond hair and blue eyes […]« while forbidden their indigenous custom, language and tradition, forbidden even access to the libraries containing documentation relating to it; and was it not Macaulay who said that a random single shelf of European books was of more value to humanity than the entirety of Sanskrit literature. The move is evident when a history of epistemology in the west describes itself simply as *the* history of epistemology, protest met with disinterest. The colonial power had philosophy, the rest of the world has only what was described as »culture« or, more condescendingly still, »wisdom tradition«. The colonisers' claim that reason (meaning their specific and provincial use of reason) is a neutral tool had thus to be exposed as trickery, this a precondition for the intellectual decolonisation of the rest of the world, and the redressing of a blatant epistemic injustice was the ambition and project of comparative philosophy.

The world of academic philosophy is now entering a new age, one defined neither by colonial need for recognition nor by postcolonial wish to integrate. The indicators of this new era include heightened appreciation of the value of world philosophies, the internationalisation of the student body, the philosophical pluralism which interaction and migration in new global movements make salient, growing concerns about diversity within a still too-white faculty body and curricular canon, and identification of a range of deep struc-

tural problems with the contemporary philosophical academy in its discursive, citational, refereeing and ranking practices. We are entering what we might call »the age of re:emergence«, a new period the key features of which are as follows. First, philosophies from every region of the world, locally grounded in lived experience and reflection upon it, are finding new autonomous and authentic forms of articulation. Second, philosophical industry, leaving behind a centre-periphery mode of production, is becoming again polycentric: the philosophical world is returning to a plural and diverse network of productive sites. Third, Europe and other colonial powers have been provincialised, no longer mandatory conversation partners or points of comparison but rather unprivileged participants in global dialogue. Fourth, philosophers within the largely anglophone international academy are beginning to acknowledge their responsibility so to arrange international institutions as to enable wide and open participation; that is, acknowledge that their control over the academy is a fallout from colonialism rather than a reflection of intellectual superiority.

Philosophers in the age of re:emergence certainly are thinkers using reason to seek new ways to understand how things, including human beings, hang together. However, the uses they make of reason are markedly different from the way reason has been used and abused in colonial intellectual projects in Europe and elsewhere. Conscious by necessity of the colonisers' ways of doing philosophy, newly emergent thinkers are continuously on guard not to allow themselves to fall into the invidious dilemma described above. A re:emergent way of thinking must combine appeal to the indigenous with defensive dialectical skills. Non-Europeans had to turn themselves into Europeanists in order to figure out how to side-step its enslavements; the same was true of those who were at the mercy of other colonial powers. Philosophy in the age of re:emergence is thus not a matter of seeking the essence of autochthonous ways of thinking, and indeed essentialism about philosophical traditions is but a modern strategy to cope with colonial guilt, resting in the vain hope that the colonised have not, after all, been deprived of intellectual integrity. The once-colonised do not have the luxury to practice philosophy in some state of philosophical innocence, and nor do they wish for it: for in this new era every philosophical identity is hybrid and dynamic, criss-crossing multiple localities of geography and epoch, transcending each and again returning (»cross-cultural philosophy« and »fusion philoso-

phy« are but special cases of the re:emergent project, as is »intercultural translation«, but re:emergence does not require cross-culturality). They leave to philologists and text-critical historians the attempt to construct an archaeology of past systems of thought destined only to become specimens in a museum of ideas, for the once-colonised has always to watch against being made into an ethnographic object. For them the use of reason consists in the manner in which they inherit a past and transform it into an articulation of a lived experience, and in that very act of retrieval and reinvention fashion a distinctive understanding of how it all hangs together, and why. When it is therefore asked, »Can Asians and other non-Europeans think and reason?«, the answer is »Yes, of course!«. Must they think and reason as if they are Europeans? No, because the fundamental asymmetry that colonialism produced cannot simply be made to disappear in an act of collective amnesia of the sort intellectuals of former colonial powers seem so remarkably adept. The cosmopolitanisms of re:emergence are subaltern and subversive interplays between a plurality of open vernaculars and new, non-coercive, ways to think about our common humanity. Solidarity across borders among the once-colonised leads to revitalisations in the understanding of those various inherited pasts, revitalisations that in turn deepen cosmopolitan awareness (such a project indeed retrieves the cosmopolitan ideal from imperial misappropriation).

As philosophers in every linguistic and geographical region of the globe re:emerge, so too do innovative ways to use reason. I shall give two examples of ways of using reason that do not fall into the colonial model I have criticised. Here I appeal to India, the non-European philosophical world I know best: world philosophers everywhere must retrieve from their own inheritances their own renewed ways to use reason. My studies of logical theory in India have led me to see that there is a fundamental contrast between two styles of reasoning, that of formal deduction and that of particularist, case-based, »blueprint+adaptation« extrapolation. The latter model – whose origins in India lie as much in the ritual reasoning of the Mīmāṃsā exegetes and the jurisprudence of the Dharmaśāstra as in explorations in the science of prediction in the medical treatises and, perhaps most especially, in early Nyāya logic – developed into a general theory of ethical and normative reasoning. The basic idea is that an object is inferred to have one, unobserved, property on the grounds that it has another, observed, one: »there is fire on the mountain because

there is smoke there«. The most distinctive aspect of the schema is the fundamental importance given to the citation of an example, a single case said either to be similar or else dissimilar to the topic at hand. Suppose I want to persuade you that it is about to rain. I might reason as follows: »Look, it is going to rain (*pakṣa:* proposed thesis). For see that large black cloud (*hetu:* sign). Last time you saw a large black cloud like that one (*dṛṣṭānta:* exemplary case), what happened? Well, it's the same now (*upanaya:* application). It is definitely going to rain (*nigamana:* decision)«. What does it tell us about the nature of reason when particulars are in this way made to work as exemplary cases? First, that methods of selection and adaptation are implied by the description of the particular. As a structured complex whole, the particular is normative: it constrains what other particulars count as resembling it by sharing a common basic framework, and it constrains what modifications or substitutions are possible, thereby determining a method of adaptation. Like a curved object used as a benchmark, an exemplary case bends the ruler to fit itself. Second, the standards are context-sensitive and localised, because of the requirement that proper purpose is preserved, whether that be matching the shapes of objects, performing rituals that have their intended effects, or making accurate predictions. This implies that substitutions and comparisons remain close to the prototype, that the spread of the standards of selection and adaptation is localised. In both versions of the »blueprint+adaptation« model, the version in which particulars are typical samples and the version in which they are prototypical schemata, the standard is not absolute and universal, but localised, sensitive to context and open-textured. The early Indian thinkers thus present an important style of thinking well, yet one that is not understood if we think of all good reasoning as involving subsumption to general rule.

Within this model there can be diversity in reasoning-and-evaluating practice without incommensurability. From variation in reasoning practice it does not follow that the idea of reason itself is context-sensitive, though the uses to which it is put may well be: it implies only that there is a variation in the base-sets of exemplars and in the kinds of background information that inform similarity judgements. Case-based norms are trans-sectarian but dialogue-specific. The model provides for the kind of immersed rational practice that I regard as essential in the evaluation, development and criticism of values, using cognitive resources available to a group in order to provide authentic forms of justification (for example, of human

rights) and critical revision (for example, of social inequality); that is, a method for the evaluation of values that is both genuinely critical and yet does not imperiously impose from without. The Sanskrit idea of the *pūrvapakṣa* (an opponent imaginatively considered by the author of a philosophical work) is that of potential objection that is in this sense immersed.

The act of bringing into contact philosophical ideas from distinct geographical regions or linguistic communities should be seen as being itself a creative one, the act of creating a »case«, a site of unresolved tension between conflicting measures, and the working out of the case is itself constitutive of a form of philosophical practice, producing in time new measures, new philosophies, new models for the way individuals conceive of themselves and their place in the world. It is an illustration of the way in which forms of philosophical practice can be governed by reason even in the absence of some explicitly identified common ground (a common ground is implied but not explicit). Such acts of creative philosophical confrontation are by their very nature embedded in the moment, and the rules by which they are governed must themselves be adjusted to every new encounter. The philosopher identifies cases of interesting contraposition and, in the spirit of the theory just set out, exploits those moments of resemblance in processes of adaptation and substitution to fashion new strategies in philosophical inquiry. This is an intellectual activity that replaces comparative philosophy in the age of re:emergence, and it is indeed a genuinely philosophical use of reason in search of understanding.

There is, to give a second example of an acolonial use of reason, a kind of philosophy that consists in perspicuous ordering, staying on the surface, rendering evident. The distinction between, on the one hand, generative explanations, the step-by-step reasoning of a philosophical deduction, and, on the other, using insightful ordering and sparseness to put the phenomenon in question on display, has a strong parallel in the Indian mathematicians' discussion of a kind of mathematical proof, which they say aims at rendering a mathematical result transparent rather than reaching it in a series of deductive steps. So Bhāskara II's diagrammatic proof of the theorem known from the *Sulba-sūtra* is meant to display the theorem not deduce it. A diagram is just a diagram, it does not itself do anything: what does the proving is the viewer's moving triangles around in imagination to form two squares. So, likewise, philosophy here occurs at the interface between text and reader, in the reader's acquisition of a clear

perspective in the topology of concepts through their imaginative engagement with the text. One finds this method at work in the Indian philosophers who compose extremely compact texts, written in short aphorism-like formula which aim more at conceptual cartography than at system-building. Seeing interrelatedness is as creative a philosophical act as drawing consequences. One is a matter of evidence, the other of what is evident. The interrelations between the components of a complex theoretical structure can be explained or at least explicated by displaying their isomorphism with another structure, perhaps more familiar or antecedently better understood; so, in this method, similes function as models. A clear map of the conceptual terrain is a powerful tool, enabling both creative thought and empathetic attention, and philosophy based on this second use of reason has not lost sight of its ties to deepened ways of living. In this use of reason, the idea of omission plays an important role, for philosophers who use reason in this second way are careful to omit anything that can cloud the reader's capacity to form a picture – a large part of philosophical skill is knowing what to ignore.

Thus I would say that what makes a practice philosophical is the use of distinctively human capacities to find orientation in the space of reasons (that is to say, to move from perplexity or *saṃśaya* to clarity or *nirṇaya*), and that orientation can come either in the form of a reasons *compass*, which enables the activity of going step-by-step engaging one's powers of deductive manoeuvring and capacities for projective extrapolation, or else in the form of a concept *map*, which engages the imagination and enables one to make a survey of the terrain, locating oneself within it. This conception of philosophy embodies a type of pluralistic realism, a commitment to the claim that there are many ways to investigate a reality whose existence is independent of human inquirers, a plurality of ways of thinking that cannot be reduced to any single mode of interrogation (least of all to the colonial use of reason).

I have described two techniques for the interrogation of reality that I discovered through commerce with Indian philosophical texts in Sanskrit, and I have given an indication of the styles of philosophical practice they sustain and their potential for contributing to a re: emergence of creative philosophy from this one part of the decolonised world. Those who are immersed in philosophies from Africa, Asia, Mesoamerica and Australasia will have their own contributions to make, and we may look to a future when there will be a vibrant

pluralistic realism in departments of academic philosophy around the globe, and a new cartography of philosophy.[1]

–Jonardon Ganeri, New York University

[1] Acknowledgements: I have drawn the term »re:emergence« and its distinctive typography from Yuko Hasegawa, curator of the exhibition »Re:emerge: Towards a New Cultural Geography« ⟨http://www.sharjahart.org/biennial/sharjah-biennial-11/information⟩; the colon suggesting correlative obligations of submerger and submerged. The famous first definition of philosophy is due to Wilfred Sellars. I have learned from Hamid Dabashi, »Can Non-Europeans Think?« ⟨http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/01/2013114142638797542.html⟩, Bharat Vallabha, »The Philosophy of Pluralism« ⟨http://insearchofanideal.com/2015/07/05/the-philosophy-of-pluralism/#more-1016⟩, Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach, »Comparative Philosophy as a Philosophy of Practice«, Mimesis World Philosophies Workshop, SOAS June 2015, and Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *Epistemologies of the South* (2014). The epistemology of visual thinking in mathematics, to which I allude, is excellently analysed by Marcus Giaquinto ⟨http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/epistemology-visual-thinking/⟩.

Responses

On the Possibility of Rational Neutrality in Comparative Philosophy: A Response to Jonardon Ganeri

In *»A Manifesto for Re:emergent Philosophy«* written for the *Confluence* symposium on the question *»Is Reason a Neutral Tool in Comparative Philosophy?,«* Jonardon Ganeri argues that »comparative philosophy« is neither a branch of philosophy, nor a distinct method in and by itself (Ganeri 2016a: 134). It is rather an »expedient heuristic« forming a »part of a global movement towards intellectual decolonisation« (*ibid.*: 135). He further added that »comparative philosophy« is there to prevent »intellectual servitude« that colonialism sought to impose (*ibid.*). Comparative philosophy is, therefore, an *equal* opportunity venue for philosophies of the south, where the south is a construct that betrays geography, much like Edward Said showed how the east is an orientalist construct. Within colonial terms of reference, some regions double as ›south‹ and ›east,‹ but do they all get the same attention in Ganeri's paper?

Ganeri defines »colonial« by listing various colonial powers and the regions that fell under direct colonialism including North and South America, Africa, Central and South Asia, the Tibet and Australasia, the Nordic countries and the Gulf, etc. (*ibid.*) Nevertheless, I was surprised that a conscientious paper like this is shy of mentioning British-French scooping of the Middle East (remember the Sykes-Picot agreement!), including the longest modern colonial project in Palestine that continues to be a reminder of the failure of the international community to be serious about ending it. This is not to say that elsewhere on earth, everything is ok.

The principle of equality should not be taken as in sprinting, where athletes begin by situating themselves in identical starting blocks, running on the same tracks, and reaching the same finish line, albeit with different speeds. I do hope that philosophers of the south are not expected to make it to a colonial finish line, for they didn't begin from the same cultural blocks, where they could have begun long ago in different and rich cultural contexts that they are »redis-

covering« as Ganeri puts it. They do not need a civilizing factor (i. e., colonialism) to bring them to where »coloniser philosophy […] is a point of reference« (*ibid.*). If the road map for philosophers of the south will be measured against philosophy produced by the colonizers or the structures they left behind, and they will be expected to reach the same conclusions, then colonial undercurrents still abound.

In a Eurocentric colonial worldview, only that which is ›western‹ makes it to the top of every product, spiritual, intellectual or material culture. A third world thinker, therefore, could only approximate that which is European, including Europe's normalized extensions in different parts of the world that are geographically not contiguous. Examples of normalized extensions include, but are not restricted to, the USA, Australia and New Zealand. These are places where colonialism succeeded in the sense that the post-colonial, indigenous inhabitants do not try to change the new status quo. An example where direct colonialism failed is Algeria. Yet the weight of the colonial cultural package is still visible in language (French in Maghreb, Italian in Libya, and where the British were colonizers, it is English). Some thinkers from the former colonial powers and the formerly colonized do not necessarily have a decolonized egalitarian frame of reference. Crossing the Mediterranean southward does not necessarily mean putting both intellectual histories on equal footing, to begin with, nor crossing the Mediterranean northward necessarily means a decolonized intellect. The latter is expressed in identifying with the former colonizer, uprooting herself/himself from the indigenous cultural context in order to demonstrate their »comparability with colonial insight« (*ibid.*), even in a post-colonial period, for ending the colonization of physical geography does not mean that the immaterial cultural space goes through the same rapid transformation. Both sides continue to assess the impact of the war; the end of French colonialism in Algeria in 1962 prompted rethinking French universalism. Examples of French intellectuals who crossed the Mediterranean are Mohammed Arkoun and Jacque Derrida. They were born within two years of each other in Algeria, 1928 and 1930 respectively, but Derrida was granted French citizenship before stepping a foot in France because all Jews in Algiers became citizens in 1870. Derrida is described as French who was born in Algiers, while Arkoun is described as Algerian/French. I personally think that Arkoun struggled with his identity much more than Derrida who took small measures such as modifying his first name from Jackie to Jacque! They both were in the

business of »deconstruction,« but I doubt they were accorded the same stature. This is about the politics of identity and not an evaluation of philosophical input.

Today, refugees flocking to Europe across the Mediterranean, running away from conditions that originate in colonialism, are asked to demonstrate their comparability or rather subscribe to what are loosely described as European values. This seems to be a call for assimilation rather than integration. A woman's head-scarf, for example, is taken as a symbol of her purported antagonism towards ›European‹ values. However, its prohibition is in fact the antithesis of the European value of liberty.[1]

I am afraid that first generation immigrants continue the quietism they are used to in their original countries where dictators prevail. Another important aspect is that it, in general, seems values are ever-changing in the Western liberal paradigm, and asking refugees and immigrants to subscribe to values contrary to their own personal conscience is twisting their arms in times of need, and this is the antithesis of the liberal values of freedom of conscience as well as autonomy. It is also inhumane. It will be a great loss – even for the European societies themselves – if highly educated refugees practice self-censorship and refrain from contributing to intellectual life and public discourse, because they are afraid it would jeopardize their legal status.

The question »*Is Reason a Neutral Tool in Comparative Philosophy?*« reflects the need to understand neutrality and comparative philosophy. Jonardon Ganeri described comparative philosophy as »expedient heuristic« connected to »intellectual decolonization« (*ibid.*)! I would venture into considering comparative philosophy a

[1] In Germany, Chancellor Merkel, who does not subscribe to multiculturalism, stated that »refugees must respect our culture and learn our language,« and added that they also must adhere to laws that protect equal rights for women and gays, and that they reject anti-Semitism (Newsweek, Dec. 2, 2015, and Times of Israel, Dec. 3, 2015). While there should be no room for Judaeophobia, there are two overgeneralizations here: the refugees are Judaeophobic and Germans are not. Rather than encourage participation in public life and dialogue, Merkel's comments could stifle legitimate criticism of Israel (What country is above criticism anyhow?) and having a personal educated position vis-à-vis social issues. Laws and policies should be in place, but one's citizenship should not be conditioned on having a specific position regarding social issues, for to assume that all German citizens existing today (Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims and others) are supportive of gay rights, or being pro-choice regarding abortion defies reality.

kind of intra-philosophical dialogue, the aim of which might differ according to the participant, much like in interfaith dialogue. If it is possible to decolonize the intellect, neutrality of the intellect will shine, but is it possible to be totally decolonized? And is it possible to be radically neutral, even in principle? Even if one wills to be decolonized, and is very conscientious of that which is colonial, there might still be residues, preventing total neutrality from taking place. Entering into dialogue in Comparative Philosophy might prove to be a space to discover these residues. One has to clarify that colonialism is not the only source of prejudice. Individual, group and general biases, regardless of where one comes from, are signs of the lack of neutrality.

Islamic philosophy could be part of the dialogue within comparative philosophy and beyond, but Islamic thought is not alien to the European scene, especially if we see Ibn Rushd (1126–1198), Ibn Tufayl (1105–1185) and many other philosophers who hailed from Andalusia as European. In his infamous Regensburg lecture on 12 September 2006, Pope Benedict XVI used quotations from a medieval dialogue that took place between the 14th c. Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos with an unnamed Persian, the message of which is that Islam is both violent and irrational. Ibn Hazm (994–1064), also from Andalusia, was the only Muslim scholar quoted, who was a very interesting literalist (i. e., Zahirite), a school that ceased to exist long time ago. I would rather introduce Imam Al-Ghazali (1058–1111) for his intellectual humility and deep insight, both of which are the outcome of systematic doubt and the limits of reason, allowing a window for esoteric knowledge and spirituality. Epistemologically, Imam Al-Ghazali's position is not counter to reason or irrational, it is that reason ultimately acknowledges its own limitations, precisely because exploring the metaphysical is beyond the capacity of reason, unless it is animated (literally, from the Latin *animus*).

Comparative Philosophy might have provided a venue for non-western thinkers to express a post-colonial stage that dealt with western philosophy as triumphant, appropriating it, at times as branded, and sometimes claiming original thinking within that frame of reference. On whether non-Europeans can think, and whether they think like Europeans? Ganeri's answers were ›yes‹ and ›no,‹ respectively. Human existence, I fathom, goes hand-in-hand with thinking, but the history of complex philosophical ideas might show philosophical development in many lands way before and away from Europe. Civi-

lization itself is cumulative, borrowing from past and co-existing civilizations. Therefore, Ganeri's reference to cross-cultural philosophy and fusion philosophy are in line with cross-culturality, where thinking is most likely the result of crossing geographical boundaries, physically and virtually, but he is right that such cross-culturality is not a condition for the re:emergent project. Otherwise, original thinking, which in Ganeri's words would be done in a state of innocence, does not have a reality of its own.

I share with Ganeri the hope for a future academia with a fair representation for the philosophical traditions coming from Africa, Asia, indigenous Australasia and Mesoamerica. But much of the world has yet to be truly decolonized, from direct and indirect colonization alike.

–Mustafa Abu Sway, al-Quds University,
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Is Comparative Philosophy Based Upon a Mistake? A Reply to Ganeri's ›Re:emergent Philosophy‹

Comparative philosophy, as I understand it, is the study of philosophical problems in a cross-cultural setting: a comparative philosopher may, for example, study the nature of knowledge by comparing Western epistemology with the Confucian tradition's writings on the subject.

Comparative philosophy has been gaining in popularity. Western philosophy, and especially Western analytic philosophy, the dominant strain of philosophy in the Anglophone world for a century, used to be strikingly insular. It all but ignored philosophical work in non-Western traditions. To this day, one can easily earn a philosophy PhD in the very best graduate programs in the Anglophone world without being exposed to a single word of Chinese, Indian or Arabic philosophy.

Recently, though, this insularity has been giving way. There is a new openness to, and interest in, philosophical work in non-Western traditions. There is talk of appointments in comparative philosophy. The Berggruen Institute for Philosophy and Culture (Los Angeles, USA) is funding postdoctoral fellowships in Asian philosophy and major departments are eagerly lining up to host them. Faculty and graduate students are spontaneously forming reading groups to study major non-Western texts.

What's the point of comparative philosophy? Is it a good thing that it is gaining in popularity?

Viewed from where I am sitting, it certainly seems to be. I am interested in certain basic philosophical questions. What is value? Are there truths about value and if so on what do they depend? What is consciousness and how does it relate to the physical? In what does a person's identity consist and can it survive the demise of their physical body?

It stands to reason that ancient civilizations such as those of India, China and the Arab world, all of which attached a great deal of

importance to philosophy and all of which produced thinkers of the first distinction in a whole host of other areas, will have developed important insights into some of these very same fundamental questions. (It is left open, of course, whether these insights take the form of alternative answers to the very same questions, or the rejection of the original questions and their replacements by more fruitful alternatives.)

In any case, whether or not comparative philosophy yields insights into basic philosophical problems, the comparative exercise is important in its own right. Non-Western cultures are of intrinsic interest and one good way to interrogate and reveal their thought is to compare what they have to say about philosophical problems with alternative approaches to those problems.

In his rich and provocative essay, »Is Reason a Neutral Tool in Comparative Philosophy?« Jonardon Ganeri rejects this rosy picture of comparative philosophy (Ganeri 2016a: 134–135):

> [...] comparative philosophy is not, I submit, a branch of philosophy nor it is a distinct philosophical method: it is an expedient heuristic introduced at a particular moment in world history as part of a global movement towards intellectual decolonisation. The ambition of comparative philosophy was not to generate new philosophical insights but to protect thinkers in colonised countries from the peculiar form of intellectual servitude colonialism sought to impose. Recognition and integration were its leading motifs: a first generation of philosophers, still colonised, seeking recognition for indigenous manners of understanding through the demonstration of their comparability with colonial insight; a second generation, in the years after the end of colonial rule, hoping for assimilation and integration in an internationalised philosophical academy. Philosophers writing bravely against the grain in colonised societies or in the ferment of postcolonial nation state formation made extraordinary progress in the rediscovery of lost philosophical inheritances and in the demonstration of their full entitlement to philosophical recognition. Yet coloniser philosophy remained in such endeavours a privileged mode of thought and point of reference, if only as a focus of resistance. These projects aimed either to incorporate indigenous thinking into an unchallenged colonial paradigm or else to reverse colonial asymmetries while leaving a fundamentally colonial structure intact.

Ganeri leaves it unclear whether he thinks that comparative philosophy *essentially* involves »intellectual servitude,« (*ibid.*) or whether it contingently involved it as it was practiced by the first and second generations of comparative philosophers. The fact that he dismisses it as a legitimate subfield of philosophy suggests the former. But his

other remarks make sense only on the latter reading. In any case, it is hard to see how comparing what distinct philosophical traditions have had to say about some of the perennial questions of the human condition could be an essentially reprehensible exercise.

On Ganeri's view, comparing non-Western philosophy with Western philosophy in the modern era was bound to lead to unhappy results because Western philosophy pretended that only its use of ›reason‹ was legitimate. This is how he puts it (*ibid*.: 135–136):

> When in what follows I refer to ›the colonial use of reason‹ I shall not mean its use by the ancients or pre-moderns but by those philosophical giants in the 18th and 19th centuries who provided colonialism with its moral and intellectual foundations. This colonial use of reason represented itself as impartial, objective and universal but was in fact anything but, and that was its first dishonesty. Its second was the way it defended its claims to impartiality and universality over and against competing claims from outside. It did not engage in honest debate, philosopher to philosopher, but instead dismissed the alternative's claim to universality altogether. So colonisers took what was in fact itself a local way of using reason (one contextually entangled with the history of the colonial project), falsely promoted it as a uniquely acontextual methodology, and denied that outsiders had so much as a concept of the general application of reason on the grounds that they did not share its parochial epistemic practices.

I found myself a little unclear about exactly what Ganeri means by the ›colonial use of reason.‹ He says it is the use of reason by those philosophical giants of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that provided colonialism with its intellectual and moral foundations. But as he is no doubt aware, the intellectual and moral legitimacy of colonialism was a matter of active debate among those giants (John Stuart Mill, for example, being an apologist for it while Diderot was a critic). But on any notion of reason that I recognize, both of those thinkers were using the same principles of reasoning.

It's a good question what accounts for disagreement between good thinkers when it occurs. Presumably, more often than not, it derives not from the fact that they *reason* differently from premises to conclusions, but, rather, from the fact that they find different *premises* plausible. In the debates about colonialism, for example, some thinkers found it plausible that there was such a thing as ›natural law,‹ that the alternative practices of indigenous peoples violated that law, and that this served as a proper basis for justifying their exploitation. Others, though, rejected these claims. Ultimately, disagreements

about these matters can be traced not to disagreement about principles of reasoning but to a disagreement about various initial assumptions or axioms.

Ganeri (*ibid*.: 138–139), however, seems very much to hold that it is principles of reasoning that are at issue, rather than the differential plausibility of competing axioms.

> As philosophers in every linguistic and geographical region of the globe re: emerge, so too do innovative ways to use reason […] My studies of logical theory in India have led me to see that there is a fundamental contrast between two styles of reasoning, that of formal deduction and that of particularist, case-based ›blueprint+adaptation‹ extrapolation. […] The basic idea is that an object is inferred to have one, unobserved, property on the grounds that it has another, observed, one: ›there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke there‹. The most distinctive aspect of the schema is the fundamental importance given to the citation of an example, a single case said either to be similar or else dissimilar to the topic at hand.
>
> Suppose I want to persuade you that it is about to rain. I might reason as follows: ›Look, it is going to rain (pakṣa: proposed thesis). For see that large black cloud (hetu: sign). Last time you saw a large black cloud like that one (dṛṣṭānta: exemplary), what happened? Well, it's the same now (upanaya: application). It is definitely going to rain (nigamana: decision)‹.

Ganeri goes on to make interesting claims about what makes this ›blueprint and adaptation‹ (b+a) type of reasoning distinctive, and why it might not have so easily contributed to justifications of colonial exploitation. Unfortunately, I don't have the space to consider all those claims. Instead, let me simply invite him to say a bit more about the following questions.

First, how does this form of reasoning differ from standard forms of inductive reasoning – for example: whenever we have observed large black clouds in the past, they have led to rain. So, this large black cloud is also likely to result in rain?[1]

Second, assuming it is a distinctive form of reasoning, distinct from standard inductive reasoning, is it supposed to be *compatible* with standard inductive reasoning or not?

If the former, then the two methods would yield all the same results under the same circumstances, so there would be at best only a notional difference between them.

[1] Ganeri contrasts this ›blueprint and adaptation model‹ with formal deduction, but it seems to me that its closest Western cousin is induction not deduction.

Presumably, then, Ganeri must think that the b+a model is *incompatible* with standard inductive reasoning. Suppose we agree with this and also accept his claim that it is an innovative and legitimate way to reason. How should we respond?

Should we conclude that standard inductive reasoning, which is essential to the scientific method as practiced in the West, is to be rejected in favor of this b+a model? That seems implausible.

Or is the idea that while inductive reasoning is appropriate for the West, blueprint and adaptation reasoning is appropriate to non-Western countries?

If we take that line, though, it seems as though we will have to concede that colonial reasoners were perfectly justified in their pro-colonial conclusions, even as colonized subjects may have been justified in rejecting them.

But the conclusion we wanted was that putative justifications for colonialism were mistaken. (Similar questions could be raised for the second example that Ganeri provides.)

Ganeri (*ibid*.: 141) concludes:

> This conception of philosophy embodies a type of pluralistic realism, a commitment to the claim that there are many ways to investigate a reality whose existence is independent of human inquirers, a plurality of ways of thinking that cannot be reduced to any single mode of interrogation (least of all to the colonial use of reason).

However, as I have tried to argue here, and as I have tried to show in detail elsewhere, it is in fact very hard to make sense of the idea that there are many conflicting, yet equally valid, ways of arriving at justified beliefs about the world.[2]

–Paul Boghossian, New York University, New York, USA

[2] See my *Fear of Knowledge* (2006).

What's In a Name? In Support of *A Manifesto for Re:emergent Philosophy*

I was lucky enough to meet Jonardon Ganeri in June 2015, at the Mimesis workshop on World Philosophies, held at SOAS, University of London (mimesisinternational.com/world-philosophies-series-workshop). It is a pleasure to continue the conversation through the pages of this journal. I draw on a background in Māori philosophy (Mika 2014; Stewart 2014a) and Māori science education in responding to Ganeri's »Manifesto« article (Ganeri 2016a: 134–142), which introduces and advocates for a new form of philosophy he calls »re:emergent philosophy«. Ganeri's big message in this article is that the time of ›comparative philosophy‹ has expired: it is time for a new term to capture the new spirit of philosophy today, and to lead philosophy forward into the future. ›Re:emergent philosophy‹ is his suggestion for that term.

Before turning to his arguments, a note is in order about Ganeri's chosen term, ›re:emergent philosophy‹, inspiration for which he attributes to a major intercultural art exhibition curated in 2013 by Yuko Hasegawa, titled *Re:emerge, Towards a New Cultural Cartography*[1], commenting »the colon suggest[s] the symmetrical obligations of submerger and submerged« (Ganeri 2016a: 142). For the reader, the colon in the middle of the adjective »re:emergent« sends ambivalent signals. First, it suggests sympathy towards linguistic novelty, or the transgression of language norms (as in the language of texting or youth culture), since using a hyphen instead would be more grammatically correct, and give almost the same range of meanings. Second, it aligns somehow with market thinking, providing a recognisable ›brand‹ for this philosophical position. Thus this phrase is open to critique, even before considering its conceptual claims, yet in such a way that seems part of its strategy, and hence a strength. In

[1] See: www.sharjahart.org/biennial/sharjah-biennial-11/welcome (last accessed on 8 January 2016).

themselves the choices represented by this term can lead to a rich philosophical discussion about language, linguistics, discourse and power: key phenomena at the heart of the critique advanced in its name.

Ganeri (*ibid*.: 135) begins by interrogating the term ›comparative philosophy‹, which, he explains, is best understood, not as a »branch« or »method« of philosophy, but as an »expedient heuristic« or helpful teaching tool in the global educational challenge of advancing beyond the recent period of modern intellectual history and philosophy, which for several lifetimes has been inextricably associated with colonialism and social power backed up by military force (Mignolo 2011). Ganeri highlights the politicised meaning of ›comparative philosophy‹ in describing its primary purpose or object:

> The ambition of comparative philosophy was not to generate new philosophical insights but to protect thinkers in colonised countries from the peculiar form of intellectual servitude colonialism sought to impose (Ganeri 2016a: 135).

And again in defining his terms:

> [When] I refer to ›the colonial use of reason‹ I shall not mean its use by the ancients or pre-moderns but by those philosophical giants in the 18th and 19th centuries who provided colonialism with its moral and intellectual foundations (*ibid*.).

Ganeri thus defines ›comparative philosophy‹ as an intervention against the colonial use of reason, which affects the meaning of the symposium theme question: Is Reason a Neutral Tool in Comparative Philosophy? Reason, according to comparative philosophy, has been anything *but* neutral in the last 200 years or so of world history. Reason, for example, in the form of Victorian science, featuring Social Darwinist notions of the ›Family of Man‹, has underwritten British colonisation and the subjugation of the indigenous Māori people throughout the history of New Zealand, dating back to the late 18th century: a national history that bears similarities to those of many other postcolonial countries around the globe: contemporary nations that are ex-colonies of European and other imperial powers. By definition, the meaning of the term ›comparative philosophy‹ includes cognisance of those other histories and identities, since if there were only one form of philosophy and one way of being, how could it be compared with anything?

A detailed description of comparative philosophy and its history is presented in the introductory essay with which the first issue of *Confluence* opened. In that essay, comparative philosophy is described as dating back to (at least) the inauguration of the journal *Philosophy East and West* in 1951, and as being »a vibrant field today« (Kirloskar-Steinbach et al. 2014: 8). Tracing its increased emphasis over time on the politics of philosophy, less on a method of comparison, and concomitant moves away from a lopsided tendency to explain ›the East‹ in terms of ›the West‹, the perspective on comparative philosophy in this essay is consistent with that of Ganeri:

> Generally speaking, mainstream philosophers have not, as yet, seemed to fully comprehend the relevance of comparative philosophy to philosophy as a discipline (*ibid.*: 43).

These authors explain that *Confluence* was established specifically as a forum for comparative and intercultural philosophy, which have been »sidelined« and »disenfranchised« within professional philosophy (*ibid.*: 44). Whereas Kirloskar-Steinbach seeks to raise up its profile, Ganeri recommends replacing it altogether. But what does it mean to change the terminology in a field: at what point does a philosophical label reach the limits of its usefulness?

In discussing the heuristic, educational meaning of ›comparative philosophy‹, Ganeri's reasoning is analogous to my argument that the term ›Māori science‹ is best understood as a provocation of the meaning of ›science‹ especially the idea that science is Western. The meaning of ›Maori science‹ is more ethical than epistemological: it is an indigenous Māori response to the Eurocentric implications of the dominant notion of science as being essentially modern and Western in nature. Similarly, Ganeri argues that the meaning of ›comparative philosophy‹ is based on political, ethical concepts rather than epistemic categories. In this view the role of ›Māori science‹ is to interrogate the unmarked meaning of ›science‹, just as (so Ganeri argues) the role of ›comparative philosophy‹ is to interrogate the unmarked meaning of ›philosophy.‹

These and other related epistemological debates turn on the slippage between possible alternative meanings invoked when some kinds of modifying words, such as ›comparative‹ or ›Māori‹, are used with basic knowledge nouns such as ›science‹ or ›philosophy.‹ Many such two-word knowledge phrases, such as ›Māori science‹ or ›comparative philosophy‹, are vulnerable to divergent interpretations, not

all of which are philosophically/politically robust or aligned with each other. This slippage in meaning is apt to be confusing and unhelpful, and may even be manipulated to thwart the interests of the original, often ameliorative, impulse out of which such terms arise in the first place. For example, ›Māori science‹ (or Indigenous science in general) is dismissed as ›creationism‹ or ›anti-science‹ by most philosophers of science. On the other hand, Māori sometimes over-promote the claims of ›Māori science‹, as discussed below. The result is an unhelpful binary in which both sides talk past each other.

Also unhelpful is when these terms migrate from one field of knowledge to another, with unpredictable effects. A Canadian example arose at government hearings of evidence against establishing a new diamond mine. In presenting his testimony based on traditional indigenous knowledge, an Aboriginal Dene Nation elder explained, ›I call it Dene science because in the literature it is regarded as a science‹. Terms such as ›Dene science‹ appear in social science research (in anthropology and related fields) in relation to initiatives to record and recover traditional knowledge of Aboriginal American peoples (see, for example, Alaska Native Knowledge Network).[2] But the idea of ›Dene science‹ holds no authority within the discourses of scientific rationality that underwrite government, industry, and an engineering project such as a diamond mine. Here the elder falls into the trap set by academic politics and disciplinary boundaries; and science, as usual, supports capital in trumping any argument from indigenous or environmental perspectives.

Another example of migrating terms is the idea within the Māori education community that there is a distinctively ›Māori‹ form of science, on which a culturally-appropriate science curriculum for Māori students should be based. This politically ›innocent‹ view of ›Māori science‹ follows the global trend of teaching ›Indigenous science‹ to Indigenous students, and contradicts the critical argument, outlined above, that the meaning of ›Māori science‹ is primarily ethical, not epistemic. A critical, politicised view of science, shorn of Eurocentric overtones, is implicit in my original term, ›Kaupapa Māori science‹ – a model for science education that combines mastery of science knowledge with studies in critical history and philosophy of science, exposing science's role in the service of colonization and global capital. This new term designed to update the ›Māori science‹ de-

[2] See www.ankn.uaf.edu (last accessed on 2 January 2016).

bate is analogous to Ganeri's recommendation of the new term, re: emergent philosophy.

Ganeri's delineation of universalist philosophy as colonising »trickery« aligns with the wider critique against the Western academy advanced in recent decades with the emergence of new traditions, including feminist philosophy, critical theory, comparative philosophy itself, and, more generally, poststructuralism, which is based on a questioning of any ›grand narrative‹ including philosophical grand narratives such as universalism, and critical research methodologies, which seek more inclusive participation of diverse voices and sectors in the academy. To date, these reforms have advanced more successfully in adjoining fields, such as education, than in philosophy itself, which underscores the importance of Ganeri's article, and the mission of the journal *Confluence* itself, in placing this debate more squarely within philosophical discourse.

Ganeri explicitly includes and speaks for a wide range of critical philosophical traditions, including cross-cultural, fusion and intercultural philosophy, while noting that »re:emergence does not require cross-culturality« (2016a: 138). Avoiding the traps of homogenisation, Ganeri clarifies how these various traditions differ and overlap with each other, and with comparative philosophy, and envisions next steps towards which attention might be directed.

Ganeri lists four features of the »age of re:emergence« (*ibid.*: 137):

1. The articulation of philosophies and traditions located in many countries all around the world;
2. The shift from a centre-periphery structure to a »plural and diverse network« of philosophical work;
3. The demotion of Europe and other colonial powers in a flattening of the international academic hierarchy; and
4. The acceptance by philosophers in the »largely anglophone international academy« of their responsibility to support these three trends above, acknowledging their own privileged position as »a fall-out from colonialism rather than a reflection of intellectual superiority«.

Ganeri outlines two useful models or »similes« (*ibid.*: 141) for the application of re:emergence philosophy: one that sees philosophy as a compass, or direction-setter; the other for philosophy as like a map, which helps the philosopher to orient within their locality. Both models emphasise a concept of philosophy as action or a practice, rather

than a set of truths or criteria for truth. Drawing on Indian philosophical traditions, Ganeri demonstrates how comparative philosophy provides a means to reflect on the nature of philosophy itself, freed from the trappings of colonial reason, »retriev[ing] the cosmopolitan ideal from imperial misappropriation« (*ibid*.: 138) and reinforcing the value of the liminal perspective, such as Māori philosophy, in being able to hold up a mirror to the mainstream.

Ganeri explains that re:emergent philosophy

> embodies a type of pluralistic realism, a commitment to the claim that there are many ways to investigate a reality whose existence is independent of human inquirers, a plurality of ways of thinking that cannot be reduced to any single mode of interrogation (least of all to the colonial use of reason) (*ibid*.: 141).

Here he identifies ›pluralistic realism‹ as a relevant »branch« of philosophy, in the sense he discounts as possible for comparative philosophy. A pluralist position is consistent with a limited form of relativism; a relativist epistemology that allows for the existence of indigenous people-as-indigenous at all. Understood in this sense, pluralistic realism counts as part of a wider effort to reform analytical philosophy, to overcome the reductionism inherent in universalism, which tends towards scientism and the subordination of reason to power, such as in the colonial use of reason. Similar motives also seem part of the rationale for contextualism, pragmatism, and other recent philosophical traditions. As with many such terms, pluralism takes on different shades of meaning at different levels of debate: political, scientific, religious, philosophical. But whether expressed in terms of pluralism, relativism, or even diversity, the important point seems always to be to overturn the »false claim to neutrality« of the colonial use of reason (*ibid*.: 136).

By the end of the article it is clear that Ganeri is less interested in terminological debates and more in promoting a vision both practical and utopian:

> Those who are immersed in philosophies from Africa, Asia, Mesoamerica and Australasia will have their own contributions to make, and we may look to a future when there will be a vibrant pluralistic realism in departments of academic philosophy around the globe, and a new cartography of philosophy (*ibid*.: 141–142).

As a Māori – an indigenous person from Aotearoa-New Zealand – I count myself as included within »Australasia« in this sketch of Ga-

neri's vision for the future of philosophy, as well as those he describes as the »once-colonised« (*ibid.*: 137). In my own life, real-world problems brought me to philosophy: in my early twenties I completed an MSc with First Class Honours in Chemistry, but decided not to continue to doctoral study, and worked in technical and commercial jobs in Chemistry for several years before leaving to live on my father's ancestral land. Two decades later, after an intervening career as a secondary teacher of Te Reo Māori, Mathematics/Pāngarau and Science/Pūtaiao, I started doctoral study in Education. My doctoral research was on the Māori science curriculum: a deeply philosophical topic. My external examiner was a leading figure in PESA, the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia (www.pesa.org.au) and since 2007, when I attended my first PESA conference held in Wellington, PESA has been my primary academic network. Yet in 2015, despite the strength of Māori education across Aotearoa-New Zealand, built up over the last several decades, in particular with Kaupapa Māori, I am one of only two Māori members currently active in PESA. The two of us represented ›Australasia‹ at the World Philosophies Workshop referred to above at the start of this piece, which suggests a lack of Māori/Indigenous representation to be found within philosophy itself in this part of the world.

During the last 200 years of Pākehā occupation of their lands, Māori, of necessity, have been culturally pragmatic for survival. It therefore seems natural for Māori philosophy to align with the key concepts of pragmatism (as espoused by Peirce, James and Dewey), in addition to a limited version of relativism, as noted above, and a general attitude of incredulity towards Eurocentrism and its grand narratives of Eurocentrism. As already discussed, such an attitude is a key characteristic of poststructuralism.

Those who do not see the point of poststructuralism, postmodernity, postcolonialism, and so on, sometimes make deprecating jokes, such as labelling them all »the posties.« From an indigenous scholar's point of view, this kind of ludic scholarship is a serious impediment, perhaps equally as serious as the »shriek[ing of the] neoconservative demonology«. Not to afford poststructuralist or postmodernist ideas the respect of even engaging with them is tantamount to the philosophical equal of ›terrorism‹, understood as a situation in which »neither side can really ›see‹ the other« (Dutta 2004: 434). That some (perhaps much) postmodernist scholarship is badly written is no excuse for ignoring the need for reform in philosophy.

Ganeri's vision for the future of philosophy is inclusive but politicised, rigorous yet supportive – a balance that is not always easy to maintain. Key for those who practice philosophy while identifying with colonising philosophy's »excluded outsider« (Ganeri 2016a: 136) is to understand this project, and develop the ability to recognise their allies of all stripes, who may use a range of labels to express their ideas, but who share genuine commitment to the project of decolonising philosophy. This is a change whose time has come.

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Reply

Reflections on Re:emergent Philosophy

1 Philosophy without Borders and Cosmopolitan Thought Zones

Re:emergent philosophy consists in a retrieval and rearticulation of precolonial philosophical heritages in such a manner as to enable creative philosophical thinking in solidarity with others. Let me begin by describing two ideas in the same conceptual territory. Early in 2016 a new volume appeared. Edited by Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber, its official title is *Comparative Philosophy without Borders* (2016). Yet this title is a little misleading, for the essays contained in it are not exercises in comparative philosophy but explorations in a beyond-comparative experiment the editors term »borderless philosophy«, ones for which their »Introduction« and »Afterword« constitute a brilliant call-to-arms: »Once we have climbed up to the level playing field of global combative cooperative critical creative philosophy from the fetid wells of centuries of unacknowledged epistemic inequalities, we can, it is hoped, throw away the ladder of comparison« (*ibid.*: 238). A borderless philosophy should »spontaneously straddle geographical areas and cultures, temperaments and time-periods« (*ibid.*: 22) in which »instead of preserving, quoting, and juxtaposing [one's sources], one picks up a concept, a line of reasoning or some, however minor point arising out of years of imaginative rearrangement and cross-fertilization of the ideas retrieved from different cultures, periods, texts, and disciplines« (*ibid.*: 231). Borderless philosophy is not a synthetic »fusion«, because in a borderless philosophy, »when making, say Zhuangzi speak to Strawson about knowing other minds, the point cannot be which of them is right to say what he says, but simply what is the right thing to say, independently of who says it. What would come out would perhaps be less historical and less encyclopaedic as a reference to this philosopher or that philosopher, but it would be something valuable, some-

thing in a twilight zone, surely something constructive, probably even something original« (*ibid.*: 232). A borderless philosophy leaves behind three stages of comparativism, a first stage in which analogues for Western ideas were sought in non-Western traditions, a second stage which discovered lacunae in Western tradition in comparison with the non-Western, and a third stage defined by the imperative »to re-interpret Indian, Chinese, or Japanese philosophy in terms of (oppositionally or positively) Western philosophical ideas as much as contributing back into English-language philosophy by bringing in elements of Asian or African or Hawaiian philosophy« (*ibid.*: 20). The history of colonialism looms large in these comparative exercises, for:

> whether it was predominantly a history of knowledge-looting, or of conversion in the name of civilization or of systematic erasure of non-European intellectual traditions by means of deletion and distortion of indigenous cultural memories, the history of colonialism and its dream of Europeanization of the globe, changed the global research-imperative in the Humanities. Under and immediately after colonialism, comparison has been done, somewhat anthropologically, merely for the sake of understanding other cultures or for the sake of finding ›fascinating‹ resemblances and disanalogies (*ibid.*: 28).

The insidious dilemma I described in the *Manifesto* (2016a: 134–142) is restated here in the following terms: »There is one extremely frustrating charge that should worry all of us who have dedicated considerable parts of our intellectual careers to this risky business of boundary-breaking cross-cultural thinking […] The charge, when formulated abstractly, is this: either we represent an Asian (or African or Islamic or Hawaiian etc.) philosophy in its own original terms, which are utterly alien to Western philosophy, in which case it is not philosophy proper, or we rephrase it in Western terms, in which case it risks ending up as just a repetition of what we already have in the West. Thus we either have no need of comparison with foreign ideas because they are just the same or too similar to our own native ideas, or we cannot allow it to count as hard-core philosophy because it is too different from how philosophy is done in the Western tradition« (Chakrabarti and Weber 2016: 18). Put in this way there is a structural parallel with the Paradox of Inquiry, often known as »Meno's Paradox« but in fact discussed and refuted in detail within the Sanskrit knowledge systems: either you already know what you are searching for, in which case the search is pointless, or you don't, in which case

you cannot even begin. And as with that pseudo-paradox, the solution here is to acknowledge states of incomplete understanding, enough to get inquiry off the ground without forestalling it:

> This space between unrecognizably and unintelligibly alien and boringly familiar has to be found by any comparative philosopher who wishes to be heard by the mainstreams of both of the traditions that she is trying to bring together, either in conflict or in cooperation, in conversation or contestation *(ibid)*.

A second vital document is the »Introduction« by Kris Manjapra to a volume of essays entitled *Cosmopolitan Thought Zones* (2010). What Manjapra demonstrates is that experiments in borderlessness and re: emergence have been going on for a hundred years already, outside the arena of orthodox comparativism. The term Manjapra uses to denote those experiments is »aspirational cosmopolitanism«:

> By speaking of ›aspirational cosmopolitanism‹ we mean the pursuit of conversations across lines of difference, between disparate socio-cultural, political and linguistic groups, that provisionally created shared public worlds. Translation, interpretation and shared social experience created heterogeneous transnational public spaces […] Cosmopolitan thought zones are the treacherous and provisional shared worlds that arise when disparate groups seek to solve problems together (*ibid*.: 1).

These anticolonial cosmopolitanisms are »lateral networks« in which a centre-periphery model is displaced by »political, intellectual and social connections of South Asians with other colonized peoples worldwide, and with European and American groups who stood on the margins of imperial power, or were critical of it« (*ibid*.: 2).

> [A concern with] medial zones of thought is not tantamount to a shift of focus onto the intermediate spaces between two intransigent poles, Europe and the colonies, the West and the East. Rather, the attempt is to disaggregate and scale these monoliths, and to trace the plural nettings, interactions and affinities that ranged across global dimensions […] A different framework is needed in which ›the intermediate‹ does not signify the state of being ›in between‹ two poles, but rather evokes the dynamic of being itself, as an open process of circulation and historicity. The intermediate state of becoming has an ontological status that need make no reference to assertions about ›rooted‹ authenticity or the bounded termini of enclosed cultural identities (*ibid*.: 7).

Here, the two myths I described in the *Manifesto* by which colonialism seeks to ensnare the colonised is identified with perceptive clarity:

> Colonial peoples were said by British administrators to be particulars without access to universals. Colonial rule insisted that the particularity and peculiarity of Indians broached no larger ethical universalism, and had no ultimate horizon of social meaning. The only universalism Indians could possibly belong to was the universalism bestowed by empire. It was not state inclusion versus state marginalization that cosmopolitans in the colonies had to challenge, but the assertion about the very impossibility of their global imagination and pursuits amounting to anything more than ›sedition‹ or ›insurgency‹. They faced an existential conundrum between inclusion into the category of ›humanity‹ as mimics of the West, or relegation to a stagnant and archaic particularity, having no access on their own to larger significance (*ibid.*: 10).

The way out of this insidious dilemma is through the creation of »universal communities transcending the imperial axis« *(ibid.)*.

While Chakrabarti and Weber take the mind of the individual philosopher as the site within which borderless experimentation takes place, for Manjapra what is of interest is a transient shared public world that is a »thought zone«. These two forms of activity, philosophizing without borders and constructing medial cosmopolitan thought zones, are perfect examples of what I have in mind when I refer to a re:emergent philosophy.

2 The Politics of Post-Comparativism

Georgina Stewart (2016: 154–161) enriches and finesses ideas in the *Manifesto* with the kind of deep insight available only to someone for whom philosophy is not merely an academic game but a part of lived experience. She has demonstrated the importance of language and terminological innovation to these quests for borderlessness, re:emergence, and medial cosmopolitanisms. When an adjective drawn from one discourse is placed in apposition with a noun from another, the linguistic effect need not be simply one of semantic restriction but instead one of critique. So there is, in the phrase »Māori science«, »a critical, politicized view of science, shorn of Eurocentric overtones […] a model for science education that combines mastery of science knowledge with studies in critical history and philosophy of science, exposing science's role in the service of colonization and global capital« (*ibid.*: 157). Similarly, in phrases such as »Buddhist epistemology« or »Ubuntu ethics«, there is a subtle rhetorical rejection of the

comparativist model – a search for predefined epistemological or ethical categories in the philosophical literatures of the colonised – and instead a challenge to rearrange and reformulate those very categories. Stewart forcefully reminds us that even as some parts of the world rapidly progress along the path of decolonization, in other parts the struggle is even now one of basic survival. Philosophy has been widely hailed, in many historical epochs and many geographical locations, as a medicine for the human spirit. If it can serve as a cure, when the disease is one of intellectual colonization and the destruction of indigeneity, then we shall also need a »preventative philosophy«, to stop the disease returning, and now, as in the past, cosmopolitan thought zones may provide a sought-after solidarity.

If solidarity is needed anywhere it is in the region of the world known as West Asia or the Middle East, of which the Perso-Arabian Gulf is but one part (and »gulf« here does indeed seem to be the right noun for adjectival critique). Solidarity is needed with those who attempt with huge courage to find avenues of understanding between Palestinian and Jew, and the three stages of comparativism continue to serve in their important heuristic role. Here indeed, as Mustafa Abu Sway (2016: 147) rightly points out, comparative philosophy underpins and facilitates inter-philosophical dialogue in a manner analogous to interfaith dialogue. Solidarity is needed too, as Sway emphasises, with those millions of »refugees flocking to Europe across the Mediterranean, running away from conditions that originate in colonialism« (*ibid.*: 146). And solidarity is needed with the vast numbers of immigrant workers from South Asia, indentured by recruitment fees, embezzled by false contracts, and finally enslaved by the inhumanity of the *kafala* system. Solidarity is grounded in a shared instinct for justice, and for Sari Nusseibeh the instinct for justice cannot be separated from the instinct of love. In his marvellous experiment in borderless philosophy, »To Justice with Love«, published in the volume I mentioned above, Nusseibeh draws on Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) to upturn John Rawls, rehumanizing justice with the idea of *asabiyyah*, the natural instinct to care for another. On the basis of this retrieved idea he defines an Overlapping Principle, »that there be a coincidence of the want for those things I want for others with those things that they want for themselves« (2016: 194). This principle »guarantees that I seek to help others to develop themselves […] obliging me to extend help to others«, and is, Nusseibeh argues, more fundamental than and provides a basis for the Raw-

lsian Difference Principle, which guarantees only »that I do nothing that might prevent their ability to so develop themselves« *(ibid.)*. In this preventative philosophy, injustice is dissolved by the solidarity of love before it has chance to turn into rage.

Another adjectival construction of the same sort as those referred to by Stewart is »comparative philosophy«. My claim in the *Manifesto* is that the addition of the adjective here engenders a movement away from philosophy and towards a different kind of intellectual activity altogether, one whose value has historically largely been in the context of projects of intellectual decolonization. Paul Boghossian rightly observes that this intellectual activity has value in cross-cultural understanding, for »non-western cultures are of intrinsic interest and one good way to interrogate and reveal their thought is to compare what they have to say about philosophical problems with alternative approaches to these problems«, and perhaps also in the philosophical inquiry into fundamental problems, since non-Western thinkers »developed important insights into some of these very same fundamental questions« (2016: 150). I am as encouraged as he is in what genuinely seems to be a new wave of interest in the academy in non-Western philosophies; my point is that, in addition to the two kinds of comparative exercise he mentions, which correspond to the second and third stages of comparativism isolated by Chakrabarti and Weber, there is a more productive model available in terms of which to understand the nature of this new engagement. The philosophical academy must go global, but this will require a more profound reorientation than has hitherto been realised.

3 What is a »Use of Reason«?

I appeal in the *Manifesto* to the notion of »a use of reason« (Ganeri 2016a: 135). Boghossian rightly presses me to clarify what I mean by the phrase, an expression there left undefined. I will spend what space I have left attempting to do just that. To sum up the argument I am about to make: in *Fear of Knowledge* (2006) Boghossian argues that there cannot be a plurality of genuinely distinct epistemic systems, where an epistemic system is a set of epistemic principles, and an epistemic principle is a general normative proposition. If my phrase »use of reason« were taken to be a synonym of his »epistemic system«, his argument would apply to me too. What I mean by that

phrase, however, is something else: I mean an epistemic stance, where a stance is not a proposition but a policy or strategy concerning the use of epistemic principles (in Indian vocabulary, the distinction is between the notions of *pramāṇa* and *naya*). Other names for an epistemic stance include »epistemic culture«, »style of enquiry«, »way of interrogating reality«, »use of reason«, and »mode of argumentation«. My epistemic pluralism is a pluralism about stances, and so is not the position Boghossian has argued against. In the *Manifesto* I contrast the epistemic stance of colonialism with »case-based« and »visual thinking« stances. What denies legitimacy to the epistemic stance of colonialism is that it is dogmatic in denying the existence of alternative stances and that it recommends the use of violence over reason to silence alternatives.

Space for what I describe as a pluralistic realism seems to vanish in the oscillation between two views that have largely shaped contemporary discussion, the view, on the one hand, that that science is a single, unified, discipline that discovers a single objective world according to a uniquely valid set of objective epistemic procedures, and the view, to the contrary that truth is relative to the interests, perceptions, background commitments, and values of disparate communal groups. The most influential advocate of the second view in recent times has been Richard Rorty, and of the first, Paul Boghossian. Boghossian meticulously constructs an argument against the compatibility of epistemic pluralism and realism. The target of his argument is the relativistic view that »if our judgments about what it's ›rational‹ to believe are to have any prospect of being true, we should not claim that some belief is justified absolutely by the available evidence, but only that it is justified relative to the particular epistemic system that we have come to accept« (2006: 62). Such a view would seem to »give immediate support to the idea that there are many radically different, yet equally valid *ways* of knowing the world« *(ibid.)*. A relativist ought not say that there are many radically different, yet equally *rational*, ways of knowing the world, because »that would amount to endorsing a use of ›rational‹ that is absolute, whereas the relativist view on offer is precisely that we cannot sensibly speak of what is rational, period, but only of what is rational relative to this or that accepted epistemic system« (*ibid.*: 63, n.5). Here, the notion of an epistemic system is that of a collection of epistemic principles, »general normative propositions which specify under which conditions a particular type of be-

lief is justified« (*ibid*.: 85). There are »generation« principles, which generate a justified belief on the basis of something that is not itself a belief, and there are »transmission« principles, which prescribe how to move from some justified beliefs to other justified beliefs (*ibid*.: 65). Again, there are »fundamental« epistemic principles, principles »whose correctness cannot be derived from the correctness of other epistemic principles«, and »derived« epistemic principles, whose correctness can be so derived. The way of fixing beliefs that we call »science«, Boghossian suggests, is but a rigorous application of certain »ordinary, familiar« fundamental epistemic principles. In particular:

(Observation) For any observational proposition p, if it visually seems to S that p and circumstantial conditions D obtain, then S is prima facie justified in believing p.

(Deduction) If S is justified in believing p, and p fairly obviously entails q, then S is justified in believing q.

(Induction) If S has often enough observed that an event of type A has been followed by an event of type B, then S is justified in believing that all events of type A will be followed by events of type B.

And perhaps also

(Inference to the best explanation) If S justifiably believes that p, and justifiably believes that the best explanation for p is q, then S is justified in believing q.

Might there be epistemic systems other than the one for which these »ordinary, familiar« epistemic principles provide a conception of justification? Perhaps, for example, premodern Christian societies took as fundamental the epistemic principle Revelation:

(Revelation) For certain propositions p, including propositions about the heavens, believing p is prima facie justified if p is the revealed word of God as claimed by the Bible.

Likewise, the Azande, it would appear, employ a different epistemic principle, Oracle:

(Oracle) For certain propositions p, believing p is prima facie justified if a Poison Oracle says that p.

The three epistemic systems, modern science, Christianity, and Azande, appear to employ divergent underived epistemic principles,

and that might seem to motivate epistemic relativism, a view which Boghossian defines as the conjunction of three claims (*ibid.*: 73):

A. There are no absolute facts about what belief a particular item of information justifies. (Epistemic non-absolutism).
B. If a person, S's, epistemic judgments are to have any prospect of being true, we must not construe his utterances of the form »E justifies belief B« as expressing the claim *E justifies belief B* but rather as expressing the claim *According to the epistemic system C, that I, S, accept, information E justifies belief B*. (Epistemic relationism).
C. There are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems, but no facts by virtue of which one of these systems is more correct than any of the others. (Epistemic pluralism).

Two objections to Epistemic relationism are now countenanced. First, propositions of the form *E justifies belief B* are normative, they make claims about what one should believe given certain evidence, whereas propositions of the form *According to the epistemic system C, E justifies belief B* are purely descriptive, they merely document the logical implications of a given epistemic system (*ibid.*: 75). A purely factual remark about what an epistemic system requires has come to replace a normative claim. There is a second, apparently fatal, objection. According to the relativist, the absolute claim *E justifies B* must be false, because justification is never absolute but only relative to an epistemic system. The objection is that epistemic principles are general normative statements about what beliefs are justified by what sorts of evidence. If, therefore, particular normative statements of this sort express something false (or incomplete), then the epistemic principles too must be false (or incomplete):

> Given that the propositions which make up epistemic systems are just very general propositions about what absolutely justifies what, it makes no sense to insist that we abandon making absolute *particular* judgments about what justifies what while allowing us to *accept* absolute *general* judgments about what justifies what. But that is, in effect, what the epistemic relativist is recommending (*ibid.*: 87).

Again,

> If we think of epistemic systems as composed of propositions, we will have to think of those propositions as complete, truth-evaluable propositions which encode a particular conception of epistemic justification. And if we do that, we will fail to make sense of epistemic relativism. We will be unable to understand how we could coherently accept the relativist's recommendation that we speak not of what is justified and unjustified, but only of what is justified or unjustified relative to the epistemic systems that we happen to accept. For we will no longer be able to make sense of our acceptance of some of those systems over others (*ibid*.: 91).

The view I want to defend affirms pluralism but rejects relativism, and I can thus agree with Boghossian on this point. Note though his merging two separate claims under the general label »Epistemic relativism«. Boghossian's argument against *relativisation* is an argument only against what he terms »Epistemic *relationism*«, and does not yet speak to Epistemic pluralism. Boghossian does present an independent argument against pluralism, which he defines as the claim that there are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems, but no facts by virtue of which one of these systems is more correct than any of the others. Let us suppose that one epistemic system, C1, employs epistemic principles that imply *if E, B is justified*, while another epistemic system, C2, employs epistemic principles that imply *it is not the case that if E, B is justified*. How can it be, in this circumstance, that there are no facts by virtue of which one system is more correct than the other, Boghossian asks. If there are no absolute facts about justification, then C1 makes a false claim, and C2 claims something true. More generally, if we take any contradictory pair of epistemic systems, »if one of them is deemed to say something false, the other will have been deemed to say something true. Under those circumstances, it's hard to see how it could be right to say that there are no facts by virtue of which one epistemic system could be more correct than any other« *(ibid.)*. Boghossian's target is the thesis he terms Equal Validity: »There are many radically different, yet ›equally valid‹ ways of knowing the world, with science being just one of them« (*ibid*.: 2). His argument is that the very idea of a plurality of epistemic systems, each encoding a particular conception of epistemic justification, is incoherent.

Boghossian, however, mischaracterises the view of an epistemic pluralist. He is wrong to claim that pluralism about epistemic cultures is reducible to a pluralism about epistemic *systems*, as these have been

defined by Boghossian, namely as sets of general normative propositions which specify under which conditions a particular type of belief is justified. Reflection on the Sanskrit knowledge systems makes this evident. Indian epistemology in general is an analysis of *pramāṇas*, methods for interrogating reality, sources of warranted belief. A *pramāṇa* is, more or less, what Boghossian means by an epistemic principle. The Indians were perfectly aware of the distinction between generative principles and transmission principles, and would have chastised Boghossian for failing to mention an important transmission principle, Testimony:

(Testimony) For certain propositions p, believing p is prima facie justified if a reliable witness testifies that p.

Their names for Observation, Deduction, Inference to the Best Explanation and Testimony are *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *arthāpatti*, and *śabda*. Yet they may have forgiven him, because they also discussed and disagreed among themselves whether Testimony is a fundamental or a derived epistemic principle, and they were, in general, fully cognisant of the importance of establishing a basic set of underived epistemic principles. Other putative epistemic principles, *pramāṇas*, were entertained, and much discussion took place around the question of their status, for example, whether they are derivable from more basic epistemic principles and whether they ought to count as epistemic principles at all. Indian versions of Revelation and Oracle, for instance, were largely dismissed. Yet, the crucially important point is that although the different Sanskrit epistemic cultures disagreed with each other about what the underived epistemic principles are, they agreed that there is just one correct set of such principles. That is, they *agreed* about there being just one epistemic system, even though they disagreed about what constitutes it. Thus the epistemic pluralism that the Indian tradition displays cannot correctly be described as a pluralism about epistemic systems.

In fact, the nature of the epistemic pluralism on display has already been analysed for us, and by the Sanskrit tradition itself. The remarkable Jaina philosophers make a distinction of fundamental epistemological significance when they say that as well as and in addition to *pramāṇas*, epistemic principles, there are also *nayas*, epistemic *standpoints* or *stances*, and that both are essential constituents of

an epistemic culture.[1] A *naya* is not a proposition but a practical attitude, a *strategy* or *policy* which guides inquiry: it is an *approach* to the problem of producing knowledge, not a thesis about the sources of justification.[2] One such policy might be to attend only to what is immediately present in experience, another might be to enumerate everything one encounters without making any categorial distinctions, another to attend to stasis rather than flux, or vice versa. To see that stances are not propositions, we need only reflect on the epistemic stance adopted by Nāgārjuna, the Buddhist Mādhyamika, who denied that there is any way to say what nature is *in itself (svabhāva)*. Nāgārjuna was accused of refuting himself, for if his epistemic proposition that everything is thus empty then that proposition should be itself empty, i. e. without meaning *in itself*. His response was that he held no proposition, that emptiness is not a proposition, indeed that it would be a fatal error to mistake adopting emptiness as a philosophical position for belief in any philosophical proposition.[3] And this might remind one immediately of van Fraassen's argument that, as a position in the philosophy of science, empiricism is not a propositional thesis, for it if were then, since it claims that every thesis is open to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation it would itself be open to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation (van Fraassen 2002).[4] To put it in Boghossian's terminology, someone who claims that Observation is the only underived epistemic principle would have to regard Observation as itself rationally justified on the basis of observation. van Fraassen's response is to say that:

> A philosophical position can consist in a stance (attitude, commitment, approach, a cluster of such – possibly including some propositional attitudes such as beliefs as well). Such a stance can of course be expressed, and may involve or presuppose some beliefs as well, but cannot be simply equated with having beliefs or making assertions about what there is (2002: 48).

The idea is helpfully elaborated by Anjan Chakravartty, who says that,

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[1] TS 1.6 (Tatia 1996); NAV 29.28 (Balcerowicz 2002: 124).

[2] »Among these, the [general] definition is as follows: ›The reflection of one facet of an object recognised by a *pramāṇa* is the standpoint‹, because this [general definition] pertains to all particular standpoints and because it is capable of distinguishing [among standpoints of] different forms« (NAV 29.12; Balcerowicz 2001: 97).

[3] Nāgārjuna, VV 29 (Bhattacharya et al. 1978: 113).

[4] See Doctor (2014).

a stance is a strategy, or a combination of strategies, for generating factual beliefs. A stance makes no claim about reality, at least directly. It is rather a sort of epistemic ›policy‹ concerning which methodologies should be adopted in the generation of factual beliefs […] Stances are not themselves propositional; they are guidelines for ways of acting. One does not believe a stance in the way one believes a fact. Rather one commits to a stance, or adopts it (2004: 175).

So, for instance, »physicalism is not so much a factual thesis, but a deference to the claims of basic science«. To adopt a stance is to resolve or commit oneself to acting or making decisions as described by it. Stances are open-ended, in terms of how they are interpreted and applied; their application requires discretion and judgement. They express and implement values, much as the policy of not lying implements a positive valuation of the truth (Teller 2004: 166). Let me therefore say that a stance is a policy adopted towards the employment of epistemic principles. Epistemic pluralism is a commitment to pluralism about epistemic stances, not to epistemic systems in the Boghossian sense.

Boghossian's argument against pluralism about epistemic systems was that »if one of them is deemed to say something false, the other will have been deemed to say something true. Under those circumstances, it's hard to see how it could be right to say that there are no facts by virtue of which one epistemic system could be more correct than any other« (2006: 91). This argument does not apply to epistemic stances, for it is possible for there to be pairs of genuinely alternative epistemic stances and no facts by virtue of which one is more correct than the other. We can see this most clearly if we remember that stances are action-guiding policies governing the application of epistemic principles. One can analogously think of a route as a guide to performing the action of reaching the summit of a mountain: there can be different routes up the mountain, perhaps with different benefits and drawbacks, but equally good for reaching the top. Here it is absurd to say that deeming one of the approaches »true« necessitates deeming the other »false«, both because truth and falsity are not the norms according to which plans for action are evaluated, and because whatever that norm is, both approaches may satisfy it equally well. To give another example: it is often the case that a given mathematical theorem can be proved in two different ways, adopting in each case a different proof strategy, yet both equally »correct«, i. e. sound as proofs of the theorem in question.

A fundamental distinction emphasised by the Jainas – and this was their second great theoretical achievement – is a distinction between *inclusive* and *dogmatic* ways of adopting a stance. A stance is adopted inclusively if its adoption does not prohibit others' use of different stances; a stance is adopted dogmatically if its adoption does prohibit others' use of different stances. Someone assumes a stance dogmatically if they believe, or expect, or even just hope, that in the context under consideration, the stance is susceptible to rational support of the kind that makes it uniquely defensible as opposed to its contraries (*cf*. Teller 2004: 162). It was, claim the Jainas, the great failing of the traditional proponents of the Sanskrit philosophical systems that they invariably took a dogmatic approach to the epistemic stances they articulate. The importance of the distinction is now clear: if we restrict our attention to stances adopted dogmatically, then a version of Boghossian's argument against pluralism about epistemic systems returns. For to adopt an epistemic stance dogmatically is to deem that its prescriptions for the use of the epistemic principles is correct and that any other prescription is faulty.

Siddharṣigaṇi, indeed, argues, in an exact parallel to Boghossian's argument against pluralism about epistemic principles, that the dogmatist claims that whenever a piece of evidence justifies a belief that an object has some one sort of property, e.g. stability, it also justifies a belief that it does not have other, contrary, properties, e.g. transformation, a claim that is literally false if reality is indeed multi-aspectual. Epistemic stances ought not commit themselves to the second conjunct of this claim, but should remain silent on how things go with properties other than the one under investigation, and to that extent they are always *incomplete* ways of interrogating reality. Epistemic principles, on the other hand, are *complete* or absolute in their claims about justification, but they achieve completeness because there is a suppressed quantification over hidden parameters, which can be made explicit by attaching the operator »in a certain sense; somehow« *(syāt)*. This is how he explains the Jaina thesis that »this cognitive approach to a particular cognoscible may consist in standpoints *(naya)* and principles *(pramāṇa)*. Among these two, a principle should be known to grasp completely, whereas a standpoint should be known to grasp incompletely« (NAV 29.28; Balcerowicz 2002: 124).

Boghossian does consider a related idea, which is that epistemic systems, as he has defined them, are sets of imperatives. He rejects

that idea on the grounds that an epistemic system encodes a particular conception of epistemic justification, but a set of imperatives does not, as well as on the ground that it cannot make sense of the relativist's relativisation of justification to systems (2006: 91–93). But neither argument succeeds against the view that pluralism concerns stances. For, first, we have agreed that there is a unified epistemic system comprised of a set of epistemic principles *(pramāṇa)*, we have defined an epistemic stance as a policy governing the use of that epistemic system; thus a stance does not itself encode a conception of epistemic justification. And second, we have separated out the claim about relativisation and the claim about pluralism, which Boghossian surreptitiously merges in his conjunctive definition of relativism. Having separated these distinct claims, it is evident that epistemic pluralism about stances is compatible with a rejection of relativisation. Indeed, if it were true that epistemic principles are imperatives then stance pluralism would be impossible, for there cannot be distinct alternative approaches to the dictates of an imperative.

The Jaina distinction between principles and stances is enough to diffuse Boghossian's argument against epistemic pluralism. I have said that distinct stances may sometimes apply with equal correctness to an investigation. The Jainas argue that this does not entail that the distinct deliverances of stances are necessarily contradictory. Rejecting the idea that things have a single unique essence, the Jainas instead say – and this is their third theoretical innovation – that reality is in some sense manifold or multifaceted: the Jaina term is *anekānta*. Metaphysics tends to treat objects, qua targets of inquiry, as if they are simple points, like the peak of a mountain. Yet the mountain itself is metaphysically more complex, its variously shaped sides offering different aspects to the climber and so different potential routes to the top. So, to quote Siddhasena, »the real thing, whose essence is multiplex *(anekānta)*, [forms] the domain of all acts of awareness; an object qualified by one facet *(ekadeśa)* is known as the province of the standpoint *(naya)*« (NA 29.28; Balcerowicz 2002: 83). Siddharṣigaṇi elaborates, adding that »the real thing, both external and internal, endowed with a form that is under the sway of *multiplex essential natures* not separate from each other, unfolds itself to all epistemic principles *(pramāṇa)*« (NAV 29.1.; *ibid.*: 84). Mountaineers, whichever route they select, have the same tools and techniques available to them, but the mountain unfolds itself differently to each, and each aspect thus presented has as much of a claim to be the essence of the moun-

tain as any other. Likewise, each non-dogmatic epistemic stance is an approach to some one aspect of the world. Different stances are policies for warranting beliefs about different aspects of the world. That is, we might think that there is a plurality of special sciences, each special science having as its provenance some particular domain or level of properties, no such domain being reducible to any other. To say this is to deny that there is a single way the world is *in itself*, that there is some uniquely objective description of the world viewed *sub species aeternitatis*, from nowhere; rather, the multiplicity of different approaches collectively constitute a »view from everywhere«.

4 Classifying and Evaluating Epistemic Stances

An epistemic stance is a policy governing the employment of the epistemic principles. Other names for an epistemic stance include »epistemic culture«, »style of enquiry«, »way of interrogating reality«, »use of reason«, and »mode of argumentation«. The traditional proponents of the Sanskrit *śāstras* fell into dogmatism in their attitude towards the epistemic stances they articulate. Bracket the dogmatism and what remains is a viable mode of accessing some one aspect of reality. Each of the Sanskrit »knowledge systems« is thus an epistemic *stance* (not an epistemic *system*, in Boghossian's use of that term), practiced in a distinctive way to produce knowledge in a distinctive domain. For example,

{Nyāya Meta-epistemology} Use the epistemic principles *(pramāṇa)* to produce knowledge about those very principles, with a background commitment to metaphysical realism and a negative hedonic soteriology.

{Alaṃkāra Poetics} Use the epistemic principles to produce knowledge about poetry, subject to the aesthetic conventions of courtly Sanskrit.

The emptiness of Madhyamaka Buddhism is also an epistemic stance,

{Madhyamaka Emptiness} Use the epistemic principles to refute any claim about what a thing is in itself.

The Jainas, in their survey of the variety of epistemic stances employed in classical Sanskrit intellectual culture, identified seven distinct stances and discussed their application. »There are [the following] standpoints: comprehensive, collective, empirical, direct, grammatical,

etymological, and factual«, says Umāsvāti (*Tattvārtha-sūtra* 1.33; Tatia 1994). But Siddarṣigaṇi thinks rather that,

> according to the number, however, [standpoints are] infinite, because the real thing is endowed with infinite properties and because [various] outlooks confined to [one] property of this [real thing] are standpoints. Nevertheless, ancient preceptors taught that there are seven standpoints, by means of assuming seven outlooks that collect together all [possible standpoints] (NAV 29.12; Balcerowicz 2001: 97).

Geoffrey Lloyd is sensitive to a corresponding pluralism within European intellectual cultures, and in his early pre-comparative work identified in broad outlines two epistemic cultures or »modes of argumentation«, which he termed polarity and analogy. The analogical stance questions reality by appeal to resemblances, models, images and related notions; »analogies apprehend or postulate similarities or connections, often suggesting inferences and extensions of the similarities apprehended« (2015: 3). He has shown in his later comparative investigations that the analogical stance is to be found in many Chinese writers, including those of the *Huainanzi*. I have argued that this is the epistemic stance of several strands within ancient India, most explicitly evident in the Ritual sūtras and in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, and in the *Manifesto* I used the term »case-based use of reason« to describe it. The analogical stance is the epistemic stance according to which

> {Paradigm} Use Induction liberally, including even from single instances (models, exemplars), and in combination with Inference to the Best Explanation.

This is not an epistemic principle derived from Induction and Inference to the Best Explanation, but a distinctive epistemic policy regarding their use. By polarities Lloyd means,

> modes of reasoning that focus on pairs of opposites and use those oppositions as the basis of schemas of argumentation, as when two opposites are held to present mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives, and one proceeds from the rejection of one to the confirmation of the other (*ibid*).

The polarising stance, in which the epistemic principle Deduction and in particular the law of the excluded middle are prominent, is also evident in the work of the great Buddhist logician Dignāga, whose »wheel of reasons« encodes just such a view about argumentation.

Another epistemic stance, widely employed in India, appeals to visual thinking in mathematics, the use of external visual representations, such as diagrams, graphs, or symbol arrays, whose »epistemic roles include contributions to evidence, proof, discovery, understanding and grasp of concepts« (Giaquinto 2015). The same stance is operative in hermeneutics, when compactly formulated texts are treated as putting on display a certain array of concepts, rather than as presenting explicit narrative argument (Clooney 2016). We might describe the policy of such a stance approximately as follows:

{Visual Thinking} Use Observation, in application to diagrams, graphs, or symbol arrays, instead of Deduction, in the construction of mathematical proof or hermeneutical understanding.

This is the second stance I described in the *Manifesto*. The stance of European scientism is dogmatic because it incorporates the belief that science, and science alone, explains all modes of being. This is more a creature of mythology than of fact, that the idea of science as a unified quest for a view from nowhere is a piece of collective self-depiction rather than a description of actual scientific practice.

{European Scientism} Use the epistemic principles in accordance with scientist mythology, and do so dogmatically.

Alternative epistemic stances, such as Paradigm and Visual Thinking, have no place within the stance of European Scientism, and are regarded as being incorrect. Yet they too represent modes of accessing aspects of reality, aspects that have not been thought to fall within the field of vision of European science, at least according to its own mythology. These are stances that do not use the epistemic principles with the intention of viewing the world from nowhere, for they are contextual in application and work through the extrapolation of local standards of comparison, drawing variably upon the individual cognitive capacities of specific viewers or readers.

Dogmatism about the actual practices and modes of production that constituted 19th and early 20th century European science, along with a belief in the appropriateness of the use of violence to suppress other stances, is constitutive of still another epistemic stance, which one might term »European colonialism« or the »colonial use of reason«:

{European Colonialism} Use the epistemic principles in accordance with the conventions of 19th/20th c. European scientific communities, and use violence against anyone who employs them differently.

The violence here is brute and physical, supplementary to the intellectual violence *(hiṃsā)* implicit in dogmatism. While Boghossian describes relativism as implying a »fear of knowledge«, the hallmark of this colonial stance is »fear of *others'* knowledge«. Sheldon Pollock writes that »when colonialism made the norms of Europe the norms of India the Sanskrit intellectual formation melted like so much snow in the light of a brilliant, pitiless sun« (2001: 24). But first, they were not the norms *of Europe*, because, I have argued, there is a common set of general normative epistemic principles that constitute a conception of justification, and indeed this was something agreed by the Sanskrit intellectuals as much as by the Europeans. It wasn't the epistemic norms of Europe that were made India's by colonialism but its colonial epistemic *stance*, the policy of imposing its own provincial mode of accessing reality and actively undermining all others with non-evidence-based means. That was what Simone Weil condemned as the intrinsic absurdity of children in French Polynesia being made to recite »Our ancestors the Gauls had blond hair and blue eyes […]« while forbidden their indigenous custom, language and tradition, forbidden even access to the libraries containing documentation relating to it. Stances are certainly open to evaluation according to non-aletheic norms, and what rules out European Colonialism as a legitimate stance is that it is dogmatic in denying the existence of alternative stances and that it recommends the use of violence over reason to silence alternatives.

For a World Philosophies project, the lessons to be learned are that attention should be focused on philosophies as expressions of stances, that there should be detailed investigation into the non-truth-based standards of legitimacy that are appropriate to stances, that dogmatism should be everywhere revealed for what it is, and that all philosophies can contribute to working out what are the underived epistemic principles. In this way, »conversations across lines of difference« are grounded in a pluralist realism.

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Exhibition Concept

W. E. B. Du Bois in the Ruins of the Warsaw Ghetto: Notes on the Relations of ›Race‹ and ›Racism‹

Abstract
My paper addresses the importance of a broad approach in the analysis of racism. To this end, I discuss the relations of ›race‹ and ›racism‹ in three sections. *First*, I deal with the subject matter of racism analysis. Investigating the opposition of purity and mixture, I conclude that racism includes more than race. *Second*, I oppose the increasing hypertrophy of the race concept. Discussing the position of W. J. T. Mitchell, I highlight some problems concerning the overexpansion of the category of race. *Third*, proceeding from the thoughts of W. E. B. Du Bois on witnessing the destroyed Warsaw Ghetto, I design a virtual exhibition room. It elucidates the necessity of a concept of racism that exceeds the range of race.

Keywords
race and racialization, concepts of racism, color line, antisemitism, anti-Muslim racism, W. J. T. Mitchell, W. E. B. Du Bois.

My notes on the relations of ›race‹ and ›racism‹ carry a heading that takes into account at least two widespread racisms, the racism of the ›colour line‹ and of antisemitism. My orientation is determined by the invitation to the conference ›Race – history and actuality of a dangerous concept‹.[1] It contains a brief outline for a projected exhibition on the subject of race, which specifies three objectives: »bringing together a group of international experts to discuss the latest developments of the investigation and theoretical reflection of the phe-

[1] The conference ›Rasse: Geschichte und Aktualität eines gefährlichen Konzepts‹ was organised by the *German Hygiene Museum*, the *German Federal Agency for Civic Education* and the *Historical Institute of the University Koblenz/Landau* in Dresden, October 8–10, 2015. This paper is a translated and slightly supplemented version of my presentation there. I want to thank Charles W. Mills and Stefanie Affeldt for their detailed reading of my text.

nomenon of racism«; »debating the role and the topicality of racism for our contemporary world sincerely and also controversially«; and »exploring how an exposition concerning the topic of race and racism in Germany could be modelled«.[2]

In this programmatic passage, the word ›race‹, eponymous for the conference as well as for the envisaged exposition, turns up only once. The word ›racism‹, however, appears in the context of all three items. Though this may be accidental, I nonetheless take it as evidence for my argument, since the categorical disparity refers to a shift in the international discussion of racism as well as to a vagueness in the exposition's concept.

I discuss these problems in three sections. *First*, I approach the object of racism analysis, indicate its varying definitions, illustrate its complexity by investigating the opposition of purity and mixture, and come to the conclusion that racism has a wider reach than race. *Second*, I criticize the increasing hypertrophy of the category of race, not least by a retrospective use of the idea of racialization, and explain my point of view using the example of W. J. T. Mitchell's ›semitic moment‹. *Third*, I use W. E. B. Du Bois' thoughts regarding the destroyed Warsaw Ghetto to outline a potential exhibition room, which requires simultaneous reflections on antisemitism and colour racism and thereby points to the necessity of a broad concept of racism, at the same time involving and going beyond the scope of race.

1 The Complexity of Racism

In reference to the *first point* of the above quoted outline, the ›current state‹ of racism analysis reveals at best a disparate picture. This applies to its topic, which is diversely defined, as well as to its scope, which oscillates historically between Antiquity and Modernity and geographically between Europe and the world. On the one hand, many scholars still share the view that the »concept of race enters European social consciousness more or less explicitly in the fifteenth century« and that racism »appeal[s] ex hypothesi to the concept of

[2] Diskussionspapier für die Internationale wissenschaftliche Tagung (Oktober 2015) zur Vorbereitung einer Ausstellung am Deutschen Hygiene Museum (2017/18) zum Thema ›Rasse. Schicksal und Methode‹, Dresden: Deutsches Hygiene Museum, 2015 – the quotes further down with reference to this conference are also from this paper.

race as the basis for discrimination« (Goldberg 1993: 21, 123).[3] On the other hand, »the durability and pervasive nature of elements of race-thinking over millennia« is suggested and leads to the postulation that »the social construction of racial identities should be understood as a global process being produced by many societies outside the West« (Law 2010: 3, 8).[4]

The concept of this conference argues in a comparatively restricted manner but dates the »history of racistly motivated persecution« at least back to the »forced conversion of the Jews in Spain at the end of the Reconquista« and the »beginning of the colonial domination of Europeans in the rest of the world«. In both cases racism doubtlessly existed – but it was a racism without races. In Spain, it was not only aimed against forcibly converted Jews and Muslims but also against voluntary converts and their descendants. Many did not adhere covertly to their old religions and traditions but had become sincere Christians and were therefore regarded as apostates by their former communities. Nevertheless, they fell victim to anti-Judaistic and anti-Islamic persecution, which discriminated against them by questioning their faith through linking genuine Christian belief to the purity of blood.[5]

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[3] D. T. Goldberg, *Racist Culture. Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning*, Malden [et al.]: Blackwell, 1993.

[4] I. Law, *Racism and Ethnicity. Global Debates, Dilemmas, Directions*, Harlow [et al.]: Pearson, 2010. For an extensive recent effort in the direction of a comparative analysis of racisms see F. Bethencourt, *Racisms. From the Crusades to the Twentieth Century*, Princeton [et al.]: Princeton University Press, 2013; for a thorough critique of this endeavour *cf.* the review by S. Affeldt, M. Hinrichsen, W. D. Hund, ›Review of Francisco Bethencourt, Racisms. From the Crusades to the Twentieth Century‹, *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, Vol. 55, 2015 (http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/afs/81630.pdf; last accessed 27 October 2015).

[5] *Cf.* i. a. N. Roth, *Conversos, Inquisition, and the Expulsion of the Jews from Spain*, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995; M. Carr, *Blood and Faith. The Purging of Muslim Spain*, New York [et al.]: The New Press, 2009. Carr, from my point of view, accurately concludes: »Some historians have argued that modern concepts of racism are anachronistic in the context of sixteenth-century Spain and that religion rather than race was the deciding factor in Christian hostility towards Muslims and Jews. Such criticisms ignore the extent to which modern notions of racism are a continuation of a tradition whose essential contours can be traced back to classical times. Crucial to this tradition is the idea that all members of a particular society or social group share the same inherently hateful, inferior, or contemptible characteristics. Whether these narratives of inferiority are attributed to culture, religion, or biology, they invariably serve to justify domination, exclusion, and even extermination by the group that takes its own superiority for granted« (*ibid.*: 185).

This politics of ›limpieza de sangre‹ cannot simply be understood as an antecedent of genealogical racial thought. This became extremely clear after the colonial conquest of South America. Here, too, evidence of blood purity had to be provided to gain membership to public and social institutions. Even having distant Jewish or Muslim ancestors was seen as a criterion for exclusion. In contrast, the forebears of the heathen Indians did not present a problem, especially if they came from ›good‹ families (Martinez 2008; Carrasco 1997).[6] Not only could European conquerors marry American women, but a high-ranking Spanish lady like Doña Francisca de la Cueva could also take an Indian husband like Don Diego Louis de Moctezuma (Connell 2011: 64).[7]

The corresponding ideology persisted up to the Mexican ›casta‹ paintings of the eighteenth century (Katzew 2004).[8] According to the message of these paintings, the union of Spanish and Indian partners would ultimately again produce Spaniards. However, this was not seen as applying to the offspring of Spaniards and Africans and hence reflected the social consequences of transatlantic slavery as a genealogical fate. As late as the first half of the twentieth century, José Vasconcelos (1997) presented similar arguments in his promotion of a ›raza cósmica‹.[9] The (mixed) cosmic race would be the greatest in the world because it would combine the most outstanding qualities of the other races: the civilising capabilities of the ›white‹, the stoicism of the ›red‹, the sensuality of the ›black‹, and the spirituality of the ›yellow‹ race. In the long run, however, this amalgam did not amount to much because a spontaneous aesthetic-eugenic process of selection would, in the end, lead to the disappearance of the ›black‹ elements of this superrace (*cf*. Hund 2014: 70 ff.).[10]

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[6] M. E. Martínez, *Genealogical Fictions. Limpieza de Sangre, Religion, and Gender in Colonial Mexico*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008; P. Carrasco, »Indian-Spanish Marriages in the First Century of the Colony«, in S. Schroeder, S. Wood, R. Haskett (eds.), *Norman Indian Women of Early Mexico*, University of Oklahoma Press, 1997, pp. 87–103.

[7] W. F. Connell, *After Moctezuma. Indigenous Politics and Self-Government in Mexico City, 1524–1730*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011.

[8] I. Katzew, *Casta Painting. Images of Race in Eighteenth-Century Mexico*, New Haven [et al.]: Yale University Press, 2004.

[9] J. Vasconcelos, *The Cosmic Race. La raza cósmica*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.

[10] W. D. Hund, *Negative Vergesellschaftung. Dimensionen der Rassismusanalyse*, Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, [2]2014.

To understand this line of reasoning requires not an exhibition of ›race‹ but rather the showcasing of the issues of social ›purity‹ and ›contamination‹. The phantasmagoria of maculation and pollution imputed and propagated a dichotomy that was considered as basically unbridgeable because it was thought to rest upon an indelible stain. This notion was still contained in Nazi antisemitism – despite all its race rhetoric. The first leader of the ›Department for Genealogy‹ (›Sippenamt‹) of the ›National Socialist German Workers' Party‹, which was to ensure the ›racial purity‹ of the party members, was convinced that the characteristic of »Judenstämmling« (literally: stemming from Jews) would be »inherently unlimited«, because it would be impossible to »specify the number of generations which were necessary to eliminate the impact of the occurred mixture« (quoted in Esser 2002: 78).[11]

The idea of contamination as formulated here was already part of the basic elements of scientific racism in the eighteenth century. This caused, inter alia, a methodological aporia in the race theory of Immanuel Kant (*cf.* Hund 2011).[12] He endeavoured to formulate what he thought to be a strictly scientific definition of races by describing them as groups that are defined by inherited differences within a species, which can nevertheless produce fertile offspring and, in this way, equally (›halbschlächtig‹ – literally: which one half of each kind) pass on their respective attributes. But, at the same time, Kant declared exactly this *differentia specifica* of his definition to be undesirable and noxious: »Half-breeds […] are not much good« (Kant 1923: 589).[13] Even in his notes on anthropology, Kant initially defined »races« as groups which »could generate their equals«, only to subsequently profess: »It is not good that they mix« (Kant 1923: 878).[14]

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[11] C. Esser, *Die ›Nürnberger Gesetze‹ oder die Verwaltung des Rassenwahns 1933–1945*, Paderborn [et al.]: Schöningh, 2002.

[12] W. D. Hund, »›It Must Come from Europe‹. The Racisms of Immanuel Kant«, in W. D. Hund, C. Koller, M. Zimmermann (eds.), *Racisms Made in Germany*, Berlin [et al.]: Lit., 2011, pp. 69–98.

[13] I. Kant, »Reflexionen zur Anthropologie«, in *Kants gesammelte Schriften* (Akademie-Ausgabe), Vol. 15, Berlin: Reimer, 1923, pp. 55–654.

[14] I. Kant, »Entwürfe zu dem Colleg über Anthropologie«, in *Kants gesammelte Schriften* (Akademie-Ausgabe), Vol. 15, Berlin: Reimer, 1923, pp. 655–899. The handling of Kant's racisms in the German discussion is an example for a stubborn denialism ignoring the international debate. According to it, Kant has argued in an exclusive scientific manner and has renounced the discriminatory defamation of racistly constructed others. Nothing could be further from his deliberations (*cf. i. a.*

This straining of logic indicates that earlier culturalist elements of racist discrimination remained even in race thinking that was trea-

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R. Bernasconi, »Who Invented the Concept of Race? Kant's Role in the Enlightenment Construction of Race«, in R. Bernasconi (ed.), *Race*, Oxford [et al.]: Blackwell, 2001, pp. 11–36, R. Bernasconi, »Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism«, in J. K. Ward, T. L. Lott (eds.), *Philosophers on Race. Critical Essays*, Oxford [et al.]: Blackwell, 2002, pp. 145–166; M. Brumlik, *Deutscher Geist und Judenhaß*, Munich: Luchterhand, 2000, pp. 27–74; E. C. Eze, »The Colour of Reason. The Idea of ›Race‹ in Kant's Anthropology«, in E. C. Eze (ed.), *Postcolonial African Philosophy*, Oxford [et al.]: Blackwell, 1997, pp. 103–140; R. Lagier, *Les Races humaines selon Kant*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2004; C. W. Mills, »Kant's Untermenschen«, in A. Valls (ed.), *Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy*, Ithaca [et al.]: Cornell University Press, 2005, pp. 169–193; T. Serequeberhan, ›Eurocentrism in Philosophy. The Case of Immanuel Kant‹, *The Philosophical Forum*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1996, pp. 333–356; B. Stangneth, »Antisemitische und antijudaistische Motive bei Immanuel Kant?«, in H. Gronke, T. Meyer, B. Neißer (eds.), *Antisemitismus bei Kant und anderen Denkern der Aufklärung*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2001, pp. 11–124; A. Sutter, ›Kant und die ›Wilden‹. Zum impliziten Rassismus in der Kantischen Geschichtsphilosophie‹, *prima philosophia*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1989, pp. 241–265.
The endeavour to throw the smokescreen of an allegedly general zeitgeist over Kant's reflections on Africans, Americans, Asians, Gypsies, and Jews (*cf.* Hund 2011: 69–98) is likewise foredoomed to fail. The contemporary debate had already been controversial. Kant's dispute with Georg Forster and Johann Gottfried Herder shows that the scientific knowledge of that time had not been as uniform and generally backed as it is being occasionally depicted until today. In contrast to Kant, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (*cf.* id., *Beyträge zur Naturgeschichte. Erster Theil*, Göttingen: Dieterich, 1790, pp. 93–118), in his library, had collected a whole stock of writings of or about outstanding Africans and, *i. a.*, mentions *Anton Wilhelm Amo*, *Jacobus Elisa Johannes Capitein*, *Ignatius Sancho*, Gustav Vassa, i. e. *Olaudah Equiano* (*cf.* A. W. Amo, *Übersetzung seiner Werke*, Halle: Martin-Luther Universität, 1965; J. E. J. Capitain, *The Agony of Asar. A Thesis on Slavery by the Former Slave Jacobus Elisa Johannes Capitein, 1717–1747*, G. Parker (ed.), Princeton: Marcus Wiener 2001 [1742]; I. Sancho, *Letters of the Late Ignatius Sancho, an African. To Which are Prefixed, Memoirs of his Life*, F. Crewe (ed.), Cambridge [et al.]: Cambridge University Press, 2 vols., 2013 [1782]; O. Equiano, *The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the American, Written by Himself*, W. Sollors (ed.), New York [et al.], Norton, 2001 [1789]. For recent publications on Amo see: O. Ette, *Anton Wilhelm Amo. Philosophieren ohne festen Wohnsitz. Eine Philosophie der Aufklärung zwischen Europa und Afrika*, Berlin: Kadmos, 2014; J. E. H. Smith, *Nature, Human Nature, and Human Difference. Race in Early Modern Philosophy*, Princeton [et al.]: Princeton University Press, 2015, pp. 207–230. For Capitein see: K. K. Prah, *Jacobus Eliza Johannes Capitein 1717–1747. Etude critique sur un Africain du XVIIIe siècle*, Paris: Présence Africaine, 2005. For Sancho see: M. Ellis, »Ignatius Sancho's Letters. Sentimental Libertinism and the Politics of Form«, in V. Carretta, P. Gould (eds.),

ted as science (*cf*. Hund 2007: 34–87).[15] These elements are clustered in characteristic contrastive pairs of opposites and, among others, find expression in the stereotype of the barbarian (constructing incomplete humans or half-humans and sub-humans), the stereotype of demons and devils (imagining outcasts descendent from religious counterworlds), and the stereotype of impurity (declaring others to be a contagious threat).

2 The Boundaries of Race

In reference to *point 2* of the outline quoted at the beginning, I want to stay with its key categories (›race‹ and ›racism‹) and to point out a pervasive hypertrophy of the concept of race in the theory of racism. The ›topicality of racism‹ this conference is expected to discuss and which the planned exhibition is intended to illustrate is undoubtedly evidenced by the persistence of racial discrimination. But it is also reflected in patterns of racist exclusion and contempt with reference

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Genius in Bondage. Literature of the Early Black Atlantic, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001, pp. 199–217. For Equiano see: V. Carretta, *Equiano, the African. Biography of a Self-Made Man*, New York [et al.]: Penguin 2005).
Capitain, Sancho, Equiano, as well as *Ottobah Cugoano*, *Angelo Soliman*, *Phyllis Wheatley* and many others, were contemporaries of Kant (*cf.* O. Cugoano, *Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil and Wicked Traffic of the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species*, Cambridge [et al.]: Cambridge University Press, 2013 [1787]; P. Wheatley, *Complete Writings*, V. Carretta (ed.), New York [et al.]: Penguin, 2001. For Cugoano, see L. Gordon, *An Introduction to Africana Philosophy*, Cambridge [et al.]: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 40–45. For Soliman, see: P. Blohm, and W. Kos (eds.) *Angelo Soliman. Ein Afrikaner in Wien*, Wien: Brandstätter, 2011. For Wheatley, see: H. L. Gates, Jr., *The Trials of Phillis Wheatley. America's First Black Poet and Her Encounters with the Founding Fathers*, New York: Basic Books, 2003).
Not least, Kant himself was a witness of the beginning of the revolution in Haïti. In her paper on »Kant's Second Thoughts on Colonialism« (in K. Flikschuh, L. Ypi (eds.), *Kant and Colonialism. Historical and Critical Perspectives*, Oxford [et al.]: Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 43–67), P. Kleingeld has argued that Kant has changed his attitudes concerning colonialism and slavery in view of the abolitionist debates of his time. Whether this has had any impact on Kant's racism is questioned by R. Bernasconi, C. W. Mills and others and is open to further debate (*cf.* R. Bernasconi, »Kant's Third Thoughts on Race«, in S. Elden, E. Mendieta (eds.), *Reading Kant's Geography*, Albany: Suny Press, 2011, pp. 291–318; C. W. Mills, ›Kant and Race, Redux‹, *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, The New School for Social Research, ed., Vol. 35, Nos. 1–2, Philosophy and Race, 2014, pp. 125–157).
[15] W. D. Hund, *Rassismus*, Bielfeld: transcript, 2007.

points not shaped by an alleged dissimilarity of races. This includes, for example, anti-Muslim racism. Its history commences long before of the invention of race and its current manifestations can neither be understood adequately by applying the category race nor, by its derivation, the idea of racialization.

This applies, inter alia, to the racist marginalization and persecution of the Moros in the Philippines, the Rohingiya in Myanmar or the victims of religiously linked conflicts in the Central African Republic or other African states.[16] But this also holds true for a society

[16] The colonisation of the Philippines by the USA in 1899, for example, inspired Rudyard Kipling's metaphor of the ›White Man's Burden‹. Shortly afterwards, the issue was presented in the context of the contemporary race paradigm at the 1904 St. Louis World's Fair. The exposition included a differentiation of the Philippine population into ›savage‹ and ›civilised‹ parts, projecting ›savageness‹ onto the non-Christian members of the population and visualising it by the exhibition of a group of Igorots. In Mark Bennitt's contemporaneous history of the world fair, this led to the assessment that the population of the Philippines would represent »many stages of social progress from the lowest types of head-hunting savages to the best products of Christian civilization and culture« (quoted in P. A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government. Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006, p. 262).
In the course of the Lake Mohonk Conference of 1912, dealing with the imperialism of the USA under colonial auspices, its secretary Henry S. Haskins declared the »Moro Province« to be a »problem within a problem«, because this »province contains over a quarter of a million of fighting Muhammadan fanatics« (quoted in A. Lubin, *Geographies of Liberation. The Making of an Afro-Arab Political Imaginary*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014, p. 62). In the further course of discussion of the subjects of a limited autonomy and the possible independence of the Philippines, Senator Millard Tydings in 1934 downplayed religious antagonisms and emphasized the ›racial identity‹ of the population and the dominance of its Christian majority (*cf.* D. Rodríguez, »White Supremacy as Substructure. Toward a Genealogy of Racial Animus, from ›Reconstruction‹ to ›Pacification‹«, in M.-K. Jung, J. H. Costa Vargas, E. Bonilla-Silva (eds.), *State of White Supremacy. Racism, Governance, and the United States*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011, pp. 47–76, p. 71). In the late twentieth century – after the foundation of numerous Muslim organisations of resistance like the Moro National Liberation Front or the Moro Islamic Liberation Front – in his ›Abu Sayyaf. Displays of Violence and the Proliferation of Contested Identities among Philippine Muslims‹ (*American Anthropologist*, Vol. 100, No. 1, pp. 41–54, p. 43), the anthropologist Charles Frake referred to the diverse ethnic groups subsumed under the name ›Moro‹ and commented that this identity was invented by the Christians and only recently accepted by the Muslims.
The multilayered and continuing discrimination against the Moros is embedded in a complex historical process. Although it was continued at the beginning of the twentieth century with a »thoroughly racialized war of conquest« (E. San Juan, Jr., *Racism and Cultural Studies. Critiques of Multiculturalist Ideology and the Politics of Dif-*

like the USA in which race consciousness figures prominently. Of the Muslim population living there, 30 percent claim themselves as white, 23 percent as black, 21 percent as Asiatic, 6 percent as Hispanic, and 19 percent refer to another category. Surveys in the UK show that when it comes to people's attitudes towards Muslims, religion overrides all other ethnic criteria. The attitudes towards Muslims are markedly more negative than towards Buddhists or Hindus (despite all of them in the UK having to a considerable extent South Asian origins).[17]

In such and related contexts, the race concept is unhelpful and leads to inconsistencies. I will elucidate this using the example of a leading scholar of visual culture. William J. T. Mitchell (2012) views »race« as a »diagnostic tool […] that provides access to the disease known as racism« (*ibid.*: 17).[18] Thereby, he wants to dissociate his position from theories representing ›race‹ as an ›illusion‹. Instead, he recommends pursuing a path that allows the combating of racism through a renewal of the race concept. In doing so, however, he falls prey to the naturalistic undertow of the category of race by linking it to the elements ›blood‹ and ›body‹ which, moreover, he disconnects from modern race theory and instead generalises historically. Against this backdrop, he rejects the »idea that race-thinking and racism are specifically modern« and alleges that this idea »has to be consigned to the dustbin of history«. Subsequently, he states: »I want us to be able to see and to say that the [ancient] Greeks were racists too« (*ibid.*: 69).

Except for its voluntaristic charm, the questionability of this statement is not based in the reference to racism in Antiquity but in the fact that it links this form of racism to the existence of races. Mitchell regards racism and races as an inseparable entity. However, ancient racism did not rest on the construction of races but on the

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ference, Durham [et al.]: Duke University Press, 2002, p. 2), whose structural consequences are manifest until today, the continuing racist discrimination against the large number of Philippine overseas workers in places as different as Hong-Kong, the USA, or the United Arab Emirates cannot be reduced to the concept of race. In fact, the discrimination is dependent on a combination of classism with different racisms based on disparate cultural foundations.

[17] *Cf.* ›A Demographic Portrait of Muslim Americans‹ (http://www.people-press.org/2011/08/30/section-1-a-demographic-portrait-of-muslim-americans/; last accessed on 27 October 2015) and: ›Why are Muslims Less Accepted Than Other Minorities in Britain‹ (http://blog.policy.manchester.ac.uk/featured/2015/04/why-are-muslims-less-accepted-than-other-minorities-in-britain/; last accessed on 27 October 2015).

[18] W. J. T. Mitchell, *Seeing Through Race*, Cambridge (Mass.) [et al.]: Harvard University Press, 2012.

construction of barbarians. Efforts to associate this construction retrospectively with the category race (which was unknown in Antiquity) give rise to a re-naturalization of this concept.

But not only is Mitchell's approach supposed to facilitate a far-reaching historical critique of racism by means of the category race, it is also thought to be a means to overcome the impact of racism in the long run. The author exemplifies this by using the conflict in »Israel/Palestine« (as he labels it using a double name) in conjunction with what he calls »the Semitic moment« (*ibid.*: 63–90). In the course of his argument, he obliterates the borders between racist ascriptions and ethnic identity formation. Moreover, he conflates important historic differences through the alleged logic of the category race and thereby renounces the analytical precision of racism analysis.

This becomes apparent in the reified representation of a ›semitic race‹. Despite this idea originating from the nineteenth century and owing its dubious provenance to misleading translations, viz. from biblical genealogy into linguistics and from there into race science, Mitchell asserts: »A blanket anti-Semitism that did not discriminate between Jews and Arabs was a powerful feature of European Christianity for centuries« (*ibid.*: 66).[19]

He then reverses this postmodernist historical speculation and presents it as a potential (albeit today still utopian) basis for a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. The claim is that it could underwrite the replacement of the unrealistic two-state solution by the vision of a binational community. In order to back up this assertion, Mitchell supplements his twofold division of ›body and blood‹ with the duality of ›blood and soil‹ and portrays both a »shared identity as Semites« and a »shared piety about a material place« (*ibid.*: 75) as the foundation of a future Jewish-Palestinian State.

The critique of racism in this argument is, in its own reasoning, completely caught up in the race trap. The attempt to subsume racist ascriptions and ethnic identity under a joint paradigm ends up disas-

[19] The problem with this remark is not the fact that racist anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim justifications for discrimination often used overlapping arguments. Petrus Alfonsi, for example, developed his denigration of Islam in his ›Dialogues against the Jews‹, and Petrus Venerabilis declared that Muhammed had Jewish teachers. The writings of both were part of an »increasing tendency to link anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim polemics« (J. V. Tolan, *Saracens. Islam in the Medieval European Imagination*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 154). The pitfall of Mitchell's proposition is that it naturalistically overstretches and uncritically flattens the meaning of antisemitism.

trously. The historical differences between anti-Judaism and anti-Islamism are blurred by a racially construed notion of antisemitism, and the discriminatory concept of race is taken to be suited for securing a coming »racial harmony« (*ibid.*: 87).

3 The Spectrum of Racisms

With that said, I turn to *point 3:* the question, formulated at the outset, of »how an exposition concerning the topic of race and racism in Germany could be modelled«. I hope that I have already made clear what I assume to be questionable regarding the formulation ›race and racism‹: in my view, it indicates a questionable narrowing of the analysis of racism.

To elucidate this judgment, I have imagined a virtual room for the planned exhibition in which pictures and artefacts should be merged into a telling ensemble and combined with a textual message. The ensemble shows William Edward Burghardt Du Bois considering the ruins of the Warsaw Ghetto and the memorial by Nathan Rapoport raised in memorial of the ghetto uprising. The textual message is a quote from an article written by Du Bois under the title ›The Negro and the Warsaw Ghetto‹ and published in the journal ›Jewish Life‹ (*cf.* Rothberg 2001).[20]

[Fig. 1]

[20] M. Rothberg, ›W. E. B. Du Bois in Warsaw. Holocaust Memory and the Color Line, 1949–1952‹, *The Yale Journal of Criticism*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2001, pp. 169–189.

The memorial in the destroyed ghetto could be shown on a large-sized photograph (see fig. 1). In front of this picture I visualize a stele with images of the two sculptural elements of the memorial. The one shows the stone carving with a migration of sufferers (see fig. 2), the other presents the bronze figures of resistance fighters (see fig. 3).[21] This already makes clear that racist discrimination is a social relation determined by power, whose aim is the social death of all those subjected to it but which is not able to break and prevent their resistance. This indicates that racism was always deemed illegitimate and iniquitous by those forced to endure it. Because of this, not even a time-bound exculpation of racism is conceivable. It was never an undivided manifestation of a zeitgeist, however shaped.

[Fig. 2]

The assembly of these pictures should be surrounded by rubble, as it surrounding the memorial when Du Bois visited it. This arrangement would be as realistic as symbolic and would illustrate the violence of racism directed to the destruction of the cultural identity of the oppressed.[22]

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[21] Incidentally, both works of art cover complex subtexts. For the bronze figures of the resistance fighters created by Rapoport in Paris, kibbutznikim of the Jishuv in Palestine were the artist's models. The big granite blocks for the memorial and the relief came from Sweden. They had already been prepared for transport some time ago and had originally been ordered by sculptor Arno Breker for a victory monument of German fascism (*cf.* J. E. Young, ›The Biography of a Memorial Icon. Nathan Rapoport's Warsaw Ghetto Monument‹, *Representations*, Vol. 26, 1989, pp. 69–106).

[22] At the same time, this would be an allusion to Gustav Metzger's handling of a well-known photograph from the Warsaw Ghetto which was shown in his exhibition ›Historic Photographs‹ 2011 in New York – http://artnews.org/newmuseum/?exi=27602 (last accessed on 27 October 2015).

[Fig. 3]

To the right and the left of this ensemble I picture, on the one side, a statue of Du Bois, for instance the bronze figure to which Radcliffe Bayley had given the posture of Auguste Rodin's ›The Thinker‹ (see fig. 4).[23]

On the wall behind this statue, I see three photographs illustrating the historic reality that provided the background to Du Bois' thoughts on the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial. One photo shows the brutality of racism directed against Blacks in the USA, using one of the shots which were made of lynchings and the white mobs involved (see fig. 5) and quite often circulated in the form of postcards (*cf.* Allen et al. 2005).[24] Another photo depicts one of the numerous pub-

[23] *Cf.* http://www.newamericanpaintings.com/blog/radcliffe-bailey%E2%80%99s-maroons and http://iyftc1oqf704bytwz45ub151.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/W.E.B.-DuBois-by-Radcliffe-Bailey-016.jpg (last accessed on 27 October 2015).

[24] J. Allen, H. Als, J. Lewis, L. F. Litwack, *Without Sanctuary. Lynching Photography in America*, Santa Fe: Twin Palms Publishers, 2005. In her *Photography on the Color Line. W. E. B. Du Bois, Race, and Visual Culture* (Durham [et al.]: Duke University Press, 2004), Shawn Michelle Smith has analysed the more than 350 photographs presented at the 1900 Paris Exposition Universelle in Du Bois' three albums ›Types

[Fig. 4]

lic protest actions of the civil rights movement (see fig. 6), in this particular case a march against lynching in which Du Bois participated (*cf*. Waldrep 2009).[25] In between these two photos the flag is to be seen in a third one, which the ›National Association for the Advancement of Colored People‹ flew out of the window of its New York office every time news about lynching arrived (*cf*. Tuttle 2005: 664).[26]

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of American Negroes‹. She characterises them as a counter-archive of pictorial resistance to the publicly circulating lynching postcards, which exposes the latter as »a spectacle of whiteness« (*ibid*.: 118), and demonstrates that »whiteness is a split identity formulated on the violent repression of the other« (*ibid*.: 143).

[25] C. Waldrep, *African Americans Confront Lynching. Strategies of Resistance from the Civil War to the Civil Rights Era*, Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009.

[26] K. Tuttle, »Lynching«, in A. Appiah, H. L. Gates, Jr. (eds.), *Africana. The Encyclopaedia of the African and African American Experience*, Vol. 3, New York [et al.]: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 663–666. Art exhibitions – curated in 1935 in the Newton Galleries (›An Art Commentary on Lynching‹) and the Contemporary Art Gallery (›Struggle for Negro Rights‹) in New York – have been part of the protest against lynching (*cf*. H. Langa, ›Two Antilynching Art Exhibitions. Politicized Viewpoints, Racial Perspectives Gendered Constraints‹, *American Art*, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 10–39). I exemplarily refer to the sculpture ›Death (Lynched Figure)‹ by Isamu Noguchi from 1934, shown at both exhibitions (*cf*. D. Apel, *Imagery of Lynching. Black Men, White Women, and the Mob*, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2004, pp. 92 ff. – for an image see http://www.wikiart.org/en/isamu-noguchi/death-

[Fig. 5]

The flag bore the inscription: ›A man was lynched yesterday‹ (see fig. 7).

The opposite wall should display a tablet with Du Bois' quote. (In this way, the entire ensemble would form a room, on whose rear wall is mounted the photography of the ghetto and whose lateral walls are set by Du Bois' statue in front of the images from America and by his quote. Access to this room could well be directed through some kind of curtain, showing Willy Brandt in front of the Ghetto Memorial so that his 1970 Warsaw Genuflection has to be symbolically shared[27] by the visitors walking through).

Du Bois' deliberations, central in this context, read:

The result […] of my view of the Warsaw ghetto […] was a real and more complete understanding of the Negro problem. In the first place, the problem of slavery, emancipation, and caste in the United States was no longer

lynched-figure-1934; last accessed on 27 October 2015). And I compare this sculpture with Françoise Salmon's ›Le Déporté‹ or ›Der gestürzte (or: sterbende) Häftling‹. The artist, who had survived the Concentration Camps of Auschwitz and Ravensbrück, sculpted this figure in 1965 for a memorial in the concentration camp Neuengamme (*cf.* KZ-Gedenkstätte Neuengamme (ed.) *Die Bildhauerin Françoise Salmon und ihre Plastik ›Der gestürzte Häftling‹*, 2005; for an image see https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:KZ-Neuengamme_%E2%80%9EDer_sterbende_H%C3%A4ftling%E2%80%9C_%281%29.jpg; last accessed on 27 October 2015).

[27] The German original makes use of the ambiguity of the word ›teilen‹, meaning ›to divide‹ or ›to split‹ on the one hand and ›to share‹ on the other hand (for an image see http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/images/Brandt_Polen.jpg; last accessed on 27 October 2015).

in my mind a separate and unique thing as I had so long conceived it. It was not even solely a matter of color and physical and racial characteristics, which was particularly a hard thing for me to learn, since for a lifetime the color line had been a real and efficient cause of misery. […] [T]he race problem in which I was interested cut across lines of color and physique and belief and status and was a matter of cultural patterns […]. [T]he ghetto of Warsaw helped me to emerge from a certain social provincialism into a broader conception of what the fight against race segregation, religious discrimination, and the oppression by wealth had to become (Du Bois 2000: 199 f.).[28]

The relevance of this statement for my reflections is obvious. Du Bois had already conceived ›race‹ as a bio-social fact well before his visit to Warsaw. His criticism of racist relations had always drawn on the concept of race and did not abandon it even then. Nonetheless, he referred to the similarities between the persecution of Jews and Blacks, which could not be comprehended with the category of race. In the face of racist demarcations that drew no ›colour line‹, Du Bois emphatically accentuated the relevance of cultural factors for patterns of racist discrimination and, thereby, pointed beyond the concept of race.

The configuration coming into the picture in this manner admittedly also shows race relations. But, at the same time, these are interrelated with antisemitism, a form of racism that has predominantly existed without the race concept in the course of its long history. Instead, it made use of the religious antagonism of damnation and chosenness, and of the sexist as well as classist antagonism of impurity and purity. Furthermore, besides the devil and the perils of contamination, it drew on the well-nigh classical ascriptions of barbarism and monstrosity as well as on the only marginally more recent Orientalism.[29]

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[28] W. E. B. Du Bois, »The Negro and the Warsaw Ghetto«, in P. Zuckerman (ed.), *Du Bois on Religion*, Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2000, pp. 197–201 (from *Jewish Life*, Vol. 6, No. 7, 1952, pp. 14–15).

[29] There are numerous studies concerning the different items on this (incomplete) list: *cf. i. a.* J. Trachtenberg, *The Devil and the Jews. The Medieval Conception of the Jews and its Relation to Modern Anti-Semitism*, New Haven: Yale University Press 1943 (ad ›devil‹); M. S. Hering Torres, *Rassismus in der Vormoderne. Die ›Reinheit des Blutes‹ im Spanien der Frühen Neuzeit*, Frankfurt [et al.]: Campus 2006 (ad ›impurity‹); B. H. Strickland, *Saracens, Demons, and Jews. Making Monsters in Medieval Art*, Princeton [et al.]: Princeton University Press, 2003 (ad ›monstrosity‹), I. D. Kalmar, D. J. Penslar (eds.), *Orientalism and the Jews*, Waltham: Brandeis University

[Fig. 6]

At the same time, both issues show that the offenders (despite their own hierarchical social stratification) share a common racist symbolic capital, which nevertheless is not legitimate, because racism and its various justifications are suspected, criticised, rejected, and opposed by the victims. As a result, racism must be understood as a social power relation and as a form of discrimination, which, in modernity, intensely avails itself of the ideology of race but extends beyond the construction and degradation of races historically, geographically and topologically. This applies not only to older forms of

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Press and Hanover [et al.]: University Press of New England, 2005 (ad ›Orientalism‹); the stereotype of the ›barbarian‹ was positioned against Jews from Antiquity (*cf.* Y. Shahar, »Imperial Religious Unification Policy and Its Divisive Consequences. Diocletian, the Jews, and the Samaritans«, in R. W. Mathisen, D. Shanzer (eds.), *Romans, Barbarians, and the Transformation of the Roman World*, Farnham [et al.]: Ashgate, 2011, pp. 109–119) to Modernity (*cf.* H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951). For a new perspective on anti-Judaism as »a way of critically engaging the world« (however in an affirmative manner) see D. Nirenberg, *Anti-Judaism. The Western Tradition*, New York [et al.]: Norton, 2013 (quote: p. 3).

[Fig. 7]

racism. Present-day racisms are the heirs of a multifaceted tradition of discriminations whose diverse patterns of suspicion and exclusion they frequently combine.[30]

–Wulf D. Hund, Emeritus, University of Hamburg, Germany

[30] For a video of the original presentation, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S19lvbw-ibc; an animated version of the fictional exhibition room conceptualized in chapter 3, can be seen 17:00–21:20.

Discussion Article

Does Comparative Philosophy Have a Fusion Future?*

Abstract
This essay challenges the claim that fusion philosophy is the successor to comparative philosophy. Comparative philosophy should find itself deeply at odds with the approach to various philosophical problems and traditions that fusion philosophy is taking, and comparative philosophers will surely deny Mark Siderits'[1] (2003: xi) claim that they have been superseded. The manner then in which fusion philosophy dismisses comparativist concerns and objections is to admit that such objections are valid in some case but to deny that they are intrinsic to good fusion philosophy. Comparativists however generally do not claim that fusion philosophy is necessarily or inherently bound to make the mistakes and contribute to misunderstandings that they claim it often does. Their claim is that from the start such philosophy often does make just these kinds of problematic errors and assumptions, and that this is what comparativist philosophy must seek to avoid. By the time fusionists are done defending – actually sanitizing – fusion philosophy from comparativist objections, one is left not with fusion philosophy but with what is – from the comparativist perspective – comparative philosophy. There is no succession from comparative philosophy to fusion philosophy and no segue from one to the other.

Keywords
Fusion philosophy, Comparative philosophy, Confluence, Mark Siderits, Methodology, constructive-engagement.

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* At regular intervals, *Confluence* will feature articles which engage with methodological aspects crucial to the development of world philosophies. We invite our readers to participate in these debates by submitting short statements on the subject. These responses will be printed in our forthcoming issues. *The Editors.*

[1] M. Siderits, *Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons*, London: Ashgate, 2003.

> Fission involves large radioactive nuclei which break down in to two smaller ones […] giving off energy in the process.
> Fusion involves two smaller nuclei which under extreme temperature and pressures bond together to form a larger atom and also give off energy in the process […] One of the most appealing characteristics of fusion as opposed to fission is that it is much cleaner.[2]

1 Introduction

Although the two have met, ›fusion philosophy‹ has yet to be properly introduced to comparative philosophy. There are those on both sides of the divide, and some are on either side of the divide, that will deny that fusion philosophy and comparative philosophy are engaged in the same sort of enterprise, or are in competition. They have not thought the matter through. While it is largely true that they are not doing the same sorts of things (e.g. analyzing the same issues), it is not the case that their different approaches, self-conceptions, and understandings of some of the same subject matter and source material, means that they are not competing with one another. There are weaker and stronger versions of fusion philosophy. Among the more radical fusionists are Mark Siderits (2003: xi) who claims that comparative philosophy has been superseded by what he terms fusion philosophy, Graham Priest, Owen Flanagan[3] and perhaps Bo Mou. However, as we will see, even among those who see themselves as fusionists (e.g. Siderits), some at least are at times better understood as doing comparative rather than fusion philosophy.

Comparative philosophy should find itself deeply at odds with the approach to various philosophical problems and traditions that fusion philosophy is taking, and comparative philosophers will surely deny Siderits'[4] claim that they have been superseded. The fusion challenge may help comparativists to clarify further the methodolo-

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[2] *http://www.upei.ca/~phys221/rlh/fision_vs_fussion/fision_vs_fussion.htm* (last accessed on 10 September 2011).

[3] O. Flanagan, *The Bodhisattva's Brain: Buddhism Naturalized,* Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2011.

[4] Siderits (*ibid.*). Also see M. Siderits »Comparison or Confluence Philosophy?« *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy,* J. Ganeri (ed.), 2015, DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199314621.013.5 (last accessed on 22 January 2016).

gical and theoretical doubts that have informed comparative philosophy from the start.

What Siderits calls fusion philosophy arguably has a number of aliases. Thus, although Bo Mou would emphatically deny this, what Bo Mou calls the »constructive-engagement strategy of comparative philosophy« or CECP for short, is *at times* sufficiently similar to fusion philosophy to warrant the same appellation.[5] Indeed, several of the editorial advisers to the journal *Comparative Philosophy*[6], edited by Bo Mou, are prime examples of those doing just what it is that Siderits calls fusion philosophy. The question then is whether fusion philosophy has superseded comparative philosophy in the way Siderits claims it has; or is it, instead, a newer and more sophisticated or useful version of comparative philosophy; perhaps a version that CECP at times incorporates (or vice versa)?

Bo Mou never uses the term or refers to ›fusion philosophy‹ in the introductory essay that lays out the ›theme‹ of *Comparative Philosophy*. In principle at least, I think Bo Mou would see CECP as distinct from fusion philosophy, and claim that CECP rather than fusion philosophy is the genuine and latest incarnation of comparative philosophy. In any case, Siderits sees an established trend towards fusion philosophy, while Bo Mou sees a trend amongst philosophers with

[5] Bo Mou, ›On Constructive-Engagement Strategy of Comparative Philosophy: A Journal Theme Introduction,‹ *Comparative Philosophy* 1, No. 1, 2010, pp. 1–32 (http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/comparativephilosophy/vol1/iss1/4/; last accessed on 22 February 2016). Also see J. Fleming, ›Comparative Philosophy: Its Aims and Methods,‹ *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2003, pp. 259–270. Fleming appears to reiterate the case for comparative philosophy (not fusion philosophy) as traditionally understood. He would therefore reject Siderits' claim that comparative philosophy has been superseded. While endorsing the virtues of comparative philosophy and gains to be had from it, Fleming says some things that few comparativists and virtually no contemporary analytic philosophers would endorse. On page 263, he says, for example, that »Such comparisons […] may in the end reveal a common pattern running throughout all philosophies and cultures that constitutes their inner contradiction/rupture […] comparison […] may expose a similarity in how each is essentially different from itself: the nature of inner contradiction (which is defining) may turn out to be the same (and of course somewhat different) in the various philosophies (or cultures) compared – more specifically, we may discover that all philosophies (and cultures) are dialectical.« It is these sorts of generalizations and search for commonalities that methodologically informed (or concerned) comparativists tend to warn us about.

[6] The journal's full title is ›*Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy.*‹

comparativist concerns towards CECP. Who is right? Siderits is right with regard to Western analytic philosophers. CECP may however better characterize what many other comparativists are doing.

The alleged differences between fusion philosophy and CECP may be summarized as follows. (1) Fusion philosophy is largely unconcerned with methodological issues (detailed below) while CECP attends to such issues – even more than traditional comparative philosophy; (2) Fusion philosophy generally denies the historical approach while CECP does not. CECP considers the philosophical-issue-concerned approach and the historical approach as complementary and as sensitive to distinct purposes and focuses. It emphasizes philosophical interpretation of the classical texts; (3) Fusion philosophy focuses largely on analytic treatment; in contrast, the CECP emphasizes the constructive engagement between distinct approaches from different traditions; (4) Fusion philosophy has been largely focused on Buddhism. In contrast, the CECP's coverage is far more comprehensive.[7] It is a way of doing philosophy.

In short, Bo Mou does not recognize the challenge that fusion philosophy (though he doesn't use the term) poses to comparative philosophy because, unlike Siderits, he would consider fusion philosophy – at least in some of its guises, as rather antithetical to CECP. And it is the latter (CECP) that he sees as the new comparative philosophy. Bo Mou (2010: 1–2) explains CECP as follows:

> The constructive-engagement goal and methodological strategy of comparative philosophy (›constructive-engagement strategy‹ for short), briefly speaking, is to inquire into how, via reflective criticism and self-criticism, distinct modes of thinking, methodological approaches, visions, insights, substantial points of view, or conceptual and explanatory resources from different philosophical traditions and/or different styles/orientations of doing philosophy (within one tradition or from different traditions) can learn from each other and jointly contribute to our understanding and treatment of a series of issues (?), themes or topics of philosophical significance, which can be jointly concerned through appropriate philosophical interpretation and/or from a broader philosophical vantage point.

If this account is seen as a desideratum for comparative philosophy, then it has something for everyone and there is little, even for fusion philosophers, to disagree with. As this account moves to a level of

[7] This may just be an historical accident rather than a principled difference between the two. But it remains a difference nonetheless.

generalization and vagueness that glosses over significant differences, disputes between fusion philosophy and the more methodologically concerned comparativists appear to vanish. The illusion of conciliation is achieved through smoke and mirrors.

What Bo Mou does not point out but is nevertheless certain, is that comparative philosophers since the 1950's, *as well as fusionists*, have always implicitly or explicitly claimed to employ constructive-engagement strategies and their purpose has always been to ›constructively engage.‹ No one in comparative philosophy (›fusionists‹ or comparative philosophers) would deny that they are trying to ›critically engage‹ with philosophical systems that are embedded deep within other cultures. The question is how to go about such constructive engagement. What are the proper methods, adequate constructive-engagement strategies, and necessary skills? What does one mean by »constructive engagement«? For example, is exploring another philosophical tradition's insights or arguments with the aim of bringing them back home count as constructive engagement? Many Native American philosophers would see it as expropriation and piracy.[8]

Fusion philosophy, *as well as* much of what Bo Mou terms CECP, at times eschews the methodological concerns of more traditional comparative philosophy and by and large seeks to ›get on with it‹ (that too is a strategy).[9] It seeks to bypass method and get on to the ›critical engagement‹ part. And it does so for the simple reason that it sees such concerns as largely irrelevant to their purpose. Fusion philosophers may be right about this, but questions remain. Can fusion philosophy (or CECP) be philosophically productive and useful, without relying on methodological constraints that early comparativists often thought essential (e.g. contextualizing; considering a position or problem *in situ;* and at times, primary language capability)? There

[8] *Cf.* T. Norton-Smith, ›A Shawnee Reflection on Franz Wimmer's »How Are Histories of Non-Western Philosophies Relevant to Intercultural Philosophizing?‹« *Confluence*, Vol. 3, 2015, pp. 145–150.

[9] Bo Mou's (2010: 19–22) methodological guiding principles are well worth examining. It is clear that fusion philosophy adheres to them randomly at best. But more to the point perhaps is that arguably CECP does little better. Moreover, there is little in the principles that traditional comparativists would disagree with. Bo Mou (2010: 22n. 28; 21, 24–29) reads his principles back into »the reflective practice of comparative philosophy« – which is easy enough to do. But to read guiding principles into a particular comparative essay is quite different than actually being guided by them.

are the issues of (1) whether different traditions even try to solve the same problems, and (2) whether or not they understand these apparently identical problems in the same way.

This paper assesses fusion philosophy's self image and claim to be the successor to comparative philosophy. By seeking to distance itself from comparative philosophy, which it sees as steeped in religion, fusion philosophy plays up its Western contemporary philosophical credentials. Comparative philosophy (including CECP) on the other hand claims fusion philosophy, or what is useful about it, as its own. It sees, or should see, virtually nothing new in fusion philosophy, except a methodological naïveté – albeit one very much at odds with comparative philosophy's traditional concerns with the difficulties of cross-cultural comparisons.

Virtually all humanities and social science disciplines self-consciously reflect on the methods they employ. Such methodological preoccupation (not all of it navel-gazing) occurs far more here than in the hard sciences where whatever particular experiments are construed and methods employed, standards for objectivity are far more likely to be agreed upon – at least by practitioners if not theorists. Even so, comparative philosophy has been far more concerned in an ongoing manner with its methods and approaches to the study of mostly religiously grounded philosophies than other disciplines have been. Leaving aside often heard contentions that Confucianism and even Buddhism are not ›religions,‹ in a non-western context, like it or not, ›philosophy‹ largely refers to philosophy as grounded in and expounded through some world-view. It is only from a rather rarified theoretical or ideological point of view, that from a Western, customary, traditional, scholarly perspective, one could claim these not to be religions. (Talal Asad and others have called into question the use of religion as a trans-cultural category.[10])

At least sixty years on and comparativists are still trying to explain what comparative philosophy is, what it should be doing, and how it should be going about it. It is an exaggeration, but one with a point, to say that there are nearly as many accounts of what comparative philosophy is as there are comparative philosophers. Nevertheless, there are some broad commonalities. Its upfront and continuous

[10] *Cf.* T. Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993; *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam Modernity*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.

methodological ruminations are probably linked to its need to justify its standing as a discipline. In one way or another, comparative philosophy draws on most other disciplines, some even more than philosophy, in the humanities and social sciences. But from its very conception, much like religious studies, where quite naturally much of comparative philosophy found its home, it has suffered from something of an identity and inferiority complex: treated like less than equal by other disciplines that see it as located at the interstices and as less formidable than their own. Comparative philosophy is a relatively recent addition to philosophy programs, as opposed to religion and religious studies departments in the West.

2 What is Fusion Philosophy?

It is somewhat ironic then that ›fusion philosophy,‹ described by Mark Siderits as a successor to comparative philosophy, seems virtually unconcerned with method.[11] Fusion philosophy has its roots largely in contemporary analytic philosophy, though it draws on continental and phenomenological traditions as well. The extent to which it can properly be seen as emerging from comparative philosophy rather than from a cultural broadening of analytic philosophy itself is questionable.

Siderits says (2003: xi):

> The enterprise of fusion philosophy is meant to be a successor to the practice of what has been called comparative philosophy […] Comparative philosophy has always involved the comparison of elements drawn from two distinct philosophical traditions […] the point of the comparison has often seemed to be limited to bringing out similarities and differences that might be of interest to scholars of one or the other tradition. To those who see problem-solving as central to philosophy, and who also believe that the counterpoising of distinct traditions can yield useful results in this endeavor, the name ›fusion philosophy‹ seems appropriate.

Not only is what Siderits terms ›fusion philosophy‹ unconcerned with the kinds of methodological issues that are, to this day, constitutive of comparative philosophy, this self-proclaimed successor seems to brand itself by means of not so much deftly avoiding, as simply sloughing off the concerns about method and theory – objectivity,

[11] Siderits (2003).

distortion, decontexualization etc – that previously defined comparative philosophy.

Furthermore, the view that sees »problem-solving as central to philosophy« and believes »that the counterpoising of distinct traditions can yield useful results in this endeavour« is, by itself, likely to be seen as a regressive step by comparative philosophy. Deutsch (2002: 23) describes »a rich diversity of aims, methods and styles« that has been exhibited by comparative or »cross-cultural« or transcultural or »global« philosophy.[12] Problem-solving is among them. Deutsch (*ibid.*) says: »In its earliest phases, a deeper agenda was also at play, which many comparativists today regard as a rather naïve one, which was to bring about a general synthesis of what was thought to be best in different traditions and attain a certain universal accord among philosophers wherever to be found.« This move towards what may be termed philosophical ecumenicalism is not the same thing as either Siderits or Deutsch has in mind by »problem-solving.« Deutsch (*ibid.*) goes on to say that this approach »occupied the attention of many of the philosophical pioneers in the field in the early-mid decades of the last century and is still carried out in a number of different ways.« Perhaps one of the different ways Deutsch has in mind could be seen as corresponding to fusion philosophy; in which case, from Deutsch's comparative perspective, fusion philosophy is best seen as one aspect of comparative or »cross-cultural« etc. philosophy.

Deutsch does in fact go on to describe another form of comparative philosophy that comes closest to fusion philosophy. Indeed it appears to describe exactly what the fusionists are after. It is the account of comparative philosophy closest to his own and captures the »creativity« he thinks can be achieved and that should be aimed for through at least some comparative philosophy. Deutsch says (*ibid.*: 23–24):

> [A]gainst the background of twentieth century Western analytic philosophy […] attention gets focused on issues in epistemology, philosophy of language and logic where, it is thought, a careful and sophisticated reading of non-Western texts can enrich Western treatments of these issues […]. This approach may be seen to be part of a larger comparative enterprise

[12] E. Deutsch, ›Comparative Philosophy as Creative Philosophy,‹ *APA Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophy*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2002, pp. 23–26.

which we might call the ›problem approach‹ […] [W]e can identify philosophical problems that cut across various traditions and employ the resources of those traditions to […] broaden one's own philosophical understanding […] [O]ver thirty years ago, I stated what I still believe to be the most exacting and exciting approach to comparative philosophy. ›We are aware now,‹ I wrote then, ›that there is much of intrinsic philosophical value and interest in Asian thought and that consequently this thought need not be cast merely in the mould of an historical (or exotic) curiosity. Students ought to be able to study Asian philosophy for the purpose of enriching their philosophical background and enabling them to deal better with the philosophical problems that interest them.‹ I went on to say, and would now soften considerably the somewhat universalistic language employed, that ›Without losing sight of the distinctive and sometimes unique characteristics of a tradition, one ought to be able to concentrate attention on the tradition as it is a response to a series of universal questions and problems, and with the express intention that these responses will influence one spontaneously in one's own thinking.‹[13] Today […] we have become more circumspect in our understanding that philosophical problems, as well as the answers given to them, are highly contextualized and that one of the significant creative functions of comparative philosophy is to examine how one's initial formulation of a specific problem can itself be reformulated in the light of alternative possibilities proffered in other traditions. We have also come to realize that the very idea of *philosophy* may mean rather different things in different cultures and that we have much to learn from these other conceptions.

Deutsch sees fusion philosophy as reliant on, and embedded in, comparative philosophy rather than a successor to it.

Apart from comparative philosophy, fusion philosophy is apt to run afoul of the problems that earlier comparative philosophy concerned itself with and sought to overcome. Fusion philosophy draws on distinct philosophical traditions when they can be seen as offering support, conceptualizations or ways of thinking that address a rather narrow range of philosophical problems as conceived largely in Western analytic, and occasionally continental, philosophy. But it cannot do this without the methodological, theoretical, linguistic and other resources constitutive of comparative philosophy. As Deutsch (*ibid.*: 24) says: »The creative comparativist faces a number of formidable tasks, the first of which is that of understanding and interpreting the philosophical achievements of other traditions. This calls for a

[13] See E. Deutsch, *Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction*, Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1969, preface.

complex and subtle hermeneutic.« Fusion philosophy, conceived of as something independent of, or as a successor to, comparative philosophy sees little if any need for such a hermeneutic.

Few comparative philosophers would agree with Siderits that »the point of the comparison has often seemed to be limited to bringing out similarities and differences that might be of interest to scholars of one or the other tradition.« (They can agree that at times it may ›seem to be,‹ but they would deny that it is). Nor do I know of any comparative philosopher, and few philosophers in general, who would deny (certainly not openly) »that we can sometimes make progress toward solving philosophical problems by looking at what traditions distinct from our own have had to say about the issues with which we are concerned« Siderits (2003: xi). In what sense then is fusion philosophy a successor to comparative philosophy? Even if he is successful in showing how classical Indian philosophy can show us a way to »adjudicate the dispute between Parfit and his many critics« *(ibid.)* Siderits has some way to go to establish fusion philosophy as comparative philosophy's successor – by which he means its intellectual heir. Although Siderits bases his analysis of the Hindu/Buddhist traditions, it is said to be applicable to comparative philosophy as a whole. But given the embeddedness of these traditions in a particular context, why should one presume that this analysis would hold, and is applicable, in different contexts in which comparative philosophy is carried out? Would it apply to African philosophy, for example?

3 Rites of Succession

The recently established (2010) online journal, *Comparative Philosophy: An International Journal of Constructive Engagement of Distinct Approaches toward World Philosophy* makes no specific mention of fusion philosophy on their website description. Nevertheless, it appears to describe what Siderits and other fusionists have in mind. How is this journal supposed to differ, if it is, from *Philosophy East West, Asian Philosophy, Religious Studies* and, to a lesser degree, other journals with a significant comparative component (e.g. *Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Journal of Indian Philosophy*)? We find:

Comparative Philosophy [emphasizes] […] the constructive engagement of distinct approaches to philosophical issues, problems, themes from various

philosophical traditions/styles/orientations of doing philosophy for the sake of their joint contribution to the common philosophical enterprise, and/or on general theory and methodology of comparative philosophy […]. The coverage of *Comparative Philosophy* is not restricted to, but can include, any particular comparative-engagement pairs of distinct approaches from different traditions or styles/orientations of doing philosophy […] The contents of *Comparative Philosophy* are to be intrinsically relevant to the philosophical interest and inquiry of philosophy scholars and students, no matter which specific traditions they study (e.g., Chinese or Indian philosophy) and no matter which style of philosophy they instantiate (e.g., analytic or ›Continental‹ philosophy), given that they work on issues and topics under examination in the Journal. For a philosopher would be intrinsically interested in distinct approaches to the issues and topics under her philosophical (instead of merely historical) examination and in their reflective relation to her current working approach, whether or not she takes some other distinct approach also as her (current) working approach, which may be related to her training/specialty background, personal research interest or the need of the current study.[14]

Method and theory are both mentioned here (»and/or on general theory and methodology of comparative philosophy«), but as something in addition to or separate from the principal fusionist focus. Methodological and theoretical essays will be considered, but the principal idea is to draw from various philosophical traditions and approaches cross-culturally »for the sake of their joint contribution to the common philosophical enterprise« and »constructive engagement.«

However, it is most certainly fusionist philosophy that is being referred to in the claim: »For a philosopher would be intrinsically interested in distinct approaches to the issues and topics under her philosophical (instead of merely historical) examination and in their reflective relation to her current working approach […].« This sentence dismisses the comparativist's methodological, theoretical and philosophical concerns by simply assuming these »distinct approaches« and views are there for the picking independent of a »working approach,« »training/specialty background,« or »personal research interest« (?). It further assumes that philosophical content can somehow be siphoned off, or distilled from, historical and other unnamed approaches. The fact that fundamental philosophical ideas

[14] http://www.comparativephilosophy.org/index.php/ComparativePhilosophy/ (last accessed on 22 February 2016).

like the Buddhist notion of *nirvāṇa* (is it utter annihilation?), or the neo-Confucian idea of *li*, are contested within their various traditions and sub-traditions, makes little difference to the fusionist. They choose an interpretation off the rack, one that appears to fit, and thus advance, a view of their own.

Whereas comparative philosophy concerns itself with what constitutes ›constructive engagement,‹ fusion philosophy assumes (like the Supreme Court justice who couldn't define obscenity) that we will recognize it when we see it.[15] Fusionists may be right – at least part of the time. Contemporary analytic philosophy that draws on what are seen to be significant commonalities with Buddhist philosophy, and is supported by that philosophy, is paradigmatic of what they have in mind. Siderits' work on identity, and Owen Flanagan's on consciousness are two prominent fusionist examples. Neville (2002: 22)[16] writes:

> [T]the point of comparison for the sake of integrative philosophy is not just intellectual history but the creation of a conversation within which all parties share in the struggle to develop old ideas into new ones, each appreciative of the heritage of the others […] comparative hypotheses […] are both backward looking as in comparative intellectual history, and forward looking as in the work of creative reconstruction for contemporary purposes.

Fusionists will either accept this view or reject it. If they accept it, then on what grounds is fusion philosophy to be distinguished from comparative philosophy? If they reject it, then how can they claim to be a successor of comparative philosophy, rather than say simply rejecting it?

Without denying (perhaps) that ideas are often contextualized and historically localized, the supposition by fusionists generally seems to be that any idea or argument can be taken from its natural (as it were) setting and held up for comparison, critically examined and, most importantly, transposed in meaningful and useful ways to a contemporary philosophical context. In other words, what Siderits calls fusion philosophy defines itself by denying a significant, even

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[15] When asked how the law could determine if something was obscene, the United States' Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart famously remarked in 1964 that »I know it when I see it.«

[16] R. Neville, ›Beyond Comparative to Integrative Philosophy,‹ *APA Newsletter*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2002, pp. 20–23. Also see J. Kupperman, ›The Purposes and Functions of Comparative Philosophy,‹ *APA Newsletter*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2002, pp. 26–29.

essential, part of what comparative philosophy hitherto has defined itself in terms of. If so, it is difficult then to know what to make of the claim that fusion philosophy is the successor to comparative philosophy. They seem to share no DNA. It is unlikely that Siderits means fusion philosophy is the successor only in the sense that it temporally follows it. He must see it as an intellectual successor as well; as building upon what comparative philosophy started. Given that fusion philosophy defines itself by negating comparative philosophy's central concerns, how can this be?

For nuclear physics, achieving fission (as in the atom bomb) is not a problem. It is fusion that is something of a holy grail. Suppose that these terms (fission and fusion) could be used to describe two general (albeit vague) approaches to comparative philosophy – where ›fission‹ not fusion, is conceived as the mode that meets traditional comparativist concerns. Further suppose that instead of producing energy, the goals the two approaches both sought could be broadly (albeit vaguely) described as knowledge that advanced an understanding of the comparative philosophical strands, whether singularly or together, in some useful ways – such as in advancing contemporary philosophical theory. Would anything useful or normative about the nature(s), methods or goals of comparative philosophy be revealed if it were then asked whether, in comparative philosophy, fission or fusion (as in fusionist philosophy) best produced the desired results?

Or to carry the comparison a step further (perhaps a step too far), does it make sense to say that in comparative philosophy, as in nuclear physics, ›one of the most appealing characteristics of fusion as opposed to fission is that it is much cleaner‹? It may seem cleaner (less messy), unconcerned as it is with history, method and the like. But comparativists like Neville seem to be committed to the view that so-called fusion philosophy is not genuinely comparative philosophy. Fusionists seem to want to look forward without looking back. They want to take a shortcut, to bypass, the issues that comparativists have been concerned with for decades.

Neville (*ibid.*: 20) talks about moving »beyond comparative philosophy to integrative philosophy« – the title of his article. However, the methodologically astute integrative philosophy he has in mind bears little resemblance to that of fusion philosophy. An explicit concern or even preoccupation with method does not mean that comparative philosophy does not see itself as methodologically pluralistic – not only in terms of fusion and fission, but in terms of being »crea-

tive« (Deutsch) and »integrative« (Neville). Both of these terms are used to describe what comparative philosophy – explicit in its comparative work and methods (i. e. employing »disciplined comparison«) – could be doing in drawing on whichever strands of Western philosophy (analytic or continental) and Eastern thought that might be useful in making a philosophical point. Neither term however seems to apply to fusion philosophy seen as the successor to comparative philosophy.

4 Who are the Real Fusionists?

Comparativists like Neville and Deutsch would see themselves as the real ›fusionists‹ as Siderits describes it, though they of course do not use the term. This is because as Siderits describes it, where fusion philosophy meets all comparativist objections and warnings, fusion philosophy just is comparative philosophy. Despite Siderits' claims on behalf of what he terms »fusion philosophy,« Neville's »integrative« and Deutsch's »creative« approach to comparative philosophy might both claim Siderits for their own. This would depend both on whether or not they see him as having done interpretive justice to the Buddhist formulation of personal identity and reductionism, and second on the appropriateness and adequacy of its application to Parfit.

In any case, claims concerning fusion philosophy as it relates to comparative philosophy had better be considered independently of just how successful Siderits is in providing Parfit with forceful, useful and *correct* ways of responding to his critics. Siderits (2003: xiii) argues that,

> ontological reductionism about any sort of entity is best understood as a kind of ›middle path‹ between the two extremes of non-reductionism (the view that entities of that sort are ultimately real) and eliminativism (the view that such entities are utter fabrications). Thus Reductionism, or ontological reductionism about persons, is best understood as situated between Non-Reductionism and Eliminativism. I claim that by replacing Parfit's dichotomous taxonomy (Parfit speaks only of Non-Reductionism and Reductionism) with the Buddhist trichotomy, we can become much clearer about what Reductionists are and are not committed to.

Why this strategy is not simply seen as a different way – perhaps a different useful way – of expressing the same point – a point made elsewhere, is not clear.

Does it lend clarity to reductionism or avoid a commitment to eliminativism properly and contextually understood in this specific case? It does neither. One must simply be clear on what is being eliminated. When Hume claimed that he could never discover a ›self‹ but only a series of impressions, he was making a similar point – occupying a middle way if you like, though his conclusion was still eliminativist – as long as we understand what it is that was being eliminated (i. e. an enduring underlying self that is the locus of experience through time – or something like that). And the Buddhist claim that the five *skandhas* are aggregates of mental and physical characteristics that come together to create an individual, can likewise be called eliminativist. To see it »as situated between Non-Reductionism and Eliminativism« is at least equally misleading.[17] In any case, whether Siderits' claim on this matter is illuminating is independent of both his grand claims for fusion philosophy and misconceptions about comparative philosophy. He has piggy-backed a series of views of comparative philosophy and fusion philosophy on the back of a straightforward interpretive claim about how best to understand the Buddhist account of no-self.

It may be that neither fission nor fusion sufficiently captures or adequately describes any approach to, or way of doing, comparative philosophy – let alone two general methodological approaches that are recognizable and normative. It may also be that insofar as the terms do apply to what is actually being done in comparative philosophy, they apply willy-nilly. That is, comparative philosophical studies may make use of both. Terms, concepts and arguments, may be split off from larger ones and historically, culturally and even philosophically, decontextualized if it is thought that in doing so something significant or interesting will be learned. Alternatively, and within the same study, a version of fusion may occur. Terms, concepts, arguments, ways of seeing are brought together in ways that may be illuminating for each doctrine, term, concept, dogma, point of view, etc. individually; or there may be a further point to the comparison. Something new might be postulated or learned that wouldn't be from even the most careful and astute consideration of any doctrine, term or argument in isolation.

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[17] For an account of eliminativism versus reductionism see P. Churchland, *Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind*, Cambridge MA; MIT, 1988.

One comes up against pitfalls, incongruities and dead-ends whether methodologically guided by a fusion approach (there is rather little method to such a ›see what one needs‹ approach) or by the various comparative approaches employed by comparative philosophy. Nevertheless, there is reason, based on accomplishment, to suppose that comparative philosophy's most significant and at times unexpected achievements result from the juxtapositions, dialectics, interpretations and arguments that are not ingredients in approaches dominated by fusion philosophy on its own.

For at least some fusionists (e.g. Siderits, Flanagan, Miri Albihari)[18] the fact that Buddhist philosophy may be embedded in doctrine and intertwined with religious views appears to be of little concern – at least as far as their philosophical exposition and intent are concerned. The operative fusionist principle here is that if it is philosophically useful to do so, then (for example) Buddhist philosophical arguments, terms (e.g. self) and beliefs can – without serious loss of meaning or distortion – be pried out of and disentangled from religious, cultural and historical settings. Thus, the truth about the nature of the ›self‹ or consciousness transcends any and every particular context in which it arises. Here, the religious roots of Buddhist views on these issues seem of little consequence. In another way however it is of great concern, and fusionists often seek to distance themselves from the religious as much as possible.

It is not uncommon among fusionists (e.g. Flanagan, Siderits, (?) Albihari) who draw on Buddhism (a prime example) to either deny that Buddhism is a religion at all or see it as inconsequential. They see it primarily as a philosophical tradition. Whether or not one can successfully extract a philosophical view, the doctrine of no-self (or not-self) for example, from its Buddhist religious roots may be questionable for some. It is, after all, at the core of a Buddhist world-view and ethos.[19] But the fusionists see no particular difficulty in separating

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[18] Flanagan (2011); M. Albihari, *Analytical Buddhism: The Two-tiered Illusion of Self*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

[19] C. Geertz, ›Religion as a Cultural System,‹ in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York: Basic Books, 1973, pp. 87–125. Geertz says (*ibid*.: 89),

[…] sacred symbols function to synthesize a people's ethos – the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood – and their world view – the picture they have of the way things in sheer actuality are, their most comprehensive idea of order. In religious belief and practice a group's ethos is rendered intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life ideally adapted to the

philosophical wheat from religious chaff. Comparativists may understand and appreciate the fusionist analysis of ›self‹ but are apt to situate the philosophical significance of the no-self theory in the context of a Buddhist world view. Fusionists, however, locate that significance in terms of a philosophical account of the self or identity. They see no need to embed the view in a tradition. This difference is not insignificant and helps to fill in a picture of how to distinguish comparative philosophy from fusion philosophy.

Nevertheless, hard and fast distinctions between the two are impossible to draw. Thus, at the conclusion of chapter two of *Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy,* Siderits discusses the connection that Buddhists allege exists between ›suffering‹ and the belief in a self. Is the discussion of Buddhist reductionism and ethics in chapter 5 more comparative philosophy than fusion? Or is it an exposition of Buddhist doctrine and psychology? Where does such exposition fit in? Even if these discussions are contextualized and an account of the role that it plays in his book is given, the answer may not be readily apparent. Fusion philosophy seems held in abeyance with regard to the discussions in terms of Buddhist thought in chapters 2, 5 and 9 about suffering in relation to false beliefs in a ›self‹; the implications of reductionism for concern with the welfare of others; and the ethical consequences of a Buddhist conception of ›self‹ or ›empty person.‹

Remember that Siderits characterizes fusion philosophy as concerned with »problem-solving.« Fusionists (Siderits 2003: xi) »believe that the counterpoising of distinct traditions can yield useful results in this endeavor.« Here then is a pointed question addressed to fusionists. No doubt fusing various traditions might yield useful results. But fusion philosophy appears to require no essential reference to any tradition whatsoever. It seems possible to eliminate references to distinct traditions altogether and simply assess the arguments involved. Siderits' book should be able to be rewritten in principle with no reference to Buddhism. If so, then why not proceed in this manner where the kinds of methodological and interpretive difficulties raised by comparative philosophy are of no consequence and can be simply eliminated by fiat?

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actual state of affairs the world view describes, while the world view is rendered emotionally convincing by being presented as an image of an actual state of affairs peculiarly well-arranged to accommodate such a way of life.

5 Mark Siderits on Fusion or Confluence Philosophy

Mark Siderits is the one who coined the term fusion philosophy and who has been its foremost methodological proponent. A further and closer look at his position will help clarify the issues in the fusionist/comparativist debate.

In ›Comparison or Confluence Philosophy?‹ Siderits (2015: 1) defines the

> project of fusion or confluence philosophy: [as] philosophizing that draws on resources from both Indian and Western philosophical traditions in seeking solutions to philosophical problems […] [It] proceeds from the assumption that a given Indian text or author [for example] is sufficiently well understood that we can bring it into dialogue with something from Western philosophy. In the past much of this was done under the banner of something called ›comparative philosophy.‹ And implicit in that label is the suggestion that the Asian and Western traditions have their respective places in two distinct cultures, and that comparison and contrast are consequently the best we can hope for.

I doubt that the view that »comparison and contrast are […] the best we can hope for« was ever implicit in the label »comparative philosophy« or that such a view fairly sums up what comparative philosophy was and still is about. Some of the reasons why this is not a fair assessment should become clear.

Siderits continues (*ibid.*: 2): »The idea behind the model is that just as the views of Aristotle might be relevant to defending a particular solution to the problem of incontinence, so we should see that the arguments of Kumārila may be a source of important ideas concerning the problem of how one can be conscious of their own consciousness, or that Nyāya metaphysics might contain some key suggestions about how to frame an endurantist account of persistence.« Few comparatists would deny such a claim and Siderits cites none. In attributing such a view (such a denial) to comparative philosophy Siderits further misconstrues and misrepresents comparative philosophy's methodological concerns as well as their core objections to fusion philosophy.

Siderits (*ibid.*: 1) says that there are »[v]arious challenges to the project [fusion philosophy],« and that among these are the »criticism[s] that the two traditions are incommensurable, and the charge that such a project is politically problematic.« However, while these are undoubtedly among the criticisms made of fusion philosophy,

neither of these are its principal difficulties, nor indeed the principal criticisms.

Siderits *(ibid.)* states »When we see the practice of philosophy as chiefly concerned with trying to solve unresolved philosophical problems, we can see why it might prove useful to know the genealogy of the problem and how related issues were addressed in the past.« He equates this practice of philosophy with fusion philosophy and suggests comparative philosophy raises the same issues. Comparative philosophy just is, or has come to be, fusion philosophy on his account.

Doing comparative philosophy and drawing on Indian and other non-western sources is no different for Siderits than drawing on historical Western philosophical sources to address contemporary philosophical issues. This view is also held by Graham Priest who, if I understand him, claims that there is no such thing as comparative philosophy – only philosophy.[20] However, to note – correctly – that drawing on historical Western sources may introduce many of the same problems associated with comparative philosophy, does nothing to show that the methodological concerns traditionally raised by comparatives are unwarranted. On the contrary, it assumes they are genuine. The conclusion to be drawn here is that if one is methodologically naïve in one's approach to comparative philosophy and non-western sources, then for the same and similar reasons, one may be naïve in drawing on certain western historical sources. Instead, Siderits and Priest beg the question and conclude that there is no problem (really). This is because they assume, at least here, that there are no serious difficulties in drawing on western historical sources.

In considering objections to the very possibility of fusion philosophy, Siderits (*ibid.*: 2) says:

A given philosophical argument or concept, it will be said, has its meaning only through its having a particular location in the tradition in which it arose. Where that tradition is not one's own, one can grasp its meaning only by fully entering into that tradition – by coming to think like a native of that culture.« He cites no one who holds the view and that is because it will be difficult to find anyone who does – though I am sure some do. The issue

[20] A version of this paper was presented at the 2015 conference on comparative philosophy in Melbourne, Australia. During question time Graham Priest, the conference's keynote speaker, asked me »What is Comparative Philosophy? I don't know what it is.« He drew the same parallel Siderits does between comparative philosophy and contemporary philosophy that draws on Western historical sources.

is not that »one can grasp its meaning only by fully entering into that tradition« but rather what it takes to adequately understand »a given philosophical argument or concept.

Siderits (*ibid.*: 3) writes »The objection [to fusion philosophy] was that individual elements of a philosophical tradition – specific theories, concepts, or arguments – cannot be lifted out of their cultural context. But why not?« But this is not a fair or adequate statement of the objection. The objection is that it is not easy to do so (to lift a concept etc. out of its connect) – that one must attend to certain meanings, understanding, usage and contexts in order to do so – if one is to come away with the meaning that can justifiably be ascribed to the concept. The objection, correctly understood, is defendable on various accounts of ›meaning‹ including *both* Wittgenstein's »meaning as use« and at least some essentialist (necessary and sufficient condition) accounts. It seems to be a common sense objection. Siderits *(ibid.)* says that this objection »must rather have something to do with a kind of meaning holism that would make the basic semantic unit not the word or the sentence but the totality of what is said in the culture« and that »this seems prima facie implausible.«[21] But this too is misleading since the objection rests not on »meaning holism« but on theories of meaning that are, or can be independent of meaning holism.

Siderits's strategy, and that of other fusionists, is to defend fusion philosophy by pointing out instances where comparativist's concerns to fusion philosophy are being met. But comparativists do not generally deny that their concerns may be met (and at times are met) – which is what comparative philosophy is meant to do and which is what they claim fusion philosophy often does not do. What they claim, and what Siderits, Priest, Bo Mo and others downplay or turn a blind eye to, is that sometimes those concerns are not met; that there really is misapplication and misunderstanding of terms and

[21] Siderits (*ibid.*) claims the objection relies on something like »the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis, some way of supporting the claim that certain concepts cannot be expressed or fully grasped outside the cultural context in which they are at home. And while the notion that distinct conceptual schemes might somehow be incommensurable continues to have popular appeal, there are good Davidsonian reasons to question its coherence.« This just isn't the case. The Whorf-Sapir hypothesis is not needed to support the objection properly understood and »Davidsonian reasons« are not relevant since the issue of simple interpretation and translation is no part of the objection properly understood.

concepts; a de-contextualization coupled with imaginative transformation of meaning that amounts to equivocation, misappropriation and the like. Incidentally, none of this is meant to deny that at times the work of fusionists may be insightful. After all, the work of Siderits and other sophisticated fusionists may at times adhere to methods and standards that are consistent with comparativist concerns.

Siderits (*ibid.*) writes »A very different sort of objection to the confluence project comes not from a comparativist but from the intended audience of the project, philosophers firmly rooted in their own tradition […] The objection might be put tersely as, Why bother? That is, why suppose that the effort involved in coming to understand another tradition will yield adequate payoffs in the problem-solving department?« But this too misses comparativist objections to fusion philosophy. Comparativists do not generally deny that »the effort involved in coming to understand another tradition will [*may*] yield adequate payoffs in the problem-solving department.« What does Siderits think comparativists are doing? What does he think, what do fusionists think, that comparativists think the purpose of doing comparative philosophy is? Comparative philosophy is all about gaining such insight. However, it is coupled with methodological concerns and constraints on the adequacy, justification, and rationality of some ways of going about it.

Siderits (*ibid.*: 4) writes »When one broadens one's vision to take in other traditions, what was invisible from within one's own tradition may come into view. To do philosophy in the [fusionist] confluence way is to learn to see a set of issues from two rather different perspectives. And binocular vision can add depth to what one sees. Therein lies whatever promise there may be in a fusion project.« And what comparativist would deny that this aim of fusion philosophy is at the core of comparative philosophy? What comparativists claim is that fusion philosophy often fails to broaden one's vision and fails to genuinely see »a set of issues from two rather different perspectives.« And indeed I think this is true. The fusionist approach is often procrustean.

Elsewhere, Siderits (*ibid.*: 5) does correctly identify criticisms that comparatists have made and approaches and pitfalls they have warned against. And these are, as Siderits acknowledges, applicable to at least some fusion philosophy. He says for example:

Perhaps the obstacle that is most difficult to overcome in doing fusion philosophy is the tendency to see elements from one tradition in the other when they are not there. Examples are not hard to come by. So one finds claims concerning verificationism in Nāgārjuna, transcendental arguments refuting naturalism in Madhyamaka and Mīmāṃsā, failed solutions to the problem of induction in Indian epistemology and the like. Each of these cases is, arguably, one of superimposition; superficial resemblances have led to a failure to see deeper differences and thus obscured important lessons *(ibid.)*.

Since it is always possible that the presuppositions that structure another tradition's approach are quite different, one must refrain from an overly hasty dismissal of views that may at first blush look like failed attempts from one's own tradition's past […] One must develop some degree of mastery of the techniques of the two different ways of doing philosophy before one can put tools from one tradition to new work in the other. We need to put on the 3-D glasses to gain the added depth of field that comes from doing philosophy across distinct cultures. The politics of the situation can interfere with this in several ways. Cultural chauvinism is one common route to an over-hasty dismissal. But there is also the opposite danger of an over-hasty embrace, one that fails to enter fully into the problematic of the alien tradition before attempting to appropriate some theory or argument (*ibid.*: 6).

Siderits however invariably dismisses these objections and in doing so Siderits examples are carefully chosen so as to bypass or undermine the plausibility of the comparativist's objections to fusion philosophy. He says, for example: »Viewing him [Nāgārjuna] as an anti-realist need not count as yet another case of neo-colonialists imposing a hegemonic discourse on the subaltern Other« *(ibid.)*. Fine. But why doesn't Siderits choose an example where it may be plausible to suppose that such an imposition has taken place?

The manner then in which Siderits chooses to defend fusion philosophy and dismiss comparativist concerns and objections is to admit that such objections are sometimes valid but to deny that they are intrinsic to good fusion philosophy. But comparativists generally do not hold that fusion philosophy is necessarily or inherently bound to make the mistakes and contribute to misunderstandings that they claim it often does. Their claim is that from the start such philosophy often does make just these kinds of problematic errors and assumptions, and that this is what comparativist philosophy must seek to avoid. By the time Siderits gets done defending – actually sanitizing – fusion philosophy from comparativist objections, one is left not

with fusion philosophy as Siderits would have it, but with what is – from the comparativist perspective, comparative philosophy. There is no succession from comparative philosophy to fusion philosophy and no segue from one to the other.

6 Fusion Philosophy, Religion, Truth

The difference as to where the significance of a doctrine lies for comparative philosophy versus fusion philosophy is related to another significant self-characterization of fusion philosophy. What is behind the insistence of Buddhism as a philosophy as opposed to a religion for fusionists? Let's stick with Buddhism, although Confucianism, Judaism and just about any other tradition can be substituted. The problem facing the fusionists is this. They believe in core doctrines of Buddhism, but as philosophers, as an aspect of the fusionist self-image, they believe they have to distance themselves from religion. How does one do that? They do it by denying that Buddhism is fundamentally a religion, or if that is impossible, by insisting that philosophical doctrine may be neatly and with no loss, separated from religious views. There is a third option here as well: denying that the philosophy vs. religion distinction applies to Buddhism, or Shinto, or Native American »thought.«

Philosophy of religion, as now practiced, is regarded by mainstream Western philosophy as somewhere between a poor relation on the one hand, and an irrelevant anachronism on the other. It is no wonder then that those who identify themselves as philosophers first and foremost want to distant themselves from religion. It is not so much ironic as it is odd that contemporary analytic philosophers of religion (a field dominated by conservative Christians) misperceive themselves as mainstream – as both a vital part of contemporary philosophy, and knowledgeable about ›religion‹ probably because they are religious. They are almost wholly engaged with apologetics.

It might be tempting to regard the emergence of fusion philosophy as a triumph of comparative philosophy – it's greatest to date. After all, aren't the fusionists doing just what comparativists have always regarded as a prime objective of comparative philosophy – to learn from other philosophies and cultures and to take them on board, scrutinize and respectfully critique them, synthesize them and even make them part of one's own? Probably not. Comparativists are likely

to regard fusionists of this ilk as naïve, at least on methodological grounds, and frequently on philosophical grounds as well. Philosophers in the fusionist camp (some are relative newcomers to the study of the traditions they draw from) are likely to regard comparative philosophy as largely rooted in religion (a term that is itself controversial in the cross-cultural context), and as another aspect of religious studies or a feeble attempt at interdisciplinarity. Like Siderits, they think that whatever the concerns of comparative philosophy may be, ›problem solving‹ is not principal among them. In short, they do not regard it as philosophy at all – at least not rigorous analytic philosophy.

Let's return to Neville's account of comparative philosophy to highlight some further possible distinctions between fusion and comparative philosophy. Neville (2002: 20) describes comparative philosophy as »not new.« Aristotle's typological method was a kind of comparative philosophy on Neville's account, and the »six schools of Vedic-Hindu tradition in the face of Buddhist challenges, and in explicit dialogue with Buddhisms of several sorts« *(ibid.)*, was also comparative philosophy. On his account, »comparative philosophy is always at work where dialogue takes place between philosophical positions that do not share cultural assumptions, styles of rationality, and interpretations of the meaning of philosophy.« He further characterizes comparative philosophy in the twentieth century as being generally »objectivist« or »normative« with each of these themselves made up of various different kinds of comparative philosophy. Among the objectivist approaches he cites are the typological, social science, philosophy of culture, and »historical analysis of core texts and motifs« kinds (2002: 21). He says *(ibid.)* »normative approaches to comparison are far rarer. They involve the deliberate use of disciplined comparison to make a philosophical point […]. The normative approach to comparison is in fact a kind of integrative philosophy that is explicit in its comparative work, in contrast to the integrative philosophy that simply builds an argument on the resources brought together by comparison.«

On Nevilles's account then, fusion philosophy would be a type of integrative philosophy (the latter kind of integrative philosophy he mentions) but one that simply »builds an argument on the resources brought together by comparison.« There is no explicit suggestion that this latter type of integrative philosophy is inferior to the former even though it is not »explicit in its comparative work.« Fusion phi-

losophy of this type would not be a normative approach to comparative philosophy even though it is *in a sense* explicit in its comparative work. It is explicit insofar as its comparative method is just to use available »resources« (ideas and arguments). Fusion philosophy might also fail as comparative philosophy on Neville's account because it is questionable whether a »dialogue takes place between philosophical positions,« rather than a one way importation.

Neville remarks on how normative approaches that involve »the deliberate use of disciplined comparison« run the risk of distorting the elements compared. He notes *(ibid.)* that objectivist comparison also runs the risk of distortion since they too have »normative elements […] [such as] the selection of the categories according to which ideas are compared.« Many of the same kinds of points are made in claims that history (the discipline) is irreducibly subjective. Distortion as well as bias are always a danger. But what of the »integrative philosophy [Fusion Philosophy] that simply builds an argument on the resources brought together by comparison?« The possibility of misrepresentation and distortion seems to be even greater here. While the first kind of methodologically deliberative integrative philosophy might distort the philosophies being compared »because of the normative case being made« *(ibid.)*, the categories and terms chosen etc., isn't the second kind of integrative philosophy, the kind »that simply builds an argument on the resources brought together by comparison,« bound to distort both traditions or philosophies in question?[22] Hasn't this been a core methodological concern of comparative theorists from the start?

Fusionists are likely to dispute this and claim that far from distorting the views in question they may (do) have a better understanding of the particular philosophical points being made in whatever tradition they are drawing from. Thus, it is Owen Flanagan who can teach the Buddhists about a Buddhist theory of consciousness philosophically speaking and Siderits who can teach them about a Buddhist conception of identity, anti-realism and so forth. If there are good reasons for supposing they are not right about this, wouldn't they

[22] Neville's example of a normative approach using »disciplined comparison« is R. Ames' and D. Hall's *Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucius, and the Hope for Democracy in China*, LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1999. They ask (Neville 2002: 21) »what kind of Western philosophy would be helpful for China today in light of its Confucian heritage, and answer […] *pragmatism*.«

have to be cast in terms of the kinds of methodological and theoretical concerns that have always occupied comparative philosophers?

Fusionists, some at any rate, are far less concerned with the accuracy of various accounts of Buddhist views on mind, identity or annihilation, than they are with whether the view in question (accurate or not) can provide support for a particular line of argument or advance some research question or program. This seems integral to fusion philosophy. Given their own account of what fusion philosophy is trying to achieve, the question for fusionists is, or should be, not particularly whether some view is correctly attributable to say the Buddha. Instead the question is whether such a view, correctly attributable or not, might be right or help lend insight and support to some contemporary philosophical view. This approach and perspective is more or less foreign to comparative philosophy as traditionally conceived – where what the Buddha really said rather than what he should have said, or Confucius meant rather than what he should have meant is paramount. Why should either of these matter to fusion philosophy, unless of course one assumes their actual views and arguments are more likely to be linked to truth and knowledge?

There might be a presumption that served a methodological purpose in supposing that the actual views, for example of the Buddha, were those most likely to be true rather than other views merely attributed to the Buddha. But for the fusionist this could be nothing more than a useful initial supposition if that. It might well be that one of the incorrect interpretations of what the Buddha said, or a view incorrectly attributed to the Buddha, was more philosophically plausible or useful from a fusionist perspective. From the comparativist's perspective the issue is treated differently. Their focus on correct and accurate translation, duly contextualized and historicized, is partly an end in itself. They too may presuppose that the actual views of the Buddha (etc) are most likely to be if not true or quite true, then at least the most useful. But their reasons for doing so are different.

There is frequently an underlying supposition that fusionists may not share which is that aspects of the actual theories or views are either true or contain insight. Fusionists, even when they believe, for example, in the Buddha's account of personal identity or what they take it to be, are not tied to Buddhism in the same way. For the fusionist such views are generally not constitutive of what Geertz called a world view and ethos. There are, however, exceptions like those fusionists who believe in many of the basic tenets of Buddhism

(e. g. no-self; past lives – including his claim that these can be empirically verified) but deny that Buddhism is a religion rather than a philosophy.

7 Advantages of Fusion Philosophy

From what has been said thus far one might get the impression that I see no value in fusion philosophy and nothing but value in comparative philosophy. But of course, some fusion philosophy is insightful and may even advance or ›solve‹ problems it sets its sights on. Comparative philosophy on the other hand does sometimes seem to draw vapid conclusions and pointless comparisons.

One advantage of fusion philosophy is that it is more inclusive. There are fewer, if any, gatekeepers. For example, there is no insistence on language capability for primary source material. The simple recognition is that those engaged in fusion philosophy will never develop language skills that would enable them to comprehend source material with greater understanding or nuance than reading such material, including relevant substantive disputes about translation, as translated by ›experts.‹ The comparativists who have insisted on language capability have often done so on questionable grounds. If no one can do ›serious‹ comparative work unless one has the language ability, then it is at times implicitly supposed that those who do have the requisite language skills also have the requisite philosophical and methodological skills to do comparative philosophy.

I remember (well) a well-known academic/Confucianist arguing that since there is no word for ›ethics‹ or ›morality‹ in Chinese, those who spoke about Confucian, Daoist or Chinese ethics were generally misguided and somehow fundamentally confused. Why one cannot profitably speak of such ethics even given the absence of such a word in Chinese was not addressed, nor was the fact that one hardly has to be able to read Chinese in order to ›know‹ that there is no word for ethics in Chinese – or to claim that this presented no serious obstacle to analyzing what we may call Chinese ›ethics.‹ Similarly, it has been argued by biblical scholars that given the absence of any specific word for ›miracle‹ in the Bible (putative ›miracles‹ being called ›wondrous‹ events instead), the entire debate about the plausibility of such events, their relation to laws of nature, or the possibility of justified belief in such events was somehow seriously off track. With argu-

ments as transparent as these, it is no wonder that fusionists deny the necessity, albeit perhaps not the desirability, of primary source language ability for comparative philosophy.

Fusionists have turned these sorts of arguments by comparativists on their head. Complementary to this fusionist dismissal of some long standing ground rules of comparative philosophy's territorialism, fusionists may hold the view (many do) that those with comparativist skills (e. g. language skills) often lack the (analytic) philosophical expertise required to do what comparative philosophy is really meant to do: advance genuine philosophical insight and argument into matters like the nature of mind, consciousness and identity. While comparative philosophers of the more classical sort may be capable of expositing the views in primary source material, they may lack the philosophical expertise necessary critically to examine such ideas in ways that could integrate such views into mainstream analytic philosophy. There is after all, just so much one can study in depth. If one devotes oneself to primary source material it may come at the expense of in-depth philosophical training – and vice versa.

8 Conclusion: Fusion's Future

What is the future of comparative philosophy/religion versus that of fusion philosophy? Fusion philosophy's view is that it has superseded comparative philosophy, though just what is meant by the claim of succession is never made clear. The new journal *Comparative Philosophy* emphasizes »the constructive engagement of distinct approaches to philosophical issues, problems, themes from various philosophical traditions/styles/orientations of doing philosophy for the sake of their joint contribution to the common philosophical enterprise.« This statement basically defines fusion philosophy. The view of comparative philosophy on the other hand, on some accounts, is that it already contains fusion philosophy and in nascent form always has to a degree; but that in any case it alone has the resources that fusionists must continue to draw on.

Discipline groupings and divisions are driven by so many factors, largely factors outside of academic considerations that it is difficult to tell what will happen. I am inclined to think however that fusion philosophy does not have as bright a future as the more traditional comparative philosophy – though the latter is likely to embrace more

fusion philosophy than before. Fusion philosophy talks about »constructive engagement of distinct approaches« and »themes from various traditions,« but measured against what fusionists have done, this is largely rhetoric. The themes that they have mined other traditions for are largely the ones that fit their own agendas and method of doing philosophy and they are relatively few.

Thus, we have seen fusionists focus on Buddhist conceptions of no-self and the nature of mind, personal identity and the like – views they regard as consonant in important respects, or that tend to support, their own contemporary views. Confucianists stress the social dimension of identity and ethics. The use that contemporary analytic philosophers make of the views they take up is largely illustrative and supportive – though they are apt to claim that the views are mutually supportive. In so doing they make no apologies for decontextualizing those views. Other traditions are also drawn upon, but the bulk of Buddhist, Vedānta, Daoist, Confucianist etc. metaphysics, ethics, philosophical psychology, aesthetics, let alone mythology, demonology etc. holds little interest for the fusionists since they are not seen as adding to the »joint contribution to the common philosophical enterprise.« Fusionists might claim that a consideration of Buddhist ethics and metaphysics can be part of a »constructive engagement of distinct approaches« when considering, for example, a ›pro-choice‹ position on abortion. But unless one held the relevant Buddhist positions it is difficult see how such positions could support or undermine the ethical justification for pro-choice. Buddhism does little to advance the abortion debate – unless of course one happens to be a Buddhist.

In considering the future of fusion philosophy, one question is whether there is enough in the distinct approaches and content of other traditions to sustain the fusionist's (i. e. western analytic philosophy's), as opposed to comparative philosophy's, interest. This is doubtful. Furthermore, if comparativists have been right from the start about the importance of context, the difficulties and rewards, confronting cross-cultural philosophical study and the like, then in looking only for that which in the fusionist view will enhance »their joint contribution to the common philosophical enterprise,« fusionists are likely to be methodologically, theoretically and substantively procrustean. They are likely to exclude much that is philosophically interesting – the most philosophically interesting on the comparativist's account – though little of philosophical value on the fusionist's narrow conception. By »the common philosophical enterprise« they

mean that enterprise as they conceive of it – not as it was conceived by those who they wish to enlist in their allegedly »joint contribution.« Fusionists conceive of themselves as they would like to be conceived – as doing philosophy *simpliciter* – timelessly and without location.

Returning to the original metaphor: fusionists are really ›fission- ists.‹ Fission involves a breaking down of the larger into the smaller to give off energy (or in this case philosophical insight), while fusion involves bonding the smaller into something larger for the same end. Fusionists are not bonding various views and positions together, but are instead mining those traditions on behalf of positions they already hold or are developing. We began by noting that fusion philosophy sees itself as the sequel to or successor of comparative philosophy. But if comparative philosophy's concerns with method and context have been right all along, then not only is this self-image mistaken, but to think that a more sophisticated comparative philosophy might result from fusion philosophy superseding comparative philosophy is also confusion.[23]

–Michael Levine, The University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia

[23] My thanks to anonymous referees and to the editors for their comments.

Intellectual Journeys

On the Way to Intercultural Philosophy

Abstract
In this autobiographical essay, I will sketch some events which have played a significant role in my intellectual biography. I began my career with a study of Islamic thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries before turning towards a study of Sufism. The exchanges, which took place with colleagues during conferences conducted by the East-West Philosophers' Conferences, proved to be crucial for my further philosophical development. My current philosophizing is marked by a turn towards intercultural philosophy.
In many ways, my own intellectual biography parallels socio-political developments. What began as an intellectual exchange with Soviet fellow philosophers during the heydays of the USSR has matured towards a quest for an intercultural philosophical standpoint.

Keywords
comparative philosophy studies in Russia, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Marxist-Leninist ideology, Muslim philosophy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Sufism, East-West Philosophers' Conferences, Eliot Deutsch, Roger Ames, intercultural philosophy.

My life as the life of everybody else has been full of randomness and patterns. Let me share with you just a few events which have played a significant role in my intellectual biography.

I was born in Moscow in an Armenian family. My parents were from Akhaltsikhe, a town located on the border with Turkey. Both graduated from gymnasiums in the Georgian capital. My father moved to Moscow in 1927 and my mother joined him after marriage in 1934. Both of them stayed here till their death. My parents spoke mostly Russian at home (my father could not even read or write in

Armenian). Thus my younger sister and I spoke only Russian, though I could understand very simple Armenian.

After school graduation in Moscow (in 1953, two months after the death of Stalin) I was to make a decision about my future profession. I planned to study humanities, either history of art or Oriental studies. My parents wished that I study in the Moscow Institute (University) of Oriental Languages. I became a student of the Indian department with special training in Urdu.

In the first year, I was happy with the professors and the whole atmosphere at the University. However, on my return to university at the start of the second year I found out that the Institute of Oriental Studies had been liquidated by the decision of the USSR Government. The official authorities had come to the conclusion that the country did not need so many specialists in Orientology. Only one-third of the students were allowed to continue their former orientation in education at the newly established faculty of Oriental Studies of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations which existed under the patronage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I was among those lucky ones. It seemed quite strange to be the only girl in a class with fourteen boys. It meant that for the other girls gender had played its role in their decision.

I graduated from University with honors in 1959. Three chairholders (Indian literature, history, and economics) proposed that I should continue my studies in graduate school. However, at that time I did not wish to do a PhD. I wanted to get a job which would allow me to visit and work in India, the land of my dreams. I was simply being realistic: being a girl I had no chances at getting a job at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Foreign Trade. There was no other option than to consider the vacancies suggested by the State Commission. According to the rules of the Soviet Union, the state was to give a job to every university graduate. I was given three alternatives: to continue education in a post-graduate school; to work at Moscow Radio, division of the programs in Urdu; to become a fellow of the Institute of philosophy, USSR Academy of Sciences.

The Rector of the University, Fedor Rizhenko, was a professor of philosophy. I decided to ask for his advice. He strongly recommended joining the Institute of Philosophy. I had many doubts about that. He assured me that if I did not like the job I was welcome to return to the *Alma Mater* for post-graduate studies and teaching. The Rector gave

me a good advice. I started to work at the Institute of Philosophy in September 1959 and continue to work there till now.

How could a graduate in Oriental studies get a vacancy at the Academic Institute where any graduate in philosophy dreamt to work? The regime planned to introduce changes in the interpretation of the history of philosophy by turning away from a Eurocentric attitude, which Russia had inherited primarily from Germany. While teaching of philosophy in Europe started in the twelfth century, in Russia philosophy was taught only after Peter the Great, following Leibniz's advice given to him in 1724, issued a decree to start teaching philosophy at the Academic University of Petersburg Academy of sciences. By establishing Moscow University in 1755 the teaching of philosophy firmly got the status of a secular discipline. The Russian-German academic relations of that time played the main role in raising the rank of philosophy in its opposition to the widely spread conservative public opinion, in particular, of the clerical milieu.

The general trend in the history of teaching philosophy in the Russian Empire prior the October Revolution of 1917 was characterized by the constant struggle between two opposite trends: one that was oriented towards the promotion of freedom and plurality of views, philosophical in particular, and the other trend (mostly preferred by the authorities) was aimed to maintain and to strengthen the three ›pillars‹ of the ideology – Orthodoxy, the czarist autocracy, and nationalism.

Paradoxically, the October Revolution, in spite of all radical changes it claimed, and in fact brought, smashed the above mentioned pillars but did not uproot them. As a result, these old pillars were replaced by new ones which appeared to be different but, verily, were cultivated from the former roots. Thus, Christian Orthodoxy was substituted by the orthodoxy of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the autocracy of the czars by the dictatorship of the Communist party, and nationalism by Soviet patriotism. In the long run, the results were similar: freedom and plurality of views were limited, intellectual life in the Soviet Union remained very much separated from the outside world.

I would not like to exaggerate and simplify the matter. The above said intellectual ›separation‹ did not mean that foreign writers or philosophers were not translated, published, and studied. On the contrary, the Soviet Union boasted of a very high rate of circulation of books translated from many languages of the world. Yet, it did not mean a genuine openness. There was a strict selection aimed to support the

monopoly of the single ideology – Marxism-Leninism. The philosophical system, which was presented as the most perfect, rested on a number of dogmas: materialism as opposed to idealism, dialectics as opposed to metaphysics, rationality as opposed to irrationality, atheism as opposed to religion, and so on. The contrast between each of these dualisms terribly impoverished the philosophical heritage and led to a distorted presentation of the history of philosophy as such.

Soon after Stalin's death in 1953 things changed, which had their impact on philosophy as well. Thus plans emerged to rethink the history of philosophy. The decision was taken to prepare a new edition of *History of Philosophy*.[1] One of its novelties was »to restore the historical truth, showing the fruitful progressive development of philosophical thought […] in China, India, in the Arab and other countries of the East« (Vol. 1 1957: 18).[2]

For realization of the project a special department (in Russian – »sector«) of Eastern philosophies was established. Philosophy graduates had not studied Oriental languages or religious and philosophy traditions of the East. Due to that very reason graduates of Oriental studies, like me, were invited to work at the Institute of Philosophy, the USSR Academy of Sciences. By 1960, when the department was finally established, there was a group of young people working in it. All of them knew the relevant languages, possessed a wide knowledge of history, economics, etc. of China, India, Arab countries, Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, Korea, and Japan. They became a team for writing a chapter for a new edition of *History of Philosophy*. With my knowledge of Urdu, I was requested to write about Islamic philosophy of Indo-Pakistan.

In order to be able to fulfill my duties I desperately needed at least two things. First, be much better equipped with knowledge of philosophy, at least by reaching graduate level. Second, have access to primary sources and literature in the field in which I had to work and write.

The first problem was solved by joining post-graduate courses, which gave me the opportunity to attend the lectures presented by the best professors at that time. It was expected that I study and work at the Institute. After passing exams I should present the PhD thesis

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[1] See: *История философии, В 6 томах,* Москва: »Издательство Академии наук СССР,« 1957–1965 (English: *History of Philosophy*, Vol. 1–6, Moscow: »Nauka,« 1957–1965).

[2] Unless otherwise specified, all translations are mine.

in four years. The tutor was appointed. But frankly speaking, I could not expect any help from him. He lacked any knowledge in Orientology, and besides belonged to the generation of very dogmatic Marxist-Leninist philosophers. The young scholars (just few years senior to me) became my real tutors. All of them were graduates from the best philosophy faculty in the USSR: Lomonosov University. They were young and bright, open to ›winds‹ from outside and free thinking. That was the generation of the sixties. In fact, later on they have become the most respected Russian philosophers. I would like to mention just a few names: Vadim Sadovsky (logic), Oleg Drobnitskiy (ethics), Erich Solovyev (history of philosophy), Nina Yulina (analytic philosophy), Vladislav Lektorsky (epistemology).

The second problem I faced was solved unexpectedly. The Institute got the invitation to send its delegation for participation in the work of the Eighth Session of the Pakistani Philosophical Congress. Thus in the spring of 1961 I flew to Pakistan with two senior scholars: a deputy Director of the Institute E. Shorokhova and Editor-in-chief of *Voprosi filosofii*, the main philosophy journal in Russia, V. Semenov. My role was very modest. I was to be an interpreter to the real delegates. I dared to present a paper – »Study of Oriental Philosophy in the USSR«. Unpredictably the presentation was successful, though the paper was quite primitive. Since I could not to speak English fluently then, I preferred to present the paper in Urdu. My knowledge of that language was good enough so that the diploma work was written on Saadat Hasan Manto (1912–1955), a short story writer who was considered to be like Chekhov or Maupassant in Urdu literature. It was published along with the translation of his stories in Russian. The very fact of my speaking in Urdu brought me extremely warm and friendly reaction of the audience. I was presented with two huge boxes of books and journals, like *Pakistan Philosophy Journal, Iqbal Quartely,* etc. Besides all that I was exceptionally kindly treated by the President of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress Prof. Muhammad M. Sharif as well by Prof. M. Hamiduddin who replaced him later on.

In 1963 I submitted the thesis and got my PhD (In Russia it is called ›Candidate of Sciences‹ degree). On its basis in 1967, my book *Pakistan: Philosophy and Sociology* (in Russian) was published. There was nothing great in that first publication. It carried the burden of dominant ideology at that time in the Soviet Union. Yet, there was something new in it which attracted the attention of the readers both at home and outside.

In 1969 Hans Braker published his *Kommunismus und Islam. Religionsdiskussion und Islam in der Sowjetunion* in Tubingen. To my great surprise he dealt with my modest writings, especially those dedicated to Islamic ethics. Braker compared my approach with the one which was dominant in the USSR, especially with the works of the leading Soviet expert on Islam – Prof. Lutsian Klimovich. This comparison had been undertaken to point out that the new generation of the Soviet scholars was turning away from the aggressive atheistic approach and criticism of Islam.[3]

The Editor of the *Vostochnaya literatura* publishing house proposed to publish the translation of the book in English. To my chagrin, the Head of the Department on Pakistan Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies (another Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences) Prof. Y. Gankovsky, as soon as he learned about the plans to publish my book in English, wrote a letter of protest to the editor. The letter stated that the publication of my book would damage Russian-Pakistani relations; it would provoke anti-Soviet demonstrations in Pakistan. The editor, Oleg Dreyer, a great publisher with liberal views, informed me about the letter. I requested him to arrange a meeting with Gankovsky so that I could directly respond to him. It was done. I asked him not to worry about the political consequences of the publication and assured him that I would take full responsibility for that. The English translation was published in 1972[4]. The reaction in Pakistan was immediate. *The Pakistan Times* published a very favorable and even flattering review, in which it was said that the book was the first case in which the author follows Marxism and at the same time is able to be »refreshingly sympathetic to the major intellectual trends« in Pakistan society[5]. This review was followed by two other positive ones.[6]

All the above said encouraged me to continue my research in this field and to extend it. In 1966–1969 my husband was appointed to the

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[3] H. Braker, *Kommunismus und Islam. Religionsdiskussion und Islam in der Sowjetunion, Kommunismus und Wetreligionen Asiens. Zur Religions – und Asienpolitik der Sowjetunion*, Bd. 1, 1, Tubingen: Mohr, 1969.

[4] M. T. Stepanyants, *Pakistan: Philosophy and Sociology*, Lahore: Peoples' Publishing House, 1972.

[5] Zeno, ›As Others See Us,‹ *The Pakistan Times*, 13.10.1972.

[6] A staff reporter, ›Soviet Academician on Iqbal's Philosophy,‹ *The Pakistan Times*, 21.12.1972; C. F. Qadir, ›Contemporary Pakistan Philosophy,‹ *The Pakistan Times*, 24.12.1972.

Soviet Embassy in New Delhi for the second time. That stay did not interrupt my academic carrier. On the contrary, it helped me to access the primary sources and literature which I needed desperately. I became a regular reader at Sapru House and Abul Kalam Azad libraries. The stay in India was of crucial importance since I could be in contact with Indian philosophers. It enabled me to participate in the annual Indian Philosophical Congress Session and in many seminars, roundtables, and regularly publish my writings in Indian journals. In a few years after returning to Moscow, I finished the second dissertation and submitted it for evaluation.

The dissertation was to pass through a series of critical discussions at different academic levels. The first discussion in the department where I worked proved to be problematic. The record of that first discussion I keep as a memory about the Soviet times. There were two main points of criticism. First: the theme chosen for the dissertation had no politico-ideological actuality since »Islam is dead and does not play any significant role in contemporary life.«

The second point of criticism: nowhere in the dissertation is it said that »religion is the opium of the masses.« It means that the author ignores the most fundamental evaluation given to religion by Marx-Engels. The senior, more conservative, fellows voted for disapproval of the dissertation. Fortunately, the junior colleagues strongly defended me and voted for the approval. Hence, the dissertation passed the first stage. In the long run it received the approval at all the levels, and in 1974 I obtained the second degree.

On the basis of the dissertation the book *Islamic Philosophy and Social Thought (XIX-XX Centuries)*[7], was published in 1982 (in Russian) and then in 1989 in Pakistan (in English). The book proceeds from the basic notion that Islam is not a dogma, one for all times, but rather a religious teaching influenced by political, economic, and social changes. Orthodoxy, modernism, reformation and revivalism are suggested as four main trends in modern Muslim thought.

The term reformation is used in the broad sense of the word, meaning the processes which took place in the Islamic community in the nineteenth and twenties centuries and which were aimed at ad-

[7] М. Т. Степанянц, *Мусульманские концепции в философии и политике XIX-XX вв,* Москва: »Наука,« Главная редакция восточной литературы, 1982; M. T. Stepanyants, *Islamic Philosophy and Social Thought (XIX-XX Centuries),* Lahore: Peoples' Publishing House, 1989.

justing to the challenges of the time. The social and epistemic roots of the reformative way of thinking in Islam are compared to the Reformation in Christianity. An attempt is made to find out the similarities and differences between the two kinds of reformation.

The reformed attitude to the relations between God and human being is illustrated by ›spiritual pluralism‹ of Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), by ›dialectical monadology‹ of Muhammad Sharif (d. 1965), the conception of God by Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) and Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958), and others. Untraditional ideas on a correlation between reason and belief, science and religion are demonstrated by the examples of the views shared by Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838/1839–1897), Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905), Syed Husein Alatas (1928–2007). The differences from traditional views are clearly obvious in the interpretation given to such values as freedom, equality, fraternity, and justice.

Changes in political views are demonstrated by describing the evolution of the concept of nation: Panislamism of Afghani and 'Abduh, the Muslim nationalism of those who supported the theory of »two nations« on the Indian subcontinent, the secular nationalism of Al-Kawakibi (1855–1902), Amin Rihani (1876–1940), and others. Different conceptions of ›Islamic democracy‹ are considered in detail. Socio-economic conceptions are analyzed. Today I am led to think that I overrated the prospective for the reformation in Islam by underestimating the difficulties which stood on its way.

The publication of the above mentioned book in some way marked the end of the first period in my intellectual biography which was mainly dedicated to the study of Islamic thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I sensed a need to bring changes in my studies even early, when I finished the second dissertation. I felt ›fed up‹ with the field of research which was too closely connected with politics and ideology. I wished to turn to the sphere where I could feel freer and which would enrich my knowledge of the Islamic thought. I decided go into studies of Sufism.

How did Sufism attract my attention? In almost twenty years of research on the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Muslim philosophy and sociopolitical thought, I often wondered how to explain the fact that leading reformers such as Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh, Muhammad Iqbal and Abul Kalam Azad were, at the early stages of their careers, attracted by *tasawwuf*.

And an even more profound motivation to study Sufism was the

desire to deviate from ideological imposed subjects to one that could provide insight into the inner meanings of the Muslim culture hidden behind the coded symbols, metaphors, and allegories.

From 1917, Sufism was practically a taboo subject for research in the USSR. The books and articles written in those years can hardly be regarded as academic. They met, either willingly or unwillingly, the ideological aims of antireligious state policy.

Once again a happy chance helped me. My husband got a new appointment – this time, to the USSR Consulate in Montreal, Canada. I joined him as soon as I obtained my second degree in spring 1974. Six years stay in Canada gave me an occasion to be free in choosing the subject of research and what is more important – to have access to the books in the library of the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University. I used the propitious time for self-education and research.

The *Perestroika* (1986–1991) brought changes in many spheres of life. I could now express ideas on mysticism publicly. Hence I published *Philosophical Aspects of Sufism* (in Russian) in 1987[8]. The readers welcomed its publication by making the small book one of the bestsellers of that time. It was, in fact, the signal for running the blockade around the Sufi theme, though my work was not free from some ideological clichés of bygone times, retained partly for censorship considerations.

The book had two English editions: in India (1989) and in USA (1994)[9]. The American edition had become possible due to the support I got from Prof. William C. Chittick, who is best known for his groundbreaking work on Rumi and Ibn ʼArabi, and has written extensively on the school of Ibn ʼArabi, Islamic philosophy, and Islamic cosmology.

Though I have never stopped writing about Muslim thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and about Sufism, yet the third period in my intellectual biography started by the end of 1980s. For the first time one scholar from the USSR was invited to participate in the Sixth East-West Philosophers' Conference (1989) directed by Prof. Eliot Deutsch. The Institute of Philosophy decided

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[8] М.Т. Степанянц, *Философские аспекты суфизма,* Москва: »Наука,« Главная редакция восточной литературы, 1987.

[9] M. T. Stepanyants, *Philosophical Aspects of Sufism,* New Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1989; Sufi Wisdom. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.

to send me because since 1980 I was Head of Department on Oriental Philosophies' Studies at the Institute. The Conference made a great impact on me by its high standard of scholarship and the atmosphere of freedom and creativity in expressing and discussing the plurality of attitudes to the main theme of the Conference »Culture and Modernity: The Authority of the Past.« About a hundred and fifty scholars from more than thirty countries participated in the great forum which lasted for two weeks. Among the participants there were world known philosophers: A. A. MacIntyre, H. Putnam, A. Dante, R. Bernstein, R. Rorty, D. P. Chattopadhyaya, R. Gandhi, O. Oruka, K. O. Apel, S. Stoyanovich, A. Heller, B. Matilal and many others. It was truly a ›star constellation‹! With some of them I stayed in contact and cooperation for years ahead, in particularly with Eliot Deutsch and his ›right hand‹ at that moment Roger Ames. I never expected to be back to these conferences in the future. Fortunately, I was wrong.

Soon afterward the Conference I got a proposal from Professor E. Deutsch to organise a regional conference of EWPC in Moscow. Though the beginning of 1990s was a very hard time for us, yet my colleagues welcomed the proposal enthusiastically. Thus, the first regional comparative philosophy conference hold place in Moscow in July 1990. Eliot Deutsch and Roger Ames brought to Moscow seven scholars including, besides the Americans, those from India, Mexico, and the Great Britain. The theme was »Culture and Modernity: Feminist Issues.«

The first experience was quite successful: all the papers were published in Russian under the title *Feminism: East-West-Russia*[10], while the selected papers were included in the issue of *East and West Philosophy Journal*[11]. This conference was not only the first Russian conference on comparative philosophy but also the first one on feminism which was in fact almost an ›illegal‹ topic for academic discussions in the USSR.

In November 1990, another international conference was held at the Institute of Philosophy in Moscow. The topic was »Concept of Man in the Traditional Cultures of the Orient.« Its foreign partici-

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[10] M. T. Степанянц (ed.), *Феминизм: Восток-Запад-Россия,* Москва: »Восточная литература,« 1993 (English: *Feminism: East-West-Russia,* Moscow: »Vostochnaya literature,« 1993).

[11] *Philosophy East & West,* Vol. 42, No. 2, 1992.

pants were five French scholars and Eliot Deutsch as well as Roger Ames.

Incredible events in my life continued to happen. I was honored to become the Director of the Seventh EWPC on »Justice and Democracy: A Philosophical Exploration« and then co-directed with Roger Ames the Eighth Conference convened in 2000 under the theme »The Technology and Human Values on the Edge of the Third Millennium.« My role in the next two conferences was to be the Chair, International Advisory Committee and a plenary speaker at the Ninth East-West Philosophers' Conference in 2005 on »Educations and Their Purposes: A Philosophical Dialogue among Cultures,« and, besides chairing the International Advisory Committee, to present the key-note address at the Tenth EWPC in 2011 on »Value and Values: Economics and Justice in an Age of Global Interdependence.«

The impact of the EWPC and of personal links with their leaders (especially, with Eliot Deutsch and Roger Ames) was so inspiring that I suggested establishing an academic series on comparative philosophy in Russia in order to promote the studies in this field. This proposal was supported by the Academic Council. The design of the cover for the volumes in the series incorporated the logo of the *Philosophy East and West Journal* paying in this way tribute to the role played by EWPC and the journal in promoting the comparative philosophy studies in Russia.

Later on, I initiated a kind of European branch of EWPC by launching Moscow International Conferences on Comparative Philosophy. The first conference on »Comparative Ethics in a Global Age« took place in 2002; the second on »Knowledge and Belief in the Dialogue of Cultures« in 2006; the third on »Philosophy and Science in the Cultures of East and West« in 2012. The papers of the conferences were published in Russia and then in USA by the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.[12]

The great role in the success of comparative philosophy conferences in Moscow has been played by the contribution of foreign scholars. Some like Richard Rorty and Daya Krishna have passed away.

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[12] M. Stepanyants (ed.), *Comparative Ethics in a Global Age*, Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2007; *Knowledge and Belief in the Dialogue of Cultures*, Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2011; *Philosophy and Science in Cultures of East and West*, Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2014.

Others, happily, are alive: Henry Rosemont Jr., H.-G. Moeller, Peimin Ni, Arindam Chakrabarti, Gholam-Reza A'avani, Michel Hulin, Gianni Vattimo. Special gratitude should be expressed to Fred R. Dallmayr, whom I first met in Hawai'i, who participated actively in Moscow conferences and who continues to be my dear colleague and friend up till today.

The tradition of comparative studies is dynamic, sensitive to the changes and demands of the time. A comparative approach is sharply needed to be introduced in teaching philosophy. There is no doubt that cultural diversity as a property of social reality is not too much younger than humanity. However, it is only in our time that it has become one of the main features of the epoch. The transformation of cultural multiplicity from the reality of a social being into a *problem* not only at the level of a particular state, but at the planetary level, is explained by the radical changes which humanity experiences in these days. The »beginning of global history« is fraught with a threat of an enforced unification, of leveling the cultural plurality. That is why there is a vital need to resist tendencies which lead to the elimination of cultural originality, peculiarities in the ways of life, variety in mentality of peoples; in other words, tendencies which aim to subordinate everybody to a single model of civilization.

Consequently, there is a widespread rise of national self-consciousness, a boost of the efforts to find out personal and collective identities. »The era of identity is full of sound and fury. The search for identity divides and separates« (Bauman 2001).[13] The ›anger‹ easily can be transformed in violence. Education has a great responsibility for any negative consequences of the events.

I mentioned above that some efforts to rethink history of philosophy were undertaken in the USSR in the 1960s, soon after the death of Stalin. However, the publication of the new edition of *History of Philosophy* which was expected to become a kind of a manual for philosophy students had not been very helpful. In spite of claiming that it would restore ›justice‹ by showing ›the fruitful development of philosophical thought in China, India, in the Arab and other countries of the East‹ that had not been done. In their desire to discover at all costs the »line of Democritus and Plato« in ancient India, for example, the authors often identified any anti-Brahmanic trends

[13] Z. Bauman, *The Individualized Society*, Cambridge: Polity, 2001.

of thought with materialism for example, with rejection of *moksa* or with critical attitude to asceticism, etc. Yet, it is well known, that the opposition to *Brahmanism* was not yet a proof of materialist views. Suffice it to recall that the strongest anti-Brahmanic trends were the teachings of the Buddhists and of the Jains.

A real status of and correlation between materialist and idealistic views in India were arbitrarily distorted. The role of *Lokayata-Charvakas* was exaggerated and pushed into the foreground. While, say, four pages were dedicated to the Lokayata, the *Vedanta darsana*, the most influential of the classical Brahmanic schools in India, was mentioned only once and covered one page. Other darsanas (the *Nyaya*, the *Vaisesika*, the *Yoga*, the *Samkhya*, and the *Mimansa*) were considered with the single purpose of finding elements of materialism in them. Since no such elements could be discovered, say, in the Yoga, it was negatively and unequivocally defined as an extreme form of »idealism of the mystical variety.«

Things were about as bad in the case of philosophy of Buddhism, which was presented in a simplistic and schematic fashion. The name of the founder of *Madhyamika* School Nagarjuna was merely mentioned and presented in a negative light. He was said to have resorted to »logical trickery« and »speculation« in asserting the relativity of human knowledge.

As a result, the role of idealism in the Oriental philosophical heritage was underestimated, as was its objective significance for the development of human knowledge. In the conclusion to the chapter on »The Birth and Development of Philosophical Thought in Slave-Owning Societies of the Ancient East« we read: »Under the dominance of slave-owning aristocracy and religious ideology, the best and most fruitful doctrines of the Ancient East were either materialist in their nature or contained materialistic elements« (Vol. I 1957: 71).

The chapters of *The History of Philosophy* dedicated to the East, as well as the majority of the writings of the Soviet philosophers were written with the aim to eradicate a Eurocentric approach to Eastern philosophies. However, while criticizing »bourgeois« Eurocentrism, they proved to be Eurocentric in their own way. The Eastern philosophical systems were considered and evaluated solely in the frames of a vulgar, primitively understood Marxism.

Teaching philosophy in Russia continued to ignore the contribution of non-western peoples in philosophical heritage. A textbook on

non-western philosophies did not exist. I took the liberty to write the first one basing on many years of personal teaching experience.[14]

Soon after graduation from University I started to teach Urdu, then for two years I was visiting professor in Russian language at Delhi University, in 1966–1969. With Leonid Vasilyev, a leading scholar in Sinology, I presented an innovative lecture course to the students of my Alta Mater. The course was on the main Eastern religions: Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. It might sound unbelievable but the students of Oriental studies had never before been lectured on religious teachings. That was caused by a strong atheistic stand on education. Our lectures were so unusual that they were attended both by the students and by the other professors. There is no wonder that later on (after the return from Canada) I was invited by the Rector of the Diplomatic Academy Professor (academician) Sergey L. Tikhvinsky, an outstanding Russian scholar in Chinese history, to teach at the Academy. There I got my professorship (1983) and lectured for 15 years (1980–1995) combining with the main work at the Institute of Philosophy. I stopped teaching diplomats when the University of Humanities was established on the basis of the academic institutes, including the Institute of Philosophy. I was requested to be the professor and Head of the chair on philosophy and political thought in the countries of the East. Later on, the UNESCO Chair on »Philosophy in the Dialogue of Cultures« was founded of which I am Head and professor from the very beginning (1996) till now.

My first textbook was published in 1997 (see above). It contained the introductory course and a selection of texts (the Russian translations of the sources from Chinese, Sanskrit, Pali, Arabic, and Farsi). The title of the book was »Vostochnaya filosofiya« which means »Eastern Philosophy.« I explained to the editor that to use the singular noun ›philosophy‹ is wrong, there are a number of philosophies in the East. Yet the editor was of the opinion that the Russian readers were so used to the singular noun that the plural form would have been considered a sign of illiteracy on part of the author! Only in the third edition (enlarged and corrected) of that textbook have I succeeded in renaming it »Eastern Philosophies.«[15] For me it did not

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[14] М. Т. Степанянц, *Восточная философия. Вводный курс и избранные тексты,* М.: »Восточная литература,« 1997.

[15] М. Т. Степанянц, *Восточные философии. Учебник для вузов,* Москва: »Акаде-

bring any personal advantage, it was rather a victory over the impact of simplified Eurocentric attitude to the phenomena of philosophy. The textbook was translated and published in English and Vietnamese.[16] I deeply appreciate the American scholars for presenting my modest writing to the English speaking readers and in this way encouraging me.

I am not aware how the translation of the textbook in Vietnamese has been met. In any case I am happy that it was translated by my former PhD student Dr. Tran Nguyen Viet who uses it in teaching his students.

It is time now to speak about the fourth period of my intellectual autobiography. The previous three stages slowly but surely lead me to intercultural philosophy. Paradoxically, I started to do the latter long before I heard about the emergence of this trend in philosophy. (The first of my intercultural philosophy writings were dedicated to rationalistic traditions of the East in comparison of those ones in the West; to the concept of justice, and Golden Rule.[17])

I believe that it is a natural evolution of the vast majority of those who are in comparative philosophy. In my understanding since the 1980s East-West Philosophers' conferences, in fact, I have been already doing intercultural philosophy. Yet it was done without conceptualizing the general principles and methods of this trend in philosophy.

In my personal case that progression was also promoted by the position of the Head of Department on Oriental Philosophies' Studies at the Institute of Philosophy, which I hold for 32 years starting from

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мический проект,« 2011 (English: *Eastern Philosophies, University Text Book*, Moscow: Academic project, 2011).

[16] M. T. Stepanyants, *Introduction to Eastern Thought*, Walnut Creek-Lanham-New York-Oxford: AltaMira Press, A Division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2002; M. T. Stepanyants, *Triet hoc phuong dong trung hoa*, An do & Cac nuoc hoi gilao. Nha xuat ban khoa hoc xa hoi, Hanoi: 2003.

[17] К вопросу о специфике »восточных« типов философствования (вместо предисловия) // Рационалистическая традиция и современность. Москва: »Наука,« 1988; *The Ideal of Justice in the Context of Cultural Dialogue, Justice and Democracy: Crosscultural Perspectives*, Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 1997 (co-edited with R. Bontekoe); *Golden Mean as a Metaphorical Key to Understanding: The General and the Particular in Moral Philosophy, Comparative Ethics in a Global Age*, Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2006, pp. 43–52; ›Cultural Essentials versus Universal Values?‹ *Diogenes*, No. 219, Vol. 55, Issue 3, 2008, pp. 13–23.

1980. In that capacity I was expected, besides studies in the particular field of my personal academic interests and abilities, to direct and unite the endeavors of the colleagues to work as a team on some common project. This duty forced me to enlarge the sphere of my own knowledge, to study and to be aware about other philosophical and religious traditions. It was the most difficult task for me when it concerned China, and less complicated in case of India. My university training in Indian studies, the comprehension of Urdu and Hindi, five years stay in India, close cooperation with Indian philosophers, participation in many annual sessions of Indian philosophical congresses and conferences, all that was very helpful. Besides, I studied and regularly published books and articles on modern history of Indian philosophy. The most significant of contributions in that field are two Encyclopedias.[18]

For the first time I heard about intercultural philosophy as such from Professors Hans Lenk and Gregor Paul during my short but memorable visit as a guest-speaker to the *Internationale Akademie für nachhaltige Entwicklungen und Technologien* at the Karlsruhe University, Germany in March 2010. I had a chance to learn more while chairing the section »Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy« at the Twenty-First World Philosophy Congress in Athens (August, 2013). I started searching information about intercultural philosophy online.

Unfortunately I cannot read German while the majority of information on intercultural philosophy is in this language. I managed to get the book *Intercultural Philosophy* by Prof. Ram Adhar Mall. Reading Mall and later on *A Dozen Rules of Thumb for Avoiding Intercultural Misunderstanding* by Elmar Holenstein as well as some of the articles written by Hans Lenk and Gregor Paul has definitely enlightened me. I continue my regular studies and writings realizing now that I am doing intercultural philosophy.[19] In March 2015 while

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[18] Индийская философия. Энциклопедия. М. »Восточная литература«, РАН; »Академпроект,« 2009; Философия буддизма. Энциклопедия. М., »Восточная литература«, РАН, 2011; M. T. Stepanyants (ed.), *Russia Looks at India. A Spectrum of Philosophical Views,* New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research Published in association with D. K. Printworld Ltd., 2010.

[19] ›Contribution of Non-Western Cultures to the Ecological Civilization Construction,‹ *The Second Conference of World Cultural Forum;* ›Strengthen International Cooperation to Build an Ecological Civilization,‹ *A Collection of Paper Abstracts by Experts and Scholars from China and Abroad,* 2013, Suzhow (China); ›Becoming Hu-

participating in an international conference and Comité Directeur de Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie meeting in Bangkok (Thailand) I presented the paper on »Intercultural Philosophy as the Imperative of the Time.«

Intercultural philosophy is a concept that is still virtually unavailable in Russian intellectual circulation. It is true that some scholars (not yet the majority) recognize that Western philosophy is not the only one, and along with it there are other philosophies. There is an increasing interest in comparative studies. However, the latter are mainly aimed at discovering specifics of non-western traditions. Little attention is given to finding out the overlaps in different philosophies. On the contrary there is an opinion that the philosophies are so different that they do not possess anything in common. I feel that we, the Russian scholars, urgently need to rethink our views so that to move towards intercultural philosophy.

It is because of those considerations that I have written an article for our main philosophy journal which is to be published in the October issue of 2015 under the title »From Eurocentrism to Intercultural Philosophy.« I am quite realistic about my own abilities to do intercultural philosophy in the highest meaning of that concept (I have recently turned 80). Yet I am optimistic about future developments: intercultural philosophy will go beyond acknowledging the plurality of philosophies and the establishment of mutual respectful relations between them; it will lead far ahead in maintaining the dialogue between different philosophy traditions to the highest stage of rethinking the socio-political ideals, in formulating alternative modernization concepts, in looking for the responds to the challenges of the environmental crisis, in expanding the boundaries of philosophy and science, in presenting the newest scenarios for globalization, etc.

In short, if philosophy stays in cultural isolation it will lose its purpose to grasp by mind the spirit of the times.

–Marietta Stepanyants [Stepaniants], Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

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man: Different Cultural Approaches,‹ *The Symposium of the Steering Committee Meeting »Learning to be Human,«* Beijing: Peking University Press, 2014.

Philosophy on a Bridge

Abstract
The author takes a quick look back at his philosophical education and academic interests through the lens of »comparative philosophy« and uncovers a progression of cross-cultural and cross-historical patterns at work, many of them unfolding tacitly beneath the surface. He concludes with a brief listing of five such patterns, culminating in an appeal for a recovery of unified world views shaped within particular traditions but set against the universal backdrop of a common care for the earth.

Keywords
Japanese philosophy, comparative philosophy, religion, dialogue, Kyoto School, Nanzan Institute.

I came to Japanese philosophy with an interest in Eastern philosophy several sizes larger than my knowledge of it. Like many of my classmates in graduate school, I kept a copy of Wing-Tsit Chan's *Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* on my bookshelf and made my way leisurely through the *Zhuangzi*, the *Mencius*, the *Dao de jing*, the *Yijing*, the Confucian *Analects*, and a scattering of other Chinese classics. Of Japanese and Korean philosophy – not to mention the rest of eastern Asia's intellectual history – I was ignorant except for a watery stew of impressions I picked up from general books about Buddhism. For the most part, I read what everybody around me was reading but had no reason to consider any of it part of a philosophical education proper.

The neglect was entirely benign on my part. I did not consider those books either philosophical or unphilosophical. The question never arose and I had no trouble accepting the unspoken habit of just not asking. Still, in my early years of teaching I often caught myself making allusions to the Chinese classics in lectures on a wide range of

topics, even though I had no academic qualification for doing so and would not have dreamed of trying it in public. My students rather seemed to enjoy an injection of the exotic from time to time and I got used to living with the pretense. Until I came to Japan, that is.

My seminary training in philosophy had centered on the Western classics from the ancient Greeks to the twentieth century. To fill in the gaps left by the many courses centered on scholastic thought and still taught in Latin, I read through the fifteen volumes of Copleston's *A History of Philosophy.* I was later to meet the man himself when he paid us a visit at the Nanzan Institute in 1983. Copleston had since turned to the comparative study of philosophies in different cultures, recorded in his Gifford lectures and published the previous year as *Religion and the One: Philosophies East and West.* In discussions with this giant of a mind, I came to understand that his guiding motive in turning to the East was to break down the resistance of Western philosophers to other modes of thought. For such a meticulous historian, who read everything he could get his hands on and read it in the original languages, the risk of being criticized for rummaging around Eastern philosophies as an amateur in search of support for his own position was one he willingly took for that greater end.

Our undergraduate curriculum in philosophy had been designed to blend seamlessly into the study of theology, but the scaffolding fell apart with the moral and intellectual iconoclasm of the 1960s in the United States and the invigorating discussions brought into the open by the Second Vatican Council. Teachers no longer wanted to use the old manuals in which they had been trained; students were swept up in the paperback theology of the day. Within the classroom we were introduced to thinkers like Tillich, Bultmann, and Eliade and engaged in debate on everything from the secular city to situation ethics. Without, we did our best to weather the intellectual storm from the political left. Through it all, I commuted regularly to Loyola University in Chicago where I had simultaneously enrolled in the graduate program in philosophy.

In 1966 I heard Thomas Altizer lecture at Rosary College on his new book *The Gospel of Christian Atheism.* Intrigued by his theological readings of Hegel and Nietzsche, I began a correspondence with him and then briefly with other major figures associated with »death of God theology.« To combat boredom with seminary lectures on more traditional topics, I decided to write a book on the movement

and passed copies of each chapter around to classmates for comment. One of the priests sent a dittograph copy of the completed manuscript to Martin Marty at the University of Chicago who expressed his support for its publication. Meantime, at Altizer's request, I submitted a paper comparing his ideas to Teilhard's views on evolution for a volume John Cobb was editing on Altizer's thought. While it was in press, I handed it in as an assignment in dogmatic theology at which the Dean threatened to dismiss me from the seminary over the whole affair. We reached a compromise. I prudently withdrew the book and was given permission to complete my training by entering a master's program in theology at Notre Dame University. I was twenty-three.

Courses in »comparative philosophy,« let alone Asian philosophy, were not an option in either of the master's degree programs I was shuttling between. Belief in a *philosophia perennis* that dealt with a line of fundamental problems unbroken by time or culture or historical circumstance, however, was prevalent in both. For renaissance thinkers like Leibniz and Ficino who first championed the idea and later thinkers like Windelband who took it as a foundation for organizing the history of ideas, there was no thought of including philosophies not cradled in the Mediterranean basin. Within those limits, and with suitable attention to textual exegesis, we were left free to cruise across the ages scavenging ideas from the pre-Socratics to Nietzsche to bolster arguments on just about anything. Under a different name and with many of the same tacit assumptions and fallacies, the liberties we took were often little more than comparative philosophizing at its frailest.

And yet, many of us, for whom linguistic philosophy was all dust and disappointment, were caught up effortlessly in the charm and sweep of perennial thinking. Whitehead's remark, »It is more important that an idea be interesting than that it be true,« fell sympathetically, though in a naïve understanding, on my ears. As it happened, Whitehead was the first philosopher whose complete works I would read and study carefully. Having plowed respectfully through the abridged version of the *Principia Mathematica* for a class on the history of analytical philosophy, I bought all his books and over the course of several months read through them on my own. I remember at one point stumbling on Lucien's Price's *Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead* in a local bookstore and devouring it at one sitting. Somewhere along the way a light went on: what makes an idea *interesting* is not its universal applicability and detachment from history but how

the structure and expression of that universality are embedded in time.

The following year I began teaching undergraduates. For an introductory course, I had my students read Karl Jaspers' *The Way to Wisdom,* a short book that seemed to me then, and still does, a succinct and eloquent account of the origins and aims of philosophy. In no time I had compiled a shelf of Jaspers' books which I read and annotated with increasing enthusiasm. I no longer recall with any clarity the motivations of those early days, but my references to Eastern ideas must have propped upon his inclusion of Confucius and Buddha among the »great philosophers.« In those days it was *de rigueur* to be conversant with the major writings of Freud and at least the broad outlines of the interface of psychoanalysis with Marxism, literary criticism, symbolic theory, and, of course, philosophy. Jaspers brought something missing into the maelstrom of ideas around Freud's work: a sense of openness and trust towards an unknowable, uncontrollable creativity that leaves its footprints on the psychohistory of individuals but ultimately precedes them and supersedes them on all sides.

Nevertheless, there was more of the arid, abstract theory in Jaspers than I expected of an existential psychiatrist. Neither his attraction to mystics like Eckhart and Cusanus nor his appeal to an intuitive language of »ciphers« was a match for his overriding rationalism. As these doubts were gathering, someone made me a present of Jung's autobiography, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections.* Many of my classmates in seminary were reading Jung, but I had resisted and brushed it aside. This time I did read it and doubts of another sort drew my interests away from Jaspers. Here was a thinker hanging the most spectacularly varied wardrobe I had ever seen on a rather loose-limbed skeleton that seemed to grow stronger and more limber with each change of clothes. By Jung's own admission, his theories were to be judged finally not by their logical coherence or fidelity to the texts but by the effect they had on the experiences and wellbeing of his patients. It all seemed like a strange concoction of *Kulturkreis* hermeneutics and comparative religions laced with a mild dose of scientific positivism. Jung's writings would have been easy to dismiss were it not for their evident power to transform lives. His »philosophy« smacked of the esoteric or hermetic, but it dragged so many familiar names into its unapologetically cross-cultural vision that I was intrigued to diagnose it closer. I read through a

further selection of his essays and then went out and purchased the entire *Collected Works.*

The last half of that first year of teaching I started making my way systematically through Jung's writings. By the end of the second semester I was packing my things for Cambridge and decided to ship the whole set. When I arrived in England and had settled in to my college, I was informed that my advisor would be away for the semester and that for the first term I would be under the direction of Norman Pittenger, the noted Whitehead scholar. I had been contemplating a dissertation on Jaspers but he encouraged me to begin with something closer to his home than mine. I wasn't very happy about the change of direction but conceded by writing a long, rambling paper comparing Whitehead's symbolic theory with the Jungian archetypes. As we discussed it in our tutorial sessions, I was driven back again and again to Jung's works to explain myself and defend my ideas. I didn't do a very good job on either count, but I did get deep enough into Jung to contemplate a dissertation on his work. When my director, Donald MacKinnon returned, he agreed to guide me through a philosophical critique of Jung on condition I would resign myself to the fact that a thesis on the subject would not be accepted at Cambridge or Oxford, where even submissions on Freud had so far been rejected. I respected his judgment but not nearly as much as I needed his help, so I accepted his conditions and dug in my heels.

Happily, MacKinnon turned out to be wrong about acceptance of the thesis and I turned out to be right about his help. Again and again, he drew my attention to the perils of comparative philosophy, directing me to supplementary reading in Frankfurt School thinkers like Habermas and Horkheimer, philosophers of science like Popper and Feyerabend, and Kantian revisionists like P. F. Strawson and J. L. Austin. The whole point of his direction was not to sidetrack me into second-level, methodological pursuits but to make me more alert to the historical particularity of universal ideas. Meantime, at my college Sebastian Moore lured me into reading Lacan and Saussure, and Bernard Sharrat turned me to Marxist theories of knowledge, all of which sharpened my suspicions of Jung's comparative method.

I spent the summer of my first year at Cambridge in Zurich, tracking down Jung's unpublished seminar notes and talking with former students, chief among them Aniela Jaffe, the compiler of Jung's autobiography, and James Hillman, the most creative mind of the lot. In exchange for checking the Latin and Greek terms in the

galleys of Jung's correspondence, Jaffe put up with my endless questions and convinced me to let her comment on my dreams. Discussions with Hillman were more intensely philosophical and opened my eyes to the narrow lens through which I was criticizing analytical psychology as a whole.

Later that summer I traveled to Geneva at the invitation of Eleni Kazantzakis, the wife of the celebrated Cretan writer, with whom I had been corresponding about an essay I was trying to finish on Nikos Kazantzakis' novels and poetry. She was not only informative but most charming and introduced me to a circle of friends living in exile from Greece. She later arranged for me to spend time in Crete as a guest of the family of Galatea Alexiou, his first wife. It was there that I finished the essay, which Pandelis Prevelakis translated for the pages of the Christmas 1971 issue of the literary journal *Nea Hestia.* In Kazantzakis I had found a blend of earthy, sensual imagery and the pursuit of a mythical vision that filled a need my previous philosophical education had not.

As I write this, I am struck by the unrepentant promiscuity of my interests. None of this detained me at the time. In hindsight, I suppose the very fact that everything seemed to fit together might argue that I had not turned a critical eye to my own inadvertently comparative adventures. There I was, transgressing cultures, languages, academic disciplines, and epoch-specific ideas with the greatest of ease, and all the while trying meticulously to build a case against Jung's claims to having uncovered a universal map of the human psyche. It was only when I came to Japanese philosophy that I was able to turn the tables.

After completing doctoral studies in May of 1973, I spent three years teaching in the United States and Mexico. At the Catholic Theological Union of Chicago and two graduate schools in Mexico City I lectured mainly on myth, symbols, and the philosophy of religion. On one visit to Mexico, I used a small garage near my house to conduct private seminars on liberation theology, a subject prohibited in theological schools then. In 1974 I put together some of my formal lectures into a small book, *El cuento detrás del cuento,* in which I tried to use the overlaps of personal, societal, and cosmic dimensions in folktales as a key to interpret the baptismal ritual.

Over the years I had kept in touch with the Nicaraguan poet Ernesto Cardenal, with whom I had had a brief exchange of letters during my Cambridge years. He suggested I spend a couple of months

at his commune in Solentiname, the spiritual center of the Sandinista movement and a symbol of political resistance throughout Latin America. I was not to see him again until after the revolution, when he came to the Nanzan Institute as Minister of Culture for a colloquium, but the impact of Solentiname was lasting. My time in Latin America had revived many of the discomforts I had first felt as a teenager in Mexico. It was at this time of mental readjustment, when I was writing little and trying to reason out those discomforts in the lecture hall, that I received an invitation to visit Japan.

* * *

The president of Nanzan University in Nagoya, Johannes Hirschmeier, had a dream and it was nearing completion. After Vatican II, he realized, it was no longer enough for a Catholic university in Japan simply to take a dim view of missionaries proselytizing on campus. More active steps had to be taken to interact with the religious reality of Japan and the intellectual history that lay behind it. To that end, he decided to found a research institute whose aim would be to promote dialogue among philosophies and religions East and West. I was invited to consult in 1975, and the following year, to join the staff once the buildings were completed. The invitation was too tempting to turn down. By fall of 1977 I was in Japan and a year later settled in at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture.

»Settled in« is not quite the right word. When I was a little boy and would forget to close the door on my way out of the house, my mother would call out to me, »Hey, you live on a bridge?« Work in the Institute *was* living on a bridge, an ungated »and« with scholars from different disciplines walking from one side to the other and stopping to chat along the way. Everything I had thought about universals and particulars was at last coming face to face with an intellectual world that was slowly turning my mind inside out. Nothing I had studied quite prepared me for it. I was like a schoolboy thrown into an adult's world. Not only did I have to learn to read and write all over again, I had to be reeducated into new ways of thinking and communicating. I also had to find a way to relate it all to the world I had come from. I recall a passage I had come across in Arthur Danto's *Mysticism and Morality:*

> The fantastic architectures of Oriental thought […] are open to our study and certainly our admiration, but they are not for us to inhabit. […] The factual beliefs they take for granted are, I believe, too alien to our representation of the world to be grafted onto it, and in consequence their moral systems are unavailable to us. […] No one can save us but ourselves.

Then, I accepted it without a second thought. Now I was forced to second-think. The people I lived and worked with, and no one more than the Flemish philosopher Jan Van Bragt, did in fact inhabit that world and had found much of its morality to be salvific. It was not only a question of using his Western learning in an Asian language or broadening his horizons of the history of ideas, but of actually using the resources of Japan to do philosophy. Watching me founder in unfamiliar waters, he threw me what was to be the first of several lifelines. His friend Hans Waldenfels had just published *Absolutes Nichts*, a monograph on the thought of Nishitani Keiji. Van Bragt suggested that it might be worthwhile translating it into English as a companion to his own translation of Nishitani's *Religion and Nothingness*, which was nearing completing and had already caught the eye of my old friend Tom Altizer. I threw myself into the work and saw it through to publication in 1980. That was my introduction to the Kyoto School philosophers, the start of a journey that would prove to me, conclusively, how wrong Danto had been.

A series of carefully planned intellectual dialogues between Christian thinkers and representatives from Shinto, Zen, Pure Land, Tendai, and lay Buddhist movements were held periodically at the Institute over the next two decades. Longstanding barriers of mistrust and misunderstanding often collapsed in these encounters, but it became obvious as the years went by that the exercise was limited to a small group of intellectuals and had little impact on organized religion or problems discussed in Japanese society at large. Beginning in 2002, the Nanzan Institute shifted the focus of its symposia away from religion-to-religion discussion in the direction of their shared interface with ethics and society, science, and indigenous religiosity across East Asia.

Meantime, the Institute became involved with the annual meetings of the »Society for East-West Religious Exchange« and the Kyoto Zen Symposia, where the atmosphere was more directly philosophical. The topics were no less abstract, but the presence of figures like Nishitani Keiji and Ueda Shizuteru from the Buddhist side, and Yagi Seiichi and Tanaka Yutaka from the Christian side,

kept attention fixed on larger, universal problems and prevented discussion from being infected with the strains of »Japanist« thinking circulating at the time. The ideas of Nishida Kitarō were never far from the discussions. The stamp his writings had left on the Kyoto School by posing questions from the East in the language and logic of Western philosophy, yet never distracted by preoccupations with the East-West divide, helped shift the attention of Buddhist and Christian participants from simple comparison and mutual education to questions that embraced both sides in their common humanity. Not surprisingly, Western mystical thought was more influential than mainstream theological traditions. Yet here, too, the tendency to exclude pressing moral and social concerns of the day began to wear thin with the passing years and the increasing participation of younger scholars.

On several occasions during the 1980s I was encouraged by Thomas Immoos, director of Sophia University's Institute for Oriental Religions, to participate in a Japanese Jung Club he had founded in collaboration with Yuasa Yasuo, and to write for a new journal they had founded. For a decade and more the group flourished and Jungian psychology enjoyed an unprecedented boom but then went only to slide into a slow decline, as did my own interests in the analysis and critique of Jung's thought. During these years I opened a seminar for the general public at the Institute in which we discussed a variety of texts from Goethe and Dante to Zeami and Nishida Kitarō. These seminars ran for over thirty years, during which we devoted four years to a study of the history of magic from ancient Egypt to the modern day, and another three years on gnostic and hermetic literature. These gatherings quickly became a pillar of the intellectual life for me. Not only did they nudge me away from the addiction to professional jargon, they raised questions that I had ignored as a result.

Speaking of questions passed over, in 1979 Thomas Berry and I were awarded an unsolicited grant to spend time at one another's research centers. He immediately helped me overcome my embarrassment at the imparity of the plan. The week I spent at his Riverdale Center of Religious Research on the Hudson River led to some of the most intense discussions of my life. The passion of this extraordinary man for a »story of the earth« to revive ancient wisdoms and unite the moral conscience of the world was like nothing I had ever met. By the time he came to Japan to hold talks with our staff, I was convinced that the story he spoke of would have to be a necessary part of all

philosophy and all religion, and all dialogue among them, if they were to be true to themselves in the present age.

The following year I ran into Tom Kasulis at an East-West Religions conference in Hawaii, and five years later met John Maraldo at a meeting of the Kyoto Zen Symposium. Our three paths crossed again and again and we came to form a lasting friendship that shaped my life in so many unexpected ways. John had convinced the committee of the Kyoto Zen Symposium to let him organize a conference on the role of Kyoto School philosophers in the Pacific war, which we then edited and published under the title *Rude Awakenings.* Meantime, Kasulis had caught both of us up in his longstanding dream of producing a comprehensive sourcebook in Japanese philosophy. To inaugurate the project, a conference was held at the Nanzan Institute in 2004 whose purpose was to assess the state of Japanese philosophy around the world. Ironically, at the same time as scholars from six language groups were presenting their reports, the annual meeting of the Japan Philosophical Association was being held elsewhere on campus to celebrate the 200th anniversary of Kant's death under the theme »The Reality of Globalization.« All of our speakers dealt with Japanese philosophers; none of theirs did.

Over the next six years we arranged for a series of workshops to consult with specialists on the structure and contents of the *Sourcebook.* In addition, we organized a series of symposia with the aim of bringing scholars of Japanese philosophy from the West, especially younger ones, into dialogue with their Japanese counterparts. These were published in succession at the Nanzan Institute as the first seven volumes of *Frontiers of Japanese Philosophy.* By the time the *Sourcebook* appeared in 2011, it had grown to over 1,300 pages, more than twice the anticipated length. In the final stages of preparation, Kasulis suggested that we create a thematic index to open the way to tracing ideas historically. No methodological attention was given to »comparative philosophy« as such. We merely wanted to stimulate a use of the wide range of resources available across Japan's rich philosophical past. Once the English edition was completed, the three of us had supper in Barcelona with Raimund Herder who immediately committed himself to a Spanish edition. I had struck up a friendship with him ten years previously while at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra working on a book about the Kyoto School, the first of several volumes I was to publish with Editorial Herder. He had done doctoral studies under the phenomenologist Heinrich Rombach, who, in turn,

had spent time at our home in Japan to discuss his structural analysis of the Dao as a means to compare European and Eastern thought. Raimund immediately recognized the importance of the project. We both agreed to approach the young Catalan philosopher, Raquel Bouso, to solicit her help in engaging translators from around the Spanish-speaking world and coordinating the editorial process. A second round of galleys for the volume has just reached me in preparation for its impending publication.

As I noted earlier, comparative thinking had been something I engaged in haphazardly and without sufficient regard for what I was doing. That was no longer an option. The creative attempts at dialogue between philosophy and religion East and West that were taking place around me were both revolutionary and humbling. Less inspiring was the rise of a caste of theological watchdogs, some of them snapping at the heels of the venture with guidelines and methodologies meant to protect their own specializations, others harvesting the results prematurely and from a distance. Within a decade the literature on recipes for dialogue had overtaken the discipline of actual dialogue. And as the theology of religion found its way into the curricula of Europe and the United States, the open-ended quality that I had found so attractive seemed to diminish in importance. On the positive side, it forced me to take a closer look at the underlying assumptions of the dialogue in general and many of my own unreflected habits of thought.

Tanabe Hajime's »logic of the specific« was pivotal for me in the sense that it provided a framework for asking questions about the epoch-specificity of ideas. The writings of Foucault, and to a lesser extent Derrida, had laid the ground for my reading of Tanabe. Participation in religious and philosophical dialogues drew my attention to what Tanabe meant by the perils and the promise of trying to think universal thoughts in a specific context. I am no longer sure how much I owe to Tanabe and how much to what I have read into his texts. I have never used the category myself, but if anything, I have come to suspect that »comparative philosophy« is better done when discovered to have been done than when one has set out to do it. I suppose in large measure this suspicion is the result of attempts to liberate the translation of Japanese texts from the greedy grasp of second order meta-analysis and get them in the hands of a wider public. Be that as it may, I admit the category helps me squint at the

memories recounted above and identify a modest advance in my life towards sturdier patterns of comparative thinking:

1. *Comparing ideas within a tradition across temporal and cultural differences.* By this I mean the general comparative processes at work in the assumption, tacit or expressed, of a perennial philosophy reaching from the ancient Greeks to present-day Western philosophy. Even where attention if given to historical circumstances that shape particular ideas, as long as the fundamental questions are taken to be trans-historical, the answers are granted the right to transcend those circumstances.
2. *Comparing ideas across traditions without attention to specificities of history or culture.* Here the approach breaks through the limits of a single philosophical tradition. The use of such comparison ranges from the venial offense of offhanded allusions to classical texts of Eastern philosophy as a complement to Western insights, to more intellectually questionable methods of subsuming all traditions under a blanket of archetypal ideas excavated from one of those traditions. Nevertheless, the recognition of alternative modes of philosophy represents an advance over the previous mode of comparision.
3. *Comparing ideas across cultures but within a common temporal frame of reference.* Theories of an axial age are the most obvious example of this method of comparison. More sophisticated approaches require identifying a common substratum of global nature such as industrialization, modernity, or scientific-technological world views. These approaches may all have been Western inventions, but from the time Japanese words for philosophy and religion were first created in the mid nineteenth-century their academic study has always been comparative in this sense. The dialogue among traditions is best exercised on this common ground, convinced that the present world has thrown our traditions together to enrich one another by searching for a shared vocabulary to discuss ideas of very different provenance.
4. *Comparing ideas in search of a response to common, living questions that cut across cultural, philosophical, or religious barriers.* In this approach, the merits and demerits of comparison are of less interest than the role that ideas play in prompting an awakening on all sides as a requisite for morally acceptable action. All three types of comparison mentioned above are viewed

critically under the lens of orthopraxis, and this elicits one of those irreversible insights: that it is only when comparison is in service of something outside the framework of the comparison that it is worth doing at all.

For a long time, I lived and worked as if the task of engaging philosophies and religions in intellectual dialogue ended there. Recently I have begun to think that there is more to the transition from theory to praxis than a personal awakening to the moral consequences of our thoughts. It is one thing to contribute to a world of ideas whose practical residuum will outlast us and them. It is quite another to contribute to a story of the common good encompassing enough, *mythical* enough, to capture the imagination and release us from the comfort of our petty biases academic, cultural, political, economic, and personal. The mere fact of inhabiting a single planet whose health our combined efforts at civilization – including our philosophies and religions – have put in grave peril and held in place should direct us to a fifth and final stage:

5. *Comparing ideas in search of a common story grounded in the earth and in a history against whose backdrop all our philosophies and all our sciences pale by comparison.* Absent the will to believe in such a story, the gap between the thoughts we can think and the actions we are prepared to take will always be greater than any society of human beings can breach.

Globalization on such a high constructive level cannot be a new story composed from scratch. It needs to integrate long-formed traditions, in a critical reprise, giving them a new dynamic inflection. In this sense, it is not so much a question of »comparing« but of reactivating traditions in mutual solicitation and in openness to the signs of the times. Care for the earth and for the common good in the deepest sense imposes a hermeneutical imperative that bids us make sense of our traditions and scholarly specializations in a new way. Academia has been largely immune to such attempts, or at least has tended to marginalize them, while our native philosophical and religious instincts have us gasping for breath in an atmosphere that trivializes the question, »What's the point?«

In the end, of course, there is no Archimedean point from which to sit and judge the course of history. But neither is there a way to escape the desire to release our minds from the age we are wrapped in. To honor this incoherence of our human nature we can tear our stories to shreds one after the other and expose their superstition, or we

can try to combine them and retell them in a language we better understand. Or both – which is what I have come to see as the heart of the philosophical vocation.

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Survey Article

Virtues and Roles in Early Confucian Ethics

Abstract
Many passages in early Confucian texts such as the *Analects* and *Mengzi* are focused on virtue, recommending qualities like humaneness (*ren* 仁), righteousness (*yi* 義), and trustworthiness (*xin* 信). Still others emphasize roles: what it means to be a good son, a good ruler, a good friend, a good teacher, or a good student. How are these teachings about virtues and roles related? In the past decade there has been a growing debate between two interpretations of early Confucian ethics, one that sees virtues as fundamental, and the other of which starts from roles. Recently there have been two new contributions to the debate: *Virtue Ethics and Confucianism* (2013), edited by Stephen C. Angle and Michael Slote, which develops the virtue ethical interpretation, and Henry Rosemont, Jr.'s *Against Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the Foundations of Morality, Politics, Family, and Religion* (2015), which defends the role-based interpretation. This paper lays out the main contours of the debate between Virtue Ethical Confucianism and Confucian Role Ethics, as well as examines the distinctive contributions of these two new works.

Keywords
role ethics, virtue ethics, early Confucianism, comparative philosophy, comparative methodology, relational self.

In early Confucian texts, we find a great deal of discussion of qualities we might label as »virtues.« The virtue of *ren* 仁, »humaneness« or »benevolence,« is mentioned over one hundred times in the *Analects*, and Confucius also recommends to his students attributes like ritual propriety (*li* 禮), trustworthiness (*xin* 信), wisdom (*zhi* 知), dutifulness (*zhong* 忠), righteousness (*yi* 義), respectfulness (*jing* 敬), uprightness (*zhi* 直), reverence (*gong* 恭), courage (*yong* 勇), diligence (*min* 敏), carefulness (*shen* 慎), deference (*rang* 讓), courteousness

(*wen* 溫), kindness (*hui* 惠), magnanimity (*kuan* 寬), resoluteness (*gang* 剛), and reticence (*na* 訥). Confucius' follower Mencius focuses on four of these virtues – *ren*, *yi*, *li*, and *zhi* – and argues that their »sprouts« are contained in all human beings.

Still other passages in these texts stress the importance of roles: being a good son, a good ruler, a good friend, a good teacher, or a good student. When Confucius is asked about the key to good governance, he says, »Let the lord be a true lord, the ministers true ministers, the fathers true fathers, and the sons true sons« (12.11). Roles are also highlighted in Mencius' teaching of the »five relationships« (*wulun* 五倫): between father and child, ruler and minister, husband and wife, elder and younger sibling, and friend and friend. It is instruction in the proper ways of relating to one another, according to Mencius, which prevents us from falling into an animal-like state where we are driven by our basest desires.

How are these teachings about virtues and roles related? If virtue is the main currency of early Confucian ethics, then the issue of how to be a good father, good son, etc., while obviously important to thinkers like Confucius and Mencius, is a less fundamental consideration. The virtue of *ren* is significant regardless of whether you are a ruler, a teacher, or a friend; the more *ren* you are the more you are able to fulfill any of these roles. Roles are important insofar as they allow you to cultivate virtue in your everyday life, but fulfillment of the roles is not the ultimate good for human beings (Ivanhoe 2008: 39).[1] You are not defined by your roles, but by whether or not you have *ren* and the other qualities that Confucius emphasizes.

If roles are fundamental, however, then the point is not to cultivate character traits that are largely similar for everyone, but rather to master specific role-behavior. The roles themselves provide the normative standards of a society, and virtues such as *ren* may vary substantially depending on which role you are playing. On this understanding, the focus of ethics is not on the general character of the agent, but rather on the interaction of two or more people at a specific time and place (Rosemont 2015: 105).[2] You are not the virtues you

[1] P. J. Ivanhoe, »The Shade of Confucius: Social Roles, Ethical Theory, and the Self,« in M. Chandler, and R. Littlejohn (eds.), *Polishing the Chinese Mirror: Essays in Honor of Henry Rosemont, Jr.*, New York: Global Scholarly, 2008, pp. 34–49.

[2] H. J. Rosemont, Jr., *Against Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the Foundations of Morality, Politics, Family, and Religion*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015.

possess; rather, we are defined by the relationships that bind together our families and communities.

In the last few years, English-language scholarship on early Confucian ethics has seen a debate between two competing interpretations, one that sees virtues as fundamental, the other of which starts from roles. The essays found in the recent collection *Virtue Ethics and Confucianism*, edited by Stephen C. Angle and Michael Slote, generally employ the first approach, following on the work of a growing number of scholars in recent years.[3] The role-based interpretation is in turn defended by Henry Rosemont, Jr., in his new book *Against Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the Foundations of Morality, Politics, Family, and Religion*. This interpretation is rooted in Rosemont's 1991 essay »Rights-Bearing Individuals and Role-Bearing Persons« and in his more recent collaborative work with Roger Ames, as well as in the latter's earlier work with David L. Hall. Ames' widely discussed recent work *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary* defends a similar view.[4]

According to Virtue Ethical Confucianism (VEC), early Confucian and Aristotelian ethics are similar in structure, in that both offer an account of the virtues and how they are cultivated (Slingerland 2001). Yet there are enough interesting differences between Confucian and Western forms of virtue ethics that the two traditions can challenge and enrich one another. Consider the Confucian emphasis on filial piety (*xiao* 孝), which VEC takes to be an admirable character trait whose cultivation is part of the good life for the individual and

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[3] S. C. Angle and M. Slote (eds.), *Virtue Ethics and Confucianism*, New York: Routledge, 2013. See also P. J. Ivanhoe, *Confucian Moral Self Cultivation*, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, [2]2000; M. Sim, *Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007; E. Slingerland, »Virtue Ethics, the *Analects*, and the Problem of Commensurability,« *Journal of Religious Ethics*, Vol. 29, 2001, pp. 97–125; B. Van Norden, *Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007; and J. Yu, *The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle: Mirrors of Virtue*, New York: Routledge, 2007.

[4] H. Rosemont, Jr., »Rights-Bearing Individuals and Role-Bearing Persons,« in M. I. Bockover (ed.), *Rules, Rituals, and Responsibility: Essays Dedicated to Herbert Fingarette*, La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991, pp. 71–101; R. T. Ames, and H. Rosemont Jr., »Were the Early Confucians Virtuous?« in C. Fraser, D. Robins, and T. O'Leary (eds.), *Ethics in Early China: An Anthology*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011, pp. 17–39; D. L. Hall and R. T. Ames, *Thinking Through Confucius*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1987; and R. T. Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011.

the community (Ivanhoe 2007: 305).[5] Confucius thinks of filial piety as the root of other virtues, the first place where we learn the appropriate ways of feeling toward other humans, and its scope extends well beyond a son's relationship with his father, also applying to one's teachers, elders, and authority figures, and generally, in one's relations towards other people (Ivanhoe 2008: 39 n.16). Since Western virtue ethicists have devoted much less attention to familial relationships, the Confucian regard for filial piety can contribute a new dimension to the discussion.

For Confucian Role Ethics (CRE), the Confucian tradition is unique and cannot be understood through the predominant Western ethical theories. Though the early Confucians are perhaps closer to virtue ethicists than they are to deontologists and utilitarians, what makes them *sui generis* is that they do not begin from an abstract consideration of the nature of virtue, but rather with the roles we lead in everyday life and how we can make them better. The Confucian emphasis on *xiao* shows the Confucian regard for the familial setting in which these roles are first acquired (Ames 2011: 112). As Rosemont puts it, *xiao* is proof that when learning morality, »it all begins at home, in the role of son or daughter with which every human being begins their life« (Rosemont 2015: 98). Understood as a role-based ethics, Confucian ethics can offer a powerful alternative to mainstream Western ethical thinking.

The two interpretations disagree not only about the philosophical foundations of Confucian ethics, but also about the appropriate methodology for interpreting early Chinese philosophical texts. Comparative ethics brings together works from different philosophical traditions, themselves embedded in disparate cultural settings. The most significant problem that arises from the attempt to bridge cultural-philosophical traditions is the problem of *incommensurability*, which states that because the target texts are embedded in distinctive wholes, they cannot be meaningfully compared with one another (Connolly 2015: 67 ff.).[6] This challenge was raised for comparative virtue ethics in particular by Alasdair MacIntyre in his 1991 paper »Incommensurability, Truth, and the Conversation between Confu-

[5] P. J. Ivanhoe, »Filial Piety as a Virtue,« in R. L. Walker and P. J. Ivanhoe (eds.), *Working Virtue: Virtue Ethics and Contemporary Moral Problems*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 297–312.

[6] T. Connolly, *Doing Philosophy Comparatively*, London: Bloomsbury, 2015.

cians and Aristotelians.«[7] MacIntyre argues that even if there are significant areas of overlap between the ethical views found in the Aristotelian and Confucian traditions, because these traditions offer different overall conceptions of the human good, any commonalities we identify will have distinctive places within the wider moral configurations of which they are part. As a result, he contends, there are no shared standards by which we might understand and evaluate their competing claims.

In the first issue of *Confluence*, Rosemont himself raised the issue of whether it is more productive for comparativists to focus on similarities or differences between traditions, going on to argue that »it is almost surely better to focus on differences before seeking the near familiar – the latter being far more deceptive if too quickly obtained« (Rosemont 2014: 205).[8] Commensurability between traditions is best thought of as a spectrum, with total unintelligibility at one end of the scale and complete similarity at the other (*cf*. Angle 2002: 6).[9] While CRE does not maintain that the views found in texts like the *Analects* and *Nicomachean Ethics* are mutually incomprehensible, and VEC does not claim they are identical, each interpretation falls closer to either end of the spectrum.

MacIntyre points to work by Hall and Ames emphasizing the unique metaphysical foundations of the Confucian tradition, as well as by Rosemont on the tradition's distinctive cluster of ethical concepts, as providing some measure of support for his view (MacIntyre 1991: 107). However, these interpreters came to reject MacIntyre's view that if there is no universally valid comparative framework by which to measure culturally distinct traditions then we are stuck with incommensurability. »The third position,« as Hall and Ames write, »is to see these traditions as historical narratives that, at a practical, concrete level, intersect and even overlap. At this level, comparisons can be formulated and understood that are productive in identifying alternatives to familiar modes of expression and action« (Hall, and

[7] A. MacIntyre, »Incommensurability, Truth, and the Conversation between Confucians and Aristotelians,« in E. Deutsch (ed.), *Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophic Perspectives*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991, pp. 104–122

[8] H. Rosemont, Jr., »Reply: Truth as Truthfulness, *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies*, Vol. 1, 2014, pp. 205–212.

[9] S. C. Angle, *Human Rights: A Cross-Cultural Inquiry*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Ames 1998: xv).[10] Rosemont's introduction to *Against Individualism* places his work in this same vein. Whereas the more common approach to non-Western texts has been to ask, »To what extent do these texts suggest answers to questions that vex us?« he finds it more fruitful to inquire, »To what extent do these texts suggest that we should be answering different philosophical questions?« (Rosemont 2015: 5)

CRE argues for a broad set of differences separating classical Chinese and Western ethics: that Western ethics begins from the individual and ignores the family, while Confucian ethics places the family at the center; that the goal of Western ethics is to think more coherently about ethics, while the goal of Confucian ethics is to become a better person; that whereas Western ethics begins from abstract principles, Confucian ethics from concrete situations; and that Western ethics relies on rationality to determine right conduct, but Confucian ethics relies on imagination and moral exemplars (Ames, and Rosemont 2011). In *Against Individualism*, Rosemont's aim is to show that the predominant Western view of human beings as »most fundamentally free and rational, autonomous individual selves« (Rosemont 2015: xii) is both false and socially pernicious, and to defend an alternative Confucian view based on his idea of humans as role-bearing persons.

As Rosemont writes, »we should work hard to understand non-Western texts *in their own terms*, not ours« (*ibid*.: 5), and he and Ames have sought to satisfy this method of interpretation not just in their scholarly work, but also by offering their own collaborative set of translations of early Confucian texts. In *Against Individualism*, Rosemont relies on his longstanding view that philosophical traditions must be understood by means of their distinctive »concept-clusters.« In contrast to the Western set of concepts that Rosemont takes as his target in the book, consisting of terms like »rights,« »democracy,« »choice,« »autonomy,« and »individual,« and centering around the notion of »freedom« (*ibid*.: 62), or the Aristotelian concept-cluster involving terms such as *ethos*, *arête*, *prohairesis*, *phronesis*, and *eudaimonia*, early Confucian ethics has a set of concepts that is entirely unique: *ren*, *yi*, *de* 德, *dao* 道, and the like. Western interpreters of Chinese texts have distorted the inherent meanings of and inter-

[10] D. L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1998.

relationships among these terms by projecting too much of their own tradition's vocabulary onto them.

Proponents of VEC have responded to MacIntyre's challenge by attempting to construct a shared framework through which conversation between Confucian and Western forms of virtue ethics might take place. At the same time, they reject the idea that linguistic difference is the proper starting point for comparative philosophy. Jiyuan Yu, drawing on Aristotle and Martha Nussbaum, maintains that it is the basic human experiences to which our languages give expression that should be point of departure for cross-cultural comparison (Yu 2007: 9–10). Edward Slingerland uses conceptual metaphor theory to argue that, regardless of the languages we speak, humans have a shared conceptual structure that is shaped by our experience of our body in its physical environment (Slingerland 2004: 24).[11] He dismisses views like Rosemont's as »linguistic determinism« or »word fetishism« (*ibid.*: 5–6). Other defenders of VEC have criticized Rosemont's idea that we cannot claim that a Chinese thinker has a particular concept if we cannot find a term in the thinker's text expressing that concept (Van Norden 2007: 22).

While MacIntyre's views about incommensurability are only mentioned once in a footnote in the Angle and Slote volume, and Ames and Rosemont's concerns about linguistic difference and interpretive one-sidedness are not cited at all, the editors' introduction frames the collection as addressing similar issues. One feature of the volume is a recurring debate about whether or not terms like »virtue« and »virtue ethics« make sense in a Confucian context (Angle, and Slote 2013: 7). The essay by the Hong Kong-based scholar Wong Wai-ying raises doubts about whether Confucian ethics can be classified as virtue ethics, and the Taiwanese scholar Lee Ming-Huei claims that Confucian ethics is best understood as deontology.[12] Liu Liangjian, a philosopher at East China Normal University, argues that the study of Confucian virtue ethics should begin from a consideration of the classical Chinese term *de* and the modern term *meide* 美德, and proceeds to point out some important differences between these

[11] E. Slingerland, ›Conceptual Metaphor Theory as Methodology for Comparative Religion,‹ *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2004, pp. 1–31.

[12] Wong Wai-ying, »Confucian Ethics and Virtue Ethics Revisited,« Angle, and Slote 2013, pp. 74–79; and Lee Ming-huei, »Confucianism, Kant, and Virtue Ethics« *ibid.* pp. 47–55.

terms and the English »virtue« and Greek *aretē* (Liu 2013: 67–69).[13] Both this essay and the one by Chen Lai of Tsinghua University point out an interesting distinction between »virtuous character« (*dexing* 德性, with *xing* pronounced using the fourth tone) and »virtuous conduct« (*dexing* 德行, with *xing* pronounced with the second tone) in early Chinese texts, a distinction I shall return to momentarily.[14]

A second feature is the volume's regard for a »mutual learning« that goes beyond merely imposing a set of Western terms and concepts on Confucian texts. Virtue ethics, as Angle and Slote write, does not mean just Aristotle and other Western theorists; rather, »its universality exists in relation to the growing variety of particular texts and textual traditions that provide it with specificity, and some of this clearly comes out of China« (Angle, and Slote 2013: 10). Many of the papers use early Chinese texts to explore alternatives to views defended in the Western virtue ethical tradition. The paper by Huang Yong, for instance, contends that the neo-Confucian philosopher-brothers Cheng Hao (1032–1085) and Cheng Yi (1033–1107) offer resources for addressing problems that emerge in prominent versions of moral particularism.[15] Angle begins his own contribution by noting the lack of agreement among contemporary Western ethicists about whether conscientiousness is virtue; he proceeds to examine early Confucian accounts of the quality, with the idea that »stepping outside the Western tradition provides a valuable way for Western philosophers to check our bearings.«[16] The essays by Andrew Terjesen and Marion Hourdequin explore how the Confucian tradition might provide alternative foundations for empathy-based ethics.[17] Finally, the piece by Bryan Van Norden is part of a larger project that combines elements of Aristotelian, Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist virtue ethics.[18]

Such contributions are representative of the »global philosophi-

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[13] Liu Liangjian, »Virtue Ethics and Confucianism: A Methodological Reflection« (*ibid.*: 66–73).

[14] Chen Lai, »Virtue Ethics and Confucian Ethics« (*ibid.*: 15–27).

[15] Huang Yong, »Between Generalism and Particularism: The Cheng Brothers' Neo-Confucian Virtue Ethics« (*ibid.*: 162–170).

[16] S. C. Angle, »Is Conscientiousness a Virtue? Confucian Answers« (*ibid.*: 182–191).

[17] A. Terjesen, »Is Empathy the ›One Thread‹ Running through Confucianism?« (*ibid.*: 201–208); and M. Hourdequin, »The Limits of Empathy« (*ibid.*: 209–218).

[18] B. W. Van Norden, »Toward a Synthesis of Confucianism and Aristotelianism« (*ibid.*: 56–65).

cal« approach to comparative philosophy championed by Angle and others, which attempts to learn new ideas from other traditions while at the same time remaining committed to developing one's own.[19] In light of this approach, we might think that Rosemont's dichotomy of approaches to comparison is one that needs to be updated. The question of »similarities or differences?« is perhaps less relevant to today's comparative philosopher than whether we focus on »difference *within* a common framework,« such as virtue ethics, or »difference *as an alternative to* a common framework,« such as Western ethics in general.

CRE takes its point of departure from »a specific vision of human beings as relational persons constituted by the roles they live rather than as individual selves« (Ames, and Rosemont 2011: 17). It is this vision, its proponents maintain, that makes it distinct not only from deontology and utilitarianism, but also from Aristotelian and other forms of virtue ethics. We can separate CRE's claim about Confucian relational persons into both a *metaphysical thesis* and a *psychological thesis*. Whereas Aristotle's conception of the individual is based on a metaphysics of substance, CRE argues that for Confucius there is no »substantial self« left over once we take away a person's social relations. As Rosemont puts it in *Against Individualism*, »when all of [our roles] have been specified, and their relationships made manifest, then we have, for Confucius, been thoroughly individuated, but with nothing left over with which to piece together an autonomous individual self« (Rosemont 2015: 93). He devotes Chapter Three of his book to arguing that the concern with the individual self, the *real me* that exists apart from all my relationships, is at the heart of a host of misguided Western theories not just in philosophy and politics, but in the social and behavioral sciences as well.

The psychological thesis draws on Herbert Fingarette's claim in his 1972 book *The Secular as Sacred* that Confucius lacks a concept of an »inner psychic life« so familiar to his Western interpreters (Fingarette 1972: 45).[20] Since virtues like *ren* 仁 are not connected with mental states such as willing or feeling, Fingarette's account of Confucius shifts our focus outward to human interaction by means of ritual. In

[19] See S. C. Angle, *Sagehood: The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucian Philosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 6. I discuss the global philosophical approach in the last chapter of my *Doing Philosophy Comparatively* (2015).

[20] H. Fingarette, *Confucius – The Secular as Sacred*, New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

Against Individualism, Rosemont quotes with approval Fingarette's statement that »For Confucius, unless there are at least two human beings, there are no human beings,« asserting that the »private« realm is a fiction (Rosemont 2015: 97). As a result, CRE finds accounts of moral agency that rest on the notion of character to be problematic. In a recent essay critiquing Joel Kupperman's account of character, Ames and Rosemont write that their own view »would resist the uncritical substance ontology underlying Kupperman's conception of agency that requires a separation between the agent of conduct and the conduct itself« (Ames, and Rosemont 2014: 26).[21] Since Aristotelian virtue ethics likewise rests on the idea that virtuous actions must proceed from a »firm and unchanging disposition,« they think that the Greek thinker's moral psychology is a poor fit for early Confucian ethics (Ames, and Rosemont 2011: 20).

Proponents of VEC maintain that there is strong evidence suggesting that the early Confucians are committed to a notion of the self that exists independently of our roles and relationships (Sim 2007: 56 ff.; Yu 2007: 211–212). The *Analects* distinguishes between self (*ji* 己) and others (*ren* 人), and Confucius' emphasis on commitment (*zhi* 志) suggests internal self-directedness. Other passages imply the existence of relation-transcending character traits, such as when Confucius claims that the presence of a gentleman (*junzi* 君子) among the Nine Yi barbarian tribes would transform the latter, rather than they changing him (Slingerland 2011: 404).[22] Fingarette's claim about the absence of an inner psychic realm in the *Analects* has also come under scrutiny from scholars who think that there are good reasons to read the text in light of the inner/outer distinction. Confucius emphasizes self-examination, and often looks to inner character rather than external appearance to determine whether a person is virtuous (Slingerland 2013).[23] As Philip Ivanhoe sums up the case,

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[21] R. T. Ames and H. Rosemont, Jr., »From Kupperman's Character Ethics to Confucian Role Ethics: Putting Humpty Together Again,« in Chenyang Li and Peimin Ni (eds.), *Moral Cultivation and Confucian Character: Engaging Joel Kupperman*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2014, pp. 17–46. See J. Kupperman, *Character*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 59.

[22] E. Slingerland, »The Situationist Critique and Early Confucian Virtue Ethics,« *Ethics*, Vol. 121, 2011, pp. 390–419.

[23] E. Slingerland, »Cognitive Science and Religious Thought: The Case of Psychological Interiority in the *Analects*,« in *Mental Culture: Classical Social Theory and the Cognitive Science of Religion*, Bristol, CT: Acumen, 2013, pp. 197–212.

»On the Confucian view, beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and dispositions – not social roles – are largely *constitutive* of proper action« (Ivanhoe 2008: 45).

These different understandings of self are connected with different conceptions of virtue. Hall and Ames recognized early on that the focus on relations and events emphasized in their interpretation of Confucius is antithetical to the notion of virtues as attributes of substantial selves. »[I]n place of a consideration of the essential nature of abstract moral virtues,« they write in their 1987 work *Thinking Through Confucius*, »the Confucian is more concerned with an explication of the activities of specific persons in particular contexts« (Hall, and Ames 1987: 15). Ames and Rosemont's more recent defence of CRE is an elaboration of this insight, seeing virtues as the continual attaining of excellence in our relations, »virtuing,« the »activity of relating itself« (Ames, and Rosemont 2011: 34). Rosemont argues in *Against Individualism* that to say that a person is virtuous is not to ascribe a property to that person's »inner self,« but rather to make a claim about how she will act in a given role.

Proponents of VEC have in turn seen virtuous character as the defining feature of early Confucian ethics. Jiyuan Yu writes that for Confucius the attainment of *ren* »involves a full-fledged development of moral character« (Yu 2007: 48), Van Norden that »Confucius was concerned with ethical character and the cultivation of virtue« (Van Norden 2002: 20),[24] and May Sim that Confucian ethics »centers on character and its qualities and relations« (Sim 2007: 13). Sim argues that the Confucian ontology of virtue closely resembles Aristotle's, writing that »Quality is […] the category employed whenever Confucius marks out the abiding habits that qualify one as a person with a certain virtue« (*ibid*.: 53).

While the Angle and Slote volume does not mention this debate specifically, the aforementioned essays by Chen and Liu draw our attention to the distinction in early Chinese texts between virtuous character and virtuous action. Chen points out that the important account of ethics in the time period leading up to Confucius was based on »virtuous conduct« rather than »virtuous character« (Chen 2013: 17). Indeed, »virtuous character« does not appear in the *Analects*, *Mengzi*, or *Xunzi*, whereas »virtuous conduct« appears in all three

[24] B. W. Van Norden, »Introduction,« in *Confucius and the Analects: New Essays*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

texts. Liu contends that the Confucian tradition's exploration of virtuous conduct gives it a richness that surpasses Aristotelian virtue ethics (Liu 2013: 68). Hopefully these essays will lead to more discussion of the nature of virtuous conduct and virtuous character, and the connection between them, in the Confucian tradition. Is »character« a central part of the early Confucian concept-cluster?

As one reviewer commented on the debate between VEC and CRE, »there is probably no need to consider role ethics and virtue ethics to be mutually exclusive. Indeed, the idea of a virtue ethics embedded in roles, or a role ethics guided by the cultivation of virtues may well serve to approximate the Confucian view of things« (Chan 2010: 340).[25] If the best interpretation of the *Analects* does not belong solely to one interpretation or the other, then perhaps the two can help correct and clarify one another in important areas of ethical concern. We might imagine, for instance, an account of virtue in which particular roles and relationships play a more central part, so that we cannot define »courage« or »honesty« or »filial piety« without specifying the particular role in which it is displayed.[26] In Mencius' statement of »human roles,« each of the quintessential human relationships is governed by a particular norm: for fathers and children, affection (*qin* 親), for ruler and ministers, righteousness, and so on. Confucius' teachings in the *Analects* also connect virtues with specific positions: dutifulness is a quality that a minister shows in regard to his ruler; trustworthiness governs relationships between friends. To be sure, there is not a one-to-one correspondence between virtues and roles in these texts; a virtue may be valuable in multiple roles, and a single role may require a number of virtues. Yet a role-based conception of virtue might serve as an interesting counterpart to the Aristotelian view of virtues as qualities or fixed dispositions of the non-rational part of the individual's soul. At the same time, it might draw more attention to the importance of familial and other kinds of roles in the Greek thinker's ethics.[27]

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[25] A. K. Chan, Review of »Rosemont, Jr., Henry, and Roger T. Ames, *The Chinese Classic of Family Reverence: A Philosophical Translation of the Xiaojing*,« 《中國文化研究所學報》 *Journal of Chinese Studies*, Vol. 50, 2010, pp. 335–341.

[26] Ivanhoe offers a brief sketch of such an account in relation to filial piety (Ivanhoe 2008: 39 n. 16), though he maintains that the early Confucians see virtuous dispositions as the more fundamental category.

[27] For a discussion of familial roles in Aristotle and Confucius, see T. Connolly,

Despite the many differences between VEC and CRE highlighted above, I think both interpretations would agree that there is something distinctive and potentially enriching about the early Confucian emphasis on the family and community. As Ivanhoe writes in his contribution to the Angle and Slote volume, for the Confucians »Families and society in general are not simply the context or enabling conditions for human flourishing; they set constraints upon our behavior and offer core elements of what makes life good.« He thinks this element makes Confucian virtue ethics distinct from »most if not all« of its Western peers (Ivanhoe 2013: 42).[28] A similar sentiment is expressed by Van Norden, who argues that virtue ethicists like Aristotle and Aquinas do not do full justice to the relationships that are central for the early Confucians (Van Norden 2013: 63). Whether translated into language of virtue ethics or role ethics, it seems that the time is ripe for a Confucian ethics centered on virtuous human relationships.

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»Friendship and Filial Piety: Relational Ethics in Aristotle and Early Confucianism,« *Journal of Chinese Philosophy,* Vol. 39, 2012, pp. 71–88, especially section IV.

[28] P. J. Ivanhoe, »Virtue Ethics and the Chinese Confucian Tradition« (Angle, and Slote 2013, pp. 28–46.

[29] The author thanks Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach and Jim Maffie, as well as the journal's anonymous reviewers, for their contributions to this essay.

Book Reviews

Shaping Future African Philosophy

J. O. Chimakonam (ed.), *Atụọlụ Ọmalụ: Some Unanswered Questions in Contemporary African Philosophy*, Maryland: University Press of America, 2015, 315 pages.

The question about the existence of African philosophy seems to be settled. Nevertheless, the question of its future still remains. *Atụọlụ Ọmalụ: Some Unanswered Questions in Contemporary African Philosophy* sets out to chart a course for future African philosophy. The general aim is to propose a conversation between and among African philosophers and African philosophy, on the one hand, other philosophical traditions, especially non-Western, on the other. This work produces a critical survey of a structured African philosophy that aims at a future African philosophy.

The editor, Jonathan Chimakonam, and contributors to this volume identify significant questions in African philosophy. These include questions of History, Being, Ethics, Knowledge, Logic, Democracy, Cultural Imperialism, Transliteration, Culture of Philosophy, Language, the Relation between the West and the ›Rest,‹ and the Future of African Philosophy. Since there are common elements in many of the contributions, this review, though not exhaustive, will examine some key issues.

The history of African philosophy has been till date unclear because of the undecided geo-political affiliation of Egypt. Geographically, Egypt is in Africa. However, the differentiation made between the Caucasians of North Africa and the black people of Southern Sahara makes the African's claim to the legacy of civilization associated with Egypt problematic. In ›Dating and Periodization: Questions in African Philosophy‹ (9–34), Chimakonam provides a thought-provoking insight that African philosophers need not systematize the history of African philosophy according to the Western paradigm: »ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary« (4). He claims that African philosophy began following the return of the Western-trained scholars such as Leopold Senghor (1906–2001), Kwame Nkrumah (1909–1972), Julius Nyerere (1922–1999), John Mbiti, (1931–) etc. with the feeling of frustration caused by the dehumani-

zation of colonialism and slavery. This feeling of frustration generated many questions and reactions in these philosophers. Consequently, in Chimakonam's view, the history of African philosophy differs from that of European philosophy (4), in the sense that philosophy began in Africa out of frustration but in the West it began with wonder (9)[1]. However, one may argue that the distinction made between wonder and frustration is inconsequential. Both wonder and frustration can either lead to admiration/despair or can generate philosophical questions. Hence, wonder and frustration are not the beginning of philosophy but the resultant questions about reality that confront people. Arguably, it makes more sense to ground intercultural philosophy in the primacy of question.

Innocent Asouzu in his ›The Question of Being in African Philosophy: A Case for *Ibanyidanda* Ontology‹ (35–52), makes a profound and insightful contribution to the question of being. He proposes a reconciliatory approach to the ambivalence regarding human consciousness (*ihe mkpuchi anya* i. e. concealment), which constitutes the bifurcation problem or dualism in Western thought. For Asouzu, *Ibuanyidanda* ontology argues that all existent realities are »missing links of reality,« (41) in view of the unity of being and the subjectivity of consciousness (36–37). Hence, ›being‹ is ›to be with‹ *(sọ mụ adina)*; and non-being is not a negation of being but ›to be alone‹ (43).

Mulumba Obiajulu devotes his paper to ›The Question of Moral Paradigm in African Philosophy: A Case for Communocentric Ethics‹ (53–66). Relying on his analysis of African (i. e. Igbo) understanding of personhood and community (54–57), which one can also find in Ubuntu and Ujamaa, Obiajulu argues that persons are persons only within a community, through the processes of recognition which the person receives from a community (54).[2] He writes, »an individual in Igbo language therefore is *mmadu* as man is also *mmadu*« (57). However, one may argue that this is too reductionist within the Igbo language family to which he refers. Individuality is *otu* (singularity). Hence *otu* can refer to *otuonye* (human person) or *otu ihe* (one

[1] Chimakonam may not be alone in claiming that the history of philosophy in Africa is a product of struggle. Leonard Harris made the same claim about African-American philosophy, as a »philosophy born of struggle.« *Cf.* L. Harris, *Philosophy Born of Struggle: Anthology of Afro-American Philosophy from 1917*, Dubuque, USA: Kendall Hunt Publishing, 2002 [1983].

[2] This article appears to neglect the oppressive aspect of the referred African community ethics with regards to gender and the unjustly outlawed (the outcaste – *osu)*.

thing). In other words, there is a problem of transliteration. Furthermore, his etymology of *mmadu* as a contraction of *muo di ndu* (57) is also objectionable. *Muo di ndu* refers to the claim that a human being is body *and* spirit or mind *and* body. Consequently, *muo di ndu* depicts the transcendent nature of the human person. In contrast, *mmadu*, rather than a contraction of muo *di ndu*, is derived from two root words, *mma* (beauty) + *ndu* (life), which supports the idea of the sacredness of human life.

Meanwhile, regarding the knowledge question in African philosophy Chimakonam proposes a cogno-normative epistemology capable of transforming Africa (67–81). According to him, this reading provides a pragmatic approach to the nagging problem concerning African development and contains the logical structure of African thought (73). By cogno-normative, Chimakonam means a synthesis of cognitive/rational, empirical and normative aspects of the knowledge question (80), which one can interpret to be the question of epistemological authority, sources, production, decoding, communication, storage and transmission of knowledge in the modern African context. He calls this »humanized epistemology« (79).[3] For him, the question of knowledge should take an ›ought‹ rather than ›is‹ status (76–77). Thus, he argues that the ›is‹ presupposes an existing traditional epistemic order (73). Chimakonam suggests that due to the African historical predicament, there is no valid epistemic order or a valid organized authoritative knowledge (76), mainly because all that Africa is considered to have is sensual rather than rational. Moreover, for the most part knowledge is revealed by the gods (73). However, one may object that to argue that there is no epistemic order implies the denial of the existence of the epistemic agent as a historico-culturally situated agent. Moreover, experience may as well be an authoritative source of knowledge. The exclusive authority assigned to rea-

[3] I wish to observe that it is not clear what exactly Chimakonam means by a humanized epistemology. Moreover, such an argument is already present in Julius Nyerere's views on education and human development (*cf.* J. Nyerere, »Development is for Man, by Man, and of Man: The Declaration of Dar es Salaam,« in B. L. Hall, and J. R. Kidd (eds.), *Adult Education: A Design for Action*, Oxford: Pergamon, 1978, pp. 28–29). Additionally, though he criticized Paulin Hountondji, I do not see, Chimakonam distancing himself technically from Hountondji's ›reposition of the original problematics.‹ For Hountondji's argument on the question of knowledge, see P. Hountondji, *Knowledge of Africa, Knowledge by Africans: Two Perspectives on African Studies*, RCC Annual Review, 2009, pp. 1–11.

son which Chimakonam seems to defend as the sole source of valid knowledge is, stands in need of justification.

›The Logic Question in African Philosophy: Between the Horns of Irredentism and Jingoism‹ by Uduma O Uduma (83–100) and ›The Criteria Question in African Philosophy: Escape from Horns of Jingoism and Afrocentricism‹ by Jonathan Chimakonam (101–123) focus on the debate about whether logic is universal or specific to a particular philosophical tradition. Although Uduma acknowledges the motivations for an African logic that arises as a response to Eurocentrism, he claims that logic is universal, and hence, the call for an African logic is »at best tendentious« (89, 93 ff.). By that he means that the need to develop a logic with African specificity is merely a response to the question of the specificity of African philosophy, its logical form included. In contrast, Chimakonam suggests that the specificity of African philosophy also requires a specific African logic, one he calls »*ezumezu logic*« which is a three-valued logic. Chimakonam claims that in the three-valued logic, there are no contradictories (i. e. A = X is Y is true, B = X is not Y is false), rather sub-contraries that complement each other to give rise to the third value – *ezumezu (ezu + izu = ezumezu)* in a contextual mode (117). One needs a close study of the proposed three-valued logic to critically evaluate its validity. Nevertheless, if he argues that logic is primarily about intelligibility (107), it means that logic is a way of reasoning to communicate truth or understanding. Hence, there is nothing in *ezumezu* logic that denies Uduma's claim to the universality of logic in so far as, logic, two-valued or three-valued, is about intelligibility. Nevertheless, Uduma remarks that »though, logic as a study of formal inference was non-existent in traditional Africa, the situation is not different in the West because it is only those trained logicians both in the West and Africa are at home with the formal logical inference of truth« (86). Consequently, the non-existence of formal logic does not entail absence of logic in its informal form.

I would like to conclude with some general comments. Firstly, Chimakonam's etymological analysis of ›*Atụọlụ Ọmalụ*‹ (1–3), is not satisfactory. *Atụọlụ Ọmalụ*, whose completion is *Ọmalụ mana Atụọlụ ofeke ofenye isi n'ọhia* stands for the idea that a word is enough for the wise. The use of *atụọlụ ọmalụ* is not elitist. Chimakonam's analysis, in which he distinguishes the knower (philosopher) from the ›unknower‹ (non-philosopher) (1–2), suggests a certain kind of elitism. Within the cultural and language family where it is used,

Ofeke means fool. But an unknower, who is not an expert in philosophy, need not be a fool.

Furthermore, knowledge is contextual and situated within the circumstances of the epistemic agent. Consequently, one may not talk about objective knowledge devoid of the subjective circumstances of the epistemic agent, since the epistemic agent has a central role to play in the knowledge process. In other words, knowledge cannot be abstracted from the particularities of human circumstance; space and time play a role in the making and evaluation of knowledge claims.

It is indeed important to commend the contributors of this anthology for distilling these wide-ranging issues concerning African philosophy and Africa in general. Coming from within and outside Sub-Sahara Africa and beyond Africa, the contributions set the stage for a critical engagement on African thought. Although the several questions this volume raises and the proffered answers are not exhaustive, one may confidently say that it is a step in the direction of shaping a future African philosophy and general development of Africa.

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Provincializing Europe From Within

M. do Mar Castro Varela, and N. Dhawan, *Postkoloniale Theorie – Eine kritische Einführung*, 2nd ed., Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2015, 369 pages.

In the German academic context, postcolonial theory has finally arrived to stay, as the introduction to the second edition confirms. Undoubtedly, this is in part due to the publication of Castro Varela's and Dhawan's book *Postkoloniale Theorie,* two leading theorists of postcolonial feminist theory. This new, second edition is greatly expanded focusing on new texts by the late Edward Said, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, and Homi Bhabha and an engagement with critiques of their works as well as presenting new developments in postcolonial theory with pressing contemporary global social justice issues. This important primer presents a detailed and extensive overview of key discourses on colonialism, imperialism, and modernity. With each chapter extensively revised and over two hundred additional pages, this is almost a completely new book, not merely a second edition.

Castro Varela and Dhawan skillfully bring up contemporary debates on German colonialism, thus providing an important corrective to what continues to be treated as an afterthought in mainstream discourses about genocide, reparations, and the like. The call for apologies and reparations for the first genocide of the twentieth century against the Herero and Nama has come to a head in the year of the hundredth anniversary of Namibia's liberation from German colonialism. So a publication on postcolonialism in 2015 couldn't be more timely.

Aimé Césaire's magisterial *Discourse on Colonialism* (1955) sets the stage for emergence of postcolonial studies. The field as such is established after Edward Said's intervention with *Orientalism* (1978), which is labeled as the »foundational document of postcolonial theory« (p. 96).[1] Similarly, V. Y. Mudimbe's *The Invention of Africa* (1988) serves as foundational text for postcolonial studies in African Studies and Walter Mignolo's *The Idea of Latin America* (2005) for

[1] Unless otherwise specified, all translations are mine.

decolonial studies in Latin American Studies (p. 95, n. 6). Castro Varela and Dhawan contend that Said (and, I would add, Frantz Fanon) takes a special role in charting the course regarding »anticolonial resistance, strategies of decolonization and critiquing eurocentrism« (p. 94).

Why focus (critically) on Said, Spivak, Bhaba? Does the impetus come from Robert Young's (1995) famous categorization of them as the »Holy Trinity«?[2] Why not choose a Latin American author? *Postkoloniale Theorie* notes the far-reaching impact of conceptual interventions like Said's orientalism, Spivak's subaltern, and Bhabha's hybridity. All of them are inspired by »high theory« French theorists, notably engaging in an ambivalent fashion with Michel Foucault, especially in the case of Said and Spivak. While Said heavily draws on Foucault's discourse analysis in his early work and later turns against him, Spivak moderates her early poignant critique of Foucault in her later work.

The familiar charge of »high theory« raised against Spivak and Bhabha's affinity for poststructuralist thought is deftly addressed. And what is especially noteworthy is that the authors are able to write in an accessible jargon, rather than replicating the dense and obfuscating rhetorical styles of Spivak and Bhabha. A particular concern is the aspect of complicity of being elite intellectuals in elite (Ivy League) universities, which practically haunts Said. Ironically, Bhabha is least concerned with complicity and practical applications of his literary analysis while he faces more critique than Spivak or Said for having little to say about material conditions of the peoples he writes about (p. 250). Castro Varelo and Dhawan tellingly highlight this dispute with the suggestive subtitle »Bhabha in the crossfire of critique« (p. 268).

Castro Varela and Dhawan carefully lay out overlapping interests among diverse thinkers such as Spivak, Said, and Bhabha. Befitting a primer on postcolonial theory, they explain the »post« in postcolonial. After all, Spivak's and Bhabha's ideological commitments couldn't be more different, even though both critique eurocentrist philosophy while drawing on poststructuralist insights. Castro Varela and Dhawan conclude their book with a sharp critique of Vivek Chibber's *Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital* (2013) which in

[2] R. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture, and Race*, London and New York: Routledge, 1995.

turn accuses the *South Asian Subaltern Studies Group* of ignoring the universalizing tendencies of capital and reinscribing orientalism (pp. 326–327).

Even though the authors note that the postcolonial thinkers mentioned above do not focus on a specific region, postcolonial theory as such tends to be identified with India and scholars of *South Asian Subaltern Studies* in particular. By contrast, Latin Americanist intellectuals (e.g., *Latin American Subaltern Studies Group*) have branded their own school of thought as a »decolonial option« (Mignolo). Helpfully, Castro Varela and Dhawan discuss the competing postcolonial and decolonial schools of thought and fault Mignolo and Grosfoguel for mischaracterizing postcolonial theory and being mired in contradictions. For instance, Mignolo and Grosfoguel charge that members of the South Asian collective rely on high theory of French poststructuralists, yet they do not problematize the fact that prominent decolonial theorists are also western educated and draw on Marxist theory (pp. 318–326). Mignolo and Grosfoguel hold that postcolonial theorists such as the *South Asian Subaltern Studies* focus merely on literary texts and not on social reality, which Castro Varela and Dhawan claim is clearly false (pp. 322 and pp. 85). This fallacy can only »stick« as true if postcolonial theory were indeed an exposition of a singular ideological perspective. This is not the case because it draws on »multidirectionality,« e.g., in its critique of global capital, austerity measures as part of structural adjustment programs, intellectual property rights and biopiracy, as well as other excesses of neocolonialism, working with critical race theory, feminist theory, Marx, Foucault, and Derrida.

With its focus on Said and South Asian subaltern studies, *Postkoloniale Theorie* gives a nuanced account on the diverse ideological commitments within the larger postcolonial studies context. Therefore, it is understandable, that the few representative decoloniality scholars of Latin American and Caribbean scholars are perhaps too quickly labeled as belonging to a specific group, when in reality they may not share common intellectual agendas.

Postkoloniale Theorie briefly engages with representatives of the Black Atlantic. For those readers who are not familiar with Fanon's work, it would be helpful to explain the logical discrepancy between noting Fanon's well-known antipathy of essentialized notion of négritude (p. 137, n.19) and his defense of négritude in context of Spivak's strategic essentialism (p. 308).

For a primer or an introductory text, it would have greatly helped having at least an author index. However, the authors present a good compilation of biographical material with a focus on primary and secondary texts concerning writings by Spivak, Said, and Bhaba.

Overall, this primer on postcolonial theory is an excellent introduction and should be of interest to undergraduates as well as experts in cultural studies; area, diaspora and ethnic studies; and literary studies (to name a few). Importantly, it serves as a key foundational text to the project of provincializing Europe from within Europe.

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Addendum

Addendum

In my paper ›Relationships Between Early Modern Christian and Islamicate Societies in Eurasia and North Africa as Reflected in the History of Science and Medicine‹ published in an earlier issue of this journal,[1] I mentioned one of my forthcoming papers. The paper in question deals with historiographical issues found in publications by historians of science and medicine and other academics interested in the Portuguese physician Garcia da Orta (d. 1567). Since then, I rewrote a substantial part of this paper because in Winter 2015, a new book on Orta and his work appeared. It is edited by Palmira Fontes da Costa.[2] The most valuable contribution – in my view – amongst its twelve papers comes from Dr. Costa. Under the header »Identity and the Construction of Memory in Representations of Garcia de Orta,« she discusses the various efforts to glorify Orta as the »founding father« of »Portuguese« medicine, »the pioneer« of tropical medicine, the »first European« writer on Asian medical plants and drugs, a central rallying point for »national identity« and, more recently, as a hero of the East-West exchange of knowledge (Costa 2015: 237–264). She emphasizes that many writers about the Portuguese physician and merchant often represented the content of his book literally and in uncritical admiration, leading to hyperbole and magnification, a situation made worse by a lack of historical knowledge and sophisticated methodology and the also otherwise widespread inclination of academics to repeat the mistakes and judgments of previous authors (*ibid.*: 264). She is one of the first writers on Orta whom I encountered in academic literature who makes clear that such research and

[1] S. Brentjes, ›Relationships Between Early Modern Christian and Islamicate Societies in Eurasia and North Africa as Reflected in the History of Science and Medicine,‹ *Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies*, Vol. 3, 2015, pp. 85–121.

[2] P. Fontes da Costa, *Medicine, Trade and Empire: Garcia de Orta's Colloquies on the Simples and Drugs of India (1563) in Context*, London: Ashgate, 2015.

writing practices carry with them political, ideological and scientific legitimation strategies (*ibid*.: 255, 258). In the case of Orta, such value statements are closely linked to positions on Portuguese colonialism, the Portuguese Inquisition, Catholicism and Judaism, scientific progress and the importance of ancient Greek, Islamic, Indian and modern Western contributions to the sciences and medicine (*ibid*.: 255–262). Understandably, she overlooks the very same tendencies in some of the papers included in this new book. But given the substantial shortcomings of previous papers and books on Orta along the lines described by Costa, her analysis as well as the book as a whole are an important step forward towards a more balanced and reliable historical evaluations of the man and his work.

–Sonja Brentjes, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science, Berlin, Germany

Institutional Programs

»Light and Shadow« Summer School in Istanbul, 17–22 August 2015

In the context of UNESCO's »Year of Light« the Fourth International Summer School, organized by the Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin Research Foundation (FSRF) for the History of Science in Islam, focused on a cross-disciplinarily approach to various aspects of »Light and Shadow«. Located in the former stables of the Topkapı Palace, the foundation is cooperating with the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Vakıf University in Istanbul (FSMVU).

Vision and Light

After Dr. Detlev Quintern (FSRF) had welcomed the attendees, the scope and the activities of UNESCO's year of the light were introduced by Selçuk Aktürk (Istanbul Technical University). Following a historical time-line, theories of vision and light (Plato, Euclid) were presented along with problems of translation (Greek–Arabic), notably in the Chapter »On Sight« by Nemesius, which was translated by Isḥāq b. Ḥunayn (809–873). Elaheh Kheirandish's (Harvard University, USA) presentation »The Checkered History of Early Optics« covered the development of optics as an early interdisciplinary study, combining mathematical and geometrical methods with physical and optical experiments. Zeynep Kuleli (FSMVU) introduced Ibn al-Haytham's (965– c. 1040) book of optics *(Kitāb al-Manāẓir)*. Known in the West as Alhazen, Ibn Haytham is considered the father of modern optics. He underlines that a scientist should always be critical of the sources he is studying, she/he should also be self-critical in order to avoid preconceptions. Ibn al-Haytham established not only the optical laws of light's movements, but analyzed at the same time the anatomy of the eye to which the rays of light are reflected from the objects in straight lines. For the first time he scientifically reflected the phenomena of the Camera Obscura, and in our summer school these were demonstrated practically in a darkened room by Maryam Farahmand (University of Teheran, Iran). Her presentation »Light, Shadow and Images – Historizing the Camera Obscura« elucidated the long knowledge-waves in the history of optics which led to new techniques of painting (central perspective) and finally to photography.

Modern applications were presented by Yücel Aşıkoğlu (Istanbul University, Istanbul): e. g. the nineteenth century paraxinoscope, a mirror effects based entertainment device.

Mathematics

The famous Alhazen Problem was introduced by Henk Hietbrink (Utrecht University, Netherlands) who demonstrated the methods which are necessary to find the point on a mirror from where the light ray is reflected to the eye, given a light source and a spherical mirror. This also led Ibn al-Haytham mathematically to an equation of the fourth degree. Ruward Mulder and Sander Kooi (Utrecht University, Netherlands) demonstrated the determination of π to 16 decimals, following thereby a manuscript of al-Kāshī (d. 1429). In a workshop the square root of 3 was computed and checked by recalculation.

Medicine and Ophthalmology

Alicia Maravelia (Hellenic Institute of Egyptology, Athens) framed the development of »Enlightening Ophtalmiatric Surgery from the Alexandrian Medicine to Islamic Medicine«, while emphasizing especially on old Egyptian contributions to the history of eye surgery. Kadircan Keskinbora (History of Medicine and Ethics, Bahçeşehir University, Istanbul) outlined »Classic Arabic-Islamic Contributions to Ophtalmology«, introducing further developments in the field of cataract surgery from the tenth century onwards. In a »Historical Note on the Light Reflex« Mojtaba Heydari (Shiraz University of Medical Sciences, Iran) shed light on pathophysiology and clinical applications, focusing on what is set out in al-Rāzī (d. 925), thereby emphasizing the progress he made compared to Galen. In »Medical Aspects of Light in Islamic Medicine« Seyyed Hamdollah Mosavat (Shiraz University of Medical Sciences, Iran) deduced on the basis of historical texts light effects on health, e. g. the moonlight's stimulating and self-healing effects. Antonia Viertel (Münster University, Germany) gave an insight into »Spiritual Medicine in Islam,« introducing the book »Mufarriḥ an-nafs« written by Ibn Qaḍī Baʿalbakkī (thirteenth century). »Cheering up the Soul« can be achieved not

only with a specific nutrition or medicine, but also with melodies, fragrances and not least by visual perception of cheerful colors.

Astronomy and Astrology

Fathi Jarray (University of Tunis, Tunisia) discussed »The Measurement of Time in Tunisia through History«. Mainly horizontal, vertical and equatorial sundials were used to indicate shadows which change in direction and length due to the earth travelling round the sun in an elliptic orbit. The earth's axis is tilted at about 26 degrees. Hani Muhammad Ismail Dalee (Astronomy Outreach/QEERI-Qatar Foundation) proved to us the accuracy of the sundial which is in the center of the arches to the south of Al-Aqsa Mosque in the old city of Jerusalem. During an out-door workshop and considering the latitude of Istanbul (41°), the sun time was computed with self-made sundials (cardboard). Amir Moosavi and Elahe Javadi (University of Tehran, Iran) instructed a workshop, in which an astrolabe was constructed in cardboard and determined on a latitude of 40° (near to Istanbul), showing the sky with the stars and planets, noting the months, days and hours. The positions of stars and planets at a given time were determined.

Viktor Blâsjö (Utrecht University, Netherlands) discussed »The Rationale for Astrology,« showing why it was thought that certain constellations and positions of stars and planets might influence human moods and decisions. Wilfried de Graaf (Utrecht University, Netherlands) prepared an Astrolabe (cardboard) computed and designed by Zawraqī, based on the detailed descriptions by the great mathematician and astronomer Abū Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī (d. 1048). While using the zodiacal signs with the corresponding Iranian months and western dates, the local time on the birthdays of the participants were computed, supposing the sun is on a certain degree above the horizon.

Philosophy and Mystic

Qudratullah Qorbani (Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran) discussed »Suhrawardī's (1155–1191) Illuminationist Philosophy« *(hikmet-ul ishrak)*, emphasizing the central role of light and darkness in Suhra-

wardī's philosophy. Everything that is alive, moves and exists as »light.« Another understanding of »existence« was brought into the discussion by Nader Schokrollahi (Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran), referring to the philosophy of Mulla Ṣadrā (d. 1641), who took up Suhrawardī's light-philosophy and conceptualized »evolutionary stages of being«. Here »light« was replaced by »existence« and »shadow« by »quiddity. »Who is Ibn Yaḥyā in Tschaikovsky's Opera Jolanta?« by Detlev Quintern (FSMVU) raised the question of human sense perception. Jolanta, who became blind in her early childhood, was taught by the Arab physician Ibn Yaḥyā from Cordoba. Tschaikovsky's opera deals with the complex issue whether »seeing« is replaceable with other senses such us touching or »seeing with the heart.«

Poetry, Coloring and Architecture

Christiane Czygan (University of Hamburg, Germany) analyzed the poetry of »light and darkness in the imagery of Kanuni Sultan Süleyman's Third Divan« and embedded the Sultan's poems into the historical context. »Natural Dyes from Plants and their Practical Applications« by Ingrid Hehmeyer (Ryerson University, Canada) applied specific plants used in dying to natural cloth (cotton) during a workshop. Muhammad Mahdi Abdollahzadeh's (Shahid Behesti University Iran) concluded the summer school with »Natural Light's Effect on Human Health«, emphasizing the importance of light in our surroundings. Architects should be careful to plan bright living spaces. Even bathrooms, where mostly no windows are installed, should have wide windows.

To round off the »Light and Shadow« Summer School a workshop was held by the Black Sea Coast of Şile. With a telescope, brought by Zeynep Aydoğan (FSMVU), stars were observed. Hani Dalee and Maryam Farahmand taught how to identify stars, constellations and zodiac signs.

–Yurdagül Ertem, Prof. Dr. Fuat Sezgin Research Foundation for the History of Science in Islam, Istanbul, Turkey

Notes on Contributors

Mustafa Abu Sway was appointed as the first holder of the Integral Chair for the Study of Imam Ghazali's Work at the Holy Al-Aqsa Mosque and at Al-Quds University in 2012 (King Abdullah II Endowment). He is also Dean, College of Da'wah and Usul Al-Din, and College of the Qur'an and Islamic Studies, Al-Quds University (2014).

He has been Professor of Philosophy and Islamic Studies at Al-Quds University in Jerusalem, Palestine, since 1996. He taught at the International Islamic University in Malaysia including a year at the Institute for Islamic Thought and Civilization-ISTAC (1993–96) and was a visiting Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence at the Wilkes Honors College at Florida Atlantic University (2003–4), as well as a visiting professor at Bard College, New York (2008–2010).

Prof. Abu Sway earned his Ph.D. from Boston College (1993), dissertation title: »The Development of Al-Ghazali's Genetic Epistemology.«

Through his writings and worldwide lectures Prof. Abu Sway has contributed to studies on Imam Al-Ghazali, classical and contemporary Islamic issues, and the Palestinian question. He is also active in interfaith circles.

Prof. Abu Sway is a member of the Hashemite Fund for the Restoration of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock, Islamic Waqf Council in Jerusalem, and the Association of Muslim Scholars and 'Ulama in Palestine.

Prof Abu Sway has appeared on numerous times on Al-Jazeera, BBC, CNN and others.

Arun Bala is a physicist and philosopher of science who is Senior Research Fellow with the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, and currently Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto. His publications include: *The Dia-*

logue of Civilizations in the Birth of Modern Science (Palgrave, Macmillan, 2006), *Asia, Europe and The Emergence of Modern Science: Knowledge Crossing Boundaries* (ed., Palgrave Macmillan 2012), and *The Bright Dark Ages: Comparative and Connective Perspectives* (eds. Arun Bala and Prasenjit Duara, Brill, 2016). His recent research focuses on the implications for philosophy of science of the dialogical connections across the Eurasian region that shaped the rise of contemporary scientific ideas in the early modern era.

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