Confluence: Journal of World Philosophies <p><cite>Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies</cite> is a bi-annual, peer-reviewed, international journal dedicated to comparative thought. It seeks to explore common spaces and differences between philosophical traditions in a global context. Without postulating cultures as monolithic, homogenous, or segregated wholes, it aspires to address key philosophical issues which bear on specific methodological, epistemological, hermeneutic, ethical, social, and political questions in comparative thought.</p><p><cite>Confluence</cite> aims to develop the contours of a philosophical understanding not subservient to dominant paradigms and provide a platform for diverse philosophical voices, including those long silenced by dominant academic discourses and institutions. <cite>Confluence</cite> also endeavors to serve as a juncture where specific philosophical issues of global interest may be explored in an imaginative, thought-provoking, and pioneering way. We welcome innovative and persuasive ways of conceptualizing, articulating, and representing intercultural encounters. Contributions should be able to facilitate the development of new perspectives on current global thought-processes and sketch the outlines of salient future developments.</p><p><strong>Please note:</strong> <cite>Confluence: Online Journal of World Philosophies</cite> is no longer published. To read the back issues of <cite>Confluence</cite>, follow <a href="/iupjournals/index.php/confluence/issue/archive">this link</a>. The journal is now publishing as the <cite><a href="/iupjournals/index.php/jwp/index">Journal of World Philosophies</a></cite>.</p> en-US (Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach) (Dan Pyle) Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:10 -0500 OJS 60 Thinking Dialogically about Dialogue with Martin Buber and Daya Krishna <p> The first half of the paper consists of a philosophical reflection upon a historical exchange. I discuss Buber’s famous letter, and another (less known but not less interesting) letter by J. L. Magnes, to Mahatma Gandhi, both challenging the universality of the principle of ahiṃsā(non-violence). I also touch on Buber’s interest and acquaintance with Indian philosophy, as an instance of dialogue de-facto (not just in theory) across cultures. Gandhi never answered these letters, but his grandson and philosopher extraordinaire Ramchandra Gandhi ›answers‹ Buber, not on the letter but about the ideal of dialogue at large, and the interconnection of dialogue and ahiṃsā. The second half of the paper focuses on the work of Daya Krishna, another ›philosopher of dialogue.‹ from within Daya Krishna’s vast philosophical corpus, I underscore one of his last projects, in which he sketches the outlines of what he refers to as »knowledge without certainty,« contrary to common and traditional ways of perceiving the concept of knowledge. I argue that the pramāṇa, means and measure of knowledge, in the intriguing case of »knowledge without certainty,« depicted by Daya Krishna as open-ended, dynamic, constantly evolving, is inevitably dialogue, and I aim to disclose the meaning and salience of dialogue in Daya Krishna’s oeuvre. However, not just the content, but also the form, or the ›how,‹ matters in my paper. I use different materials across genres and disciplines to rethink, in dialogue with Buber and Daya Krishna, the possibilities and impossibilities (with emphasis on the possibilities) of dialogue. These ›materials‹ include Milan Kundera and Richard Rorty, Krishna and Arjuna (of the <cite>Bhagavadgītā</cite>), Vrinda Dalmiya who works with the notion of care as bridging between epistemology and ethics, Wes Anderson on seeing through the eyes of the other, and Ben Okri on hospitality in the realm of ideas. As author of the present paper I am moderating an imagined a multi-vocal dialogue between these ›participants‹ on dialogue as concept, as craft and especially, as a great necessity in the world in which we live.</p> Daniel Raveh ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:03 -0500 Siddhis and Psi Research: An Interdisciplinary Analysis <p> Psi experiences, or siddhis, are one among many varieties of human experiences reported from ancient times across cultural and geographical boundaries. The data and theories from psi research inform philosophical debates on the nature of time, causality, information and their implications for the free-will–determinism debate. In this article we present an overview of theoretical approaches of psi research, and the varieties of siddhis mentioned in classical Indian literature. Further, we examine siddhis in relation to the findings from contemporary psi research, with particular reference to informational psi, along the dimensions of training, personality, and meditation.</p> Sonali Bhatt Marwaha ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:04 -0500 Brief Comments on »Siddhis and Psi Research: An Interdisciplinary Analysis« N/A Edward F. Kelly ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:05 -0500 The Scientific Revolution and the Transmission Problem <p> Recent dialogical histories of science propose that the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century was shaped by contributions from different astronomical traditions of the Eurasian region – especially the Maragha School of Arabic astronomy, the Chinese infinite empty space cosmology and the Indian Kerala School of astronomy. Such narratives are based on many discoveries in these traditions which antedate similar discoveries made in Europe during the Scientific Revolution. These views have generated intense objections from critics of the dialogical perspective who maintain independent discovery in Europe of these parallel achievements by repudiating claims for transmission as lacking documentary evidence or acknowledgment. This paper explores these debates using transmissions from the Maragha tradition as a case study. It proposes that a plausible case for transmissions can be made on the basis of circumstantial evidence even in the absence of direct documentary evidence.</p> Arun Bala ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:05 -0500 On the Paradigm Shift of Comparative Studies of Heidegger and Chinese Philosophy <p> In this paper, I first address two facets that can play a role in initiating a paradigm shift in comparative studies of Heidegger and Chinese philosophy: One is the necessity of renovating methodology in studies of Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy. The other is an adequate understanding of Heidegger’s own comportment toward East-West dialogue. In this connection I briefly respond to some criticisms of my book Heidegger on East-West Dialogue: Anticipating the Event . Then I stake out three directions of re-configuration or reorientation entailed in such a paradigm shift. The first direction is concerned with a deconstruction of the notion of philosophy. The second direction is related to a critical and intercultural approach to Heidegger’s thinking. The third direction is connected with the overcoming of the unilateral direction in comparative studies.</p> Lin Ma ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:05 -0500 Islam: Philosophy and Law-making <p> Historically, ethical deliberations amongst religious scholars in Islam played a far more important role in determining ethical and social practices of Muslims than did analogous deliberations by philosophers. A common language was never developed between scholars of the two disciplines, a circumstance which still feeds into a growingly unhealthy relationship in Muslim society today between two registers, the religious and the rational. Primarily this was the result of the philosophers’ dogma that theirs was a superior reasoning methodology to that of the jurists. Besides challenging this dogma by exposing the rational rigor practiced by jurists, this paper argues that a long needed common language between the two registers is vital if modern Muslim society is to set a healthy course for itself in an ever-changing world.</p> Sari Nusseibeh ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:06 -0500 Symposium: »Is Reason a Neutral Tool in Comparative Philosophy?« <p> Is Reason a Neutral Tool in Comparative Philosophy? In his answer to the symposium’s question, Jonardon Ganeri develops a »Manifesto for [a] Re:emergent Philosophy.« Tracking changes in the understanding of ›comparative philosophy,‹ he sketches how today’s world of academic philosophy seems to be set to enter an »age of re:emergence« in which world philosophies will (and can) be studied through modes of global participation. In their responses, the symposium’s discussants tease out implications of this <cite>Manifesto</cite>  for different issues: While Mustafa Abu Sway suggests that comparative philosophy be understood as an intra-philosophical dialogue, whose aim depends on its participants, Paul Boghossian questions whether there can be conflicting, yet equally valid, ways of arriving at justified beliefs about the world. For her part, Georgina Stewart draws out the similarities between Ganeri’s understanding of comparative philosophy and the ethical stance involved in studying Maori science. In his <cite>Reply</cite>, Ganeri fleshes out his understanding of a pluralistic realism. Only an epistemic culture, which is open to a plurality of epistemic stances, he contends, can propel polycentric modes of knowledge production.</p> Jonardon Ganeri, Mustafa Abu Sway, Paul Boghossain, Georgina Stewart ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:06 -0500 W. E. B. Du Bois in the Ruins of the Warsaw Ghetto: Notes on the Relations of ›Race‹ and ›Racism‹ <p> My paper addresses the importance of a broad approach in the analysis of racism. To this end, I discuss the relations of ›race‹ and ›racism‹ in three sections. <cite>First</cite>, I deal with the subject matter of racism analysis. Investigating the opposition of purity and mixture, I conclude that racism includes more than race. <cite>Second</cite>, I oppose the increasing hypertrophy of the race concept. Discussing the position of W. J. T. Mitchell, I highlight some problems concerning the over expansion of the category of race. <cite>Third</cite>, proceeding from the thoughts of W. E. B. Du Bois on witnessing the destroyed Warsaw Ghetto, I design a virtual exhibition room. It elucidates the necessity of a concept of racism that exceeds the range of race.</p> Wulf D. Hund ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:07 -0500 Does Comparative Philosophy Have a Fusion Future? <p> This essay challenges the claim that fusion philosophy is the successor to comparative philosophy. Comparative philosophy should find itself deeply at odds with the approach to various philosophical problems and traditions that fusion philosophy is taking, and comparative philosophers will surely deny Mark Siderits’<span>1 </span> (2003: xi) claim that they have been superseded. The manner then in which fusion philosophy dismisses comparativist concerns and objections is to admit that such objections are valid in some case but to deny that they are intrinsic to good fusion philosophy. Comparativists however generally do not claim that fusion philosophy is necessarily or inherently bound to make the mistakes and contribute to misunderstandings that they claim it often does. Their claim is that from the start such philosophy often does make just these kinds of problematic errors and assumptions, and that this is what comparativist philosophy must seek to avoid. By the time fusionists are done defending – actually&lt; sanitizing – fusion philosophy from comparativist objections, one is left not with fusion philosophy but with what is – from the comparativist perspective – comparative philosophy. There is no succession from comparative philosophy to fusion philosophy and no segue from one to the other.</p> Michael Levine ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:08 -0500 On the Way to Intercultural Philosophy <p> In this autobiographical essay, I will sketch some events which have played a significant role in my intellectual biography. I began my career with a study of Islamic thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries before turning towards a study of Sufism. The exchanges, which took place with colleagues during conferences conducted by the East-West Philosophers’ Conferences, proved to be crucial for my further philosophical development. My current philosophizing is marked by a turn towards intercultural philosophy. In many ways, my own intellectual biography parallels socio-political developments. What began as an intellectual exchange with Soviet fellow philosophers during the heydays of the USSR has matured towards a quest for an intercultural philosophical standpoint.</p> Mariettta Stepanyants ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:08 -0500 Philosophy on a Bridge <p> The author takes a quick look back at his philosophical education and academic interests through the lens of »comparative philosophy« and uncovers a progression of cross-cultural and cross-historical patterns at work, many of them unfolding tacitly beneath the surface. He concludes with a brief listing of five such patterns, culminating in an appeal for a recovery of unified world views shaped within particular traditions but set against the universal backdrop of a common care for the earth.</p> James W. Heisig ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:09 -0500 Virtues and Roles in Early Confucian Ethics <p> Many passages in early Confucian texts such as the <cite>Analects</cite> and <cite>Mengzi</cite> are focused on virtue, recommending qualities like humaneness (<cite>ren</cite> 仁 ), righteousness (<cite>yi</cite> 義 ), and trustworthiness (<cite>xin</cite> 信 ). Still others emphasize roles: what it means to be a good son, a good ruler, a good friend, a good teacher, or a good student. How are these teachings about virtues and roles related? In the past decade there has been a growing debate between two interpretations of early Confucian ethics, one that sees virtues as fundamental, and the other of which starts from roles. Recently there have been two new contributions to the debate: <cite>Virtue Ethics and Confucianism</cite> (2013), edited by Stephen C. Angle and Michael Slote, which develops the virtue ethical interpretation, and Henry Rosemont, Jr.’s <cite>Against Individualism: A Confucian Rethinking of the Foundations of Morality, Politics, Family, and Religion</cite> (2015), which defends the role-based interpretation. This paper lays out the main contours of the debate between Virtue Ethical Confucianism and Confucian Role Ethics, as well as examines the distinctive contributions of these two new works.</p> Tim Connolly ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:09 -0500 Shaping Future African Philosophy <p>J. O. Chimakonam (ed.), <cite>Atụọlụ Ọmalụ: Some Unanswered Questions in Contemporary African Philosophy</cite>, Maryland: University Press of America, 2015, 315 pages.</p> Christiana Idika ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:10 -0500 Provincializing Europe From Within <p>M. do Mar Castro Varela, and N. Dhawan, <cite>Postkoloniale Theorie – Eine kritische Einführung</cite>, 2nd ed., Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2015, 369 pages.</p> Mechthild Nagel ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:10 -0500 Addendum N/A Sonja Brentjes ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:10 -0500 »Light and Shadow« Summer School in Istanbul, 17–22 August 2015 N/A Yurdagül Ertem ##submission.copyrightStatement## Wed, 16 Nov 2016 09:15:10 -0500