The source and value of voting rights and related dividend promises
This paper examines the relative share pricing of 98 firms with two classes of common stock trading in the United States from 1984 to 1999. The firms feature common stock classes with differential voting rights and, in some cases, differential rights to dividends. The observed voting premiums are higher than those reported in previous studies of U.S. firms and are dependent on the form of dividend promise to the low-vote shareholder. The voting premium is higher in the presence of a control threat, when insiders do not hold controlling voting power, and during periods of poor firm performance.
Dividends, Ownership structure, Dual-class, Voting Rights
"The Source of Value of Voting Rights and Related Dividend Promises," co-authored with Steven Cox, Journal of Corporate Finance, vol 8, 2002: 337-351.*
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