National Context and Ethnocentrism

Abstract
In this survey article, the author reviews three recent works concerning Slovak history. They criticize the idea of a ›national revival‹ and present the history of the national movement as a later construct omitting the variety of contradicting ideologies which propelled it. By introducing a broader perspective, they show how an isolated tradition of thought can become comprehensible or relevant outside of its self-imposed cultural borders.

Keywords
nationalism, national revival, Slovakia, Hungary, ethnocentrism.

I   Introducing Ethnocentrism as a Problem of Philosophy

Since the earliest times, European philosophy was faced with its locality. The tradition called ›philosophy‹ by its admirers and proponents did not hold the sole claim for truth and wisdom against the ›barbarian‹ traditions (Diogenes Laërtius 1915: 3),[1] yet it could not escape its identification with the Hellenic world for long. The ancient Sceptics already saw the cultural background as an obstacle: the determination of one's thoughts by the social environment narrows the perspective from which a problem can be examined (*ibid*.: 410). Later thinkers from the early modern era criticized this aspect of things as well. We are limited both from an objective point of view, from the aspect of language and traditional methods of inquiry (Bacon 1863, Book 1, Aphorism 43),[2] as well as from a subjective view, because of

boastful pride (Vico 1948: 125).[3] Notwithstanding the rising interest in non-European traditions of thought, as well as the gradual globalization of the academic sphere, these matters have also become more urgent.

Starting with the second half of the twentieth century, scholars of philosophy and other human sciences have adopted the term ›ethnocentrism‹ for these limitations. The term itself comes from the field of American social psychology. It was coined in 1908 by the social Darwinist thinker William G. Sumner (1906: 15)[4] and later used by David Levinson (1949),[5] working with Theodor Adorno's research team on the problem of ›authoritarian personality.‹ Both theories diverged in their definitions of ›ingroup,‹ meaning, the ideal group which reveres the values of the ethnocentrist person. For Sumner, ethnocentrism is a phenomenon observable in the cultural output of major cultural groups like nations; for Levinson, it is a property of an individual, while the reference group of one's ethnocentrism does not have to reflect his actual ethnic identity.

Other human sciences focused on two main effects of ethnocentrism. For anthropologists the problem was more epistemological in nature: it described the tendency to make analogies between the researcher's society and that of the object of study. In this way the criticism of Clifford Geertz (1989)[6] or Ernest Gellner (1996)[7] continued the idea of cultural relativism, proposed variously by Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, and Edmund Leach (1964).[8] For others, the use of local categories from the thinker's cultural background for societies outside of it was not only a methodological weakness, but it was also seen as a forceful imposition of a foreign order. In the terminology of Edward Said, human sciences – anthropology, history, sociology, and also phi-

[1] Diogenes Laërtius, *The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*, C. D. Yonge (trans.), London: Bell and Sons, 1915.
[2] F. Bacon, *The New Organon, or: True Directions Concerning the Interpretation of Nature*, J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath (trans.), Boston: Taggard and Thompson 1863 (Online edition at: http://www.constitution.org/bacon/nov_org.htm, last accessed on 25 May 2014).
[3] G. Vico, *The New Science*, T. G. Bergin and M. H. Fisch (transl), New York: Ithaca, 1948.
[4] W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, Boston: Athenaeum Press, 1906.
[5] D. J. Levinson, ›An Approach to the Theory and Measurement of Ethnocentric Ideology,‹ *Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 28, 1949, pp. 19–39.
[6] C. Geertz, *Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as an Author*, Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1989.
[7] E. Gellner, *Anthropology and Politics*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.
[8] E. R. Leach, *Political Systems of Highland Burma: A Study of Kachin Social Structure*, London: G. Bell and Sons, 1964.

losophy – thus continued the European (or, more generally, Western) colonization of the ›third world‹ in the intellectual sphere (Said 1978).[9] This line of thought, especially as articulated in debate between Geertz and Richard Rorty (*cf.* Geertz 1985; Rorty 1991),[10] but as already similarly initiated by Jacques Derrida (1997),[11] entered the philosophical discourse as well. Recent discussion on political terms proposed by non-Western thinkers found these terms often marked as nationalist or otherwise locally biased by their Western critics (Dallmayr 2004).[12] The term gained an ethical (or political) meaning, reflecting phenomena like disrespect of ›lesser‹ cultures, marginalization of their philosophical traditions or history, attempts for assimilation, and such. In this way, the borders between epistemological, ethical, and political questions were quite blurred.

Recent discussions within the field of cross-cultural philosophy adopt the term ›ethnocentrism‹ as well. It is remarkable that the identification of the ingroup of a biased philosopher with anthropological ethnic groups is generally avoided. Confessional groups, ideological affiliations, or adherence to particular schools of thought can function in the same way: cross-cultural philosophy can be considered cross-religious, cross-ideological, and cross-disciplinary as well. Following Jürgen Habermas and Franz Wimmer (Habermas 1996; Wimmer 2004),[13] we can terminologically speak of a ›centrism‹ without the ›ethno-‹ prefix. The variety of ingroup categories doesn't, however, make them irrelevant for study. Identification of one's own centrism, of overestimated values or unavoidable premises, remains very important for the thinker. It is actually one of the first steps with which a person attempting cross-cultural philosophy has to contend.

In this article, I will divert a bit from the usual cross-cultural discourse, and take a very traditional definition of an ingroup: nations. Nations have always had a specific role in discussions about

ethnocentrism. The work that coined the term has already used nations as main examples of institutionalizing and promoting this syndrome. Sumner uses the term while retaining all of its ambiguity – namely the blurry borders between the definition of the anthropologist's ethnic group and the historian's country or faction, but also between the institutionalized, sovereign nation and an externally defined ethnic category. These ambiguities persisted until today, although many studies have managed to make the definition of a ›nation‹ and ›nationalism‹ clearer (e.g., Hutchinson, and Smith 1994; Eriksen 2010).[14]

In keeping with the impetus of cross-cultural philosophy, my focus will be on the high variety of *specific* national ideologies, effective either within a single country or in a trans-national region. These particular ideologies are usually reflected in the literature of the national ›canon,‹ embedded in national educational systems, in the scope of the local academic community of historians, and also in political rhetoric. I will thus present three works of historians which critically review the construction of the specific national ideology of Slovakia. These are: Alexander Maxwell's book *Choosing Slovakia* (2009), Tetsuya Nakazawa's article ›Slovak Nation as a Corporate Body‹ (2007) and Miroslav Hroch's book *Národy nejsou dílem náhody* (›Nations Aren't the Work of Chance‹) (2009).[15] All of them are ›foreign‹ to ›Slovak academia‹: one piece comes from New Zealand, the second from Japan, and the third is from a Czech writer. They all show ambitions to formulate methods for researching the concept of nation, its emergence, and its propagation universally. They propose the idea that the specific historical traditions tend to focus on the existing (or realized) nations instead of the causes behind the development. This bias towards the present is a kind of ›centrism‹ too. Maxwell, Nakazawa and Hroch consider these national historical narratives to be the source of bias, not the cultural centres of nations.

[9] E. Said, *Orientalism*, London: Penguin, 1978.

[10] C. Geertz, ›The Uses of Diversity,‹ Lecture at the University of Michigan, 8.11.1985, (transcript available at: http://tannerlectures.utah.edu, last retrieved on 25.5.2014); R. Rorty, »On Ethnocentrism,« in: R. Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991, pp. 203–2010.

[11] J. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, G. Chakravorty Spivak (trans.), Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997 [corrected edition].

[12] F. Dallmayr, ›Beyond Monologue: For a Comparative Political Theory,‹ *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2004, pp. 249–257.

[13] J. Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, Band 1, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982; F. M. Wimmer, *Interkulturelle Philosophie*, Wien: Facultas, 2004.

[14] J. Hutchinson, and A. D. Smith (eds.), *Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994; T. H. Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*, London: Pluto Press, 2010 [third edition].

[15] A. Maxwell, *Choosing Slovakia: Slavic Hungary, the Czechoslovak Language and Accidental Nationalism*, New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2009; T. Nakazawa, »Slovak Nation as a Corporate Body,« in: T. Hayashi (ed.), *Regions in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present*, Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007; M. Hroch, *Národy nejsou dílem náhody: Příčiny a předpoklady utváření moderních evropských národů*, Prague: Slon, 2009.

Similar to cross-cultural philosophers, these works attempt to ›decenter‹ the approach to the historical phenomenon of nationality. Where the philosophers propose cross-cultural or comparative paradigms instead of universalist claims of European or Socratic tradition, we can propose a similar variety of theories of social order apart from the ›theory of nations.‹ The works described here show and compare alternative political concepts and social mechanisms at work during various revolutionary periods in a nation's history before they were suppressed and replaced by a local application of the general ideology of nationalism. All of them focus on Slovakia as one such case in point.

II   Decentering the Historical Phenomenon of Nationality

Alexander Maxwell – Choosing Slovakia

Maxwell is a senior lecturer of history at the University of Wellington, New Zealand. He has gained his Master's degree at the CEU in Budapest and the PhD at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His main research interest is the culture and politics of the late Habsburg Empire and its successor states, primarily the phenomenon of ›national revivals‹ of this period. He directs an ›Antipodean East Europe Study Group,‹ which focuses on these themes as well. *Choosing Slovakia* is his second book publication: the first was a translation of Ján Kollár's work *Reciprocity Between the Tribes and Dialects of the Slavic Languages* (2008).[16] He has also edited two volumes of studies, the first one concerning symbolic geography (2010), and another one looking at the influence of Miroslav Hroch on studies of nationalism (2011).[17]

The full title of the book in question is *Choosing Slovakia: The Slavic Hungary, the Czechoslovak Language and Accidental Nationalism*. This title reflects the author's attempt to divide the early Slovak national movement into three historical movements. Depending

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[16] J. Kollár, *Reciprocity between the Tribes and Dialects of the Slavic Language*, A. Maxwell (trans.), Bloomington: Slavica Press, 2008.
[17] A. Maxwell (ed.), *The East-West Discourse: Symbolic Geography and its Consequences*, Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010; *The Comparative Approach to National Movements: Miroslav Hroch and Nationalism Studies*, London: Routledge, 2011.

on the prevalent ideology, these movements can be seen also as periodization, culminating in ›Slovak particularist nationalism‹ in Czechoslovakia. In the first period, described in the first four chapters, the Slovak movement is seen as attempts of a certain group of thinkers, writers and political activists in 1840s, mostly Lutheran Protestants, to emancipate the Slavs of northern Hungary from the Magyar-speaking population. A critical turning point in this conflict was the revolution of March 1848. Here, the main Slovak politician Ľudovít (in contemporary writing used by Maxwell: Ľudevít Štúr) withdrew his support for the revolutionary movement after the Hungarian Diet refused to acknowledge Slavic as one of the languages of administration and education.

Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the second political model, namely that of solidarity between Slavs (*All-Slavism*, in Maxwell's terminology), or more particularly between Czechs and Slovaks. This model was popular among intellectuals of both emerging nations, because of the mutual intelligibility of their dialects, historical parallels regarding their unity (ninth century principality of Great Moravia), and even a common literary language (*bibličtina*, from seventeenth century translation of Bible based on the Moravian dialect of Kralice). Unlike Štúr's pre-revolutionary movement, this movement demanded much broader political emancipation, based either in the Bohemian kingdom or a separate Slavic republic. It started somewhat earlier with Ján Kollár, who had published his major work on All-Slavic reciprocity in 1836. His thoughts gained prominence especially in Prague, endured the opposition of Štúr, and finally managed to reach their goals with the founding Czechoslovakia after World War I.

The Czechoslovak movement is central to the third part of his book. The last three chapters deal with the reasons why the solidarity did not ultimately survive: both in 1939, when Slovak politicians declared independence under the threat of Nazi occupation, as well as in 1993, when the federation was dissolved in the wake of nationalism throughout post-Communist Europe. Maxwell's explanation is a cultural one. Because of different education systems in both parts of the Czechoslovak Republic, the generation born in 1910s and 1920s had already acquired distinct identities. Solidarity between Czechs and Slovaks was undermined by the very attempt to preserve the cultural distinction; it was reduced to a mere political alliance. The cultural base for this distinction, however, could be found already earlier: in

Štúr's theory of a specific Slovak ›tribe‹ and ›dialect,‹ in the successful spread of the modern standard Slovak created by Martin Hattala, and also in the Catholic populist movement of Andrej Hlinka. However, the education system of the First Republic, ironically despite its attempts, primarily helped the ›Slovak particularist nationalism‹ to become a political power.

Maxwell tries to answer the primary question ›how and why the Slovak nation came to be‹ (Maxwell 2009: 1) by using a method similar to the one used by Eugen Weber in his book *Peasants into Frenchmen* (Weber 1976)[18] and Miroslav Hroch's *Social Preconditions of National Revivals in Europe* (Hroch 1985),[19] namely by showing the cultural centers and channels of influence of national ideology on the broader masses of population. His view, on the other hand, also points out that there were multiple models of Slovak nationality at work, while only one of them succeeded in the long run. As these models contrasted each other, Maxwell considers the failure of different revivals to be a crucial factor for the explanation of his primary question, a factor avoided in studies of Weber and Hroch. The development was discontinuous: its »historical actors selectively appropriated, reinterpreted, or discarded preexisting heritages in light of political goals« (Maxwell 2009: 3). These reinterpretations are presented most vividly in the case of Hlinka and his party, through their newspaper *Slovák*. This newspaper, for example, had an important rule in denying the relevance of Protestant literature to Slovak literary history (*ibid*.: 178).

The ironical conclusion (*ibid*.: 7) that the attempts of Czechoslovakia to promote the idea of a bilingual nation actually led to the destruction of the »possibility of a single Czechoslovak nation« (*ibid*.: 181) is not thoroughly argued. In the last chapter, Maxwell describes the convergence of both orthographies, culminating in the unsuccessful reform of 1931, which was bashed as propaganda by circles within Hlinka's party and also multiple different political and non-governmental activists (*ibid*.: 179). During this time, loyalty to language seemed to be at work across society: socialist writers united with Catholic populists against the reform.

However, Maxwell argues that the opposition grew from the fact, that by mastering one or the other orthography, one could be thus qualified for jobs only in one half of the country. He illustrates it with a case from 1937 where some students in Bratislava protested against the use of the Czech language at their school. This is, in my opinion, an unnecessary tangent, as the anti-Czech propaganda was already strong enough in the 1920s. Hlinka's Populist Party was without doubt the most influental political power in Slovakia: it gained more than half a million votes in 1925[20] and entered the government in 1927. Imprisonment of Hlinka's right-hand Vojtech Tuka for espionage in 1929 also helped to radicalize the particularist movement somewhat.

One could argue about the conclusions Maxwell draws from his analysis, but the idea of a national history as a string of group-defining contingencies is quite interesting in the face of the narrative of ›national revival.‹ This narrative replaces the cause behind a development with its result – the ›choice‹ of national loyalty is predetermined by the needs of the community. Maxwell presents himself in fact as a radical constructivist with his Bourdieuan ›dialect argument‹: it was the convergent identification of a dialect group, a region, a political force, and carefully chosen (and in the course of action appropriated, reinterpreted or discarded) historical symbols, which led to the creation of the Slovak nation. To understand these choices, however, one has to avoid the bias of the present situation and dominant narratives of national history, and speculate on possible scenarios as to what could have been, were the choices different.

Tatsuya Nakazawa – Slovak Nation as a Corporate Body

Nakazawa's article forms the ninth chapter of the volume *Regions in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present*, edited by Tadayuki Hayashi and published in 2007 by the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center at Hokkaido University in Sapporo. As the title shows, the volume itself has a very broad scope: the geopolitical meaning of the Central-European region, contrasts between the West and the East, and finally regional concepts and identities have all their respective parts. The

18 E. Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976.
19 M. Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*, B. Fowkes (trans.), New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1985.

20 The second strongest Agrarian Party gained merely 248 thousand votes in the Slovak regions (http://csugeo.i-server.cz/csu/2006edicniplan.nsf/t/220060E38B/$File /4219rr11.pdf, last accessed on 20 November 2014).

historical and regional definition of the volume's scope is also some-what unclear: the first article by Hayashi broadly identifies it with the »zone of small nations,« defined by Masaryk[21] and others (Hayashi 2007: 5).[22]

Tatsuya Nakazawa obtained his PhD in European History from Waseda University. Since 2005 he has worked as an associate professor at the University of Fukui. He also lectured at Comenius University in Bratislava. His focus is on studies of the Habsburg monarchy, especially its legal traditions. Nakazawa has also published articles on coronation rituals in Hungary (2012) and on early Hungarian Jacobinism (2013). His *Slovak Nation as a Corporate Body: The Process of the Conceptual Transformation of a ›Nation without History‹ into a Constitutional Subject during the Revolutions of 1848/49* resulted from a paper presented at two conferences in Fukui.

It might be asked why a review of a whole book is followed by a review of a single article. On the one hand, Nakazawa's article can be said to supplement Maxwell's book. The article presents a phenomenon which shows the contingent character of nation-building, the dynamical development of an ideology controlled by only a limited group of ›representatives‹ of the nation. On the other hand, the article also provides an alternative explanation to the problem, without the danger of copying the ›revival‹ narrative. While Maxwell's book sees the nation as a new creation, this article traces the tools, rhetorical tropes, and legal practices used not only by the national activists, but also by their opponents. In this case ›national revival‹ is presented as a part of the local legal, and political scene.

Nakazawa begins the article with a description of the key concepts and documents of the constitutional system of the Kingdom of Hungary, focusing on the idea of ›corporate rights.‹ To describe the etymology of this term, he enumerates the legal documents from the Golden Bull of 1222 onward (Law of Seigniorial Rights of 1351, Law of 1435, Tripartitum Law of 1514). These documents show a general tendency to empower the nobility, conceived as a ›body of the realm‹ *(corpus regni)*. Nobility was represented with its Diet, which since the fifteenth century included the king, who was elected by the assembly.

The Diet thus became the main bearer of state sovereignty, with nobility as its ›limbs‹ and the king as its ›head.‹ The *natio Hungarica* was a term for the class of population (one of its *gentes*, ›communities‹) with political privileges to be represented in the Diet. As the nobility was seen as an ›organic‹ part of the realm, these privileges are interpreted here as ›corporate rights.‹ It is a pity that the author fails to demonstrate how these privileges were extended to free royal cities and other communities, like the specific *gentes* included, for example those in the aforementioned Treaty of Szatmar (1711).

In the next sections, Nakazawa examines the activities of Ľudovít Štúr during his time as a member of the Diet and afterwards, describing these activities in three periods. The first phase stretches from his election as a representative of the royal city of Zvolen in October 1847 to March 1848, when he abdicated his mandate. During his mandate he proposed an extension of privileges held by the *natio* to a broader mass – first to smaller, non-royal towns (were the Slovak language was more common), and from December 1847 to the peasants even. Thus he tried, Nakazawa concludes, to redefine the *natio* from a class concept into a nation-state composed of multiple, ethnically defined *gentes*. Štúr believed that a privilege should have been transformed into a civil right. This was in an opposition to the view of the majority backing Lajos Kossuth. This majority would have liked to see their privileges transformed into civil rights too, but also considered their ideal *natio Hungarica* to be an ethnically homogenous (Magyar) group. In Kossuth's view, the extension of rights should follow a ›magyarisation‹ of the population. Thus Štúr's proposals were rejected.

In the second period, Štúr acted mostly through his own assembly of Slovak intellectuals. In their petition from May 1848 he identified the ethnic groups as ›limbs‹ of the nation, the same formulation we have seen in the description of the ›body of the realm.‹ He declared patriotic loyalty to Hungary as a political nation, while demanding natural rights for Slovaks as one of its traditional *gentes*. The revolutionary government reacted with a warrant for his arrest, so he left for Prague, where a Pan-Slavic congress was held in June of that year. There he proposed the idea of ›United Independent Slavic Communities‹ as a direct subject of the Austrian Empire. In this way, the Slavs (with Slovaks forming one community under the UISC), being ethnically defined, should have received a similar position to that of previously feudally defined Crown realms of the Empire. This position,

[21] T. G. Masaryk, *Světová Revoluce*, Prague: Čin a Orbis, 1924.
[22] T. Hayashi, »Masarykí's ›Zone of Small Nations‹ in His Discourse during World War I,« in T. Hayashi (ed.), *Regions in Central and Eastern Europe: Past and Present*, Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007, pp. 3–20.

however, put him into a conflict with the parties representing those peoples, which claimed certain privileges in the realm: primarily the Czechs and Croats. The Czech representative Šmíd, for example, preferred an approach to national revolution similar to that of the Kossuth's party in Hungary, by identifying a traditional Crown (Bohemia) with the ethnic (Czech) majority.

Thus in the third period, beginning after the June Congress of 1848, Štúr began to call for an independent Slovakia as a specific community: first as a county (e. g., as a *Pannonia Superior*), later as a grand principality with the name Slovakia *(Slovensko)*. His loyalty was totally in support of Vienna then. Štúr even organized a voluntary armed force of students in support of the imperial counter-revolutionary forces. In March 1849 he submitted a plan to establish the principality to the Emperor, who, after some glimpses of hope, rejected it after the Hungarian revolution was defeated. These attempts show, however, a reluctance still to define the nation within new, ethnic-territorial borders. Nakazawa concludes that in all of these concepts Štúr used traditional legal categories as a base. Instead of presenting Slovaks as a revolutionary, new nation ›without history,‹ he always returned to natural rights granted by the Crown and similar precedents.

While it has to be admitted that Štúr was not the only leader of the Slovak movement, he was surely the most influental – and the most respected – during the Hungarian revolution. An interesting fact is that Štúr never invoked Great Moravia as a predecessor of the Slovak nation during his political career, although he often did so in his earlier works. The reason for this was his adherence to the Hungarian, and, according to Nakazawa, to the general East-Central European political tradition as well. This tradition is based on continuity: in case of Hungary, this could be traced to the establishment of elective monarchy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. This work shows an interesting reinrepretation of the national movements. The call for national emancipation is presented not as a redefinition of citizenship and equality, but rather as an extension of the noble privileges to state-constituting nations – one nation in case of Kossuthian Hungary, two in Czechoslovakia. Although the state-constituting nation is a quite broad mass of population, it should be noted it still can (and historically does) behave as a dominant class.

Miroslav Hroch – Národy nejsou dílem náhody

The last text of this review is a work from one of the most influental Czech historians of the last century, Miroslav Hroch. A professor at Charles University of Prague, Hroch is known for his extensive work comparing national movements, especially in ›smaller nations‹ (Hroch 1971).[23] Already known at that time in Germany, these studies became available to English-speaking academia in 1985, when he published *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe.* As a professor with international renown, he held lectures at many universities around the world. Besides his most influental works, he also wrote several studies on historical subjects ranging from the High Middle Ages to the present. He is also the author of many didactic texts and popular works on history.

The Czech version of *Národy nejsou dílem náhody* was published in 2009 by Slon, a sociological publishing house in Prague. The book is an answer to a request from the Center for Comparative History at the Free University of Berlin. This institute requested a major work that could offer a good analysis on the matter. On the one hand, this book can be seen as an update of the theme presented in *Social Preconditions*, considering that the work became a standard for discourse on nationalism, or rather national movements in general. On the other hand, this work was a conclusion of the author's own long-running studies and an opportunity to declare some of his own opinions on the controversial themes pertaining to the study of nations. Unlike *Social Preconditions*, which mostly analyzed ›smaller nations,‹ *Národy* gives a considerable attention to larger ›state nations‹ as well.

The work is divided into three parts. The first portion (pages 13–60) provides an extensive outline of the study of nations and nationalism from the nineteenth century until today. Two aspects merit the special attention of the author. One is the typology of nations: a modern European nation, as the author rightly stresses (Hroch 2009: 48). Here, he adopts a three-fold definition from Theodor Schieder, recognizing ›state nations‹ (státní národy) as emerging within already existing countries by means of internal revolution (e. g., France); unify-

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[23] M. Hroch, *Obrození malých evropských národů*, Prague: Univerzita Karlova, 1971.

ing nations formed by an integration of states with a population with similar cultures and languages (e. g., Germany); and separatist nations, which emerge within multiethnic empires. The second aspect is connected with the book's title: Hroch rejects the radical constructivist position, considering national movements, especially in Eastern Europe, to be a deviation from the course of inter-class emancipation and the effects of destructive nationalism.

In the next part (pages 61–130), the author follows out his point that reducing a national movement to a mere effect of nationalism is an oversimplification. No study of nationhood can omit the specific workings of historical consciousness, language, modernization, clashes of social interests, and emotional aspects of identity (*ibid*.: 44). Three of these aspects – history, ethnic (linguistic) heterogeneity, and modernization – form the second part of the book, presenting the objective ›preconditions‹ for the national revival. Under the broad term ›modernization,‹ Hroch understands processes of administrative centralization, industrial development, intensification of social communication, spread of mass education, and even democratization of politics. While linguistic differences act as a precondition for the emergence of new national movements well into the twentieth century, the other aspects combined themselves in various forms. For example, industrialization preceded the mass movement which led the Czech national revival. This is taken to be an example of an ›integrative movement.‹ However, in the Irish case, we have a ›rebel movement,‹ where industrial revolution only followed the declaration of independence (*ibid*.: 124).

The longest and final part focuses on historical instances of national movements, seen as agents of revival. Hroch analyzes their social background, the existing clashes of social interest, the use of historical narrative, and the tensions caused by modernization. The preconditions from the second part sometimes seem to affect the development of national movements as ›needs,‹ for example in case of administration, where a language had to be chosen for schools. The classifications from the previous part, however, still shows that a single, reductive model for a national movement cannot be formulated. This holds true even for ›nationalism,‹ as far as it doesn't mean the ethnocentrism in the specific psychological sense (*ibid*.: 133). As Hroch concludes, the preconditions for a national movement include psychological, social, and historical aspects as well, and neither of them suffices to produce a successful national movement on its own.

Hroch's study is one of the most complex works in the field of national studies. It provides an overview (or at least a glimpse) of many national movements in Europe, and one which found success or at least wide recognition from the scholar community. The author openly confesses that he omitted the details of the Russian and Jewish national movements due to their complexity, although at least the Russian case is described in many instances, e.g., when comparing its relations to Finnish, Latvian, and other movements.

The text is relevant for us as an example of an attempt at a ›decentered‹ view. One important aspect is his own terminology: e.g., ›modernization‹ has a broad meaning, but it is in no case a non-critically accepted positive ideal of development. Its role as the motive force of nationalism is also questioned. We can see that the Czech movement worked as a model for Hroch: industrial capital in German hands came into economic conflict with Czech workshops in Bohemia (*ibid*.: 165); but still it is instantly contrasted with the cases where socio-economic tensions were not relevant for national agitation at all, as in the Polish and Hungarian cases. Another aspect of overcoming bias is his reflection of it. Hroch constantly turns to the Czech example, but he does not take it as a model: he is aware that the national movement of his own nation is not unique and wishes to present relevant differences and analogies in the movement of other nations.

The main argument of the work is the refusal of the Hans Kohn's typology of Eastern (›ethnic‹) and Western (›civic‹) nationalism, as well as the whole ›tradition‹ of similar generalizing classifications, like Friedrich Engels' criticism of smaller Slavic nations or the newer typology of Liah Greenfeld. These critics of national movements consider them to be negative outcomes of history, because of their reactionary views (Engels) or xenophobic nature (Greenfeld). Greenfeld, as Hroch mentions, does not refer to Kohn at all; it is clear this ›tradition‹ is his construct. In fact, one can find many convincing arguments against such classifications in his earlier 1985 book; *Národy* serves rather as an update and extension.

But why did he actually need to refer to them at all? The reason is in the text: justification of the nation's existence proceeds through the construction of its history, thus providing arguments against its critics, both real, and fictive (*ibid*.: 179). By explaining the whole in rational terms, he attacks the notion that even the Czech national movement could be an irrational enterprise. Hroch provides an exten-

sive, cross-national analysis of the phenomenon usually confined to national historical discourses, and yet he remains a ›loyal‹ member of the tradition. If Maxwell's irony was hard to grasp, Hroch's autoirony is remarkable.

III   Conclusion

As we can see in the works reviewed here, the concept of a ›national revival‹ has already surpassed the context of historical narratives of particularly ›revived‹ nations. Thanks to his extensive knowledge and systematic comparison of historical cases, Hroch's influence was crucial in this regard. The concept has its explicative power, and despite its roots in a rather limited socio-cultural context, it was successfully adopted in various historical analyses throughout the world.

The concept has, of course, its shortcomings. It is still focused on the ›victors,‹ the present order of nations seen primarily as product of multiple national revolutions – no matter whether they broke down multiethnic countries or were built by integration and conquest. Hroch (a thinker ›within‹ the revivalist tradition) admits it, but he does not step over it. Thus it is hard to see the workings of the legal systems of their precedent countries, which Nakazawa (with his legalist perspective) shows, or the inner oppositions and dynamics of self-identification markers in national movements, as described by Maxwell (focusing on choice). The goals of the Slovak movement, if they can so be called, were changing not only according to the opportunity, but also according to the subjective ideals of society. These ideals were often determined by the existing legal order, even if the present historical narrative interprets the revival movement as a counter-culture.

The national context is thus a very productive phenomenon. Its needs for education, nation-branding, and a dominant historical narrative have to be fulfilled through the constant production of texts and followers of the tradition. The only danger for these followers remains in their own head: whether they will choose to ignore the writings of non-natives on their narrative as attacks on their own justifications of the nation's existence, or whether they will begin to see the work of these outsiders as contributing to a better understanding between various traditions of thought. Consciousness of one's

national context does not have to contrast with transnational integration, cross-cultural philosophy, or individual cosmopolitanism.

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