Matching Contributions and the Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: Experimental Evidence

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Date

2006-09-29

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Abstract

Laboratory experiments are used to study the voluntary provision of a pure public good in the presence of an anonymous external donor. The external funds are used in two different settings, lump-sum matching and one-to-one matching, to examine how allocations to the public good are affected. The experimental results reveal that allocations to the public good under lumpsum matching are significantly higher, and have significantly lower within-group dispersion, relative to one-to-one matching and a baseline setting without external matching funds.

Description

An updated version of this paper is available at http://www.iub.edu/~caepr/RePEc/PDF/CAEPR2006-007_updated.pdf

Keywords

CAEPR, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, public goods, free riding, laboratory experiments

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This paper is also located in SSRN and on CAEPR's website (http://www.indiana.edu/~caepr).

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Working Paper