Quantification, Time and Necessity
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Date
1991
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Oxford University Press
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Abstract
The fundamental assumption of a logic of actual and possible objects is that the concept of existence is not the same as the concept of being. Thus, even though necessarily whatever exists has being, it is not necessary in such a logic that whatever has being exists; that is, it can be the case that there be something that does not exist. No occult doctrine is needed to explain the distinction between existence and being, for an obvious explanation is already at hand in a framework of tense logic in which being encompasses past, present, and future objects (or even just past and present objects) while existence encompasses only those objects that presently exist. We can interpret modality in such a framework, in other words whereby it can be true to say that some things do not exist. Indeed, as indicated in Section 3, infinitely many different modal logics can be interpreted in the framework of tense logic. In this regard, we maintain, tense logic provides a paradigmatic framework in which possibilism (i.e., the view that existence is not the same as being, and that therefore there can be some things that do not exist) can be given a logically perspicuous representation.
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"Quantification, Time and Necessity," in Philosophical Applications of Free Logic, J. Karel Lambert, ed., Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1991, pp. 242-256.
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