Performance Measurement under Rational International Overpromising Regimes

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Date

2008-04-03

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Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research

Abstract

Overpromising remains ingrained in international agreements, clouding their expected aggregate outcomes and how to assess the Parties’ performance. This paper provides a theory-based explanation and evaluation of this regime and its consequences, with an empirical application to the Kyoto Protocol. It shows (1) overpromising to be part of a sustainable strategy for electoral success, and (2) there are common determinants of the countries’ overpromising values that characterize the group regime. (3) Targets need to be adjusted for regression-predicted overpromising to yield rationally-expected outcomes. (4) Individual countries’ performance is best identified by deviations of outcomes from their adjusted, not the agreed, targets.

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Keywords

CAEPR, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Overpromising, international agreements, treaty compliance, performance measurement, politics and environment, Kyoto Protocol

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Working Paper